Trajectory of Smooth Female Spaces within the Striated Masculine in Kiarostami’s Ten

 

We are led to pose the woman question to history in quite elementary forms like, “Where is she? Is there any such thing as woman?” At worst, many women wonder whether they even exist. They feel they don’t exist and wonder if there has ever been a place for them. I am speaking of woman’s place, from woman’s place, if she takes (a) place.

Hélène Cixous, “Castration or Decapitation?”

In the smooth space of Zen, the arrow does not go from one point to another but is taken up at any point, to be sent to any other point, and tends to permute with the archer and the target.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus

Through a series of examples, in her widely-acclaimed article, “Castration or Decapitation?,” Hélène Cixous seeks to demonstrate the strictures that have been imposed on womankind throughout history. At the heart of her arguments lies the demonstration of restrictions imposed on women’s mobility that bind them to a certain turf, which is labelled as both familiar and familial. Invoking the examples of the Sleeping Beauty and Little Red Riding Hood, Cixous posits how a woman’s “trajectory is (either) from bed to bed” or “from one house to another.”[2]Although one may want to situate such restrictions in the past, the truth of the matter is that women continue to strive for their total emancipation on various fronts, not the least of which is the right towards individuation and the attainment of the status of a self-knowing subject that can only be realized if women feel entitled to unhindered mobility and an unhampered scope of action. ­The late Iranian director, Abbas Kiarostami has masterfully depicted the path embarked upon by a working woman in Iran, the homeland of the director and a country known for the many restrictions it imposes on women towards that actualization of the self and its concomitant aspects of discovery of the Other. The focus of this paper will be on Kiarostami’s portrayal of the nuanced trajectory adopted by Mania Akbari, who, more or less, features herself as a seemingly ambitious and active artist. As she drives through the circuitous streets of Tehran while engaging in a number of thought-provoking dialogues with a variety of passengers, primarily women, who go on to shed light on the evolving role and place of a woman in the Iranian society, the spectator appreciates how she cleverly dodges the restrictions imposed on her as she succeeds in carving out a smooth feminine space, à la Deleuze and Guattari, in the midst of the entangling striated space, which is deemed to be masculinist, restrictive and hierarchical. In addition to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s “smooth” and “striated” spaces, other theories surrounding the indispensable role of space in self-expression including Henri Lefebvre’s triadic conceptualization of space, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm that entails the enfolded bond between the body and the outside world and Gaston Bachelard’s explication of what constitutes a home, spatially speaking, will come into play with the aim of situating the spatial dynamics of Ten–which marks the first time the auteur has turned women and their place in society into a pivotal theme—within the wider context of gender dynamics.

 

Kiarostami, skilfully portrays the unfolding of a smooth space, in the sense of its being a space that is “undirected,” “intensive rather than extensive” and “hapticrather than optical,”[3] in the midst of the striated space par excellence, that of a city. As we see throughout Ten, the female driver navigates through one of the busiest and action-ridden cities in world, during which she carves out a smooth space, which by definition, “is occupied by intensities, wind and noise, forces, and sonorous and tactile qualities”[4] in the midst of the authoritarian striated space of the city. As we see in Ten, smooth spaces, on grounds of their inherent characteristics, allow for the formation of sisterly bonds between women in the course of thought-provoking conversations that cohere around sex, heteronormative relationships, parenthood and religion, among other significant social matters (in fact, many a tabooed topic, including, abortion are also touched upon). Nicholas Balaisis is quite astute in pointing out the importance of the car in the film, as not only its primary setting, but also in terms of creating an atmosphere that inflects the conversations around driving and its corollary issues. However, despite invoking Merleau-Ponty and his concept of chiasm as the enfolded bond between our bodies and the world outside, spaces beyond the interior of the car are not the focus of argument, perhaps, for the reason that, as he posits, “in Ten, unlike A Taste of Cherry, there are no external shots of the car.”[5] That having been said, exterior spaces continuously seep into the interior space of the car, hence, the importance of analyzing certain aspects of the outside spaces, which, as shall be argued, tend to be significant for a more accurate analysis of gender dynamics.

 

One need not delve too much into the characteristics offered by Deleuze and Guattari regarding smooth spaces to conclude that in their evocation of sensory stimuli including touch and their overall intensity, they are very feminine in nature. The pan-corporeality that comes to the fore in the smooth feminine space is one that, though highly auditory, represents an “acoustic space,” which based on Marshall McLuhan’s interpretation, is one that is “boundless, directionless, horizonless, the dark of the mind, the world of emotion, primordial intuition, terror,”[6]as women in seemingly unscripted dialogues while meandering at times aimlessly through the striated city streets, feel a multiplicity of their senses and feelings enhanced. Balaisis rightfully invokes the gendered aspect of the interior space of the automobile when he highlights its significance as a space where “women are able to communicate freely and honestly.”[7] His observation of how the interiority of the car indicates the lack of such spaces in Iran is also worth pondering upon, although one could also see how the freedom or lack thereof that women feel within this space not only originates from but also carries over to beyond the car itself.

 

World renowned Swiss-French architect, Le Corbusier has described our taking up of space as the initial indication of existence (la prevue première d’existence, c’est d’occuper l’espace) which he describes as “the initial gesture of all living beings” (le geste premier des vivants);[8] yet, in order to exercise one’s basic right of freedom of speech and movement, one needs to go beyond the mere occupation of space and engage in practices that allow for an optimum use of space. Women feeling hindered even in their primary spaces, namely their homes, set about to carve out a space approximating an ideal domain for their social imaginary where they can engage in the exchange of ideas, brainstorming of alternative modes of existence and simply, an unfolding of humour or simple counter-measures in the face of the hegemonic norms prevailing outside. One could have recourse to Henri Lefebvre’s triadic conceptualization of space that boils down to space “perceived” (perçu), “conceived” (conçu) and ultimately, “lived” (vécu), “space as it might be, fully lived space”[9] to better understand the spatial dynamics that surface in the movie. It is the enactment of this “fully lived space” that one is witness to in Kiarostami’s Ten, where women of diverse class and professional backgrounds engage in dialogues with the female driver, who nudges them to reveal a bit more about themselves, their modus operandi of existence, their (philosophical) convictions and pains and miseries.

 

On a different level, that “fully lived space” is referred to as “spaces of representation,” which Christian Schmid interprets as the social field, “the field of projects and projections, of symbols and utopias, of the imaginaire and … the désir.”[10] The social imaginary, “the creative and symbolic dimension of the social world, the dimension through which human beings create their ways of living together and their ways of representing their collective life,”[11] comes to the fore in the course of the dialogues as Mania exchanges words on how women behave and ought to behave, for example, in the vignette on Roya, the heartbroken woman who is sobbing over her breakup: “We women are wretched creatures because when we are little we are clinging unto our mom, then unto our dad, then unto a certain man, then unto our child […].” The imagination, which manifests itself in the social imaginary here, is a power to contend with and, as anthropologist Arjun Appadurai has noted, is “no longer a mere fantasy, no longer simple escape, no longer simple elite pastime,” but it “has become an organized field of organized practices, a form of work (in the sense of both labour and culturally organized practice), and a form of negotiation between sites of agency (individuals) and globally defined fields of possibility.”[12] It is through this power of imagination that women are able to go beyond the confined spaces of the home to come up with new ways to carve out a niche where they can exchange ideas that will alleviate the pain of living in a patriarchal environment.

 

Gaston Bachelard’s description of a home as a place which “thrusts aside contingencies,” “without (which), man would be a dispersed being” and one that maintains one “through the storms of the heavens and through those of life,”[13] has little or no meaning in the lives of most, if not all the women depicted in Kiarostami’s Ten. This fact comes to the fore in the dialogues of Mania with her son, who reprimands her for not being at home and taking care of the household and in her dialogue with the prostitute, who highlights the discrepancies that exist between the emotional bonds between men and women within and without the home. That Mania herself appears to be constantly on the go, as pointed out by her son, Amin, whether for professional reasons or otherwise, is in and of itself an indication of the lack of security and warmth that a woman desires at home.

 

As Hélène Cixous has noted, in our patriarchal world, women should not allow themselves to venture out their homes or even beds (as we see in the classic example of The Sleeping Beauty); should not embark on the forbidden: make a little detour, travel through their own forests in the fashion of Little Red Riding Hood.[14] Similarly, what is displayed in Ten, as women travel through their so-called “own forests” created at the heart of masculinist spaces in an automobile that becomes a vehicle of (self-)investigation and knowledge/power, is quite a daring move and challenged by the so-called Symbolic Order, at the height of which lies the Name-of-the-Father that is aimed at setting down rules and regulations and putting a finale to laughter, women’s prime emblem of womanly existence that appears as a threat to the Symbolic Order as Cixous has shown us in her examples of the Medusa as well as the decapitation of laughing women in Sun Tse’s manual of strategy.[15] The smooth feminine trajectory that women are shown to embark upon, unlike the fairy-tale example of Little Red Riding Hood, is quite real as it appears to actually capture a slice of the female protagonist’s life in modern-day Tehran. Kiarostami has himself said that “I can assure you that it is all [in Ten] very true to life, and I really am giving a realistic picture of the Iranian middle-class woman as she actually is.”[16]

 

One of the distinguishing features of Ten is, in fact, its certain characteristics that align it with neo-realism, primarily, the use of non-professional actors that allow for the unfolding of reality as is. Kiarostami, has been aligned with Cesare Zavattini, who describes neorealism as the desire “to give human life its historical importance at every minute.”[17] Yet, as we have come to know, the genre in which Ten is embedded, though cleverly labelled as “observational documentary”[18] by Balaisis can be better termed as an example of a “new hybrid documentary form” in its “interplay between reality and fiction.”[19] Another layer of the film is remotely similar to other road films such as Thelma and Louise (1991) and Paris Texas (1984) in that, likewise, Mania is on the road, albeit with the major difference that unlike the many other examples of this genre, her trips are not goal-oriented and, even in a way, they seem to be a goal unto themselves. As Jack Kerouac has it in On the Road (1957), one has to be or be influenced by someone who is “tremendously excited with life,”[20] to hit the road; yet, in the case of Mania and her female passengers, more than being excited with life, what characterizes their movement is a sense of ontological fulfillment that finds an echo in what Spinoza calls conatus, “a striving to persevere in being,”[21] a mode of being that would grant them more space, both figuratively and literally. The myth of the mobile masculine hero, as classically represented, for example, in the figure of Oedipus, and the monstrous feminine Sphinx, who merely poses as an obstacle to be overcome as part of the heroic rites de passage, is thus reversed. What distinguishes Ten from other examples of road genres and the myth of the hero, even in its cinematic instantiations in Kiarostami’s own oeuvre, is that this time round women dominate the scene.

 

Joan Copjec, has rightfully, pointed out “the accusation persistently levied against [Kiarostami’s] cinema was that it was wholly indifferent to the condition of women in contemporary Iran and sought, rather, to catch the eye of Western audiences by serving up the kinds of Orientalist images they expected to see: male protagonists driving through a timeless, rural Iran dominated by the ubiquitous presence of other men, with women shunted to the margins, hidden behind doors or toiling in long shot on the fringes of vision.”[22] What comes to the fore in Ten, is a reversal of gender roles in the trajectory that is traced out in the film, as we see a woman at the wheel interacting with other women, with the exception of her son. In addition to the feminine aspects of the trajectory, one ought to refer to similar aspects of the interiority of the car, which bring about an inescapable sense of intimacy that allows for raw exchanges that lead to eye-opening confessions.[23] Many a time, we see how Mania, subtly engages in the art of extracting those truths from her passengers and along the way, so as to get to the heart of the inner recesses of their minds, their unconscious. The film is rife with such instantiations as they come to the fore in the dialogue with, for example, the prostitute, who initially, refrains from opening up, but then being nudged by Mania on multiple occasions to respond to the question of “why, she being so young, engages in the profession that she does,” she relents and takes a stance in defense of her choice in a seemingly nonchalant manner that nonetheless hints at the many repressions that have taken place within the unconscious. For example, she does confess to having at least once been in love, but then goes on to stress the dishonesty of men who tell their wives that they love them while spending time with the likes of her.

 

In addition to the mobile aspects of the trajectory, the means of the journey, an automobile, is one of significance as Kiarostami himself notes in 10 on Ten. For a fact, the car in its mobility affords hope to the women appearing in Mania’s vehicle whose destinies seem to be sealed by a socio-political system that has failed them at every turn of the road. Kiarostami says how the idea of the film came to him once he heard about a female psychiatrist whose office had been closed in the wake of a complaint by a female patient who had come to regret a decision to separate from her husband in the wake of consultations with the psychiatrist. As a result, the psychiatrist decided to turn her car into a mobile office.[24] When looking at the dynamics going on in Ten, at times, Mania serves as a psychiatrist by nudging her passengers to speak out their mind. For example, in her dialogue with the prostitute, which happens to be modeled on information that Kiarostami had garnered through telephone conversations with actual prostitutes and not on any data provided by a real prostitute as no prostitute was willing to act the role, one sees Mania using subtle tactics to extract some personal information within the context of love, sex and relationships. However, the significance of the closed space of the car is definitely worth taking into account as it, for the most part, compels the passenger to sit still and give into the process of conversation/therapy and eventually, perhaps, confession. That the primary spatial focus, unlike Taste of Cherry, is on the inside of the car rather than the outside, enhances the atmospheric intimacy between the characters and allows for the surfacing of some sort of sisterhood between the women who partake in the ride.

 

Going back to Deleuze and Guattari’s explication of smooth spaces and their characterization as haptic, which they describe as being “a better word than ‘tactile’ since it does not establish an opposition between two sense organs but rather invites the assumption that the eye itself may fulfill this nonoptical function,”[25] one can better appreciate the choice of the interior of an SUV for the conversations that constitute the basis of the movie in that they lend themselves to the emergence of such feminine and intimate spaces. Significantly, smooth spaces and their haptic characteristics have mostly been aligned with the nomadic life, which is associated with being local and not global, in the sense that “there is close vision, space is not visual, or rather the eye itself has a haptic, nonoptical function: no line separates earth from sky, which are of the same substance; there is neither horizon nor background nor perspective nor limit nor outline or form nor centre.”[26] The description of the local aspect of nomadic space characterizes it as non-hierarchical and borderless which fits in with the ambience that the moving car creates in ways that allow for stories to play out by themselves without direct directorial intervention. To better understand the differentiation of “smooth” and “striated” spaces, Deleuze and Guattari present the image of the painter’s involvement with the painting: when the artist takes a step back, s/he is developing a “striated” perspective; on the other hand, when the painter happens to be so close that s/he gets lost in the strokes, s/he is within “smooth” spaces, so to speak.[27]

 

A stanza by Rumi much cited by Kiarostami, including in 10 on Ten, which can be translated as “You are my polo ball and you ran before my mallet and I run after you although I made you run,” explains an element in the maestro’s work that comes to the fore in Ten, amongst his other films. That element is one that from a sub specie aeternitatis view can fall between free will and determinism, in that, it simultaneously manifests the enforcement of directorial dictates and the emergence of unscripted scenes as those which come to the fore in Ten. The installation of two digital cameras on the dashboard, to whose existence nonprofessional actors tend to be oblivious, in fact, allows for the emergence of a comfortable ambience that aligns itself with that of “smooth spaces,” in its characteristic element of intimacy, in that, while actors seemingly go by a certain diegetic template, they end up coming up with their own add-on scenarios further bringing home the importance of the mystic maxim of Rumi’s verse, as cited above, in the creation of Ten. Alain Bergala, in his categorization of the car device (le voiture dispositif) in his commentary on Kiarostami’s cinematic corpus, attributes its roles as “an apparatus to encounter the real” (une machine à rencontrer du reel) and “a pleasant space for a conversation between two people” (le bon espace à parler à deux) to the vehicle used in Ten. In expanding upon the former attribute, Bergala highlights the role of the car as a vehicle which enables encounters, both organized and random, and as such, Kiarostami finds himself exempt from the burden of setting up scenarios: “through the car door, at any moment, one can find a face, a body, a personage, a slice of reality come to the fore.”[28] This aleatory aspect of the film that emerges as a result of the choices made in terms of space and setting, speaks to the verse by Rumi in that it manifests the director’s predilection for setting the scene in ways that allow for that unpredictability that will in turn galvanize him into movement, bearing in mind that it was he in the first place, who set the ball into motion.

 

Going back to the other aspect brought up by Bergala with regard to the dynamics of the car in Ten, namely, that it is conducive to giving rise to tête-à-tête conversations, one can see how this aspect could be more prominent when two women were involved in dialogue. Women, more so than men, tend to view themselves as part of a gender-based collective and as a result sympathize, empathize and commiserate more easily with other women being fully conscious of the challenges that tend to beset them more so than men in a predominantly patriarchal world. American feminist scholar, Nancy Chodorow makes the following observation: “Girls come to experience themselves as less differentiated than boys, as more continuous with and related to the external object-world and as differently oriented to their inner object-world.”[29] As Susan Stanford Freedman has noted, “by ‘object’ Chodorow does not mean ‘things,’ but rather people.[30] Chodorow continues to highlight the significance of the feminine paradigm which situates itself in a collective unlike the masculinist approach: “Women’s object-world’ remains a more complex relational constellation than men’s … Masculine personality, then, comes to be defined more in terms of denial of relation and connection (and denial of femininity), whereas feminine personality comes to include a fundamental definition of self in relationship.”[31] Taking these factors into account is significant for a better appreciation of the intimate conversations that unfold in the course of Ten, some of which, as mentioned earlier, segue into confessions that enfold the very essence of womanhood. Perhaps, one of the most memorable of these conversations is the one that takes place towards the end between Mania and a heartbroken and disillusioned Katayoun who has taken to prayers in her lovelorn state, a move which she had not found herself previously capable of. Significantly, the fact that she has shorn herself of her hair, in a country whose most visible emblem of religiosity is the enforced donning of hijab by women, intimates a new beginning to a self that is attempting to recover from the ashes of a lost love. Phoenix-like she may not be; however, doffing the headscarf to expose a shaven head in a country like Iran is indicative of a form of resistance that may lead her towards a new path that entails more self-reliance and self-discovery.

 

One of the primary results of becoming aware of one’s self and consciousness is the emergence of an independent subject in the modern world. Most of the women depicted in Ten (with the exception of the older religious lady) are on the path towards attaining the status associated with a self-knowing subject which is one of the hallmarks of modernity.[32] However, in order for that conscious subject to emerge, certain factors have to be in place including a safe space through which the subject can explore the self and her surroundings and, as famously noted by Virginia Woolf, “a room of one’s own,” which denotes a space where the subject can sit still and contemplate on the self and its inner transformations. The dialogues that play out in the course of Ten during the meanderings of the self-seeking and inquisitive protagonist of the film, hint at a collective engagement in the act of self-knowledge, which, as Teresa de Lauretis brings to the fore in her arguments on the ramifications of the Oedipus myth, is at the heart of each heroic myth. That quest, as noted by de Lauretis, includes hurdle(s) that not only mark spatial boundaries, but also lead to questions that target the ontological essence of (wo)man.[33] While, as already discussed in the paper, the nature of the spaces which the women carve out in the course of their navigations across the congested streets of Tehran, comes close to Deleuze and Guattari’s description of “smooth spaces,” these spaces exist in tandem with other spaces, described as “striated” that pose as literal or figurative bumps on the path of the women in the film. Examples surface in the course of the journey such as the first vignette with Katayoun in which Mania picks her up from the Ali Akbari Mausoleum and is confronted by a male driver who is blocking her way and goes on to falsely accuse her of driving in the wrong direction. While the city in and of itself is an example of a “striated space” par excellence with its too many institutions and embedded regulations; yet, these so-called nomadic women, though destitute of the proverbial “room of one’s own,” are shown to take matters into their hands by breezing through one of the most populated cities in the world to gain a measure of freedom and agency towards self-realization.

 

This nomadic aspect of the women, which also happens to accord with the characteristics of “smooth spaces,” gives them not only a certain level of scope in the construction of a social imaginary of sisterhood, but also allows for the emergence of a circular space that is feminine in nature and contrasts with masculine, linear, logocentric goal-oriented movements. Deleuze and Guattari posit that “the nomads have no history; they only have a geography”[34] and  then go on to suggest how the nomads can gain the upper hand through capturing the “force of the hunted animal” so to speak, meaning that the nomads, instead of acting like the hunter whose “aim was to arrest the movement of wild animality through systematic slaughter, […] [set about] conserving it, and, by means of training, the rider joins with this movement, orienting it and provoking its acceleration.”[35] The women are engaged in becoming, which, as maintained by Deleuze and Guattari, “has no term, since its term in turn exists only as taken up in another becoming of which it is the subject, and which coexists, forms a block, with the first.”[36] As a result, they are full of a dynamism that allows them to defamiliarize the familiar and thus look at their surroundings and themselves through nuanced perspectives. The nomadic women depicted in Ten, far from reversing the hunter-hunted vector in the battle of the sexes, go beyond paradigms of war and hunting with the aim of harnessing the power of masculinity so as to re-orient it in ways that will lead to a partial reclamation of their rights, a reterritorialization of their spaces. Never do we see these women attempting to arrest the masculinist forces in place as we observe how they harness patriarchal forces as they weave their way through the smooth grooves existing in the heavily striated phallocentric texture of society. One need only observe Mania’s attitude towards her husband and son and her cleverly navigations across the striated space par excellence: the polis (in this case, Tehran), to appreciate examples of such a nomadic approach. Creatures of cartography they are without looking behind or ahead in tandem with the nomadic characteristics that they embody and they move within their terrain with no specific goal other than becoming in sight. The perspective that they incarnate resonates well with that of a number of Kiarostami’s early works including Bread and Alley (1970) and Two Solutions for One Problem (1975) which showcase the contingencies that accompany a goal-oriented trajectory, in its lack of a specific goal or destination and allows for the surfacing of aleatory elements that are part and parcel of human existence. This simultaneously serpentine and serendipitous characteristic of the spaces accords with the film’s form in its use of two DV cameras on the dashboard which come close to eliminating directorial mediation.

 

Film scholar, Ohad Landesman has made a series of interesting comments on the “unclassifiable hybrid”[37] aspect embodied in Ten that comes to the fore as a result of the use of DV cameras rendering it an artistic example of a cinematic oeuvre which lies along the interface of the factual and the fictional and he also highlights the democratization that is realized in the process. Nonetheless, I am not quite sure if one could classify the ambience that surfaces in the car as “voyeuristic,”[38] as the connotations associated with that term tend to more often than not sexual. Elsewhere, Landesman characterizes the interior space of the car as “claustrophobic,”[39] which may not quite be the case in that most spectators take into account the surrounding urban spaces in their viewing of the film. The striated aspects of the metropolis make themselves palpable through the occasional honking and, as already mentioned, the masculinist voice that, in seeing a woman at the wheel, wants to assert itself in accusing the woman of not driving the proper way; yet, overall, aside from the punctuated presence of those spaces within the interiority of the car, the spectator becomes privy to a series of preoccupations on the minds of these women ranging from their desire for that ever-elusive matrimonial bliss to their will to resolving their miseries through perpetual prayers. There is an allure and appeal in the act of discovery that the spectator partakes in alongside Mania; however, I am not quite sure if that aspect per se could be qualified as “voyeuristic,” unless one were to assume a very diluted connotation of this simultaneously cinematically and sexually charged term.

 

As much as one were to commend the agency that the women depicted in Ten have garnered, it would be a far stretch to attribute to them the possibility of the blossoming of a fully self-knowing and empowered subject for a variety of reasons. It is true that these women have moved beyond the “bed to bed” and “one house to another” trajectory that Cixous has bemoaned and have expanded their scope of action beyond that of Phyllis Wheatley, who, according to Alice Walker, was “a slave who owned not even herself;”[40] however, they have yet to move to that level of personhood that renders them free to roam around outside confined spaces and that of someone who has a home and not merely a house to go to. These women are on their way to enacting their rights to exercise their social imaginary in a fully-lived (vécu) space and seem to be getting close to creating a niche that will go beyond smooth spaces towards the formation of an actual safe and sound space that can be called home. What transpires in the course of Ten, is a feminist attempt at the recognition of the self and Other in a discursive on-the-go space that embraces a multiplicity of discourses including the right for self-expression, the freedom of movement, the right to dress as one wishes and ultimately, the right to move in the direction of individuation without feeling hampered by obstacles embedded in a predominantly masculinist attitude that for centuries have come to view women as the realm of the propre (both as an object of ownership and a subject that has maintain cleanliness and  rectitude).[41] Going back to the citation from Cixous which appears at the very beginning of the paper, the women that appear in Ten are fully conscious of their existence to the point that they are assiduously engaged in their ontological fulfillment and realization; yet, their quest seems to be for a niche where they can exercise their rights without having to fear the patriarchal forces outside. These women, unlike the women whom Cixous is referring to, are aware that they, indeed, have a place and what we see unfold in the course of the movie is their proactive attempts at creating smooth spaces that will, ultimately, peacefully co-exist with exterior striated spaces in ways that will, in the end, lead towards an oasis which they can almost call home.

 

 

[1] Pouneh Saeedi is a sessional lecturer at the University of Toronto where she has been teaching Gender and Media Studies for a number of years. Amongst her previous publications mention can be made of “Female Figurations in Kiarostami’s The Wind Will Carry Us (Canadian Journal of Film Studies, 2013) and “Women as Epic Sites/Sights and Traces in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness” (Women’s Studies, 2015). A shorter version of her current paper was presented at the Canadian Humanities Congress held at the University of Victoria in 2013.

 

[2]See Hélène Cixous, “Castration or Decapitation?,” Signs 7, no. 1 (1981): 43.

 

[3]Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 479.

[4]Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 479.

[5]Nichalos Balaisis, “Driving Affect: The Car and Kiarostami’s Ten,” Public: Art, Culture, Ideas (2005): 72,

public.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/public/article/view/30063/27626.

 

[6]Marshall McLuhan, “Five Sovereign Fingers Taxed the Breath,” eds. Edmund Carpenter and Marshall McLuhan, in Explorations in Communication: An Anthology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), 207.

[7]Balaisis, “Driving Affect,” 74.

[8]Le Corbusier, “L’espace Indicible,” Le Corbusier, Savina, Dessins et Sculptures, éd. Sers (Paris, 1984), 1.

 

[9]Rob Shields, Lefebvre, Love and Struggle: Spatial Dialectics (London: Routledge, 1996), 160.

[10]Christian Schmid, Stadt, Raum und Gesellschaft: Henri Lefebvre und die Theorie der Production des Raumes (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2005), 205.

[11]John B. Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology (Cambridge: Polity, 1984), 6.

 

[12]Arjun Appadurai, Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 31.

[13]Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 7.

 

[14]Cixous, “Castration or Decapitation?”, 44.

[15]Cixous, “Castration or Decapitation?”, 42; Cixous, “Laugh of the Medusa,” Signs (1976): 885.

[16]See Alberto Elena, The Cinema of Abbas Kiarostami, trans. Belinda Coombes (London: Saqi in association with Iranian Heritage Foundation, 2005), 176.

[17]See Craig Fisher, “Comics and Film,” in The Routledge Companion to Comics, eds. Frank Bramlett, Roy T. Cook, Aaron Meskin (New York: Routledge, 2017), 344.

[18]Balaisis, “Driving Affect,” 72.

[19]Ohad Landesman, “In and Out of this World: Digital Video and the Aesthetics of Realism in the New Hybrid Documentary,” Studies in Documentary Film 2, Issue 1 (2008): 33.

[20]Jack Kerouac, On the Road (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 4.

[21]Steven Nadler, “Baruch Spinoza,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Calif:  Stanford University, 2016) ,plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/spinoza/.

 

[22]Joan Copjec, “Cinema as Thought Experiment: On Movement and Movements,” Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies27, no. 1 (2016): 150.

[23]Michel Foucault makes a distinction between ars erotica and ars sexualis.  He situates the former in the East and the latter in the West. Foucault distinguishes the former in being esoteric and operating on the basis of “knowledge that must remain secret” and the latter, he aligns with “procedures for telling the truth of sex which are geared to a form of knowledge-power strictly opposed to the art of initiations and the masterful secret: I have in mind the confession.” However, what we observe being played out in terms of the confessions that come to the fore in Ten seems to be more in tune with the ars sexualis in terms of confessions serving as a means to the unfolding of the truth as is, particularly, evident in the dialogue between Mania and the prostitute and not so much the ars erotica that was dominant in the East in ancient times. See: Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 57–58.

[24]Abbas Kiarostami, 10 on Ten, DVD, directed by Abbas Kiarostami (2004; New York: MK2/Zeitgeist Films).

 

[25]Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 492.

[26]Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 494.

[27]Here, Deleuze and Guattari cite Cézanne as an example who spoke of “the need to no longer see the wheat field, to be too close to it, to lose oneself without landmarks in smooth space.” Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 493.

[28]Alain Bergala, Abbas Kiarostami (Paris: Cahiers du cinema: SCÉRÉN-CNDP, 2004), 77.

 

[29]Nancy Chodorow, Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 167.

[30]Susan Stanford Friedman, “Women’s Autobiographical Selves,” in The Private Self: Theory and Practice of Women’s Autobiographical Writings, ed. Shari Benstock (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 41.

[31]Chodorow, Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender, 169.

 

[32]See Marita Sturken and Lisa Cartwright, Practices of Looking: An Introduction to Visual Culture (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 94–95.

[33]As noted by De Lauretis, female spectators mostly see themselves aligned with “the mythical obstacle, monster or landscape,” thereby rendering it difficult for them to entertain themselves as subjects. Kiarostami has therefore applied an interesting narratological twist here in granting women agency against hurdles that could be interpreted more so in light of the masculine than the feminine. See De Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 141.

[34]Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 393.

[35]Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 396.

[36]Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 238.

[37]Landesman, “In and Out of this World,” 38.

[38]Landesman, “In and Out of this World,” 38.

[39]Landesman, “In and Out of this World,” 36.

[40]Alice Walker, “In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens,” in Worlds of Difference: Inequality in the Aging Experience, eds. Eleanor Palo Stoller and Rose Campbell Gibson (Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press, 2000), 50.

[41]As Betsy Wing says: “Since woman must care for bodily needs and instill the cultural values of cleanliness and propriety, she is deeply involved in what is proper, yet she is always somewhat suspect, never quite propre herself.” See Betsy Wing, “Glossary,” in The Newly Born Woman by Hélène Cixous and Catherine Clément, trans. Betsy Wing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 167.

Shafiei-Kadkani between Poetry and Prose

 

از زمانی که عبدالحسین زرین‌کوب جایگاه شفیعی کدکنی را در ادبیات فارسی نشان داد زمان درازی می‌گذرد. با وجود این، امروز که می‌خواهیم از این مقوله سخن به میان آوریم، باز همان تصویر پیش روی ما نقش می‌بندد. زرین‌کوب در مطلب کوتاهی که برای سفرنامۀ باران: نقد و تحلیل اشعار دکتر محمدرضا شفیعی کدکنی نوشته است می‌گوید: ”حق آن است که کمتر دیده‌ام محققی راستین در شعر و شاعری هم پایه‌ای عالی احراز کند و خرسندم که این استثنا را در وجود آن دوست عزیز کشف کردم.“[1] مفهوم دیگر این گفته آن است که پیدا کردن شخصیت دیگری در این جایگاه در فرهنگ‌های فارسی‌زبان در عصر حاضر ناممکن است. بنابراین، چنان‌چه بخواهیم فرد دیگری از نوع خودش را در کنارش جا دهیم لازم می‌آید از مرزهای فارسی‌زبان پا فراتر گذاریم. در این خیزش فرافرهنگی است که به دیدۀ من به شخص مورد نظر برمی‌خوریم و این فرد جز تی. اس. الیوت، شاعر و منتقد انگلیسی‌زبان، کس دیگری نیست. تی. اس. الیوت نیز مانند دکتر شفیعی ‌کدکنی نخبه‌ای است ممتاز که هم‌زمان در شعر و نقد نقش پیشتاز را ایفا کرده، با این تفاوت که الیوت در مقام بنیادگذار مدرنیسم ادبی در شعر غرب از موقعیتی جهانی برخوردار است، در حالی که شفیعی کدکنی زمانی به مدرنیسم فارسی پیوند می خورد که دست‌کم سه دهه از شعر نیما گذشته و مدرنیسم فارسی پس از نیما چهره‌هایی چون اخوان و شاملو و فروغ و سپهری را پشت سر گذاشته است. در این مدت، ایشان موفق می‌شود در شمار پیشتازان مدرنیسم جا گیرد. مرتضی کاخی، یکی از نظریه‌پردازان کاردیدۀ ادبیات فارسی، هر چند با شگفتی باید گفت اسماعیل خویی را از قلم انداخته است، در نوشتۀ کوتاهی که اخیراً به مناسبت سالگرد درگذشت قیصر امین‌پور در نشریۀ بررسی کتاب تهران به چاپ رسانده، جایگاه شفیعی‌کدکنی را چنین به تصویر می‌کشاند:

من اگر بخواهم دربارۀ امین‌پور در یک جمله صحبت کنم می‌گویم امین‌پور تک‌چهرۀ شفاف و درخشان و یک چهرۀ زلال نیمایی بعد از انقلاب است . . . اگر به دو پایۀ قبل از انقلاب که اخوان و شاملو بوده‌اند و دو پایۀ بعد از انقلاب که کسانی بودند مثل آتشی و شفیعی . . . در شعر امروز بخواهیم از شعر معتبر باحیثیت که یک مقداری بین انقلاب و بعد از انقلاب است نام بریم، اول منزوی است و الان قیصر امین‌پور است.[2]

نیاز به یادآوری است که در این گستره ده‌ها شاعر دیگر حضور دارند که هر یک با افزودن فصل درخشانی بر شعر معاصر فارسی، به مدرنیسم در ایران غنا بخشیده‌اند. اینکه شفیعی ‌کدکنی در چنین مجموعه‌ای می‌تواند یکی از قله‌های بلند ادبیات مدرن را در انحصار گیرد، خود دلیل برخورداری او از توان ویژه‌ای در خلاقیت شعری است.

پرسشی که بی‌درنگ به آن برمی‌خوریم این است که شفیعی ‌کدکنی در زمینۀ شعر و آثار انتقادی در چه جایگاهی قرار دارد. بی‌هیچ تردیدی می‌توان گفت درجۀ شناخت شفیعی‌کدکنی از ادبیات فارسی چنان است که مرجعیت او در زمینۀ نقد را، به‌رغم برخی از شعرهای ناب و نغزی که سروده ، برتر از جایگاه او در پهنۀ سرایش قرار می‌دهد. برخی از دوستداران شعر شفیعی‌ کدکنی بر این باورند که چنان‌چه توان و زمانی را که به پژوهش اختصاص داده بر سرایش متمرکز می‌ساخت، مقام بالاتری در شاعری کسب می‌کرد. به ‌راستی کمتر پژوهشگری را می‌شود پیدا کرد که توان نفوذ او را در تعیین مسیر جریان‌های ادبی ایران به دست آورده و به‌ویژه در میان دانشجویان و شیفتگان جدی شعر جایگاه ممتازی مانند او را از آن خود ساخته باشد. شفیعی ‌کدکنی نه فقط دیروز و امروز شعر فارسی را خوب می‌شناسد، بل انگار از فردای شعر به خوبی آگاه است. چارچوب شناخت او از شعر و ادبیات و قلمروهای وابسته به آن وی را در جایگاهی نشانده است که نام او در پیوند با بسیاری از کوشش‌های هنری و روشنفکری، از شعر گرفته تا فیلم و تئاتر و نقاشی و موسیقی و پیکرسازی و خوشنویسی و غیره، به چشم می‌خورد و در همۀ این زمینه‌ها با نام او در مقام نظرشناسی ممتاز روبه‌رو می‌شویم. شناخت او از لطیف‌ترین خیال‌های ادبی و نازک‌ترین مفاهیم شعری چنان می‌نماید که انگار مانند لحظۀ آفرینش شعر فقط از راه نوعی الهام امکان‌پذیر شده باشد. گستردگی دامنۀ پژوهش‌های او در شعر فارسی به گونه‌ای است که اظهار نظر دربارۀ همۀ آنها در یک بررسی ناممکن است. آنچه در اینجا مطرح است، اشاره به نکاتی است که او را در زمینۀ داوری‌های ادبی در بلندترین قلۀ انتقادی نشانده و هم‌زمان بر توسعۀ تئوری نقد اثرگذار بوده‌اند.

همچنان ‌که تی. اس. الیوت با نوشته‌ای جان میلتون را که تا پیش از آن در حیات ادبی انگلستان بر ”تخت شاهی“ نشسته بود معزول ساخت و جان دان، شاعر متافیزیکی، را در جایگاه او نشاند، شفیعی‌ کدکنی نیز در شناساندن بیدل دهلوی و اعتبار بخشیدن به سبک هندی در ایران چنین نقشی را ایفا کرده است. شفیعی ‌کدکنی دربارۀ بیدل می نویسد: ”از شگفتی‌ها اینکه در ایران، حتی تحصیل‌کردگان رشتۀ ادبیات، حتی دارندگان درجۀ دکتری ادبیات و بسیاری از شیفتگان جدی شعر او را نمی‌شناسند و حتی بسیاری از آنان نام او را نشنیده‌اند.“[3] امروز به اعتبار تحلیل درخشان شفیعی ‌کدکنی از شعر بیدل، به دیدۀ ایرانیان شعرشناس، بسیاری از غزل‌های او در شمار سروده‌های ناب فارسی جا گرفته‌اند. تجدید چاپ شاعر آیینهها بیش از پنج نوبت در دهۀ اول انتشار خود بهترین نشانی است که درجۀ شناخت جامعۀ کتاب‌خوان ما را از بیدل دهلوی، شاعری که تا پیش از انتشار این کتاب حتی کسی نامش را نشنیده بود، به نمایش می‌گذارد. بنا بر کلیدهایی که دکتر شفیعی ‌کدکنی از شعر بیدل به دست می‌دهد، پس از کوشش بسیار اگر معنی ابیات وی

بر ما روشن شد، ممکن است حالت شگفتی به ما دست دهد که ببینیم این گویندۀ قرن یازدهم چه تصویرهای دور از ذهن و چه عناصر پراکنده‌ای را با ریسمان بلند تداعی‌های خویش به یکدیگر پیوند داده که طی کردن فاصلۀ آن ممکن است برای بعضی ذهن‌ها ساعت‌ها وقت بگیرد و برای بعضی دیگر روزها و برای دسته‌ای فاصله‌اش غیرقابل وصول باشد.[4]

تحلیل‌های آموزنده و راهگشای این کتاب چنان‌اند که نه فقط بیدل را از گمنامی بیرون می‌آورند و او را در جایگاه واقعی‌اش، یعنی شاعر برخی از غزل‌های ناب فارسی، می‌نشانند، بل کلیدهایی به دست می‌دهند که همگام با بیدل اعتبار ناشناختۀ سبک هندی را نیز به آن باز می‌گردانند. شفیعی ‌کدکنی می‌نویسد:

اگر برای هر یک از شیوه‌های شعر فارسی بخواهم نماینده‌ای برگزینم که تمام خصایص آن شیوه را به گونه‌ای آشکار در آثار خویش نمایش دهد، بیدل را باید نمایندۀ تمام‌عیار اسلوب هندی به شمار آوریم، زیرا این گویندۀ پُرکار و نازک‌اندیش قرن یازدهم و دوازدهم راه و رسمی را که پیشینیان او، از یکی دو قرن پیش از او، بنیاد نهاده بودند، با مجموعۀ آثار خویش به مرحله‌ای رساند که هر یک از خصائص شعری گویندگان این اسلوب را باید به گونه‌ای روشن‌تر و مشخص‌تر در آثار او جستجو کرد.[5]

تا پیش از انتشار این کتاب و شناخت بیدل، تصور ایرانیان شعردوست و شعرخوان بر این بود که با پیدایش سبک هندی پس از حافظ، سنت بزرگ شعر فارسی شدیداً افت می‌کند و شاعران سبک هندی مانند صائب تبریزی و کلیم کاشانی به صورت افرادی جلوه می‌کنند که جز تصاویر عجیب و غریب و دور از هرگونه ذوق هیچ نشانی از خلاقیت شعری در آثارشان به چشم نمی‌خورد. رمزگشایی شفیعی‌ کدکنی نشان می‌دهد چنان‌چه از زاویۀ درستی به این شعرها نگاه کنیم، در برابر مدخلی جا می‌گیریم که ما را برای ”التذاذ از بخش عظیمی از شعر فارسی که ما آن را اسلوب هندی می‌خوانیم“[6] آماده می‌سازد.

قلمرو دیگری که شفیعی‌کدکنی در غنی ساختن تئوری نقد فارسی در آن اثرگذار بوده اصطلاحات فنی است که بر گسترۀ واژگانی نقد امروز افزوده است. مهم‌ترین اینان واژه‌ها و ترکیب‌هایی است که در زمینۀ موسیقی ساخته و به جای اصطلاحات سنتی ”نظام ایقاعی“ مانند وزن و قافیه و غیره رواج داده است. این اصطلاحات عبارت‌اند از

موسیقی بیرونی شعر (یعنی عروض آن)، موسیقی کناری (یعنی قافیه و ردیف و آن‌چه در حکم آنهاست، از قبیل تکرارها، ترجیع‌ها و برگردان‌ها)، موسیقی داخلی (که عبارت است از مجموعه هم‌آهنگی‌هایی که از طریق تقابل یا تضاد صامت‌ها و مصوّت‌ها در شعر به وجود می‌آید و انواع جناس‌ها یکی از جلوه‌های معین موسیقی داخلی به شمار می‌روند)، موسیقی معنوی (که منظور از آن همۀ ارتباط‌های پنهانی عناصر یک مصراع یا یک بیت است که از رهگذر ترکیب تضادها و مطابقه ها و . . . به وجود می‌آید).[7]

اگرچه اصطلاحات موسیقی متکی بر شعر مولاناست، اما دیری از انتشار آنها نمی‌گذرد که کاربردشان در حیات انتقادی شعر فارسی جنبۀ تام پیدا می‌کند و رواج گسترده‌شان را می‌توان در بسیاری از نوشته‌های انتقادی پیدا کرد.

لازم به توضیح است که آنچه در تعریف موسیقی معنوی آمده، به دیدۀ من، با واژۀ موسیقی قابل توجیه نیست. از منظر شفیعی ‌کدکنی، منظور از موسیقی معنوی، چنان‌چه دیدیم، ”همۀ ارتباط‌های پنهانی عناصر یک مصراع یا یک بیت است که از رهگذر ترکیب تضادها و مطابقه ها و . . . به وجود می‌آید.“ ”ارتباط‌های پنهانی“ نه فقط در این کاربرد کلی و نارساست و تفاوت چندانی با عناصر ”موسیقی داخلی“ ندارد، بل روشن نیست که ارتباط و وجه اشتراک آن با اصطلاح موسیقی دقیقاً در چیست؟ درست است که عناصر متضاد بخش مهمی از محتوای موسیقی را پدید می‌آورند، اما آیا می‌توان بر هر مقوله‌ای که عناصر متضاد دارد نام موسیقی گذاشت؟

واژۀ موسیقی در دوران مدرن را نخستین‌بار در ادبیات غرب آی. اِی. ریچاردز در پیوند با معنای شعر سرزمین هرز به کار گرفت. از آنجا که این شعر با شکل بی‌سابقه‌ای به میدان آمد، خوانندگان انگلیسی‌زبان از فهم آن ناتوان ماندند. ریچاردز نشان داد برای آنکه بتوانیم از این شعر لذت ببریم، لازم است آن را به صورت یک قطعۀ موسیقی تصور کنیم. به این معنا که در موسیقی، مخاطب به دنبال معنی نیست و می کوشد بداند آنچه از رهگذر آوا و معنای واژه‌ها دریافت می‌کند چه تأثیری بر او بر جا می‌گذارد. این تأثیر گاهی زاییدۀ کشف همانندی‌هایی میان برخی عناصر، به‌ویژه عناصر متضاد، و گاهی حاصل لمس تضادهایی میان عناصر، به‌خصوص بعضی از عناصر همانند، است. مجموع این حالت‌ها برانگیزانندۀ احساس لذتی است که از خواندن شعر به مخاطب دست می‌دهد. گاهی این احساس برخاسته از زنجیره‌هایی از تداعی میان مفاهیم دور از هم و بیگانه با یکدیگر است. ریچاردز نام شعر الیوت را، که بر همین اساس ساخته شده بود، به جای فراهم آورندۀ مفاهیم تازه و مدرن موسیقی مفاهیم (music of ideas) گذاشت و توضیح داد که این ”مفاهیم از هم نوع اند، انتزاعی و جامد، عمومی و جزیی، و مانند عبارت های موسیقی، بر این اساس سازمان نیافته اند که چیزی را به ما بگویند، بل تاثیر شان در ما در تمامیت مدونی از احساس و شیوه برخورد به همدیگر گره بخورند و رهایی خاصی از اراده را فراهم آورند.“[8] آنچه واژۀ موسیقی را در این کاربرد توجیه می‌کند، تأکید بر تأثیر واژه‌ها در مخاطب است، نه بر معنای واژه‌ها.

شفیعی‌ کدکنی خود در جای دیگری از شاعر آینهها تعریفی از شعر می‌دهد که با آنچه از ریچاردز باز گفتیم بسیار نزدیک است. می نویسد:

بسیاری از قدما به‌مانند ناقدان جدید اروپایی تصریح داشته‌اند که شعر خوب معنی ندارد. شبکه‌ای از تداعی‌ها – بعضی روشن، بعضی در ابهام– از ذهن عبور می‌کنند و التذاذ روحی شنونده یا خواننده را سبب می‌شود و اگر بخواهد همین خواننده یا شنونده اجزای آن شبکه تداعی را تجزیه کند و مورد تفسیر و توضیح قرار دهد، در همان آغاز کار ممکن است با اشکال روبه‌رو شود.[9]

دو اصطلاح دیگر که در این چارچوب جا می‌گیرند و بی‌هیچ تردیدی خلاقیت و ذوق شفیعی‌ کدکنی را به تماشا می‌گذارند اوزان ”خیزابی“ و ”جویباری“ هستند. منظور از خیزابی وزنی است که سبب می‌شود شعر با پروازی تند بال گشاید، برای نمونه،

مرده بدم زنده شدم گریه بدم خنده شدم

دولت عشق آمد و من دولت پاینده شدم

نوعی شعر است که آهنگ خیزابی را هنگام خواندن نشان می‌دهد. برعکس، وزن جویباری وزنی است نرم و ملایم که مانند بیت زیر خوانش شعری را با حرکتی کند، اما همخوان با محتوای شعر ممکن می‌سازد:

دوش می‌آمد و رخساره برافروخته بود

تا کجا باز دل غم‌زده‌ای سوخته بود

بی‌شک چنان‌چه این شعر در وزن خیزابی شکل می‌گرفت، شتابی به حرکت موسیقیایی بیت‌ها می داد که با آنچه به تصویر آمده در تضاد می‌افتاد. نکته اینجاست که پیش از این دو اصطلاح، نقد فارسی خالی از امکانات واژگانی بود که به منتقد توان بخشده‌اند تمایز میان این دو نوع آهنگ وزنی را با واژه‌هایی دلچسب و گویا توضیح دهند. فقط فردی با خلاقیت شفیعی‌ کدکنی و میزان دانش و بینش او می‌توانست جای خالی این اصطلاحات را پر کند. به سبب آنچه ایشان بر اصطلاحات موسیقایی شعر افزوده است، نقد فارسی به راستی از غنایی برخوردار شده که به واسطۀ آن، نوشته‌های انتقادی امروز در قیاس با گذشته هم طراوت بیشتری دارند و هم از نیروی کشف ظرفیت‌های تازۀ شعری بهره‌مندند.

خالی از طنز نیست بگوییم آنچه اجازه نمی‌دهد جایگاه شفیعی ‌کدکنی در سرایش از آنچه هست بالاتر رود، دانش ژرف و گستردۀ ایشان در حوزۀ ادبیات گذشته و حال است. شعر شفیعی کدکنی را در کسوت شاعری سرآمد زمانی در اوج آفرینش می‌بینیم که از تداخل ادبیات گذشته مصون مانده باشد. برای نمونه می‌خوانیم:

سفر بخیر

– ”به کجا چنین شتابان؟“

گون از نسیم پرسید

– ”دل من گرفته اینجا،

هوس سفر نداری

ز غبار این بیابان؟“

– ”همه آرزویم، اما

چه کنم که بسته پایم . . .“

– ”به کجا چنین شتابان ؟“

– ”به هر آن کجا که باشد به جز این سرا سرایم.“

– ”سفرت به خیر!

اما،

تو و دوستی، خدا را!

چو از این کویر وحشت به سلامتی گذشتی،

به شکوفه‌ها، به باران،

برسان سلام ما را.“[10]

این شعر با تمام کوتاهی و سادگی بیان شعری ما را با نمونۀ گویایی از کیفیت والای شعر مدرن فارسی روبه‌رو می‌سازد. می‌بینیم که ”کثرت استعمال“ این شعر را به کلیشه بدل نکرده است، چرا که هر بار به آن برمی‌خوریم، و روزی نیست که این پیشامد به گونه‌ای رخ ندهد، انگار با سروده‌ای تازه و طراوت‌بخش سرو کار داریم و این مهم‌ترین نتیجه‌ای است که می‌توان با آن میزان ناب بودن این شعر را آزمود. این نمونه شعری است که از هر نشانی از ادبیات گذشته خالی است و ذهن خلاق شاعر آزادانه دست به آفرینش زده است.

اینک شعر دیگری از شفیعی ‌کدکنی را از نظر می‌گذرانیم:

خموشانه

شهر خاموش من، آن روح بهارانت کو؟

شور و شیدایی انبوه هزارانت کو؟

می‌خزد در رگ هر برگ تو خوناب خزان

نکهت صبحدم و بوی بهارانت کو؟

کوی و بازار تو میدان سپاه دشمن

شیهۀ اسب و هیاهوی سوارانت کو؟

زیر سرنیزۀ تاتار چه حالی داری؟

دل پولادوش شیرشکارانت کو؟

سوت وکور است شب و میکده‌ها خاموش‌اند

نعره و عربدۀ باده‌گسارانت کو؟

چهره‌ها در هم و دل‌ها همه بیگانه ز هم

روز پیوند و صفای دل یارانت کو؟

آسمانت همه‌جا سقف یکی زندان است

روشنای سحر این شب تارانت کو؟[11]

”خموشانه“ یکی از شعرهای نمادین شفیعی‌ کدکنی است که برای نمادین ساختن آن از شعر دیگر شاعران بهره گرفته است. واژه‌های ”شب“ و ”خزان“ بنا بر سنت رایج در گسترۀ نمادین شعر فارسی نماد خفقان سیاسی و ”بهار،“ ”صبحدم“ و ”سحر“ اشاره‌ای سربسته به رهایی از اختناق و استقلال و هوای آزاد دانسته می‌شوند. ریشۀ این نمادها در غزلی از حافظ به چشم می‌خورد   که با مصراع ”روز هجران و شب فرغت یار آخر شد“ آغاز می شود و در آن می‌خوانیم:

آن همه ناز و تنعم که خزان می‌فرمود

عاقبت در قدم باد بهار آخر شد

در معنای معنا: نگاهی دیگر توضیح داده‌ام که این غزل دارای چند لایۀ معنایی است که یکی از آنها بر فضای سیاسی غزل دلالت دارد. بنا بر آنچه در تاریخ عصر حافظ آمده، حافظ سال‌های جوانی خود را در دورانی از تاریخ سپری کرده که کشور ایران زیر حکومت خاندان چوپانی یکی از سیاه‌ترین دوران‌های خود را می‌گذرانید. یکی از فاسدترین و بی‌رحم‌ترین این سرداران، امیر حسین چوپانی، معروف به امیر پیر حسین، است که در سال 741ق ”مانند یک بلای ناگهانی“ بر شیراز مسلط شد و به مدت دو سال حکومت کرد. میزان مردم‌آزاری و خونخواری در دوران حکومت او بر شیراز چنان بود که ماجراهای ظلم و زورگویی آن دوره از نظر سیاح و مورخ معروف، ابن‌بطوطه، دور نمانده است. در سال 743ق، سرانجام دوران محنت به دنبال یک رشته حوادث خونین به دست شیخ ابواسحق اینجو، پادشاه بعدی مُلک فارس، پایان می‌پذیرد و چهره مهربان‌تری از تاریخ، گیرم برای مدتی کوتاه، بر مردم ستمدیدۀ شیراز رخ می‌گشاید. با توجه به تصویری که از امیر حسین چوپانی به دست دادیم، می‌شود تصور کرد که احساس رهایی ناشی از شکست و گریز او برای مردم آن دیار چه مفهومی داشته است. غزل مورد بحث بازگفت این احساس و نشان‌دهندۀ فریاد شادی برخاسته از این لحظۀ رهایی است. از این منظر با سیمایی از غزل روبه‌رو می‌شویم که هر یک از اجزای آن در ارتباط با این پیشامد تاریخی معنای تازه‌ای به خود می‌گیرد.

در این نمای تازه، اشاره به بهار را می‌توان بیان سربستۀ لحظۀ رهایی دانست که با پیروزی و ورود امیر جمال‌الدین شاه ابواسحق اینجو، پادشاه دلخواه حافظ، ممکن شده است. واژۀ خزان، برعکس، نماد دوران سیاه خفقانی است که در زمان حکومت امیر پیر حسین در فارس جریان داشت.[12]

دانسته است که واژۀ ”شب“ و مفاهیم وابسته به آن به منزلۀ عنصری برای بیان اختناق سیاسی به دست نیما رواج پیدا کرد. باید افزود که نیما خود در این خصوص مدیون حافظ است. در شعر ”چوک! چوک!“ نیما شب را به مثابه نمادی سیاسی به کار می‌گیرد و از آن به صورت زن آبستنی نام می‌برد که در حال زاییدن است، اما آنچه از او می زاید ”رنج“ است. می‌خوانیم:

چوک!چوک! در این دل شب که از او این رنج می‌زاید

پس چرا هر کس به راه من نمی‌آید؟

حافظ در ”ساقی‌نامه“ بیتی دارد که معنای این نماد را به روشنی نشان می‌دهد:

فریب جهان قصه‌ای روشن است

ببین تا چه زاید، شب آبستن است

اما شبکۀ نمادین شعر مدرن فارسی فقط به واژۀ ”شب“ و واژه‌های متضاد آن محدود نمی ‌شود، بل بسیاری از مفاهیم وابسته به آن مانند تاریکی، روشنایی، صبح، هوای سحری، مه، ابر، خزان، زمستان، بهار و مانند اینها را نیز در بر می‌گیرد که شعر فارسی را به امکانات نمادین گسترده‌ای مجهز ساخته است. این شبکۀ نمادین به دست شاعرانی که پس از نیما آمده‌اند رفته‌رفته گسترش یافته و سنت بزرگی را در زمینۀ تصویر فضای سیاسی در شعر فراهم آورده‌ است. بهار به منزلۀ نماد تجدید حیات سیاسی و بازگرداندن هوای آزاد به فضایی خفقان‌آور شعر شفیعی ‌کدکنی را با پاره‌ای از ممتازترین نمونه‌های شعر روزگار ما خویشاوند می‌سازد، هرچند چنین می‌نماید که ایشان در به کار گرفتن نمادهای ”بهار“ و ”خزان“ چشم به غزل یادشده از حافظ داشته است.

”خموشانه“ بی‌شک شعری ”خوب“ در چارچوب شعرهای نمادین ادبیات مدرن تلقی می‌شود. منظور از شعر نمادین این نیست که بگوییم شاعر برای بیان برخی از مفاهیم درون شعر از نماد یاری جسته است. در حقیقت، کمتر شعری را می‌توان در دوران معاصر پیدا کرد که در آن نماد به کار نرفته باشد. در اینجا، شعر نمادین شعری است که حیات معنایی آن، در کلیّت خود، با نماد شکل یافته باشد.

در این شعر با تصویر شهری رو‌به‌رو هستیم که در آن، عشق و دوستی از قلب‌ها رخت بربسته و دل‌ها همه با هم بیگانه شده‌اند. این ویژگی بیان واقعیت اجتماعی دردناکی در دوران خاصی از تاریخ جامعه است و می‌توان از آن به مثابه پیام غایی این شعر سخن گفت که با تکیه بر نماد به تصویر آمده است. بنابراین، باید گفت نخستین ویژگی شاخص این شعر پیام انسان‌دوستانۀ آن است که ژرف‌ترین لایه‌های ممکن آگاهی و حیات عاطفی خواننده را درگیر خود می‌کند.

آنچه به همراه این ویژگی حساسیت زیبایی‌شناسانۀ ما را برمی‌انگیزد، گوناگونی نمادها و تنوع تصاویر زنده‌ای است که نمادها را در خود شکوفا می‌سازند. ویژگی دیگری که به شعر تشخص می‌بخشد غنای موسیقایی آن است. بازگشت آوای ”ش“ را در واژه‌های ”شهر خاموش“ و ”شور و شیدایی“در نظر بگیرید که چگونه با تکرار آوای ”ز“ در ”هزارانت“ و ”می‌خزد“ و ”خزان“ تبادلی دلچسب برقرار می‌سازد و درک موسیقایی خواننده را از همان آغاز کار بالا می‌برد. همچنین، مصراع‌های درخشانی را در نظر بگیرید که مانند ”دل پولادوش شیرشکارانت کو“ یا واژه‌هایی چون ”تاتار“ و ”هیاهو“ و ”نعره و عربده“ به‌گونۀ مؤثری بر دریافت موسیقایی خواننده تأثیر می‌گذارند.

به‌رغم آنچه گذشت، اگر در متن این شعر دقیق شویم درمی‌یابیم که انگار دانش اندوخته‌شده در ذهن ناخودآگاه شفیعی کدکنی در لحظۀ آفرینش فروچکیده و هویت شعر را با جا دادن واژه‌هایی مخدوش ساخته است. برای اثبات این گفته کافی است شعر شفیعی کدکنی را کنار غزلی از حافظ با مطلع ”یاری اندر کس نمی‌بینیم یاران را چه شد؟“ قرار دهیم. چنین به نظر می‌رسد آنچه ابزار تداعی این غزل شده است نخستین بیت آن باشد که پیام نهایی شعر شفیعی کدکنی نیز بازگفت آن می‌نماید. به دنبال این تداعی، واژه‌هایی از غزل حافظ را در شعر شفیعی کدکنی می‌بینیم که بی‌آنکه هیچ پیوند زیبایی‌شناسانه‌ای با غزل حافظ برقرار ساخته باشند، ابیات شعر شفیعی را میدان بازگفت خالی و دور از بار معنایی لازم قرار داده‌اند. مصراع‌های زیر نمونه‌هایی‌اند که در آنها شاهد نفوذ بی‌هدف واژه‌های غزل حافظ می‌شویم:

حافظ: خون چکید از شاخ گل باد بهارانت چه شد؟

شفیعی کدکنی: شهر خاموش من، آن روح بهارانت کو؟

حافظ: عندلیبان را چه پیش آمد هزاران را چه شد؟

شفیعی کدکنی: شور و شیدایی انبوه هزارانت کو؟

حافظ: خون چکید از شاخ گل باد بهارانت چه شد؟

شفیعی کدکنی: نکهت صبحدم و بوی بهارانت کو؟

حافظ: کس به میدان در نمی‌آید سواران را چه شد؟

شفیعی کدکنی: شیهۀ اسب و هیاهوی سوارانت کو؟

حافظ: کس ندارد ذوق مستی میگساران را چه شد؟

شفیعی کدکنی: نعره و عربدۀ باده‌گسارانت کو؟

حافظ: مهربانی کی سرآمد شهریاران را چه شد؟

شفیعی کدکنی: روز پیوند و صفای دل یارانت کو؟

شفیعی کدکنی به راستی مانند شاعری رفتار کرده است که به سبب عدم دسترسی به واژگان مورد نیاز خود از زبان آمادۀ شعر گذشته بهره برده و بی‌آنکه واژه‌ها را در هاضمۀ زیبایی‌شناسانۀ خود داخل سازد، آنها را به کار گرفته است. از آنجا که چنین رفتاری با شناختی که از شفیعی کدکنی داریم شدیداً در تعارض است، ناگزیر باید آنچه را در این شعر پیش‌آمده حاصل تداخل ناخودآگاه اندوخته‌های ذهنی شاعر دانست. نیاز به یادآوری است که غزل مورد بحث یکی از زیباترین غزل‌های حافظ است و به‌ویژه از زمانی که شجریان آن را خوانده، کمتر ایرانی شعردوستی است که با آن آشنایی نداشته باشد. وقتی چنین مخاطبی واژه‌های یادشده را دور از متن زیبایی‌شناسانۀ آنها می‌خواند، خود را در جایی می‌بیند که با تجربیات گذشتۀ او متفاوت است. باید توضیح داد که ایراد بر خود واژه‌ها وارد نیست. مشکل عدم وجود علتی است که انتقال آنها را از غزل حافظ به شعر شفیعی کدکنی توجیه کند.

فزون بر این، در ابیات پایانی شعر ”خموشانه“ خود را در فضای نمادین شعر ”زمستان“ مهدی اخوان ثالث می‌بینیم. در این شعر می‌خوانیم:

هوا دلگیر، درها بسته، سرها در گریبان، دست‌ها پنهان

نفس‌ها ابر، دل‌ها خسته و غمگین،

درختان اسکلت‌های بلورآجین،

زمین دل‌مرده، سقف آسمان کوتاه،

غبارآلوده مهر و ماه،

زمستان است.

شفیعی کدکنی این فضا را چنین در شعر خود بازتاب می‌دهد:

چهره‌ها درهم و دل‌ها همه بیگانه ز هم

روز پیوند و صفای دل یارانت کو؟

آسمانت همه‌جا سقف یکی زندان است

روشنای سحر این شب تارانت کو؟

در اینجا نیز کوشش چندانی برای کمال بخشیدن به فضای نمادین شعر صورت نگرفته و آنچه می‌بینیم از بازگفت زبان اخوان پا فراتر نمی‌گذارد.

در نبود علتی برای شیوۀ برخورد شفیعی کدکنی در این شعر، این اندیشه به ذهن راه می‌یابد که شاید منظور ایشان از این کار بهره گرفتن از ”آشنایی‌زدایی“ به معنایی بوده است که در مجلۀ بخارا در این باره به چاپ رسانده است. اگر به راستی ایشان چنین فکری را در نظر داشته است، باید گفت برخورد ایشان خالی از ایراد نیست. در نوشتاری با عنوان ”استاد شفیعی کدکنی و آشنایی‌زدایی: پاسخی به استادم دکتر شفیعی کدکنی در مورد بحث ایشان پیرامون آشنایی‌زدایی،“ این ایراد را بازگو کرده‌ام و از تکرار آن خودداری می‌کنم. اما طرح خلاصه‌ای از آن در اینجا راهگشا به نظر می‌ر‌سد . وقتی سخن از آشنایی‌زدایی در میان است، منظور نو کردن بیانی است که بر اثر بسامد فراوان جذابیت خود را از دست داده و مخاطب را نسبت به خود بی‌اعتنا کرده است. اینک باید پرسید آیا غزل ”یاری اندر کس نمی‌بینیم یاران را چه شد؟“ به راستی دچار چنین مشکلی شده است و دیگر خواننده از خواندن یا شنیدن آن لذت نمی‌برد؟ به دیدۀ من، مشکل بتوان این غزل را مصداق این ویژگی دانست.

اگر بخواهیم تفاوت این شیوۀ برخورد را با نمونه‌ای نشان دهیم که سلطۀ شفیعی کدکنی را بر فرآیند آفرینش آشکار می سازد، بجاست به ظرافت ایشان در شعر ”حتی به روزگاران“ اشاره کنیم و منظور اشاره به غزلی از سعدی است. در شعر شفیعی کدکنی می‌خوانیم:

گفتی به ”روزگاران مهری نشسته“ گفتم:

”بیرون نمی‌توان کرد، حتی به روزگاران“

شفیعی کدکنی با تغییری کوچک فضای معنایی بیت سعدی را به کلی زیرو زبر ساخته است، در این معنا که واژۀ ”حتی“ را به جای ”الا“ نشانده و با این ظرافت کوتاه، عشق را از تجربه‌ای محدود به احساسی جاودانه مبدل ساخته است. توان شفیعی کدکنی در کسوت شاعری ممتاز را در ظرافت‌هایی از این دست می‌توان دید و برخورد با این ظرافت‌ها در شعرهای او پیشامد نادری نیست.

از آنجا که بخش عمده‌ای از این نوشته به جایگاه شفیعی کدکنی در مقام منتقد اختصاص یافت، بجاست سخن با یادآوری خلاقیت ایشان در مقام یکی از شاعران سرآمد روزگار ما خاتمه یابد. به این منظور کافی است چند نمونۀ درخشان از شعر ایشان را بیاوریم که نمونه‌هایی ماندگار از شعر مدرن فارسی‌اند:

آخرین برگ سفرنامۀ باران این است:

که زمین چرکین است

چون صاعقه در کوزۀ بی‌صبری‌ام امروز

از صبح که برخاسته‌ام ابری‌ام امروز

آه از این قوم ریایی که درین شهر دوروی

روزها شحنه و شب باده‌فروشند همه

تو در نماز عشق چه خواندی

که سال‌هاست

بالای دار رفتی و این شحنه‌های پیر

از مرده‌ات هنوز

پرهیز می‌کنند؟

مهم‌ترین معیار سنجش این نمونه‌ها، که شمارشان در شعر شفیعی کدکنی اندک نیست، این است که به‌رغم بسامد چشمگیرشان در نوشته‌ها و نشریات هرگز به کلیشه بدل نشده‌اند و هر بار به آنها برمی‌خوریم برایمان تازگی دارند.

سفر ادامه دارد و

پیام عاشقانۀ کویرها به ابرها

سلام جاودانۀ نسیم‌ها به تپه‌ها

تواضع لطیف و نرم درّه‌ها

غرور پاک برف‌پوش قله‌ها

صفای گشت گلّه‌ها به دشت‌ها

چرای سبز میش‌ها و قوچ‌ها و برّه‌ها

[1] عبدالحسین زرین‌کوب، ”           ،“ سفرنامۀ باران: نقد و تحلیل اشعار دکتر محمدرضا شفیعیکدکنی، به کوشش حبیب‌الله عباسی (تهران: نشر روزگار، 1378)، یادآوری.

[2] مرتضی کاخی، نقد و بررسی کتاب تهران، شمارۀ 48، 5.

[3] محمدرضا شفیعی کدکنی، شاعر آینهها: بررسی سبک هندی و شعر بیدل (چاپ 4؛ تهران: نشر آگه، 1376)، 9.

[4] شفیعی کدکنی، شاعر آینهها، 16.

[5] شفیعی کدکنی، شاعر آینهها، 15.

[6] شفیعی کدکنی، شاعر آینهها، 14.

[7] محمدرضا شفیعی کدکنی، (مقدمه، گزینش و تفسیر)، مولانا جلالالدین محمد بلخی: غزلیات شمس تبریز (تهران: سخن، 1387)، جلد 1، 114.

[8] I. A. Richards

[9] شفیعی کدکنی، شاعر آینهها، 106.

[10] عباسی، سفرنامۀ باران، 326.

[11] عباسی، سفرنامۀ باران، 349.

[12] رضا قنادان، معنای معنا: نگاهی دیگر (     : مهرویستا، 1391)، 64.

Da’i Jan Napelon as a Comic Masterpiece

Da’i Jan Napelon as a Comic Masterpiece

Dick Davis

I have written elsewhere[1] about the pleasures and difficulties of translating Iraj Pezeshkzad’s Da’i Jan Napelon, so here I shall confine myself to more general reflections about the novel and its possible relationships with other literary works, together with a word or two about my virtually nonexistent relationship with its author.

The huge popularity of Iraj Pezeshkzad’s great comic novel Da’i Jan Napelon in Iran and in the Iranian diaspora is undeniable—I have never met an adult Iranian who didn’t have a knowledge of at least the television serial that was based on the novel, and most will claim to have read the novel itself even if, sometimes, “a long time ago”; but in spite of all this, it often seems to me that the book has received less than its deserved recognition.

When I wrote the word “great” near the beginning of the above sentence, I wasn’t using the word loosely. Simply by virtue of what it is, comic writing often seems to us a less serious affair than more weighty and sober-faced disquisitions, including solemnly momentous novels, and this includes for many readers their evaluation of the portraits of the societies that comic novels anatomize. But this is certainly selling the genre short. Looking only at the British culture in which I grew up, Chaucer’s largely comic Canterbury Tales is certainly a more accurate and penetrating portrait of the mores of 14th century England than is his tragic novel in verse, Troilus and Criseyde, set in an imagined mythical past, for all the latter’s charm and emotional force.  The Canterbury Tales is “real” in a way that Troilus and Criseyde never attempts to be; it gives us a panorama of social classes, professions, and religious avocations in late 14th century England, and it’s possible to glean many snippets of social fact from its narratives—for example that the French spoken by the English aristocracy and middle classes was different from that spoken in France, or that a total of twenty books was considered an adequate library for an educated man.

Similarly, it’s clear that Shakespeare’s comedies are a better guide to the England of the author’s time than are his tragedies; for all their fantasy and whimsy, The Merry Wives of Windsor, The Taming of the Shrew, and even A Midsummer Night’s Dream are obviously, at least in part, mirrors (even if often distorting funhouse mirrors) held up to contemporary 16th and early 17th English society in ways that King Lear and Othello, equally obviously, are not. The comedies take place in a real and recognizable England; King Lear takes place in an imaginary ancient Britain, and Othello in a travelers-tales’ Venice and a vaguely imagined Cyprus, an island which Shakespeare clearly knew almost nothing about. It would be easy to multiply examples—Fielding’s comic Tom Jones is at least as good a guide to 18th century England as Richardson’s po-faced Pamela, whose story is set in a kind of sentimental wish-fulfillment world, whereas Tom Jones almost rubs our noses in the muck and mire of 18th rural century England, as well as giving us a very shrewd portrait of relations between various would-be fixed but in fact dissolving social classes. And has there ever been a more penetrating portrait of middle-class England than that we see in Jane Austen’s largely comic novels? … and so on.

The modern European novel virtually begins with one of the greatest works of the genre, Cervantes’s comic Don Quixote. In creating Don Quixote, Cervantes gave us the archetype of any number of later literary misfits and non-conformists; he is the perpetual fantasist whose delusions are more real to him than the quotidian reality in which he exists, the man whose reading has given him a world to live in that is more solid than his own real experiences and memories. The mention of Don Quixote brings us to one of the major reasons for the comic novel’s social relevance, which is the endless opportunities the genre gives for satire—of, for example, Czech nationalism and militarism (The Good Soldier Schweik), or of Russian autocracy (The Master and Margarita). Iraj Pezeshkzad’s Da’i Jan Napelon belongs, it seems to me, in the same august group as Chaucer’s, Shakespeare’s, Fielding’s, Austen’s, Cervantes’s, Hasek’s and Bulgakov’s comic—and undeniably great—literary portraits. It’s not just a funny jeu d’esprit, a literary lark, it’s a masterpiece, and I would argue a profound one, like those of the authors I have just listed.

The Good Soldier Schweik brings me to Da’i Jan Napelon specifically. As I was reading Pezeshkzad’s novel I was often irresistibly reminded of its Czech forerunner, which I had read as an adolescent in Cecil Parrot’s (truncated and somewhat bowdlerized, though at the time I did not realize this) English translation. Hasek’s Czech hero, Schweik, is a trusting, naïve, good-hearted simpleton who gets drafted into the Austro-Hungarian army during the first World War, and who becomes the servant of a number of vainglorious, self-important, swaggering military officers, whose posturings, antics, and lies he tries valiantly to back up and abet.

Once one has noticed it, the similarity of Pezeshkzad’s Mash Qāsem to Hasek’s Schweik is hard to ignore; they are both servants of vainglorious military figures, to whom their relationship seems distantly based on that of Sancho Panza to Don Quixote, and they share a kind of caricatured peasant naivety combined with flashes of equally caricatured native wit and canniness that bring them much closer to the realities of any given situation than the versions that obsess their self-important and self-deluded masters. Both simultaneously offer us a version of their circumstances that is much more simplistic, but also much closer to the truth, than that of the surrounding characters, and they share an unsophisticated propensity for telling the truth when this is the last thing their interlocutors wish to hear. They are presented as foolish but also often wise in their foolishness, so that they are, we can say, versions of that stock comic but also equivocally instructive mainstay of literature, the wise fool, as he appears in, for example, many of Iran’s Mullah Nasruddin stories. In English literature the most obvious examples of “wise-fools” are the fools in Shakespeare’s plays, who like Mullah Nasruddin often show themselves to be far more understanding and sagacious than the more sophisticated and supposedly cleverer social superiors with whom they interact.

Much later, once I had decided to attempt to translate Da’i Jan and I began reading everything I could find about the novel’s author, I learned that Pezeshkzad had in fact translated Hasek’s novel into Persian, which obviously accounted for the intermittent but still fairly frequent family resemblances between the novels. Just in case anyone thinks that I am mentioning this as some kind of diminishment of Pezeshkzad’s achievement, I would point out that this conscious or unconscious mining of others’ works for one’s own ends is something that has always been done by all authors without exception, including and perhaps especially, by all great authors. I have looked for Pezeshkzad’s translation of Schweik but been unable to find it; I presume, given Pezeshkzad’s impeccable French and (I would guess) his ignorance of Czech, that the French version of The Good Soldier Schweik, in the translation by Benoit Meunier, was the text from which he worked.

Da’i Jan is set in Iran in the second World War, and it’s instructive to compare it to another major Persian novel also set in the second World War, Simin Daneshvar’s Savūshūn. The major differences between the novels are not only those of genre (one comic and one indisputably serious), but also of setting; Da’i Jan takes place in Tehran, Savūshūn largely in the countryside near Shiraz, and while the representative of the peasantry in Da’i Jan (i.e., Mash Qāsem) is stereotypically comic, the peasants in Savūshūn are treated, like virtually all the novel’s characters, with a kind of fastidiously respectful compassion and empathy. Even so, we can say that the “realism” of Daneshvar’s novel is almost as equally literary as the comic caricatures of Pezeshkzad’s; Daneshvar’s villagers are drawn from life, but they are also drawn from literature, particularly Russian literature, and I would guess probably most particularly from Tolstoy. And as a novel Pezeshkzad translated, Hasek’s Good Soldier Schweik, can occasionally be discerned as a kind of ghost in Pezeshkzad’s narrative, so the presence of a novel Simin Daneshvar translated, Alan Paton’s Cry the Beloved Country, which deals with the effects of apartheid in South Africa, can also sometimes be discerned in Savūshūn (this is especially true of the novels’ closing pages). Both novels depend heavily, for their techniques and effects, on literatures that precede them. As the novel was still a relatively new (at the outside a little over a hundred years old) genre in Iran when they were written, their debts to non-Iranian literature are fairly obvious, but equally obviously they also develop local Iranian literary traditions. In Da’i Jan’s case for example, the comic caricatures of rū’ḥawz̤ī performances, and also scurrilous satire like that by Obayd-e Zakani as well as the prose romances of the 19th century (Amir Arsalān is specifically mentioned in the novel’s opening pages). Comparatively, in Savūshūn, the tradition of pand / andarz literature, as exemplified by, for example, the Shirazi author (and Savūshūn is set in and near Shiraz) Sa’di informs much of the story-telling, and of course Savūshūn’s most obvious and compelling literary source is the Shahnameh, the legend of Seyavash, and the folklore that grew up surrounding it. A particular Iranian influence on both novels, one that has not been especially remarked on perhaps because it is so pervasive in Iranian novels of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, is that of Hedayat’s Būf-i Kūr, which was written more or less as one long feverish quasi-nightmare in which “truth” is revealed. A nightmare in which truth is obliquely or directly revealed became, for some decades, almost a sine qua non in any “serious” Iranian novel.

Savūshūn is in some sense written against the tradition Hedayat established (it is realist / literal where Hedayat is phantasmagorical / surreal, moral where Hedayat is at best amoral, and it deals with the realities of village and peasant life whereas Hedayat’s novel is about a déclassé disintegrating aesthete), nevertheless it includes the all but obligatory truth-telling dream towards its end, when the heroine Zari dreams of her husband’s death. In Da’i Jan, a novel that could hardly seem further from Hedayat’s preoccupations as they are displayed in Būf-i Kūr, the narrator’s confusedly surreal feverish nightmare towards the novel’s end is also a truth-telling dream that shows him the event he has long dreaded (his beloved Layli’s marriage to the odious Puri) as occurring before his horrified eyes. As in Savūshūn, this feverish sleep is the culminating moment that resolves the fraught emotional tension that has run through the whole work, and both Zari and Pezeshkzad’s narrator (in his case after a second bout of fever) awake to a quieter but for them far emptier world once the event their nightmares revealed is over.

Whilst I was working on my translation of Iraj Pezeshkzad’s novel, I was living in the United States while he was living in France, and our relationship, if it can be called that, consisted almost entirely of emails, postcards, and the odd phone call. I wrote initially to ask him if I could have his permission to translate his novel and he answered granting me this permission with two conditions. The first was that I complete the work within two years (I later learned that this was because a French translation had been begun but never finished, but although it wasn’t finished the translator was unwilling to say that it wouldn’t be finished at some point, so that Pezeshkzad was left unsure of whether he should accept someone else’s offer to do the work, or not). The second was that I should send him my translation seriatim as I completed each chapter; this I later learned was partly to “check” the translation for accuracy, but also to see that I was in fact working on the book as I had said I would. It turned out that the “checking” part of this condition was something of a sleight of hand, as Pezeshkzad’s command of English, though I didn’t know this at the time, was certainly not adequate for such a task. When I learned this, I realized that the “checking” had been something of a joke on his part, one I perhaps should have expected from an author famous, precisely, for his jokes. I sent him chapters for a while, as he had stipulated, and each time I received in return a laconic postcard saying he was satisfied with what I’d sent.  After a while I sent chapters at wider intervals (two or three or four at a time) and always received virtually identical responses. Eventually I stopped sending chapters altogether until the whole work was completed.

Once I had started work on the translation, one thing soon became plain: Pezeshkzad was very keen that the novel “work” in English, that it have as much impact as possible, and to this end he was quite happy to have parts of the manuscript tweaked in order to suppress specifically Iranian details so that comic moments could come across more forcibly, “unfiltered” through a non-English reference. A minor example of this occurred in my translation of the very first sentence when the narrator says he falls in love on the 13th of Mordad which, it is implied, is an unlucky day. Pezeshkzad was aware that Friday the 13th is considered to be an especially unlucky day in anglophone cultures and he asked me to insert “Friday,” which isn’t in the Persian, into the sentence in order to emphasize how very unlucky the day was, and he was also happy for me to turn Mordad into August despite the fact that the two don’t wholly overlap. Later on, he suggested I turn all the references to mullahs to references to ayatollahs, as the word ayatollah was at that time a well-known word in English and one with very negative connotations, but for some reason I baulked at this. In general, I tried to hew as closely as I could to the Persian, and not take such liberties except at his express suggestion. I also learned that he had been present at the making of the television series based on his novel, and as anyone who knows both is aware, there are quite important differences between the novel and the series, especially as the work comes to an end. It turned out that all these changes were sanctioned by Pezeshkzad (either suggested by him, or agreed to when they were suggested by the director or actors), and this seems of a piece with his advice to me that I bring features or moments into the translation that would make it work better in English, though I should emphasize that I hardly ever did this, as I wanted the work to be as much as possible just as it was in Persian. Just occasionally I would add in a phrase that clarified something that might otherwise be unclear to an anglophone reader (for example, I added a sentence to the effect that Assadollah Mirza’s frequent interjections of “Moment!” were pronounced in the German way, with the accent on the second syllable, rather than in the first as in English), and Pezeshkzad said he was more than happy for me to do this kind of thing, indeed encouraged me to do it.

It turned out that we met only once, at a symposium on his work, and my admiration for him, together with the fact that, naturally, many people crowded around him monopolizing his attention, meant that we didn’t exchange many words—mostly expressions of mutual regard as far as I remember, and not much beyond that.  One thing the translation did give me though was that it marked the beginning of my relationship with Mage Publishers; Mage have published all my translations from Persian since this moment, and my great good fortune in this regard is not the least of the many pleasures that engagement with Iraj Pezeshkzad’s novel has brought me.

Dick Davis is emeritus Professor of Persian at Ohio State University. He is the English language translator of Iran Pezeshkzad’s Da’i Jan Napelon (Mage Publishers, 1996; Random House, 2006) as well as of numerous volumes of Persian poetry, the most recent being Nezami’s Layli and Majnun (Penguin Random House, 2020; 2021) and The Mirror of My Heart: A Thousand Years of Persian Poetry by Women (Penguin Random House, 2019; 2021).

[1] The Routledge Handbook of Persian Literary Translation, ed. Pouneh Shabani-Jadidi, Patricia Higgins and Michelle Quay (Routledge, London and New York, 2022), 16-19.

Radio: A New Cultural History of Listening to Iranian Music, 1940-1952

Radio: A New Cultural History of Listening to Iranian Music (1940-1952)[1]

Pouya Nekouei

 

Introduction

Radio was a significant medium in the formation of modernity’s global soundscape. From the early decades of the twentieth century, radio became an important part of mass media, not only in Western capitalist contexts, but in the Global South as well. The sonic milieu created by radio significantly transformed the ways people listened to sound and music and received data. Radio, as Meltem Ahiska points out, was “a public political instrument” through which the state and the ruling classes promoted nation building, spread political propaganda, and fostered cultures of consumption.[2] In Iran too, radio’s foundation was a tool invested in by the state, but it was also a turning point in the history of sound, listening, and music.

In this article, I focus on a contested theme in the historiography of music in radio, make a few revisions to the current literature, and present new documents on the subject: the case of Iranian music performed in and broadcasted from Radio Tehran, since its establishment in April 1940 until early 1950s, which is concomitant with the political turmoil of the oil nationalization movement in Iran. While radio’s role in the promotion of popular music is an accepted assumption, the role of Iranian music in this medium remains a point of contestation among writers. In this article, I argue that Iranian music, including Iranian art/ classical music,[3] was crucial to radio’s programming throughout this roughly twelve-year period. In other words, despite all the administrative changes in radio, Iranian music was continuously listened to by the audience of radio during this period.

The radio’s emergence was indeed a unique phenomenon in the performance history of Iranian music. The radio studio was a unique space, given the live nature of performances during this period.[4] Narratives left for us testify to perplexities of musicians and odd instances during live performance sessions. Tales of technological malfunctions, or musicians’ errors during live performances provide a glimpse into this unique experience of live performances. Javad Badeezadeh (1903–1980) recounts that in the early days of radio, he and his accompanying ensemble, including Saba, Somaei, Neydavud and Tehrani were performing in a live radio session, throughout which the studio’s light had to be switched off, due to the perils of the Second World War.[5] According to his narrative, the ensemble finished the opening sections, but Badeezadeh could not find the lyrics of the song. The notebook containing the lyrics fell on the ground, and after the orchestra had performed twice, Badeezadeh, ridden with anxiety, improvised an alternative lyric for the song that later angered the lyricist, Nurollah Homayun.[6]

However, an important aspect was that radio enabled mass accessibility to the listening experience of Iranian music for modern listening subjects.  ence, radio led to a wider listening experience of Iranian music than was earlier ushered in by the gramophone, mainly during the Reza Shah period. This wider sociability of Iranian music and its listening experience had interesting gender dimensions, too: radio made the voice of female vocal musicians performing āvāz and taṣnīf available to the wider public.[7] More importantly, radio subjected the performance of Iranian music to the new discipline of time; musicians in radio had to perform in specific time schedules and hours; this meant that each performance session was distinct, and different genres of music, including Iranian art/classical music, had space in this mass media.

Problems of Writing the History of Music in Radio

Writing the history of music in radio in modern Iran is not an easy task, and involves various historical, as well as conceptual challenges for at least two reasons: (a) with respect to the period of the present study, access to primary sources has been a major obstacle; (b) the second issue concerning music history of radio is a complex historiographical problem regarding musical life in radio during the Pahlavi period. Writers and music activists generally associated with the revivalist music movement have constructed a narrative of music history informed by a revivalist discourse.[8] In this narrative, the music broadcast from Radio Tehran is generally considered as the Other of Iranian art/ classical music and therefore tantamount to being ‘inauthentic’. The ‘authentic’ age of Iranian music, according to music revivalists, was the late Qajar era of music, and the music broadcast from radio represented ‘light’ and ‘non-serious’ music. This situation has largely to do with the ideological issues apropos of the historical narrative of Iranian music, specifically the one broadcasted from Radio Tehran prior to the 1979 Revolution. Musicians of the Gulhā program— broadcast on the radio from the mid-1950s on— represented the mainstream musical current of Iranian music prior to the 1979 Revolution.[9] As a result of the emergence of the revivalist music movement in the 1960s, and a gradual shift in musical discourse and practice, musicians associated with the Gulhā program were marginalized in post-revolutionary musical discourse. The 1979 Revolution ousted these musicians from public musical life in post-revolutionary Iran.  riticisms of Iranian music broadcast from radio within the revivalist discourse began with the activities of Nur-Ali Borumand in the 1960s and continued in the years to come. Borumand, as a major revivalist figure, criticized what he considered to be “false improvisation.”[10] The music broadcast from Radio Tehran in the revivalist narrative was considered to be the symbol of such designation, and Iranian music broadcast from radio was increasingly and derogatorily referred to under such rubrics as mūsīqī-i rādiyūī (radio music) or shīrīn navāzī (sweet performance).[11] It was Majid Kiani, a major figure in revivalist music discourse, who employed the term shīrīn navāzī, thus associating ‘lightness’ and a sense of ‘amusement’ with a major part of Iranian music broadcast from radio.[12] I argue that these monolithic binary metanarratives of music history vis-à-vis radio have rendered an entire thirty-seven years of music history of Iranian music in radio to an ideologically reductionist ahistorical narrative, overlooking detailed historical and stylistic examinations of music in radio.

In recent years, there has been a growth in historical and conceptual studies of radio in modern Iran. Sasan Fatemi, in his work on the emergence and development of popular music in Iran, suggests the foundation of radio “symbolically” is “the starting point for the definite formation of popular music” in Iran.[13]  He also believes that the process of commercialization of music was accelerated with the establishment of radio in Iran.[14] In his work, the binary of ‘popular,’ versus ‘classical’ has been central to the binary narrative of contemporary music history generally, and specifically that of radio’s during the Pahlavi period.[15] In this study, I distance myself from conceptualization of radio as a promoter of commercial music, and borrow from the cultural history of music. Historicization of sound and listening over the past few years has become a major focus of cultural historians of music.[16] Of course, radio did not necessarily lead “disciplined listening” practices, as cultural historians of music have argued vis-à-vis musical life in public and private spaces, but it is clear that the broadcasting of Iranian music on radio led to an unprecedent sociability of this music at a large scale notwithstanding the varied tastes, cultural, or religious orientations of the listening subjects.

Another major work on the history of radio in Iran belongs to Mohammadreza Fayyaz. Fayyaz, in his historical analysis, provides a detailed narrative of the initial years of radio, and contextualizes radio in the larger socio-political context, cultural politics, and discourse of Reza Shah’s period. Fayyaz acknowledges the role of Iranian music in this media, and analyzes a series of issues surrounding musical politics and factional contestations between music groups in radio until the mid-1940s.[17] He challenges the normative narrative of early radio’s music history—that is, of music on radio since its foundation, and until Reza Shah’s resignation—in which Qolamhoseyn Minbashian’s opposition to Iranian music has been a central theme and a matter of debate.[18]According to Fayyaz, only a few selected virtuosic musician could enter the space of radio, given the high musical standards expected by Minbashian as head of the radio’s music programs.[19] He then points to various issues pertaining to music on radio after Vaziri’s take over, following Reza Shah’s resignation from power, including the contestations between Vaziri and his colleagues, and an emerging support of pro-western music led by Parviz Mahmud until the mid-1940s.[20] While by and large I agree with his narrative, I stress on the performance of Iranian vocal and solo instrumental music, and smaller ensembles, until roughly early 1952, in time-bounded schedules. Despite all of the administrative problems in radio, this continuity in the performance of Iranian music until the early 1950s led to the wider listening of it by a larger public. This was an important aspect, specifically in the history of Iranian art/classical music, for while traditionally Iranian art/classical music was bound to a tiny segment of music lovers from among Qajar elites in the latter half of the nineteenth century, radio ironically, as a mass media, accommodated Iranian music, including the Iranian art/classical, during this period. Hence, Iranian art/classical music, including instrumental forms such as pīshdarāmad, and ring, and vocal music—that is, āvāz and taṣnīf—were performed in radio during this period and were appreciated by a wide range of audiences.

Radio Goes Public in Modern Iran

Radio became a contested device and medium in the cultural and political discourse in Iran soon after its establishment in 1940, capturing the attention of policy makers and the public alike. Devices became an attractive object in the market from the late Reza Shah period, and immediately after the foundation of Radio Tehran, they were advertised in newspapers, and circulated in the market.

30An Advertisement for a brand of radio. Iṭilā‘āt, April 23, 1940. (Figure 1.)

31

Advertisement for Philips Radio. Source: Tehran Muṣṣvar, 1947. (Figure 2.)

32

Advertisement for Lafayette Radio. Source: Tehran Muṣṣvar. 1950. (Figure 3.)

Radio was pivotal to the state’s policies and the dissemination of its political agenda. Fayyaz outlines how this medium was situated in the late Reza Shah’s modernizing discourse of the ‘cultivation of thought’ or parvarish-i afkār.[21] The daily Iṭilā‘āt referred to radio’s founding as “a significant educational institution, whose reach is as far as the globe.” This advertisement also promised that it would make available “the pleasant music of esteemed musicians of the country to people’s ears.”[22] As early as the 1940s, policymakers were intrigued by radio’s wide outreach in Iran and beyond. A report addressed to the minister of finance and the chief of radio’s commission in the first months of radio’s foundation submitted that, from June 1940, the sound of Radio Tehran was audible throughout the country, and its range extended as far as Kabul, Baghdad, and Berlin.[23] Soon the sound of Radio Tehran became audible in a transnational sound space, and Persian-language broadcasting became part of global media production.

34

Studio and equipment, Radio Tehran Iṭilā‘āt-i Haftegi. (Figure 4.)

Like the gramophone, radio became an object of political and administrative intervention as well as state control in Iran.  itizens, from the late Reza Shah’s reign and also in the tumultuous context of World War II, were required to have specific permissions issued by officials in order to own a radio device. Such policies were clearly aimed at controlling the flow of information through a sound device that had no precedence in terms of circulation. A document issued by the General Directorate of Police of Isfahan in June 1941 mentions that an additional thirty-four radio receivers are added, totaling 403 receivers in the province of Isfahan (Figure 3). The same document mentions that the official permission is sent by the police bureau to the owners. In 1943, another document informs the authorities that in June 1943 a radio speaker was installed in Isfahan’s Chaharbagh street in order to broadcast news. During World War II, the radio was also used by foreign forces in Iran. Apparently, these programs were a matter of contestation. An advertisement in the weekly Iṭilā‘āt states that based on a directive sent by the general directorate of the propaganda bureau, all programs of the allied forces on the radio, including programs of the British and Indian army, the Soviet cultural house, the program for the Polish population, and the educational English language program, will come to a standstill.[24] Radio was also used as a disciplinary apparatus; an example of this was a radio station in the 1940s owned by the police, whose main objective was to make the prisoners’ narrative audible in order to prevent crimes, but also to announce its investigative operations of criminals, and to seek public help.[25]

35

Official permission granted to singer, Aminollah Rashidi, to own a radio device. Early 1940s. (Figure 5.)

36

Source: National Library and Archives of Iran. (Figure 6.)

37

Source: National Library and Archives of Iran. (Figure 7.)

Despite such issues, music from the heyday of radio became a crucial part of broadcasting programs. As early as the founding of Radio Tehran, the authorities attempted to incorporate different genres of music in its programming. An order issued from the prime minister’s office requested the ministry of foreign affairs to oversee the purchase of a significant chunk of gramophone records from Norway, for broadcast from Radio Tehran. Soon after, in June 1941, the military college’s orchestra began to perform on Radio Tehran.[26] Musicians performing Iranian music appeared in the radio’s studio from very early on. The audience was not only able to listen to voices of prolific vocal musicians of Iranian art/classical music, and instrumentalists performing musical instruments such as the ney, tar and santur, but also experienced the opportunity to listen to newly composed songs and a few orchestras and ensembles with instruments such as piano and violin.

The wide outreach of the radio’s sound and musical production was significant and indeed a sensitive issue, considering the religious sensitivities of sections of the public. Broadcasting authorities were aware of such religious sensitivities. For instance, on religious occasions, the radio authorities temporarily halted music programs; the daily Iṭilā‘āt reported of “the removal of the radio’s music” due to the commemoration of Shiites’ second Imam and Islam’s Prophet, mentioning that, during the hours in which music was to be broadcast, there would instead be silence.[27] Although public performance of music had grown throughout Reza Shah’s reign, and the phenomenon of musicophilia, [28] i.e., the public performance, production, and consumption of music, and the collective listening of and writing about it, became a cultural feature of musical modernity in Iran, considerable sections of Iranian society remained religious even in the 1940s, and musicians did not necessarily enjoy a respectable social status. The memoirs of the famous vocal musician, Badeezadeh and his narrative on Abdolhoseyn Shahnazi testify to this. According to Badeezadeh, Abdolhoseyn Shahnazi, a famous tar performer faced a crowd’s anger in a Jewish neighborhood in Tehran during the early 1940s, which broke his instrument.[29] These powerful religious sentiments against music are also reflected in his account of Abdolhoseyn Shahnazi’s funeral; according to Badeezadeh, none of the Shiite clerics in Tehran were ready to perform his ceremonies, and finally the famous moderate cleric, Falsafi, accepted the task, but at the end of the funeral speech asked for the divine’s forgiveness for Shahnazi due to his profession.[30] These tales are an indication of how sections of Iranian society in the Tehran of the 1940s retained their religious sentiments even after the secularization of the public sphere under Reza Shah. Religious sensitivities among the public lingered even in later years, and sections of the public reacted to radio’s role in the promotion of music. A document addressed to the senate in 1951 by the Youth  Committee of Merchants and Guilds vehemently criticized the speech of a senator who spoke against the decision of banning music’s broadcasting from radio during the month of Ramadan (Figure 8). The Committee expressed its “disgust and abhorrence” at the speech (Figure 8). Another letter followed by this request, and sent to Seyyed  assan Emami, known as Imām-i Jom‘ah, the Shiite cleric who headed the seventeenth parliament at this time, requested the concerned authorities “to organize the undisciplined” programs of radio, omit the music sections, and instead include sections on health, religion, political, and ethical speeches, etc. The letter stressed that music is one of the prohibitions of the Sharia law, that it “makes the innocent youth of the country lecherous,” and inhibits them from seeking a “scientific and ethical position” (Figure 9).  ence, the experiences of listening to radio generally, and to music specifically, were different in nature, and included such reactionary responses as well.

38

Source: National Library and Archives of Iran. (Figure 8.)

39

Source: National Library and Archives of Iran. (Figure 9.)

Iranian Music on Radio Tehran: 1940-1941 (The Formative Phase)

During this short but formative period in which policy makers were busy formulating the content of radio programs, Iranian music nevertheless became audible through Radio Tehran. Tehran’s radio programs in May 1940 show various rubrics: “Western music” performed by the bureau of music’s orchestra, “Iranian instrumental and vocal music” (sāz va āvāz Irani) by the “radio’s music performers,” and a few sections broadcasting gramophone records, and the royal anthem.[31] Beginning in Radio Tehran’s second year, a separate section for Iranian music appeared in its list of programs.  owever, even in accommodating various musical genres, the radio authorities had limited choices and resources. Such limits were therefore not necessarily related to the varied tastes of policymakers, but rather stemmed from limited resources, even in the case of popular music. For instance, in a document dated March 1941, and signed by the deputy to the prime minister’s office, a purchase of “Arabic, Turkish, and Afghani records” is ordered for the Iranian ministry of foreign affairs. The order requested the ministry to navigate the best singers and performers of other countries who were popular among their people.[32]

Apart from such efforts to accommodate imported popular music records during this early period, specific schedules for the performance of Iranian music were allocated. The radio’s audiences were able to listen to the works of notable male musicians, including Aliakbar Shahnazi, Moshir-Homayun Shahrdar, Habib Somaei, female vocal musicians such as Qamarolmoluk Vaziri, Ruhangiz, and Ruhbaksh, and also the sound of ensembles performing Iranian music. An ensemble that appears in the documents is referred to as “the board of Radio’s musicians” or the “radio’s music ensemble.” This group, which performed in the Homayun mode, is listed as a performer of Iranian music on the radio’s programs, and is featured in the annual festival of the organization for the cultivation of thought in April 1941.[33]

However, as I mentioned earlier, the foundation of radio led to the increased audibility of Iranian music within specific time schedules, which was important specifically for the sociability of Iranian art/ classical music given radio’s wide outreach. In what follows, I consider a few advertisements titled “The Program of Iranian Music” featuring Moshir Homayun Shahrdar, and Ali Akbar Shahnazi, and I show how the musical content of these programs was distinct and featured both Iranian art as well as popular compositions separately in different schedules. One of Moshir- Homayun’s performance sessions consisted of an official tributary song, two rhythmic vocal songs or taṣnīf, composed by himself on the poems of Ferdowsi and Khayyam, a ney solo, a duet with tar, and finally a solo piano performance.[34] The program featuring Shahnazi on May 27, 1941 details his performance session as follow: in the first section Shahnazi and his ensemble performed a popular song titled “Forugh-i shādi,” further to a pīshdarāmad, taṣnīf, and ring in Isfahan mode, all of which constitute the core repertory of Iranian art/classical music. The second section consisted of pīshdarāmad, taṣnīf, and ring in the chahārgāh mode. In the final section of the program, Shahnazi also performed a solo for fifteen minutes.

40
Iṭilā‘āt.
May 14, 1941. Source: Iṭilā‘āt (Figure 10.)

41
May 17, 1941. Source: Iṭilā‘āt. (Figure 11.)

42
May 21, 1941. Source: Iṭilā‘āt. (Figure 12.)

43
May 26, 1941. Source: Iṭilā‘āt. (Figure 13.)

During this short but formative stage, the radio became a space where female vocal musicians of the Reza Shah period, such as Qamarol-Moluk Vaziri, Ruhangiz, and Ezzat Ruhbakhsh performed, and whose voices could be heard by larger masses. While nearly all instrumental performers were male, female vocal musicians’ presence was an interesting aspect given radio’s large coverage. Generally, the entire period under discussion marked an era where the gendered dichotomy in vocal music performance between āvāz and taṣnīf—as it appeared later in the mid 1950s—had not been yet formed.

A document dated February 26, 1941 lists Ruhangiz as a performer of vocal music under the section titled, the “Iranian instrumental and vocal music program” (sāz va āvāz Irani).[35] In another interesting document, the deputy of the radio’s commission, in a letter addressed to Radio Tehran’s subcommittee, conveys a series of decrees ordered by princess Shamas Pahlavi to the radio’s commission. The second clause of the order mentions that the vocal music of two female vocalist, namely Behzadi—a relatively unknown figure—and the famous and prolific vocalist of Reza Shah’s period, Qamarolmoluk Vaziri, is endorsed, and the decree further asked the subcommittee to recruit these two female vocal musicians.[36] Such decrees show that the administration of radio at this time was not solely dependent on the decisions made by music authorities such as Minbashian, and that decision-making in accessing the pathways of radio was in fact a more complex process.

44
From Left to Right: Mehdi Qiasi, Ruhangiz, Hoseyn Yahaqqi, Unknown, Lotfollah Majd,
Unknown, Javad Lashkari. Radio’s Studio, 1940s. Personal Collection. (Figure 14.)

Iranian Music in Radio Between 1941-1942

In this section, I follow the question of Iranian music’s audibility from Radio Tehran, and show how Iranian music, specifically vocal and instrumental music, were prominently heard from that platform. Reza Shah’s resignation in September 1941 heralded various transformations in the cultural, political, and administrative sphere in Iran, including transformations in the radio’s administration. One immediate result was the reemergence of Vaziri at the administrative level of music in the country, and his presence in radio. One of Vaziri’s very early initiatives in this period was founding the modern orchestra or urkistr-i-nuvīn in radio. The orchestra began its activities in radio from November 1941 and performed twice a week on Radio Tehran.[37] Vaziri, in his November 24, 1941 speech on the radio, described the music of this orchestra as “Iran’s new music in a newly founded orchestra, with the aim of reaching audiences’ ears.” In this speech, he expressed that music must be ‘revived’ based on what he called “scientific methods.” He described his modernist goals for Iranian music as follows:

The music of Iran should not be sacrificed for European music. The only aspect of European music useful for us is to base our music on the methods and foundation of European music, and to make it scientific, so that it can be taught in any school. Over the past one-and-a-half months that I have been appointed in charge of a job that I always admired […] I have established […] an orchestra. The orchestra’s repertory is based on the foundations of Iranian music, but from a scientific perspective, and it is based on international music, which is to say […] [it] has harmony, and unlike the usual approach in Iranian music, it is not monotonous.[38]

Despite the significance of orchestration and Vaziri’s ‘scientific’ approach to Iranian music, the majority of Iranian music performances broadcast on Radio Tehran from 1941 until late 1942 were of vocal art/ classical music performed by noted vocal musicians, and instrumental performances of solo or smaller ensemble musicians. In other words, although Vaziri represented the modernist narrative of Iranian music in which the question of orchestration was significant, in these years it was instead āvāz and solo performances that were widely performed.

The bureau of music too had requested the “local performers of the provinces to perform their regional music on radio,” and invited the famous ney performers of Reza Shah’s period, Mehdi Navāei from Isfahan, and Rahim Qanuni from Shiraz, to perform on Radio Tehran.[39] This announcement stated that “the best performers and singers of each city, specifically the performers of the national and old musical instruments that are common in between the villagers,” are invited to perform on radio.[40] Clearly, this request did not lead to invitations of regional folk musicians to the radio, but in fact, in the first two years it was—as previously mentioned—specifically well-known musicians of Iranian vocal and instrumental music who performed. The weekly Iṭilā‘āt began listing radio performances following Reza Shah’s resignation. These programs show distinct performances that involved important sections from the repertory of Iranian art/classical music that included pīshdarāmad, vocal sections, taṣnīf and instrumental chahār’mizrāb, and ring forms.[41]

Such a strong presence of Iranian art/classical music, specifically vocal and instrumental music, resulted in objections by various audiences, and from other music activists. For instance, an advertisement sent to the daily Iṭilā‘āt titled “The New Program in Radio,” shows the dissatisfaction of some of radio’s audiences from what it claimed to be the “exclusion of the European music section from the end of the daily music program.” The letter further demanded that the bureau of music, but also Vaziri, pay attention to this situation.[42] As Fayyaz shows, one of the issues at this time—that is after Reza Shah’s resignation—in radio’s management was the contestation between two wings in the musical administration of radio: on the one hand, the Vaziri-Khaleqi wing that represented a modernist narrative of Iranian music, and, on the other hand, a new wing that promoted Western classical music, represented by Parviz Mahmud. Vaziri was in fact at the center of these criticisms, since in the eyes of the critics, he represented Iranian music. Harsh criticism came from Ataollah Zahed, who sent a letter from Tehran’s theater hall to Radio Tehran, addressing Abutaleb Shirvani, the general chief of the bureau of publication and radio. In this letter, he severely criticized radio policies, to which he attributed Vaziri’s presence at the level of decision making. Zahed claimed the situation of music, since Vaziri’s take over, has become worse than before.[43] He raised five critical points about radio’s music programs, and accused Vaziri and Khaleqi to have “purposefully made people listen to and experience the music of Iran as dreary, and have made the world weary of our music.”[44][45] The manifestation of “dreary music,” according to him, was the vocal music of the famous vocal musicians performing Iranian art/classical vocal music on radio. He objected by asking why, in such a vast country, only a few “old and scrap singers” should perform on radio. He wrote:

For instance, consider how much a person could at any point of time, upon switching on the radio, listen to Iranian music, and be compelled to listen to a performance in Sah’gāh by Rubakhsh, an Isfahan by Adib Khansari, or a Shur by Badeezadeh, or a Bayat Tork by Ruhangiz, or Homayun by Taj or the songs Kharīdār-i tū and nīm-i shab by Abdol’ali Vaziri (a relative member)!!! Never mind how perfect and excellent these performances are.49

The fierce criticisms Zahed raised against the radio’s music targeted Vaziri. But at the core of Zahed’s criticism are his objections against the centrality of Iranian music generally, and specifically vocal classical music, and its performers. Zahed’s criticisms showcase a reality: the primacy of Iranian vocal and instrumental classical music. This was something that he considered Vaziri to be responsible for, but did not realize that such performances indeed constituted the main capacity of Iranian music at the time and even in the years to come.

As I mentioned in the previous section, with the establishment of Radio Tehran, the performance of Iranian music within specific time schedules became important. It is in this period that such a conception of performance in specific time schedules gains even further importance with more regular performances. Both Iṭilā‘āt and Iṭilā‘ātiHaftegi published the list of programs of radio from the fall of 1941 until at least 1942.[46] Vocalists such as Taj, Adib Khansari, Badeezadeh, Qamarolmoluk Vaziri, and Ruhangiz were prolific during this period. Free metered vocal music,[47] and metered vocal music or taṣnīf, instrumental pieces such as pīshdarāmad and ring, were performed frequently. Iṭilā‘āt, in its advertisement of the radio’s programming, details these programs, and I will briefly describe a selection of the performance sessions. In a program dated November 30, 1941, in the first section Ruhangiz performed with Abolhassan Saba’s violin in the sah’gāh mode; the performance repertory included a pīshdarāmad, free metered vocal music, and a taṣnīf. The second program of the day also featured Ruhangiz, but with the tar performed by Neidavud. In the third section of the day, urkistr-i nuvīn performed various pieces, including popular pieces such as marsh, waltz, but also a taṣnīf that was performed by the vocal musician Abdol’ali Vaziri. Another program dated December 4, 1941 listed two sections; the first section involved a performance by the college of officers’ orchestra that featured four songs during the first hour of the day. But during the second time slot of the radio’s program, the famous Santur performer, Habib Somaei, performed for an hour along with Badeezadeh’s vocal music in the abūʿaṭā mode. The second section of the same day again featured Badeezadeh with Ali-Akbar Shahnazi who performed in Humayūn mode; the performance involved a pīshdarāmad, an āvāz, and ended with a taṣnīf titled “Parvānah-i gulzār.” The program dated December 11 had three sections: in the first section, the officers’ orchestra appeared on radio; in the second section, Habib Somaei, along with the vocal musician Taj-i Esfahani,[48] performed in the Bayāt-i turk mode, and finally in the third section, Taj again performed with Ali-Akbar Shahnazi in the sah’gāh mode; this latter performance session included a pīshdarāmad, an āvāz section, and a final ring as the closing section.[49]

45
Radio Tehran’s programs. November 29, 1941. Source: Iṭilā‘āt. (Figure 15.)

16
Radio Tehran’s programs. December 1941. Source: Iṭilā‘āt. (Figure 16.)

17
Radio Tehran’s programs. Source: Iṭilā‘āt. (Figure 17.)

18
December 29, 1941. Source: Iṭilā‘āt. (Figure 18.)

Iranian Music on the Radio: From the Mid-1940s to the Early 1950s

Iranian music remained an important component of the radio’s programs from the mid 1940s until 1951. This period has often been overlooked given the lack of sufficient documents and sources. In this section, I situate my earlier argument based on a few published documents, and also several recently found documents of the radio’s programs. Sections titled, “Iranian music,” “solo” and “Iranian ensemble,” or orchestra, are frequently mentioned in these documents. It is finally the political crisis during the oil nationalization movement that marginalized music, including Iranian music performed on radio.

Three recently found catalogues of Radio Tehran outline radio programming in 1946, 1947, and 1950. The first catalogue, dated November 23-29, 1946 shows the regular presence of noted Iranian musicians; these include figures such as Abolhassan Saba, Hoseyn Yahaqqi, Morteza Neidavud, and Hassan Khan Etezadi.[50] The general term “music” appears on several sections of the programs, and a few sections feature musicians performing Iranian music. A separate section details the broadcast of “Iranian music records” on different days, which most likely entailed the broadcasting of music from the 78rpm gramophone records of Reza Shah’s period. The 1947 catalogue titled īnjā Tehran Ast contains several sections under the titles “Iranian music,” “solo instrument,” “Iranian orchestra,” and “Iranian music records,” but does not refer to specific names of musicians. This catalogue, however, provides a few interesting visual documentations of the performers. Finally, the last catalogue titled Ṣidā-yi Tehran, dated 1950, illustrates the radio programs in the month of March, and provides detailed information about various radio musicians.

19Morteza Mahjubi, performing in Radio Tehran’s studio. 1947. Source: Injā Tehran Ast:
Radio Tehran’s Magazine. Personal Collection. (Figure 19.)

20
A chart of Radio Tehran’s programs. 1947. Injā Tehran Ast. Personal Collection.
(Figure 20.)

The National Association of Music, founded in the summer of 1944,[51] performed on several occasions on radio during this period. Chang, the magazine of the National Association, reported that the orchestra of the association had performed four times on radio until 1946. In November 1944, nearly five months after the foundation of the national association, the orchestra led by Khaleqi, along with two vocal musicians, Yahya Motamed-Vaziri and Abdol’ali Vaziri, performed on radio.[52] A few years later, in 1941, after the attempted assassination of the Shah in front of the Faculty of Law at the University of Tehran, Khaleqi conducted the orchestra of the association along with the vocal performance of Qolamhoseyn Banan, and Maleke Hekmat-Shoar, as a tributary performance to the monarch’s health. The orchestra also performed a song for the nationalization of oil in May 1951.[53]

Throughout the latter half of the 1940s, smaller ensembles of Iranian music proliferated and performed on radio. All the mentioned catalogues refer to some of these ensembles. For instance, on November 23, 1946, the third part a separate section marked under the rubric of “Iranian music,” Qasem Qorab, along with an ensemble including Abolhasan Saba, Javad Ma’rufi, Vosuq, Somaei, Vaziritabar, Zarpanje, and Mehdi Qiasi, performed on the radio in Bayāt Isfahan mode. Qasem Qorab and the same ensemble appeared once again in the programs dated November 26 and performed for half an hour in Chahārgāh mode. The same ensemble accompanied Qolamhoseyn Banan, an emerging male vocalist of the 1940s in another “Iranian music” program for half an hour. Another program, titled “Iranian orchestra,” featured another ensemble consisting of I’tiẓādī on tar, Rezaei performing violin, and Safaeipur with tonbak. In the programs dated November 25,1946, the Ma’arefi brothers’ ensemble appeared in the second section. A letter dated November 1, 1947, and signed by Moshir Homayun Shahrdar, as head of Radio Tehran’s music council, requests Yahya Niknavaz to conduct a newly founded orchestra. According to this letter, other members include the famous tar performer Esmaeil Kamali, Kordbache, Mansur Yahaqqi, Asadi, Mehdi Qiasi, Khosravani and vocal musicians Yunes Dardashti and Manuchehr Shafiei.[54] The 1950 catalogue shows an increase in musical performances on the radio, and includes references to various smaller ensembles and orchestras including Tehran’s radio orchestra, and the Barbad Society’s ensemble.[55]

Solo performances of Iranian music were part of the radio’s programs and many soloists performing Iranian music were featured on radio. In the third section of the programs dated November 23, 1946, Lotfollah Majd, one of Radio Tehran’s prolific future tar soloists performed for fifteen minutes. Majd also appeared in another solo performance, lasting fifteen minutes, and dated November 26. The 1950 catalogue also shows that Majd was one of Radio Tehran’s soloists. On November 29, 1946, Manuchehr Sadeqi performed a solo performance for fifteen minutes under the second section of the day’s programs, titled “special program.”  Another solo performance of Iranian music on the same date featured the famous piano performer Moshir-Homayun Shahrdar, who performed for half an hour. Hoseyn Yahaqqi, one of the important figures of Iranian art/classical music who performed mainly violin, but also Kamānchah, contributed to the solo performances by way of a fifteen-minute section on November 27, 1946. Mansur Yahaqqi mentions that in the middle of the 1940s, Khaleqi requested his uncle, Hoseyn Yahaqqi, to perform and ‘revive’ the kamancheh, which had been undermined by the violin in Iranian music.[56] In fact, Hoseyn Yahaqqi’s name appears as a kamanche soloist in Radio Tehran’s solo performance programs on Tuesdays in 1950. The 1950 catalogue lists a separate section for solo performances. Apart from Hoseyn Yahaqqi, Abolhasan Saba, and Morteza Mahjubi, who had appeared in earlier radio programs, the end of this period marked the emergence of a new generation of soloists as well. Tar performers such as Mehdi Takestani, Esmail Kamali, and Ebrahim Sarkhosh, the piano performer Javad Ma’rufi, and Ahmad Ebadi on setar. Many of these names also appear in the list of Radio Tehran’s programs published in the monthly Mūsīqi-i Iran in 1952.

The radio gradually welcomed a younger generation of musicians and soloists. One of the youngest emerging musicians whose name appears among the contributors to Radio Tehran’s music programs is Homayun Khorram, a noted apprentice of the famous violin performer Abolhassan Saba, who performed for fifteen minutes on November 26, 1946. Manuchehr Jahanbeglu, another young musician, performed on santur in a fifteen-minute section on November 29, 1946. There are many documents regarding the participation of Mansur Yahaqqi, a young santur performer and one of Habib Somaei’s apprentices from the mid-1940s. Mansur Yahaqqi recounts that in the mid-1940s, Ruhollah Khaleqi met him at his uncle Hoseyn Yahaqqi’s house, and that Khaleqi invited him to perform a santur solo during the interludes of the national association’s orchestra. A document presumably dated around the same time, and signed by Ruhollah Khaleqi, requests Mansur Yahaqqi to perform on the radio.[57] Another document signed by one of Radio Tehran’s head of programs on August 4, 1946  asked Mansur Yahaqqi to perform a santur solo on air on the occasion of the constitutional revolution on August 5, 1946.[58] His name also appears among the radio’s young santur soloists, in a program dated November 28, 1946, in which he performed for fifteen minutes in the second section of the radio’s programs. Mansoor Yahaqqi also points to an invitation letter handed over by Khaleqi to perform santur on Radio Tehran; the invitation letter issued by the general bureau of publication and propaganda requested Mansoor Yahaqqi to be present at the Radio Tehran festival on April 25, 1947, on the occasion of the eight-year anniversary of the radio’s inauguration.91 Mansur Yahaqqi’s name also appears as part of Yahya Niknavaz’s ensemble.

21
Iraj Sadeqi, a young santur performer at the studio of Radio Tehran. Injā Tehran Ast.
Personal Collection. (Figure 21.)

Famous male vocal musicians continued their performances from time to time on radio until the latter part of this period. Abdol’ali Vaziri featured on radio with his tar and vocal music performance at the end of the third section. Apart from the famous vocal musicians of Iranian music such as Adib and Taj, a new generation of Iranian vocal musicians who performed art/classical vocal music found their ways to the hallways of the radio’s studio. Seyed Javad Zabihi, a famous vocalist also associated with Tehran’s religious circles, began his career in the late 1940s and early 1950s in radio and performed vocal music with religious and spiritual content. Two other male vocal musicians who performed on radio at the end of the 1940s and during the early 1950s are Yunes Dardashti and Mohammad Emami.

Female vocalists continued to contribute to the radio’s Iranian music performances. The names of Qamarolmoluk Vaziri and Ruhangiz, two performers of the earlier generation, again appear among radio’s female vocal musicians during these years. Qamarol-Moluk Vaziri’s name appears in the second section of November 29, 1946, under the title of the “Special Program.” In this program, Qamar featured along with an “Iranian orchestra” for half an hour. In the second brochure of the radio’s programs dated 1950, her name appears among the vocalists of Radio Tehran on March 23. Ruhangiz’s name appears as vocal musician on Radio Tehran during the final years of the 1940s. Her name does not appear in the current list of programs available from the mid-1940s, but from what is available from 1949 on, it is certain that she began her performance career in radio. Ruhangiz was a regular performer in one of Tehran’s famous cafés known as Jamshid. She ostensibly stopped performing there in order to resume her performances on radio in the latter half of the 1940s. The daily Iṭilā‘āt, in an advertisement about Ruhangiz, mentions that she has stopped performing at the above mentioned café, and that she has commenced performing on Radio Tehran.[59] A new generation of female vocal musicians performing Iranian music gradually emerged from the mid-1940s on. In the catalogue dated 1946, Delkash, a female vocalist who had emerged in the 1940s, performed in sah’gāh mode along with one of the important ensembles of Iranian music consisting of Morteza Mahjubi on piano, Neidavud on tar, Mehdi Khaledi, Forutan and Zolfonun on violin, and Zahedi on tonbak.

00

 Cover of the Catalogue of Radio Programs, November 23-30, 1946.
Source: Majlis Library. (Figure 22.)

23
1946  Catalogue. November 23. (Figure 23.)

24
Catalogue. November 24. (Figure 24.)

25
1946 C atalogue. November 25. (Figure 25.)

26
Catalogue. November 26. (Figure 26.)

27
1946  Catalogue. November 27. (Figure 27.)

28
1946 Catalogue. November 28. (Figure 28.)

29
1946  Catalogue. November 29. (Figure 29.)

30
1950 C atalogue. Personal Collection. (Figure 30.)

31
1950 Catalogue. Personal  Collection. (Figure 31.)

32
1950  Catalogue. Personal Collection. (Figure 32.)

33
1950  Catalogue. Personal Collection. (Figure 33.)

34
Radio Music Programs. 1952. Source: Mūsīqī-yi Iran. (Figure 34.)

Conclusion

In this article, I examined Iranian music on the radio in the first decade of the latter’s establishment in Iran, showing how music performance within specific schedules was a crucial part of radio programming. Iranian music, including Iranian art/classical music, was audible throughout this period. Instrumental forms such as pīshdarāmad, ring and taṣnīf, and Iranian free metered vocal music known as āvāz alongside metric vocal pieces, were broadcast for a broader audience. While radio is predominantly considered as a medium in the dissemination of popular music, at least during the first decade of its establishment in Iran, it led to the wider listening experience of Iranian music, including Iranian art music.

[1] I must thank my mentor, Dr. Dariush Rahmanian from the history department of the University of Tehran, Mardomnameh’s editor-in-chief, and Jane Lewison, Director of the Golha and Golistan Projects, for their invaluable support and guidance.

[2] Meltem Ahiska, Occidentalism in Turkey: Questions of Modernity and National Identity in Turkish Radio Broadcasting (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 2.

[3] I use the term Iranian art/classical music instead of mūsīqī-yi sunnatī or Iranian/Persian traditional music. The term ‘traditional’ for various negative connotations is not correct. Moreover, as I have tried to hint here, performances with instruments such as violin and piano also constituted Iranian art/classical music. In this paper, I consider pieces such as pishdarāmad, ring, and free metered vocal music known commonly as āvāz as constituting the core repertory of Iranian art/ classical music. Of course, taṣnīf or metric vocal music are potentially part of the repertory of Iranian art/classical music too. In recent years, there has been debate about the term “classical” in non-western musical contexts, including in Iran. I do not enter the ethnomusicological debates in Iran on this concept, as I think such debates have in various ways reproduced binaries and created metanarratives regarding music history in modern Iran that are ahistorical in nature. For an ethnomusicological discussion on the concepts of popular and classical in modern Iran, see Sasan Fatemi, Paydayish-i mūsīqī-i mardumʹpasand dar Irān: taʼammulī bar mafāhīm-i kilāsīk, mardumi, mardumʹpasand [The Genesis of Popular Music in Iran: Reflections on Concepts of Classical, Folk and Popular] (Tehran: Mahoor, 2013).

[4] Jane Lewisohn, based on her interviews with an influential radio authority prior to 1979, and an early sound engineer named Nikoogar, mentions that at least until the mid-1950s, the radio’s programs were performed live. Of course, there are a few sound materials available from radio performances before the mid-1950s, including a performance session from the late 1940s—recorded in the army radio on a 78rpm record—by the famous vocal musician Hoseyn Qavami and Salehi on tar. These few sound sources were ostensibly recorded on 78rpm records.

[5] Seyyed Javad Badeezadeh, Gulbāng-i miḥrāb tā bāng-i miz̤rāb: Khāṭirāt-i Javād Mīr‘alinaqī, 1281-1358 [Melody of Mihrab to the Strike of Mezrab: Memories of Seyed Javad Badeezadeh (1903-1980)], ed. Seyyed Alireza Miralinaqi (Tehran: Ney, 2004), 122.

[6] This aspect requires further detailed historical analysis.

[7] At the end of the 1940s there gradually emerges a gendered conception in the context of Iranian vocals, one that becomes prominent later in the 1950s. I have discussed this historical aspect of gender in Iranian vocal music history during the Pahlavi period in my forthcoming work. “Iranian Vocal Music and the Question of Gender During the Pahlavi Period.”

[8] For a discussion on history of music revival regarding Iranian music, see Laudan Nooshin, “Two Revivalist Moments in Iranian Classical Music,” in The Oxford Handbook of Music Revival, ed.  aroline Bithell and Juniper Hill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[9] For a discussion on Gulhā’s formation and history, see Jane Lewisohn, “Flowers of Persian Song and Music: Davud Pirniā and the Genesis of the Gulhā Programs Journal of Persianate Studies 1 (January 2008): 79–101.

[10] See Borumand in Iḥyā-i sunnatʹhā bā rūykard-i naw [The Revival of Traditions with a New Approach], ed. Einollah Mosayyebzadeh (Tehran: Sūrih Mihr, 2014), 28.

[11] riticisms of Iranian art/classical music, as well as radio’s music dates back to 1950s and 60s. I have discussed these criticisms in my master’s thesis and have analyzed and contextualized some of the debates in a published work. See Pouya Nekouei and Reza Parvizade, “Naqd va tafsirʹhā-yi ‘ʻirfān garāyānah az mūsīqī-i Īrānī va barkhī az janbah’ha-yi bistar-i farhangi: farhangi’ijtimā‘aī mūsīqī dar dahah’hā-yi si va chihil-i shamsi” [‘Sufi-Based’ Narratives and riticisms of Iranian Music and Socio- ultural  haracteristics of Musical  context in 1950s and 1960s”] Pazuhisha-i Irānshināsi 10 (Winter and Spring 1400/2021): 209-224. https://jis.ut.ac.ir/article_78286. html?lang=en.

[12] For his views on shīrīn navāzī, see Majid Kiani, Haft dastgāh-i mūsīqī-i Irān [The Seven Dastgah of Iranian Music] (Tehran: Moa’llef, 1368/1181), 109-10.

[13] Fatemi, Paydāyish-i mūsīqī-i, 127.

[14] Fatemi, Paydayish-i mūsīqī-i, 127. This understanding of radio in modern Iran, in my view, owes to the Adornoian conceptualization whereby radio’s role in the promotion of commercial music, and the idea of “regression of listening” resonates prominently. For a discussion on Adorno’s “regression of listening,” see Veit Erlman, “Echoless: The Pathology of Freedom and the Crisis of Twentieth Century Listening,” in Reason and Resonance: A History of Modern Aurality (New York: Zone Books, 2019), 307-42.

[15] For a brief discussion on problems of historical writing in music, see Pouya Nekouei, “Mukhtaṣarī dar bāb muʿz̤alāt va faqar tārikh nigārī dar tarikh-i muʻasir mūsīqī-i Iran” [A Brief Note on Problems of Historical Writing in Contemporary Music History of Iran], Hunar-i Mūsīqī 182 (2021).

[16] For a comprehensive treatment of this theme in the west, see The Oxford Handbook of Listening in the 19th and 20th Centuries, ed.  Christian Thorau and Hansjackob Ziemer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). I have also looked at the public and private sphere and the question of listening to music in modern Iran in two separate studies. For a published discussion, see Pouya Nekouei, “Consirt va Tārikh-i Shinidan: Mardum va Mūsīqī-yi Kilāsikī dar Tehran-i Dūrah-i Riz̤ā Shāh [Concert and History of Listening: People and Iranian Classical Music in Tehran During Reza Shah’s Period],” Mardumnāmah, no. 18 and 19 (2021-2022 Fall and Winter): 10-45. https://www.magiran.com/paper/2548356/کنسرت-و-تاریخ-شنیدن.

[17] Mohammadreza Fayyaz, Tā barʹdāmidan-i gulʹha: muṭālaʻah-i jāmiʻahʹshinākhtī-i mūsīqī dar Irān az sipīdah dam-i tajaddud tā 1334 [Until the Advent of Gulhā: A Sociological Study of Music in Iran from the Dawn of Modernity until 1954] (Tehran: Sure Mehr, 2019), 163-68.

[18] Fayyaz, Tā barʹdāmidan-i gulʹhā, 154.

[19] Fayyaz Tā barʹdāmidan-i gulʹhā, 154.

[20] Fayyaz, Tā barʹdāmidan-i gulʹhā, 157-75.

[21] Fayyaz, Ta barʹdamidan-i gulʹha, 21-26.

[22] Iṭilā‘āt. “Guftār-i Rūz: Radio Tehran,” No. 4165: 1.

[23] Report addressed to “the Minister of Finance and the Chief of the Radio Commission,” National Library and Archives of Iran, Document Number 240/096320.

[24] Iṭilā‘āt-i Haftegi, July 20, 1945, 2.

[25] Tehran Muṣṣvar, August 18, 1950. No. 367.

[26] Iṭilā‘āt. June 10, 1941. “Music of Radio.”

[27] Iṭilā‘āt. March 15, 1942, No. 4835.

[28] I have borrowed this concept from Tejaswini Niranjana’s recent works. For a discussion on the concept of musicophilia, see Tejaswini Niranjana, Musicophilia in Mumbai (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020).

[29] Badeezadeh, Gulbang-i mihrab, 24.

[30] 30Badeezadeh, Gulbang-i mihrab, 96.

[31] “Radio Tehran’s Program,” National Library and Archives of Iran, Document Number 240/016320.

[32] National Library and Archives of Iran, Document Number, 240/096315. Until this date, the various genres of popular music in Iran had not yet completely developed.

[33] Iṭilā‘āt April 25, 1941, Friday. No. 4514, 1.

[34] The piano emerged as an important instrument of musical modernity in the context of Iranian music during Reza Shah for the performance of Iranian music. Moshir Humayun, along with Morteza Mahjubi were two prominent performers of Iranian-style piano, whose records appeared during the Reza Shah period.

[35] The brochure of Radio Tehran’s programs dated February 26, 1941. National Library and Archives of Iran, Document Number 310-065130016.

[36] “Radio’s Music Subcommittee,” National Library and Archives of Iran, Document Number 240-096315.

[37] Iṭilā‘āt.

[38] “Iranian Music”, Iṭilā‘āt, No. 4717, November 24, 1941.

[39] Document No. 91 in Documents from Music, Theater and Cinema (1925-1979), vol. 1: 267.

[40] Document No. 91: 267.

[41] For an example of schedules of Iranian music on radio during this time, see Iṭilā‘āt-i Haftigī, March 21, 1942, 23.

[42] Iṭilā‘āt, October 27, 1941.

[43] Ataollah Zahed, Document No. 06/1, in Documents from Music, Theater and Cinema in Iran, vol. 1, 274.

[44] Zahed, Document No. 06/1, 275.

[45] Zahed, Document No. 06/1, 275.

[46] For a comprehensive list, see Shahab Mena, Habib Somaei va raviyan athar-i aw [ abib Somaei and Narrators of his Works] (Tehran: Sure Mehr, 2010), 278-81.

[47] This term is commonly known as āvāz in Persian. There are of course differences of opinion about a better term for āvāz, but I do not enter musicological debates, and have used the common accepted term āvāz in this paper.

[48] Taj Isfahani, a prolific vocal musician who began his career in 1928, was invited to perform on Radio Tehran as “vocalist of Radio Tehran” from October 23, 1941. In fact, there is another document signed by Khaleqi as chief of the country’s Music Bureau, that informs Taj of his performances on the radio’s monthly programs.

[49] Performances of pīshdarāmad, vocal section, taṣnīf and ring still constitute a full cycle of classical performance.

[50] A relatively less famous, but important tar performer of Reza Shah’s period. His performances were recorded on Polyphon with red labels in Tehran at the end of 1927 and the beginning of 1928.

[51] For a detailed history of the National Association of Music, see Pouya Nekouei, “An Overview of the Activities of National Association of Music and its documents in the 1940s,” Mahoor Music Quarterly.

[52] Iṭilā‘āt 5639, November 1944.

[53] idā-yi Tehran, 1951, Personal  ollection.

[54] Mena, Habib Somaei, 555. While Niknavaz was in charge of conducting this orchestra, the famous and prolific vocal musician Javad Badeezadeh was put in charge of managing it.

[55] The catalogue also mentions other orchestras: the Royal Army Orchestra, Tehran’s Theater Hall Orchestra, and the Balalaika Orchestra. The Balalaika Orchestra featured in the 78rpm records during the Reza Shah period. The orchestra performed Iranian musical pieces such as ring and pīshdarāmad but using equal temperament musical scales. Hence, I have not included it among the ensembles that performed Iranian music.

[56] Mansoor Yahaqqi in conversation with Shahab Mena, in Habib Somaei, 552.

[57] Mena, Habib Somaei, 552.

[58] Mena, Habib Somaei, 554.

[59] Iṭilā‘āt, September 19, 1949.

A Chronology of Sino–Sasanian Political Relations (455–710) Built Directly from Chinese Primary-Source Quotations

Exile and Absence from the True Homeland: The Topos of Exile in Religious Literature

Alan Williams is Research Professor of Iranian Studies and Comparative Religion at the University of Manchester, was British Academy Research Professor, and held a Leverhulme Trust Major Research Fellowship. His interests span the literatures and cultures of pre-Islamic and Islamic Iran, with published studies of Pahlavi-era, classical, and modern Persian texts. Among his most recent books are The Zoroastrian Myth of Migration . . . Qesse-ye Sanjan (Brill, 2009), and The Masnavi of Rumi, A New English Translation with Persian Text and Explanatory Notes, books 1 and 2 (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2020), with books 3 to 6 to follow.

Introduction

This paper started life as a short presentation at a one-day conference on “Exile, Diaspora and Persian Poetry” in November 2019 at Leiden University. My brief was to present some medieval texts of my own choosing with the theme of exile and absence from the homeland, as a precursor to the evening’s discussion of twentieth-century perspectives on poetry and politics in modern Iran and its diaspora. I chose texts I had previously translated or discussed in publications, but not together as here, where my purpose is to reflect on the fluidity of the concepts of exile and absence from the homeland.

In the present age of postcolonial migration, the concept of diaspora becomes increasingly ramified as diasporic communities become assimilated into their adopted lands, and self-identify as Iranian American, British Muslim, or Indian Parsi, for example. Diaspora, dispersion of a people, is a borrowing from the Ancient Greek diaspeírein (to scatter about)—for example, as used by historians to describe the movement of citizens of a dominant city–state who migrated in order to colonize other areas, to bring the territories into their empire. With the translation of the Hebrew Bible into Greek in the third century BC, diaspora came to be used of Jewish and other tribes from the Northern Kingdom of Israel who had been exiled by the Assyrians in the eighth century BC. Thereafter follows the long history of diasporic populations of displaced peoples, who had migrated more or less against their will.

The topos of exile and separation from the physical or spiritual homeland runs deep in the religious imagination, and is tantamount to an underlying plot or narrative of chronologically and causally related actions. In genres such as mystical and eschatological literature, the religious are repeatedly exposed to key texts, whether they are scriptural citations, prayer formulae and traditional aphorisms, or elements of ritual practice that dramatize and reenact their salvation history. The three medieval or premodern poetic texts discussed below variously recall or allude to contexts of actual dislocation, but also reflect metaphorically on the theme of existential, spiritual separation from and longing for the “true homeland.” Indeed, reflect is the operative word in each case: if the actual and the metaphorical are two sides of the same coin, it is not certain which is which, and whether the explicit form is the obverse or the reverse, as they interpenetrate and flow into one another.

However, I begin by identifying a set of reference points in discussion of exile in religious literature; such nodal points may intersect and overlap. They are the following:

  1. Lost home: This is in only one sense the starting point (that is, of a migration), for it is occasioned by previous actions and events. In general, those who lose or leave their home may do so for negative reasons, by compulsion (for example, prototypically, the Fall and expulsion from Eden), or because of the danger of invasion, revolution, war, or persecution. Alternatively, departure may be voluntary—that is, for positive reasons such as to fulfill a vow or obligation, or to improve one’s lot by economic migration. Yet even this may be preconditioned by the negative events just mentioned. The professed motivation for leaving carries a burden of ambivalent symbolism and poignant significance, pregnant with existential or spiritual meaning.
  2. Homelessness: This is the focal point of each of the texts, and is emphatically not a static state but a transitional, intermediate condition and ongoing process, with several stopping points along the way. Thus, as in these texts, it is often represented by a journey of stages and, characteristically, as in two of the texts, by an experience or threat of chaos and disintegration at a critical point in the transition. The Hebrew and the Zoroastrian Persian examples below feature a sea crossing interrupted by a storm at sea: a state of insecurity, suffering, and hopelessness. Exiles, who fear being lost in liminality, are ironically in danger of being swallowed up by the deep.
  3. Home: As a category, this is better left undefined and understated here, as it is in question in the poems, like a vanishing point, and is resolved in different ways by the poems, as a promise or commitment, or a mystery that defies fixed definition. However, two key features of this point are defined by its remoteness from the lost home, and by the necessity of a traumatic, transformative, purgative experience of the crisis experienced in Homelessness

Three Texts

The texts, from Zoroastrian, Islamic, and Jewish cultures, are by authors experiencing exile away from their longed-for homeland as they define it. Each achieves resolution of a personal and poetic tension by distinctively different means. Two are written in Persian and one in Hebrew, but they form a triad of texts with correspondences and contrasts of genre and a particular temporal point of view: looking at them together makes for a three-dimensional appreciation of the depth of pathos and poignancy in texts about exile.

The Qesse-ye Sanjan 

The Zoroastrian text now known as the Qesse-ye Sanjan (Story of Sanjan, hereafter QS) comprises some 435 Persian verse couplets composed in 1599 in the masnavi version of the bahr-e hazaj (shaking) meter.[1] Its author is the literary-minded high priest of Navsari, Bahman Kay Qobad Sanjana.[2] Text and author are more or less unknown outside the Indian Zoroastrian (Parsi) tradition. It is neither a short lyric poem nor one of masnavi length; rather, it is a micro-epic, quasi-historical in character. Overall, it tells of Zoroastrianism from its origins to the author’s present. I have chosen a central passage of 32 verses about a storm at sea at a crucial point in the long journey of flight from Islamic Iran to refuge in India. The QS is addressed to posterity, but it seems it is intended exclusively for the ears of those “of the Good Religion”: it is a narrative poem, written both for pious, commemorative reasons, representing an oral tradition of a body of story preserved within the Zoroastrian community in Gujarat, and also for the author’s own political reasons within the community, as I discovered in the course of studying it toward a published edition, translation, and analysis.[3] It features several scenes of crisis, the first of which is quoted in full below: the storm at sea during the crossing from the island of Dib (Diu, on the southern tip of the Rajkot peninsular in Gujarat) to Sanjan.

The QS begins with a 63-verse doxological proem, including a section of مناجات (prayers) in praise of God, followed by some verses on the nature of humanity and its relationship with God, and imprecations by the author. Notably, in light of the long journey ahead into exile in India, from the beginning the author addresses his God in appropriately migratory terms (vv. 5–8):

بما هر جا پناه و دستگیرست             کند بخشنده و پوزش پذیرست

همو فریاد رس هموار بودست                      بما دانش بداد و دین نمودست

غریبان پرور و دارای عالم              گنه آمرز و لغزش بخشِ آدم

همو همواره ما را رهنمای ست         انیسِ خلوت و مشکل گشای ست

He is our refuge and protector everywhere,

forgiving and accepting penitence.

And He has been our constant source of refuge,

He gave us knowledge, He revealed the faith.

The stranger’s Guardian, Keeper of the world,

forgiving sins, He pardons man’s backsliding.

He also is our Everlasting Guide,

the Friend in solitude, the Problem-solver.[4]

This poem includes a sentiment of the author’s that could equally be applied to the pilgrims on board the ship before they reach a safe haven at Sanjan (v. 53):

در این گیتی رهائی از تو ما راست    چرا از دیگران مخلص کنم خواست

In this world our salvation is from You,

why should I look to others for asylum?

The most important and well-known section of the QS runs from verse 64 to verse 223, covering all the narrative of the journey from Iran to India, and begins with a nuanced verse that is curiously resonant:

کنون بشنو شگفتی داستانها               ز گفت موبدان و باستانها

Now listen to the tales of wondrous things,

told from the lore of priests and ancient sages.

This verse contains a twofold literary reference: to the first verse of Rumi’s (1207–73) Masnavi (see the later section in this paper on the Masnavi), and also to how Ferdowsi (940–1019 or 1025) refers back to his own ancient sources of the Shahname at the beginning of the story of Rostam and Sohrab.[5]

ز گفتارِ دهقان یکی داستان               بپیوندم از گفتۀ باستان

ز موبد بر این گونه برداشت یاد        که رستم یکی روز از بامداد

In the dehqān’s story there is a tale that I

have versified from ancient narratives.

The mobad starts his recollections thus,

“Rostam, one day, just as the sun rose up…”

Bahman Kay Qobad’s introductory doxological narrative (vv. 1–63) comprises three parts: blessings in praise of God (vv. 1–10), the creation of humankind (vv. 11–21), and the calling down of blessings upon the author (vv. 22–63). The story is introduced first at v. 64, with mention of the traditional sources and a contracted synopsis of the early history of the Zoroastrian faith, as if it has been a prediction of the prophet Zoroaster, as Bahman announces in v. 77a (بوستا در بگفته حالها را, “He told of things to come in the Avesta”). Less than twenty verses later, the text sweeps forward to the end of Zoroaster’s millennium and the fall of Iran to Islam (vv. 95–97):

چو از زرتشت سال آمد هزاره          زدینِ به همی آمد کناره

چو از شه یزدگر شاهی برفته           که جُدین آمد و تختش گرفته

از آن مدت شکسته گشت ایران         دریغ آن ملکِ دین افتاد ویران

When Zoroaster’s thousandth year had come,

the limit of the Noble Faith came too.

When kingship went from Yazdegerd the King,

the infidels arrived and took his throne.

From that time forth Iran was smashed to pieces!

Alas that land of Faith now gone to ruin!

Immediately, the story begins of how those faithful to the Zand and Pazand (Avestan scriptures and subsequent exegetical texts) had to go into hiding and abandon all they possessed (vv. 99–100):

چو بهدینان و دستوران سراسر         ز کارِ دین نهان گشتند یکسر

مقام و جای و باغ و کاخ وایوان        همه بگذاشتند از بهر دین شان

When every layman and dastur at once

went into hiding for religion’s sake,

Left homes, lands, gardens, villas, palaces,

they left all for the sake of their Religion.

According to the QS, the faithful are oppressed by the دُروندان (wicked ones) to the point of renouncing their faith or fleeing to the mountains, where it is said they remain for a hundred years. At all stages of their journey, they are guided by heaven through the consultations of a sage dastur (high priest) in vv. 103, 107–11, and 117–18. The QS tells of how they travel south to Hormuz, on the southern coast of Iran, where they remain for another fifteen years, until they set sail along the coast and eventually land at the small island of Dib. They stay there for nineteen years, until they resolve to make the famously perilous sea crossing of about 200 kilometers to the western coast of India. The action of this decisive journey starts here, beginning with the decision to leave Hormuz:

درآن کشورچو سال آمد ده و پنج                   ز دروندان کشیده هریکی رنج

بدانجایی که بُد دستور دانا                            همیشه در مُنجم بُد توانا

همو در زیج‌های کهنه دیده                           که بر ما آبخور آخر رسیده

اگر این بوم بگذاریم شاید                             کنون زین ملک بیرون رفت باید

وگرنه ما همه افتیم در دام                            خرد باطل شود کاری بود خام

پس آن بهتر که از دیوان دروند                     بباید رفت ما را بر سرِهند

ز بیم جان و بهر دین همه کس                      گریزیم باز سوی هند زان پس

سوی دریا چو کشتی ساز کرده                      همانگه بادبان بر پای کرده

زن و فرزند در کشتی نشاندند                       به سوی هند کشتی تند راندند

چو کشتی سوی هند آمد یکایک                     بدیب افتاد لنگروار بیشک

105   When fifteen years had passed in that domain,

each one had suffered grief from infidels.

A wise dastur there was in that domain,

a master in the science of the stars.

He looked in his old tables of the heavens,

and said, “At last our life is finished here.

It is correct for us to leave this land.

We must now make an exit from this realm,

Or else we shall all fall into a trap.

To reason were in vain, a foolish thing.

110   So it is better we set off for India,

and that we leave behind the wicked devils.

Let everyone escape henceforth to India,

to save our lives and for Religion’s sake.”

And when a boat was ready on the sea,

and even as the mast was raised aloft,

The women and the children were embarked,

to India then they sped the boat apace.

Now when the boat came close to India,

at once they chanced on Dib, for anchorage no doubt.

The episode that follows occupies only another 22 verses of the poem but is central to the fate of the Zoroastrian pilgrims in search of a safe and permanent refuge:

فرود آمد گرفته جای آنجا                 بگل در ماند آخر پای آنجا

در آن بودند بهدین نوزده سال           شده آخر منجم زد یکی فال

بزیج اندر به دیده پیر دستور همانگه گفت کای یاران پر نور

از اینجا رفت باید جای دیگر که در آنجا بود آرام یکسر

ز گفتارش همه کس شاد گشتند          سوی گجرات کشتی تیز راندند

چو کشتی ره بدریا در کشیده از آن جا آفتِ طوفان رسیده

همه دستور دین حیران بماندند          در آن ورطه چو سرگردان بماندند

بدرگاهِ خدا رخ زار سودند               بپا ایستاد و زاریها نمودند

که ای دانا تو یاری رس در اینکار     ازین سختی رهان ما را به یکبار

بیاری رس تو ای بهرام فیروز          از این مشکل مرا گردان تو به روز

115   They disembarked and made their landing there,

and there their feet remained on land at last.

The faithful would remain for nineteen years,

until at length their sage divined an omen.

The old dastur consulted his star tables,

and said at once: “Companions, full of light,

We must depart here for another place,

together in that place there will be peace!”

They all rejoiced to hear what he had said,

full speed they sailed their boat to Gujarat.

120   But once the boat made headway on the sea,

a most ferocious storm blew up from there.

The dasturs of the faith were all distraught,

as they were cast adrift upon that whirlpool.

They rubbed their faces, crying in God’s presence,

they stood up straight and let their cries come out.

“Wise Lord, come to our rescue in this plight,

save us just once from this calamity!

Victorious Bahram, come to rescue me!

Make things auspicious for me in this trouble!

بلطفِ تو غم از طوفان نداریم                       هراسی در دل و جان می‌نیاریم

تو خود فریاد رس بیچارگانرا                       نمای راه تو گم کردگانرا

از این غرقاب گر یابم رهایی                        نه هرگز پیش آید زین بلایی

از این دریا اگر در کشور هند                       رسیم آنجا بدلشادان خرسند

فروزیم آتش بهرام پانا                                از این سختی رهان و کن توانا

پذیرفتیم مایان این ز کرکر                           که جز وی ما نداریم ایچ دیگر

ز یمن آتش بهرام فیروز                              از آن سختی همه گشتند بهروز

همان ساعت قبول افتاد زاری                       خدا در کار ایشان داد یاری

خنک بادی وزیده با خره نور                       همان باد مخالف شد از آن دور

چو کشتیبان بنام پاک دادار                           زبان بگشاد و زورق راند یکبار

همه دستور و بهدین کرد کُستی                     همانگه راند اندر بحر کشتی

چنین حکم قضا شد هم از آن پس                   سوی سنجان رسیدند آنهمه کس

125   By your grace we’ll not suffer from the storm,

there’ll be no dread within our hearts or souls.

You are defender of the helpless ones!

Reveal the way to us who’ve lost our way!

If we should find salvation from this whirlpool,

and no disaster falls on us again,

If from this sea we reach the land of India,

and are contented there with happy hearts,

We’ll light a Fire of Bahram, our Protector,

O save us from this plight and make us strong!

130   We’ve undertaken this ourselves with God,

apart from Him we have no other help.”

They were all blessed in their adversity,

by fortune of victorious Bahram’s Fire.

The very moment when their cry was heard,

God gave them succour in their difficulties.

A fair wind blew, there was a glorious light,

the hostile wind then disappeared from there.

The captain uttered “By the Holy Name

of God,” and straightaway he steered the vessel.

135   All dasturs and all laymen tied their kusti,

the boat was then propelled upon the sea.

And after that it was the law of Fate

that every one of them arrived at Sanjan.

The journey to India begins with the statement (v. 101) that they left their homes for کوهستان, the “mountainous region” of Khorasan in the northeast of Iran. A century ago, Parsi historians J. J. Modi and S. H. Hodivala argued that this is where the original Khorasani town of Sanjan was located; the QS itself asserts (in vv. 190–223) that Sanjan was the name the Zoroastrian dastur gave to the place where the pilgrims subsequently consecrated a fire temple dedicated to Bahram/Verethraghna, the Avestan yazata (gods) of victory in fulfillment of the promise they made at the height of the storm at sea.[6] The ateshbahram, which they named ایران شاه (King of Iran; the QS also refers to it as شاهِ ایران in vv. 363 and 399), is the most sacred grade of Zoroastrian ritual fire. The fire was later moved with great ceremony to the town of Navsari for safekeeping, as is reported in the QS in vv. 366–403.

The storm at sea in the QS is a dramatic and unforgettable setting for the life-or-death crisis of the homeless émigré Zoroastrians. At its height, they collectively appeal to Ohrmazd, “Wise Lord,” through their dasturs all “distraught” and “cast adrift” (v. 121). Their dedication to “Victorious Bahram” is affirmed in their cry to heaven, which is immediately answered with the arrival of a fair wind and a glorious light, and so all is made well, as they all become “blessed in their adversity, / by fortune of victorious Bahram’s fire” (v. 131). The rescue is almost prosaically undramatic, as the captain utters the benediction of the name of the Holy Creator, “and straightaway he steered the vessel” (v. 134), and by “the law of Fate,” they arrive at Sanjan (v. 136). The brief storm episode and quick bargain with heaven allows the author to drive the narrative forward onto Indian soil. The author immediately switches his attention to the landing at Sanjan, in which the written text of the QS has a memorable exchange of speeches between the dastur and the “virtuous prince Jadi Rana”; the latter subsequently grants them sanctuary and land on which to settle and to build their fire temple. This scene has been much elaborated in the Parsi (Gujarati and English) oral traditions, and today, Parsis pay more attention to it than to anything else in the QS—understandably, as it simultaneously establishes their ethnic-religious identity as Iranian Zoroastrians as well as confirming their official acceptance as Indian Parsis.

Judah Halevi’s Poem “Still Chasing Fun at Fifty”[7] 

Abu’l-Hasan al-Lawi is better known as the Judeo-Arabic poet and philosopher Judah Halevi (1075–1141). He is thought to have been born into an elite Jewish family in Tudela in Spain, and was author of a large body of poetry in Hebrew, as well as his great philosophical treatise in Arabic, the Kuzari.[8] His 39-couplet Hebrew poem “Still Chasing Fun at Fifty” purports to be about a rescue from the jaws of death in a storm at sea, like the passage of the QS, but there, the similarity ends. A strong theme in the poem gives it perhaps more of a connection with the Persian text by Rumi that follows here, as Halevi’s poem treats the peril of such a dramatic life-threatening experience as a stage on the way to transcendence and unity. The goal is definitely otherworldly.

Whereas the Iranian Zoroastrians of the QS were leaving their home to find a new life free of Islamic persecution, Judah Halevi deliberately left his family, friends, and community in Spain. In mid-life, he had turned more seriously to religion, and resolved to set off by ship from his home to Alexandria. This particular poem, like others of his sea poems, is written in anticipation of the future voyage, bound as he is to make the pilgrimage,‎ the “ascent” (Heb. עֲלִיָּה,‘aliyah), to the Holy Land of Israel, specifically to Jerusalem, to Zion, in order to die there. It is recorded that he boarded a ship that set sail from Alexandria on 14 May 1141. Raymond P. Scheindlin, author of a modern study of Halevi, asks the crucial question, “Did Halevi reach Jerusalem?” His answer is worth quoting at some length:

According to a later tradition, he arrived at the gates of the city and was kneeling there to recite his great “Ode to Jerusalem”, when an Arab horseman, enraged at this display of Jewish piety, charged and trampled him under the hooves of his steed. The story is probably a legend. All that we know is that Halevi died during the summer of 1141. But the legend of Halevi’s violent death embodies a sort of higher truth, for the devotion to the land of Israel expressed in his poetry emits a whiff of martyrdom. Furthermore, the legend’s depiction of Halevi dying in the embrace of stones and the soil of the Holy Land echoes a particular recurring image in his poetry that expresses his principled quest for concreteness and certainty in religious experience. It was this quest, pervading his poetry and religious thought that led him to the East.[9]

Halevi was not making a conventional religious pilgrimage, like the annual medieval pilgrimage to the Mount of Olives or the Islamic Hajj ritual, as he never intended to return to Spain; again, it was his wish to die there in the Holy Land. Indeed, his life of exile was the one he left in Spain, and his ‘aliyah seems to have been an act of religious purification, toward illumination and union: finding home.

Here is Halevi’s poem in the original Hebrew:

Here is Scheindlin’s translation of “Still Chasing Fun at Fifty” (translating Heb. Ha-tirdof na‘arut ahar hamishim):[10]

Still chasing fun at fifty, like a boy! –

and yet your time could run out any day.

You flee God’s service,

have no better aspiration

than to be slave to men.

You seek the favor of the many, turn away

from One who has it in Him

to answer every man’s desire,

if they would only ask.

You won’t be bothered gathering provisions for your journey,

but lightly trade the banquet of eternity

for lentil stew.

5       When will your appetite say, “Enough”?

When will your lust

stop growing back her maidenhead every month?

Turn from her advice to God’s,

abandon those five senses.

Make peace with your Creator

while your remaining days are speeding by.

Do not expect half-hearted deeds will please Him,

or go to serpent-oracles to learn your fate.

To do His will, be tiger-fierce, gazelle-fleet, lion-mighty.

10     And do not lose heart in the heart of the sea,

when mountains seem to be sliding, shifting,

when sailors’ hands are limp as rags

and skilful seamen silent, helpless

(they were jaunty sailing forward;

cross now, thrust backward).

You’ve nowhere but the ocean to escape to,

the trap of doom your only refuge.

The sails are tilting, slipping,

boards shift and tremble.

15     The wind toys with the water

like harvesters bringing sheaves to threshing,

pats the water flat as a threshing floor,

then heaps it up like mounds of grain.

The waves surge up like lions leaping,

then recede in foam that coils like serpents.

Waves succeed those waves and chase them—

vipers that no charmer can control.

Here comes a mighty blow! The mighty ship might founder!

Mast and pole are shivered.

20     The decks, all three,

and all their chambers are in chaos.

Rope men are in terror,

passengers (not only women) are collapsing.

Sailors’ spirits fail, and people faint.

The strength of masts and skills of men mean nothing,

when cedar masts behave like chaff,

and cypress turns to reeds,

25     when ballast hist the sea like straw,

and iron bars like stubble.

Each man is praying to whatever he holds holy,

but you are facing God’s own Holy Temple,

remembering the Sea of Reeds, the Jordan—

miracles engraved on every heart—

and praising Him who smoothes the sea

when it churns up scum.

You beg that He may purify your heart.

He will spare you for the sake of holy ancestors,

30     renew His miracles as you renew

the Levites’ dance and song to Him.

He will restore the souls to bodies,

put back life in desiccated bones.

At once, the waves are calm;

they seem like flocks of sheep

scattered on a meadow.

The sun is setting and the stars are rising,

with the moon as captain, watching over them.

The night is like a Moorish woman dancing,

wearing an embroidered cloth with eyes,

cloth of sky-blue set with crystals.

35     Lost in the heart of the sea, the stars

dart and wander like men compelled

to leave their homes as exiles;

they make little lights in their own image,

little flames and flares in the heart of the sea,

pairs of ornaments on sky and water

to adorn the night.

Sea and sky, so like in color, seem to merge,

while in between

my heart makes yet another sea,

as my new songs and praises upward surge.

The poem is addressed by the poet to himself, yet he never speaks of himself in the first person until the last, v. 39, where he refers to “my heart.”

Vv. 1–9: The poem begins conventionally, with moral reproachments about the foolishness of youth in vv. 1–5, answered in reverse order in vv. 6–9. Each of the first five verses is a challenge, and each is answered in reverse order:

(1) don’t let time run out                                (9) be tiger fierce

(2) don’t flee God’s service                            (8) don’t be half-hearted

(3) don’t seek popular favor                           (7) make peace with God

(4) don’t trade the banquet of eternity            (6b) abandon those five senses

(5) don’t be trapped by the lust of woman     (6a) turn from her advice to God’s

  1. 10, “And do not lose heart in the heart of the sea, etc.”: As A. Hamori has observed, “This beautiful poem is of the familiar literary type in which a physical and a spiritual journey run parallel courses.”[11] The formally smoothed transition (تخلص, in Arabic rhetoric)—that is, from the moral exhortation to the beginning of the spiritual journey—begins here at v. 10, as Halevi begins to imagine what might happen if he were to make the sea crossing. Unlike the QS, Halevi describes the storm not in the past tense but in what I would call the visionary present, as the poet imagines, or foresees, the tribulations of a storm and takes the reader through them with him. It is directly a reference to Psalm 46:2–3: “2 Therefore will not we fear, though the earth be removed, and though the mountains be carried into the heart of the sea; 3Though the waters thereof roar and be troubled, though the mountains shake with the swelling thereof.” As Hamori notes, “The takhalluṣ turns on the word lev [“heart,” in v. 10] having been used in the moral sense in v. 8, it is now naturalised in ‘the heart of the sea.’”[12]
  1. 13, “You’ve nowhere but the ocean to escape to, / the trap of doom your only refuge”: Halevi addresses himself in the second person, and builds a violent storm to a climax alongside “skilful seamen silent, helpless.” The “trap of doom” is reminiscent of QS vv. 107b–10, where the dastur says this:

At last our life is finished here.

It is correct for us to leave this land.

We must now make an exit from this realm,

Or else we shall all fall into a trap.

To reason were in vain, a foolish thing.

So it is better we set off for India,

and that we leave behind the wicked devils.

The Zoroastrian and Jewish pilgrims are similarly caught between the devil and the deep blue sea.

Vv. 17–18: The wind and the waves are now out of control and, as Scheindlin comments,[13] “turn into a surreal landscape inhabited by lions, snakes and vipers [. . .] All that is left is prayer.”

Vv. 19–25, “Here comes a mighty blow, etc.”: Here, the end is announced as the elements are about to destroy the ship (which Halevi does not refer to as a whole, but only as sails, boards, decks, and chambers). The total disintegration of the scene on board is graphically sketched in each hemistich, as if frame by frame.

Vv. 26–31, “Each man is praying to whatever he holds holy, / but you are facing God’s own Holy Temple, etc.”: This is the pivotal point and climax of the poem: while all others fall into prayer, only Halevi faces the Holy of Holies, and his presence of mind to praise God, beg for forgiveness, and recollect his religious faith allows for the resolution in calmness and transformation of the scene. As Hamori observes, “In the poem, a scene of soaring peace follows the storm.” He adds, commenting on Halevi’s transformation of Isaiah 57:20, “The heart will come through; it will emerge pure from its tumults; the dross will be cast out.”[14]

Vv. 32–39: It is not necessary to comment on these sublime verses, except to quote the last two verses in Andras Hamori’s translation:

38     The sea will be like the firmament in colour,

the two of them two seas bound together,

39     With my heart between them a third sea,

as the waves of my new praises rise.[15]

His reading, in identifying the Neoplatonic ideas underlying Halevi’s thinking in the poem, to me sums up their essence: “These images – of purification, illumination, and union – govern the conclusion of the poem.”[16]

 

A Passage from Rumi’s Masnavi Book 4

Mowlana Jalaloddin Rumi Balkhi is, of course, far better known to Persian speakers than either of the two writers just discussed, but he is not conventionally thought of as an exile: although he lived his adult life several thousand kilometers from the place of his physical birth and childhood, he did not have to migrate in order to return to his home. For him, the separation he speaks of at the opening of the Masnavi is the common human predicament so long as humans are dominated by the nafs, the egoistical, illusory condition of self-regard. The beginning of the Masnavi is the only place to start (1.1–4):

بشنو این نَی چون شکایت می کند          از جدایی ها حکایت می کند

کز نَیِستان تا مرا بُبریده اند                  در نفیرم مرد و زن نالیده اند

سینه خواهم شرحه شرحه از فِراق         تا بگویم شرحِ دردِ اشتیاق

هر کسی کاو دور ماند از اصلِ خویش   باز جوید روزگارِ وصلِ خویش

[—]Listen to this reed as it is grieving,

it tells the story of our separations:

“Since I was severed from the bed of reeds,

in my cry men and women have lamented.

I need the breast that’s torn to shreds by parting,

to give expression to the pain of heartache.

Whoever finds himself left far from home,

looks forward to the day of his reunion”[17]

This is no metaphor—it is the underlying premise of the whole of his work. It is no theme, but the reality Rumi inhabits: like Judah Halevi before the Holy of Holies, Rumi is no exile in his spiritual home.

As so often in Persian poetry, here the bird is Rumi’s symbol of the soul (1.2736–38):

مرغ کآبِ شور باشد مسکنش            او چه داند جای آب روشنش؟

ای که اندر چشمۀ شور است جات      تو چه دانی شطّ و جیحون و فرات؟

ای تو نارَسته از این فانی رباط         تو چه دانی مَحو و سُکر و انبساط

The bird, whose home is on the salty sea,

how can she know a place of limpid water?

O you whose home is in the brackish spring,

what do you know of Oxus and Euphrates?

And you who have not fled this half-way hostel,

what do you know of ecstasy and passion?

In this “half-way hostel” (این فانی رباط), we are all exiles. Toward the end of this book, Rumi writes two Arabic verses in homage to Hallaj (executed 922), imitating the opening to one of his most famous odes (1.3949–51):

اقتلونی یا ثقاتی لائما                      ان فی قتلی حیاتی دائما

ان فی موتی حیاتی یا فتی                کم افارق موطنی حتی متی

Kill me, my trusty friends, for I am wretched,

indeed my death is my eternal life.

Indeed my life is in my death, young man,

how long shall I be severed from my homeland?

Rumi then adds, also in Arabic, quoting Koran 2:156 (1.3951),

فرقتی لو لم تکن فی ذا السکون         لم یقل انا الیه راجعون

In this my dwelling if there were not severance,

He would not say, “To Him we are returning.”

In fact, with the mention of severance (فُرقتی), Rumi is returning to the severance of his beginning nearly 4,000 verses earlier (کز نَیِستان تا مرا بُبریده اند). But his next verse leads to a conclusion (1.3952):

راجع آن باشد که باز آید به شهر        سوی وحدت آید از تفریقِ قهر

He who returns comes back to his own city,

to unity from violent separation.

This leads me directly to a passage of 29 verse couplets of Masnavi book 4 with which I would like to conclude this discussion, presented here in my new and previously unpublished translation (4.3629–57):

سال ها مردی که در شهری بوَد                    یک زمان که چشم در خوابی رود

شهرِدیگر بیند او پر نیک و بد                      هیچ در یادش نیاید شهرِ خَود

که من آنجا بوده ام این شهرِ نو                      نیست آنِ من در اینجاام گرو

بل چنان داند که خود پیوسته او                     هم در این شهرش بُده ست ابداع و خو

چه عجب گر روح موطن های خویش             که بُده ستش مسکن و میلاد پیش

می نیارد یاد کاین دنیا چو خواب                   می فرو پوشد چو اختر را سحاب

خاصه چندین شهرها را کوفته                       گردها از درکِ او ناروفته

اجتهادِ گرم ناکرده که تا                              دل شود صاف و ببیند ماجرا

سر برون آرد دلش از بُخشِ راز                    اوّل و آخر ببیند چشم باز

For years a man may dwell within a city—

the moment when his eyes drift into sleep

3630 He sees another full of good and bad,

and nothing of his city is remembered

Recalling “I was there, this city’s new,

this is not mine, here I am just a guest,”

But no! He thinks that he has always been

here in this very city born and bred.

What wonder if the spirit’s own abodes,

which were its dwellings and its former births,

Are now forgotten? For this world, like sleep,

enfolds it as the clouds obscure the stars.

3635 More so, from all the cities it has trodden

the layers of dust are unswept from its sight.

It has not striven ardently in order

to purify the heart and see what’s happened,

To raise its heart out of the pit of mystery

and see with open eyes both first and last.

آمده اوّل به اقلیم جماد                                 واز جمادی در نباتی اوفتاد

سال ها اندر نباتی عمر کرد                         وز جمادی یاد نآورد از نبرد

وز نباتی چون به حیوانی فتاد                       نآمدش حالِ نباتی هیچ یاد

جز همین میلی که دارد سوی آن                    خاصه در وقتِ بهار و ضَیمران

همچو میلِ کودکان با مادران            سرِّ میلِ خود نداند در لبان

همچو میلِ مفرطِ هر نو مرید                        سوی آن پیرِ جوانبختِ مجید

جزوِ عقلِ این ازآن عقلِ کل است                   جنبشِ این سایه زآن شاخِ گل است

سایه اش فانی شود آخر در او                       پس بداند سرِّ میل و جست و جو

سایۀ شاخِ دگر ای نیکبخت                           کی بجنبد گر نجنبد این درخت

باز از حیوان سوی انسانی اش                      می کشید آن خالقی که دانی اش

At first he came to inorganic realms

from inorganic to organic life.

For years he lived in an organic state

and now forgot the inorganic world.

3640    And when he passed from plant to animal

there was no memory of the state of plants,

Except a feeling which he had for it,

so strong in springtime with its fragrant flowers,

Like babies feeling for their mother, it

knows not the secret of its urge to suckle,

Or like each novice’s attraction felt

toward his noble Pir of generous fortune.

This finite mind is from that perfect Mind

this shadow moves just as the Great Bough moves.

3645    His shadow passes into Him at last,

and then he knows the secret of the quest.

How can the shadow of the other move,

O blessed man, if this Tree does not move?

Again the Lord Creator whom you know

led it from animal to human nature.

همچنین اقلیم تا اقلیم رفت                             تا شد اکنون عاقل و دانا و زفت

عقل های اوّلینش یاد نیست                           هم از این عقلش تحوّل کرد نی ست

تا رهد زین عقلِ پر حرس و طلب                  صد هزاران عقل بیند بوالعجب

گرچه خقته گشت و شد ناسی ز پیش               کَی گذارندش در آن نسیانِ خویش؟

باز از آن خوابش به بیداری کَشند                  که کند بر حالتِ خود ریشخند

که چه غم بود آن که می خوردم به خواب؟       چون فراموشم شد احوالِ صواب؟

چون ندانستم که آن غم و اعتلال                    فعلِ خواب است و قریب است و خیال؟

همچنان دنیا که حُلمِ نایم است                        خفته پندارد که این خود دایم است

تا بر آید ناگهان صبحِ اجل                           وا رهد از ظلمتِ ظنّ و دغل

خنده اش گیرد از آن غمهای خویش                چون ببیند مستقَرّ و جای خویش

And so it went from state to state like this

till now it is enlightened, wise and great.

There’s no recalling prior states of mind;

from this one too there is advancing onward,

3650    To quit this greedy avaricious mind,

to see a hundred thousand minds of wonder.

Though he might fall asleep forgetting all,

how could they leave him to oblivion?

They bring him back to wakefulness from sleep

that he may laugh at his own sleepy state:

“What was that sorrow suffered in my sleep

and how could I forget the truthful states,

and could not see those sorrows and those ills

result from sleep, deception, fantasy?”

3655    Thus is the world, which is the dream of sleepers!

The sleeper thinks it truly is eternal,

Till suddenly the dawn of death shall break

and free him from thought’s darkness and deceit,

And laughter at those sorrows overcomes him

to see his true abode and dwelling place.

A full commentary on this remarkable example of Rumi at his most lyrical outside the Divan will be included in book four of my ongoing series The Masnavi of Rumi. The passage—which has been referred to by R. A. Nicholson as “one of the finest in the Mathnawí[18]—is concerned with the divine origin of the soul. Nicholson takes considerable interest in these verses in several pages of commentary, as he finds here a clear case of Rumi’s using ideas that “have their source in the Neoplatonic theory of emanation and the psychology of Aristotle and Plotinus.”[19] Nicholson sees Rumi “as standing much nearer to Plotinus” in his ideas than to Aristotle and his interpreter Farabi, and draws parallels from Christian mysticism with Origen, Plotinus, John Milton in Paradise Lost, and even with the more contemporary William Wordsworth in his Ode on Intimations of Immortality. Rumi’s “all the cities it has trodden” of v. 3635 are, according to Nicholson, the “phases of experience through which the soul must pass in its journeys from and to God before it can attain to gnosis.”[20] Long before this, back in the first book of the Masnavi, Rumi refers to the world as a prison, in which humanity is oblivious (1.986–87):

این جهان زندان و ما زندانیان           حفره کن زندان و خود را وا رَهان

چیست دنیا؟ از خدا غافل بُدن            ده قماش و نقده و میزان و زن

This world’s a prison and we are prisoners,

so burrow out of prison and escape!

What is the world? Obliviousness of God,

not goods and money, weighing scales and women.

Here in the fourth book, he changes the metaphor of the condition of being in the world to dreaming in sleep, in which we forget the true identity of the person we are in the wakeful consciousness. Like the English poets of whom Nicholson is reminded, Rumi does not use philosophical terminology to explain the Neoplatonic doctrine of emanations and the ascent of souls through mineral, vegetal, and animal states. Rather, he lightly suggests to the reader a dreamlike sequence of “flashes.” One example of these flashes occurs in a succession of images of momentary feelings in the transition from plant to animal: fragrant flowers in springtime, babies’ urge to suckle, and the novice’s attraction to the teacher (vv. 3641–43). A doctrine is slipped in in v. 3644a:  ,جزوِ عقلِ این از آن عقلِ کل است“This finite mind is from that perfect Mind.” However, he then quickly returns to the images of shadows moving, and the unseen mover of the Great Bough (vv. 3644b–46). The passage continues ascending from animal to human nature and higher to the present moment in v. 3648b:تا شد اکنون عاقل و دانا و زفت, “till now it is enlightened, wise and great.” At v. 3649, there is a pausing in this present, and a reflection that the process of ascension shall continue. Presumably, this is a reassurance to the reader that though one may lapse from a certain attainment, one is subsequently roused:

باز از آن خوابش به بیداری کَشند                  که کند بر حالتِ خود ریشخند

They bring him back to wakefulness from sleep

that he may laugh at his own sleepy state.

One senses that Rumi is himself in an ascending, expansive state here, as the passage continues to the end in a mood of laughter and relief. The discourse, in fact, continues for a further 11 verses, to v. 3668, where it is explained that sorrow and distress in dreams turn out to mean their opposite. And since this world is all a dream, the outcome is that on Resurrection Day, which is the time of true awakening, there will be joy:

گریه و درد وغم و زاریِ خود          شادمانی دان به بیداریِ خود

Know that when you awake your tears and grief

and sorrow and your pain will turn to joy.

My overall conclusion, then, after all these many kinds of verses, is that these three works contain expressions of three different catharses being worked out in poetry to treat the pain of separation. In the first work, the Zoroastrians are escaping from a fallen land that has been “smashed to pieces” by invading enemies. It is all told in the past tense as a memorandum to future generations. Much of the Zoroastrians’ journey, as they moved eastward toward India, would presumably have navigated coastal waters, avoiding the turbulence of the deeper ocean; but the crossing from Diu (Dib) to mainland Indian Gujarat, which is notoriously prone to storms, provides the author with a dramatic opportunity to play out under heaven’s eye all the insecurities and perils of the pilgrims’ journey. The hostile forces of the storm bring them to the point of begging for a celestial solution, and inspire their promise to the divine. In the other two texts, two superior visionary thinkers speak in the present tense about a metaphysical transposition of the travelers’ plight. Both poets ascend in different ways to the summit of their aspirations. Both are capable, with their powerful command of poetic skills, of doing justice to their spiritual inspiration in words. They reflect on what has gone before with no suggestion of nostalgia, but see it as part of an evolutionary process. In Judah Halevi’s case, he knows that he, alone among the company on board, is prepared for the necessary cleansing of the heart and to face the Holy of Holies. Rumi’s verses show parallels with the Hebrew poet in his Neoplatonic intuitions of a true home beyond worldly multiplicity and severance from the divine. In their texts, the poets clearly are on their way home. Whether such parallels support an argument for a universal tendency to such mystical abstraction of the exilic topos is a tempting question, but on this occasion, I resist it.

[1]It is also the meter of some renowned classical Persian poems—for example, Nezami’s Khosrov o Shirin, ‘Attar’s Elahiname and Asrarname, and Mahmud Shabestari’s Golshan-e Raz.

[2]The author does not refer to the text by the full name of Qesse-ye Sanjan, though he several times calls it قِصه. One MS has the descriptive heading آغازِ داستانِ بهدینانِ فارس که از ولایتِ ایران به هندوستان آمده اند (The Beginning of the Story of the Zoroastrians of [the Province of] Fars Who Came from the Land of Iran to India).

[3]Alan Williams, The Zoroastrian Myth of Migration from Iran and Settlement in the Indian Diaspora; Text, Translation and Analysis of the 16th Century Qesse-ye Sanjan (Leiden: Brill, 2009).

[4]All translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

[5]J. W. Clinton, trans., The Tragedy of Sohráb and Rostam from the Persian National Epic, The Shahname of Abol-Qasem Ferdowsi, Rev. ed. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), 4–5.

[6]However, for further discussion see Williams, Zoroastrian Myth of Migration, esp. 32–34 and 172–73.

[7]I previously discussed this poem, in conjunction with an early translation of the above-quoted passage of the QS, in a paper at a conference at the Ben-Zvi Institute, Jerusalem. The paper was subsequently published as “The Zoroastrian Qesse-ye Sanjan and Judah Halevi’s ‘aliya to Eretz Israel: Reflections on Two Contrasting Journeys in Faith,” in Irano-Judaica, vol. V, ed. Shaul Shaked and Amnon Netzer (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 2003), 27–51. In that paper, I relied on an old (but dependable) translation by Nina Salaman. Since then, Raymond P. Scheindlin has published his excellent study, The Song of the Distant Dove: Judah Helevi’s Pilgrimage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Here, I am able to quote his own lively and lyrical version of the same poem (184–89), and I gratefully acknowledge his illuminating work on the subject. I have also availed myself of the insights of Andras Hamori’s reading of the poem, especially his seeing a Neoplatonic influence on Halevi, in Hamori’s essay “Lights in the Heart of the Sea. Some Images of Judah Halevi’s,” Journal of Semitic Studies XXX (1983): 75–83. After the translation, I have also added a few of my own remarks.

[8]The Kuzari, known in Arabic as كتاب الحجة والدليل في نصرة الدين الذليل, “The Book of Refutation and Evidence on Behalf of the Despised Religion,” is a dialogue between a rabbi and a pagan. It has been translated by N. Daniel Korobkin as The Kuzari: In Defense of the Despised Faith (Northvale, NJ: J. Aronson, 1998; Jerusalem: Feldheim Publishers, 2009).

[9]Scheindlin, Song of the Distant Dove, 4.

[10]Hayim Brody, ed., “Ha-tiṛdof na‘arut aḥar ḥamishim,” in Dīwān yehuda ben shemuel haleivi, vol. 2 (Berlin: Mekize Nirdamim, 1909), 160–63 (poem 5). This is quoted, translated, and discussed by Scheindlin, Song of the Distant Dove, 184–91. See also the discussion by Hamori, “Lights.”

[11]Hamori, “Lights,” 75.

[12]Hamori, “Lights,” 76, n. 4.

[13]Scheindlin, Song of the Distant Dove, 189.

[14]Hamori, “Lights,” 76.

[15]Hamori, “Lights,” 77.

[16]Hamori, “Lights,” 77.

[17]Books 1 and 2 of the Masnavi are published. See Alan Williams, ed., The Masnavi of Rumi, A New English Translation with Persian Text and Explanatory Notes, books 1 and 2 (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2020). Others will follow in the same series. NB All verse references are according to the edition of Mohammad Este‘lami, ed., Masnavi, 7 vols. (Tehran: Entesharat-e Sokhan, 1393/2014), not to R. A. Nicholson’s edition.

[18]Reynold A. Nicholson, ed., The Mathnawí of Jalálu’ddín Rúmí, vol. VIII, Commentary on Vol. III-VI (London: Gibb Memorial Trust, 1940), p. 214, n. to vv. 3628–36.

[19]Nicholson, Mathnawí, vol. VIII, 215.

[20]Nicholson, Mathnawí, vol. VIII, 214, commenting on 4.3634 of his edition.

History through Talisman: The Historical Value of a Newly Identified Safavid Treatise by Molla Jalal-e Monajjem-e Yazdi

Behzad Karimi is an assistant professor in the Department of Iranian Studies at Meybod University. His main field of research is Safavid history. He has published several articles and books, among which his most important books are Women in the Safavid Medical Discourse (Pejuheshkadeh-ye Tarikh e-Islam, 2016) and Time and Cosmology in the Safavid Era (Qoqnoos Publishing, 2017). He is currently publishing an edition of the “Limia” section of Molla Hossein Waez Kashefi’s Asrar-e Qasemi (Negarestan-e Andisheh).

Introduction

The present article’s primary focus is on an occult sciences treatise that is not well-known by Safavid scholars. Occult science is the knowledge of forms, numbers, and letters. Compared with the traditional or conventional sciences, occult sciences have a long history in Iran dating back to ancient times. Occult sciences are esoteric sciences mostly with an unknown origin,[2] and are used to confront supernatural forces, intervene in world affairs, and predict the future.

In recent decades, European historians have reflected on occult sciences, especially in terms of their relationship with the modern world. From these historians’ point of view, occult sciences were an essential feature of the Renaissance, the scientific revolution, and even scientific modernity. Some historians have even gone so far as to consider occult sciences as the driving force behind early European imperialism and colonialism, arguing that astrology, alchemy, and magic were tools for understanding and controlling the universe.[3]

But what happened to occult sciences in the Islamic world? Occult sciences (especially astrology, the science of letters, and geomancy) were recognized as formal knowledge and had been in the standard classifications of sciences under the “natural” category since the formation of Islamic sciences. However, after facing the opposing approaches of philosophers, theologians, traditionalists, and historians respectively—such as Ibn Sina, al-Ghazzali, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn Khaldun—these sciences were marginalized.[4] Using a postcolonial perspective to consider the current approaches to Islamic occult sciences begs the following question: Why are occult sciences interpreted as a pioneer of modernity in the West while in the Islamic world, where these sciences were much more officially supported than in Europe, they are considered one of the leading causes of Islamic civilization’s decline? Occult sciences, which were always accused of magic, inherently conflicted with religion. Hence, for survival in Iranian Muslim society, especially after the religious revival in the Safavid era, these sciences gained religious legitimacy and documented their principles and teachings in the actions and words of the prophets and imams. This is why some famous scholars, who naturally had to oppose these sciences within the framework of the discussions proposed by Ibn Sina and Ibn Khaldun, were themselves among the professionals in the field of occult sciences.

In the first centuries of Islam, the occult sciences, only parts of which were examined by scholars, became widespread, and the Persian texts of these sciences found their way into most Iranians’ homes.[5] In this and the following periods, occult sciences affected almost all components of Iranian society from kings to the lower classes. This spread of occult sciences occurred for various reasons: the efforts of governments to control the world through occult sciences; the spread of millennial ideas; the inadequacy of formal sciences in solving everyday problems; and disappointment with the political, social, economic, and religious structures in place to solve Iranians’ problems and with the consequences of foreign invasions, to name a few. Especially during the Qajar period, occult sciences were reduced to their most superficial form: unscientific folk beliefs.

With this consideration, this paper posits that traditional approaches to occult sciences, which reduce them to the level of superstitions by equating them with their popular dimension, should not diminish the research value of the occult sciences texts. Also, it is possible to study the traditions of occult sciences and the surviving books from a cultural perspective and offer an intellectual reading to understand the ancient Iranian cosmology.[6] Accordingly, the texts of occult sciences deserve research attention, including in the field of historiography, and the sources of occult sciences should be considered alongside other well-known historical research authorities.

The Safavid era, as has been said many times, marked the beginning of a new era in Iranian history. Though this period has been studied from different angles, certain issues have been less addressed. Cataloguing and publishing new manuscripts and paying close, accurate attention to some of the available texts unearths facts about this period that unfortunately have no place in Safavid’s politicized historiographical sources. Based on the above considerations, this paper will examine a lithograph treatise on occult sciences that is not yet known as a historical source for this period—or at least, for reasons to be discussed, not taken seriously. The textual study of this treatise provides new, valuable findings from the Safavid era.

Asrar-e Qasemi: A Timurid Occult Treatise with Safavid Elements?

 

In an article entitled “The Cosmological Order of Things in Early Modern Safavid Iran,” Kathryn Babayan cites a treatise known as Asrar-e Qasemi in discussing the prevalence of magic and sorcery in the Safavid era.[7] Asrar-e Qasemi, Babayan points out, is known to scholars and historians as a late Timurid source. The original treatise is attributed to Molla Hossein-e Waez Kashefi (840–910/1436/37–1504/5), a scholar and author in the court of Sultan Hossein Bayqara in Herat. Kashefi, in his usual way of using both old and contemporary sources in his writing, explicitly mentions in the introduction that this work is, in fact, an anthology and translation of authoritative books of the time in the field of occult sciences, including Sheikh Shahab al-Din Sohrevardi’s Hall al-Moshkelat, Abu Abdollah al-Maghrebi’s Sehr al-ʿOyun, and Abu al-Qasem Ahmad al-ʿIraqi al-Samavi’sʿOyun al-Haqa ͗eq and Izahal-Ṭara ͗eq. Therefore, according to this information, Kashefi is the translator of Asrar-e Qasemi and not its author.[8] Many manuscripts and lithographs of this treatise remain, which shows the popularity of this work among the general public and professionals in the occult sciences.[9] This work is provided in five maqsads (destinations), corresponding to the five famous branches of occult sciences.[10] Each maqsad contains several asls (principles), and each asl includes several fasls (chapters).

In the same article, Babayan states that although Kashefi is considered to be the author of this treatise, the author should not be equated with the known Kashefi. In fact, according to Babayan, the author of Asrar-e Qasemi was actually a person named Molla Hossein Waez Kashefi who lived in the Safavid era. Considering the treatise content, he must have been a pupil of Sheikh Baha ͗i (953–1030/1547–1621), the famous Safavid scholar, because the author refers to Sheikh Baha ͗i as his “master.” Babayan also implicitly rebukes scholars who consider the treatise to belong to the Timurid period and the famous Kashefi, regardless of the treatise’s content. Babayan’s rebuke is aimed at the authors of a series of articles in a special issue of Iranian Studies dedicated to the works and personality of Molla Hossein Waez Kashefi.[11]

In at least one article from this collection, Asrar-e Qasemi is attributed to the famous Kashefi. Based on it, the occult sciences in the Timurid era have been studied and analyzed. The article was written by Pierre Lory, director of the religious sciences section at École Pratique des Hautes Études. In this article, “Kashifı’s Asrār-i Qāsimī and Timurid Magic,” Lory bases his work on the offset printing of a lithograph Asrar-e Qasemi published by the late Mohammad Hassan ͗Elmi.[12] This is the same version used by Babayan. Babayan is right in criticizing Lory. In his article, Lory examines Asrar-e Qasemi as a religious scholar and not a historian. Still, due to a lack of knowledge of Iranian history and occult sciences, he makes mistakes. For example, when examining the third maqsad, which is called “Limia” and deals with the names and talismans that lead to “strange actions and strange effects,” Lory continues to insist on dating this section and the entire text to a pre-Safavid period despite the text’s mention of names of relatively famous characters from the Safavid era. He even mentions some of these personalities, such as Shah Ismaʿil I (r. 907–30/1501–24) and Morshed Qoli Khan Ostajlu (d. 997/1589), but when he comes to the name of Baha ͗ al-Din Mohammad, Lory disregards the historical adventures and personalities that are all in the context of the Safavid era. Instead, Lory identifies this person as Baha ͗ al-Din Mohammad Naqshbandi (718–91/1318–89) and accordingly devotes a considerable part of the article to the influence of Naqshbandi Sufis in the spread of occult sciences and to their relations with the kings of the time.[13] Lory ignores the titles “Master” and “My Master,” which have been used many times for Baha ͗ al-Din Mohammad by the author of this maqsad, and also the various stories in which the author (Molla Jalal) played a role. Lory relates Baha ͗ al-Din Mohammad Naqshbandi, who died in 791/1389, to the Kashefi of the late ninth century, leaving a gap of about 110 years. It is also strange that Lory ignores the details of the adventures narrated in this section and passes by several familiar, famous names, such as Shah ʿAbbas I (r. 995–1038/1588–1629) and Shah Safi (r. 1038–52/1629–42).

Lory makes other mistakes, too. For instance, he considers Hall al-Moshkelat, attributed to an Indian sage named Hakim Tamtam,[14] to be the same as Hall al-Moshkelat Shozur al-Zahab by Ibn Arfaʿ R ͗as (515–593/1121–97).[15] Maria E. Subtelny, the author of the “Kāshifī” entry in Encyclopaedia Iranica, was the guest editor of the Iranian Studies special issue on Kashefi. Without considering the above details, she acknowledges Asrar-e Qasemi as a Timurid occult treatise by Kashefi. Of course, her main source for this inaccurate comment is Lory’s article.[16]

The first scientific attention to the “Safavid Limia” in Asrar-e Qasemi was given by Jalal al-Din Homayi, which is problematic. My searches show that the content of the added “Safavid Limia” is also available in the form of an independent treatise entitled Hall al-Moshkelat[17] with the same structure as “Limia”: they have two fasls, each fasl has four noʿs (singular type), and each noʿ consists of four qesms (singular part). Therefore, to speak of the chapter on the talismans of Asrar-e Qasemi and Hall al-Moshkelat, without considering minor differences in writing, is to speak of a single text. The only difference is that, contrary to what Kashefi says, Hall al-Moshkelat has been attributed to Hakim Tamtam, and its translator is known as Abu al-Mahasen Mohammad ibn Saʿd ibn Mohammad or Ibn Savaji (alive in 732/1332). Accordingly, Homayi—in his scholarly introduction to the Konuz al-Moazzemin that is attributed to Ibn Sina (370–428/981–1037), in the section “Evidence of attributing the treatise to Sheikh [Ibn Sina]”—deals with this treatise because of Ibn Savaji’s mention of Konuz al-Moazzemin in Hall al-Moshkelat. Homayi identifies Ibn Savaji, who we know now was an eighth-century writer and translator, as the author of Hall al-Moshkelat and contemporary of ShahʿAbbas I.[18] Unfortunately, Homayi does not mention the bibliographic specifications of the version of Hall al-Moshkelat that he is using.

Still, thanks to Iraj Afshar’s introduction to Estakhri’s Masalek va al-Mamalek, we know now that the basis for Homayi’s comment was a manuscript version of Hall al-Moshkelat. Ten years after Homayi’s critical edition of Konuz al-Moazzemin, Afshar published a Persian translation of Masalek va al-Mamalek, one of the alleged translators being Ibn Savaji. For reasons that are beyond the scope of this study, Afshar rightly considers Ibn Saʿd as an eighth-century scribe and not the translator of Masalek va al-Mamalek. According to Afshar, in a private conversation with Homayi he warned the “master” of this mistake; while Homayi admitted this mistake, he did not rule out the possibility of distortion by scribes in adding Safavid stories to Hall al-Moshkelat. Accordingly, Afshar definitively considers Hall al-Moshkelat as one of Ibn Savaji’s writings and attributes the Safavid section’s addition to the later scribes. Neither Homayi nor Afshar mentions the possibility of Ibn Savaji copying or translating Hall al-Moshkelat.[19] The only other available information about Afshar’s attention to Hall al-Moshkelat relates to two years after the publication of the translation of Masalek va al-Mamalek; in an article in Yaghma, Afshar corrects his misconception that Ibn Savaji’s Hall al-Moshkelat had not been hithero published until then and reports the existence of a lithographic version of Hall al-Moshkelat, which was published in 1312/1895 in Mumbai.[20] Afshar did not have access to this lithographic treatise, but he reconsiders his previous certainty of its authorship by Ibn Savaji. According to the information in this lithographic version, Hall al-Moshkelat was written by the Indian sage Tamtam, or at least attributed to him, and translated by Ibn Savaji.[21]

In her discussion on the identity of the author of Asrar-e Qasemi, Babayan rightly considers Sheikh Baha ͗ al-Din Mohammad to be Sheikh Baha ͗i, but she errs in attributing the treatise to one of Sheikh Baha ͗i’s pupils named Hossein-e Kashefi. Assuming the coherence of all parts of the treatise and to solve the problem of asynchrony between the life of Kashefi and the adventures of the Safavid era, she considers Kashefi’s student to be the writer of the talisman chapter, called here “Safavid Limia.”

Reflecting on the manuscripts and lithographs of Asrar-e Qasemi leads to the conclusion that the “Safavid Limia” chapter is also available as another independent treatise entitled Hall al-Moshkelat of Indian Tamtam, and contains precious information on the hidden part of the Safavid era. Strangely enough, this part of Asrar-e Qasemi, as well as Hall al-Moshkelat (of which many copies are available), has been almost completely disregarded by historians. Apart from Homayi, whose analysis included codicological aspects, only Ahmad Soheili Khansari has given “Safavid Limia” any attention. In an article on Molla Jalal-e Monajjem-e Yazdi (d. 1028/1619), Soheili Khansari refers to the Safavid material mentioned in “Limia” to prove the prevalence of occult sciences in this period, but he mentions his reference not as Asrar-e Qasemi, but as material presented by the author of Kashf al-Raml (Discovery of Geomancy). The only copy of Kashf al-Raml is kept in the library of Qom ͗Azam Mosque, and its content does not include the Safavid data of “Limia” and contains information about only geomancy. The fact that Soheili Khansari does not mention the author of Kashf al-Raml reinforces the assumption that the author’s identity was not clear to him.[22] Another possibility is that perhaps this treatise, like Hall al-Moshkelat, contains the data in Asrar-e Qasemi but under a different name.

However, having examined the content of the section “Limia” of Asrar-e Qasemi and Hall al-Moshkelat, I can claim that the significant parts of their Safavid information were written by Molla Jalal-e Monajjem-e Yazdi, the official astrologer at the court of Shah ʿAbbas I. Later, unknown writers added material to this treatise and put it in the form of Kashefi’s Asrar-e Qasemi or Tamtam’s Hall al-Moshkelat. In the following sections, this paper examines this position by using the text and hypertext of the added Safavid materials in Asrar-e Qasemi and other related sources.

Codicological Aspects of Asrar-e Qasemi

 

It is tough to speak of clear boundaries in authorship, copying, and translation in premodern Iran due to the vastness of these areas and the scarcity of classical specialized or study sources. This difficulty becomes accentuated when considering that in the area of copying of premodern knowledge in general, only the taste and knowledge of the authors and scribes or the kind of audience determined the content and form of the treatises. This is especially true of the occult or hidden sciences, which required familiarity with many principles, mysteries, and subtleties, particularly after the Safavid era, during which these sciences became popular. The study of occult sciences treatises shows a bizarre mess and endless plagiarism, making it very difficult to decide on the authenticity and distinguish and identify works in this field.

Occult sciences had a specific scientific framework. However, after the fall of the Safavids and a distancing from scientific foundations, the field experienced a kind of empiricism and populism. Therefore, practitioners of occult sciences immediately gained experience in each of the components of these sciences and tried to add their personal experience to the experience of the dignitaries and masters. In this way, they did not follow any codified, specific method. Also, occult sciences were prevalent in the period under study. As a result, the production of a significant volume of literature related to these sciences was accompanied by many changes and transformations. These changes were variously made by ordinary people, scribes, and professionals in the field of occult sciences. In many cases, the scope of these distortions is such that it is almost impossible to separate the original text from the appendices.

Following these preliminaries, some codicological considerations can be made in connection with Asrar-e Qasemi. Talking about manuscripts or lithographs of this work means talking about numerous treatises, each of which is different from the others due to distortions and changes. Nevertheless, Asrar-e Qasemi’s original structure has been preserved, and the distortions and manipulations have been carried out in an almost-certain framework. Examination of Kashefi’s introduction and several other manuscripts of this treatise shows that Kashefi designed his translation in a five-part structure. According to this structure, occult sciences are divided into the sections of “Kimia” (“alchemy”), “Limia” (“talisman”), “Himia” (“appropriation of impacts of seven planets, spirits, and sprites”), “Simia” (“to form a mental image as real”), and “Rimia” (“prestidigitation”). According to believers, these sciences are called Khamse-ye Mohtajabeh (“five secrets”) or Kollohu Ser (“all of it is secret”).[23]

As mentioned before, various textual and hypertextual signs indicate that the third maqsad, under the title “Limia,” is an addition by Shah ʿAbbas I’s official astrologer, Molla Jalal, an annotation on the margins of Asrar-e Qasemi which has gradually merged with the original text and replaced the original in later versions.[24] To clarify this issue, manuscripts dating back to before the period of Shah ʿAbbas I have been examined. According to the contents of various catalogs of manuscripts, only one manuscript of Asrar-e Qasemi dates back to before the time of Shah ʿAbbas I. This manuscript is a copy dated to the tenth century, and it is currently kept in the Library and Central Documentation Center of the University of Tehran as No. 299 from the Faculty of Theology. This version is remarkable in two ways. First, its author is Safial-Din ͗Ali, Kashefi’s son, who tried to provide a summary narration of the original text. Second, this version does not include the “Limia” added in the Safavid era. Although Kashefi definitely organized Asrar-e Qasemi into five sections—the introduction of almost all manuscripts and lithographs confirms this—there is no “Limia” section in most pre- and post-Safavid manuscripts. I suspect that due to the religious sanctity of witchcraft and jurisprudential strictures regarding its teaching in Muslim societies, the scribes removed this section deliberately from the original text. This means that most of the treatises of Asrar-e Qasemi, including “Safavid Limia,” are lithograph versions. Although I have not been able to obtain manuscripts of “Safavid Limia” or Tamtam’s Hall al-Moshkelat, the existence of manuscripts, including the one available to Homayi, shows that these additional sections are also available in manuscript form, and after the arrival of the lithographic technique, such manuscripts became more popular.

The comparison of the text of “Safavid Limia” with that of the other four sections shows significant differences in style and writing, which further supports the claim that another person wrote this section at a different time from the time of Kashefi. Thus, “Safavid Limia” is a separate entity in the context of occult sciences. It can be compared to an island in the sea of Asrar-e Qasemi. In addition to the difference in prose, “Safavid Limia” differs in combining the teachings of talismans with Safavid experiences and adventures.

According to Kashefi, he arranged and translated Asrar-e Qasemi at the request of a similarly named person called Amir Seyyed Qasem. Speculations on this subject by catalogers and scholars are significant in terms of the time this treatise was written. Some have equated Kashefi’s patron with Seyyed Qasem Anvar (d. 837/1433) and, aware of the asynchrony of the lifetime of Seyyed Qasem Anvar and that of Kashefi, have concluded that Kashefi dedicated the book to his patron’s soul.[25] But there are two points to consider. First, although most versions state that Seyyed Qasem originally ordered the treatise’s translation, the famous title “Anvar” is never mentioned. Second, the prayer sentences after Seyyed Qasem’s name confirm that he was alive at the time of the translation of the book, and the later scribes did not confuse Seyyed Qasem with the famous Seyyed Qasem Anvar or quote prayers for the person to be forgiven. However, another group of catalogers, considering the history of Kashefi’s life and the death of Seyyed Qasem Anvar, and perhaps the points mentioned above, believe that this Seyyed Qasem was one of the rulers of the Safavid government, but do not provide further information.[26] My research shows that this Amir Seyyed Qasem most likely must have been Mirak Jalal al-Din Qasem, one of Sultan Hossein Bayqara’s sadrs (“a person who controls religious affairs”) and a contemporary of Kashefi.[27] Also, a unique report in Tonekaboni’s Qeṣaṣ al-͗Olamā, although it may be from popular knowledge and not historically significant, is very interesting due to its close connection with the Safavid context of “Limia.” According to this report—which questions all the previous accounts of the work’s spiritual patron, particularly Qasem Anvar—Sheikh Baha ͗i, after returning from a long journey, brought with him a strange science, and at this time, a Qasem came to him, and he performed miracles like those of the sheikh. The sheikh was astonished, and Qasem, in response, called his extraordinary deeds magical and considered the sheikh’s works genuine. So the sheikh asked him to renounce the promotion of magic, and if he wished to write down this knowledge, to use the “pen of secrets” or the secret language that “the incompetent people” could not comprehend. Hence, Qasem wrote a book called Asrar-e Qasemi.[28]

“Safavid Limia”: Some Historical Inconsistencies

 

The assessment of “Safavid Limia” includes important codicological and historical points. The first is the textual coherence of “Safavid Limia.” As mentioned earlier, in the classical texts of occult sciences, “Limia” discusses talismans; “Safavid Limia” is committed to the same thing. Yet this is not the same as narrative coherence. The purpose of writing “Safavid Limia” was to provide instructions for making talismans and not to narrate history, but the author’s commitment to accompany the instructions with historical evidence and examples to prove the effectiveness of amulets transforms the work into a valuable source of knowledge about the Safavid era’s hitherto-hidden aspects. Accordingly, this article attempts to consider the work’s historical aspects, regardless of the data related to occult sciences, which, of course, deserves attention. What is remarkable about the historical parts of “Safavid Limia” is that the characters, events, and places, except in a few cases, have a definite identity and can be proven to have existed. Also, the internal and historical logic of the narration is acceptable and removes the suspicion that information on Safavids might have been added in the post-Safavid period.

Of course, this text, like all other historical texts, has not been spared from distortions and changes over time. It is noteworthy that the historical inconsistencies of this text mostly relate to the entry of inaccurate historical popular information regarding events from before the author’s time, the author, in my opinion, being Molla Jalal-e Monajjem-e Yazdi. For example, take the author’s reliance on the popular accounts of Genghis Khan, Sheikh Safi al-Din Ardabili,[29] Khajeh Nasiral-Din Tusi, Plato, and Aristotle, which, without historiographical rigor and in the usual way of writing occult texts, have found their way into “Safavid Limia.”[30] The important point is that almost all of these personages are part of the long chain of scholars of occult sciences, and in the Persian occult culture, they and their works are repeatedly mentioned. However, proof of the personages’ words and deeds is impossible, and they should be evaluated in their universe of discourse. The consciousness of Safavid-era Iranian scholars, including historians, of the lives of non-Iranian figures such as Aristotle, Plato, and Alexander the Great could not be of today’s “scientific” type and was limited to teachings prevalent in popular rumors. Also, the characterization in the folk tales of the day, such as Eskandarnāmeh by Manouchehr Khan-e Hakim, which has created a vivid but imaginary image of Alexander the Great, Aristotle, and Plato, has been very influential in informal narratives of these characters, including in “Safavid Limia.”[31]

Another historical inconsistency in “Safavid Limia” is the reporting of events which, although not popular, have no parallel in historiographical texts. This inconsistency has two aspects. The first involves the few events that are definitively recorded in historiographical texts because of their breadth and fame, and the second involves events that, by their very nature, require a kind of secrecy and are thus not entered in historiographical texts. Hence, the lack of a parallel for such events in connection with the royal harem or events inside the court cannot be considered a weakness in “Safavid Limia” or undermine its authenticity. In fact, this disconnect may be a strength in that the text shows us angles from the Safavid era that are unique and acceptable in terms of the era’s historical logic. The small account of events related to the period after the death of Molla Jalal, and the inclusion of prayer phrases implying Molla Jalal’s death, should be attributed to the scribes of the text and common additions after the author’s life. The mention of previously unknown people in “Safavid Limia” simply reinforces that knowledge of Safavid-era figures is mostly limited to those involved in politics and other areas related to politics. And it seems natural in a text that has a close connection with the hidden layers of intra-court social life to mention those whose names have not appeared in other well-known texts of this age and who have not been the subject of historiographical attention.

On the Safavid Authenticity of “Safavid Limia”

 

“Safavid Limia” is full of stories and personalities that are historically provable, and the details of the events are so related to the Safavid time and context that there is little doubt about their authenticity. Looking for signs that confirm the identity of the author of “Safavid Limia” as Molla Jalal-e Monajjem Yazdi is a more useful endeavor.[32] An examination of all the events in the work indicates that they took place during the reign of Shah ʿAbbas I. Therefore, the author must have been a contemporary of this king, and because of the nature of these events, which necessitated access to the first circle of the shah’s entourage, the author was probably close to the shah. Throughout the text, the author often introduces himself theoretically and practically as Sheikh Baha ͗i’s pupil, which shows humility considering that Molla Jalal and the sheikh were approximately the same age. Because of the sheikh’s scientific superiority, this pupil–master relationship is believable. Sheikh Baha ͗i, whom a historian of the time of Shah ʿAbbas I called “the mystic of eternal knowledge and the knower of secret and revealed sciences,”[33] was one of the greatest scholars of occult sciences at that time. His involvement in making amulets—albeit within Sharia—for Shah ʿAbbas and the court elites is considered quite probable, and numerous historical reports in Safavid sources, including Tarikh-eʿAbbasi by Molla Jalal-e Monajjem-e Yazdi and Tarikh-e ʿAbbasi by his grandson, Molla Jalal II, indicate a close relationship between him and Shah ʿAbbas in various fields, especially occult sciences.[34] Several works in occult sciences have been attributed to Sheikh Baha ͗i,[35] and his involvement in mathematics, astronomy, and astrology, which were considered requirements of occult sciences at their high level, could be another sign of the sheikh’s prominent position in this context.[36] The long and continuous association of Molla Jalal and Sheikh Baha ͗i and the overlap of their spheres of activity necessitated a kind of closeness. And because of the sheikh’s knowledge and charisma and his position with the shah, a pupil–master relationship was required between the sheikh and Molla Jalal. These common experiences, in terms of occult sciences, constitute the plot of the narratives in “Safavid Limia.”

Moreover, two important textual signs prove that “Safavid Limia” was written by Molla Jalal. First, the author mentions himself in two different places in the text. In the first qesm of the second fasl of the second noʿ, which is dedicated to making the talismans of “ʿEqd al-Lesan” (“tying the tongue”), he introduces himself as “Aqall-eʿEbadallah, Jalal-e Monajjem Bashi” (“the least slave of the God, Jalal, the astrologer”). In the second qesm of the third noʿ, one of the characters, to prove the correctness of his testimony in the presence of Shah ʿAbbas, refers to “Molla Jalal-e Monajjem” as a witness. The account is narrated in first person a few lines earlier, and according to the number and identity of the characters related to it, the witness could be Molla Jalal. A brief review of other references by Molla Jalal to himself, especially in Tarikh-eʿAbbasi, with phrases such as “Jalal-e Monajjem,” “Molla Jalal-e Monajjem,” and “Molla Jalal” shows the similarity of the context of these references in both works, especially concerning the phrase “Molla Jalal-e Monajjem” mentioned in “Safavid Limia.”[37] Second, I have obtained a copy of Tohfat al-Monajjemin (A Gift to Astronomers), the astronomical work of Molla Jalal, which belonged to him personally. In the note of its acquisition, on the date of Jumada t-Tania 1010/December 1601, he mentions himself with the phrase “Aqall-e ʿEbadallah, Mohammad Ibn Abdollah al-Monnajjem al-Yazdi,” which is remarkably similar to the style of the first mention in “Safavid Limia.” These two[38] textual signs played a decisive role in identifying the author of “Safavid Limia” as Molla Jalal.

Another point that helps to substantiate this claim is the writing style of “Safavid Limia,” which bears an undeniable resemblance to some parts of Tarikh-eʿAbbasi. The reason this resemblance is not found in all parts lies in genre differences: Tarikh-e ʿAbbasi is a historical work with a general audience and a royal patron, and “Safavid Limia” is a set of private notes on an occult sciences treatise with a small audience. Naturally, the first work had to be written according to the criteria and methods of complicated court writing and literature, and in continuation of the tradition official Persian historiography. Nevertheless, Molla Jalal’s style in Tarikh-e ʿAbbasi is simple and fluent in comparison with that of his counterparts, especially the author of Tarikh-eʿAlam Ara-yeʿAbbasi. Also, in several parts of this work, Molla Jalal, especially in the narration of the shah’s close relations with the courtiers, almost completely abandons the order and etiquette of court writing, as if he is having a common conversation with the audience.[39] The writing style of these sections bears a striking resemblance to the prose of “Safavid Limia.” “Safavid Limia” had a special audience, and there was no need to use long-winded prose to convey meaning. Also, the story’s language provides evidence of the history of talisman use in the Safavid court, which required narrative prose. These characteristics of the writing style make “Safavid Limia” an unfamiliar part of Asrar-e Qasemi, distinguishing it from Kashefi’s prose.

The evidence surrounding the dominance of the discourse of occult sciences during the reign of Shah ʿAbbas I is definitive. The teachings of the Noqtaviyeh sect influenced Shah ʿAbbas from the beginning of his reign, and he even became a follower of Darvish Khosrow for a while, which eventually led to the destruction of the Noqtaviyeh for political reasons. But the shah highly valued the occult sciences, to the point that he even changed some of his tough political decisions. For example, according to one of the accounts of Tarikh-e ʿAbbasi on the events of 1002/1594, the rebel ʿAbd al-M ͗omen Heravi presented the shah with a copy of Jafr va Jameʿ attributed to Imam ʿAli, which is considered one of the most important works of Shiʿite occult sciences. As a result, the rebel was freed from punishment, and even “the government of some localities of Isfahan was handed over to him.”[40] Also, beyond the shah’s personal character and temperament, the relationship of the pragmatic aspects of his personality with occult sciences in a broad political context is evident in the sense that, in principle, the continuation of a kingdom depends on the simultaneous support of both physical and metaphysical forces. That is why kings set up observatories and welcomed astronomers, astrologers, fortune-tellers, and magicians to seek supernatural forces’ support and ensure the monarchy’s continuity.[41] It was along this line that Shah ʿAbbas undertook the plan to rebuild the Maragheh Observatory and entrusted its implementation to Sheikh Baha ͗i, the well-known scholar of occult sciences; ʿAlireza ʿAbbasi, the eminent calligrapher of the court; and Molla Jalal, his astrologer. Although this plan was never implemented, it shows the dominance of occult sciences over the court of Shah ʿAbbas and also the connection between the sheikh and Molla.[42]

The study of the personalities and events mentioned in “Safavid Limia” shows their historical authenticity. More than all the signs provided to prove that this work was written in the Safavid era by Molla Jalal, the historical identity of characters and events and their intertwining with historical information is highly plausible and credible. Many of the characters in “Safavid Limia” are not included in the histories of the time: women, courtiers, accountants, and agents known only by their name; commanders and junior officers; children and wives of high officials; and the unknown actors of occult sciences. These marginalized people exist alongside the most prominent personalities, including Shah ʿAbbas, Ghias al-Din Mansur Dashtaki (866–948/1462–1542), Sheikh Baha ͗i, Khalifeh Soltan (1001–64/1593–1654), and Allahverdi Khan (d. 1022/1613). They exist in an atmosphere full of hidden competition to overcome the enemy, escape from death and financial troubles, escape the king’s wrath, control women, gain power and wealth, and use spells to unite with loved ones. These readable events operate in the hidden spaces of Safavid history, access to which has been made possible thanks to “Safavid Limia.” The juxtaposition of the names of famous and unknown people whose historical identity can nonetheless be traced through firsthand sources minimizes the possibility that “Safavid Limia” was forged. If “Safavid Limia” had been forged, the narrator would have had to resort to mentioning only the famous personalities of the time to make the narrative believable, not those whose historical identity could be proven only with an in-depth exploration of contemporary sources. Examining all these characters and events in detail is beyond the scope of this article. Therefore, a selection of them will be presented in this final section, and the details will be left to the research publication of “Safavid Limia,” which I am currently preparing.

Women are one of the main actors in “Safavid Limia.” Although their identities have been obscured in significant cases for cultural reasons, some have been given time to express themselves through a text originating in a patriarchal culture. An example of this group is Varsaq Khanom, one of the harem women of Shah ʿAbbas and then Shah Safi, who played a role in the marriages of the king and his children. According to “Safavid Limia,” when Shah ʿAbbas intends to marry his daughter to the Khalifeh sultan, Varsaq Khanom takes the news of the shah’s consent to this marriage to the Khalifeh sultan’s house.[43] There is little information in other sources about this woman, who was influential in the harem’s internal relations, but this little knowledge shows that she had a role to play in this area.[44] “Safavid Limia” also has other interesting references to her.[45]

“Safavid Limia” refers to other forgotten historical figures, too. One of the spells in the text protects against an accountants’ audit or, as it was known, taqrir. As Molla Jalal himself writes, he provides this talisman at the request of Mehdi Qoli Mirakhor[46] and Mowla Mozaffar Monajjem[47] and under the guidance of Sheikh Baha ͗i to save Mir Shams al-Din ʿAli, the minister of Isfahan, from an audit by accountants. Little information about this Mir Shams al-Din ʿAli is available in Safavid historiographical sources, except a brief reference by Molla Jalal in Tarikh-eʿAbbasi.[48] Another rare mention of his name can be found in the documents of Astan-e Qods-e Razavi, which, along with recent information, confirms his historical authenticity.[49] There is another reference to Mir Qiyas al-Din, an ordinary Mostowfi who was mentioned only once in Tarikh-e ʿAlam Ara-yeʿAbbasi and who, by resorting to this spell, became the accountant of Isfahan.[50] Among the other forgotten historical figures in “Safavid Limia” is Hossein Beig Akhteh ʿOmar. This person, whose title suggests that he was a yuzbashi (the commander of one hundred soldiers in the army), is mentioned only twice in Safavid historical texts, including in Tarikh-eʿAbbasi, which could be another sign that Molla Jalal wrote “Safavid Limia.”[51]

Very little information is available on the wives and children of Safavid nobles. What is available in the sources, especially historiographical ones, centers on the men’s political activities. But in “Safavid Limia,” names of these sometimes-influential but now-forgotten people are found in several places. Apart from Varsaq Khanom, Molla Jalal includes Shah ʿAbbas’s wife and daughter (without mentioning their names), the daughter of the shah’s physician, the daughter of Seyyed Beig Kamuneh, the daughter of Qarachqai Khan, and some other court and non-court women. Molla Jalal narrates stories from them that show the domination of occult sciences in the royal harem and among government-affiliated women, an interesting topic in itself.[52]

“Safavid Limia” also refers to many unknown or little-known professionals in occult sciences who occasionally appeared in court circles on important and unimportant business and became influential. Although there were varying ranks for these people, all of them, even those whose performance in the occult sciences was not very successful, are mentioned with the prestigious titles of “Mowla,” “Molla,” and “Mowlana.”[53] Among the professionals mentioned is Ghias al-Din Mansur Dashtaki, one of the leading scholars of the early Safavid period and one of the most famous scholars of occult sciences, to whom many talismans have been attributed. Dashtaki grew up in the intellectual space of the Shiraz school. The claim that he was part of the field of occult sciences is valid, given his knowledge of and occupation in mathematics and astronomy, which were among the general requirements of the occult sciences.[54] Noteworthy here is Shah Ismaʿil’s order—reminiscent of Shah ʿAbbas’s idea—to Dashtaki to rebuild the Maragheh Observatory, which, although not implemented, is a sign of Shah Ismaʿil’s interest in receiving help from divine forces, as well as a confirmation of Dashtaki’s knowledge of the occult sciences.[55]

Conclusion

 

This paper has primarily focused on drawing historians’ attention to the historical value of occult sciences texts generally and to the importance of the added section of “Limia” (called here “Safavid Limia”) to the copies of the famous treatise Asrar-e Qasemi particularly. The first part of the essay reviewed the first scientific and codicological attention given to “Safavid Limia.” Based on this section’s data and a thorough codicological-historical discussion, claims were made that “Safavid Limia” dates back to Shah ʿAbbas I’s era and was written by Molla Jalal Monajjem-e Yazdi. Due to its containing rare historical information, “Safavid Limia” has historical value. In order for these claims to be taken seriously, the authorship of “Safavid Limia” in the period under discussion and the identity of its writer must be proven by credible sources. Therefore, the paper discussed the textual and hypertextual implications of these propositions. “Safavid Limia” contains some historical inconsistencies, information taken from popular sources, and misinformation. But the text is not much different from even the authoritative historiographical texts of this period in this respect, and the paper covered reasons for the inconsistencies and use of popular sources in “Safavid Limia.” In the final section, the article tried to reconcile the author’s identity with the identity of Molla Jalal, and proposed the idea that this additional section could be considered a newly identified work by this Safavid historian-astrologer. The paper also used competent sources to examine the historical nature of the characters and events mentioned in “Safavid Limia.” The result mostly supported the original claim of the text’s authenticity. “Safavid Limia” can be considered an annotation by Molla Jalal to the “Limia” section of Asrar-e Qasemi, an annotation which has gradually found its way into the original text. Nor can “Safavid Limia” be accused of being fake. The context of the writing, the context and time of the text’s production, and the narrator’s appeal to little-known but actual historical characters make any motive and context for forgery by later scribes lacking in credibility. I hope that this article will be a small step toward demonstrating to historians the importance and historical value of occult sciences texts.

[1]All translations in this article are mine.

[2]In the context of Shiʿism, the invention of some of these sciences, such as Jafr (the science of Shiʿite letters), has been attributed to Imam ʿAli. For more information on Jafr, see Hossein Ruhollahi, “Jafr,” in Dā ͗erat al-Maʿāref-e Bozorg-e Eslāmī, vol. 18 (Tehran: Dā ͗erat al Maʿāref-e Bozorg-e Eslāmī, 1389/2010), 288–92; Gernot Windfuhr, “JAFR,” in Encyclopaedia Iranica, vol. 14, fasc. 4 (New York: Brill, 2008), 367–71; Toufic Fahd, “Djafr,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam (New Edition) (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1991), 375–78. In the non-Shiʿite context, some angels, prophets, and sages are believed to have invented these sciences. For example, see Mohammad Baqer Tabataba ͗i Yazdi, Nafaḥāt al-Asrār fī ʿElm al-Raml, lithograph edition (Najaf, Iraq: Dar al-Kotob al-ʿEraqiah, 1359/1940), 10. It is impossible to provide a universal definition of occult sciences, because different definitions can be given at different levels. For an example of a classical definition of occult sciences, see Seyyed Ahmad Sajjadi, “ʿOlūm-e Gharībeh,” in Da ͗erat al-Maʿāref-e Tashayyoʿ, vol. 11 (Tehran: Saied Mohebbi Publication, 1384/2005), 386–407. Matthew Melvin-Koushki is among the young generation of Islamist scholars who believe that the mathematically based occult sciences have mistakenly been considered the cause of Islamic civilization’s decline in an orientalist paradigm. For more information on his ideas, see his “Powers of One: The Mathematicalization of the Occult Sciences in the High Persianate Tradition,” Intellectual History of the Islamicate World, no. 5 (2017): 127–99.

[3]For an example of these intellectual endeavors, see this brilliant work recommended to me by Matthew Melvin-Koushki: Jason A. Josephson-Storm, The Myth of Disenchantment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017).

[4]The list of opponents of occult sciences is, of course, longer. For more information, see George Saliba, “The Role of the Astrologer in Medieval Islamic Society,” Bulletine d’Etudes Orientales 44 (1992): 45–67; Yahya J. Michot, “Ibn Taymiyyah on Astrology Annotated Translation of Three Fatwas,” Journal of Islamic Studies 11 (2000): 147–208.

[5]Matthew Melvin-Koushki, “Pseudo-Shaykh Bahai on the Supreme Name, Safavid-Qajar Letterist Classic,” in Light upon Light: Essays in Islamic Thought and History in Honor of Gerhard Bowering, ed. Jamal J. Elias and Bilal Orfali (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2019), 256–90.

[6]In recent years, Rasul Jaʿfarian especially has tried to introduce them in his works as irrational and one of the causes of the decline of Islamic civilization generally and Iran particularly. For instance, see his “Neẓām-e Maʿrefatī-ye ʿOlūm-e Gharībeh: Morūrī bar Ḥerz al-Amān,” Khabar Online Website, www.khabaronline.ir/news/1211880 (21 Azar 1397/12 December 2018).

[7]Kathryn Babayan, “The Cosmological Order of Things in Early Modern Safavid Iran,” in Falnama: The Book of Omens, ed. Massumeh Farhad and Serpil Bagci (London: Ashgate, 2009), 246–55.

[8]This introduction has been repeated in various forms in different manuscripts and lithographs of Asrar-e Qasemi. For example, see Molla Hossein Waez Kashefi, Asrar-e Qasemi, MS no. 3090, Ketabkhaneh va Muzeh-ye Melli-ye Malek, Tehran; Molla Hossein Waez Kashefi, Asrar-e Qasemi, MS no. 12559/2, Ketabkhaneh, Muzeh va Markaz-e Asnad-e Majles-e Shora-ye Eslami.

[9]For a list of manuscripts of this treatise, see Mostafa Derayati, “Asrār-e Qāsemī,” in Fehrestgān-e Noskhehā-ye Khaṭṭī Iran (FANKHĀ), vol. 3 (Tehran: Sazman-e Ketabkhaneh va Asnad-e Melli-e Iran, 1390–91/2011–12), 429–33. Based on the available catalogs, Derayati has identified fifty-seven manuscripts of Asrar-e Qasemi. The existence of recent versions shows the work’s continuous popularity. For example, Fakhr al-Din ʿAli Safi or Safi al-Din ʿAli, Kashefi’s son, in 928/1522 wrote a summary of Asrar-e Qasemi under the name of Toḥfe-ye Khānī or Kashf al-Asrar at the request of the ruler of Khorasan, probably Dormish Khan. On this version, see Fakhr al-Din ʿAli Safi, Toḥfe-ye Khānī, MS no. 1065/5, Ketabkhaneh, Muzeh va Markaz-e Asnad-e Majles-e Shora-ye Eslami; Fakhr al-Din ʿAli Safi, Toḥfe-ye Khānī, MS no. 3424, Ketabkhaneh va Muzeh-ye Melli-ye Malek.

[10]These five branches will be briefly described later.

[11]Iranian Studies 36, no. 4 (2003).

[12]Pierre Lory, “Kashifı’s Asrār-i Qāsimī and Timurid Magic,” Iranian Studies 36 (2003): 531–41. Both Lory and Babayan mistakenly record “ʿElmi” as “ʿAlami.” The lithographic version of Asrar-e Qasemi used by Babayan, Lory, and me is Molla Hossein Waez Kashefi, Asrar-e Qasemi (Tehran: Ketabforushi-e ʿElmi, n.d.).

[13]Lory, “Kashifı’s Asrār-i Qāsimī,” 537.

[14]A semi-mythical figure in the history of occult sciences, the pronunciation and meaning of whose name remain uncertain. Some have called him “Tamtam,” others “Temtem” or “Tomtom.” Most writers and practitioners of occult sciences know him as an Indian, but little other information is available about him. He has been credited with writing many works, but his most famous book is ʿAmal-e Kavakeb-e Sabʿeh, which deals with the five branches of the occult sciences. Fuat Sezgin, Tārīkh-e Negāreshhā-ye ʿArabī, vol. 4 (Tehran: Khane-ye Ketab, 1380/2001), 155–56; Anton Hauber, “Tomtom (Timtim) = Dindymus?” ZDMG 63 (1909): 457–72.

[15]Lory, “Kashifı’s Asrār-i Qāsimī.”

[16]Maria E. Subtelny, “Kāšefi, Kamāl-al-Din Ḥosayn Wāʿeẓ,” in Encyclopaedia Iranica, vol. 15, fasc. 6 (New York: Brill, 2011), 658–61. While the present article was in the final stages of editing, Subtelny published an article on Asrar-e Qasemi, the main sections of which are related to Kashefi’s personality, Asrar-e Qasemi in the Timurid era, and the Safavid versions of Asrar-e Qasemi. The final part of the article introduces the idea that the “third maqsad” or “Līmiā” was written by Molla Jalal-e Monajjem. Maria E. Subtelny, “Kāshifī’s Asrār-i Qāsimī: A Late Timurid Manual of the Occult Sciences and Its Safavid Afterlife,” in Islamicate Occult Sciences in Theory and Practice, ed. L. F. Leoni, L. Saif, M. Melvin-Koushki, and F. Yahya (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2020), 267–313.

[17]Several treatises called Hall-e Moshkelat or Hall al-Moshkelat exist. It seems that this is a general title for treatises that dealt with the complex issues of various fields of knowledge. Hall al-Moshkelat, however, is used here as a specific name. Derayati has identified six manuscripts of the relevant Hall al-Moshkelat; Mostafa Derayati, “Asrār-e Qāsemī,” in Fehrestgān-e Noskhehā-ye Khaṭṭī Iran (FANKHĀ), vol. 13 (Tehran: Sazman-e Ketabkhaneh va Asnad-e Melli-e Iran, 1390–91/2011–12), 367–68. Therefore, caution is needed when discussing these treatises of the same name, which are also unified in subject. A relatively well-known treatise among these is attributed to Sheikh Shahab al-Din Sohrevardi. In occult sciences, Kashefi says in the introduction to Asrar-e Qasemi that he translated the “Limia” section of this book himself. However, my research shows that Sohrevardi did not write a treatise entitled Hall al-Moshkelat.

[18]Ibn Sina, Konuz al-Moazzemin, ed. Jalal al-Din Homayi (Tehran: Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli, 1331/1952), 12–13. Melvin-Koushki believes that Konuz al-Moazzemin was attributed to Ibn Sina in the Safavid era. Matthew Melvin-Koushki and James Picket, “Mobilizing Magic: Occultism in Central Asia and the Continuity of High Persianate Culture under Russian Rule,” Studia Islamica 111 (2016): 231–84, reference on p. 258; Melvin-Koushki, “Pseudo-Shaykh Bahai,” 267.

[19]Abu Eshaq Ebrahim Estakhri, Masalek va al-Mamalek, ed. Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Bongāh-e Tarjomeh va Nashr-e Ketāb, 1347/1968), “Notes” on 15–18. Apparently, this is the second edition of this book. According to Afshar, the first edition was published in 1340/1961; this edition was not available to me.

[20]Iraj Afshar, “Eṭṭelāʿātī Darbāre-ye Ḥall al-Moshkelāt, Meṣbāh al-Hedāyah, Dorre-ye Nādereh,Varaqeh va Golshāh va Qaṣīdeh-ye Paris,” Yaghma, no. 189 (1343/1964): 33–35. Reference on p. 33.

[21]Derayati, FANKHĀ, vol. 13, 367.

[22]Ahmad Soheili Khansari, “Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad-e Yazdī, Monajjem-e Shāh ʿAbbās-e Bozorg,” Honar va Mardom, no. 167 (1355/1976): 28–31; Anonymous, Kashf al-Raml, MS no. 1280/1, Ketabkhaneh-ye Ayatollah Borujerdi, Qom.

[23]For a brief but valuable review of Kashefi’s works and approach to the field of occult sciences, see Mostafa Gohari and Mohammad ʿAli Kazembeiki, “Vażīyat-e ʿOlūm-e Gharībeh pas az Ḥamle-ye Moghol; Moṭāleʿeh-ye Moredī: Āsār-e Mollā Ḥossein Vāʿeẓ-e Kāshefī,” Tarikh va Farhang, no. 95 (1394/2015): 137–57. These definitions have more or less been accepted by scholars of occult sciences in different eras, and as mentioned, this division is one of the most common classifications in the classical definitions of occult sciences. For example, see Molla Ahmad Naraqi, Ketāb al-Khazā ͗en, ed. Hasan Hasanzadeh Amoli and ʿAli Akbar Qaffari (Tehran: Ketabforushi-e ʿElmieh Eslamieh, n.d.), 97. Naraqi has documented this definition in the words of the icon of occult sciences in the Safavid era, Sheikh Baha ͗i. For more information on the nature of these sciences, see Mohammad Hossein Tabataba ͗i, Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qurān, vol. 1 (Qom: Esmaʿilian, 1371/1992), 244.

[24]Merging text and margins was common practice for scribes. For information on how to do this, and tips for distinguishing text from margins, see Najib Mayel Heravi, Naqd va Taṣḥīḥ-e Motūn (Mashhad: Bonyad-e Pejuheshha-ye Eslami, 1369/1990), especially the third chapter, “The Scribe and His Manipulations,” 66–82.

[25]For example, see Hassan Anusheh, “Qāsem Anvār,” in Da ͗erat al-Maʿāref-e Tashayyoʿ, ed. Ahmad Sadr Hajj Seyyed Javadi (Tehran: Saied Mohebbi Publication, 1386/2007), 446–47.

[26]Apparently, the source of this claim is Aqa Bozorg-e Tehrani’s Al-Zariʿah elā Taṣānīf al-Shīʿah, and other catalogers have quoted this without sufficient research. Aqa Bozorg Tehrani, Al-Zariʿah elā Taṣānīf al-Shīʿah, vol. 2 (Najaf, Iraq: Matbaʿat al-Ghora, 1355/1936), 54; Ahmad Monzavi, Fehrestvāre-ye Ketābhā-ye Fārsī, vol. 5 (Tehran: Markaz-e Da ͗erat al-Maʿaref-e Bozorg-e Eslami, 1380/2001), 3938–39; Derayati, FANKHĀ, vol. 3, 429.

[27]Mirak Jalal al-Din Qasem was Sultan Hossein Bayqara’s sadr for about four years from 898 to 901/1493 to 1496. For more information about Qasem, see Ghias al-Din Khandmir, Ḥabīb al-Sīyar fī Akhbār-e Afrād al-Bashar, vol. 4, ed. Seyyed Mohammad Dabirsiyaqi (Tehran: Khayyam, 1380/2001), 323–24. This identification of Mirak Jalal al-Din Qasem is also mentioned by Gohari and Kazembeiki, “Vażīyat-e ʿOlūm-e Gharībeh,” 151. The identification can be disputed because this Mirak is unknown in spiritual circles of the time, and the order for such a person to write a work with the characteristics of Asrar-e Qasemi would have been somewhat exceptional. However, given the present options, this Mirak is the most likely person.

[28]Mohammad ibn Soleiman Tonekaboni, Qeṣaṣ al-͗Olamā, ed. Mohammad Reza Barzegar Khaleqi and ʿEffat Karbasi (Tehran: ʿElmi va Farhangi, 1383/2004), 302.

[29]In particular, Sheikh Safi al-Din can be judged to be similar to other Sufi saints. The followers of these spiritual leaders often narrated and composed many extraordinary stories about them after their death. Ibn-e Bazzaz-e Ardabili’s Ṣafvat al-Ṣafa can be considered the main source of this type of narration about the sheikh. Tavakkol ibn Ismaʿil Ibn-e Bazzaz-e Ardabili, Ṣafvat al-Ṣafa, ed. Gholam Reza Tabataba ͗i Majd (Tehran: Zaryab, 1376/1997).

[30]For example, see Kashefi, n.d., 92–93, 95–96, 104, 106, and 111–112.

[31]For examples of the characterization of Alexander the Great, Aristotle, and Plato, which is ironically dealt with in terms of occult sciences, especially spells and marvelous events, see Manouchehr Khan-e Hakim, Eskandarnāmeh, ed. ʿAlireza Zakavati Qaragozlu (Tehran: Sokhan, 1388/2009).

[32]Detailed historical information on Molla Jalal-e Monajjem and his family is lacking, and studies are limited to articles, introductions, or parts of books. The most important of these works are the following: Seyyed Saʿid Mirmohammad Sadeq, “Tarikh-eʿAbbasi,” in Dāneshnāmeh-ye Jahān-e Eslām, vol. 6, ed. Gholam Ali Haddad Adel (Tehran: Bonyad-e Daerat al-Maaref-e Eslami, 1380/2001), 234–35; Molla Jalal Monajjem-e Yazdi, Tarikh-e ʿAbbasi, ed. Maqsud ʿAli Sadeqi (Tehran: Negarestan-e Andisheh, 1399/2020), especially 17–21; Qolamreza Mehdi Ravanji et al., “Tārīkhnegāri va Tārīkhnegari-ye Khāndān-e Monajjem-e Yazdī,” in Tarikhnegari va Tarikhnegari, no. 18 (1395/2016): 89–110, especially 91–94; Ali Asghar Mossadeq, “La famille Monajjem Yazdi,” Studia Iranica 16 (1987): 123–29; Derek J. Mancini-Lander, “Memory on the Boundaries of Empire: Narrating Place in the Early Modern Local Historiography of Yazd,” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2012), 404–30.

[33]Eskandar Beik Torkaman, Tarikh-e ʿAlam Ara-yeʿAbbasi, vol. 2, ed. Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1382/2003), 967.

[34]For example, see Molla Jalal II, Tarikh-e ʿAbbasi, MS no. 4204, “Chapter Ten,” fol. 39a–52a, Ketabkhaneh-ye Markazi va Markaz-e Asnad-e Daneshgah-e Tehran, Tehran. This treatise was published by Rasul Jaʿfarian under the title Ma ͗aser ʿAbbāsī. But it is not clear why the editor attributed the treatise to Mohammad Saleh Yazdi, the grandson of Molla Jalal, despite the author’s explicit mention of his name as “Jalal,” which he was called by Shah ʿAbbas I. For more information, see Jaʿfarian, Ma ͗aser ʿAbbāsī, in Mīrās-e Bahārestān, vol. 1 (Tehran: Ketabkhaneh, Muzeh va Markaz-e Asnad-e Majles-e Shora-ye Eslami, 1388/2009). Maqsud ʿAli Sadeqi and Daryush Rahmanian are preparing a new edition of this treatise.

[35]The sheikh’s most famous writings on occult sciences are collected in Kashkul, a work on various topics. Many manuscripts, lithographs, and new editions of this work are available. For example, see Sheikh Baha ͗i, Kashkul-e Sheikh Baha ͗i, trans. Bahman Razani (Tehran: Arastu, 1363/1984). Some works of occult sciences titled “Sheikh Baha ͗i Kashkul” have also been attributed to the sheikh, but in principle, such attributions cannot be trusted. See also Tonekaboni, Qeṣaṣ al-͗Olamā, 302–3.

[36]Among them are these works by the sheikh on mathematics and astronomy: Khulāṣat al-Ḥesāb, Tashrīḥ al-Aflāk, Resāle-ye Aʿmāl-e Osṭorlāb, and Resāleh fī enna Anvār al-kavākeb Mostafādaho men al-Shams.

[37]For example, see Monajjem-e Yazdi, Tarikh-e ʿAbbasi, 208, 214, 227, 230, 244, and 280.

[38]Molla Jalal Monajjem-e Yazdi, Tofat al-Monajjemin, MS no. 6982, Ketabkhaneh, Muzeh va Markaz-e Asnad-e Majles-e Shora-ye Eslami, fol. 2a.

[39]For examples of Molla Jalal’s simple and narrative prose in Tarikh-e ʿAbbasi, see the following: p. 531 on the shah’s game with Amir Heidar Kashi, Baba Soltan Qomi, and Molla Jalal; p. 562 on the raising of the lid of the Qezqani Arab’s pot in Ardabil in front of the shah; and p. 551 on the dispute between Mir Heidar Moʿamm ͗i and Qazizadeh Davari. Molla Jalal’s prose style has also been discussed in Shahin Farabi and Mehri Edrisi, “Barresī-ye Taṭbīqī-e Dīdgāhā-ye Tārīkhnegāri-ye Eskandar Beik-e Monshī va Mollā Jalāl-e Monajjem-e Yazdī,” Jostarha-ye Tarikhi, no. 1 (1394/2015): 89–108. Reference on p. 97.

[40]For information about Shah ʿAbbas’ Noqtavi tendencies, see Behzad Karimi, “Bāzkhāni-ye Zamān va Keyhān dar Jonbesh-e Noqṭavieh: Ta ͗ammolī dar Revāyathā-ye Tārīkhnegārāneh-ye ʿAṣr-e Ṣafavī,” in Zamānnegarī va Keyhānbāvarī dar ʿAṣr-e Ṣafavieh (Tehran: Qoqnoos, 1396/2017), 79–104. For the forgiveness of Heravi, see Monajjem-e Yazdi, Tarikh-e ʿAbbasi, 216.

[41]According to various accounts, including Molla Jalal’s Tarikh-e ʿAbbasi, Shah ʿAbbas, who is ironically considered one of the most pragmatic Safavid kings, repeatedly sought his astronomer’s advice to make decisions on personal, political, and even military issues. See, for example, p. 203, 204, and 286.

[42]Molla Kamal, Zobdat al-Tavārīkh, MS no. 9544, Ketabkhaneh, Muzeh va Markaz-e Asnad-e Majles-e Shora-ye Eslami, fol. 90a.

[43]Molla Jalal Monajjem-e Yazdi, “Limia,” in Molla Hossein Waez Kashefi, Asrar-e Qasemi (Tehran: Ketabforushi-e ʿElmi, n.d.), 91.

[44]According to the sources, she was the wife of Shah Qoli Soltan Kholafa, a person close to Shah ʿAbbas. After Shah Safi ascended the throne, Varsaq Khanom was sent to bring the daughter of Tahmures Khan, the Kakht governor, who had married Shah Safi, to Iran. Mohammad Yusof Valeh Qazvini, Iran dar Zamān-e Shāh Ṣafī va Shāh ʿAbbas-e Dovvom, ed. Mohammad Reza Nasiri (Tehran: Anjoman-e Asar va Mafakher-e Farhangi, 1382/2003), 285; Mohammad Taher Vahid-e Qazvini, Tārīkh-e Jahān Arā-ye ʿAbbāsī, ed. Seyyed Saʿid Mirmohammad Sadeq (Tehran: Pejuheshgah-e ʿOlum-e Ensani va Motaleʿat-e Farhangi, 1383/2004), 221.

[45]Monajjem-e Yazdi, “Limia,” 92.

[46]Mehdi Qoli Beik Mirakhor was Shah ʿAbbas I’s mirakhor (“person responsible for royal stables”). Eskandar Beik Torkaman, Tarikh-e ʿAlam Ara-yeʿAbbasi, vol. 3, ed. Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1382/2003), 942.

[47]Mowlana Mozaffar Jonabadi or Gonabadi was a famous astrologer of Shah ʿAbbas I’s time. Torkaman, vol. 3, 1038 and 1075; Vahid-e Qazvini, Tārīkh-e Jahān, 319.

[48]Monajjem-e Yazdi, Tarikh-e ʿAbbasi, 545.

[49]According to the documents in the Markaz-e Astan-e Qods-e Razavi, Mashhad, he was the minister of Isfahan during the reign of Shah ʿAbbas I. For more information, see Doc. no. 33181.

[50]Eskandar Beik Torkaman, Tarikh-e ʿAlam Ara-yeʿAbbasi, vol. 1, ed. Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1382/2003), 162.

[51]Hossein Beig Akhteh ʿOmar is mentioned in only Kholāṣat al-Tavārīkh and Tarikh-e ʿAbbasi. In the first instance, he’s mentioned on the occasion of the murder of his brother, Shah Qoli Beik, by Shah Ismaʿil II on 21 Rabiʿ al-Awwal 994/28 June 1576 in Qazvin. See Qazi Ahmad Qomi, Kholāṣat al-Tavārīkh, vol. 2, ed. Ehsan Eshraqi (Tehran: Daneshgah-e Tehran, 1383/2004), 622. Molla Jalal refers to him as Hossein Beig Yuzbashi, who became known as Akhteh ʿOmar after being taken out of a well. Monajjem-e Yazdi, Tarikh-e ʿAbbasi, 89.

[52]Monajjem-e Yazdi, “Limia,” 85–86, 90, 92, and 95.

[53]For example, in Monajjem-e Yazdi, “Limia,” 83–85 and 87–88.

[54]For details of Dashtaki’s works in these areas, see Parvin Baharzadeh et al., “Dashtakī, Ghīās al-Dīn Manṣūr,” in Dāneshnāmeh-ye Jahān-e Eslām, vol. 17, ed. Gholam Ali Haddad Adel (Tehran: Bonyad-e Daerat al-Maaref-e Eslami, 1391/2012), 728–33.

[55]For more details of this decree, see Qazi Ahmad Qomi, Kholāṣat al-Tavārīkh, vol. 1, ed. Ehsan Eshraqi (Tehran: Daneshgah-e Tehran, 1383/2004), 296. The origin of the dispute between Dashtaki and Mohaqqeq-e Sani about redirection of the qibla (direction of the Kaaba in the Great Mosque in Mecca) was Dashtaki’s knowledge of mathematics and astronomy, which is famous and needs no explanation. See Haj Mirza Hasan Hosseini Fasa ͗i, Fārsnāmeh-ye Nāṣerī, vol. 1, ed. Mansur Rastegar Fasai (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1383/2004), 391. Dashtaki also taught students, including Amir Seyyed Fath Allah Shirazi and Mahmud ibn Mohammad Dehdar (whose pen name was ʿAyani), each of whom later became one of the greatest scholars of occult sciences. For more information, see Qasem Kakai, “Āshnā ͗ī bā Maktab-e Shīrāz: Shāgerdān-e Ghīās al-Dīn Manṣūr-e Dashtakī-e Shīrāzī (3),” Kheradnameh-ye Sadra, no. 11 (1377/1998): 23–32. In fact, Dashtaki Shirazi can be considered the teacher of the most famous scholars of occult sciences in the Safavid era, because he is also known as Sheikh Baha ͗i’s master through two intermediaries. See ʿAbbas Zareʿi Mehrvarz and ʿAlireza Sufi, “Pejūheshī Tārīkhī darbāre-ye Khāndān-e Dehdār dar ʿAhd-e Ṣafavī,” Motaleʿat-e Farhangi, no. 2 (1388/2009): 63–94.

Individualization and the Emergence of Personalized Politics in Post-Revolutionary Iran

 

Azadeh Kian is a distinguished professor of sociology, director of the social science department, and director of the Center for Gender and Feminist Studies and Research and its journal, Les cahiers du CEDREF, at Université de Paris. Her research focuses on politics and society in Iran, gender and Islam, and gender and power in the Middle East. She has published six single-authored books and twelve edited volumes. Her latest publications include Femmes et pouvoir en islam (Women and Power in Islam) (Michalon, 2019) and “Globalized Gender and Creative Strategies against Inequalities in Turkey” in The Globalization of Gender (Routledge, 2019).

The 1979 revolution in Iran, which overthrew the monarchical regime, was the result of collective action of a tripartite political-cultural alliance: the intellectuals (belonging to the modern middle class), the baazari (merchants), and the clerics.[1] Each of these groups mobilized specific urban strata. This alliance had adopted a heterogeneous political ideology. Secular actors were influenced by the Shi‘ite cultural model and symbolic interpretations whose meaning had been transformed by the cultural, economic, and social changes that the shah’s modern state policies had brought about.[2] Iranian Islam had taken on a socio-symbolic dimension to become an imaginary capable of repairing inequality. On the other hand, religious actors were influenced by the egalitarian discourse and political commitment of secular, left-wing actors and their demands for social justice.[3]

Despite the high cost of the revolution, individuals motivated by ideas, culture, values, beliefs, and ideologies surpassed themselves, braving the shackles of social convention and fear. However, the actors adhered not to a rational discourse but to fragments of a revolutionary ideology condensed and mobilized in the form of images that often referred to myths and religious beliefs. Ideologies are based on a series of metaphors and images to which individuals respond based on their shared experiences and expectations. It is through ideology that emotional reactions are generalized beyond the specific contexts. Ideology is therefore not only a link between ideas; it is above all a link between actors.[4]

In the aftermath of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic regime, continued to advocate the “unity of the ummah” (the community of believers) and unity of discourse (vahdat-i kalameh), rejecting both individuality and diversity.[5] He even opposed a political system based on a multi-party system, believing that the formation of parties contributed to the fragmentation of society and that it would have harmful consequences on unity.

 

Fragmented Post-Revolutionary Society

However, post-revolutionary Iranian society has been marked by the individualization of its young members, who constitute the majority of the population. They were born after the revolution and many after the Iran–Iraq War, and do not aspire to a collective identity or the ascetic values that were dominantly promoted during the war period. As to the religious youth, the individualization of their religious choice ensures continuity with their own Islamic heritage while rejecting traditional readings of the state’s official Islam.[6] This new religiosity is one of the consequences of the revolution and the politicization of Islam, combined with profound social and cultural changes in society and families which have resulted in the secularization of the sacred. Individuals have thus built their own socio-religious identity from the various symbolic resources available to them. Since the end of the 1970s, society has rapidly urbanized (75 percent of Iranians now live in cities), the gap between rural and urban areas has narrowed, and the literacy rate for people aged six to twenty-four has grown to 96 percent. Women have adopted the family planning campaign “fewer children, better life” (in effect from 1989 to 2015), which has reduced the annual population growth rate from 3.8 to 1.2 and the average number of children per woman from 7.2 to 1.8 today. This in turn has both liberated women from continuous childbearing and child-rearing, and allowed them to think and act for themselves. It has also made children more valuable and placed their well-being at the center of their parents’ concerns; parents now mobilize their resources to respond to their children’s needs and their often consumerist demands. As our national survey demonstrated, the widespread permissive style of education among various social groups has led children to construct an individualized identity and enjoy unprecedented individual freedom within their families.[7]

On the other hand, the economic crisis of recent decades and the failure of the Islamic state to carry out the revolution’s promises, especially those of social justice and freedom, have led parents and grandparents (who belong to the generation of the revolution) to feel guilty toward the younger generation, who are suffering from unemployment and cultural and political repression. Consequently, instead of intergenerational conflicts between parents and children, we are faced with a reinvention of relationships based on respect and understanding between them. This has resulted in the weakening of patriarchy within the family despite the laws that attempt to strengthen patriarchy. It has also led to the rejection of obedience to political and religious authority and the emergence of a cultural and political counterweight.[8] Authoritarianism and violence as a means of regulating politics, as well as the political institutions that generate them, have thus been rejected.

Since 2014, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the conservatives have challenged the modern demographic behavior of Iranians, who prefer to have fewer children in order to provide them with a better life, by calling on the government to end family planning and to limit women’s access to the job market. The free distribution of contraceptive means in health clinics is now prohibited, thus exposing poor women, especially in rural areas and deprived neighborhoods, to the risk of unwanted pregnancies. Voluntary female and male sterilization is criminalized, and doctors who perform it are liable to imprisonment. In September 2016, under President Rouhani’s government, the supreme leader, who targets a doubling of the population, published an order according to which the birthrate should increase and stating that women are first and foremost mothers and wives. This order contravenes the very constitution of the Islamic Republic, which recognizes women as social, economic, and political actors beyond their maternal role. However, these injunctions have failed to gain the support of women, as illustrated by the steady decline in fertility rates. Between 2018 and 2019, for example, births diminished by 170,000.[9] Women’s work outside the home continues to be discouraged by the state unless it is essential for the survival of the family, and the home is considered the most suitable place for women. Through these measures, the government has also tried to find a solution to the crisis of traditional masculinity aggravated by the high unemployment rates of young men aged fifteen to twenty-nine years, whose official unemployment rate of 21.4 percent is twice as high as the average for working men. Masculinity refers to men’s sense of identity and their individual and collective rights within the material relationships that are grounded in family/domestic relationships. Traditional masculinities construct men as breadwinners who assume control over income and resources, as well as over women. The identity of men as providers has legitimized women’s exclusion from work outside the home.

 

The Discourse of Unity in the Face of a Privatized State

In early 2000, faced with an economic crisis, massive unemployment of youth, and deteriorating social cohesion, the reformist government tried to adapt the model of the social state by implementing a social policy funded by oil revenues rather than taxation and solidarity. Under the Islamic regime, the centrality of the state’s role in the rentier economy has allowed the state to maintain the dependence of the most disadvantaged groups through a public social policy of resource allocation, and further to co-opt other social groups, including parts of the modern middle class. These parts of the middle class run the administration as high-ranking state cadres or experts or are active in the economy’s private sector. The state’s inability to finance social programs through taxation of the main beneficiaries of oil revenues (especially Bonyads, or foundations) reflects the political influence of monopolistic structures and the distribution sector.[10] However, the state’s “dersirability” has been weakened for several reasons: the sharp decline in oil revenues due to US sanctions[11] after a decade of international sanctions (December 2006–January 2016); the privatization of the state, which benefits a limited number of institutions, and individuals in or close to power; and more recently the crash in oil prices. The discourse of unity uttered by the leaders at the beginning of the revolution no longer stands in an increasingly fragmented and individualized society that threatens the state’s cultural and ideological hegemony.

In order to maintain the social order and assure its hegemony, the state pursues a repressive policy against active social groups. It continues to apply a social policy aimed at the voluntary servitude of individuals who benefit from state aid, and at the same time, it denies the population political citizenship, locking them out of the decision-making processes.

Lack of job opportunity and of individual and collective freedoms has led thousands of educated, middle-class youth to leave the country every year. According to official statistics, almost twelve thousand Iranians migrated in 2014–15. This showed a 16 percent increase in brain drain.[12] The brain drain phenomenon has increased despite important visa limitations set by the US and European administrations. Sorena Sattari, the vice-president in charge of science and technology, declared in 2019 that over two thousand brilliant students leave the country each year for the United States.[13] Thousands of others leave the country for Europe, Canada, Turkey, Malaysia, New Zealand, or Australia. As to the unemployed or poorly paid underprivileged youth who are devoid of credentials and financial means to immigrate, they were involved in unstructured and spontaneous economic and social riots in more than seventy small and medium-sized cities in December 2017–January 2018, and following the sharp increase in gas prices in November 2019, in over one hundred large and medium-sized towns.

These riots were different from the 2009 Green Movement both in terms of the main social actors and demands. The Green Movement was made up mainly of the urban, educated middle classes, who attempted to transform the social protest of civil society into a political movement in order to democratize the system from within. It called for shared conceptions of what should be good functioning or what E. P. Thompson called the moral economy.[14] The movement’s main slogan, “Where is my vote?”, showed that its actors still referred to the constitutional law of the Islamic Republic that stipulates the importance of voting in the process of legitimizing the political system. The actors were therefore demanding respect for their vote in the face of massive electoral fraud. By breaking this pact, the Islamic state has unknowingly contributed to the rejection of political paternalism and the same social order on which its power is founded.

In the December 2017–January 2018 and November 2019 riots, the demonstrators were mainly from the lower and lower middle classes. They showed hybrid and individualized forms of political participation. For the first time since the revolution, they acted independently of existing political currents and the educated middle classes (who, in contemporary Iran, have been historically at the forefront of the protest movements), thus constituting an autonomous aggregation of individuals with myriad social and political demands. These sociopolitical and cultural transformations render ineffective the persistence of a specific habitus, which is a system of practices and representations allowing individuals to inhabit and appropriate classical forms of political institutions.[15] This is especially true because the security policy conducted by state authorities has prevented the consolidation of other forms of collective action through, for example, independent trade unions or political parties.

 

How Formal and Informal Civil Society Matter

Debates on the crucial importance of civil society have emerged in Iran, particularly beginning in the second half of the 1990s. The United Nations organized multiple world conferences (including those on population and development, held in Cairo in 1994; on women, in Beijing in 1995; and on cities and housing, in Istanbul in 1996). These conferences called for a new type of relationship between governments and local and national, and not just international, non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The liberal or neo-Tocquevillian perspective, which makes a clear distinction between the state and civil society, and considers  associative life the key to a good society, quickly became dominant in Iran. From this viewpoint, civil society is a self-regulated universe of associations committed to the same ideals and resisting state despotism. According to Robert Putnam, whose book was translated and published in Iran in the 2000s and became extremely influential amongst reformists, economic and political success is directly linked to the strength and health of community life.[16] Proponents of this perspective also argue that a strong civil society, as the foundation of democratic politics, protects against domination and hinders the rise of anti-democratic forces. Participation in civil society organizations is thus supposed to promote tolerance, peaceful conflict resolution, and civility.[17] The advocates of a neoliberal vision of civil society target the individual’s success, believing that detached from all social constraints, the individual, with their will and action, constitutes the main actor of social change. Under Mohammad Khatami’s presidency (1997–2005), NGOs and formal voluntary associations proliferated. By the end of his mandate, more than twenty-eight thousand NGOs were registered. The number of women’s NGOs increased from about fifty in 1995 to almost one thousand during Khatami’s presidency.

However, civil society is a site of struggle and paradox permeated by power relations. Social relations of class, ethnicity, gender, or religion within NGOs are sometimes so paramount that cooperation among them becomes impossible. The NGOs do not raise the issue of power relations and can reproduce the social hierarchy and the limits of existing political structures. The educated women from the urban middle classes of large cities, especially Tehran, founded NGOs to help subaltern women, especially from urban, lower-class origins. But the differences among the two groups of women—social class, level of education, way of life, cultural values, even language—made listening and understanding very difficult. Moreover, the nature of these relationships is always open to asymmetrical power dynamics since one group is supposed to be able to “help” while the other is constructed from the beginning as “needy” and subaltern.

Many women’s NGOs mainly supported women’s individual success. Moreover, according to the liberal view, the NGOs should not address issues of economic, social, or political rights nationally or globally. Ernest Gellner, who shares the liberal perspective, argues that if NGOs begin to pursue such goals, they must stop being NGOs. Gellner also claims that civil society and Islam are incompatible because the individual cannot freely leave Islam as an institution.[18]

During this period, however, the active citizen, the most important element for the democratic reform of the state, emerged in Iran’s political landscape. Despite the risks involved, intellectuals, artists, journalists, women’s rights activists, and students continued and even intensified their struggles for the institutionalization of freedom of expression, thought, and the press. Weakened by the repression of their riots in July 1999 and 2003 and the limitations imposed on their political activities, the student activists nevertheless managed to organize cultural and political activities on university campuses. Through their presence, which reflected active citizenship, they tried to introduce changes in the perception of political elites and to reshape state institutions. However, zones of civil action in daily life are effective only if institutional violence is absent. Despite the impact of social activities on collective action, the practice of democracy, and the willingness for social participation to bring about change from below, emerging civil society cannot develop as a social movement if freedom of speech, association, or thought is not guaranteed by law and applied. Indeed, because of the restrictions imposed by the authorities, the shaping of a democratic framework for the expression and development of collective visions on the rules of the democratic game could not emerge. The Islamic State has indeed tried to control or repress the activities of organized civil society, particularly following the repression of the Green Movement, which led to the departure in exile of a large number of activists, including women’s rights activists, and the emergence of individual initiatives and the individualization of resistance.[19]

Moreover, organized civil society’s action has proved vulnerable to policy change of governments that have oscillated between liberalization (under Khatami), de-liberalization (under Ahmadinejad), and re-liberalization (during Rouhani’s first term of office), with a destructive impact on NGO activities.

But civil society is not limited to formal networks. As Asef Bayat points out, in the Middle East, ordinary citizens in their daily lives have invented strategies to defend and improve their lives against growing inequalities.[20]

In Iran, mobilizations to air demands for social inclusion and rights are not initiated by only organized civil society. The resistance against state injunction in Iran is expressed through family networks, parental support for youth, neighborhood initiatives, cyber media, websites trying to create a virtual public space, and all kinds of formal and informal associations and groups. This resistance testifies to the preponderance of Antonio Gramsci’s vision of civil society as a site of rebellion against the construction of the cultural and ideological hegemony of political power.[21]

 

Globalization, Individualization

In addition to transformations enhanced by crucial social change, globalization and communication technologies have had important impacts on the younger generation of activists, whose political mobilization is no longer motivated by ideology or identification with formal groups. We hence observe the rise of new social protests, which has also coincided with the dilution of reference and obedience toligion outside the major institutions and organizations established by the state. Along with the secularization of society, the weight of institutional structures (including mosques and theological schools) has diminished in society and among believers alike. Alternative socializing structures have been reactivated, such as the associative net and solidarity networks, contributing to the process of distancing from and counterbalancing the state. The weight of obedience has diminished in favor of demands for individual freedoms and values of individual well-being. The result of this profound change is that the individual is no longer content to simply suffer their fate, but engages in social action to claim individual rights in the modern sense of the word.

The impact of external pressures on the redefinition and reconstruction of individuals’ identities is of crucial importance, especially in an era of globalization and the reign of social networks. The new social protests in Iran have taken on a transnational dimension and developed according to the model of globalized societies that operate through networks, the communication flow that radically transforms the two fundamental dimensions of the human experience: time and space.[22] These networks also disseminate ideas for action.

In 2018, Iran, with a population of over 80 million, had an approximate 56.7 million Internet users (both occasional and daily users) and a penetration rate of 69 percent.[23] By way of comparison, the rate of Internet users was almost 80 percent in Israel (which ranks first in the Middle East). During the same period, Instagram reached 24 million active users in Iran in January 2018, ranking seventh in the world.[24]

The transnational mode of mobilization in collective action exposes actors to new forms of socialization that almost exclusively use (virtual) social networks to the detriment of face-to-face interactions. On the other hand, and as Marie-Joseph Bertini argues, communication technologies do not create but accompany and amplify social demands. However, we still need to measure the extent of their impact. For example, my observations show that some of the collective actions of women in Iran initiated by middle-class activists in the capital, such as the One Million Signature Campaign to Change Discriminatory Laws (launched in 2006), were better known outside the country than inside Iran, with Persian lower-class and/or provincial women and non-Persian urban and rural women especially unlikely to know of this initiative. The subaltern women, who did not have the same access to the social networks of middle-class activists, used the available means to help each other, without being in contact with or “guided” by women’s rights activists. In villages, educated women organized literacy classes and informal discussions at their homes on women’s rights for poorer and illiterate women in order to empower them.[25] It is therefore interpersonal ties that often create political ties. The impact of this recruitment process explains the almost homogeneous nature of women’s rights movements in Iran. Inter-class and inter-ethnic recruitment and alliances between the middle classes and the underprivileged women are either absent or ephemeral. The agency of change, however, is located in an alliance of various categories of women, which is likely to bring about the conditions for all women to step out from subalternity.

 

The Act of Public Unveiling: An Example of Personalization of Politics

In rapidly changing societies, individuals gain power through social networks and individualized communication technologies that allow an increasing number of ordinary people to connect with and be recognized by many others. As Lance Bennett argues, “Social fragmentation and the decline in group loyalties have given rise to an era of personalized politics in which individual expression displaces collective action frames in the embrace of political causes. The rise of personalized forms of political participation is perhaps the defining change in the political culture of our era. . . This large-scale individualized collective action is often coordinated through digital media technologies, sometimes with crowds using layers of social media to coordinate action.”[26]

In Iran, this personalized political participation currently occupies more space in political discourse than other forms of protest. Due to various state limitations set on the activities of organized groups, including women’s rights groups, individuals further codify their political action through the values of their personal way of life as a means to empowerment. The empowerment of the younger generation is reflected in, among other things, the rejection of the compulsory veil by a growing number of young women.

The personal action of women who determine their own goal and decide their forms of struggle corresponds to the action of young women called “the Girls of Enghelab Avenue,” who started to remove their compulsory veil in public in December 2017. These individual actions focused on gender identity and undermined dress codes of which the mandatory veil is the symbol. These young women evolved on a globalized scene and were located between the local and the global. They questioned religious and national specificities in the unifying wake of globalized gender norms that transformed their relationships and interactions with state power as well as with society.

The act of unveiling in public has been an innovation in women’s repertoire of action and a nucleus of resistance against power injunctions with myriads of personal claims even if all of those who unveiled observed a homogenized, methodical performance: climbing on a stage, removing the white or black headscarf, putting it on a stick, and then waving it like a flag. The images of these young women advocating for individual freedom of choice were widely disseminated on social networks, giving them a broad scope both nationally and internationally. These individualized collective actions often sought a rapid response to claims related to individual values and lifestyles (in this case, the desire not to hide hair or the body).

Vida Movahed was the first Girl of Enghelab Avenue. On 27 December 2017, on the fringes of the social riots that shook the country, she unveiled in public to protest against compulsory veiling. This act of civil disobedience was repeated by at least thirty-seven other women, all of whom were arrested and many of whom were sentenced to prison terms.

On Monday, 29 January 2018, Narges Hosseini was the second woman to climb on an electrical transformer box on the street. Originally from Kashan and aged thirty-two at the time of her arrest, she was detained at Gharchak Prison, about forty kilometers from Tehran. In a telephone interview from prison, she says:

For about ten minutes, I was standing on the transformer, and then the police arrived and asked me to step down. Which I did. They took me first to the police station, then to the Islamic Guidance Prosecutor’s Office, and later to Gharchak Prison. The judge asked me to confess that my act was illegal and that I regretted it in order to reduce the sentence. I replied that I disagree with the law and that I actually acted against a law that I do not accept. And so I don’t regret it [. . .].[27]

In her interview, Narges says she chose a Monday to unveil in public so that her act would not be confused with Masih Alinejad’s online campaign calling on women to remove their veils on Wednesdays.[28] Referring to the Green Movement and the large demonstration that took place on a Monday, Narges says, “For me, Mondays are still Green Mondays. The Green Movement was peaceful and so was Vida Movahed’s action… I wore a green ribbon that day and wanted to graft these two peaceful acts.” Her family, who lives in Kashan, a medium-sized town where she is known for her transgression of norms, supported her. Narges had also been active at Mir-Hossein Moussavi’s headquarters in Kashan; Moussavi, the unfortunate candidate for the controversial 2009 presidential election, has been under house arrest ever since the election. But she says she made the decision to unveil alone: “It was my personal decision. I was not in contact with anyone. It was just me and me. But I was reporting my protest on Twitter and Instagram. I mean, I believed in my own action. I claim my rights and the right to choose my clothing is the least of my rights. . . I do not expect my action to succeed, however.”[29]

Azam Jangravi, the third girl from Enghelab Avenue, went to the same place as Vida Movahed and stood on the electrical transformer box to remove her veil on 12 February 2018. She was arrested and tried and says she was sentenced to three years in prison. The deputy prosecutor reportedly threatened to ban her from her job, withdraw her driving license, prevent her from continuing her studies, and separate her from her daughter, Viana. Later, Azam managed to leave Iran illegally. In an interview, she says she decided to protest against Islamic laws for the sake of her daughter: “I knew I would be arrested and I was worried about Viana but I thought she shouldn’t grow up under the same conditions as me. Now I am no longer the second sex.”[30] Born in Tehran in 1982, Azam obtained a master’s in artificial intelligence and robotics. Unlike many of her counterparts, she had been politically active before her unveiling:

I started my political activities with the Iranian Construction Party (close to the late former President Rafsanjani) hoping that the reforms would change women’s status. [. . .] Later when I worked at the Center for Studies and Research on Women, I realized that several interesting studies were carried out by the Center and sent to various ministries. But these studies were not followed by actions. The motion against violence against women is one example. For many years it has been waiting to be promulgated. All women’s issues are linked to Islamic precepts. . . I realized that these were empty words and told myself that it was time to act.[31]

She was dismissed following her arrest. The judiciary revoked her recent divorce and ordered that the custody of her daughter, who was entrusted to her as a result of her ex-husband’s drug addiction, be withdrawn. Running away with her daughter was the only way out.[32]

Some of these “Girls” were so concerned about the obligation to wear the veil that they seemed not to establish a link between different oppressions suffered by women under the Islamic regime. Yassamin, another young woman, declares:

When I drive, shop, or walk, I take off my headscarf. People’s reaction is very positive. Some people smile at me. Some others gently tell me that my scarf has slipped off. Society favors the freedom of choice to wear the veil or not, and I think that in the very near future the wearing or not of the veil will be free. But the most radical are the heavily veiled and religious women. They put the veil back on my head [. . .]. My action was peaceful. I offered a white rose and a white scarf to the veiled women who were protesting against my unveiling in public. Several of them even tried to veil me by force. I explained to them that I am not asking all women to remove their veils, but only that my choice be respected and that I enjoy the same rights as others.[33]

Shaparak Shajarizadeh was first arrested and beaten in March 2018 when she, like her counterparts, removed her white veil in northern Tehran. Some days later, she was summoned to the detention center, where she was again beaten. She was arrested for the third time in Kashan with her four-year-old son and was sentenced to three years in prison. Her lawyer, Nasrin Sotoudeh, was herself arrested by the judiciary and remains in prison. Shaparak left Iran a few weeks after her release and settled in Canada. She believes that obtaining freedom of choice of clothing for women is the most important right and the first step toward obtaining other rights and freedoms.[34]

Another Girl of Enghelab Avenue, Bahar, a university-educated woman in her early thirties, says: “They are not going to offer us our freedom. We have to win it. They can’t arrest all women. Our problem is not only the compulsory veiling, but the fact that they [the authorities] do not see us. They inferiorize us, they despise us. . . I spent a night in police custody in Kish (a seaside resort in southern Iran) for wearing a skirt. . .”[35]

Setareh, who was arrested, says she had not respected the compulsory veiling for many years well before the launching of the recent campaign, and said she had suffered degrading reactions from both the public and the police. Setareh refuses to credit the more recent campaign against compulsory veiling initiated from the United States by Masih Alinejad even though she maintains that it shares the same goal.[36]

Despite the increasing number of officially so-called “improperly or badly veiled women,” particularly in major Iranian cities, the actions of the Girls of Enghelab Avenue—that is, public unveiling—remained individual and in low numbers and have not been transformed into a collective action. Noushin Ahmadi-Khorasani is a feminist activist and the editor of The Second Sex (Jens-i dovvum), the first post-revolutionary secular feminist journal, and has initiated many collective activities and mobilizations in the past. She points out: “This new activism is based on the individual and his or her own demands. It is very different from the classical structures of mass movements that relayed collective claims and slogans or great narratives such as Islam, Iranianness or various utopias. The actions of these activists aim to find a rapid response to their claim that affects their daily lives.”[37]

Indeed, the actions of the Girls of Enghelab Avenue have not spread and have remained marginal compared with other individual actions that do not seek confrontation with coercive forces or to break with society and the state. This is illustrated by hundreds of thousands of women who observe and wear the veil “badly” (or not fully the “right” way), letting hair strands stick out and wearing eye-catching makeup or tight and short unbuttoned coats revealing clothes underneath—in short, violating the norms in the perspective of what Gayatri Spivak calls “enabling violation.”[38] These almost-ordinary citizens who, in their daily lives, practise creative strategies against gender discrimination, think and act in relation to their immediate environment, but in a globalized world in which the great stories have given way to a fragmented world (despite the unifying appearances of the media and social networks). They show their disagreement with law and Islamic precepts and grant themselves the power to resist but leave the door open to negotiation with the institutions. Let us recall in passing that in 2012, the action of women who unveiled in their private cars, arguing with the police that their cars constituted a private space and that wearing the veil was therefore not mandatory, provoked debates within the Islamic Parliament.

The public unveiling is undoubtedly a transgression, but it is also a staging aimed at social networks and foreign media, especially Western ones, which have relayed the information concerning the issue of the mandatory Islamic veil. The Girls of Enghelab Avenue wanted to relocate themselves from the margins to the spotlights. They were very sensitive to media coverage of their actions. Removing the headscarf and waving it on a stick is a form of artistic activism, an “iconic subversion,” whose political end is individual well-being.

As Marie-Joseph Bertini points out: “The image has freed itself from classical argumentative modes to switch to the immediacy of emotions, the prevalence of affects, shifting the dialectic of discourse from the grayness of the endless show [. . .]. The image is an action in itself that obscures all parallel discourses [. . .].”[39]

Although the personalized actions of the Girls of Enghelab Avenue did not lead to an uprising of women against compulsory veiling, or to women’s freedom of choice, these actions nonetheless provoked debates among women’s rights activists both inside the country and internationally. Following Hakim Bey, we may qualify the Girls’ action as “temporary autonomy zones.” He argues that “Faithful to traditional mediations, the proponents of modern forms of political advocacy fail to understand the value and scope of postmodern action, which consists in provoking reactions, in attracting constant attention in order to stimulate debates and exchanges that will lead to collective awareness and which will have the vocation of creating a space for critical reflection.”[40]

 

Conclusion

In the absence of independent organizations, political parties, or trade unions and faced with a political system in deadlock, the civil society, both formal and informal, is more invested in social action through both traditional and modern social networks. This participation is likely to ensure, in the long term, the conditions for the development of the spheres of social autonomy, and to set limits on the actions of the state, thus leading to the weakening of the patriarchal political system whose logic of domination through nepotism and co-optation has already broken down and been rejected by the population. Iranians are in the processes of becoming a free-acting plurality.

Despite the loss of legitimacy, the Islamic Republic of Iran is not likely to collapse. As Adam Przeworski points out, “What constitutes a threat to authoritarian regimes is not only the loss of their legitimacy, but the formation of counter-hegemony: the existence of collective projects for a different future. When collective alternative solutions are available, isolated individuals will gain a political choice.”[41]

Public life as a potential source of power, likely to create a common ground, and a strengthened collective solidarity allowing individuals to challenge institutions and thus construct a new articulation between politics and society—these have yet to emerge in Iran.

 

[1]Ahmad Ashraf, “Bazaar-Mosque Alliance: The Social Bases of Revolts and Revolutions,” Politics, Culture, and Society 1 (1988): 538–67.

[2]Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi, “The State, Classes, and Modes of Mobilization in the Iranian Revolution,” State, Culture, and Society 1 (1985): 3–39.

[3]Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut, Secularization of Iran: A Doomed Failure? The New Middle Class and the Making of Modern Iran (Louvain, Belgium, and Paris: Peeters and Institut d’études iraniennes, 1998).

[4]David John Manning, The Form of Ideology: Investigations into the Sense of Ideological Reasoning with a View to Giving an Account of Its Place in Political Life (London: Allen & Unwin, 1980).

[5]Ahmad Ashraf, “Theocracy and Charisma: New Men of Power in Iran,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 4 (1990): 113–52.

[6]Farhad Khosrokhavar and Amir Nikpey, Avoir vingt ans au pays des ayatollahs (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2009).

[7]Our quantitative survey was taken in 2002, in collaboration with Iran’s Center for Statistics, in all Iranian provinces, with a sample of thirty-one thousand. It was completed with a qualitative survey I conducted from 2004 to 2008. For a discussion of the findings, see Azadeh Kian, “From Motherhood to Equal Rights Advocates: The Weakening of Patriarchal Order,” Iranian Studies, no. 1 (2005): 45–66.

[8]Kian, “From Motherhood to Equal Rights Advocates.”

[9]The Islamic Parliament’s research center published a report entitled The Promulgation of the Motion on Population and the Promotion of the Family in the Eleventh Parliament (Tehran: Office of Studies on Education and Culture, 2020). It stated that according to the data provided by the civil registry, there were 1,196,135 births in 2019, the lowest during the past decade. This figure shows a 12 percent decrease compared with 2018 and a 22 percent decrease compared with 2014. “The Birth Rate Has Reached the Lowest in Ten Years,” radiozamaneh, 1 July 2020, www.radiozamaneh.com/515610.

[10]Azadeh Kian, “Iran : l’État islamique entre structures monopolistiques et modèle de l’État social” (“Iran: The Islamic State between Monopolistic Structures and the Model of a Social State”), Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée, no. 105–6 (2005): 175–98.

[11]Iran’s oil exports decreased from 2.2 million barrels of oil per day in 2018 to less than 250,000 in 2020. Dalga Khatinoglu, “Iran Crude Oil Exports Drop to Less Than 250,000 Bpd in February,” Radio Farda, 2 March 2020, www.en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-crude-oil-exports-drop-to-less-than-250-000-bpd-in-february/30464729.html.

[12]“Why Do the Scientific Elite Migrate?,” Aftabnews, 12 January 2020, www.aftabnews.ir/fa/news/631464/%DA%86%D8%B1%D8%A7.

[13]“The Annual Migration of Two Thousand Iranian Students to the United States,” Resalat, 22 July 2019, www.resalat-news.com/?p=6210.

[14]E. P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past & Present, no. 50 (1971): 76–136.

[15]According to Pierre Bourdieu, habitus is at the heart of the reproduction of social structures. Habitus is incorporated and assures the active presence in each individual, in each body, of the history of relations of domination and social order. Habitus designates a system of preferences, a lifestyle that influences the daily practices of individuals: their way of dressing, speaking, perceiving. These predispositions are internalized unconsciously during the socialization phase, during which the individual adapts and integrates into a social environment. Pierre Bourdieu, Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique (Paris: Librairie Droz, 1972), 175, 178–79.

[16]Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993).

[17]Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

[18]Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994).

[19]Azadeh Kian, L’Iran : un mouvement sans révolution ? La vague verte face au pouvoir mercanto-militariste (Iran: A Movement without Revolution? The Green Movement Faced with a Mercanto-Militaristic Power) (Paris: Michalon, 2011).

[20]Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

[21]Antonio Gramsci, Guerre de mouvement et guerre de position (War of Movement and War of Position), ed. Razmig Keucheyan (Paris: La fabrique, 2012); Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society, ed. Simone Chambers and Will Kymlica (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 94; Azadeh Kian, “La Société civile : coopération avec l’Etat ou site de rébellion ?” (“Civil Society: Cooperation with the State or a Site of Rebellion?”), Les cahiers de l’Orient, no. 123 (2016): 45–61.

[22]Manuel Castells, L’Ère de l’information, la société en réseau (Paris: Fayard, 1998).

[23]“Iran,” Internet World Stats, www.internetworldstats.com/me/ir.htm (accessed 6 April 2020).

[24]“Iran Ranked World’s 7th Instagram User,” Financial Tribune, 4 February 2018, www.financialtribune.com/articles/economy-sci-tech/81384/iran-ranked-world-s-7th-instagram-user.

[25]Azadeh Kian, “Gender, Ethnicity and Identity in Iran: Surrender without Consent. Baluchi Women in Changing Contexts,” in Navigating Contemporary Iran: Challenging Economic, Political and Social Perceptions, ed. Leif Stenberg and Eric Hooglund (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 117–38.

[26]W. Lance Bennett, “The Personalization of Politics: Political Identity, Social Media, and Changing Patterns of Identification,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 644 (2012): 20–39. Quote on p. 37.

[27]Narges Hosseini, “The Girl of Enghelab Avenue,” interview by Shahrzad Hemmati, Kanoon-i zanan-i irani, 12 February 2018, www.ir-women.com/16103. All translations are mine.

[28]Masih Alinejad is a Washington-based journalist and a controversial women’s rights activist who initiated a campaign called My Stealthy Freedom.

[29]Narges Hosseini, “Narges Hosseini’s Narrative of the Gharchak Prison,” interview by Kanoon-i zanan-i irani, Kanoon-i zanan-i irani, 27 February 2018, www.ir-women.com/16184.

[30]Azam Jangravi, “I Did It for My Daughter,” interview by Reuters, Reuters, 14 February 2019, www.reuters.com/video/watch/idOVA1K72GX.

[31]Jangravi, “I Did It for My Daughter.”

[32]Maryam Sinaiee, “Iranian Hijab Protester Speaks Up about Cruelty of Fugitive Judge,” Radio Farda, 21 June 2020, www.en.radiofarda.com/a/iranian-hijab-protester-speaks-up-about-cruelty-of-fugitive-judge-/30682805.html.

[33]Yassamin, “Ravayat-e eteraz-e az zaban-e dokhtaran-e enghelab” (“The Narrative of Protests by the Girls of Enghelab Avenue”), interview by Niusha Boghrati, Radio Farda, 2 February 2018, www.google.com/amp/s/www.radiofarda.com/amp/sixth-hour-unveiling-women-of-iran/29014916.html.

[34]Shapark Shajarizadeh, “The Veil is an Obvious Form of Violence against Women,” interview by Ehsan Manouchehri, Chehreh ha va goftogu ha, 29 April 2020, www.rfi.fr/fa/29/04/2020.

[35]Bahar, “Ravayat-e eteraz-e az zaban-e dokhtaran-e enghelab” (“The Narrative of Protests by the Girls of Enghelab Avenue”), interview by Niusha Boghrati, Radio Farda, 2 February 2018, www.google.com/amp/s/www.radiofarda.com/amp/sixth-hour-unveiling-women-of-iran/29014916.html.

[36]Setareh, “Ravayat-e eteraz-e az zaban-e dokhtaran-e enghelab” (“The Narrative of Protests by the Girls of Enghelab Avenue”), interview by Niusha Boghrati, Radio Farda, 2 February 2018, www.google.com/amp/s/www.radiofarda.com/amp/sixth-hour-unveiling-women-of-iran/29014916.html.

[37]Noushin Ahmadi-Khorasani, “Dokhtaran-i enghilab va zohur-i nasl-i jadid koneshgaran-i ejtema’” (“The Girls of Enghelab Avenue and the Emergence of a New Generation of Social Activists”), Noushin Ahmadi-Khorasani, 6 March 2018, noushinahmadi.wordpress.com/2018/03/06.

[38]Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Righting Wrongs,” South Atlantic Quarterly 103 (2004): 523–81.

[39]Marie-Joseph Bertini, “Fragments d’une épistémologie de la domination. La geste de Femen, un dispositif socio-technique de communication à haute tension,” in Médias, transgressions et négociations de genre, Cahiers de la transidentité, Hors-série 1, ed. A. Alessandrin et al. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014), 19–38. Quote on p. 30 and 32.

[40]Hakim Bey, TAZ. Zone autonome temporaire quoted in Bertini, “Fragments d’une épistémologie,” 35.

[41]Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 54–55.

Tales of Two Cities: Tehran in Persian Fiction

M.R. Ghanoonparvar is a professor emeritus of Persian and comparative literature at The University of Texas at Austin. He has published widely on Persian literature and culture in both English and Persian and is the author of numerous books, most recently Iranian Film and Persian Fiction (Mazda, 2016) and Dining at the Safavid Court (Mazda, 2016). His translations include Jalal Al-e Ahmad’s By the Pen (Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1988), Sadeq Chubak’s The Patient Stone (Mazda, 1989), and Simin Daneshvar’s Savushun (Mage, 1990).

To my knowledge, the only city in Iran that in the twentieth century was divided in people’s minds into north and south is Tehran. In general, while north Tehran, for the most part, occupies the more elevated slopes and foothills of the Alborz Mountain range, south Tehran extends to the flatlands that eventually lead to the deserts that encompass other cities such as Qom. North Tehran, with its Western-style buildings and streets, already had the appearance of a modern city in the mid-twentieth century, whereas south Tehran remained an old city with twisting, narrow alleyways and streets and mud-brick houses. To Iranians and foreign visitors alike, north Tehran exhibited an image of affluence, a city with an appetite for change, one that displayed the glittering hues of modern metropolitan progress and the absence of religious moral constraints. In contrast, south Tehran continued to be seen as a traditional Islamic city resistant to change, a city that seemed to have been abandoned in some past century, immersed in poverty, with little economic and social progress, still stubbornly holding on to the trappings of a traditional religious society. This contrast between north and south Tehran, symbolically perhaps representing a contrast between north Tehran and the remainder of Iran, is the subject of a 1969 poem by the prominent poet Esma’il Kho’i.

Kho’i begins his poem “Shomal Niz” (“North, Too”), with a prediction of sorts: “Rain shall destroy the southern part of the city.” Repeating the same line, he continues: “And I, astonishingly, will not be sad.”[2]

The poetic persona wishes for the “cloud” to be the source of the flood that destroys the southern part of the city, professing

I have faith in the cloud

I am certain that the cloud knows

And it will not scatter its seeds

Lapful by lapful, impudently over the heads of these famished people.

The southern part of the city shall be destroyed

And there is no room at all for sorrow, no room at all for sorrow:

The southern part of the city MUST be destroyed.

Injustice?

No! This is not injustice

Injustice is to take pity on the ditches.

Injustice is to take pity on the bushes dwelling in the valleys,

To be a peak and to pity the valley.

Injustice has always been so

The flood says so

I say so:

Injustice has always been so.

And the flood says

“All ditches must be filled

And there should be no mountains or valleys.”[3]

The socioeconomic differences between the “famished people” of south Tehran, who, according to the speaker of the poem, dwell in the “valleys,” and the affluent in north Tehran, who are at the “peak,” would have been quite evident to Kho’i’s audience. Hence, Tehran is portrayed as a city of inequality and injustice, for the elimination of which the speaker contends that both parts shall and must be destroyed:

The southern part of the city shall be destroyed by the water’s debris

And the northern part of the city

By the destruction of the south[4]

Kho’i is not the only Iranian literary artist whose portrayal of Tehran is gloomy. An overview of modern Persian fiction since its inception in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries shows that almost all Iranian writers who use Tehran, fully or partially, as the backdrop for their stories present a similar picture. Published in Cairo in 1895, the first modern Persian novel, Siyahatnameh-ye Ebrahim Beyg (The Travel Diary of Ebrahim Beyg) is the story of a young Egyptian-born Iranian who is instructed in his father’s will to visit his ancestral homeland, which the father has described as paradise on earth. However, the novel provides a picture of the entire country, and Tehran in particular, which appears to Ebrahim more like hell than paradise.[5] Ebrahim summarizes his impressions of the Qajar capital at the end of his visit to Tehran. Regarding the businesspeople, for instance, he writes: “The merchant class does not give any thought to the advancement of commerce or its expansion. They follow the same path that their predecessors did. In all of Tehran not a single company has been founded for propagating the goods and products of the country. Although there are several owners with sufficient capital, they don’t trust one another. Even in business deals they move very cautiously with each other. All they think about is stepping on the other.”[6] He concludes his remarks about the city by saying that all the inhabitants of the city are “defective in intellect and deficient in faith,” and adds, “They’re dead, but alive; alive, but dead.”[7]

Despite the drastic efforts to modernize the country and the initial manifestations of these efforts in the capital city, not only did the transition from the Qajar dynasty to the Pahlavi dynasty not significantly change the negative image of Tehran in literary works, but in some ways, it increased it. The face of certain central areas in Tehran changed, but in literature, Tehran continued to be portrayed as a horrible city.

In fact, the title of one of the earliest social novels, by Morteza Moshfeq-Kazemi, is Tehran-e Makhowf (Horrid Tehran).[8] This novel was published in 1925, the year of the coronation of Reza Shah, who had consolidated his powers over the country about four years after virtually dismantling the Qajar rule in a coup d’état. The plot of the story, which follows a traditional love tale of two young people, Mahin and Farrokh, is a pretext for its author to show the ongoing corruption in the city, mainly through the machinations of Mahin’s father, who is attempting to secure a position of power for himself. In addition, Moshfeq-Kazemi describes the “horribleness” of Tehran by taking his characters, especially Mahin’s father and the son of an aristocrat whom he prefers to marry his daughter, to visit the seamier side of Tehran, such as the houses of prostitution and opium dens.

Other writers of the same period, perhaps most prominently Mohammad Hejazi and Ali Dashti, also use Tehran as the locale of their stories. To many writers, certain aspects of modernization, especially the entry of women into the arena of social life, seem to be a harbinger of moral corruption and deviation.

In his novels Homa (1928), Parichehr (1929), and Ziba (1930), which are all named after their female protagonists, Hejazi uses the Tehran upper-middle-class setting with which he was most familiar and chooses his characters as representatives of this class.[9] Homa is the story of a young, educated girl who is in love with a young man; but when by chance she discovers that her deceased father’s close friend, who is now her guardian and whom she greatly respects and admires, is in love with her, she decides to devote her life to him. Tehran becomes the site of a series of vicious machinations by Homa’s former suitor, who now considers the guardian to be his rival and tries to take revenge, assisted by a corrupt cleric. In Parichehr, Hejazi didactically cautions his audience against moral corruption, the victims of which are usually young women, in cities that are rapidly becoming modern, such as Tehran. In his last novel of this period, Ziba, Hejazi moralizes about governmental, political, and bureaucratic corruption, in particular in the capital city. The story revolves around Hoseyn, a young seminary student from a village, who comes to Tehran to study and to make a better life for himself. In Tehran, he meets Ziba, a well-known prostitute with many government connections. Hoseyn develops a taste for modern life, and Ziba influences him to become involved in all sorts of evil acts in order to advance.[10]

Hejazi and Dashti were often criticized by writers of the following generations for focusing on the affluent classes and characters in the capital city and disregarding the rest of the people in Tehran and the entire country.[11] But there were also writers, such as Mohammad Mas’ud of the same generation, who wrote about a different class of characters, such as young lower-class people. In his novels published in the early 1930s, Tafrihat-e Shab (Fun at Night) and Dar Talash-e Ma’ash (Striving to Make a Living), for instance, Mas’ud describes the lives of these young working-class men who struggle to survive in the rapidly changing city of Tehran by any means possible, even by engaging in illicit acts. His novels also detail the men’s indulgence in Tehran’s nightlife, including visits to taverns and the brothels of Shahr-e No (New City), Tehran’s notorious red-light district.

The efforts of Reza Shah and his government to modernize the country initially came to fruition, even if superficially, in the capital city. The emergence of the social novels of the 1920s and early 1930s, represented in this discussion by the works of Moshfeq-Kazemi, Hejazi, and Mas’ud, was the inevitable outcome of the new Tehran as the only “modern” city in the country at the time. The creation of this modern city at the center of the still pre-capitalist rural and agricultural country would be conducive to all sorts of social and moral evils seemingly inherent in modern cities.

An anomaly to the social novels of the early 1930s is the best-known piece of Persian fiction, Sadeq Hedayat’s Buf-e Kur (The Blind Owl), which was written in the mid-1930s and presents at best an ambivalent picture of the city.[12] Hedayat uses Ray (or Rey), the ancient city that eventually was absorbed by modern Tehran, as the locale of his novel, since this ancient city lends itself more suitably to the themes and subject matter of this work.[13] The Ray/Tehran of Buf-e Kur is a city having undergone drastic changes within a span of less than two decades. While Tehran had assumed the appearance of a modern city, this ancient city seemed to resist change. Ray was completely overshadowed by the growing metropolis of Tehran. All that remained of it consisted of ancient ruins and old, dilapidated houses with poverty-stricken inhabitants.

Buf-e Kur is a surrealistic representation of the same city and time frame as appears in the novels of Moshfeq-Kazemi and Mas’ud. One inhabitant of the city, the narrator of Buf-e Kur, refers to it as the “Bride of the World”:

Opening off my room is a dark closet. The room itself has two windows facing out onto the world of the rabble. One of them looks onto our own courtyard, the other onto the street, forming thereby a link between me and the city of Rey, the city they call the ‘Bride of the World’, with its thousand-fold web of winding streets, its host of squat houses, its schools and its caravanserais. The city which is accounted the greatest city in the world is breathing and living its life there beyond my room.[14]

But to the narrator, the “Bride of the World” is the world of the “rabble,” or the riffraff.

In his controversial satirical novel, Tup-e Morvari (The Pearl Cannon), Hedayat establishes a more direct link between Ray and Tehran.[15] In the form of a fictional petition written by women to “His Majesty,” who has ordered the pearl cannon (the women’s favorite edifice, which grants their wishes) to be removed from the center of the city, Hedayat fabricates various humorous etymologies for the name of the city of Tehran. Regarding one of these, he writes that according to a “reliable hadith

the origin of the word Tehran is “tah-e uran,” which means the city of those with naked buttocks, because its inhabitants perpetually cleaned themselves and refrained from wearing pants. According to another account, the origin of the word is “tah ran,” which is derived from “tah,” which means bottom, and “ran,” which means drive. More precisely, it means those who drive on their bottoms, in other words, on their buttocks. Later on, this name, which referred to the inhabitants, became the name of this area. To explain further, at the time of the Arab invasion, the inhabitants of Shar-e Ray out of fear—of course, as a sign of protest—scooted on their buttocks and took refuge to the slopes of Alborz Mountain, which is the location of Tehran today, and they did not go back to Shar-e Ray any more.[16]

The Tehran of the first part of the twentieth century, which Hedayat describes mockingly, is a city that is, as one critic observes, “as though the place and its inhabitants did not belong to each other or to Iran.”[17]

Perhaps Hedayat and other writers of the decades prior to World War II who viewed Reza Shah’s efforts to modernize and change the face of Tehran in particular as superficial and sham intentionally focused attention on Tehran’s seamier side and the negative aspects of life in the rapidly growing city; this may have been done in reaction to the shah’s dictatorial rule. This mode of expressing dissidence was largely due to strict censorship and the iron hand of the government in dealing with anyone who dared oppose or even criticize it. In the 1940s, with the forced abdication of Reza Shah and the entry of the Allied forces into the country, the so-called “spring of freedom,” a period of relative relaxation of restrictions, began. During this time, both established and younger writers began to publish stories that were more explicitly critical of the government, although still many were about Reza Shah’s era. In the works of writers such as Sadeq Chubak, Jalal Al-e Ahmad, and Ebrahim Golestan, who began their literary careers in the politicized social climate of the 1940s, Tehran, often the backdrop of their stories, is a schizophrenic city, one of contrasts and contradictions, where traditional and modern life seem to encounter one another with reluctance. Moreover, while earlier writers such as Hejazi focused their attention on social and moral corruption, this new generation often seemed to be more interested in presenting individual portraits of inhabitants of the city, who are referred to as the “riffraff” by the narrator of Buf-e Kur and who include members of all social classes.

Tehran is a city of paradoxes, an unhappy gathering place of the poor and the affluent, in Chubak’s first collection of short stories, Kheymehshabbazi (Puppet Show), published in 1945.[18] In “Golhay-e Gushti” (“Flowers of Flesh”), in a crowded street of the city, we find Morad, a homeless opium addict and alcoholic who becomes intoxicated at the sight and scent of a woman in a provocative Western-style dress with poppy-flower prints, as he tries to evade paying his meager debt to a shopkeeper.[19] Chubak’s portrayal of Tehran continues to be negative, even in stories published more than a decade later—for example, in “Asb-e Chubi” (“The Wooden Horse”), written from the perspective of a young French woman married to an Iranian from a traditional family.[20] With the experience of having lived in Iran for three years with her husband, Jalal, the woman is spending her final hours in Iran in a bare room alone with her young son on a cold Christmas night. Reviewing her past, she recalls how she fell in love with and married Jalal, and after the birth of their son, came to live in Tehran. Her unpleasant impressions and memories include the nauseating smell of the outhouse of her in-laws’ home upon her arrival; the sickly siblings of her husband, one of whom had typhoid and died, but not before causing her to be infected with the same disease; and finally, her husband’s change in character, when soon after their arrival in Iran, he married his fat, ugly cousin. Now, looking out the window at the city makes her nauseated:

Through the window she watched the snowflakes and the black flecks of space in the street that were untouched by the snow. Cars with dazzling eyes chased after one another like scuttling ladybugs. She looked at the city’s scene, at the dome and minarets of the Sepahsalar mosque. Suddenly she felt sick. She rushed out of the room to the bathroom. Here the unwashed face and bleary eyes and tousled, grubby hair that she saw in the mirror abruptly turned her stomach and she threw up in the sink.[21]

Scenes similar to those in Chubak’s stories are also found in Al-e Ahmad’s first collection of short stories, Did-o Bazdid (Exchange of Visits), published in 1945.[22] In these stories, however, Al-e Ahmad’s general choice of setting is a public place in Tehran. The scene of “Goldan-e Chini” (“China Flower Vase”) is a crowded city bus with an assortment of people. The passengers represent a microcosm of Tehran after the lifting of the ban on chadors and veiling imposed by Reza Shah a few years earlier. A well-dressed man in an overcoat and a new hat carrying an obviously precious antique vase in his gloved hand boards the bus and, finding no other seat, manages to squeeze himself between four passengers, two men and two women fully veiled in chadors, on the bench seat at the back of the bus. A shabbily dressed, happy-go-lucky, middle-aged man, who “neither wore a collar nor a tie” and “the sleeves of [whose] shirt the buttons of which had fallen off were sticking out of his stiffly-starched raincoat” and who is sitting next to the well-dressed man, becomes mesmerized by the intricate designs on the vase; and eventually, when the owner is asked and agrees to let him examine the vase, he inadvertently drops and breaks it.[23] The passengers begin to comment on the mishap, some blaming it on fate and others taking the side of the vase’s owner. Unlike writers of the previous generation, in his created microcosm of the bus, rather than focusing on social, political, or moral corruption in the seemingly modernized capital, Al-e Ahmad is concerned with the behavior of individuals, with the rules of responsible conduct for living in such a city. With his detailed descriptions of the different dress, social class, and persuasion of various characters on the bus, Al-e Ahmad shows the incongruity of the city’s social makeup. With a comment by the frustrated owner of the broken vase, “As a nation, we are not deserving of anything. And now that he has broken it, he blames it on fate,” Al-e Ahmad seems to suggest that traditional ways, such as blaming mistakes or incompetence on fate, are incompatible with living in a modern society.[24]

Ebrahim Golestan’s short story “Zohr-e Garm-e Tir” (“Hot Noon in July”), which was written later in the same decade, is a cynical metaphor for where Tehran, before the rest of the country, was headed in its confused and clumsy march toward modernity in the mid-1940s.[25] Pulling a cart with a heavy load in the summer heat for a long distance in the streets of the city without knowing its precise destination, an illiterate porter finally manages to get the attention of a man exiting a taxi with a bare-legged woman in a flowered dress, to have him read the address written on a crumbled piece of paper. The man looks at the address and points the porter in some direction. Sweating profusely and exhausted, the porter finally reaches the destination, or so he thinks, which is a house that is still under construction in an alleyway. A shabbily dressed man who answers the door tells the porter that no one lives in the house yet, and asks him what he has on his cart. “A refrigerator,” the porter answers. “It works with electricity. It’s a new thing.”[26] Astonished, the man says, “Such weird things!”[27] As a product of modernity, the refrigerator not only seems an oddity to the man, but its delivery to a house under construction conveys the story’s intended point: Tehran, despite the efforts to change and modernize its appearance, is still under construction and not ready for modernity. This point becomes further evident with Golestan’s choice of the streets of Tehran as the backdrop of this story.

From his early stories, such as “Zohr-e Garm-e Tir,” Golestan seems to have been interested in showing the incompatibility of the people, whom he viewed as traditional or at best pseudo-modern, with modernity and its products. This is also the theme of Golestan’s 1974 novel, Asrar-e Ganj-e Darreh-ye Jenni (The Secrets of the Treasure of the Haunted Valley), which was based on his 1971 film with the same title. In the story, a dirt-poor farmer, who accidentally finds an underground treasure, begins to buy all sorts of electric appliances and take them to his village, which does not have the basic utilities of electricity and piped-in water.[28] The location of many scenes in both the novel and the film is Tehran, which, as a modern city, is contrasted with the farmer’s home village.

For many young Iranians who came to Tehran from other cities and villages for higher education in the 1960s and 1970s, Tehran often meant the University of Tehran. They would typically spend their entire three or four years of undergraduate education in the dormitories and the neighborhoods around the university campus, since anywhere else in the city they would feel like outsiders. In fact, Tehran residents pejoratively referred to them (and to other people from the provinces) as shahrestani, which carried the connotation of “country bumpkin.” This type of reception as well as the size of the city was intimidating and alienating to such students. The 1960s were also politicized years at the university, years of student protests, riots, and clashes with the agents of SAVAK (the regime’s security organization) and riot police.

Nader Ebrahimi’s short story “Bad, Bad-e Mehregan” (“The Wind of Mehregan”) is the fictional diary of one such student, who finds himself in this politicized university environment.[29] The students, all of whom seem to be opposed to the regime, talk about a revolution that has to happen, and they argue about whether they should fight for “bread” or for “freedom.” They also debate the function of poetry in addition to whether art should be “for art’s sake” or for the sake of society. All this is confusing to the provincial student, who has just begun his first year of medical school. Everyone and everything seems strange and alienating to him. Even the smells are different from those he finds familiar. The smell of the dormitory to him is “the smell of the Allies—maybe—or the smell of the Axis. The smell of wartime soldiers, the disproportionately tall Americans. And sometimes even the smell of burnt gunpowder and French perfume.”[30] He even dislikes looking into people’s eyes. When he takes a bus near the university, he feels “something ominous in the driver’s eyes,” and he continues: “Why doesn’t this thing or attitude have a name, a definition? Maybe it does, too, only I don’t know it.”[31]

To any Iranian from another part of the country, such as the protagonist of Ebrahimi’s story, Tehran and its people seemed strange and alien. As the scene of many social and political upheavals, to those who come from quiet towns and villages, the city was incomprehensible and culturally distant. As a writer from the provinces, Ebrahim Rahbar conveys this sense in his 1973 collection of short stories, Man dar Tehranam (I Am in Tehran), a series of vignettes about people from all walks of life living in a large, complex twentieth-century metropolis.[32] The first story, “Kucheh” (“Alleyway”), explores the difficult lives of young girls who are brought to the city to serve as housemaids. In “Khat” (“Bus Line”), Rahbar shows the disorder and chaos caused by the inadequate public transportation system. The narrator of the title story, “Man dar Tehranam,” is a young office employee, who, like many people in the city, is not from Tehran. Living in Tehran has so overwhelmed and confused him that he cannot even remember which bus to take home and winds up in the outskirts of Tehran, hoping for its destruction: “I hope for wind, a strong destructive wind, a storm that would toss the earth up into the sky, wreck everything, uproot the trees, and turn the buildings upside down. A person like me and in my situation, with this life and the world in which I find myself, what else could he wish for?”[33] “Khaneh” (“House”) is a story about a house of prostitution in which we get a glimpse of the lives of its occupants, prostitutes who, in the interval between their “guests,” play hopscotch in the open courtyard like little girls, and the madam who, according to one of the regular customers, owns two rental houses in the affluent section of the city.

Tehran, as the city that appears to many Iranians from the provinces to be the place where they can find jobs, has lured the protagonists of “Dar Ghorbat” (“Away from Home”) and “Peygham” (“Message”); but they soon become lost and disillusioned, as the city fails to fulfil their dreams. Likewise, the narrator of “Molaqati” (“The Visitor”), who was born in and has lived a vagrant life on the streets of Tehran, is now a peddler who sells bric-a-brac he carries on his bicycle. Tehran, however, is not kind to even the more affluent. Sina in “Eshqha” (“Loves”) is a twenty-eight-year-old, educated government employee who lives with his mother in a luxury apartment. Similar to several other young men in Rahbar’s short story collection, he is fed up with his life in the city. He feels like “a prisoner in the office,” where all day, all they do is drink tea and no work is done, and he thinks that all of his education has been wasted.[34] His evenings are not much better, as “he sat in front of television and killed the hours, one by one, as though they had made the television programs for bored people like him.”[35] At the end of the story, we find him on a bus; having left work early, he is traveling aimlessly but resolutely out of Tehran. An interesting aspect of Rahbar’s vignettes in Man dar Tehranam is that all the stories occur in public places: in an alleyway, on the street, on a bus, in a hospital, in a house of prostitution, in a movie theater, and in an office. Privacy and private space seem to be nonexistent in the city.

Many modernist Iranian writers, who often use fiction as a vehicle for social criticism, focus their attention on the negative aspects and the poor sections of the capital city, or south Tehran, and present gloomy pictures of the city. In a series of short stories generally referred to as the “Suri stories,” which were published from 1968 to 1971 in separate collections, Mahshid Amirshahi focuses on north Tehran and offers her readers a humorous image of the city.[36] The protagonist of these stories, Suri, is a teenage girl who, like her creator, belongs to a wealthy upper-middle-class family. Suri recounts her own stories, which often sound like diary entries and usually depict the idiosyncrasies of the members of her family and others, especially the adults; her own awkward teenage behavior; and the rapid and often uneasy comingling of Iranian and Western cultures, especially as symbolized by Tehran. Even though she nearly always seems to make fun of the city and its people, she also displays a genuine love of her city. In one story, on a snowy day, she comments, “When it snows, I’m quite fond of Tehran because it becomes a more agreeable and cleaner city.”[37] Later in the same story, hearing her uncle and other adults reminisce about old times in Tehran, she thinks that it must have been “an interesting sort of place,” adding

I dearly wish that the city gates and the moat and so on were still there. It would be nice too if the streets still retained their former names [. . .] There is a map of Tehran in our house [. . .] When you look at it, you imagine it’s of an entirely different place, not just because the Tehran of today has grown so huge, but because the place names have all been changed. Surely that’s why Tehran is now so utterly without roots [. . .] Let me put it like this: as soon as it gets a bit of history, they start to modernize it again, changing its appearance and all its various names.[38]

In contrast to Amirshahi’s Tehran of the Suri stories is the Tehran of Gholamhoseyn Sa’edi’s “Ashghalduni” (“The Dump”), published a few years before the Islamic Revolution.[39] The story begins on the outskirts of Tehran, where an impoverished teenage boy (Ali) and his sickly old father are panhandling on their way to the city. Hungry and homeless, they come across a man who tells them they can make some easy money by selling their blood. This encounter serves as the teenage boy’s introduction to the modern city, a city crowded with poor, hungry people; drug addicts; and money- and sex-hungry thieves, a city in which even its doctors are involved in illicit activities—in this case, the black market of blood taken mainly from the sick and addicts. Ali’s involvement and adventures in this modern jungle begin in a hospital, where he is first seduced by an older nurse, and eventually learns how to seduce other females in the hospital. He proves to be a natural “entrepreneur,” one who can survive and thrive through a series of “enterprises.” With the help of hospital workers, he begins by selling hospital food to the poor people; after gaining more experience, he eventually becomes involved in the “blood business” and even becomes a spy and a snitch for the government security organization, SAVAK. Early in the story, the hospital ambulance driver, Esma’il, who views Ali as a naïve country boy, tries to help him and teach him how to behave in Tehran:

When I say, go to hell, you have to say, You go to hell and don’t come back. If I answer you back worse, you have to give me an even worse one. For every one curse, you should give a hundred curses. And if we start a fight, you can’t run away, and you can’t lose, either. If I slap your ears, you have to give me a good slug on the chin. If you don’t do these things, you’ll always be taking it on the chin. And people who take it on the chin are no good in this dump.[40]

At the end of the story, having watched the naïve teenager transform into a monstrous character who would do just about anything for money, Esma’il finds out about Ali spying for SAVAK and realizes that Ali has become a creature who is totally at home in the Tehran Esma’il earlier referred to as a “dump”: “Listen, boy, I’ve been figuring you out all this time [. . .] You’re just a hustler. You know what a hustler is? A hustler is a go-between, a pimp, a bat, a dealer in blood, a con man, a thief, someone who doesn’t work but his pockets are full, understand? You’re not the only one; there are lots of them.”[41]

Even though disguised as a story about corruption in the medical community and blood banks, “Ashghalduni” was at the time a rather daring story about the capital of the country. For this reason, perhaps, in its film adaptation by the famed Iranian director Daryush Mehrju’i, the title was changed to Dayereh-ye Mina (“The Cycle”). The film was released during the upheavals of the late 1970s that led to the Islamic Revolution.

The picture of Tehran during and after those upheavals, as presented in Mahshid Amirshahi’s novel Dar Hazar (At Home), is even gloomier than the one Sa’edi paints in “Ashghalduni.” In the Suri stories, the upper-class teenager living in north Tehran naïvely dreams about “old Tehran” with its moats and city gates. In contrast, the Tehran in which the narrator of Amirshahi’s novel lives a decade later, during the uprising in the late 1970s, is a city of riots, confusion, filth, fear, killings, death, and lawlessness. The picture she presents of Tehran in Dar Hazar is that of a city in transition, changing from bad to worse. The novel begins with its protagonist at her home in Tehran waking up early one morning to the voice of, oddly enough, a “town crier,” announcing marshal law: “Respected inhabitants of Tehran! From this morning, in order to preserve calm in the capital city, marshal law has been declared.”[42] At every corner, people are stopped and frisked. Everything is set on fire. “Tehran is burning,” the narrator informs us: “Most banks, cinemas, and restaurants are the target of arsonists. The television news broadcast film of the attack on the university—prior to the start of the fires—has turned everyone into a rebel and an outlaw.”[43]

However, all this occurs before the change of the regime. The narrator’s depiction of Tehran after the change is far more negative. She decides to visit Riviera, one of her favorite cafés in Tehran. But Riviera has been set on fire, and she ends up in an alleyway:

The July sun has heated the garbage next to the walls of the alleyway, and I can smell the stench of rotten food, urine, and excrement. A swarm of mosquitoes quivers on the pile of garbage with every step I take and moves up and down. Several stray dogs and cats are lying down lethargically on the leftover piles of food and watermelon rinds [. . .]

I’m holding my nose with one hand and with the other, I’m driving away the large flies that have mistaken me for garbage. Not even walking fast will do any good. The flies accompany me to the end of the alleyway, and I feel the stench on my skin.[44]

Eventually, she decides to leave her beloved city. The last scene is at Tehran’s Mehrabad Airport, and her final memory of Tehran prior to her departure is when she is subjected to a humiliating search by an “ugly, middle-aged woman” whose head is completely encased in a fitted veiled:

The woman begins the search from the back. She snaps the elastic of my bra through my woolen blouse and says, “Undo this!” She then squats down and touches every centimeter of the edge of my skirt between her fingers.

I’m struggling to undo the hooks of my bra. One of the hooks is caught on my blouse, making it impossible to separate the hook and eye [. . .] Suddenly the rough fingers of the woman feel my thighs, and immediately on both sides of my underwear, before I can show any reaction, the quick hands have pulled my underwear down to my ankles, with the skill of experienced hands that remove a bandage from a wound, not for the purpose of changing the bandage but, with merciless pleasure, only to observe that moment of intense pain with the intention of leaving the wound uncovered and unprotected [. . .] The woman, who has pulled up my skirt for a more thorough examination, releases it and says, “What’s with you?  You think you’ve got something special? I’ve got one just like it. If one of those roughnecks with a thick mustache [. . .]”[45]

After the Islamic Revolution, similar to the post–Reza Shah period, when both established and new writers wrote about the bygone era, many writers chose previous decades for their stories, whether nostalgically or to escape the scrutinizing eyes of the censors. Hence, whenever the setting of the story is Tehran, it is most often the city prior to the revolution. For instance, although the settings of Shahrnush Parsipur’s novels Tuba va Ma’na-ye Shab (Tuba and the Meaning of Night), Zanan bedun-e Mardan (Women without Men), and Aql-e Abi (Blue Logos) are all in Tehran, only the last novel is set after the revolution.[46] In all these novels, however, we get glimpses of Tehran when the city is in turmoil. In Tuba va Ma’na-ye Shab, which spans over a century, Tehran is in turmoil several times: during the Qajar era and the Constitutional Revolution, the 1921 coup d’état that led to the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty, the occupation of the country during World War II, and finally, the 1953 coup d’état that overthrew the government of Mohammad Mosaddeq.[47] The 1953 coup d’état is also the backdrop for Zanan bedun-e Mardan, while the Iran–Iraq War provides the backdrop for Aql-e Abi.[48] Interestingly, in her most popular novel, Zanan bedun-e Mardan, Parsipur portrays several women from various classes, all of whom live in Tehran. But in the end, their leaving the city, similar to the protagonist of Rahbar’s “Eshqha,” and gathering in a garden in the nearby town of Karaj suggests that they do not consider Tehran a suitable place for women.[49]

The vantage point of Amir Hasan Cheheltan’s novel Tehran, Shahr-e bi Aseman (Tehran, a City without a Sky) is after the revolution and during the Iran–Iraq War; but again, most events in the story occur prior to the revolution, from World War II to the fall of the Pahlavi regime.[50] The protagonist of the story, Keramat, is a south Tehran street thug in this enigmatic narrative, who now lives with his family in a luxury house in an affluent section of Tehran. In his younger days and throughout his life in the city, he has been involved in all kinds of illegitimate work, and even though he remains involved in illegal enterprises such as smuggling drugs and antiques, his conscience seems to have triggered a world of nightmares for him, considering all his past crimes. These nightmares, which make up most of the novel, run through his mind as on a movie screen, from knife wielding to prostitution, to having had a hand in looting Prime Minister Mosaddeq’s home as a crony of Sha’ban Bimokh, the leader of the street thugs who supported the shah during the 1953 coup d’état.[51] His recollections describe Tehran before the Islamic Revolution as a megacity “as large as an ocean” with thousands of streets, parks with flowers and fountains, but also migrants from the provinces who lived on the outskirts of old Tehran.

Keramat recollects that the people of the city made him sick: “The explicit manhood of these people, under the pressure of mimicking the effeminate gestures of women, expensive perfumes and powders, European jewelry and foods and steaks that you could only eat with knives and forks, short skirts and tight pants, universities and bookstores, and in short, the Tehranis’ offensive mimicry, was moving in the direction of femininity.”[52] He adds that “the sense of honor in the Tehrani men had hit bottom,” and that “Tehran had become a center for odd things, the center for strange behavior.”[53] Given his confused state of mind, it would be farfetched to categorize Keramat’s recollections of Tehran in the past as nostalgic, since he now believes that the revolution that transformed the city was a good thing, and that it occurred because the poor migrants from the provinces still had a sense of honor that the effeminate Tehrani men lacked.

In contrast to the novels of Parsipur and Cheheltan, genuine nostalgia characterizes Goli Taraqqi’s autobiographical stories in Khaterehha-ye Parakandeh (Scattered Memories).[54] In the first story in the collection, “Otobus-e Shemiran” (“The Shemiran Bus”), we find the narrator and her little daughter waiting on a snowy day in Paris for a bus to go to school. The snow reminds the narrator of the Tehran of her own childhood. She recalls:

I am put in mind of Tehran in winter, dominated by the tall, snow-clad Alborz peak underneath the turquoise-blue skies, the bare, sleeping trees in the far end of our garden, dreaming of the return of migrating birds.

In my childhood, snowy days had no end [. . .] Saturday, Sunday, Monday. I counted the days [. . .] Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and the snow continued to fall. Ten centimeters, twenty centimeters, half a meter, to the point that snow would block doors and the school would close for a whole week.[55]

And then, “What a joy!” she adds. But her expression of joy now as an adult is not merely because school was closed; it is incited by her memories of old Tehran—north Tehran.

In another story, “Khaneh-ye Madar Bozorg” (“Grandma’s House”), one day when the narrator’s mother and other female relatives take her shopping in the city, despite the heavy traffic, crowded buses, and her mother and aunts being accosted with catcalls and pinched by hooligans on the streets, she writes:

Personally, I just love Istanbul Avenue. The odor of fish and the aroma of coffee and roasted nuts and seeds [and European perfumes and powders] blend in my nostrils, making me feel steeped in languor and drowsiness [and make my body flex in joy]. I imagine myself a grown-up woman and the object of desire of all men around me. I fantasize that I have an interminable supply of money, that I am able to buy all the fruit loops and cream puffs my heart desires, that I can go to see [the film] “Bathing Beauties” a hundred times.[56]

Unlike Taraqqi’s nostalgic remembrances of old Tehran, Ghazaleh Alizadeh’s 1999 novel, Shabha-ye Tehran (The Nights of Tehran), the time frame of which is also before the Islamic Revolution, in the 1960s and 1970s, is a sardonic look at the past.[57] Much of the story, which revolves around the lives of a group of young, educated, and idealistic characters from the upper classes, occurs in aristocratic parties and gatherings in north Tehran’s luxurious homes and gardens; but a significant portion of the novel is also devoted to detailed descriptions of the doom and gloom of south Tehran and its inhabitants.

With a large cast of characters, this six-hundred-page novel begins with the return of Behzad, a young man in his early twenties who has spent his childhood and school years in France studying painting, and his introduction to Tehran’s “high society” by his extremely wealthy, frail grandmother. Early in the novel, Behzad becomes acquainted with a retired colonel’s daughter and son, Nastaran and Farzin, and in turn, Farzin introduces him to his friends, whom he refers to as the “savages.” Rebellious and idealistic, the “savages” represent a generation of young Iranians who want to change the world, some with subversive political activism and others through their poetry or art.

For the first nearly three hundred pages of the novel, Tehran appears to consist of merely north Tehran, which is usually represented by the gatherings of the fashionably dressed members of high society in large aristocratic homes and lush gardens full of flowers and trees. Mentions of south Tehran in this part of the novel are usually in passing, without any detailed description. One such occasion occurs in a club which Behzad’s friends have opened and for which they have had a nineteenth-century Qajar-era house completely renovated and furnished. South Tehran is mentioned in a brief conversation between Behzad and Abolala, his impeccably dressed friend who is a Western-educated architect:

“The place turned out to be very attractive. We looked around a lot to find a house like this.”

Behzad slowly placed the ashtray on the mantelpiece. He got up and stood in front of the fire:

“I never thought houses like this still existed in Tehran. Every generation of our people destroys everything from the previous generation.”

“In the southern part of the city, yes, there are a lot of old houses. But in these neighborhoods, they keep demolishing them and replacing them with those donkey phalluses.”

Behzad laughed:

“Maybe this is precisely why Tehran is a faceless ugly city.”[58]

Although south Tehran is almost totally absent in the first half of Shabha-ye Tehran, it is represented vividly in the second. The novel contrasts the parlors and gardens of affluent north Tehran with the squalor and poverty in the streets, alleyways, and flophouses of south Tehran. It also juxtaposes the genteel behavior and dialogue in the first part of the novel, about art and other “sophisticated” topics, with the rudeness and vulgar language in some episodes of the second part. This contrast and juxtaposition present an ambivalent picture of Tehran as a megalopolis that, like many other such cities throughout the world, is moving in opposite directions: north Tehran, toward a modern society with all the amenities that the twentieth century offers, and south Tehran, toward death and destruction. To fully introduce south Tehran to the reader, Alizadeh refocuses her narrative on the subversive, underground political activities of several members of the “savages,” including Farzin, who has disavowed his parents’ social class and claims that he has become a member of the working class by choice.[59] His disappearance triggers a search for him in south Tehran by his sister, Nastaran, with the help of an older member of the “savages,” Akbar Shirzad, one of the strangest characters in the novel and a self-proclaimed social philosopher. The cultural difference between north and south Tehran requires Nastaran to cover herself in a chador. After a long drive in the crowded section of the city that links the two parts of Tehran, they find themselves in an alleyway in one of the south Tehran neighborhoods: “A gutter passed through the alleyway that emitted a foul stench. Rotten leaves, empty cans, and broken glass moved through it noisily in the slimy black water. The brick walls were high, occasionally a cluster of ivy hanging from the edge. The scent of black locust and jasmine mingled with the odor of hot oil, boiled meat, and green vegetable stew. Children were playing, chasing one another, their heads shaved, grubby pacifiers hanging from their necks.”[60]

In search of Farzin, they visit several flophouses, mostly occupied by the homeless or people from the provinces. Nastaran becomes nauseous and vomits in one of them from the stench and filth, and in another

they entered a long dark hallway. The door to the room was open, and in it disheveled people with greasy dark faces were lying down or sitting in a row on metal beds. Old dying men with drifting, glassy unfocused eyes as narrow as those of roosters, mouths half open, black and toothless, large heads covered with soft white fuzz resembling newly-hatched chicks, the smell of sweat, dampness, and ammonia wafting in the hallway. They entered the room. Akbar looked at the beds and tattered clothes scattered around the brick floor. The air was unbreathable.[61]

Shabha-ye Tehran, with its gloomy themes, is the story of a lost generation, but it is also the story of Tehran; hence, the title can be a metaphor for Tehran in the years referred to as the “Age of Night,” the years that led to the events of the ensuing decade.[62]

Nostalgia for and yearning to return to Tehran, where he has lived almost all his life, is what Bahman Esfandiyar feels, as a seventy-year-old former general in the shah’s army who had fled Iran following a brief period of incarceration by the new regime, shortly after the Islamic Revolution. Ja’far Modarres-Sadeqi’s novel Ab-o Khak (Homeland) begins with the general’s return to Tehran at Mehrabad Airport, where he intends to go down on his knees to kiss the ground of his native city.[63] His plan, however, fails, because he is hastened along with the crowd of other passengers onto a bus and on to the terminal by the Revolutionary Guards for passport and security inspections. He has left behind his wife and children, who are now grown-up and married, in Irvine, California, hoping to spend the rest of his days in Tehran. He expects to be met at the airport by the wife and two daughters of his former boss and long-time friend, another general, who was executed after the revolution. This plan also fails, however, as the authorities confiscate his passport. A week later, having gone several times to an address that was given to him to retrieve his passport, he is told repeatedly that he needs to return the following day or the next week. He is frustrated: “Going after his passport was one of the things he had to do, twice a week; and in addition to going after his passport, he had to go to many places. Finding each of these in a city so crowded, after all these years of not having been in this city, and all these new names and two-way streets that had been made into one-way streets, was not an easy task.”[64]

Eventually, however, despite the fact that he can hardly recognize Tehran any more, he attempts to become accustomed to the city and its new ways. At the same time, an old love affair with his former friend’s wife, Minu, is rekindled, which becomes even more of an incentive for him to stay. However, after months of trying to cope, and following an unpleasant encounter with the security officials, his frustration intensifies. Tehran, the city every “alley and back alley of which he knew so well,” has totally changed. It is no longer the hometown he yearned for a few months earlier:

The streets had no sidewalks. At one time, all the streets of Tehran were two-way streets. At one time, all the streets of Tehran had sidewalks, and all these noisy, annoying motorcycles didn’t weave in and out between the cars. He did not wish to live in a city so stinky, so crowded, so ugly, and so filthy! A city full of cars and motorcycles honking their horns all at once, and those in the cars and the pedestrians constantly yelling at each other and fighting. The shouting of the traffic officer from the loudspeaker of the police car was louder than the other noises, and he would yell at the drivers and even curse offensively. The sidewalks were full of spit. Everyone spat wherever he wanted and no one cared. He saw some people blowing their noses and wiping their snotty hands on the trees by the sidewalk, on the wall, or on the backs of their own pants. All this insistence on spitting seemed strange to him; it was a new custom. He could not remember whether the Iranian people twenty-some years ago were so excessively fond of spitting, or not.[65]

Moniru Ravanipur’s “Tehran” is also a nostalgic story, but with a twist.[66] The narrator is a woman who, in her younger days during the Islamic Revolution, was a political activist and who has now returned to Tehran. The story opens with her wondering: “Is this the same avenue once called Mossadegh? And what are these department stores, with such elaborately designed windows and red-carpeted floors[?] Are they the same shops you used to run past like a flash of light in early dawn, with [a] stack of leaflets under your arms, to slip them under their doors?”[67] She visits a few of these luxury stores, one of which is so exclusive that she has to ring the bell to be let in, and then she wonders: “No, this kind of luxury store was not here in those days. How long ago were “those days” anyway? When did these stores and these tower-like, high-rise buildings appear in this place, you wonder. And this small park? It was not here in those days, or was it?”[68]

Walking toward the park to rest on a bench near the playground, where children are frolicking, she comments on her legs being unable to easily carry her fifty-year-old, “barrel-like” figure, when she is intercepted by a shabbily dressed young man who appears to be complimenting her on her figure or dress. When she smiles in return, a young, attractive woman sitting on another bench warns her that the man is a member of a gang of purse snatchers and that she should take out her cell phone and pretend to dial the police. After a friendly chat with the young woman, the narrator walks to a nearby store to buy a couple of sodas for them. When she returns with the sodas, the woman has vanished, and so have the contents of the narrator’s purse, including her cell phone, wallet, and ID. The story ends with, “You have been robbed.”[69]

In contrast to the Tehran portrayed in Ab-o Khak, whose protagonist’s dreams of returning to and living in “his own” city are shattered by the crowded streets packed with cars and motorcycles, sidewalks full of spit, and mistreatment at the hands of officials, the picture of Tehran presented by Ravanipur’s narrator reveals a more tranquil city: one with luxury stores, high-rises, and quiet parks—in other words, a modern city associated in the reader’s mind with a place perhaps somewhere in Europe. However, this portrayal of Tehran is even more negative, since it shows a city concealing the hands that rob those extended in friendship.

The wish or prediction of the poetic persona of Esma’il Kho’i’s poem cited at the beginning of this article was seemingly about to be fulfilled a decade later with the Islamic Revolution, which was hailed by its leaders and supporters as the “revolution of the downtrodden.” Like the “rain” in Kho’i’s poem, this revolution was supposed to eliminate the inequality and injustice that separated the “famished people” of south Tehran, who dwelled in the “valleys,” from the affluent in north Tehran, at the “peak.” Prior to this revolution, those in “modernized” or “Westernized” north Tehran were viewed as being in control of the capital city as well as the rest of the country, and they bore the blame for the poverty and misery of underdeveloped south Tehran.

As Tehran has undergone many social and political changes in the course of more than a century, its portrayal in Persian fiction has also changed. Although the overall picture of the city in these tales changes in some respects, in others it remains the same. While issues such as prostitution and moral corruption in the capital city seem to be a main concern in the works of pre–World War II writers such as Moshfeq-Kazemi, Dashti, Hejazi, and Mas’ud, post–World War II writers such as Chubak, Al-e Ahmad, Golestan, Ebrahimi, Rahbar, and Sa’edi focus their attention on the downtrodden represented by south Tehran; in general, their portrayal of such characters is a sympathetic one. In post–Islamic Revolution fiction, while the work of a writer such as Taraqqi reflects a nostalgic look back at the city of her childhood, stories by writers such as Parsipur, Cheheltan, and Alizadeh, with their retrospective look at Tehran, mainly deal with individuals and their efforts to cope with life in the megacity. On the other hand, Tehran as it appears in the works of other writers such as Amirshahi, Modarres-Sadeqi, and Ravanipur continues to be a city in which the gap between south and north has widened or become more evident, not only in social and economic terms, but also culturally. This gap can be seen in several stories in Goli Taraqqi’s Khaterehha-ye Parakandeh; but the gap is even more visible in Mahshid Amirshahi’s Dar Hazar, in which the narrator offers the readers a far more negative picture of Tehran, one in which the south has finally overtaken the north:

Beggars and stray dogs, and Arabs in headscarves and head ropes, and men who are carrying bloody carcasses of sheep or calves on their shoulders and necks are permanent spectacles on all streets. While I am waiting on Abbasabad Street for a taxi, I see each one of the four groups marching in front of me.

The Arabs pass followed by stray dogs, but the beggars stick to you like ticks and only go away to grab another passerby or someone else waiting when you shout at them and threaten them. The goods that they all initially offer you in exchange for alms consist of a series of prayers mournfully chanted for your living and dead relatives. Some of them, in addition to these goods, display a sick child or a deformed arm or leg to increase the amount of your charitable donation. When they lose hope of receiving any money, once again, they get your living and dead relatives involved—this time with sarcasm, insults, and cursing that completely erases the effect of the prayers. These days, you cannot pray for anyone free of charge.

When an orange taxi stops in front of me, I try to free my sleeve from the obstinate claws of a dark-complexioned woman who has tattoos between her eyebrows and on her chin. The woman starts cursing me, and I say to the driver, “Shah Reza Street.”[70]

To the narrator of Amirshahi’s novel, Tehran is a city in which the “rain” has leveled the “peaks” and “valleys,” a city that is now, in her view, under the control of the former inhabitants of south Tehran.

[1]This article is a shortened version of a chapter in my forthcoming book, Iranian Cities in Persian Fiction, to be published by Mazda Publishers in 2021.

[2]Esma’il Kho’i, “Shomal Niz,” Gozineh-ye She’rha-ye Esma’il Kho’i (Tehran: Sepehr, 1978–79), 78–84. All translations from Persian are mine unless otherwise noted. The poem was originally rendered into English for a discussion of the poem in a different context in M.R. Ghanoonparvar, Prophets of Doom: Literature as a Socio-Political Phenomenon in Modern Iran (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), 52–56.

[3]Kho’i, “Shomal Niz,” 81–82.

[4]Kho’i, “Shomal Niz,” 84.

[5]Zeynolabedin Maragheh’i, Siyahatnameh-ye Ebrahim Beyg, 3rd ed. 1895. (Tehran: Andisheh, 1975).

[6]Zayn ol-Abedin Maraghe’i, The Travel Diary of Ebrahim Beg, trans. James D. Clark (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2006), 139–40.

[7]Maraghe’i, Travel Diary, 140.

[8]For a discussion of this novel, see Hasan Abedini, Sad Sal Dastannevisi, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Tehran: Tandar, 1989), 36–38.

[9]All these novels are discussed in detail in Hassan Kamshad’s Modern Persian Prose Literature (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1966), in which he devotes over ten pages to a discussion of Hejazi’s work.

[10]For a detailed sociological discussion of Ziba, see Jamshid Mesbahipur-Iraniyan, Vaqe’iyyat-e Ejtema’i va Jahan-e Dastan (Tehran: Entesharat-e Amir Kabir, 1979), 60–74.

[11]Such criticism even appeared in satirical form in Sadeq Chubak’s 1966 novel, Sang-e Sabur. For a translation of this novel, see Sadeq Chubak, The Patient Stone, trans. M.R. Ghanoonparvar (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1989).

[12]Sadeq Hedayat, Buf-e Kur, 13th ed. (Tehran: Entesharat-e Amir Kabir), 1973.

[13]For an enlightening view of Hedayat’s use of Ray in The Blind Owl, see Elton Daniel, “History as a Theme of The Blind Owl,” in Hedayat’s The Blind OwlForty Years After, ed. Michael C. Hillmann (Austin, TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1978), 76–86.

[14]Sadeq Hedayat, The Blind Owl, trans. D.P. Costello (New York: Evergreen, 1969), 51.

[15]Although written in 1947, Tup-e Morvari was not published in Iran until 1979, and then, under the pseudonym Hadi Sedaqat; it was banned soon after. It was later published in the United States under Sadeq Hedayat’s own name as Tup-e Morvari, ed. Iraj Bashiri (Lexington, KY: Mazda Publishers, 1986).

[16]Hedayat, Tup-e Morvari, 16.

[17]Iraj Bashiri, The Fiction of Sadeq Hedayat (Lexington, KY: Mazda Publishers, 1984), 154.

[18]Sadeq Chubak, Kheymehshabbazi, 4th ed. (Tehran: Javidan, 1972).

[19]This story has been translated by John Limbert in Iranian Studies 1 (Summer 1968): 115–19.

[20]Sadeq Chubak, “Asb-e Chubi,” in Cheragh-e Akhar (Tehran: Javidan, 1966), 111–31.

[21]Sadeq Chubak, “The Wooden Horse,” in Stories from Iran: A Chicago Anthology, 1921–1991, ed. Heshmat Moayyad, trans. John Perry (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 1991), 101–10. Quote on p. 108.

[22]Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Did-o Bazdid (Tehran: Entesharat-e Amir Kabir, 1978).

[23]Jalal Al-e Ahmad, “Goldan-e Chini,” in Did-o Bazdid (Tehran: Entesharat-e Amir Kabir, 1978), 71–78. Quote on p. 72.

[24]Al-e Ahmad, “Goldan-e Chini,” 76.

[25]Ebrahim Golestan, “Zohr-e Garm-e Tir,” in Shekar-e Sayeh (Tehran: Rowzan, 1965), 34–44.

[26]Golestan, “Zohr-e,” 41.

[27]Golestan, “Zohr-e,” 42.

[28]Ebrahim Golestan, Asrar-e Ganj-e Darreh-ye Jenni (Tehran: Entesharat-e Agah, 1974).

[29]Nader Ebrahimi, “Bad, Bad-e Mehregan,” in Hezarpa-ye Siyah va Qessehha-ye Sahra (Tehran: Iran Ketab, 1975), 7–50.

[30]Nader Ebrahimi, “The Wind of Mehregan,” trans. M.R. Ghanoonparvar and Diane L. Wilcox, Literature East and West 20 (1976): 218–39. Quote on p. 219.

[31]Ebrahimi, “Wind of Mehregan,” 221.

[32]Ebrahim Rahbar, Man dar Tehranam (Tehran: Amir Kabir Publishers, 1977).

[33]Ebrahim Rahbar, “Man dar Tehranam,” in Man dar Tehranam (Tehran: Amir Kabir Publishers, 1977), 27–35. Quote on p. 32.

[34]Ebrahim Rahbar, “Eshqha,” in Man dar Tehranam (Tehran: Amir Kabir Publishers, 1977), 93–102. Quote on p. 95.

[35]Rahbar, “Eshqha,” 97.

[36]These stories were published in Sar-e Bibi Khanom (Tehran: Chapkhaneh-ye Taban, 1968); Ba’d az Ruz-e Akher (Tehran: Entesharat-e Amir Kabir, 1969); and Beh Sigheh-ye Avval Shakhs-e Mofrad (Tehran: Entesharat-e Buf, 1971).

[37]In English, all the “Suri stories” were compiled and published in one volume entitled Suri & Co.: Tales of a Persian Teenager, trans. J.E. Knörzer (Austin, TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1995). The story under discussion is “Paikan Place,” 78–87, quote on p. 79.

[38]Amirshahi, “Paikan Place,” 86.

[39]Gholamhoseyn Sa’edi, “Ashghalduni,” in Gur-o Gahvareh (Tehran: Entesharat-e Agah, 1977), 93–200.

[40]This story has been translated as “The Rubbish Heap,” in Gholam-Hossein Sa’edi, Dandil: Stories from Iranian Life, trans. Robert Campbell, Hasan Javadi, and Julie Scott Meisami (New York:  Random House, 1981), 160–239. The quotations are taken from this translation, 191–92.

[41]Sa’edi, “Rubbish Heap,” 235.

[42]Mahshid Amirshahi, Dar Hazar (London: Cushing-Malloy, 1987), 1.

[43]Amirshahi, Dar Hazar, 28.

[44]Amirshahi, Dar Hazar, 344.

[45]Amirshahi, Dar Hazar, 426–27.

[46]Shahrnush Parsipur, Tuba va Ma’na-ye Shab (Tehran: Esperak, 1989); Zanan bedun-e Mardan (Tehran: Noqreh, 1989); and Aql-e Abi (San Jose, CA: Zamaneh Publishers, 1994). The last novel was originally typeset in Tehran, but its publication was prevented. Aql-e Abi has been translated by M.R. Ghanoonparvar as Blue Logos (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2020).

[47]Tuba va Ma’na-ye Shab was translated into English as Tuba and the Meaning of Night by Havva Houshmand and Kamran Talattof (New York: The Feminist Press, 2006).

[48]Two English translations of Zanan bedun-e Mardan as Women without Men have been published: one by Kamran Talattof and Jocelyn Sharlet (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1998) and another by Faridoun Farrokh (New York: The Feminist Press, 2013).

[49]Visual artist Shirin Neshat directed the 2009 film adaptation of this novel.

[50]Amir Hasan Cheheltan, Tehran, Shahr-e bi Aseman (Tehran: Entesharat-e Negah, 2001).

[51]“Sha’ban Bimokh” was the street name of Sha’ban Ja’fari. Regarding these events and the involvement of Sha’ban Bimokh in them, see Homa Sarshar, Sha’ban Ja’fari (Beverly Hills, CA: NAAB Publishers, 2002).

[52]Quoted in Anahid Ojakiyans, “[Naqd-e] Tehran, Shahr-e bi Aseman,” Nameh-ye Farhangestan, no. 6 (Summer 2005): 164–72.

[53]Ojakiyans, “Tehran, Shahr-e bi Aseman,” 170.

[54]Goli Taraqqi, Khaterehha-ye Parakandeh (Tehran: Entesharat-e Bagh-e Ayeneh, 1994).

[55]Goli Taraqqi, “The Shemiran Bus,” in A Mansion in the Sky: Short Stories by Goli Taraghi, trans. Faridoun Farrokh (Austin, TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 2003), 9–22. Quote on p. 9.

[56]Goli Taraqqi, “Grandma’s House,” in A Mansion in the Sky: Short Stories by Goli Taraghi, trans. Faridoun Farrokh (Austin, TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 2003), 39–58. Quote on p. 49.

[57]Ghazaleh Alizadeh, Shabha-ye Tehran (Tehran: Entesharat-e Tus, 1999). An English translation of this novel by M.R. Ghanoonparvar will be available through Mazda Publishers in 2020.

[58]Alizadeh, Shabha-ye Tehran, 80.

[59]Alizadeh, Shabha-ye Tehran, 398.

[60]Alizadeh, Shabha-ye Tehran, 453.

[61]Alizadeh, Shabha-ye Tehran, 460.

[62]See Reza Baraheni, “Qessehnevisi dar Asr-e Shab,” in Qessehnevisi (Tehran: Ashrafi, 1969–70), 75–132.

[63]Ja’far Modarres-Sadeqi, Ab-o Khak (Tehran: Nashr-e Markaz, 2005).

[64]Modarres-Sadeqi, Ab-o Khak, 53.

[65]Modarres-Sadeqi, Ab-o Khak, 150.

[66]Moniru Ravanipur, “Tehran 2006,” Zanan 136 (AH 1385/AD 2006): 76–79.

[67]Moniru Ravanipur, “Tehran,” in The Shipwrecked: Contemporary Stories by Women from Iran, ed. Fereshteh Nouraie-Simone, trans. Faridoun Farrokh (New York: The Feminist Press, 2014), 195–205. Quote on p. 195.

[68]Ravanipur, “Tehran,” 198.

[69]Ravanipur, “Tehran,” 204.

[70]Amirshahi, Dar Hazar, 306.

The Manichaean Living Self Reflected in Persian Mystical Poetry

Omid Behbahani <behbahani@ihcs.ac.ir> is an Associate Professor in Ancient Iranian Culture and Languages at the Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies (IHCS), Tehran, Iran. She teaches Manichaean Middle Persian and Parthian Texts of Turfan (Xinyang, China) at IHCS, Faculty of Linguistics (1998-present). She was appointed Invited Lecturer in Persian Language and Iranian Studies at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary (2008-2009), and the Australian National University (ANU), Canberra, Australia (2014-2017).


Introduction

The Living Self, as part of the divine entity imprisoned in Matter, is a defined concept in the Manichaean mythological terminology. The essence of this concept, adopted and adapted in Iranian Mysticism and reflected in the words of Persian poets, is the focus of this article. After introducing the concept of Living Self, I will bring some examples of Rumi, Hafez, and a few modern Persian poets to demonstrate the continuity of ancient believes in classical and modern Persian poetry.

Manichaeism, founded in the third century CE by Mani, borne in Babylonia (a province of Persia at the time), once flourished in the ancient world and claimed followers from North Africa to China for over a millennium. It was adopted as the state religion by Uygur kingdom (762-840 CE). “In China the religion was proscribed in 863, but although persecuted it survived there at least until the 14th century.”[1]

As a dualistic religion, Manichaeism suggested an ongoing struggle between the forces of Good and Evil in the Universe. It was also an eclectic religion that provided a synthesis of previous religions, schools of thought and their mythology such as Gnosticism, Christianity, Buddhism, and Zoroastrianism.  Mani set out his teaching in an elaborate and complicated mythology.

 

The Manichaean Myth of Creation

In the beginning there were two separate realms: The Paradise of Light and the Hell of Darkness. The Paradise of Light is ruled by a supreme god, called the Father of Greatness. It is unbounded, uncreated, and eternal. Its substance is the Five Light Elements: Ether, Air, Light, Water, and Fire. Paradise is inhabited by countless Aeons[2], considered as powers of the Father of Greatness. There exists a goddess, the Great Spirit, presumably, the Father of Greatness’ consort.

The Hell, ruled by the Prince of Darkness or Ahreman, is divided into five kingdoms, each made of the substance of darkness. It is inhabited by five kinds of devils: two-legged, four-legged, winged, swimming, and crawling. Each kind is divided into two sexes and lives in perpetual lust and strife. The Prince of Darkness is the personification of Matter.

By chance, the Devil (Ahreman) came to the boundary between the Hell and Heaven and saw, desired and invaded the Realm of Light. To protect his realm and to preserve its eternal peace the Father of Greatness evoked emanations of himself, by word, to do the battle with the powers of Darkness. These emanations are gods of Manichaeism.

In order to fight against the Darkness, three Creations of gods take place. Those of the First Creation are the Mother of Life, who evokes in turn her son, the First Man, himself a god. He, in turn, evokes his five sons, the Five Light Elements of the Paradise. With these, the First Man goes forth to fight the devils. The Light Elements are also called his armour and his bait. When the First Man is overwhelmed by the powers of Darkness, he is forced to throw the baits to distract the evil powers from Paradise. The devils swallow the Light Elements, are appeased and cease their invasion. By this act, a part of the Light has become absorbed in Darkness. This lost Light smothered by the Matter which has devoured it, suffers, and forgets its divine nature. Matter itself rejoices in the Light it has obtained, and grows to depend upon it.

The First Man, overwhelmed in the depth of Hell, remains unconscious in the battlefield. Recovering his senses, he cries out for help, and his mother, upon hearing him pleads with the Father of Greatness, who evokes the Second Creation of gods for his aid […]. The most important of these gods is the Living Spirit.  This god functions as the creator of the Universe and his sons rescue the First Man and he is led back to Paradise by the Mother of Life. According to this myth, the creation of the world is a device to rescue the Light, smothered by the Matter. The Living Spirit attacks and defeats the powers of the darkness.  And then, from the bodies of the demons he has killed, he makes eight earths and from their skins, ten skies. He fetters their chiefs, alive, in the firmament. From a portion of the swallowed Light, that is still pure, he makes the Sun and the Moon. From the Light that is slightly defiled, he makes the stars. Thus, the Cosmos is made.

But the world, in this stage, is motionless and without life. The sun is standing still in the sky. The Father, then, evokes the Third Creation, which is the creation of the redeeming gods.  The Living Spirit, at this stage, is called the Third Messenger and functions as the deceiver of the demons. He evokes the Maiden of Light. Then the Maiden of Light and the Third Messenger, naked, show their divine beauty to the chief demons chained in the firmament. Beholding them, the males ejaculate and their seeds fall into the water and become a huge sea-monster which is defeated by one of the sons of the Living Spirit. Parts of those seeds fall on land and form the trees and plants. The female devils, already pregnant from the unions in Hell, miscarry, and their abortions, containing less Light than the male semen, fall to the earth and people it with the five kinds of the living creatures, which correspond with the five kinds of species of demons.  At this time transmigration of souls has started. Ahriman, observing the actions of the Living Spirit, does not sit still.

In order to defeat the process of redemption, Ahriman, or Matter, personified as Greed or Desire, prompts a pair of huge demon-animals to devour the offspring of the other animals which had populated the earth; thus, they absorb all the stolen Light they possessed into their own bodies. The pair then mate and produce Adam and Eve in the likeness of the Third Messenger and The Maiden of Light. The accumulated Light in their bodies is transmitted to the first human pair and it forms their souls. In the human body, the Light Soul, called the Living Self,[3] is imprisoned and mixed with the Dark Soul (material soul), made up of lust, greed, envy, hate, etc. Lust ensures that the human body will propagate itself and so makes an enduring prison for a part of the swallowed Light.

The Process of Salvation

The Living Self, which makes up the human soul, cannot be physically redeemed. Its salvation depends on a conscious effort for virtue by each individual. Prophets should be sent to mankind to bring the Gnosis, or the Heavenly Knowledge to Adam’s descendants. Only with the Knowledge of Truth comes the will for redemption; but Matter always seeks to submerge the soul in the oblivion, or the sleep of drunkenness. Mani called the soul, regarding this condition, the Old Man and the awakened soul as the New Man. The soul itself, being essentially of Light, can commit a sin, only through forgetfulness, by which it loses the strength to withstand the Dark Soul, with which it is shut into the corpse of the body.

Mani taught that the soul may be incarnated many times before attaining release through the perfected virtue. The soul having been judged whether one goes to life in Heaven or back to the world, and the mixture, or to death in Hell.

The Living Spirit will then fulfil the eschatological task and imprison the Matter in an eternal prison, sealed with a great stone. And finally, the gods and the redeemed will once more behold the face of Father of Greatness, hidden from them since the struggle began.

This Manichaean myth of creation, with its Gnostic roots, was adventure-packed and, as mentioned earlier, very complicated. Yet, it was a guideline and a code of conduct for every Manichaean.  The myth shows that in order to redeem the imprisoned Light, the Manichaean gods rush courageously to fight against evil in the Hell of Darkness and some are even sacrificed. Every individual Manichean had to follow the example of their gods and tried to enact that endeavour in his life.  They had to refrain from helping the evil matter; constantly taking measures to purify their souls, making sure that after death, their soul leaves the cycle of incarnations, reaches the state of salvation, and flies to the Paradise of Light.  This was the Manichean Nirvana.  The purification of soul was the goal of every Manichaean. They regarded their soul holy, and their body unclean.[4]

Mani, supported by Shapour I of the Sassanid dynasty, embarked on propagating his religion throughout Iran. But by and by encountered the hostility of Zoroastrian priests and, finally, by the order of Shapour’s son, Vahram I, was imprisoned and died in heavy chains. After Mani’s death, Manichaeans endured bloody persecutions at the hands of Zoroastrians and migrated to Oxus region where they flourished. “The Arab conquest of Persia in the 7th century gave a brief respite from persecution to the Manichaeans there, and some even returned from Oxus to their homes.”[5] The political and intellectual atmosphere of the first and second century AH, especially in the beginning of the Abbasid Caliphate, provided the alternative thinkers, including Manichaeans to take part in public debates.[6] The translation movement[7] can be considered as the key factor to enrich the Islamic intellectual capacity by absorbing the scientific and scholarly heritage of the time, written in Greek, Syriac, Middle Persian, Indian, etc. The Persian writer and translator Abdullah Ibn Al- Muqaffa`, who translated Persian books from Pahlavi into Arabic is said to be a Zandiq, an epithet given to Manichaeans.[8]

Therefore, it is possible that such translations might have helped the ancient Iranian ideas, as well as mystical concepts to endure throughout ages in Persian literature, such concepts as:

  • Kingdom of Heaven (Paradise)
  • Hell of Darkness
  • Two absolutely opposed principles of Good (Light/Spirit) and Evil (Darkness/Matter)
  • Father of Greatness (the Supreme God)
  • Ahreman (the Prince of Darkness)
  • Aeons
  • Demons and Angels
  • Mixture of Good and Evil
  • The Imprisonment of the Soul in Man’s body
  • Knowledge of Truth (Gnosis)
  • Longing for return to Paradise
  • Perception of Light as a pure and clean substance
  • Question of Man’s Origin
  • Unity of Man and God
  • Macrocosm and Microcosm [9]
  • Battle between the powers of Light and Darkness
  • World Soul
  • Living Self, which is the topic of this article.

These concepts and several others became a part of imagery and metaphors of many mystic poets, such as Sanai, Attar, Rumi, and Hafez, and continued to appear in the poems of the contemporary poets like Ahmad Shamlou, Sohrab Sepehri, Simin Behbahani, and Houshang Ebtehaj (H. E. Sayeh).

Rumi (1207-1273) is a world-renown poet and acclaimed Persian Sufi-master of 13th century, whose ecstatic poems have been translated into English and several other languages. The following poem can be interpreted as a question by the Living Self, directed to the World Soul. The Living Self complains of being separated from the World Soul. This may be considered as an adaptation and interpretation of the Living Soul by the Iranian Mystics:

O’ Soul of the World![10]

Where hast thou been last night?

Nay, wrong I am

Thou hast been in my heart […]

Thou art the mirror

The colour reflected on thee, is just an image

Thou art free from any colour.[11]

The following line of Rumi’s poem may be interpreted as the imprisonment of the souls in the material world and their separation from the Paradise,[12] just like the Five Elements of Light being devoured by Matter in the Hell of Darkness, as the Manichaean myth indicates. In this poem, Rumi calls on the World Soul to help rescue the souls from the “battlefield” (material world), in the same way the Living Spirit did. This can also be interpreted as the Living Self[13]  who asks the World Soul[14] for redemption from the material world:

[…] As the souls from the spiritual world are imprisoned in the earth[15]

Come and redeem these souls from the battlefield in the earth [16]

And take them as the spoils of war! […]

The following verses are brought to attention in the translation of Masnavi, amongst the best known and most influential works of Sufism. In the following lines, a reed-flute is the metaphor for the lamentation of the Living Self:

Hearken the reed-flute, how it complains,[17]

Lamenting its banishment from its home:

“Ever since they tore me from my reed-bed

My plaintive notes have moved men and women to tears,

I burst my breast, striving to give vent to my sighs

And to express the pangs of my yearning for my home.

He, who abides far away from his home

Is ever longing for the day he shall return […]”[18]

 The poem of the reed-flute is in 35 couplets and all of the lamentation of the soul, being far away from its origin.

Hafez (1315-1390) is one of the greatest Persian poets in the eyes of Iranians. If just one book of poetry is to be found in a Persian home, most likely that book is his Divān (the collected poems). Many of Hafez’s verses have become proverbial sayings.

In the following poem, we can see the complaint of the Living Self, trapped in the cage of body, and is waiting for the moment of death to be released:[19]

The dust of my body is the veil of the (true)Beloved’s face:

O happy that moment when from off this face, the veil I cast!

Not fit for a sweet singer like me, is the cage (of the world) like this

To Rizvān’s rose-bed[20], I go; for the bird of that sward am I […][21]

The concepts of the imprisonment of the Living Self in the prison of body and its belonging to the kingdom of Heaven is revealed in another poem by Hafez:[22]

Openly, I speak; and of my own utterance, heart-happy—am I:

Love’s slave, I am; and of both worlds, free am I.

 

The bird of holy rose-bed (paradise), am I. Explanation of separation

    (from paradise) what shall I give,

(And) into this disaster’s snare-place, how I fell?

 

The angel, I was; and loftiest paradise was my abode:

Into this ruined cloister (this world), me, Ādam brought.[23]

 

Ahmad Shamlou (1925-2000) is one of the most influential poets and writers of modern Iran.

This short poem of Shamlou can be interpreted as a dialogue between the Living Spirit (the World Soul and the creator and controller of the Macrocosm), and the Living Self (the suffering imprisoned Light in the human body, or Microcosm):

ــ Where are you?[24]

   In the boundless expanse of this world,

                                                                Where are you?

ــ  I am standing on the farthest point of the world:

                                                                              By your side.

ــ Where are you?

                         In the impure stretch of this world

                                                                              Where are you?

ــ I am standing on the most impure standpoint:

                                                                        On the side of this grand grass washing river

                                                                                                                           Singing for you.[25]

Sohrab Sepehri (1928-1980), the notable Iranian poet and painter who is particularly famous for his mystical poems which demonstrate an atmosphere free of envy, greed, egoism, and brutality. In the following poem, titled “Water,” we can find a metaphor for light, love, and purity:

Let’s not muddy the water:[26]

Perhaps a pigeon is drinking in a distance

Or perhaps in a further thicket a goldfinch is washing its feathers

Or a pitcher is being filled in a village […][27]

 

Simin Behbahani (1927- 2014) was a prolific Persian poet and writer. She was especially known for creating modern ghazals. A selection of her poems is translated into by Farzaneh Milani and Kaveh Safa.[28] Simin was nominated twice for the Nobel Prize in Literature (1999 and 2002), receiving many literary accolades around the world.

In the following poem Simin, in a state of imagination, talks about the vision of Buddha, who invites her to the transcendental world, and she finally is joined to God, at the Kingdom of Heaven:

Risen from ebony and night[29]

my Buddha-like hallucination

Takes me away from this world

with opened, inviting arms

 

The echo of bagpipe from that world

laud with the melody of “my beloved, my beloved!”

Tempting my motionless soul to curve like a dancing snake

dancing with that melody

 

Opening the door of this small house[30]

showing the unbounded land

Handing over the wideness of Nirvana to my soul

 

The silky dusk is my gown

The stars are the ornaments of my skirt

How loveable am I

 having received so many presents!

My traverse on the carpets of light

My ascension over the staircase of the clouds

My accession on the throne of the Sun and the Moon

My glory, my Paradise

 

My body: the accumulation of Aeons

A germless image

    as your hands with the light and the breeze passed over my bones

 

Behold!

He is at my side!

Behold!

The conjunction of that Sun and this Moon.[31]

 

Houshang Ebtehaj (b.1928) wrote under the pen-name Sayeh. His beautiful poems are sometimes so eloquent that one may think they are written by Hafez (and sometimes by Rumi):

Good news![32]

The beloved embraced me

I became his shadow he took me to the sun

I am the soul of whatever can be seen or felt

I am both crying and laughing

The embraced soul I am,

as the beloved embraced me!

I am the Ka’ba

I am the Qibla

Come and pray towards me

as the beloved embraced me

The pleasant vision of him

Was shining in my eyes

Two mirrors reflected on each other

I saw him, he saw me!

I am a naked beam of light

I am a redeemed soul

You will not see me anymore

As I am not his shadow anymore![33]

These lines were only a few instances among the treasures of Persian mystical poetry to represent the evidence of ongoing and vivid mystical motifs found in them. In this way, the Modern Persian poets, as well as their classical predecessorsــ Rumi, Hafez, and many othersــ reached an intuitive awareness and ecstasy to bind the Buddhistic concept of Nirvana and the Manichaean belief of imprisonment of the soul in man’s body to the Sufi concept of annihilation in God.[34] And similarly, the concept of the Living Self, surviving in the collective memory of Iranians, goes on living.

 

[1]Mary Boyce: A Reader in Manichaean Middle Persian and Parthian, Textes et Mémoires, vol. 2 (Acta Iranica 9), (Téhéran, Liège: Bibliothèque Pahlavi, 1975), 4.

[2]In Gnosticism and Manichaeism, Aeon is one of the orders of spirits, or spheres of being, that emanated from the Godhead and were attributes of the nature of the absolute, an important element in cosmology that developed around the central concept of dualism ــ the conflict between matter and spirit. In Persian the compound word jān-zarreh clarifies this meaning.

[3]In Manichaean texts, there are two concepts of the same nature, but with different roles and functions:

Living self, Grīw zindag / Grīw rošn (Middle Persian); Grīw žīwandag / Grīw rošn (Parthian); Living Spirit Mihr Yazd (Middle Persian); and Wād žīwandag (Parthian). Both are considered as one god: The Living Spirit (in Platonic philosophy: The creator of the world; in Gnosticism: The Heavenly being, subordinate to the Supreme Being, that is, the controller of the material world; and in Manichaeism a synthesis of all those mentioned, functioning as the Redeemer, and the Living Self, as the Redeemed. See Werner Sundermann, Der Sermon von der Seele: Ein Lehrschrift des ӧstlichen, Turnhaut (Belgium), Berpols, 1997, 14-16.

[4]The Manichaean myth of creation in this article is mainly taken from Professor Mary Boyce, A Reader, 4-7.

[5]Ibid, 3.

[6]مفتخری، حسین / ضائفی، راحله، « حیات فکری مانویان در قرون نخستین اسلامی»، فصلنامۀ تاریخ اسلام، سال هشتم، شمارۀ  مسلسل31،  1386، ص 4.

[7]The Arabic Translation Movement was a widely supported movement under Islamic ruling that resulted in the translation of materials from various languages such as Middle Persian into Arabic.

[8] دایرة‌ المعارف فارسی، مصاحب، ذیل: زندیق، تهران، فرانکلین، 1356.

[9]Nasser Khosro (1004-1088), expresses these concepts as:

جهان مهین و جهان کهین

       [ …] وطن مر تو را در جهانِ برین است

تو هرچند امروزه در تیره طینی

       جهان مهین را به جان، زیب و فرّی

اگرچه بدین تن جهان کهینی

       جهان برین و فرودین توی خود

به تن زین فرودین، به جان زان برینی [ …] :  ناصر خسرو، دیوان قصاید، تصحیح مجتبی مینوی و مهدی محقق، ج 1، تهران، انتشارات دانشگاه تهران، 1353، 7-15.

[10]جان و جهان دوش کجا بوده­ای

نی غلطم در دل ما بوده­ای [… ]: مولوی، شمس الدین محمد، کلیات شمس (به کوشش توفیق سبحانی)، ج2، تهران، قطره، 1381، 1612).

Although, the more frequent form appearing in the credential editions of Ghazaliāt-e Shams, is jān-u jahān, the less frequent one: jān-e jahān is more suitable to the wellــestablished idea of the World Soul. So, my interpretation considers: jān-e jahān.

[11]English translation by A. Tahami (unpublished).

[12]Paradise in this poem is called: jahān-e rūh (the Spiritual World).

[13]In Persian Mystical literature, the Manichaean concept of Living Self can be interpreted as nafs which after acquiring the knowledge of Truth becomes “jān,” longing to return to its divine origin. This is what F. W. Nietzsche calls Der Geist (See Also Sprach Zarathustra, www.pileface.com, 156).

[14]The World Soul or the Cosmic Soul /Die Weltseele. See Sundermann, Der Sermon von der Seele, 14-16. This is what is meant by Iranian Mystics as: jān-e jahān.

[15]In the original verse: āb-u gel (water and earth) is a metaphor for Matter.

[16][…] زجهان روح، جان­ها چو اسیر آب و گِل شد،

تو زدار حرب گِل­شان برهان و غارتی کن[ …]: مولوی، شمس الدین محمد، کلیات شمس (به کوشش توفیق سبحانی)، ج1، تهران، قطره، 1381، 1016.

[17]بشنو از نی چون حکایت می کند

وز جدایی­ها شکایت می کند[…]: مولوی، جلال الدین محمد، مثنوی معنوی، ج1، سرآغاز(تصحیح متن و تعلیقات از محمد استعلامی)، تهران، زوار، 1375، 9.

[18] Masnavi i Ma’navi, Book I, trans. E. H. Whinfield (Ames, Iowa: Ophaloskepsis, 2001), 3.

[19]حجاب چهرۀ جان می­شود غبار تنم

خوشا دمی که ازین چهره پرده برفکنم […]: حافظ، شمس الدین محمد، دیوان، تصحیح محمد قزوینی و قاسم غنی، تهران، انجمن خوشنویسان، 1368، 266.

[20]An allusion for Paradise.

[21]The Divan-i Hafiz, ed., trans. Clarke H. Wilberforce (Bethesda: Ibex Publishers, 1997), 661.

[22]فاش می­گویم و از گفتۀ خود دلشادم

      بندۀ عشقم و از هردو جهان آزادم […]:حافظ، شمس الدین محمد، دیوان، تصحیح محمد قزوینی و قاسم غنی، تهران، انجمن خوشنویسان، 1368، 245.

[23]Wilberforce, The Divan-i Hafiz, 703.

[24] تو کجایی؟

 در گستره­ی بی مرز این جهان

  تو کجایی؟ […]: شاملو، احمد، مجموعه آثار، تهران، نگاه، 1384، 817.

[25]Translated into English by A. Tahami, (unpublished).

[26]آب را گل نکنیم:

در فرودست انگار، کفتری می­خورد آب […]، سپهری، سهراب، هشت کتاب، طهوری، تهران، 1363، 345-347.

[27]Translated into English by A. Tahami (unpublished).

[28]Simin Behbahani, A Cup of Sin: Selected Poems, ed., trans. Farzaneh Milani and Kaveh Safa (New York Syracuse University Press, 1999).

[29]برآمده از آبنوس و شب، توهّمِ بودانشانِ من

گشوده دو بازو به دعوتم

ربوده مرا از جهان من […]: بهبهانی، سیمین، مجموعه اشعار، تهران، نگاه، 1382، 763-764.

[30]An allusion to the material world.

[31]Translated into English by A. Tahami (unpublished).

[32]  مژده بده مژده بده

یار پسندید مرا

سایۀ او گشتم و او

برد به خورشید مرا […]: ابتهاج، هوشنگ (ه. الف. سایه)، آینه در آینه (برگزیدۀ شعرها)، تهران، چشمه، 1369، 125-126.

[33]Translated into English by A. Tahami (unpublished).

[34]Fana‘ fi Allah: The Sufi teaching of passing away from worldly reality and being made subsistent in divine reality. See under BAQĀʾ WA FANĀʾ : http://www.iranicaonline.org,

نیز: دایرة المعارف فارسی (مصاحب)، ذیل: فنا، تهران، فرانکلین، 1356.

Dye on the Frontier: Henna and the Military Elites of Nineteenth-Century Bam

James M. Gustafson <James.Gustafson@indstate.edu> is Associate Professor of History at Indiana State University.  He has published widely on the social and economic history of 18th-19th century Iran and Central Asia.  His first book, Kirman and the Qajar Empire: Local Dimensions of Modernity in Iran, 1794-1914, was published in 2015 by Routledge Press.

In the late nineteenth century, Iran’s eastern borderlands around Balūchistān were a contested frontier zone, caught between the political and commercial ambitions of the British, Russian, and Qājār Empires. Boundary commissions led by British Major-General Frederick Goldsmid in Balūchistān and Sīstān between 1870 and 1872, followed by the Perso-Balūch Boundary Commission of 1896, demarcated state borders between the Qājār Empire, Russian Turkistān, and two states under British suzerainty: Afghānistān and Kalāt.[1] Over the previous century, the sparsely inhabited frontier had become an important strategic space. The Qājārs had claimed rights to those lands along with a wider region of “greater Khurasān” based on the historical precedent of Persianate rule, and attempted to begin integrating those areas into their domains with the failed siege of Hirāt in 1857. The frontier question became more pressing with the Russian advance in the north, culminating with von Kaufmann’s 1867-8 conquests of the amirates of Khīva, Bukhārā, and Kukand in the years leading up to the first Goldsmid mission.  The boundary commissions put these political claims along the frontier down on paper. Balūchistān, however, was never fully integrated into the Qājār Empire, and the drawing of a boundary was more an abstract and symbolic act, delineating jurisdictions along a frontier to which imperial power did not extend in practice.  Nonetheless, this had a material effect on peoples along the frontier zone, which this article will explore.

Scholarship on Iran’s frontier delineation has proceeded from its significance to the construction of national identity. Kashani-Sabet, in Frontier Fictions, argues that the Qājār Empire’s frontiers became sites of mythmaking for an emerging community of Iranian nationalists, defining the territorial extent of the homeland, but also the ethno-cultural boundaries separating the nation from the “other.”[2] Arash Khazeni and Christine Noelle-Karimi followed up by analyzing Qājār travel writing across the Balūchī frontier, noting a focus on cultural and ethnic difference in descriptions of the lands and peoples of Balūchistān as a way to make sense of these new abstract lines.[3] While cultural dimensions of the frontier, and its role in identity formation, are clearly significant, we know relatively little about the local effects of the Qājārs’ new boundaries along the largely pastoral eastern frontier lands.

“Map of Western Baluchistan Compiled by Order of H.M. Secretary of State for India to Show the Western Frontier of the Territories H.H. the Khan of Kalat as Determined by the Frontier Commission under Major General Sir Frederic J. Goldsmid,” British Library: Map Collections, IOR/X/3094/1-4 (1874), Qatar Digital Library

“Map of Western Baluchistan Compiled by Order of H.M. Secretary of State for India to Show the Western Frontier of the Territories H.H. the Khan of Kalat as Determined by the Frontier Commission under Major General Sir Frederic J. Goldsmid,” British Library: Map Collections, IOR/X/3094/1-4 (1874), Qatar Digital Library

From the perspective of frontier societies, heightened imperial interests along the borderlands presented numerous opportunities for powerful groups to profit from, with taxes to collect, stipendiary posts to be filled, and occasionally lucrative lands to possess. The military elites of the small fortress town of Bam positioned themselves particularly well to take advantage of the new frontier situation. Bam was a village of only about 15,000 people, more than 200km from the border, but served as a critical military site for the Qājārs. It housed one of the largest fortifications on the Iranian plateau, the famous mud brick Arg-i Bam from which frontier patrols were conducted and taxes collected on Balūchī tribes. Balūchistān was formally under the jurisdiction of the governor of nearby Kirmān as early as the time of Ibrāhīm Khān Ẓahīr al-Dawlah (Governor of Kirmān, 1803-26), who successfully subjugated the Balūchī khans and incorporated these territories into the Qājār state.[4]

The Qājār imperial system operated more as an interpersonal network than a territorial state with a bureaucracy of defined jurisdictions. Tribal groupings like the Balūchī, who carried out taxable activities on marginal lands, proved both a potential source of human and material resources, and a challenging group to incorporate and control within their administrative practices.  The Balūchī were under the tax authority of the governor of Kirmān and his deputies along the frontier regardless of their present location, which simplified the situation somewhat.  Still, in practice, such “people who move about” [5]  proved a persistent challenge to the policy of maintaining control over the borderlands and heading off further claims by the British and Russian Empires on their diminishing lands.[6]  Calls for maintaining order and settling the unsettled were common precursors to military action and territorial claims. In the absence of a full-fledged standing army to deploy regularly for the task, maintaining a presence on the frontier was delegated to people on the spot, who were often successful in using their sudden political importance to gain lasting social power and economic benefits.

This article will look at the effects of the Balūchistān frontier policy on the elite military households of Bam, who asserted themselves as a dominant force among the local elite along the frontier during the late 19th century Anglo-Persian frontier settlements. One household in particular, the Bihzādīs, were rewarded for playing the part of Qājār agents in the tribal hinterlands.  In the process, these families came to dominate not only the provincial military establishment but also managed to wrest from a prominent local family, known as the Mīrzāʾīs, a number of major administrative posts and landed properties in around Bam, including the rich agricultural lands of nearby Narmāshīr. This article will argue that the Bihzādī family leveraged the political imperative to control the new boundaries, and obviate further Anglo-Russian incursions, to supplant Bam’s existing administrative elites.  In the process, the Bihzādī family gained control over the lucrative henna producing lands of nearby Narmāshīr, which helped them to further consolidate their position as masters of the frontiers.

Arg-i Bam, ca.1902

Arg-i Bam, ca.1902

Of course, tribal and military groups rarely speak for themselves in our sources, nor is there is a systematic archive detailing the frontier experience, adding to the difficulty of filling in these peculiar gaps in our knowledge that exist on the margins of empire.  There are, however, some interesting and useful sources written by various people crossing through the borderlands. In particular, a number of travelogues written by members of the Farmān Farmā family mention the activities of Bam’s military elites, and incidentally the form of their household estates. As governors of Kirmān in the 1880’s and 1890’s, the Farmān Farmās compiled at least four known travelogues from their tours of eastern Kirmān and Balūchistān, two of which have been published only relatively recently and received very little scholarly attention as of yet.  Most important for the present study of the military elites of Bam is ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Mīrzā Farmān Farmā’s 1894 Musāfaratnāmah-yi Kirmān va Balūchistān, edited and published by Īraj Afshār in 2003.[7]  This travelogue provides a wealth of information on local communities in eastern Kirmān and Balūchistān, including an informal land survey which gives a snap shot of activities of local elites and administrators.  It includes detailed notes on trade, the activities and structure of local administrators and military elites, the composition of private, charitable (vaqf), and crown lands, and the amount and type of agricultural production, irrigation systems, and tax revenues throughout the district. These are not exhaustive records, and not suitable for any detailed quantitative analysis, but are nonetheless invaluable for our purposes. There are also Persian local histories and geographies from nearby Kirmān which include notices on Bam, and a number of sources from the British imperial archives and consular service.  Together, these sources provide a rough picture of a changing frontier society, and demonstrate the remarkable extent to which the Bihzādī military household and their immediate networks came to quickly dominate local administration and trade in Bam and Narmāshīr through their activities in Balūchistān in the context of a new frontier policy.

Balūchistān between Empires

The late 19th century world experienced a massive intensification of exchange, economic and otherwise, driven by the totalizing impulses of industrial capitalism and imperialism. There is ample evidence from case studies around the world demonstrating that this was carried out locally in a wide variety of ways, and was not simply a process of Europeans reshaping the world at will. In southern Iran, the growth of commercial agriculture and trade was accomplished largely by native landowners, merchants and entrepreneurs who recognized and took advantage of opportunities provided by global economic conditions, improved communication and transportation routes, and access to markets.  The spectacular growth of the cotton, wool, dye and opium trades with Europe, India and China were not simply foreign economic penetration; urban landowning households made necessary investments in land, irrigation and seed, reaped enormous profits, and expanded their reach and influence deep into the countryside as landlords and administrators. By the 1870s, trade was increasingly carried through maritime routes by British protected merchants, including Zoroastrians and Hindus, while overland traffic across the eastern borderlands remained steady.

Just as Qājār Iran and its constituent parts were absorbed into the global industrial economy in the late 19th century as producers of raw materials, they also emerged as important geo-political spaces in the context of growing imperialist rivalries in Central Asia and India between Russia and Great Britain. Great Britain’s primary interest was in maintaining its hold on its prized colony in India. To keep peaceful borders and prevent the threat of foreign influences from reaching India, Britain maintained a “buffer zone” in Afghānistān between itself and the advancing Russian Empire. Two Anglo-Afghān Wars in 1838 and 1878 confirmed Afghānistān’s nominal independence under British influence, including British prerogatives on Afghan foreign policy after 1878. Russia meanwhile expanded its influence by filling the “political vacuum” in Central Asian under the khanates of Khīvā, Bukhārā and Kukand.[8]

Great Britain and Russia expanded their imperial rivalries west into the Qājār domain by establishing a network of consulates in important towns to safeguard their political and economic interests.  The British and Russian governments, following each other’s moves step by step, set up a system of consulates in Tihrān, Iṣfahān, Rasht, Mashhad, Tabrīz, and the Persian Gulf ports.  Based primarily on the mercantile activities of firms and traders from British India, the British eventually carved out an empire within an empire in southern Iran. [9] In the northern provinces, Tsarist Russia’s expanding influence in the Caucasus and Caspian extended straight into the Qājār Empire, which was drawn into an informal sphere of Russian influence.[10] This de facto division of the Qājār state into spheres of foreign influence was later formalized in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. Given Kirmān’s proximity to the British Indian frontier and the Persian Gulf ports, the province became an integral piece of the British sphere by 1894 when the first British Consulate was established there by Percy Sykes.[11]

The Qājārs’ own imperial interests in Central Asia are often overlooked in literature on the “Great Game.” Iran is usually seen as at best a passive observer, and more often a victim, of British and Russian colonial competition. The territories of the historical Persianate cultural sphere in eastern Khurasān and Transoxania had long been under the political authority of local Turkic amirs. The presence of European colonial powers on Iran’s eastern borders coincided with an attempt by the Qājārs to extend their borders east and reactivate historical claims to this region.  In an 1844 travelogue by a Qājār envoy to the Amīr of Bukhārā charged with securing the release of British traveler Joseph Wolff, he also notes a visit to Marv to press Qājār claims to the oasis to the Amir:

Marv has been a part of the province of Khurasān since the era of Manuchihr and the Governor of Khurasān has always exercised authority there.  It is the native soil (mutan) and asylum (muʾaman) of the Qājār tribe.  By the reversals of fortune and time and its domination by oppressive rulers it separated from the province of Khurasān.  It must be from here on, as it used to be, that [no one else] exercise authority there.[12]

Though the Qājārs never made a serious attempt on Marv, Muḥammad Shāh in 1838 and Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh in 1856 launched military campaigns to take the city of Hirāt.  Like Marv, Hirāt was considered by the Qājārs an integral part of the Persianate cultural sphere and a natural extension of their domain. This was based in part on the legacy of Ṣafāvid rule there.  Balūchistān held similar geographical weight for the Qājārs, bolstered by the experience of de jure control over parts of the region, albeit indirect and frequently contested. By the Nāṣirī period, eastern Balūchistān had become part of the nominally independent Kalāt state under British protection, while western or Persian Balūchistān remained at least tentatively in the hands of the Qājārs, as it had since the early formation of the empire.  It was only after the revolt of the Ismāʿīlī Imām Āqā Khān Maḥallātī, however, that the Qājārs attempted to firmly establish their authority in Balūchistān.  Āqā Khān attempted to seize power in Kirmān through forged appointment papers in 1257/1841-42, but failed.  He and his followers closed themselves up in the Arg-i Bam and held off a long siege.  He eventually fled through Balūchistān to Bombay, where he had a great number of followers.[13] His brother, Sardar Khān Maḥallātī, subsequently seized Bampūr in Balūchistān and attempted to maintain his independence from the Qājār state.[14] This incident, and the growing threat of British interference on the eastern border, persuaded the Qājārs to secure the eastern frontier.  The Governorship of Kirmān was therefore expanded in the 1840s to include authority over Balūchistān, and a responsibility for maintain order there. This was further delegated to a Governor of Balūchistān, stationed at Bam, who was subordinate to Kirmān’s governor.

There was a long history of bad blood between the Qājārs and the Balūchī tribes.  The Balūchī tribes supplemented their modest means by attacking and plundering caravans, often with a debilitating effect on overland trade between Kirmān and India. The first task of many of Kirmān’s governors was the subjugation of the tribal khans in order to establish order along the frontier and secure trade and transport routes.  According to Bāstānī-Pārīzī, punitive attacks on villages were undertaken regularly by Qājār troops, women and young boys carted off as slaves, and the decapitated heads of Balūchī khāns brought before governors of Kirmān as gifts.[15]   British travelers like Pottinger and Goldsmid commented on the extreme hostility felt for the Qājārs in Balūchistān.[16] However, as maintaining order in Balūchistān increasingly became a political imperative, eventually greater attempts were made to incorporate the area peacefully into the Qājār state.  After the failure of two Qājār notables to establish order while stationed in the administrative center of Balūchistān at Bampūr, the Qājārs eventually turned to Ibrāhīm Khān of the Bihzādī household from the more remote, but secure, stronghold at Bam. Over the 1860’s and 1870’s, Ibrāhīm Khān managed to subordinate the major tribes of Balūchistān and Sīstān to the Qājār state and even annex several districts on the southeastern frontier.

It was in this context, in 1870, that Great Britain took advantage of the relative peace to send a boundary commission under Sir Frederic Goldsmid to settle Iran’s southeastern frontier with the British sphere of interests in Central Asia.  The establishment of secure borders, would, in the opinion of British diplomats, help stem the spread of what was deemed the naturally chaotic and anarchic relations between Oriental despots ruling the lands north of India.  With the growing threat of Russian expansion southward, and the potential for anti-British sentiment to further complicate British plans in Central Asia, diplomatic initiatives were favored to direct military intervention.  In the words of Goldsmid:

The main question was how to bring about a reign of order for the bordering population, and at the same time strengthen and secure the attachment to ourselves of normally turbulent border allies, without armed or abrupt interference.  Added to this consideration was the grave fact that whatever line of policy were chosen or whatever step taken, a move would unavoidably be made, on the Central-Asian board, towards completion of the game in which our play had become characterized by a discretion so tardy, and deliberation so excessive, that it was hardly clear to the outer word whether we were playing at all.[17]

The British government established a consulate in Kirmān City under the India Office in the 1894 to further pursue their political and economic interests. This was done under Sir Percy Sykes, a soldier in the service of the India Office with an avid interest in Persian history and culture.  Sykes had spent time touring Iran in 1893, making useful connections with Qājār notables.  During his travels, he made the acquaintance of ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Mīrzā Farmān Farmā, whose family had held the governorship of Kirmān, along with the Balūchī frontier lands, off and on since 1878.  Sykes showed a keen interest in Kirmān, its history and geography, traveling widely throughout the area over the following years.  The elites of Kirmān presented him with a copy of Vazīrī’s Tārīkh-i Kirmān on his arrival, the contents of which he made frequent reference toin his consular reports.[18] Sykes’ intimate knowledge of Kirmān, and the personal relationships he cultivated with prominent local figures, aided in bringing Kirmān fully into the British orbit.  In this case, his interests overlapped somewhat with those of the Qājārs as he attempted to use his position and networks to pacify Balūchistān as part of a broader policy of protecting British mercantile interests in Kirmān.  

 

Ibrāhīm Khān Saʿd al-Dawlah and the Bihzādī Military Household of Bam

With the Balūchī frontier under the administrative control of the governor of Kirmān, the city of Bam, near the eastern frontier, served as the garrison for provincial armies.  Campaigns in Balūchistān were usually carried out with the aims of collecting delinquent taxes, violently subjugating tribal leaders, and securing trade and transportation routes.  Bam had long been a strategically important frontier town situated on the edge of the agricultural communities of Kirmān and the pastoral tribal lands of Balūchistān.  Its military importance was evident by the sheer enormity of the Arg-i Bam.  The mud brick fortress standing at the edge of the city dates to the pre-Islamic era, though rebuilt numerous times, and remained arguably the strongest fortification in all of the Qājār state.[19]  The citadel was used as a stronghold by Qājār rivals like the last Zand holdout Lutf ʿAlī Khān in 1794, and the aforementioned Ismaʿīlī Imām Āqā Khān Maḥallātī in 1842. The Arg-i Bam was situated in a thriving agricultural region, with Bam serving as a market town and administrative hub for a wider district of dependent villages, including the noteworthy henna producing district of Narmāshīr. Bam was growing into a prosperous city at this time, with a population of between 13,000 and 15,000.[20] During the governorship of Vakīl al-Mulk I in Kirmān (1859-68), he ordered the construction of a large new bāzār, and a system of canals providing running water to many houses in the city, a rare luxury in 19th century Iran.[21]  With the accumulated resources of its hinterland, Bam served as a supply point for a network of outposts further east in Bampūr and Sarhād.

In Vaziri’s 1872-74 geography of Kirmān, he notes that a local family known as the Mīrzāʾīs, had long dominated Bam’s administration. He says that “for more than 100 years they have resided in Bam, and some of the time they held the headmanship (riyāsat) there.  In terms of property and respect, they are orders of magnitude above all the elites there.”[22]  It was common throughout Qajar Iran for administrative and religious scholarly families to reproduce their power over multiple generations in this way, even across the rise and fall of dynasties as the Mīrzāʾīs appear to have done.[23] Generally this was reinforced by control over landed properties, held either as personal property (milk), or administered as crown lands (khalīṣah) or religious endowments (vaqf).  The Mīrzāʾīs were, similarly, major landowners, bolstering their prestige as dynamic, multifaceted network of notables.

The military establishment was another major element of Bam’s elite.  Similar to administrative, religious scholarly, and landowning elites, a patrimonial structure prevailed among military households as well.  The frontier armies at Bam were soldiered mainly through levies within the district of Bam and Narmāshīr, recruited both from among the tribes and through levies on agricultural communities as part of their dues to the provincial government.  These men were placed under the command of officers drawn from a core of military families tied to the provincial government.  The reproduction of power among these households, as in the case of the landholding civilian elite, was based only partially on patrimonial ties; even more apparent in the case of military households than civilian elite was the emphasis placed on the personal abilities of the officeholder. Local roots were also less important in establishing oneself among the military elite.  The patronage of the provincial government, particularly in the area of land grants and khalīṣah (crown land) administration, was in this case sufficient to establish the local authority of the military elite and tie it in closely to the government at Kirmān.  Nonetheless, the prestige and authority of military households was built slowly, over generations, but membership in a military elite household was not sufficient to secure a position of authority in the provincial armies. This was particularly true as British-aligned rulers settled along Kirmān’s eastern borders, adding to the importance of maintaining a strong military presence in Balūchistān.  Altogether, this system, if effective, provided opportunities for a new military elite to supplant the civilian elite in Bam.

Kirmān maintained three regularly staffed provincial armies (afwāj), each officered predominantly by a local military household or tribe who passed numerous high posts from generation to generation along patrimonial lines. Kirmān’s First Army (fawj-i avval) was dominated by the Līk tribe, an extended pastoral tribal group consisting of numerous sub-tribal groups who immigrated to Kirmān in the early 18th century.[24]  The heads of the Līk tribe resided in Kirmān City, but many of the others were pastoralists living in black tents in Iqtāʾ, east of the city. Many of them were soldiers in the first and second provincial armies.[25] They were a powerful tribal group, possessing military resources and manpower.  Within the district of Iqtāʾ, they were granted a degree of self-administration, possessing their own ʿāmil and remitting taxes separately. Numerous positions in the first army were under hereditary control of the Līk in the late 19th century.  Control of the first army passed from Fatḥ Allāh Khān Līk under Vakīl al-Mulk in the 1870’s to Naẓar ʿAlī Khān Līk in the 1890’s.  The latter was eventually demoted to yavār in the 1890’s, corresponding to a general decline in the circumstances of the Līk household. The second army remained under the control of the Mīrzā Ḥusayn Khān household, with numerous high posts, including command of the army, passing along patrimonial lines within the family.[26]

This system was slowly changing. Both the first and second armies began hiring new engineering graduates from Tehran under the command of local officers in the late 19th century.  This was part of a broader attempt of the Qājār state to introduce modernizing reforms to the military forces at the provincial level, while introducing this new element within the framework of the existing patrimonial structure.  In the 1880’s, the Governor of Kirmān, Nāṣir al-Dawlah, introduced new artillery shells and felt uniforms to his soldiers.[27] His younger brother, and successor, ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Mīrzā Farmān Farmā, himself a lifelong student of military sciences, instituted new methods and organization learned from his Austrian advisors.  The new exercises and maneuvers made quite an impression on the local population. Pāshā Vazīrī, observing the army in the 1890‘s, commented:

Never had they been so well-trained, from continuous exercises every day in the military sciences, the organization of the army, the drills with seven divisions, and the new Austrian exercises for the artillery, armies and cavalry, as well as preparations for military maneuvers.  They have never been better organized in Kirmān.[28]

Balūchistān was convenient both as a proving ground for ambitious military officers, and for experimenting with new military hardware and methods.  The provincial army garrisoned at Bam was reconceived in the 1860’s as a permanent frontier force, charged with maintaining Qājār authority in the tribal border regions by using their military advantage to subjugate the Balūchī tribes. Outposts were established in Bampūr and Sarhād, deep in the tribal hinterland, staffed and supplied by the garrison at Bam.  The third provincial army stationed at Bam became a standing frontier force for the government, and maintained regular patrols in Balūchistān, dealing harshly with the slightest sign of rebellion or disobedience. It was in this context that contrary to the pattern seen in core agricultural districts, the military elite and the government dīvān in Bam came to supplant the locally rooted landholding households as, in the words of the Farmān Farmā, “the pillar of the aʿyān, ashraf and mullāk [elites and notables] of Bam.”[29]

By the time of the Perso-Kalāt Boundary Commission’s arrival in Kirmān in 1870-72, Ibrāhīm Khān Saʿd al-Dawlah, a member of local military elite at Bam, had been delegated the governorship of Balūchistān and had succeeded, remarkably, in subjugating the Balūchī tribes and consolidating Qājār power in the troublesome tribal hinterland.  The British took a dim view of Qājār claims to the territories on their eastern frontier that had only recently begun paying taxes to the Qājār state, as claims based purely on Ibrāhīm Khān’s recent “insidious encroachments.”[30] Nonetheless, the British officers comprising the Boundary Commission viewed Ibrāhīm Khān with admiration for his success in Balūchistān. Major St. John, who met with him in 1872 at Bampūr, describes him as:

…a short paunchy man, of any age from forty-five to sixty, with a full and well-dyed beard and small sharp eye.  He speaks Persian with the broad southern twang, and uses provincialisms not very easy to understand by any one accustomed only to the conversation of educated men… There seemed nothing in his talk or in his face to indicate the really superior man he must be, not only as having risen to his present position by sheer merit, unaided by money or interest, but as having reduced one of the most turbulent countries in Asia to a state of order and tranquility, comparing favorably not only with most of his own country but with many native states further east.[31]

The portrayal of Ibrāhīm Khān Saʿd al-Dawlah as a self-made man who climbed to the top of Kirmān’s military establishment through sheer merit of course obscures the importance of his family networks.  He began his career as a member of the elite through his connection to the Bihzādī household.  His father, ʿAlī Khān Bamī, was a local baker who, through some unknown means, entered the service of the dīvān. He was entitled a khān and granted various administrative posts, including the ʿāmilī of Qanāt Ghasān and Langar, and, most importantly, administration of the lucrative khalīṣah lands of Narmāshīr.  ʿAlī Khān’s appointment raised the ire of the Mīrzāʾīs, a landholding household in Bam and Narmāshīr that dominated the local elite and controlled most of the important administrative posts in the district since the mid-18th century.  Muḥammad Taqī Khān Bamī, a member of the Mīrzāʾī household, along with four accomplices, are said to have murdered ʿAlī Khān in his sleep one evening.[32]

The political climate in Bam was turbulent and in flux by the time Vazīrī was writing his geographical memoir in the early 1870s. ʿAlī Khān’s relatives, known as the Bihzādīs, had already begun to establish themselves as a wealthy landholding household with strong connections to Kirmān City and the provincial government.[33] Ibrāhīm Khān was still a child at the time of his father’s murder.  He entered Kirmān’s third army in 1269/1852-53 through his household connections and quickly rose through the ranks.  Under Vakīl al-Mulk in the 1860’s he became the deputy to Muḥammad Ḥasan Khān Nūrī, the brother of Vakīl al-Mulk who was delegated the governorship of Bam and Narmāshīr, and then, under Vakīl al-Mulk II, Governor of Balūchistān and sartīp of Kirmān’s Third Army.[34]

Ibrāhīm Khān’s rise to power was aided by his skill in navigating the politics of elite households. In effect, the Bihzādī family was an amalgam of a number of other elite families, brought together through intermarriage. Ibrāhīm Khān married the sister of another important local military figure, Sūlīmān Khān Sartīp.  Sūlīmān Khān’s parents, in turn, were leading figures in two other prestigious families in Bam. Sūlīmān’s father, Asḥaq Khān, was a member of the ʿArab Bastamī household, a rather large extended tribal military group in the area, while his mother was a member of the prominent Ibrāhīmī family, as a granddaughter of Qājār prince Ibrāhīm Khan Ẓahīr al-Dawlah.  The ʿArab Bastamīs were already a major player in the local military elite. Sūlīmān Khān’s maternal grandfather, Musá Khān, was, in fact, the Governor of Bam when Ibrāhīm Khān first entered the frontier army and oversaw his speedy promotion to sardar.[35]  The ʿArab Bastamīs had a longstanding connection to the Ibrāhīmī family ever since Prince Ibrāhīm Khan Ẓahīr al-Dawlah married an ʿArab Bastamī woman in the early 19th century who bore two of his sons.[36]  Intermarriage cemented the relationships between the up-and-coming Bihzādīs, the ʿArab Bastamīs and the Ibrāhīmīs of Bam under the powerful stewardship of Ibrāhīm Khān Saʿd al-Dawlah.

Ibrāhīm Khān Saʿd al-Dawlah’s legacy grew with his leadership in expanding Qājār rule in eastern Balūchistān by subjugating local tribal khans and seizing a line of settlements on the southeastern frontier including Jalk, Kalavān and the fortress of Kūhak.[37] At a time when the Qājār state was seeing portions of its northern and eastern provinces falling progressively into the hands of the Russian and British Empires, this was a rare, albeit slight, territorial expansion.[38]  It was at this time that he was granted the title Saʿd al-Dawlah (“felicity of the state”) by the Qājār court for his accomplishments, an honor usually reserved for members of the royal household and high political appointees. Vazīrī lists him as one of the four wealthiest men in Kirmān province already by 1874, alongside the province’s major merchants and landowners.[39]  This underscores the significant wealth acquired by Ibrāhīm Khān Saʿd al-Dawlah while governing Balūchistān for nearly thirty years.  Before his death in 1884, he succeeded in building a dominant military household from various elements of the local elite that would continue to control the provincial armies as officers and administrators for decades.

Following his death, Ibrāhīm Khān’s nephew ʿAbbās Khān was granted the Governorship of Bam and Narmāshīr. He too died shortly after his appointment, having fallen off his horse drunk while on his way to Bam.[40]  He was replaced by yet another of Ibrāhīm Khān Saʿd al-Dawlah’s nephews, Zayn al-ʿAbidīn Khān Asad al-Dawlah. This man had been Ibrāhīm Khān’s deputy governor from about 1873 to 1884 and succeeded him as hakīm of Bampūr, a post which was now combined with command of the frontier army.[41] Meanwhile, Ibrāhīm Khān’s brother in law, Sūlīmān Khān, following a mutiny in the provincial army in 1880, became the sartīp (commander) of the provincial armies in Kirmān City, now merged into one entity known as the Fawj-i Shawkat.[42] The merger and centralization of these offices in the hands of a small elite connected to Ibrāhīm Khān’s Saʿd al-Dawlah and his estate was a direct consequence of his enormous personal legacy in expanding Qājār power in Balūchistān from the 1850’s to 1880’s.

Just then, a rebellion in Balūchistān, mishandled by the provincial government, threatened the continuation of Bihzādī control over the frontier. The Dāmani khans among the Bālūchīs of Sarhad rebelled against the provincial army under Sūlīmān Khān and his deputy at Bam, Zayn al-ʿAbidīn Khān.  They were attempting to reassert their control over Sarḥad after seeing their lands granted, but never fully incorporated into, the Qājār Empire after the 1872 Boundary Commission.  In response to the rebellion, Kirmān’s governor Nāṣir al-Dawlah circumvented the Bihzādīs and sent in a Cossack cavalry officer named Abu al-Fatḥ Khān, who was ordered to subjugate the Dāmani tribes in Sarḥad.[43]  He did so brutally, with the use of the new artillery, and in the process destroyed numerous villages and irrigation works. When the Kurdī tribe approached Abu al-Fatḥ Khān and swore their loyalty, even offering to fight with him against the Dāmani tribe, the Cossack instead killed all seven of their tribal khans.  Sykes reported that “not content with this, he handed over their wives to the tender mercies of his soldiery, an outrage without parallel in Baluchi warfare.”[44]  This indignity incited a full-scale rebellion which brought together nearly all of the major Balūchī khans against the Qājār appointee. The chief of the Dūzak tribe, Dilāvar Khān, besieged Abu al-Fatḥ Khān at Fahraj in Narmāshīr.  He escaped only when Nāṣir al-Dawlah and the new head of the provincial armies, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Khān Hishmat al-Dawlah, arrived at the head of Kirmān’s provincial armies and rescued Abu al-Fatḥ Khān by placing him in chains and escorting him back to Kirmān City under arrest.[45]

Following the siege at Fahraj, Nāṣir al-Dawlah rounded up the major Balūchī tribal leaders including Dilāvar Khān, Shāhdūst Khān II and Ḥusayn Khān Balūch.[46]  According to a British report, this was accomplished by summoning the Balūchī khans to meet with him, with false promises of their safety, after which Nāṣir al-Dawlah betrayed their trust and escorted them to prison in Kirmān City, where they remained until 1894.[47] After the dismissal of Abu al-Fatḥ Khān, Zayn al-ʿAbidīn Khān was reinstalled as the Governor of Balūchistān and his brother, Ibrahīm Khān, was appointed sartīp of the artillery.[48]  The Bihzādīs were again in command of the important frontier armies at Bam, with their work in Balūchistān made considerably easier with the death and imprisonment of nearly all the important tribal khans in the preceding years. This experience ultimately reaffirmed the importance of having local military leaders with knowledge and connections on the frontier in service of the state at its margins.

The Henna of Narmāshīr

In 1894, Kirmān‘s governor ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Mīrzā Farmān Farmā made a lengthy voyage through Balūchistān, during which he compiled information on geography, transportation, local administration, landownership, tax assessment, and the local elites among the settled and tribal populations. The product of this trip, his Musāfaratnāmah-yi Kirmān va Balūchistān, is undoubtedly the most important single work on the social history of 19th century Balūchistān. [49]  It also contains an abundance of information on Bam’s local military elite, their responsibilities in maintaining order in Balūchistān, and their local proprietary interests. From the overall picture presented by Farmān Farmā, it is clear how fully the provincial military was dominated by the Bihzādī household by 1894, and how successful they were up to this time in maintaining Qājār power in a region where their authority was often tenuous at best.  Farmān Farmā was quick to criticize and remove ineffective agents; it attests to the effectiveness of the Bihzādīs that he noted “no one of the elite or common classes of the tribes and peoples of Balūchistān has any sort of complaint or injustice to report.”[50]

It is clear, firstly, that commerce benefited greatly from the political stability of the frontier.  Exports of cotton, opium, carpets, and foodstuffs were significant in the 1890s. Locally, in Bam and Narmāshīr, henna production boomed and became a source of significant wealth for local landowners. Henna is produced from the leaves of the plant lawsonia alba which grew especially well in the arid, but well irrigated, lands of Narmāshīr.  Oliver St. John notes visiting a small henna manufactory in Bam where “the dried leaves and stems brought from the villages in bundles are ground to powder by a large stone roller driven by a camel.”[51]  The vast majority of the crop seems to have been sent to Yazd, however. The ground powder produced in the manufactories was then mixed to form a dye used commonly for ritual and decorative purposes, finding large markets both domestically and in India.[52]  Percy Sykes’ first commercial report on Kirmān, while impressionistic, gives a good sense of the scope of the henna trade.  He reports that 280,000 mān of henna valued at £28,000, which “comes entirely from Bam,” was mostly

Lawsonia Alba, from Royal Palm Nurseries, et.al., Annual catalogue 1899 native and exotic plants, trees, shrubs: 22

Lawsonia Alba, from Royal Palm Nurseries, et.al., Annual catalogue 1899 native and exotic plants, trees, shrubs: 22

sent to processing facilities in Yazd in 1894-5.  By comparison, this was more valuable than the entirety of Kirmān’s opium exports to Yazd and the Indian Ocean routes combined, and more than double the value of Kirmān’s cotton crop, of which Kirmān produced 200,000 mān worth £12,000 during the same year.[53]

The commercial potential of henna lands was not lost on the elites of Bam.  Some ten years after Ibrāhīm Khān Saʿd al-Dawlah’s death, the military elites connected to his household and its immediate networks.  Governing Balūchistān was a lucrative enterprise for Ibrāhīm Khān Saʿd al-Dawlah and the Bihzādī household. Through the examination of several contemporary Persian accounts, including Aḥmad ʿAli Khān Vazīrī-Kirmānī and ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Mīrzā Farmān Farmā’s notes on their landholdings and other economic activities, supplemented by the reports of British administrators, one can piece together a rough outline of the Bihzādī estate and its relationship to the patrimonialism of the Qājār provincial government.  The primary source of the Bihzādīs’ wealth was based on their right to collect taxes in Balūchistān.[54]  It was only under the Bihzādīs, it seems, that any regular incomes from Balūchistān made their way to the provincial divan, the region remaining until the 1850’s an autonomous tribal region only nominally under Qājār rule.  Much like the ‘āmils in the core agricultural districts, the Bihzādīs were granted a share of these revenues before dispatching the remainder to the provincial dīvān.  The sum they collected would undoubtedly have been enormous.

Ibrāhīm Khān Saʿd al-Dawlah purchased, or acquired in lieu of pay, extensive tracts of land around Bam. As mentioned above, Ibrāhīm Khān was already counted by Vazīrī as one of Kirmān’s four leading landholders in the early 1870s.[55] Possession of land provided the Bihzādīs not only with an addition source of revenue, but also a more substantial local rooting, landownership being a primary preoccupation of many civilian elite households.  One major cluster of landholdings was a number of villages known collectively as Rīgān, which had once been in the hands of the Ra’īsī tribe. These were granted to Ibrāhīm Khān by the provincial government as jāgīr, a tax-free landholding.[56]  Much like the more well-known tūyūl (land grant) system, this was a means of providing payment to military elites without the necessity, on the part of the government, of having to collect and distribute the tax revenues themselves.  As was customary for tax collectors, Ibrāhīm Khān collected above the amount that would normally be remitted to the dīvān.  According to one source, however, he did so in Rīgān so excessively that his heirs saw most of his properties there confiscated to compensate the rural notables they over-collected from.[57]

His successors as Bihzādī rulers of Bam and Balūchistān, Zayn al-ʿAbidīn Khān and his brother Ibrāhīm Khān Sartīp, along with their immediate relatives, owned 10 villages between Bam and Bampūr, which accounted for a huge sum, roughly 1,260 kharvār, of Narmāshīr’s agricultural production.[58]  It was his Ibrāhīm Khān Saʿd al-Dawlah’s brother in-law, Sūlīmān Khān, who stands out most in his possession of extensive landholdings in Narmāshīr.  His personal milkī properties include 14 documented villages produced over 3,000 kharvār of produce in the summer, and an addition 160 kharvār of winter crops, chief among them the valuable henna cash crop.  Sūlīmān Khān’s brother, Karīm Khān, a sartīp in the Fawj-i Shawkat (Kirmān’s main provincial army), owned or rented five somewhat less productive villages.[59]  It can be fairly assumed, then, that much of the property now in the hands of the Bihzādīs and the branch of the ʿArab Bastamī household connected to Sūlīmān Khān, were inherited from what was once an extensive personal estate held by Ibrāhīm Khān Saʿd al-Dawlah.

Even more interesting is the slightly less obvious, but no less significant, wealth acquired by new officeholders connected to the networks of the Bihzādī family.  The provincial lashkar nivīs, or paymaster general, the link between the dīvān and the provincial militaries, was a certain Mirza Ghulām Riz̤ā who was himself a member of a local military elite family, the so-called Bamī household.   Through his connection to government service, he was himself another of this small core of large landholders with seven villages producing some 1140 kharvār annually.  Perhaps not incidentally, two of these villages were held jointly with figures connected to Ibrāhīm Khān’s estate: one with Sūlīmān Khān son Muḥammad Qāsim Khān Sarhang, and the other by the daughter of Ibrāhīm Khān himself.  The state khalīṣah lands, too, which accounted for more than 10% of the land and agricultural produce in Narmāshīr, was also in the hands of the military elites through the nāẓim and mutaṣadī, both hereditary offices under the control of the Bamī household.[60]

While the local tribes, as well as local civilian elites from Bam and Fahraj, together continued to own significant tracts of villages and agricultural land, their holdings were rather modest individually.  The head of the Sīstānī tribe held a bloc of six villages, but no other individual owned more than one or two small properties in Narmāshīr.  On the other hand, this small core of Bam’s military elite detailed above, along with their immediate networks, was now in control of close to 40% of the privately held (milkī) properties between Bam and Bampūr according to the records of the provincial governor.[61]  While this account is certainly not a complete, exhaustive record, and many of the figures on population and agricultural yield are necessarily estimations, it does demonstrate a rather remarkable level of control over the agricultural economy in the hands of Bam’s military elite in the most lucrative lands outside of the city.  It also, likewise, shows that Ibrāhīm Khān’s estate in Narmāshīr provided enormous wealth to his heirs and successors in the frontier and provincial armies and opportunities for network building and patronage.  His legacy in the strength and importance of the Bam military elite laid not only in his personal prestige, and that of his household, but also in the enormous wealth he accumulated in his roughly thirty years on the Balūchistān frontier, which was deployed effectively by his successors to reproduce their power.

Noticeably absent among the major landholders in Narmāshīr is the Mīrzāʾī household, who, by the 1890’s, represented the old guard of Bam’s elite.  Their decline in the mid to late 19th century is demonstrative of the general decline in the fortunes of the civilian elite in Bam connected to local religious institutions and stipendiary posts. The Mīrzāʾīs were a local administrative household, holding high stipendiary posts in Bam and Narmāshīr from roughly the 1770s to the 1870s.  After the death of ʿAbd al-Vahhāb Khān in 1262/1845-1846, the head of the Mīrzāʾī household was Ḥājji Sayyid ʿAlī Khān who was a wealthy, though profligate, man whose greatest legacy in Bam was the construction of the first of its three Qājār era bāzārs.[62]  He was also considered a poor administrator.  Muḥammad Ismaʿīl Khān Vakīl al-Mulk appointed him the mubāshir of Bam and Narmāshīr in approximately 1860 along with the administration of the khalīṣah lands there.   He was removed from these positions, it said, for abusing the position and had to sell his properties along with an additional 1000 tūmāns from other members of the Mīrzāʾī household, to pay off a rather hefty debt accrued through wasteful spending. Given the importance and prestige of the Mīrzāʾīs, he eventually landed himself another position as head of the dīvān agents at Anār under Vakīl al-Mulk II, but again was removed after a short time for abusing his position, after which he retired and lived in relative poverty.[63] This hastened the decline of Bam’s civilian elite, just as the Bihzādīs stepped in to take their place.

Conclusion

The importance of consolidating Qājār power in Balūchistān contributed to the emergence of a wealthy, powerful and highly centralized military elite in Bam.  Ibrāhīm Khān Saʿd al-Dawlah rose to power through his connections to two of the most prominent landowning and administrative families in the Bam region.  His family came to be known as the Bihzādīs, and successfully passed down their status as heads of the frontier patrol within the family after Ibrāhīm Khān’s death.  What is most interesting about the Bihzādīs’ frontier experience, though, is how they managed to leverage the sudden political importance of the borderlands to their material advantage.  We find references in the informal land survey carried out by Kirmān’s governor in 1894 that the Bihzādīs’ possessed a significant share of the lucrative henna producing lands of the nearby agricultural district of Narmāshīr.  This is not a systematic report, by any means, but the same general impression is given in the writings of administrators and travelers to the frontier zones.  While historians have long discussed frontiers as sites of identity formation and mythmaking, this is a process rather remote from the frontier itself.  While there is much more to be said about the experience of drafting, surveilling, and enforcing boundaries in the nineteenth century, this particular case study demonstrates one particular unintended consequence: local players on the margins of empire skillfully took advantage of the needs of larger political networks to great reward.

This durability of Bihzādī leadership demonstrated clearly by the relative peace in Balūchistān following the assassination of Nasir al-Din Shah in 1896, just two years after Farmān Farmā’s visit.  Given the personal, patrimonial authority of the Shah, the death of Nasir al-Din meant essentially a lapse in government.  This was exacerbated in Kirmān and Balūchistān not only by the troubled history of the province under Qājār rule, but also by a much-circulated premonition attributed to the local 14th century Sufi Shah Niʿmat Allah Vālī that the last Shah of Iran would be named Nāṣir al-Dīn.  Visitors also repeatedly comment on rumors that the British had eyes on annexing Persian Balūchistān.  Remarkably, the immediate aftermath of the death of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh was met only by a petition to replace the governor of Balūchistān and saw no violent uprisings or confrontations. The only unrest noted by native chroniclers or British administrators was a group of ʿArab and Bahārlū tribesmen from Fārs who took advantage of the situation to raid and plunder a number of villages in Sīrjān in western Kirmān.[64]  This would attest to the high level of stability achieved under the Bihzādīs and the military elite of Bam in the notoriously unstable tribal lands of Balūchistān in its relations with the Qājār state. So complete was their economic control, too, that in 1908, General Ducat, reporting on the grim commercial prospects of southern Iran, paused to marvel at the degree of prosperity in Narmāshīr, as well as the near total monopoly that the Bihzādīs enjoyed over it:

…the district of Narmāshīr… is practically divided between three or four landowners, who are millionaires already, and make large incomes yearly out of henna, though it has all to be sent as far as Yezd to be treated.[65]

There are important similarities and contrasts in the roots of the social power of Bam‘s military elites and, for lack of a better word, the civilian elites of Kirmān‘s core agricultural districts.  Ties to religious learning for these civilian elites provided not only socio-cultural standing, but also, by extension, access to prestigious stipendiary posts, including the administration of vaqf properties.  On the other hand, landownership, while always a critical piece of elite household estates, became even more prominent with the rise of land prices and the size of urban household landholdings with the emergence of commercial agriculture in the mid-19th century.  Religious learning and ownership of land provided these civilian elites with a base of social power independent of the Qājār state and their appointees in Kirmān City.  The power of the state in collecting taxes and maintaining order was experienced by the local population through the hands of these households. This reciprocal relationship with Qājār appointees, in granting titles, offices and stipends in return for access and local knowledge, was the basis of the Qājār political system in the province.

[1]Collected reports from the 1870-72 Anglo-Persian Boundary Commission were published as Eastern Persia: An Account of the Journeys of the Persian Boundary Commission: 1870-71-72, 2 vols., ed. Sir Frederic J. Goldsmid (London: MacMillan, 1876).

[2]F. Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804-1946 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

[3]Arash Khazeni, “On the Eastern Borderlands of Iran: The Baluch in Nineteenth-Century Travel Book Writing,” History Compass 5/4 (2007): 1399–1411; Christine Noelle-Karimi, “On the Edge: Eastern Khurasan in the Perception of Qajar Officials,” Eurasian Studies 14 (2016): 135-177.

[4]Aḥmad ʿAlī Khān Vazīrī Kirmānī, Tārīkh-i Kirmān (Tehran: Nashr-i ʿIlm, 2006), 373.

[5]This famous quote from James Scott refers to a pattern of tensions he identified in the history of South Asia, between settled states in lowlands and along river systems, and highland peoples who used their mobility in subtle acts of resistance to control and exploitation.  James Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland South Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

[6]See, especially, the work of Arash Khazeni on the Bakhtiyārī tribe along the Zagros frontier in Tribes and Empire on the Margins of Nineteenth Century Iran (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010).

[7]ʿAbd al-Husayn Mīrzā Farmān Farmā, Musāfaratnāmah-yi Kirmān va Balūchistān (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Asaṭīr, 2003).

[8]On Russian imperialism in Central Asia, see especially Daniel Brower, Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

[9]H. Lyman Stebbins, British Imperialism in Qajar Iran: Consuls, Agents and Influence in the Middle East (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016).

[10]Russians in Iran: Diplomacy and the Politics of Power in the Qajar Era, ed. R. Matthee and A. Andreeva (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2018).

[11]On Qājār Kirmān, see especially James M. Gustafson, Kirman and the Qajar Empire: Local Dimensions of Modernity in Iran, 1794-1914 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).

[12]Safarnāmāh-yi Bukhārā, ed. Ḥusayn Zamānī (Tehran: Pizhūhishgāh-i ʿUlūm-i Insānī va Muṭālaʿāt-i Farhangī Vābastah bih Vizārat-i Farhang va Amūzish-i ʿĀlī), 37.  This was published as an anonymous manuscript, but comparing the contents with the account of Joseph Wolff, the author was identified as ʿAbbās Qulī Mīrzā in James M. Gustafson, “Qajar Ambitions in the Great Game: Notes on the Embassy of ‘Abbas Qoli Khan to the Amir of Bokhara, 1844,” Iranian Studies 46/1 (2014): 51-72  and C. Noelle-Karimi “Different in All Respects: Bukhara and Khiva as Viewed by Ḳāǧār Envoys,” in Şehrâyîn: Die Welt der Osmanen, Die Osmanen in der Welt: Wahrnehmungen, Begegnungen, und Abgrenzungen, ed. Yavuz Kose and Tobias Volker (Wiesebaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2012), 435-46.

[13]Vazīrī, Tārīkh-i Kirmān, 784-88.

[14]Government of India, Gazetteer of Persia (Simla, Calcutta: 1885), 4: 32.

[15]Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Bāstānī-Pārīzī, “Introduction” to Yaḥya Aḥmadī, Farmāndihān-i Kirmān (Tehran, Danish, 1975), 18.

[16]Sir Frederic J. Goldsmid, “Introduction,” to India, Eastern Persia, xliv.

[17]Sir Frederic J. Goldsmid, “Introduction,” to India, Eastern Persia, ix.

[18]Aḥmadī, Farmāndihān-i Kirmān, 28.

[19]The Arg-i Bam, a UNESCO World Heritage Site along with the surrounding city of Bam, was destroyed and rebuilt following a massive earthquake in December 2003 that killed more than 26,000 people.

[20]Sir Percy Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles in Persia: Or, Eight Years in Irán,(London: Murray, 1902), 217; Farmān Farmā, Musāfaratnāmah-yi Kirmān va Balūchistān, 53.

[21]Farmān Farmā and Ittihadiyya, Safarnama-i Kirmān wa Balucistan, 6.

[22]Aḥmad ʿAlī Khān Vazīrī Kirmānī, Jughrāfīyā-yi Kirmān (Tehran: Ibn Sīnā, 1974), 100-1.

[23]For the most comprehensive study of elite family persistence across dynastic periods, see Christoph Werner, An Iranian Town in Transition: A Social and Economic History of the Elites of Tabriz, 1747-1848 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2000).

 

[24]Vazīrī, Jughrāfīyā-yi Kirmān, 144.

[25]Vazīrī, Jughrāfīyā-yi Kirmān, 72.

[26]Vazīrī, Jughrāfīyā-yi Kirmān, 72.

[27]Aḥmadī, Farmāndihān-i Kirmān, 140.

[28]Vazīrī, Tārīkh-i Kirmān, 824-25.

[29]Farmān Farmā, Musāfaratnāmah-yi Kirmān va Balūchistān, 56.

[30]Goldsmid, “Introduction,” India, Eastern Persia, xx.

[31]Oliver St. John, “Narrative of a Journey,” in Goldsmid, “Introduction,” India, Eastern Persia, 77-78.

[32]Vazīrī, Jughrāfīyā-yi Kirmān, 98.

[33]Vazīrī, Jughrāfīyā-yi Kirmān, 98-99.

[34]Vazīrī, Jughrāfīyā-yi Kirmān, 98-99.

[35]Vazīrī, Jughrāfīyā-yi Kirmān, 98.

[36]Vazīrī, Jughrāfīyā-yi Kirmān, 55.

[37]India, Gazetteer of Persia 4: 36.

[38]Firoozeh Sabet, “Fragile Frontiers: The Diminishing Domains of Qajar Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 29, no. 2 (1997): 205-234.

[39]Vazīrī, Jughrāfīyā-yi Kirmān, 62.

[40]Farmān Farmā, Musāfaratnāmah-yi Kirmān va Balūchistān, 56-57.

[41]India, Gazetteer of Persia 4: 48. On Zayn al-ʿAbidīn Khān’s relationship to Ibrāhīm Khān Sartīp, see Daryagast, Safar-Nama-i Balucistan: Az Mahan Ta Cahbahar, 54; Sykes misidentifies Zayn al-ʿAbidīn Khān as Ibrāhīm Khān’s son-in-law in Ten Thousand Miles in Persia; Or, Eight Years in Irán.

[42]Farmān Farmā, Musāfaratnāmah-yi Kirmān va Balūchistān, 259; India, Gazetteer of Persia 4: 38.

[43]The Cossacks were a military force, originally trained and officered by Russian advisors, formed in the late 1870’s by Nasir al-Din Shah.

[44]FO 60/580, Sykes to Salisbury, “Report on Persian Baluchistan,” (2 April 1896).

[45]FO 60/580, Sykes to Salisbury, “Report on Persian Baluchistan,” (2 April 1896).

[46]Vazīrī, Tārīkh-i Kirmān, 820.

[47]FO 60/580, Sykes to Salisbury, “Report on Persian Baluchistan,” (2 April 1896).

[48]Vazīrī, Tārīkh-i Kirmān, 818.

[49]Farmān Farmā, Musāfaratnāmah-yi Kirmān va Balūchistān, 62-101.

[50]Farmān Farmā, Musāfaratnāmah-yi Kirmān va Balūchistān, 259.

[51]Oliver St. John, “A Journey Through Baluchistan,” in Eastern Persia 1: 86.

[52]Husang Alam, “Henna,” Encyclopaedia Iranica.

[53]Sir Percy Sykes, “Report on the Trade and Commerce of the Consular Districts of Kerman and Persian Beluchistan from March, 1894, to March, 1895,” Reports from H.M. Diplomatic and Consular Officers Abroad on Trade and Finance: Command Papers; Accounts and Papers; 19th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers, no.1671 (1896), 14.

[54]Vazīrī, Jughrāfīyā-yi Kirmān, 100.

[55]Vazīrī, Jughrāfīyā-yi Kirmān, 62.

[56]India, Gazetteer of Persia 4: 37.

[57]India, Gazetteer of Persia 4: 37.

[58]Farmān Farmā, Musāfaratnāmah-yi Kirmān va Balūchistān, 57, 62-101.

[59]Farmān Farmā, Musāfaratnāmah-yi Kirmān va Balūchistān, 66, 72-5, 85, 96, 98.

[60]Farmān Farmā, Musāfaratnāmah-yi Kirmān va Balūchistān, 95-101.

[61]38 of 98 milki villages, excluding 12 khalisa properties and 3 bequeathed as vaqf, were held by the individuals above.  This figure does not include a number of individuals who were not fully identifiable in contemporary sources, or were somewhat more distant members of these same households. Farmān Farmā, Musāfaratnāmah-yi Kirmān va Balūchistān, 95-101.

[62]Vazīrī, Jughrāfīyā-yi Kirmān, 95; Farmān Farmā, Musafaratnama-i Kirmān va Balucistan, 54.

[63]Vazīrī, Jughrāfīyā-yi Kirmān, 101.

[64]Vazīrī, Tārīkh-i Kirmān, 828-29.

[65]General Ducat, “Kerman and its Resources,” Journal of the Royal Society of Arts 56, no. 2918 (1908), 1021-2.

An Inquiry into the Terms of ádáb, ádīb, ádábīyāt in the Preso-Arabic Languages

Shayan Afshar <ormavi@gmail.com> has served as Associate Faculty at Arizona State University. He earned his PhD in Iranian and Persian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. Areas of specialization include Persian literature, literary criticism, poetry and linguistics. His major publication is A Lexicon of Persian Infinitives (bilingual), 2nd ed. (Tehran: Morvarid Pub., 2017).

Aspects of the Cultural and Linguistic Motifs of the ádáb Genre in the Transition from Old-Persia to the Early Islamic World and the Role of three Iranian kātebs (scribes) in the Process.

 

A foreword to the topic

A distinct characteristic of the gradual “Islamization” of Persia over the course of roughly one to two centuries and onward was that the Arabic language became the formal religious, historical and, to some degree, literary medium used by many Persian men of pen and scholars throughout the first centuries of the Islamic period in Iran.[1] Meanwhile, the Arabic language became a means of communication in the higher echelon of society, thus transference of aspects of culture in retrospect of (olden) Persian and the cultivation of Islamic ádáb culture,[2] and, for a period of time, even a vehicle for reviving a reaction to Arab dominance.[3] Simultaneous with the above process, Middle Persian (Pahlavi), which had been the formal language of the country in Sāsānian times (although to a limited degree among the populace[4]), gradually faded away, except among surviving Zoroastrian communities. In due course, with the rise of Persian dynasties in the Eastern lands of Persia proper, formal Arabic was replaced by Persian Darī, a language which enabled the Persian genres of ádáb, an epic of heritage and ethics to be transferred to the new society.  Thus, the themes of older Persian literature endured and had a marked influence on the course of Arabic and Islamic literature. Themes such as the heroic epic that reappeared in the poetic works of the tenth and eleventh centuries CE, as well as the themes of polite, urban, and courtly literature of the ádáb genre, inspired and shaped Arabic literature and Perso-Arabic mirrors of princes.[5]

 

A background of a debate

In the mid-1920s a Persian literary classical erudite, Moḥammad Moḥīṭ Ṭabāṭbāī, was closely following the debates among some Arab scholars for the possible root(s) and, from there, meaning(s) of the word adab (ádáb) in the Arabic language. He had some ideas that the root of this term might go back to Old or Middle-Persian. Eventually, in 1939, Moḥīṭ Ṭabāṭbāī, wrote a Persian article, reviewing and summing up the debates of those various Arab scholars and expressed his own somewhat speculative opinion about roots of the term adab (ádáb) and adabiyat (ádábīyāt) in Perso-Turko-Arabic languages and literature. One should mention that Moḥīṭ Ṭabāṭbāī, a well-known Persian erudite, had met some of the Arab learned –whose names and occupation will be mentioned in the context of this paper– in an international Oriental studies conference in Paris and had exchanged his opinions with a couple of them.  The now historical article of M. M. Ṭabāṭbāī has re-appeared in a now-ended famous publication A Persian Journal of Iranian Studies, Âyandeh (vol. 11, no. 1-3, 1985) with a new preface by the author. The “old” debate was rekindled following a publication of a presentation by a Japanese scholar of Perso-Arabic languages, Dyoi-Ji Nai, in the Twenty-Fifth Congress of Japanese Orientalists in Tokyo in 1984 (the original article was published first in the University of Tokyo’s annual report in 1983) titled “From Middle-Persian Awēk to Arabic Adab.”

 

View and course of this paper

Hence, in the twentieth century, the root of ádáb had to some degree been the subject of etymological debate and both literary and cultural conflict among Moslem and Christian Arab, European, and Persian scholars. After briefly considering various aspects of the debates, this essay will endeavor to reconcile the “problem.” Showing that that next to Arab and a few European scholars’ opinions, the beliefs of three Persian erudites, i.e., a classical literatus (M. M. Ṭabāṭbāī), a textual-linguistic historian of classical Persian and Arabic (Moḥammadī Malāyerī), and a literatus with linguistic background in old Persian languages (Ĵalāl Ḵhāleqī Moṭlaq), despite their somewhat different views for the etymological roots of the term ádáb, from the view of this pen, socio-culturally, one can obtain a common conclusion from rather varying views. Thus, after a short cultural-literary background, it will first present and discuss the etymological background of the expression ádáb in the context of transforming cultures, both Persian and Arabic; then show the determining role, however brief, of three Persian men of pen in the service of the late Umayyad rulers in the course of this cultural transmission, reflecting root of the transformation of ádáb into “literary” concept in the emerging eclectic culture and eventually, in modern times, to “literature.”

 

A socio-literary background of the term(s)

The writings which were translated, rendered or redacted in the early Islamic era, mainly from Persian into Arabic, were on the subjects of practical ethics, general andarz (counsel, wise wording), and a small number of philosophical themes. These writings were classified under headings such as mauʿiẕa (preaching), wasīyat (testament), ḥikmat (wise sayings and, roughly, philosophy, not necessarily Greek peripatetic) and ádáb, which came to mean good breeding, good manners, and politeness (and later, letters and literature). These expressions were often recorded in their plural form: mawāʿiẕ (مَواعظ), wasāyā (وَصایا), ḥikam (حِکم) and ādāb (آداب). The writings which were given these titles covered issues dealing with taḥḏīb al-nafs (cultivation or refinement of the self), tazkīyat al-rūḥ (purification of the spirit) and the education or upbringing of pupils in the category of ádáb. All of this may be summarized as the virtues that an individual must cultivate, and which were termed makārim al-aḵlāq (مَکارم الاخلاق). Mauʿiẕa and wasiyat closely corresponded to the Persian ándarz and pánd, categories used in Sāsānian didactic literature. It is for this reason that those often-short Persian compositions, in their Arabic redactions, were called the mawāʿiẕ of Āzarbād or Būzūrjmihr (NP: Bozorgmehr) and the wasāyā of Anōshīrvān.[6]  Accordingly, in the late first and second centuries of the Islamic era, transmission of ádáb, at least conceptually, from Sāsānian culture through the translation process of the motifs, could be attributed to two general categories: “high ethics,” or ideals and wisdom, and a discourse on issues including social ethics, good manners and behavior, speech and fine words. Later, from the second AH/ninth CE century the expression ádáb developed connotations, meaning, and gradually, branches.

Medieval dictionaries list a considerable variety of meanings for the term ádáb. Some examples include “discipline of mind,” “good qualities and attributes of mind and soul,” and of course “good breeding.” Of these types of definitions, the latter corresponds to Persian social culture, particularly the upbringing of children of nobility in the literary bureaucratic level, of the talented youth of dīvāniān (scribes who, in the Islamic period, came to be called kuttāb). In that manner, the later idea of “polite literature,” has its roots in the same background.  Pellat observes that in ‘post-classical’ Arabic texts, ádáb, in its broadest sense, appears in three different spheres which are nevertheless related: moral, social and intellectual. “We may assume ádáb to be of three basic types according to whether it aims to instill ethical precepts, to provide its readers with a general education, or to lay down guiding principles for members of the various professions.”[7] However, as Bonebakker noted, “though these are not always easily distinguishable, the question of how the same term came to find a place in all three remains to be answered.”[8]  The reason for such diverse definitions can be related to the philological and cultural roots of the idiom as it evolved from pre-Islamic civilizations such as Indians,[9] Old Persian[10] and Greeks.[11] They each had deeply rooted religious, social, and philosophical cultures, including personal and social ethics of manners, “upbringing” and education. At any rate, one fundamental debate goes back to the philological and thus cultural roots of the term.

 

Ádáb in context and philological debts

Ádáb was among the social, and literary terms that influenced the transfer of Old Persian cultural motifs into the Perso-Arabic genre of mirror of princes and “court literature.  The extended usage of this term was significant in carrying a qualitative aspect of pre-Islamic etiquette and didactic literature into the “translation movement” of late Umayyad by some scribes/men of pen and the early ʿAbbasid period in Baghdad (Bayt al-Ḥikma/The House of Wisdom) functioning as a “bureau of translation” by mixed Nestorian/Arab/Persians. Thus, another term, ḥikma[t] (roughly, “philosophy”) though not within the scope of this paper, was important for the formation of a “speculative” and “practical” philosophy which became both Persian and Arabic and from which primarily came the translation of Greek philosophy and science into Syriac and Arabic.[12]

Nonetheless, regarding the root of the term ádáb, Professor Moḥammadī Malāyerī states that there is “no reason for the usage” of the term ádáb and its derivatives in the pre-Islamic Jāhili Arabic literature, at least not within literature whose authenticity we can trust.[13] Nor does it appear in the Qur̉ān.[14]  However, on at least one occasion, a form of the term ádáb was apparently used by a pre-Islamic Jāhili poet. In al-Divān, Ṭurfa, a Jāhili poet, uses a derivative of ádáb from “taʾdib (to educate or teach [manners]) in the form of “addab walīdaka…” (Teach [manners to] your child…).[15] It appears that some Arabists post-Carlo A. Nallino,[16] not having found a root for the term in classical Arabic, have accepted that this term derives from ádáb, “the plural” of daʾb, which means habit, state, manner, or behavior –though originally it conveyed a sense of way, path or track, as the term sunna (and then, as Sunnah, tradition, and the sayings of prophet Muḥammad) also originally meant road or path. However, Sunnah came to be used for religious purposes, while daʾb retained its figurative sense of manner or conditions and ádáb was reserved for something similar to the meaning of sunna but in a secular context.[17]  Despite these assertions, Šahāb al-Dīn Aḥmad Ḵafāĵi, an Arab scholar and philologist from the eleventh century A.H., followed an earlier prominent Arab philologist, Imām Maṭrazī, in regarding the term as an “intruder” (dakhīla) in the Arabic language, meaning that it does not come from an Arabic root, and was adapted from another language.[18] A contemporary Arab scholar, Taha Ḥusayn, believes that the term has entered Arabic from another language finding no trace of this term in the confirmed Jāhilī Arabic or Semitic languages –including Hebrew– and suggest that there is a chance that the term existed in one of the ancient dialects of the Arabic language, leaving no trace today of its origin.[19]  Others assumed that the term was an adaptation from Greek[20] or, derived from Persian.[21] Among the Persian scholars who believed that the term ádáb evolved essentially from Old/Middle-Persian, the case made by the late M. Moḥīṭ Ṭabāṭabāī –to whom we referred earlier in this paper–seems most convincing, although not definite.

Moḥīṭ Ṭabāṭabāī’s article[22] is also noted by Professor M. Malāyerī,[23] in a succinct, but detailed discussion of his points. Here, we take on his assertion that ádáb most likely evolved from the [root db +OP dipa+] dip, conveying the meaning of “writing.” This word appears in King Dariuš inscription and in Sāsānīán times as dapira conveying the meaning of “writer.” If it is true that ádáb was derived from the root daʾb, it is also true that –as a firm analogy in Persian– from rām, ārām developed and from , āsā, thus, just as a prefixed >a< in the case of aviza was added to viza, an >a< was also affixed to the root db and dib, and ádáb and ádīb were derived. Hence, ádīb has evolved to mean a teacher or writer bearing literature and culture.

On the other hand, as the bureau of letters and correspondence in Persian was called dīvān, and also served to educate youth the profession of dápiri (NP: dábīrī), the place of education came to be called dábistān (dábestān) and dábīrestān which in turn are reminiscent of herbádestān, a place of education in ancient times – albeit mainly a religious one. Extending this to the fact that in the very early Islamic period, for a long time after the conquest of Iranian lands, the Muslim Arabs, not having had any state bureaucracy of finance or administration (except in Surestan/Hira –roughly present Iraq) let the old Persian dīvān function and run their affairs. Additionally, when later Persian Muslim scribes recreated the old offices, they would also have patterned the places of training and education of dábīr after dīvān. Similarly, though called maktab and kuttāb in Arabic, teacher came to be called ádib and mu ̉dáb, and the profession was called t̉adib.[24]

Somewhat apart from its etymological origin and cultural background as being synonymous to Sunnah, it is likely that the word ádáb was adapted as the equivalent of the Persian term ā’īn (/āyīn) (both Old and New Persian meanings: custom, manner, formality, rite). Thus, Djalāl Ḵāleqī Moṭlaq makes a different assertion regarding the cultural root of the term ádáb: “Adab is the equivalent of the Middle Persian fráháng and New Persian farhang.”[25] He continues that “it is also very close to another Pahlavī word ēwēn, [New-] Persian āyīn (ā’īn), meaning custom, rule, correct manner, and its plural ādāb, or rásm and its plural rosūm; but sometimes the original word, in its Persian form āyīn is retained.”[26] Despite the opinion of scholars such as A. Christensen,[27] ádáb cannot be considered exactly equivalent to ēwēn (/āyīn). According to the assertions of Ḵāleqi Moṭlaq, Â’īn-nāmá (-), (books of customs and protocols and ceremonies of the Sāsānian time,) which show ā’īn to correspond closely in meaning to ádáb as well as to the nearly synonymous Arabic term rásm. To prove the affinity in meaning, in an early classic Persian Darī dictionary of the fifth/eleventh century, Luḡat-e Furs[28] of Asadī-ye Tūsī, defines ā’īn as rásm, and in Modern Persian, the two words are used to form the expression rásm-o ā’īn, which implies that in meaning they are related terms.

In the belief of this pen and/or the view of this essay, regarding the “roots” or the background of the term/expression ádáb, the opinion of Ḵāleqi Moṭlaq -maybe more so culturally- compliments the analogical verbal assertion of M. Moḥīṭ Ṭabāṭabāī’s and the philological derivations of M. Malāyerī. Nevertheless, in the assessment of this pen, the social and the political grounds of the cultural transformation of the second half of first and the second centuries of the advent of Islam have had a determining role in the [re-]emergence and development of the multi-layered meaning and usage of ádáb. Furthermore, the usage of this expression itself was in debt to the “translation process” of the Persian cultural motifs and more indirectly from some selected Greek “philosophical” texts.

 

The emergence of the term ádáb literally by way of socially with translation process or “movement”

The source from which the term ádáb may have been derived or evolved, its expression and wide-ranging and far-reaching usage began mainly with translations made of Sāsānián ándárz literature, the “mirror for princes.” One important clarification to be made here is that the meaning of the word has changed considerably over time. Today, ádáb, together with its Arabic plural, ādāb, conveys the meaning of “literature,” which in Persian is called ádábiyāt (Turkish: edebiyāt). However, during the first phase of the translation process from the early second century A.H. (eighth century CE), it referred to what may be called “practical literature,” the aim of which was to promote elegance, learning, refinement, urbanity, and skill in the art (ā’īn) of speech; in short, everything associated with breeding and education. This reflected the elite culture of the Sāsānián as well as the aspects of the ideals of Greek philosophy.[29]

In time, Persian concepts of public behavior and private life style were introduced via scribes and escritoires and translated materials to sectors of society below the ruling class and elite.[30] By the third AH / ninth century CE, they had come to influence mainly the learned classes in the central and eastern parts of the Islamic world, people who had access to literature and education of any kind.[31]  All of this resulted in a synthesis, furnishing the background for the intellectual debates that took place, particularly at the court of al-Ma ̉mun. This “process” was due to the presence in Bağdād (MP: báğá-dátá) of a mixed population of Persian Muslims and Zoroastrians, Manicheans, Nestorian Christians from Syria, Nabateans from central-southern Iraq, and Muslim Arabs. A point that can be made here is that the term “high culture” comes close to what we consider the original meaning of ādāb, especially in Persian. This is suggested by the nature of the literature that Ebn-e Muqaffaʿ (Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ) was translating in the early second century A.H., which was designated as ādāb. This genre was not limited to Ebn-e Muqaffaʿ’s translations; there were other general titles such as Âdāb al-Furs, or specific ones such as Âdāb Būzurjmihr in Arabic or Ayādgār ī Wuzurgmihr in Middle Persian. The heritage of this genre is further reflected in a more mixed Arabo-Islamic literature under general titles such as Adab al-ʿArab wa’l Furs, Adab al-mulūk, or, specific ones such as Kitāb al-Tāj fī aḵlāq al-mulūk attributed to Jāhiz[32] And Sirāj al-mulūk of Ṭarṭūsī.[33] In this latter work, the author specifies in chapter sixty-three that he has utilized parts of the Persian book Ĵāvīdān Ḵerad (Eternal-Wisdom/ Inner-Wisdom) in his book. Of the original version form the redaction of the text from the Sāsānian times, like so many others, we do not have much knowledge, aside from some anecdotes from the period of caliph al-Ma ̉mun. However, since Moškōye Rāzī (Ibn al-Miskawayh/Ebn-e Meskavayh) (320-421 AH / 932 [/940]-1030 CE) titled one of his famous books by the name Kitāb al-ḥekma al-ḵālida (Book of Eternal Wisdom) in Arabic – and provided information about its old content, it became well known. Regarding the parts and context of Moškōye’s version of Ĵāvīdān Ḵerad, Walter Bruno Henning (Middle Iranian languages scholar, 1908-1967) believed that the Persian parts were translations or derivations from the “original,” Middle-Persian. Unfortunately, Moškōye does not specify his source(s), except that he had obtained it from a Maubed-e Maubedān (/Mobed-e Mobedān, a chief Mazdaean/Zoroastrian Priest) in Fārs (one of the old strongholds of the Zoroastrian faith well into the 5/11 century and after, albeit gradually declining); therefore, it is not evident in what exact Persian language it was written.[34] Moškōye only explains that his redaction and composition is a collection similar to the ándárz literature. Moškōye also says, in addition to Persians, such different peoples as Arabs, Indians and Greeks yet, their ‘sayings’ did not precede [the ‘original’] Ĵāvīdān Ḵerad. The reason for this is that sources for his Ĵāvīdān Ḵerad included the words of Hošang (a legendary ancient Persian king) to his son or vice throne. Moškōye explains: “I was aiming to write these precious sayings of Hošang and to collect whatever I could find from the utterances and their didactic teachings of Persians, Indians, Arabs, and Greeks, then add the former ones to the latter. The primary intention of this endeavor was for youth to know how to act [/live] and for people of knowledge to become aware of the wise literature of the people who preceded them. Also, it is intended for the people who come after us, so they may benefit from ‘cultivation of ethics,’ ‘refinement of self’ and ‘strengthening of the personality.'” He continues: “Since I have established the principles and foundation of ethics in my book Taḥḏib al-Aḵlāq (The Cultivation or Refinement of Ethics), there is no need to repeat them here. Our intention in this book is to represent the expressions and principles of good deeds and sayings of wise persons of different people with different beliefs, and in this part, I follow the style of the authors of Ĵāvīdān Ḵerad, as I had promised.”[35]

As the nature of literature in general is humanistic, thus both profane and sacred (in our terms today), it appears that the pluralistic nature of ándárz and ádáb literature was also manifested from Sāsānian times to the first few centuries of the Islamic world. This was made possible when an “open-minded” ruler or whole dynasty such as [Âl-e] Būyed (Buwayhid) (320-454/932-1063) was in power and depended on its cultural background. Among the Būyed rulers, this was under ‘Ażdud Daulah (338/934), who had gathered one the most impressive libraries of its time in the city of Ray (‘Rayy’), from which a range of erudite individuals like Moškōye Rāzī (who for a time worked as chief librarian there) could benefit. Consequently, what was understood as ádáb in this genre came from texts inherited from a selective cultural background and thus reflected as mirrors of princes.

 

Three exemplars of transmitters of ádáb literature 

After the Arab conquest of Iranian lands and during the early times of the formation of Islamic culture, there came to be three pioneering personae for the establishment of the ádáb genre. The best known among them is Ebn-e Muqaffaʿ (originally named Rōzbeh Dādōye or Dādūyá, he inherited this epithet from his father’s soubriquet).  Before Ebn-e Muqaffaʿ, no books in the Arabic language were known under the title of ádáb or ādāb. However, he had a couple of forerunners, men of pen, who had worked as translators and adaptors of “ancient literature,” and who laid the ground for the ádáb genre.

 

Abūl-ʿAlā Sālim (Salim Abū’l-ʿAlā)

Although the establishment of fresh criteria and style for prose related to ádáb, was accomplished by ʿAbd al-Hamīd, the primers go back, to his forerunner Abū’l-ʿalā Sālim (“Ērānī”) who was mawlī and a Kātib of Hishām b.ʿAbd al-Malik the Umayyad Caliph (r. 724-743 CE). Abū’l-ʿAlā Sālim was not only a Kātib for the Caliph but also a translator of Sāsānīán Middle-Persian literature into Arabic; it is likely that he was the translator of the famous Sāsānīán book of pictures and biographies of Persian kings commissioned by Hishām b.ʿAbd al-Malik.[36] Besides Ebn-e Nadim’s (Ibn al-Nadim) mention in Al-Fihrist,[37] Masʿūdī in al-Tanbīh wa’l-Ashrāf also talks about this well-known chronological book of kings[38] In Al-Fihrist, it is reported that he as a “transmitter” (نقله), he had rendered some portion of the (apocryphal) epistles of Aristotle (on government) to Alexander[39] and had corrected some others that were translated for him.[40] Also, Al-Fihrist reports that he had writings (رَسائل) of his own roughly one hundred folios. Thus, it has been suggested that ‘Salim Abū’l-ʿAlā’ as the chancellery secretary of Hishām b.ʿAbd al-Malik, had some compositions in the genre of ádáb. But, although he did have a somewhat pioneering role in the infusion of this type of literature into the Arabic language and literature, it was more as transmitter than an innovator himself.

 

ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. Yahyā al-Kātib

Abū Halāl ʿAskarī mentions in his well-known classical tome al-Sanā‘atain (الصناعتین) the influence of Persian epistolary on the writings of the famous ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Kātib (d.132 /750).[41] ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd was a great prose stylist, whose example was imitated by those who follow him. He was the first to be credited with elongating epistles in Arabic. However, Victor Danner observes that “on closer examination, there is more to his distinction than that.” He continues:

His epistolary style breathes the influence of Persian culture within an Islamic context. Some of his epistles, moreover, show Persian influence in their contents, as when he counsels rulers on how to govern, how to conduct themselves in court, which are old Persian themes…However, in no epistle, does this subtle influence of his Persian background stand forth with more evidence than in his epistle to the scribe, wherein the ancient dignity of the scribal profession is reaffirmed within an Islamic framework. It is no accident that this famous epistle was composed in the last days of the Umayyad regime, for the scribes, with their eminent positions of power and diversified culture, was then coming into real prominence, and were ready to influence the patterns and style of Islamic civilization on the basis of the essentially Semitic contents of the Qur’ān.[42]

It was toward the end of the Umayyad period that a new style of Arabic composition and style was developed. This technique was attributed to ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Kātib. He was recognized as a master of balāğa (eloquence or rhetoric, which in Persian is called soḵanvarī), and fasāa (clear language or articulate) and the power of his utterance became a proverb: “Futihat (or: bada’at) al-rasā’il bi ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd wa ḵutimat bi ibn al-ʿAmīd[43] (The commencement of the epilstery was withʿAbd al-Ḥamīd and the ending (i.e., “the perfection”) with ibn al-ʿAmīd). Aḥmad Amīn, an Arab scholar and author in the 20th century, remarks that there is clear evidence of the influence of Persian belles-lettres on Arabic literature contained in Abū Halāl ʿAskarī’s statement in Dīvān al-Mʿaānī: (دیوان المَعانی) “Whoever has learned eloquence in one language and then learns another language, can utilize the same science in the new language.”[44]

ʿAbd al- Ḥamīd’s “new style,” the simplification of balāğat (eloquence), was characterized by the expression that he “untangled the knots” of balāğat. Despite the Arabs’ attachment to laconicism or brevity in expression and prose, the distinctive inimitability of the Qur’ān, iʿjāz (miracle) (عجاز), and its ījāz (succinctness) (ایجاز) on the other hand, ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd’s itnāb (amplification of discourse or prolixity) gradually gained the approval and admiration of Arab writers.[45] They started imitating his style.[46] It seems that its most important characteristic was the exposition and expression of meanings in an amplified discursive manner which did not previously exist in Arabic. This was the beginning of artistic writing, particularly in epistle and essay, genres of writing which tend to include a title, an “introduction,” and an exposition of the subject according to the content or intention, wrapped up with a “conclusion.” ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd also categorized epistles based upon the position of the Kuttāb and their responsibilities, as reflected in the Epistle to the scribes or secretaries. This type of knowledge existed in the Middle-Persian era, used by the Sāsānīán dīvān[47] as the knowledge of literate composition: dabīrī or scribeship. The importance of dabīrī and the high standing of dabīrs (secretaries) in the Sāsānīán period and their continuing elevated status through the Islamic period has been studied by Christensen.[48]

ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd represented the second generation of those divāniān who, after the advent of Islam, knew Pahlavī (MP) and were familiar with the prose writing of their bureaucracy.  Unfortunately, out of the large body of epistles credited to him (Ebn-e Nadīm in al-Fihrist –377/987-88- credited him with a tome of a “thousand folios”) merely a handful has survived which were regarded as worthy of inclusion in anthologies or citation in dictionaries. For this, our greatest debt is to Ibn al-Ṭayfūr (204-80/819-93), author of a Kitāb al-Manthūr wa-’l-Manzūm (The Book of Prose and Poetry), for it is in the extant parts of this anthology that we find the core of all that is known to survive of ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd’s work, the nucleus of which comprises his best-known compositions, the Risālah ilā ͐l-kuttāb (Epistles to the Secretaries)[49] and an epistolary manual of guidance addressed to Marwān’s son and heir. In addition, this same source has preserved for us epistles on friendship, the permissibility of chess, and a hunting scene[50] which were in the category of old Persian ádáb. Certainly, a perceptive reader cannot fail to detect a marked relationship to the Fürstenspiegel or Mirror for Princes type of literature.[51] ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd was from Anbār,[52] a previously Sāsānian town near Ctesiphon (Madā’in). His full name given by Ibn Ḵallikān was Abū Ghānib ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. Yaḥya b. Saʿd.[53]

 

Ebn-e Moqaffaʿ (Arabic: ʿAbd-Allāh Ibn al- Muqaffaʿ /Persian: Rōzbeh (Rūzbeh) pour-e Dādūyá)

The rightful disciple and comrade of ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd was Ebn-e Moqaffaʿ (139 AH /756757 AD). The term ádáb as used by Ebn-e Moqaffaʿ has the general sense of the cultivation and refinement of practical ethics, personal and social manners and etiquette. On a social level, it also reveals the intention of training rulers and high officials. He includes the word ádáb in the titles of two of his books al-Adabˊl-kabīr and al-Adabˊl-ṣaghīr; although, it is now largely accepted that the second one, al-Adabˊl-Ṣaghīr, is not his own composition.[54] Both books deal with personal and social ethics and “politics.” Any author dealing with such topics functions as a teacher of practical ethics and conduct of “correct” deeds, espousing (particular) criteria. The criteria and method followed by Ebn-e Moqaffaʿ are derived more from wisdom and intellect rather than from religion. For him, ádáb or ethics are a group of concerns which before anything else are related to the intellect, and the intellect normatively distinguishes -in classical binary – between “beauty” and “unsightliness.” His works contain essentially rules of conduct for an ordinary or outstanding man. He distinguishes three aspects of ádáb: (1) ethics turned either inward or outward; (2) vocational training limited to rulers and high officials; and (3) culture and education insofar as historical data, etiquette, good manners are concerned.[55]

Ebn-e Moqaffaʿ in al-Adabˊl-Kabīr [and the author(s) of al-Adabˊl-Ṣaghīr] is both translator and author. He is a translator because he insists on quoting and utilizing many Old Persian epigrams, bons mots, and maxims, introducing them in such way as: “listen to this saying of a sage…” or “I have heard from a wise-man who said…” or, “It has been said…”  He is an author for the reason that he scrutinizes other writers’ views and expresses his own opinion about them.  In the beginning of al-Adab al-kabīr, he states:  “I have never seen a subject matter missed by some ancient scholar concerning which there were not able writers or rhetoricians to add something new to what has already been said…I bequeath latā’if (fine points) of my own which include, [apparently] trivial points but have been nourished by the wise sayings and mottos of my predecessors. Therefore, parts of what I have expressed are useful for the people.” In the introductory lines to Adab al-ṣaḡīr, which has the same tone as that of al-Adab al-kabīr, (the author or compiler) remarks that: “… in these books I have related sayings of people that augment calmness of mind, enlighten hearts, and illumine the heart’s eye; they enliven thought, elevate intellect and prudence, and guide fairness of ethics.”[56]  Both books contain many different maxims and sayings collected from various sources, mainly Persian, then Greek and Indian with Islamic influence. Although they may not appear to be related to each other, they may be categorized together as dealing with practical ethics using a constant flavor of ádáb.

 

Conclusion

Considering the foregoing debates –reflected in the context if this paper, among Arab scholars and assertions by Persian literates that there is no trace of usage of the term or expression of ádáb in pre-Islamic Arabic literature, except maybe one derivative in a jâhli verse, a plausible, if not definite, possible root of ádáb that goes back to Old-Persian and from there to Akkadian and Sumerian languages. Thus, the early concept of the term and its usage emerges in the late first and early second centuries of the Islamic era via, mainly, the early or “first” phase of the “translation movement” or process of aspects of Middle-Persian “literature” particularly by Ebn-e Moqaffaʿ.  And it is from that “process” that the concept ádáb evolved and later conveyed literature. Hence, is manifest that Persian secular motifs of pre-Islamic, chiefly Middle-Persian literature, were transmitted into the Perso-Arabic mirror of princes and ádáb literature, although perhaps not as first-hand translations, and every so often in Islamic disguise. Also, it is evident that the term ádáb emerged as a social and literary expression toward the end of the Umayyad period but especially with early Abbasid rulers after the first one (al-Saffah), whose court protocols (as their bureaucracy) were derived in large part from Sāsānián practice. Models were provided through the translation and imitation of works of the mirror for princes type, manuals of statecraft which had formed an important genre of Sāsānián prose literature, by secretaries and scribes who were themselves often of Iranian/Persian origin.[57] ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd and Ebn-e Moqaffaʿ represent an early peak in the evolution of ádáb literature, and one does not find other salient representatives of the genre during the first half of the 2nd/8th century. These men played influential cultural roles in establishing ádáb and its derivatives in the high culture of a newly emerging society. In the process, the role of these terms and expressions in conveying the older concepts, and as a precept, their motifs and themes coming from primarily Persian sources, in time became as lively as the starring role of these men of pen themselves in a socio-cultural expansion of the era. All of these cultural interactions, from personal endeavors to social manifestations, become for us a means to trace, decipher, and perhaps intellectually dispute the heritage of cultural interaction themselves.[58] Nonetheless, it is as likely in our time as it was in that of ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd and Ebn-e Moqaffaʿ,[59] to become politically or intellectually critical of non-democratic rulership and risk one’s livelihood and/or means of expression by way of the “pen.”

 

[1]Âzartāš Âzarnoš, Čāloš-e Mīyān-e Fārsī va ʿArabī, Sadehā-ye Nakost (Tehran: Našr-e Nay 1385/2006), 90.

[2]Moḥammad Moḥammadī Malāyerī, Al-tarjuma wa’l-naql ʿan al-Fārsīya, vol. 1, Kutub Tāj wa’l Â͑͑͑in, (Beirut: n.p., 1967).

[3]Ḥosainʿalī Momtaḥen, “Ḥosainʿalī,” in Nehżat-e Šaʿūbīyye va natāyeĵ-e sīyāsī va ejtemāʿī-ye ān, (Tehran: n.p., 1354/1975).

[4]There are indications in ]New[-Persian classical literature that different dialects of Middle-Persian existed in some regions of Iran as early the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries.  On at least three occasions, Ḥāfez refers in his ğazals to “golbāng-e pahlavī” being sung in Fārs. Yet, in this view, the robāīyāt of Bābā Tāher-e ʿUryān are in an older western Persian dialect. Thus, Aḥmad Kasravī has shown that in the mid-twentieth century there were villages high in the mountains of Āẕarbāyĵān who were speaking as a Āẕarī dialect of Pahlavī, i.e., a dialect of Western Middle Persian.

[5]C.E. Bosworth, “The Heritage of Rulership in early Islamic Iran and the Search for Dynastic Connection with the Past,” IRAN 11 (1973): 51.

[6]Moḥammad Moḥammadī Malāyerī, Adab va Aḵlāq dar Ērān-e pīsh az Eslām – va čand Nemone az Âsār-e ān dar Adabīyāt-e ‘Arabī va Eslāmī, 1st ed. (Tehran: Entešārāt-e Yazdān 1372/1983); subsequent editions with different titles: Entešārāt-e Tus 1379/2010),  24-25.

[7]C. Pellat, “Al-Jāḥiẓ”, Abbasid Belles-Lettres, CHAL (1990):  83; see also S.A. Bonebakker, “Adab and the Concept of belles-lettres,” ‘Abbasid Belles-Letters, CHAL, 17.

[8]Bonebakker, “Adab and the Concept of belles-lettres,” ‘Abbasid Belles-Lettres, CHAL, 17.  Regarding the “the medieval dictionaries” and, the assertion that “all three remains to be answered,” the late Iranian literatus and philologist, ʿAliakbar Shahabi, has somewhat similar opinion of Bonebakker, particularly, concerning the possible roots of the “terminology” of adab; he states: “From the classical roots of the Arabic word adab (ádáb) three different meaning or concept are derived: one is ‘elegance’ and ‘cleanliness’, another one, ‘wonder’ and ‘surprise’, the other one, to call to festivity or get-together. The difficulty in tracing the Arabic vocabularies which have non-Arabic roots or background is that when those adapted to Arabic, their morphology changes thus sometimes drastically thus to decipher their roots are challenging at least. In the introduction type of some old Arabic lexicon/glossary it is stated that: هذا الغة اعجمیه فالعب بها ماشـئت  meaning: ‘this vocabulary is foreign play (deal) with it as you wish’; thus, only the classicist etymologist in the language could trace or speculate their origin of form(s) and meaning(s): شهابی، (دکتر) علی اکبر، فرهنگ اشتقاقی عربی به فارسی، مقدمه، رویه هایِ ص، ی، یا

(ʿAlīakbar Shahābī, The Etymological Lexicon of Arabic to Persian, Introduction ص، ی، یا).

[9]In old Indian language (Vedic), Indian writing (scripture) is called Daevangari (the writing or scripture of Daeva –Persian Dari: ‘dīv-négārī’). Daeva among old Indo-Iranian Aryans was a deity whom after ancestral separation, keeps a positive feature and in old Iranian mythology changes to a negative one as “un-Iranian” (اَنیرانی) and eventually dīv becomes equal to the devil (fiend) [In Sanskrit: dȇva, in Middle-Persian: dēv, in Greek dues (Zeus), in Latin: divus, in French: diev (God)]. According to Avesta and Shāh-nāmeh, those are daevas while they had become captive to be freed teach the Iranians scripture. Henceforth, “Iranians” learn scripture from “natives,“

i.e., Sumerians in the north and Acadians in the south. In this manner they borrow words from former civilizations, however they are mutually influential as there are remaining words in Sumerian which have “Aryan”/Iranian origin, such as ā(b) (water) in Per. āb, or sea āba from the same root; āmā (mother) in Per. mādar; gu (caw) in Per. gāv.

[10]The root of the Old Persian (OP) words of dip and dipi, meaning scribe/letter and scripture/writing, by all probability, goes back to Sumerian inscripture. The Sumerian dub which meant letter and inscripture and, scribed tablet, appears later in Aramaic as dup but in Acadian as duppu (/duppi) as preserving the same meanings.  Old Persian dipi in Middle Persian (MP) becomes dipirih; and in Sanskrit dipi, also meaning scribe/letter. Two derivatives of Sumerian dub are dupsar meaning “writer” and eduba as pupil/apprentice.

[11]“Apart from the decisive Iranian influence, at the same time or shortly afterward another mass of foreign books was translated and put at the disposal of a Muslim elite, namely Greek works which introduced the achievements of Hellenic thought, notably logic and methods of reasoning, but no literary texts.” Ch. Pellat, “Adab ii. Adab in Arabic Literature,” Encyclopædia Iranica 1, vol.4 :439-444; an updated version is available online at

www.iranicaonline.org/articles/adab-ii-arabic-lit. [See n. 29.]

[12]One indicative example in the category of “practical philosophy” (حِکمتِ عملی), which also reflected the influence of Persian motifs of ádáb and ándárz in its content, is Ādāb al-Falāsifa by Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq (Abū Zayd Ḥunayn ibn ͐Isḥāq al-͑Abādī, 809-837 CE), an Assyrian Nestorian scholar, physician, and scientist, known for his work in translating Greek scientific and medical and works of Plato (Timaeus) and Aristotle (Metaphysics) into Syriac and Arabic. Ḥunayn had mastered four languages: Arabic, Syriac, Greek, and Persian.

[13]Moḥammad Moḥammadī Malāyerī, Farhang-e Ērānī pīš az Eslām va Âsār-e ān dar Tamaddon-e Eslāmī va Adabīyāt-e ‘Arabī, n.p., 1374/1995), 304.

[14]A passage in Qur’an that conveys a context of behavior prescribed Islamic etiquette as good manner or decorum is expressed in the sura 3, ayat 134:  “When a (courteous) greeting is offered you, meet it with a greeting still more courteous, or (at least) of equal courtesy. Allah takes careful account of all things.” Professor Ḥāmid Algār, some years ago at UC Berkeley, in a conversation, stated that some of the derivatives of the term adab (ádáb) had entered the Ḥadis tradition, for example: “addabanī rabbī fa-aḥsana ta ͐dbī.” Thus, a Sunni Ḥadis: Abu ‘Amr ash-Shaybānī said, “The owner of this house (and he pointed at the house of ʿAbdullah ibn Masʿud) said, ‘I asked the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, which action Allah loves best.’ He replied, ‘Prayer at its proper time.’ ‘Then what?’ I asked. He said, ‘Then kindness to parents.’ I asked, ‘Then what?’ He replied, ‘Then jihad in the Way of Allah.'” He added, “He told me about these things. If I had asked him to tell me more, he would have told me more.

Kitab Al Adab Al Mufard , 29,  http://qahwama.com/islamic-manners/.

[15]ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Yūsif al-Sāyīʿ, Muʿĵ am luğat dawāwin šuʿarā̉ al-muʿallqāt al-ʿashar, Maktaba Lobnān Nāšarūn (Bayrut [Beirut]: n.p., n.d.), 92.

[16]Carlo A. Nallino, Tāriḵ al-adab al-Arabiyah min al-jāhilīyah hattā ʿaṣr banī Ummayah (nuss al-muḥaḏarāti alqaha bi-al-jāmaiah al-Misriyah sanat 1910-1911), Taqdim Taha Ḥusayn, al-Tabah 2, Misr, Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1970; C.A. Nallino, La letteratura araba degli inizi all’epoca della dinasite umayyade (leçons professés en arabe a l’université du Caire), Rome: n.p., 1948; La Literature arabe des origins à l’époque de la dynastie Umayyad, trans. Charles Pellat d’après la version italienne de Maria Nallino, G. P. Maisonneuve, Paris, 1950; S. A. Bonebakker, “Adab and the Concept of Belles-Letters,” in Cambridge History of Arabic Literature: ʿAbbasid Belles-Letters, ed. Julia Ashtiany (Cambridge: Cambridge University of Press, 1990); F. Gabrieli, “Adab,” Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entrie/encyclopedia-of-islam-2/adab-SIM_0293?s.num=0&s.2_present=s.f.book.encyclopedia-of-islam-2&s.q=adab.

[17]Charles Pellat, “Adab in Arabic Literature,” EIr. I: 439.

[18]Regarding the latter’s statement, Malāyerī following Moḥīţ Ţabāţabāī [see n. 6.), states Ḵafāĵi’s opinion in the šafā̉ al-qalīl briefly. The full passage of Ḵafāji’s statement follows: “What in the beginning the Arab knew from the [term] adab was as [conveying] ‘good manners’ and ‘good behavior’, gradually after the advent of Islam, people began to use the [term] adīb in referring to the ‘poet’ and called the Arabic science adab. [Therefore,] the attribution of the [term] adab upon them (i.e., to the Arabs) is a created one.”

[19]M. Moḥammadī Malāyerī, Farhang, 304.

[20]Joel L. Kramer states: “In Arabic translation from Greek the word adab is often used to render the term Paideia,” The Culture Bearers of Humanism in Islam (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1984), 5. Malāyrī, regarding the opinion of the adaptation of the term adab from Greek, cites the belief of Anestās Karmali, “a Baḡdādian Arab philologist” who believe that adab has derived from Eduepes (meaning one with fine speech), which is comprised of two parts: edus meaning “pleasing” or “delicious”, and epos, “speech” or “utterance.” Malāyerī, Farhang,  304.

[21]Several prominent Persian literary historians/literatus such as Malek ul-Shoʿarā-ye Bahār and Ẕabīḥullāh-e Ṣafā have argued in favor of a Persian origin for adab, as has also been suggested by Richard Frye and Clifford E. Bosworth.  More recently, Ĵalāl Ḵāleqī Moṭlaq, in an article in Encyclopedia Iranica I, 431-439, which is discussed in part in the present paper, has stated his opinion that the term ádáb derived from the Middle-Persian word fárháng (فَرهَنگ), challenging the belief of the few others that adab was a derivation from the term ͗āīn (آئین/آیین).

[22]Moḥammad Moḥīṭ Ṭabāṭbāī, Āmozeš va Parvareš 9, no. 1.

[23]M. Moḥammadī Malāyerī, Farhang, 317-318.

[24]What is interesting, as professor Malāyerī brings to our attention, is that around the late Umayyad and early Abbasid periods, for the term “teacher” we find two different words conveying two different levels of social and cultural status. One is muʿalim and the other mū ͗dab. The former meant common teacher, educating “middle class” children and the latter the “elite.” The schools were also called maktab and kuttāb, the former as a common or “public school” and the latter more restricted and socially selective. The difference between muʿalim and mū ͗dab on the one hand and maktab and kuttāb on the other was mainly related to the content of discourse and education. In the first category, the instructor would teach the children primarily reading, writing and some religious matters, but in the second, the instructor would also educate the students in social manners, discourse, etiquette, and the diverse literature and skills of the scribeship for those brought up to be in the service of state and court. In another word, they were learning ádáb. One can trace the same criteria, without a definite model, in the Sāsānian time, which was well attested as a highly “class-oriented” society. Otherwise, the pre-Islamic, mainly Bedouin society and naturally relatively simple context of a single text in the first few decades of the Arab conquest were far from an elite type of education; yet, education in general, and thus reading and writing, was looked down upon, since the Arab life was mainly a tribal, protective, warrior one.

[25]T. Noldeke, “Geschichte des Artaschiri-I Pāpakān aus dem Pahlevi übersetzt mit Erluterungen und einer Einleitung versehen,” Bazzenberger’s Beitrge zur Kunde der indogermanischen Sprach 4, (1879): 38.  Note 3, H.S. Neyberg, Hilfsbuch des Pehlavi, Uppsala II (1931):  70, as cited by Professor Ḵāleqī Moṭlaq, EIr.1, 432.

[26]Ḵhāleqī Moṭlaq Ĵalāl, “ADAB IN IRAN,” EIr. 1, 432-439.

[27]Arthur Christensen, Les gestes des rois dans les traditions de l’Iran antique (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1936), 102; G. Richter, Studien zur Geschichte der alteren arabischen Fürstenspiegel (Leipzig: Heinrichs, 1932), Repr. 1968, 41, as cited by Ḵhāleqī Moṭlaq, EIr.1, 432. See alsoʿAbbās Eqbāl, al-Adab al-waĵīz, ed. Ğ. Ḥ. Āhanī (Iṣfahān (/Eṣfahān): n.p., 1340/1961).

[28]Abū Mansūr Aḥmad b. ‘Alī Asadī-ye Ṭūsī, Luğat-e Fūrs (Loğat-e Darī), ed. F. Mojtabāī (Tehrān: n.p., 1365/1976), 199.

[29]It was at the time of Abbasid caliph al-Ma ̉mun (r. 197-217 AH/813-833 CE), whose mother evidently was from Persian stock, where for a period of time his court affairs were run by the renowned family of Iranian Barmakids. The Bayt al-Hikma, “The Bureau of Knowledge [The House of Wisdom]” was established, as were  selective works of Greek philosophy (including Aristotelian), translated from Syriac by Christians scholars and others into Arabic.  For the report and assessment see for example, Dimiri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early `Abbasid Society (2nd-4th/8th-10th centuries) (London: Routledge, 1998), 20-60; also, the transmission of Greek knowledge into Arabic has been presented in some detail by Joel L. Kraemer, “Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: A Preliminary Study,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 104 (1984): 135-64.  However, as we know now and as Johannes Pedersen, The Arabic Book, trans. Geoffrey French (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) also states that al-Ma ̉mun was not the first caliph to establish a center/library of translation; the son of an Umayyad caliph, Ḵālid b. Yazīd b. Mu’awiya, preceded al-Ma ̉mun in this endeavor. Ḵālid b. Yazīd b. Mu’awiya became famous for inviting Greek philosophers from Egypt and commissioning them to translate books from Greek and Coptic into Arabic. He was also a “scholar” who was interested in medicine and astronomy, as well as being a renowned poet. One must assert that, on the other hand, the early Persian influence on Umayyad court life became evident and increased sharply during the brief reign of Yazīd III (d. 720) whose mother was Persian.

[30]The emergence of new literate/elite with cultural roots in the Sāsānian period but cultivating a synthesis with Islam and using Arabic as its mode of expression/writing for a period, was and is an important occurrence that the effect of which could be traced culturally, literally, politically and even psychologically throughout the social history of Iran. Although, “Islamization” of “Iran proper” and change of majority Sunni to Shiʿa in the Safavid period was and is a historical and social fact, nevertheless, internalization of Islam and then majority becoming Shiʿa – with “Persian”
coloring – consciously and/or sub-consciously kept ‘Iranian-Islamic’ identity obdurately separate from “Arab-Islamic,” basically, Sunni identity.

[31]C.E. Bosworth, “The Persian Impact on Arabic Literature” in Arabic Literature to the End of the Umayyad Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 490.

[32]ʿUmar b. al-Baḥr Ĵāḥiẓ [Abū ͑Uṯmān], (160-255 H.) in the introduction of Kitāb al-tāĵ fī aḵlāq al-mulūk (Cairo: n.p., 1980), states that the reason for the composition of his book was that although many of the commoners (ʿawām) and some of the elite (ḵawāṣ) behave according to the rule of obedience [to the caliphate], [they] are not aware of their duties (-manner) in relation to the rulers; thus, I have gathered the ādāb of  the kings in this book, for the people to have an example/model for [their] deeds of ádáb (p.2). Ĵāḥiẓ, foremost starts, from the “Kings of Persia, since they were the forerunners in the matter, thus, I have obtained their etiquettes, the rules of running the land (country), the order or places of commoners and elite, how to coddle the obedient and setting standards to rights of classes.” (p.23). ʿUmar b. al-Baḥr Ĵāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-tāĵ fi aḵlāq al-mulūk, (کتاب التاج فی اخلاق الملوک) (Qāhira (Cairo): n.p.,1980).

[33]Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Walid al-Ṭarṭushī (Ṭarţūsī) (also, Abū Bakr Al-Ṭorṭuchi) (أبو بكر محمد بن الوليد الطرطوشی) from Maghrib /Andalusia, traveled for knowledge, seeking to educate himself on various scholars in different parts of the Muslim world and went as far east as Baghdad. On his way, he also stopped at Damascus, Aleppo, Cairo, and Alexandria. In Alexandria, Egypt, he taught at a school. His most famous work is Sirāj al-mulūk (سراج الملوك).

[34]Moškōye (Ibn Miskawayh) may have been a Mazdaean convert to Islam, but it seems more likely that it was one of his ancestors who converted; in either case, most probably, if he was not fluent in Middle Persian, was familiar with it, thus he, very much likely, had translated the text of Ĵāvīdān Ḵerad that he had obtained from a chief Zoroastrian priest in Fārs.

[35]Abū ʿAlī Moškōye Rāzī (ابوعلی مُشکویه رازی) (Arabic: Ibn Miskawayh ابن مُسکووِیه), Ĵāvīdān Ḵerad (Persian ed. Emām ‘Ali Šūštarī.), the “Introduction.” For information regarding Moškōye’s works and style of historiography, see Taĵārib al-Umam (Experiences of the Nations), Persian ed. A. Emāmī, vol. I, “Introduction.” For a recent edition of Taḥḏib al-Aḵlāq, see Ibn Miskawayh, Tahdhib al-akhlaq (Cultivation of Morals), ed. C. Zurayk (Beirut: American University of Beirut Centennial Publication), 1966; trans. C. Zurayk, The Refinement of Character (Beirut: American University of Beirut), 1968.

[36]Ḥosayn (Ḥousin) Ḵaṭībī, Tārīḵ-e Taṭṭavvor-e Nasr-e Fannī (Tehrān: n.p., 1345/1967)), 33.

[37]Abū’l-Faraj Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq al-Nadim, The Fihrist of al-Nadim (Al-Fihrist), ed. and trans. Bayard Dodge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Dehkhoda Dictionary Encyclopedia, vol. 9 (Loghat Nameh Dehkhoda) (Tehran: University of Tehran, 1958), 13346.

[38]Abu’l-Hasan Masʿūdī, Al-Tanbīh w’al-Ašrāf, (Persian version:) trans. A. PāyandeŠh, (Šerkat-e Entešārāt-e ‘Elmī va Farhangī  (Tehrān: n.p.,1986), 99-101.

[39]M. Grignaschi, “Les Rasa’il Aristatalisa ‘ala-l-Iskandar de Salim Abu-l-Ala” et l’activité culturelle à l’époque omayyade,” Bulletin d’Études Orientales 19 (1965–66): 7–83.

[40]This collection forms the nucleus of the most famous among the mirrors for princes, the Sirr al-asrar, known in the Latin Middle Ages and early modern times as the Secretum secretorum.  M. Grignaschi, “Le roman épistolaire classique conservé dans la version arabe de Salim Abu-l-ʿAla,’” Le Muséon 80 (1967): 211– 64.

[41]M. Moḥammadī Malāyerī, Adab va Aķlāq, 123.

[42]Victor Danner, “Arabic Literature in Iran”, C.H.I., vol.4, 576-77.

[43]Ĵalāl d.-Dīn Homāī, Tārīḵh-e Adabiyāt-e Ērān (Tehrān:n.p., 1366/1978), 317.

[44]Aḥmad Amīn, Faĵr al-Islam ,(فَجرالاسلام) 123, quoted by Ḥosainʿalī Momtaḥen in Nehżat-e Šaʿūbīyye va natāyeĵ-e sīyāsī va ejtemāʿī-ye ān, part 3, 30.  The above statement continues: “ʿAbd al-ḥamīd, [was] a famous writer who had established the science of composition [and] transmitted [that learning] to Arabic.”  Curiously enough, Abū Halāl ‘Askarī also states that: “There is another reason, which is that Persian utterance is similar to Arabic speech although Persian expression is more elegant than Arabic.”

[45]Among many, one could mention the poets Baḥtair Ibn Rūmī and Abū Ishāq Ṣābī.

[46]Ḥosayn (Ḥousain) Ḵaṭībī, Tārī ḵ-e Taṭṭavvor-e Nasr-e Fannī, 34.

[47]In addition to the references found in al-Bayān wa-‘l-Tabyin of Jāḥiẓ and indications of Páhlávī (Middle Persian) style contained in Arabic translations, we have a text in Páhlávī with the title of abar ewenag nābesisnīh (the customs or style of letter writing). This is a short text with examples of different kinds of letters, both social and personal.  The Páhlávī text of this work with transliteration and Persian translation is available in Motūn-e Pahlavī, Gozāresh-e Saʿid ‘Oryān (Tehran: n.p., 1371/1992). I am in debt to my colleague Dr. Siyāmak Adhamī, an erudite in Páhlávī (MP) language and texts, for making me aware of this text.

[48]A. Christensen, Sassanid Persia (Iran dar Zamān-e Sāssānīān, tr. Rashid Yasemi) in Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 12 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), 132.

[49]“…resāla… which is a remarkable literary and socio-cultural document. The introduction to it attempts to blend Islamic teachings with Iranian traditions on court etiquette, which is a notable feature of early adab literature. As a rule, the substance of ʿAbd-al-Ḥamīd’s writings comes from Iranian sources, and it is aimed in general at molding the soul and mind of prominent people such as rulers, and powerful civil servants like kottāb.” Ch. Pellat, “Adab ii. Adab in Arabic Literature,” Encyclopædia Iranica, I, no. 4 (n.d.): 439-444; an updated version is available online at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/adab-ii-arabic-lit.

[50]J. D. Latham, “The Beginning of Arabic Prose Literature: The Epistolary Genre,” Arabic Literature to the End of the Umayyad Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 166.

[51]Ibid., 168.

[52]Anbār (meaning place of “storage” in Persian) –still a strategic town in western Iraq– was a frontier garrison town/region for the Sāsānian, with a large stock of armaments for defense or attack against the Byzantine Empire, which also had its own officialdom.

[53]It is said that he became a mawlā (a client) of the Qurashite clan of ʿMir b. Lu’ayy. At the beginning of his career he became a teacher of children and later, because of his erudition in belles-lettres, he became chief secretary to Marwān, the last Umayyad caliph, at whose order, according to one source, he was killed. Another report indicates that he died side by side with Marwān’s entourage at Būs`ir in 132/750. In addition, it is said that he escaped to Jázīrah where he went to Ebn-e Moqaffaʿ’s house, the latter giving him refuge. He stayed there until his whereabouts became known and when the deputies of al-Saffāh poured into the house and asked, “which one of you is ʿAbd al-ḥamīd”?; both the comrades responded: “I”!  According to Ibn Ḵallikān’s report, after the death of Marwān II, a certain ʿAbd al-Jabbār by order of al-Saffāh, kept a large jar of glowing charcoal on top of his head until he died, naturally with much suffering (d.132 H.).

[54]“Recent discoveries tend to confirm the opinion of scholars such as G. Richter, F. Gabrieli and ʿA. Eqbāl compared to  M. Ḡafrānī, ʿAbdallāh Ebn al-Moqaffaʿ (Cairo: n.p., n.d., 127). They held that the book of this name is not by Ebn al-Moqaffaʿ or, at least, that the extant form of it might not be the same book mentioned by Ebn al-Nadīm, because there are no citations in the sources to prove this attribution. Now it has been fully ascertained that the book we have is not an anthology of wise sayings selected at random by a certain compiler, as the introduction of the book tries to suggest, but is mainly based on the translation of two Persian texts, the arrangement of which is carefully preserved.” IʿAbbās, “Adab Al-Sagir,” Encyclopædia Iranica I, vol. 4: 446-447; an updated version is available online at   http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/adab-al-sagir.

[55] Ch. Pellat, “Adab ii. Adam in Arabic Literature,” Encyclopædia Iranica I, vol. 4: 439-444; an updated version is available online at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/adab-ii-arabic-lit.

[56]ʿAbd al-Hādī Hā’rī, Ebn-e Moqaffaʿ (Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ) (Tehrān: n.p., 1341/1962), 29-30.

[57]Julia Scott Meisami, Medieval Persian Court Poetry (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987), 5.

[58]For a noteworthy caveat contrary to viewing such interactions either in terms of “influence” or of culturally background self–assertion, see M.G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol.1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 40-45; but also 239-280-84 and Michael G. Morony, Iraq After the Muslim Conquest (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984),  27-89.

[59]At the beginning of “ʿAbbāsid revolution,” after the overthrow of the Umayyad dynasty, unlike some of his other colleagues, Ebn-e Moqaffaʿ escaped persecutions at the hands of Al-Saffaḥ, the first ʿAbbāsid Caliph (d. 754). Ebn-e Moqaffaʿ divided the best years of his life between Basra and Kūfa, the misrāni of Irāk, before the founding of Baghdād, and frequented the society of men of letters and wits such as Mutiʿ b. ʿIyās, Wāliba b. Hubāb, Hammād ʿAdirad, Bashār b. Burd and still others, all persons of “loose morals” and suspected of zandaqa.  Later, Ebn-e Moqaffaʿ returned to Basra and served as a secretary under ʿIsā b.ʿAlī and Sulaymān b.ʿAlī, the uncles of the second ʿAbbāsid caliph Abū Jaʿfar Al-Mansur (r. 754–775 CE). After a third uncle, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAli made an abortive bid for the caliphate, Ebn-e Moqaffaʿs chiefs asked him to write a letter to the Caliph begging him to not retaliate against his uncle and to pardon him. Evidently, he was executed, due to the caliph’s resentment of the terms and language that Ebn-e Moqaffaʿ used in drawing up a guarantee of safe passage for the Caliph’s rebellious uncle, ʿAbdallah b. ʿAli (who was defeated and imprisoned and was killed in 764). Ebn-e Moqaffaʿ was put to death in Basra by Sufyān b. Muʿawiyah, who took his revenge which was not already in terms with this daring kātib, nevertheless, already suspicious of “heresy.” See F. Gabrieli, IBN MUKAFFA, E.I. 2, vol. III,  883.  Also see, Mohammad Taqī Danešpažūh,  Introduction to Al-Mantiq li Ibn al-Muqaffa (Tehran: n.p., 1357/1978), 63.

“In Iran, we don’t have this phenomenon. I don’t know who has told you we have it.” Male Same-sex Sexuality in the Legislation and Jurisdictions of the IRI

 

Arash Guitoo <guitoo@islam.uni-kiel.de> obtained a BA in Political Sciences from the University of Tehran and a BA in Judicial Sciences from Azad University of Tehran. He pursued Islamic Studies and European Ethnology at Christian-Albrechts-University (Kiel/Germany) where he earned his BA and MA He is currently a PhD candidate and Research Fellow in the Department for Islamic Studies.  The subject of his PhD project is same-sex desire between tradition and modernity in Iran.

 

Hell on Earth

“If gay people really are going to hell, that hell will probably look something like Iran. In the dark backwaters of the country, gay people are flogged, tortured, abused, and even executed with shocking regularity. Thanks to a 1987 law that legalized sex changes, parents of gay children routinely force them to undergo unwanted hormone treatment, chemical castration, and sexual reassignment surgery to escape being murdered by the regime’s thugs. […] In short, it is possibly the bleakest place in the world to be gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender.”[1]

I found this description of Iran in an article entitled “10 Countries That Completely Hate Gay People” published on a website which produces top-ten “mind-blowing” lists in various categories to entertain or inform its readers. This portrait of Iran as a dangerous place, in which sexual minorities are being oppressed and systematically prosecuted is by no mean an exceptional image but rather the predominant and widely narrated one in various contexts of western societies, be that in travel guides, media reports on LGBT situation or in the scholarly texts.

Of course, there is no question that this portrait is not a product of mere imagination, but the result of actions and legislation of the Islamic Republic. From early months after the revolution, the question of the revival of Islamic sexual morality became one of the signatures of the new elite in power. Islamic sexual morality was not only the characteristic which distinguished the newly installed regime from its predecessor and its “western masters,” but also as an instrument to oppress and to intimidate the political rivals as well as the pro-western urban middle class.[2] The agenda of the revival of Islamic sexual morality was demonstrated, for example, through the prosecution and public execution of committers of livāṭ and zinā, which were intentionally well-covered and highlighted by the national press. With the establishment of the regime in the late 1980s and normalization of the situation, the officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) started to pursue a less aggressive sexual policy and thus the rate of execution due to sexual crimes dropped visibly in the 1990s in comparison to the first years of the revolution. The election of the conservative Aḥmadīnizhād in 2005 let the western world once again remember the sexual politics of the early years of the Iranian Revolution. Besides the images of Aḥmadīnizhād’s victory in 2005, there were some other images, which were broadcasted from Iran and affected the debates on IRI in the western discourse, namely a series of photographs documenting the execution of two young men who were hanged in the days around the presidential election in Mashhad. According to the Farsi sources of the report namely Quds newspaper[3] and ISNA (Iranian Students’ News Agency),[4] both men were arrested around fourteen months before their execution and sentenced to death due to the charge of abduction and rape of a thirteen-year-old boy. Outrage!, an action group with an LGBT cause in Great Britain, seized this news and published the pictures of the execution on its website with the title “Iran Executes Gay Teenagers” a few days later.[5] In the narration of Outrage! it was no longer mentioned that both young men were convicted of sexual assault; the headline suggested instead that these men were executed because of homosexuality. Although a few days later other organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International released their more accurate reports which pointed to the conviction on the basis of sexual assault, Outrage! kept on insisting on its narration that the men were executed just because of having consensual gay sex.[6] Outrage!’s version of the story, namely “Iran executing gays,” enjoyed somehow more popularity in the public debates of western societies. It fitted better in the understanding of Aḥmadīnizhād’s rise as a throwback to the early years of revolution, and the execution of sexual minorities was seen as the ramification of this change. Maḥmūd and ‘Ayyāz, the executed young men, became figures of a tragic love story of two gay men, who were prosecuted solely because of their forbidden love.[7]

The issue of oppression of sexual minorities returned once again to the list of questions  Iranian officials were asked about as soon as they were accessible to reporters, students or other politicians[8] and the situation of LGBT community in Iran was more frequently discussed in the western media.[9] Same as the Mashhad case, almost all of the executions monitored by western press as “execution of gays” in the following years, were according to the statements of the Iranian judicial officials as well as national press cases of rape or better said, “forced anal penetration” (livāṭ-i bih ‘unf). Same as to Outrage!’s version, the “rape” accusation was either not mentioned in the western reports or if mentioned was interpreted as a false accusation fabricated by Iranian judiciary to hide the real cause of prosecution, namely punishing those men having consensual sex with each other.[10]

The idea that the political changes in 2005 started a new wave of prosecution of homosexuals, which is practiced under the semblance of fabricated allegations such as rape, gets support in scholarly texts as well. Janet Afary, for instance, supports the view that the prosecution of the gay men and transgressive women increased in 2005 right after the election of “Basiji Ahmadinejad.” The case of Maḥmūd and ʿAyyāz serves her as an example of this claim. Relying on the reports of “independent gay sources inside Iran,” Afary asserts that the charge of sexual assault was fabricated by the Iranian authorities to cover up the execution of “two lovers who lived together” and were well-known in the city’s underground gay community.” She explains the compounding of the charges of homosexuality with others such as “rape and pedophilia” as the regime’s reaction to the international outrage prompted by execution of men on charges of homosexuality.[11]

These statements raise somehow some questions; principally, one may then ask, even if it might be a tasteless question, why is the rate of executions based on rape allegations so low if the IRI has started to crack down gays under this fabricated accusation? This question especially makes sense in the age of the Internet, in which the gay community has become, on the one hand more visible through the possibility of digital networking, and on the other hand more vulnerable because of its hardly erasable footprint and its traceability in virtual space.[12] There are indeed no signs of an attempt by the “digital army” of the IRI to systematically prosecute numerous individuals frequently using gay dating websites or Apps which are similar to many other filtered websites, however broadly accessed through anti-filtering softwares. Of course, it is very probable that a person using dating Apps or websites gets entrapped by undercover Basījīs and faces insult, intimidation, and harassment instead of having a pleasant date. Such incidents seem, however, to be either personally motivated or a part of the State’s tightening of moral restrictions, which has occurred time to time since the revolution up to now. These raids are, however, not a part of a determined agenda of gay prosecution since the entrapped persons are not facing more severe punishments than heterosexual persons who could also get arrested for transgressing public virtue. It is as well not convincing to claim that the low rate of executions could be the result of state’s successful hush-up of the real number of gay prosecutions, since it is unlikely that the officials could keep every case of disappearing gays away from the eyes of human rights organization as well as the gay community over several years, if they have indeed been doing it systematically.

The other allegation that the IRI is covering up the prosecution of consensual same-sex sexual activities under the fabricated accusation of rape or pedophilia is based on poorly documented claims or highly problematic subjective sources, which apparently undergo less critical examination, probably because of the general suspicious attitude towards the IRI. Furthermore, one could ask why the IRI would go through the risk of a public execution of gay men falsely accused of rape, although the officials are aware of the possible reaction of the international community. Why should the regime make an exception to its own supposed policy of hidden executions? What if the transgression being punished is the assault, and not the same-sexness of the sexual offence?

By asking these questions, I am neither suggesting here that those men were “properly” convicted of rape nor am I trying to trivialize the high risks the gay community are facing in Iran with respect to severe punishments decreed by law. The intention behind these questions is moreover to criticize the idea that the executions of convicts to livāṭ are a manifestation of the escalation of “the war against homosexuality and an openly gay lifestyle.”[13] I am somewhat suggesting that the IRI, despite its hostile attitude toward same-sex sexuality, is not considering the elimination of “deviant” subjects involved in same-sex sexual acts as an essential cause and not actively conducting a physical war against “homosexuality.” This reserved attitude is in my view inherent to the understanding of livāṭ in classical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), to which the authorities of the IRI seem to be committed. The commitment to the Islamic jurisprudence results into a penal policy, which, I claim, has a behavioristic approach towards sexual offences and is not constructing recognizable types of subjects, which are socially visible and hence prosecutable.

The act-type dichotomy underlying this question goes back to Foucault’s perception of modern and premodern sexualities, in which homosexuality as a type of subject is understood as a modern product, while the premodern prosecutions of same-sex offences are considered to be behavioristically motivated. Foucault writes:

As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of forbidden  acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of them. The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology with an indiscreet anatomy and a possibly mysterious physiology.[14]

Although I agree with the arguments of those scholars who criticize the universalization of this categorization as the distinguishing feature between modern and premodern sexualities,[15] this dichotomy still implies the distinction between the pre-modern legal approach towards same-sex sexuality from the modern one. Of course, I am also not precluding the possibility of the emergence of a “type of subject” through competitive discourses, such as the medical discourse.[16] I claim, however, that those discourses are not playing a significant role changing the judicial attitude of the IRI towards same-sex sexual offences.

In the first part of this paper, we will discuss the characteristics of ḥadd offences in context of classical Islamic jurisprudence to illustrate the main features of a penal policy towards same-sex sexual crimes, which is based on fiqh. Subsequently, we will look at the legislation of the IRI concerning the punishment of same-sex sexual conduct and examine the Iranian penal policy concerning its continuities and discontinuities of Islamic jurisprudence. Of course, the theoretical continuity of the Islamic discourse in modern Iranian legislation still does not necessarily mean that these regulations are implemented by law-enforcement authorities as they are intended to be. Thus we will also take a look at some decisions of the Supreme Court concerning livāṭ to illustrate the understanding of the judges of this court of the situation. This insight into the legal and judicial approach towards same-sex sexual offences, lead me to conclude that the underlying motive of the actions of the Iranian authorities is the implementation of (their understanding of) Islamic law, which provides the prosecution of livāṭ as a particular act under certain circumstances. This study shall also demonstrate that the notion of homosexuality as a type of subject within the legal discourse of the IRI is absent. In the final part of the paper I shall use the findings of this paper to criticize the western narratives on the issue of LGBT rights and their possible impacts on the situation of LGBT subjects in Iran.

 

add Offences in fiqh

Livāṭ counts in the Islamic juridical tradition to ḥadd offences, which are primarily violations of a claim of God (ḥaqq al-lāh) and considered to be explicitly sanctioned by the Qur’an or Sunna. These offences have their specific characteristics: their punishment is fixed and unchangeable; the qualification of their fulfillment is strictly described; they have their own exclusionary rule of evidence and a repentance results in their exemption.[17] The hearing of a ḥadd offence is a careful examination of the question if some specific act has occurred under prescribed conditions and if it is proved through its exclusionary prescribed evidence. Any uncertainty (shubhah) in any of the constructing elements or any slight deviation from the prescriptions is a reason for hesitation in prosecuting ḥadd offences and leads to the acquaintance of the defender.[18] The fiqh itself is a source of uncertainty since it is not a uniform legal system but an assemblage of views and debates of the scholars on the divine law, who frequently have different opinions and understandings of the texts.[19] Conflicting rules on a specific subject are not exceptional at all, not only among the schools of law but also among the scholars of the same school. There is also no hierarchal order of these views, in which the position of the majority would automatically discredit the less popular opinions. This variety of views in fiqh result in doubt and uncertainty for any authority implementing them.

It is not only difficult to prosecute and punish ḥadd offences but also for many reasons it is not seen as a prioritized matter. Firstly, the prosecution of violations against a claim of God is not perceived as an urgent cause since the “damaged” party of this crime, namely God, is not only powerful enough to punish any wrongdoing but also free of needs (ghanī) and thus not damaged by the violence.[20] Secondly, the ḥadd punishment itself is not considered as a measure which expiates or purifies the committer from his sin and therefore not a necessity, since the perpetrator will still face a punishment in the hereafter regardless of the worldly punishment, although it is common (but uncertain) belief among Muslim jurists that God shall forgive a perpetrator sentenced to a worldly penalty.[21] Furthermore, the implementation of the punishment is not seen as a necessity for protecting the community from God’s rage, since the assumption that God would impose collective punishments on the whole community due to its indifference towards sins does not prevail among Muslim scholars. Thirdly, the punishment is not the only way to redeem the evil that occurred since all transgressions of claims of God could also be settled through repentance (taubah). The main reason for implementing the penalty, as the Islamic scholars declare themselves, is deterring the public from those wrongdoings considered harmful to society.[22] If the undesirable acts were not severely sanctioned, individuals would not effectively be prevented from committing them, and this would lead to social decay. The fear of the spread of the wrongdoing illustrates, in my opinion, the behavioristic character of ḥadd offences. The offence is seen here as a misdeed which could theoretically be imitated by any other member of the community and is not associated with any particular feature inherent to the wrongdoer.

What are the possible features of a penal system which is committed to the above understanding of ḥadd punishment? The judicial system would probably not take the initiative to prosecute ḥadd offences, as they are difficult to prove and furthermore their prosecution could get redundant in most cases through the possibility of the repentance of the sinner. The prosecution is however more likely if the public is affected by the crime or if the rights of a third party are violated through it, as the public deterrence is seen as the raison d’être of the offence. I believe this description applies to the penal policy of the IRI regarding sexual offences. To support this claim, we shall take a look at male same-sex offences in the legislation and jurisprudence of the IRI.

 

Male Same-sex Sexual Offences in the Legislation and Jurisdictions of the IRI

The Penal Code of 1996,[23] which is the prevailing law of most decisions we discuss later, defined livāṭ as anal intercourse as well as intercrural sex (tafkhīẕ) between two male persons.[24] The anal intercourse was sanctioned through death penalty, and the intercrural sex was punished by 100 lashes.[25] Whereas insanity and force/duress exempted the accused from punishment, immaturity[26] didn’t necessarily lead to an acquittal of the charge. Immature men who got consciously and willingly involved in the act of livāṭ could be sentenced to a discretionary punishment (ta‘zīr) up to 74 lashes. Other activities among men such as passionate kissing or lying nude under the same blanket were penalized through less severe ta‘zīr punishments.[27]

The new Penal Code, which entered into force in 2009,[28] brought a few changes regarding the definition of livāṭ and its punitive measures. According to this Code, livāṭ is the act of anal penetration among two men, once the glans is inserted into the anus. The new Code also distinguishes between the punishment of penetrator and penetratee of a livāṭ act: the active person in the same-sex anal penetration would only then be sentenced to death if he has forced the sexual act or fulfills the conditions of iḥṣān; otherwise, he gets sentenced to 100 lashes. The same paragraph defines iḥṣān as the status of being permanently married to a mature woman, with whom the offender has almost had a (vaginal) intercourse and who is “available” to him, as soon as he desires.[29] An adult penetratee is however exempted from the punishment only in the case of force or duress and thus not affected by the iḥṣān rule.[30] There are no differences between the active and passive one when it comes to other less severe offences like intercrural sex, which is punished by 100 lashes. Some other forms of sexually motivated activities such as passionate embrace and caresses are sanctioned under the term homosexuality of the male human (hamjinsgarā’ī-i insān-i muẕakkar) and punished with a maximum of 74 lashes.[31]

The act of livāṭ is proven to the court only either through the testimony of four mature men or a four-time confession of the accused. The new Penal Code removed the ambiguous evidence “knowledge of judge” (‘ilm-i qā), a controversial proof provided in the previous Code, from the rule of evidence for livāṭ.[32] The new Code prohibits as well any form of investigation of private matters concealed from the public eye.[33] This prohibition is also provided by the Penal Procedure Law of 2013, which allows the investigation and prosecution of crimes against Public Virtue (‘iffat-i ‘umūmī), which are sexual offences with ḥadd or ta‘zīr punishments,[34]  only if the crime was either visible to the public or committed through force or prosecuted under the account of a private complaint. This Law also rules that in the case of a voluntarily expressed self-denunciation (confession) the judges are recommended to invite the confessing person to keep silence so as not to denounce themselves.[35] The judges are also committed to informing the witnesses about the legal consequences of a false or invalid testimony in such cases,[36] namely the possibility of being charged with sexual defamation (qaẕf), a ḥadd offence punished by 80 lashes.[37]

Once accused to or found guilty for livāṭ, one could escape capital punishment through repentance (taubah), denial after confession (inkār-i ba‘d az iqrār) or pardon (‘afv). If the defendant repents before the offence is proven, he would be exempted from the capital punishment, provided the judge is convinced of his repentance and his rehabilitation/correction.[38] This regulation is also applicable for those who committed rape and would reduce their punishment to imprisonment or lashings. In a conviction which results from a confession, the convict can also deny the act and take his confession back, which results in the exposure to the death penalty and its reduction to 100 lashes. All convicts to livāṭ are entitled to access to pardon except those whose convictions are based on the testimony of four witnesses.[39]

As I mentioned before, under the traditional understanding of Islamic law there is a reluctance to convict a defendant for ḥadd offences. This attitude has been adopted in the Iranian Penal Code as seen in the rules of evidence and punishment prescribed. The reluctance to initiate a prosecution and to implement the punishment, which we find in the classic understanding of a ḥadd crime, is reflected in those provisions which order the judges to discourage a defendant from self-incrimination, and to deter the witnesses from testifying by reminding them of the severe punishment for false testimony. The death penalty could in most cases be avoided through measures such as repentance or denial, even if the “guilt” of the perpetrator is proved, which demonstrates somehow the secondary importance of the elimination of the perpetrator. If the law-enforcement bodies are committed to the existing laws, it would be quite unlikely that the prosecution of a same-sex sexual offence results in the execution of the perpetrator. Only the penetratee of a consensual sexual act and his married sex-partner, who have been found guilty on the basis of testimony and who have not repented before the hearing of the evidence, have theoretically no chance to escape capital punishment. The certainty of the death penalty in the case of witness testimony illustrates as well another feature of ḥadd, namely the decisive role of the public in implementing the penalty. As we observed, one of the primary objectives of the implementation of a add punishment in the Islamic law is to serve as a general deterrent. If an offence has been seen and reported by a member of the public, then it is necessary for the legal system to prosecute and punish the perpetrator. This concern explains to my view the rigorous approach of the Penal Code towards those offenders convicted on the basis of witness testimony in comparison to those whose conviction results from a confession.

If we look at the recent changes of the Penal Code, it is clear that there are no signs of the emergence of a modern notion of homosexuality through these new changes. On the contrary, the major changes regarding livāṭ are responses to concerns raised on the compatibility of the former laws with sharia’s regulations. All of the major changes of the law, such as the removal of knowledge of the judge (‘ilm-i qā) as a proof to livāṭ, the adoption of the possibility of denial after confession and the introduction of iḥṣān as a decisive factor for the degree of punishments are indeed matters which we find in the of classical fiqh scholarly discussions.

The only term found in the legislation, which may suggest a shift from a behaviorist understanding of the offence towards the perception of the wrongdoing as inherent to the wrongdoer is the modern term for homosexuality (hamjinsgarā’ī). This word is indeed used in the new Penal Code, which leads some activists and journalists to conclude that the IRI is taking a step towards criminalizing homosexuality as a way of life.[40] The new Penal Code is however not using this expression to refer to a “state of being” or a certain “type of subject.” The word is instead functioning as an umbrella term for some behaviors already sanctioned and treated as undesirable in classical works of Islamic legal tradition, such as passionate touching (mulāmisat az rū-yi shahwat).

The continuity of the Classical Islamic legal discourse in modern Iranian law does not allow us to claim that the authorities of the IRI are following the premodern behavioristic approach towards the offence, and are interpreting the provisions as they are intended to be. Of course, it is imaginable that the interpretation of the law-enforcement bodies deviates from those of the classical law or fiqh. As we saw, the scope of action of the judges is defined very broadly in the law. From one side they have measures at their disposal which could stop the trial at a very early stage. They can postpone the hearing of evidence, or accept the repentance of the defendant before the prosecution has begun. At the same time, if they insist on punishment, they have massive influence with respect to the penalty, since they can reject the repentance or refuse to pass the request for pardon to the higher instances. Thus, it is essential to ask whether the presiding judges are interpreting these rules in their classical context or are possibly  homophobic agents utilizing these laws to prosecute the accused.

 

Livāṭ in the Decisions of the Supreme Court

Since the hearings of the offences against public virtue are not held publicly, it is difficult to gain detailed insight into the judicial practice regarding the prosecution of sexual crimes. Still, we can obtain some information on the implementation of the legislation in the Iranian courts and the judicial interpretation of the situation, if we take a look at the decisions of the Supreme Court and its Chambers. The decisions of the Supreme Court in its function as the final arbiter of a trial are not a binding source of law. But the rulings still reflect the interpretation, understanding, and perceptions of one of the highest judicial authorities of the country which must approve any case of capital punishment before it is carried out.

The first case we discuss was referred to the Penal Chamber of the Supreme Court in 1997, where an eighteen-year-old man was accused of the rape (livāṭ-i bih ‘unf) of a ten-year-old boy and was sentenced to death. His guilt was proven through four confessions, all of which were obtained by the judge on the same day where the defendant was asked to leave the court after giving each confession and returning for the next one. The charge was also supported by a forensic medical report which verified injuries and the deformation of the rectum of the victim due to penetration of a “hard object.” The judge refused the repentance of the defendant and sentenced him to death. The appeal court objected to this decision and returned the case to another chamber with two arguments: first, the defendant should give four separate confessions, and second, there is no indication which would lead to the assumption that the repentance is not credible. In the new trial, the defendant confessed in three different hearings to livāṭ but argued at the same time that he was not aware of the death punishment and repented from his deeds in each hearing. In the fourth day, he confessed to intercrural sex and denied the penetration. The court rejected his repentance due to his criminal record (prior convictions for intercrural sex) and insisted on the decision of the first court and sentenced him to death proven by four confessions. Once again, the appeal court overturned this decision due to lack of required evidence, namely the four required confessions and sent the case to the penal chamber of the Supreme Court for a final decision. The majority of the judges of the court concluded that in this case the required evidence for a conviction to livāṭ is not present and acquitted the defendant of the charge. The judges argued that confessions passed in very first trial had lost their validity due to the overturning of the decision of the first instance by a higher court. Furthermore, the confessions in the second court were considered insufficient for a death penalty, as the defendant had admitted in the last confession only to intercrural sex. Some judges also contended that the repentance in the first court should be regarded as a repentance before confessions in the second court, which exposes the accused to the death penalty. In the discussions on the question whether the confessions are to be given in four hearings, while the judges tended to consider four confessions on the same day as valid, they recommended the distribution of confessions over four days, due to the principle of caution (iḥtiyā). The judges of the Supreme Court also objected the decisions of the lower courts for rejecting the repentance of the defendant without any justification and stated that it is to the courts to prove the dishonesty of the defendant.[41]

In another case which was heard by the General Assembly of the Supreme Court in 2010, three young men were sentenced to death for to the rape of a thirteen-year-old boy in 2005. In the first day of the hearing all three defendants had confessed four times to the assault yet on the second day denied their statements. The judge had found them guilty due to their confessions on the first day and sentenced them to death. The revision court had objected to this decision due to a procedural error since the legal representatives of the defendants were not present on the first day of the hearing and thus rendered the confessions invalid. The case was once again heard in another trial court, which insisted on the death penalty due to the confessions in the first instance, the forensic reports and the negative reputation of the defendants. Once again, the case was reviewed in the revision court, which subsequently overturned the decision. This court accepted the claim of the defendants that they confessed under pressure from the investigating officials and raised severe doubts about the validity of this evidence. The court also considered the forensic report not to be reliable enough to ascertain that this particular act of livāṭ happened since in the report it is only mentioned that the injury had occurred through penetration of a “hard object,” which could have been anything. The court stated as well that the negative reputation of the defendants did not count as evidence for this particular accusation. As the third trial court insisted on the death penalty, the matter was discussed in the General Assembly of the Supreme Court. The Court supported the arguments of the last Revision Court and approved it and acquitted the defendants of the charge.[42]

We also find cases of convictions based on consensual same-sex sexual conduct which were examined by the Supreme Court. A Chamber of Supreme Court heard in 1990 the case of two young men who were found guilty on the basis of their confession during the initial investigation. This decision was also supported by a report of forensic medicine which testified to the permanent deformation of the rectum of one of the defendants (the penetratee), which was seen as a result of repeated penetrations over an extended period of time. The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the first instance with the reasoning that there were doubts about the validity of evidence since the confessions were made in the investigative phase and not during the official hearing. Furthermore, they objected that the forensic medical report could not concretely confirm that this specific act of livāṭ between the defendants had happened and discharged both men.[43]

The role of the the judges in these cases is consistent with the expectation of Islamic law in dealing with a ḥadd offence. As we mentioned, the elements of these crimes, as well as the rules of evidence concerning the exclusion of certain confessions and their punishments are all prescribed in Islamic law and the judges had to carefully examine if all those provisions were fulfilled. The judges of the Supreme Court seemed to be committed to this maxim. They examined the validity of the decisions of the lower courts in respect to Islamic law and then the codified law. The fiqh texts served as a source for the interpretation of the codified law and for responding to the ambiguities which occurred during the hearing. The judges, who were mostly clergy, frequently crossed the boundaries of codified law and took into account scholarly debates on livāṭ which are not in codified law. We find in their discussions, for example, notions such as the role of iḥṣān or insufficiency of the knowledge of the judge as evidence to livāṭ long before they were adopted by the Penal Code of 2009. It is also notable that the forensic findings played an insignificant role in the decisions of the court, which indicated the adherence of the judges to the strict and non-negotiable evidence rule of this ḥadd offence.[44] Furthermore, the judges seemed to have the same behavioristic approach towards the offence, which we find in the classical understanding of livāṭ. The personality or the psyche of the wrongdoer appeared irrelevant to the Supreme Court judges in their decisions and discussions. As we observed, neither the criminal record of convictions to same-sex sexual offences nor the findings of forensic medicine, which attested to regular anal intercourse, served as indicators to the judges, which would let them find the defendant guilty in the case they were hearing. None of those circumstances led the judges to conclude that the behavior was an expression of some continuous quality inherent to the personality of the defendant, which would have made the judges more biased towards him.

We observe that the legal approach of the Islamic Republic towards same-sex sexual offences is a continuity of the Islamic legal tradition, not only on the point of the adoption of harsh measures but also in the conception, perception, interpretation of this offence. This tradition is characterized by the absence of active prosecution of wrongdoers and the reluctance of implementing capital punishment as long as the public is not affected by the crime. In this traditional understanding the crime is treated as a singular act of violation and thus the personality of the offender and his character traits do not play a role on the prosecution and the trial. The more committed the law-enforcing bodies remain to this traditional understanding of the offence, the more unlikely it is that this penal policy leads to a systematic prosecution of people conducting it and I believe this commitment to the tradition is by and large present in the penal policy of the IRI.

 

Some Final Remarks

It is difficult to imagine that the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran are unaware of the existence of Iranians who identify themselves as gay. Of course, they are well-equipped enough to be able to increase pressure on the gay community and intensify the prosecution of sexual offences. Nevertheless, they seem to lack the will to actively fight against same-sex sexual conduct or to eliminate this community altogether. The regulations regarding military service offer a perfect example for the awareness of the IRI about the existence of gay citizens and the absence of any intention to punish them. For more than a decade it is possible to be exempted from the military service for homosexuality.[45] “Disorders (kazhkhū’ī) which are against military or social norms (shu’ūnāt-e ijtimāʿi wa nizāmī) such as sexual deviances (inḥirāfāt-i jinsī) and homosexuality” may exempt one permanently from military service, as per  paragraph 7 of Chapter 5 of the current Regulation of Medical Exemption of Military Service.[46] One may be skeptical of this provision and assume it is designed to keep a register of gays for possible future prosecution. But this regulation seems to be ineffective as a register as not many gay Iranians are making use of this possibility to get exempted from military service, since the bureaucratic process they have to go through is not only utterly humiliating, but also often ends in an unwanted “coming-out” of the applicants in front of their parents. The regulation seems to be a response to the problem overt homosexuality in public spaces and is fueled by the fear of spreading the undesired behavior among the others in society. Apart from the intentions of the regulation, its existence per se shows that the IRI is aware of the presence of subjects who get involved in same-sex sexual conducts yet is still not showing any intention to prosecute them.

I am of course not claiming that there aren’t any risks of being prosecuted and punished for same-sex sexual conduct in Iran and that the gay Iranians or those having same-sex sex are having a life free from the fear of facing prosecution and harassment. I am, however, suggesting that the judicial authorities of the IRI seem to be committed to a traditional understanding of same-sex sexual offences, which is characterized by the reluctance to prosecute sexual offences. As long as this perception prevails among the judicial authorities, it is less likely that they will initiate a systematical prosecution of same-sex sexual offences. Once the view of the judicial officials is “modernized” and they start to conceive gays as a social group, which is more suspected for practicing livāṭ, then we need to be alert to potential worsening of the situation of gays in Iran.

In this respect, the reports in the western medias regarding “Prosecution of Gays in Iran” could have a negative impact on the lives of the gay Iranians and increase their vulnerability. Those reports are not only objectively inaccurate and fail to provide their readers with differentiated information on the situation of gays in Iran, as I tried to demonstrate in this paper, but also exploit the LGBT issues for the “othering” of non-western (Muslim) societies and as a demarcation line between those societies and the liberal western world.[47] This process makes at the same time the anti-LGBT positions to serve as the marker of being Islamic or anti-western in the Muslim societies. As soon as taking an anti-Western course or showing dedication to Islam gets politically relevant for the actors in power, then the members of LGBT community are probably at the top of the list for suppression and harassment, as we have observed by the increase of anti-gay crack-downs in many parts of the Muslim world such as in Egypt, Chechnya, Azerbaijan or Indonesia in the last two decades.

 

[1]Morris, M., “10 Countries That Completely Hate Gay People,” Listverse, 30 December 2013,

https://listverse.com/2013/12/30/10-countries-that-completely-hate-gay-people/.

[2]Concerning the sexual politics of the revolutionary Iran, see Janet Afary, Sexual Politics in Modern Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 265-271.

[3]For the story of Quds newspaper, see http://hamjensgera.com/wiki/محمود_عسگری_و_ایاز_مرهونی.

[4]“ḥukm-i i‘dām-i dū muttaham-i bih livāṭ-i bih ‛unf ijrā shud,” ISNA 19 July 2005, www.isna.ir/news/8404-12129/حكم-اعدام-دو-متهم-به-لواط-به-عنف-اجرا-شد.

[5]“Iran Hangings,”, Outrage!, 23 June 2006, http://outrage.org.uk/2006/06/iran-hangings/.

[6]For the controversies in this case, see Scott Long, “Unbearable Witness: How Western Activists (Mis)recognize Sexuality in Iran,” Contemporary Politics 15, no. 1 (2009): 119-136.

[7]For example, the play Haram! Iran! was brought in 2010 to stage and was based on a “true story of forbidden love” with the words of Huffington Post’s contributor Jed Ryan. Ryan saw in the story of Maḥmūd and ‘Ayyāz, “…an incident [that] opened many people’s eyes on the situation for those [LGBT people] who haven’t [made some modest gains regarding visibility and rights].” The play made its New York debut in March 2017. See Jed Ryan, “HARAM! IRAN! True Story of Forbidden Love in The Middle East Comes To New York Stage,” Huffpost, 11 March 2017, www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/haram-iran-true-story-of-forbidden-love-in-the-middle_us_58c45999e4b070e55af9efb5.

[8]The reformist president Khātamī, who was more than any other Iranian official out and about on the international stage, did not face the question regarding the execution of gays until September 2006. During his speech at Harvard, as the former president, he defended the death penalty as a suitable measure for this “misdeed.” Aḥmadīnizhād, on the other hand, faced this question in almost every encounter with a western actor. His response to the student who asked him about penalizing homosexuality in Iran is perhaps one of his most memorable quotes as the President of IRI: “In Iran, we don’t have homosexuals. In Iran, we don’t have this phenomenon. I don’t know who has told you we have it.” His audience, the students and staff of Columbia University in 2007 laughed and booed after this remark. For Khātamī’s remark, see “Khatami Slams ‘Imperial’ U.S,” The Harvard Crimson, 11 September 2006, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2006/9/11/khatami-slams-imperial-us-encouraging-an/, and for Aḥmadīnizhād’s remark see Claudia Parsons, “Iranian President Spars with Academics in NY,” Reuters, 24 September 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-ahmadinejad/iranian-president-spars-with-academics-in-ny-idUSN2430987520070924.

[9]See for example, “Iran Executes Three Men on Homosexuality Charges,” 7 September 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/07/iran-executes-men-homosexuality-charges, or Shehab, Khan, “Iran Executes Gay Teenager for Crime Allegedly Committed as a Teenager,” 4 August 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/iran-gay-teenager-hanged-executed-crime-allegedly-committed-as-juvenile-a7172086.html or Benjamin Weinthal, “Iran Executes Gay Teenager in Violation of International Law,” 4 August 2016, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iran-News/Iran-executes-gay-teenager-in-violation-of-international-law-463234.

[10]I am not claiming at this point, that there is a single narration circulating in the western texts. As mentioned, human rights monitoring organizations like Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch are documenting the cases more carefully. They are of course condemning the death penalty and juvenile prosecution in general but remain cautious on categorizing the executions as actions against homosexuality. See for example, Human Rights Watch, We Are a Buried Generation: Discrimination and Violence against Sexual Minorities in Iran (New York: Human Rights Watch 2010), 27-32.

[11]Afary, Sexual Politics, 358-359.

[12]Concerning the emergence of an LGBT community and a “gay” identity, see Pardis Mahdavi, “Questioning the Global Gays(ze): Constructions of Sexual Identities in Post-revolution Iran,” Social Identities 18, no. 2 (2012): 223-237. See also Abouzar Nasirzadeh, “The Role of Social Media in the Lives of Gay Iranians,” in Social Media in Iran: Politics and Society After 2009, ed. David M. Faris and Babak Rahimi (Albany: Sunny Press 2015), 57-75.

[13]Afary, Sexual Politics, 398.

[14]Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1: An Introduction (New York: Pantheon Books 1978), 43.

[15]Afsaneh Najmabadi, for instance, questions aptly the applicability of this dichotomy in context of sexualities in pre-modern Iran and argues that although the notion of “homosexual as a type” did not exist in this time, there are still identifications based on desire types, which did not go unnoted by their contemporaries. See Afsaneh Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press 2005), 19-23.

[16]In fact, the medicalizing of homosexuality is frequently discussed as a process in which the authorities of the IRI are constructing “types of deviant subjects” and at the same time stigmatizing them. A careful examination of the scholarly works on this issue goes far beyond the scope of this study. Briefly summed up, it is frequently argued that the discourse on transsexuality and the encouraging policy of the IRI towards surgical sex-change are at the same time reproducing and reinforcing a heteronormative order and hence constructing and marginalizing homosexuality as a pathological type. For a more comprehensive study on transsexuality in the IRI, see Afsaneh Najmabadi, Professing Selves: Transsexuality and Same-sex Desire in Contemporary Iran (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2014) or see Susan Stryker, “Transsexuality and Biopolitics in Iran,” in Journal of Women’s History 28, vol. 4 (2016): 179-182.

[17]There are of course differences among and within Law Schools about the nature and scope of udūd, which can not be discussed here. See Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 53-55. See also Wael B. Hallaq, Sharīʿa, Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009), 311-312.

[18]This maxim is reflected in a prophetic adīth. See Hallaq, Sharīʿa, 311.

[19]Rudolph Peters, “From Jurists’ Law to Statue Law or What Happens When the Shari’a is Codified,” in Shaping the Current Islamic Reformation, ed. Barbara A. Roberson (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 2003), 84-85.

[20]Ibid., 55.

[21]Ibid., 54-55.

[22]Ibid., 55; also Hallaq, Sharīʿa, 311.

[23]The Law is available at http://ghavanin.ir/detail.asp?id=1232.

[24]Penal Code 1996, Paragraph 108.

[25]Ibid., Paragraph 121.

[26]Female maturity is reached at the age of nine, and male maturity is reached at the age of fifteen (lunar years).

[27]Penal Code 1996, Paragraph 123 and 124.

[28]The law was finally ratified 2014 after a test phase of five years. The law can be found at

http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/print_version/845048.

[29]Penal Code 2009, Paragraph 234.

[30]Ibid., Paragraph 234.

[31]Ibid., Paragraph 237.

[32] Penal Code 1996, Paragraph 120.

[33] Penal Code 2009, Paragraph 241.

[34]Penal Procedure Law 2013, Paragraph 306. The law could be found at http://www.ekhtebar.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/قانون-آیین-دادرسی-کیفری-با-اصلاحات-1394-سایت-حقوقی-اختبار1.pdf.

[35]Ibid., Paragraph 102-1.

[36]Ibid., Paragraph 102-2.

[37]Penal Code 2009, Paragraph 250.

[38]Penal Code 2009, Paragraph 114.

[39]The pardon of the convict is practiced in the IRI by the Supreme Leader and regulated through the Guideline of the Commission on Pardon and Reduction of Punishments, an organ of the Judiciary responsible for suggesting the possible candidates for pardon. For the Guideline see http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/print_version/135558.

[40]Ḥamīd Parnīyān, “Vaẓ‘īyat-i Hamjinsgarāyan dar Qānūn-i Jadīd-i Mujāzāt-i Islāmī,” Radiozamaneh, 22 December 2012, www.radiozamaneh.com/52003.

[41]Daftar-i Muṭāli‘āt va Taḥqīqāt-i Dīvān-i ‘Ālī-i Kishvar, Muẕākirāt va Ārā-i Hay’at-i ‚umūmī-i Dīvān-i ‘Ālī-i Kishvar (Tehrān: Idārah-yi vaḥdat-i rayīyah va nashr-i muẕakirāat-i Dīvān-i ‘Ālī-i Kishvar, 1378sh), 471-490.

[42]Summary of the decision available on: Paygāh-i Iṭṭilā’-risānī-i Ḥuqūqī-i Iran, “Ra’y-i Iṣrārī-i Kayfarī-i Dīvān-i ‘Ālī-i Kishvar: Istinād bih Qā’idah-yi Dar’ Mawjib-i Muntafī Shudan-i Ḥukm-i I’dām Shud,” 25 September 2018, http://lawyernews.ir/?p=1325.

[43]Yadullāh Bāzgīr, Qānūn-i Mujāzāt-i Islāmī dar A’īnah-i Arā’-i Dīvān-i ‘Ālī-i Kishvar: Ḥudūd, Jarā’im-i Khalāf-i Akhlāq-i Ḥasanah (Tehrān: Nashr-i Hastān, 1378sh.), 125.

[44]It is frequently said, that the IRI is using forensic medicine to intensify and optimize the prosecution of the male homosexuals. The influence of forensic reports in the discussed cases, however, qualifies this allegation. See Afary, Sexual Politics, 359 or or K. Korycki and A. Nasirzadeh, “Homophobia as a Tool of Statecraft: Iran and its Queers” in Global Homophobias: States, Movements, and the Politics of Oppression, ed. Meredith L. Weiss and Michael J. Bosia (Champaign, ILL: University of Illinois Press, 2013), 189.

[45]HRW wrongly claims that these regulations are prohibiting gay men from service and categories these measures as discriminatory, although these rules are optional and do not hinder gay men from the service. See Human Rights Watch, “We are Buried,” 23-27.

[46]The regulation could be downloaded from the website of Tabnak Professional News Site under: http://cdn.tabnak.ir/files/fa/news/1393/4/18/395987_387.pdf.

[47]For the role of (homo)sexuality in self-identification of western societies, see Jasbir Puar,

Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007), 3-24.  For a critical view on the “othering” of muslim societies on the basis of their sexualities see Joseph A. Massad, Desiring Arabs (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press 2007), 160-190.

Exilic, Diasporic, and Ethnic Media: Hamid Naficy’s Oeuvre from an International Communication Perspective

Mehdi Semati <msemati@niu.edu> is Professor and Acting Chair in the Department of Communication at Northern Illinois University. His writings on Iranian culture and media, and international communication have appeared in various scholarly journals. His books include Media, Culture and Society in Iran: Living with Globalization and the Islamic State (2008), and New Frontiers in International Communication Theory (2004). His Persian publications include a book titled, The Age of CNN and Hollywood: National Interests, Transnational Communication (2006). His latest book is a co-edited volume titled, ISIS Beyond the Spectacle: Communication Media, Networked Publics, and Terrorism (2018).

Hamid Naficy is justly recognized as the foremost authority on Iranian cinema and its social history. A prolific scholar, he has written on various topics and areas in film studies. Among these, and beyond expository and theoretical writings on Iranian cinema and its history, he has produced scholarship on the Middle Eastern cinema, Palestinian film letters, exilic cinema, ethnographic film, Third World spectatorship and modes of address, transnational cinema, independent transnational film genre, and Iranian Émigré Cinema, among others. My contention in this paper is that although this professional identity is accurate and well deserved, it is reductive for the work he has produced. Naficy’s oeuvre covers a wider range of scholarly preoccupations and theoretical and empirical domains. Although my discussion in this paper traverses these different domains, I write from a specific disciplinary location, that of International Communication. I argue that his work is trans/inter-disciplinary in character, operating at the intersection of three specific areas of Cultural Studies, “post-colonial” theory, and media theory. The connection between these three areas is tied to specific articulations and problematizations of borders, belonging, Otherness, (trans)national imaginary, states of liminality, and the broader question of culture’s relationship to power and geopolitics. I make my argument by indexing Naficy’s work to a range of topics, concepts and problematizations central to the field of International Communication. In this context, I hope to demonstrate that Naficy’s oeuvre is best explained beyond the confines of cinema studies precisely because it engages and inhabits borders and embodies the porosity of borders of various kind, be they intellectual, disciplinary, affective, geopolitical, or geographical.

In the Beginning…

I begin with some biographical information, not as evidence but as anecdotes, to suggest how scholarships, as abstraction as they might seem, produce specific effects and become organizing elements of other contexts. Anecdotes, as Meghan Morris observes, are “primarily referential. They are oriented futuristically towards the construction of a precise, local, and social discursive context, of which the anecdote then functions as a mise en abyme. That is to say, anecdotes are not expressions of personal experience but allegorical expositions of a model of the way the world can be said to be working.”[1] Two formative encounters are revealed in the anecdotes that frame my discussion in this paper. One of these anecdotes involves my first encounter with the work of Hamid Naficy. The other is about a teacher of mine in middle school in Iran that admonished me about my cinematic heroes.

I must have been 15 or 16 years old, if not younger, when I first saw Hamid Naficy’s name in print. I believe it was in Film (فیلم), a Persian-language magazine devoted to cinema I used to read in Iran as a teenager. Elsewhere I had seen his writings on film translated into Persian from English. I fancied myself as a film buff, and whenever I saw a text written by an author with an Iranian name that had been translated into Persian I would take interest in it. I would ask myself, what is it like to write in a language that was not one’s native language? What was it like to read the same writing after it was translated into one’s native language? It was fascinating to me. Moreover, I wondered, how does one write about cinema in a language that is not one’s own native language? It struck me as an impossible task. After all, I thought cinema as an art form, much like poetry, resisted “translation.” Could it be that it takes a particular talent to do that? At the same time, I asked myself: Could it be that there is something about cinema that makes it different, more susceptible to translation, something that is transnational in its essence? At the time, the word “international” was more meaningful to a young person in Iran than transnational.

The second anecdote is about a formative experience I had as a young person. Around the same time, I had been admonished in school by one of my teachers, a certain gentleman by the name of Mr. Attaran, for a drawing I had done in an art class. Having produced a drawing of a Hollywood star (Charles Bronson), he told me my art project reflected “cultural bankruptcy” on my part. I did not understand what that meant. I think I was only fourteen years old. Several years later, I moved to the United States to start my undergraduate education and the pursuit of higher education. I abandoned my desire to study chemistry, a subject I always enjoyed, partly because Mr. Attaran’s admonition had stayed with me. I was determined to study a field in which I could explore what it means to be “culturally bankrupt.” Against this background, I chose the topic of my first paper as an undergraduate student in the United States ambitiously. I had decided to write, in an International Communication class, which was now my major, a paper titled, “What is Cultural Imperialism?” Although the paper was not my best work in the eyes of my professor, it put me on a path that led me to International Communication as a professional preoccupation and a field of inquiry. At the intersection of these two contexts one could see the relationship of culture and territory, culture and place, culture and mobility (migration and exile), culture and geopolitics, all of which can be formalized as scholarly inquiries addressing the problem of border. Naficy’s work goes beyond cinema studies to cut across these domains and presents itself as resources for addressing Communication and the border.

The designation of International Communication as a “field” rather than a “discipline” is intentional in this context and it foretells a conceptual complication that I wish to exploit productively. As I have argued elsewhere, the heterogeneity of scholarly pursuits and their objects of study under the banner of International Communication does not accommodate any unmuddled disciplinary identity.[2] Moreover, attempts at defining what constitutes the field gets us entangled in arguments over definitions and disciplinary borders, though such arguments are sometimes heuristic. However, designating international communication studies as a “field” gets us closer to viewing international communication studies as a mode of “organizing inquiry.” As Peters has argued, ways of organizing knowledge is historically mutable. The impulse to organize knowledge into fields and disciplines is a vestige of a past: “Through the 19th century, the diverse inquiries thitherto done mainly by moral philosophers and historians became rationalized into the social sciences as we know them: history, economics, sociology, psychology, political science, and anthropology.”[3] Instead of fretting over not being one of those disciplines, he argues, “we might more usefully think of it as a prime example of a newer, nascent way of organizing inquiry.”[4] Inquiry tends to ignore the established disciplinary boundaries, and is driven by preoccupation with topics. As Peters observes, “We all study topics today; ‘studies’ can be attached to almost any area of inquiry.”[5] In this sense, much of the work in Communication Studies, International Communication included, cuts across traditional disciplinary borders. Moreover, in showing how Naficy’s work addresses various topics (“areas”) of interest to International Communication, I hope my presentation in this paper reveals the equally interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary character of Naficy’s work. His work might be characterized as, to use a concept he deploys in his writings, “interstitial,” for its basic character productively falls between the boundaries and not within them.

Indexing Naficy’s Work to International Communication  

The range of topics in International Communication encompassed in Naficy’s work is wide-ranging. Here I have limited space and will only address a few. I start with one of the most obvious connections to International Communication as a field, and that is the topic of “development,” as addressed from the theoretical perspective of “modernization.” His account of the social history of Iranian cinema outlines the modernization perspective while avoiding its apolitical tendencies.[6] Cinema in this context is not simply a cultural product that is exported. Rather, it has to be explicated as an element in a complex of transformations across Iranian society and history. In that regard, one of Naficy’s goals in this social history project is to “situate Iranian cinema at the intersection of state-driven authoritarian modernization, nationalist and Islamist politics, and geopolitics during its tumultuous century, charting the manner in which local, national, regional, and international powers competed for ascendancy in Iran, affecting what Iranians saw on screens, what they produced, and the technologies they adopted.”[7] As Naficy treats it, that complex includes “the emergence of mature capitalism, organized entrepreneurial investment, centralized and industrialized manufacturing, free market competition, and extensive import and export across national borders.”[8]

Naficy’s narrative takes account of modernization projects in relationship to both internal factors (state formation, local cultural dispositions and norms, etc.) and external factors (Iran’s integration into the neocolonial and capitalist Western economies). His discussion of “syncretic Westernization,” a mixture of identification and alienation, provides nuances of the cultural dimensions of “Occidentalization” of Iranians and all the ambivalence toward modernity and modernization they display. In this narrative of “modernization,” Naficy provides an expansive view of development and modernization in meticulous details.[9] In discussing the professional structure that came to govern the film industry, for example, he shows that the industry needed to undergo modernization and industrialization in both its production, distributional and exhibition infrastructures, and its professional structures: “Civil institutions were redesigned to recognize and protect the movie industry’s various professions, to preserve the industry’s products, and to promote the study, criticism, and propagation of the industry and its products.”[10] In short, the analyses he provides in his social history of Iranian cinema offers an extensive discussion of various dimensions of modernization and developments that is at once theoretically rich and empirically grounded.

The geopolitical encounter between Iran and the West in relationship to politics of culture is addressed in Naficy’s work in a manner that recalls the origins of International Communication in propaganda studies and its latter day variants of “strategic communication” and “public diplomacy.” In this context, Naficy’s discussion of instrumentalization of culture includes aspects of cultural imperialism arguments that have been a part of International Communication in various forms for decades.[11] Reflecting on the state’s responses to the unrest that followed the disputed presidential election of 2009 in Iran, Naficy “historicizes this most recent resurfacing of the cultural assault in the context of the mutual debate about political instrumentalization of culture and media in order to show its roots, variety of forms, and continual evolution.”[12] Here Naficy unpacks decades of Islamic Republic’s deployment of culture to vilify and intimidate its opponents and critics both internationally and domestically. Although the discourse of cultural imperialism, with its critical Marxist lineage, is usually an occasion to interrogate the presence (“dumping”) of Western (i.e., American) cultural products in the Global South, Naficy shows how it is used as a pretext in Iran to silence critics and justify repressive measures.

The instrumentalization of culture in Iran has included specific cultural productions and broader cultural policies that intended to implement ideological goals and visions of the state. Using state-run broadcasting system, for example, the state has routinely targeted intellectuals, writers, artists and other cultural forms it deems a threat to its hegemonic order. Television programs such as Hoviyat (“Identity”) reproduced the cultural assault thesis by claiming Iranian intellectuals, be they inside or outside Iran, were the agents of foreign powers who were the enemies of the Islamic Republic. Later on, other broadcasting programs would vilify cultural forms such as rap, rock or heavy metal music as “unIslamic,” pronouncing them as corrupting influences on the Iranian youth, going as far as claiming that such cultural activities would lead to devil-worshiping. This approach to culture was largely in line with the “cleansing” (“paksazi”) of cultural and intellectual life of the nation during the “cultural revolution” that had taken place immediately after the revolution of 1979. However, such policies have largely been unsuccessful in “Islamization” of popular culture. The opposition to hardline policies by political figures and entities associated with the reform movement has meant the struggle over the control of culture and cultural policies is a proxy wars between competing factions within the political system of the Islamic Republic, a struggle over what it means to be an Iranian and a citizen of the Islamic Republic.

It should be pointed out that Naficy addresses “mutual instrumentalization” of culture in this context, implicating both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States. The United States has long been active in “public diplomacy,” attempting to influence the public opinion of other nations, including Iran, through government-funded activities in terrestrial broadcasting (e.g., Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Voice of America) and later through satellite television. Those efforts by the United States have aggressively moved to online activities as well, targeting Iranian citizens in different venues, often in the form of attempts to “educate” them in issues related to civil society. When the United States publicly announces that it has allocated $75 million for public diplomacy to engage Iranian citizens, and additional millions of dollars “to fund U.S. and Iranian exile media to destabilize the Islamist regime and to encourage democratic efforts within the country,”[13] it is clear why such efforts would be a source of constant heartburn for the Islamic Republic. As an old saying amongst the researchers in this area would put it, just because the Iranian authorities are paranoid, it does mean some are not out to get them! Their discourse of “velvet revolution” and “soft war” based on American “soft power” and their paranoia about “foreign infiltration” is grounded in their recognition that their narrative of “enemy influence” (nofouz-e doshman) competes with other sources of information and other narratives.

One of the main sources of frustration for the Iranian authorities has been the popular culture and media of Iranian exile and diasporic communities, especially Iranian expats in the United States with a sizable concentration in “Irangeles,” California.[14] Here I do not wish to conflate or reduce the vibrant culture of Iranian expats and their (popular) culture around the world to the satellite television programing that is beamed to Iran, which is the source of frustration for the Islamic Republic. Naficy addresses such transmissions in the context of politics of culture directed at Iranians inside Iran.[15] More important, however, it is here that Naficy’s work addresses one of the most fascinating and compelling topics of interest to International Communication scholars, the media of diasporic populations.[16]

Naficy’s work here goes beyond explicating popular culture of Iranians living in exile. It is a conceptual reflection on “ethnic” and “minority media” and, more important, on the conditions of its emergence. Naficy points out the structural conditions for the emergence of “decentralized global narrowcasting” alongside the extant model of “centralized global broadcasting.” This is the era of population movements, migration, displaced communities and exile, at a time when “massive worldwide political, economic and social restructurings and displacements along with rapid technological advances have ushered in a new model of television that could be termed ‘decentralised global narrowcasting.’”[17] This model of narrowcasting, however, is not monolithic or homogeneous, even if they share a relationship to a homeland. Naficy divides this narrowcasting into three categories of ethnic, transnational and exilic. As he points out, even though these three categories are “flexible, permeable and at times simultaneous,” they have different characteristics.

Ethnic television is comprised of programming produced in a host country by indigenous minorities (e.g., BET in the United States), whose audiences are addressed within an intracultural relationship to the majoritarian culture of the host country. Transnational television covers mostly media imported into the host country from abroad (e.g., Korean or Chinese television in the United States). Because they are imported for audiences from their home countries, they tend to “minimize” what Naficy calls “the drama of acculturation and resistance.”[18] Lastly, diasporic television is produced in the host country by “liminars and exiles as a response to and in tandem with their own transitional and/or provisional status.” [19] Iranian, Arab or Armenian television programs produced in the United States for expats are examples of this type of television. To the extent that “ethnic” media try to and do reach mainstream audiences, as Naficy argues, they reach for “broadcasting.” In other words, it is only for transnational and diasporic media that narrowcasting is the operational logic, especially given that the content is in the foreign language of the motherland.

It is in this area of diasporic media that Naficy’s work on narrowcasting has been especially influential and engaging. As he demonstrates, diasporic media, as decentralized narrowcasting, crisscrosses time and space; it looks to the past and present concurrently, and is local and global all at once. Naficy delineates the specificity of this type of programming as a genre formation, that of exile or diasporic genre.[20] This is what he calls “ritual genre” because “it helps the displaced communities to negotiate between the two states of exile: the rule-bound structures of the home and host societies (societas) and the formlessness of exilic liminality in which many rules and structures are suspended (communitas).” As ritual communication, the genre provides “a sense of order in the life of its viewers by producing a series of systematic patterns of narration, signification and consumption that set up continually fulfilled or postponed expectations.”[21] At the same time, these programs reflect the complexity, the diversity and complex histories of Middle Eastern societies in ways that defy conventional binaries (e.g., East/West, Shi’i/Sunni, etc.).

Diasporic and exilic media add complications to our existing formulations of media in an international framework in terms of what is called media flows and “contra-flows.” An important aspect of media or cultural imperialism thesis has been the movement of cultural products, often couched in terms of a hegemonic relationship between American and Western culture to the Global South. There is no dispute that there has been an uneven distribution and movement of culture globally, as the disputes tend to be around the question of the meaning and the implications of such unevenness. The era of globalization or “the information age” is often said to involve “flow” of various kinds (capital, information, technology, images, sounds, etc.).[22] Although such discussions of flows have traditionally involved film, television and music of Hollywood (read “American”), the Internet and digital social media have altered or broadened the scope and understandings of “flow.” Thussu divides “flows” into three broad categories of global (e.g., Hollywood), transnational (e.g., Bollywood) and “geo-cultural” — catering to specific cultural-linguistic audiences, such as Middle East Broadcasting Center, which provides Arabic-language programming to the Middle East and North Africa.[23] Flows are conceptualized as either “dominant” flows, “largely emanating from the global North, with the United States at its core,” or as contra-flows, “originating from the erstwhile peripheries of global media industries—designated ‘subaltern flows.’”[24] This typology is a useful tool for the way it allows considerations of media flows in broad brushstrokes, and the way it points to the need for finer distinctions.

Naficy’s work on diasporic and exilic media, and “the interstitial mode of production” in exilic cinema provides a conceptual tool that enables us to account for such finer distinctions.[25] Diasporic media, as is the case with Iranian popular media in Los Angeles, might travel as examples of contra-flow, from within what we could call “internal global south in the Global North,” but on a path that is nonlinear, bouncing around on the nodal points of a distributed network that connects Iranians all over the world. More important, the diasporic media content in such a context might return to homeland where it affects or is affected by the “local” cultural dynamics, if we can still find a “local” that is untouched by the global, the transnational, or the regional. The diasporic media in the age of global networks will find or constitute its networked publics. This is our present media-saturated, highly mediated, networked and hyper-connected and mobile context. My experience of reading Naficy as a teenager, reading his writing translated into Persian from English, a writing about Hollywood, a quintessential home for immigrants in diaspora, a writing he penned in his second language, now recalling that experience to reflect on his writings as they have played a somewhat formative role in my studying of International Communication, … all of that might have been anticipated in my experience as a youngster enamored with “foreign films” and the writings by an Iranian scholar in English translated to Persian and read in Iran. Anecdotes, as stated previously, are allegorical expositions of models that tell us how the world is working. Going to the cinema, especially to see “original language film,” and then reading about it, for an Iranian teenager, was the experience of being cosmopolitan. And, as Naficy points out, “Cinema has always and everywhere been both a deeply local and a highly global industry and set of practices.”[26] This is so because “religious, ethnic, and national minorities, as well as émigrés, exiles, refugees, expatriates, and diasporic and transnational subjects, have contributed greatly to the rise of cinema and film industry in many countries and in the revival and redefinition of certain genres and national cinemas.” Hollywood itself “was from the start both ethnic and global, and it has been renewed and revived by contributions of waves of new émigré, refugee, and ethnic filmmakers.”[27] Reading Naficy’s work years later explains what I instinctively understood to be the experience of a global unicity, even if it is lived unevenly.

Naficy’s work on “accented cinema,” which he has described as “global cinema of displacement,” addresses the context and conditions of proliferation of displacements – which is the very context of interest to International Communication scholars.[28] This “accent” Naficy  speaks of “emanates not so much from the accented speech of the diegetic characters as from the displacement of the filmmakers and their artisanal production modes.”[29] This is not simply international or global, but filmmaking and filmmakers as index of re-territorialization of culture, home and/as dislocation, of journey, and of dis/placement as structural conditions. These are “accented” films in relationship to the dominant cinema. “Accented films,” Naficy argues, “are interstitial because they are created astride and in the interstices of social formations and cinematic practices. Consequently, they are simultaneously local and global, and they resonate against the prevailing cinematic production practices, at the same time that they benefit from them.”[30] In his analysis, “the best of the accented films signify and signify upon the conditions both of exile and diaspora and of cinema.”[31] These films critique “the home and host societies and cultures and the deterritorialized conditions of the filmmakers.”[32] All accented filmmakers, exilic, diasporic or postcolonial ethnic, share a “liminal subjectivity and interstitial location in society and film industry.”[33] Naficy’s work on “accented cinema” offers a wealth of conceptual reflections and resources that problematize various categories of International Communication.

Naficy’s examination of diasporic and exilic media has been influential because it offers a theoretical framework that is capable of addressing various operative spatial categories in International Communication: local, national, regional, transnational, and global. More important, this framework allows one to engage concepts that push these categories beyond mere scalar or spatial considerations: home, community, belonging, exile, dislocation, displacement, mobility, liminality, and interstitiality among others. Exile cultures are located in intersection of cultures. They are both local and global. They are lived experiences of displacement and belonging.[34]

Viewed from the perspective of those working in International Communication, the larger contexts for Naficy’s intervention in exilic discourse were the debates in post-modernism and post-structuralism, and the theoretical questions regarding “difference,” as they were addressed in the emerging literatures in Cultural Studies, and post-colonial and literary theories in the 1980s and the 1990s. The concept of “representation” was being reworked in the same context. Naficy’s writings on the “Other” (e.g. “mediating the Other” and “consuming the Other”) are a part of this context.[35] As Naficy and Gabriel explain, their collaboration on “media and otherness” was prompted by writings centered on questions of “diversity”, “multiculturalism,” “representation” and “postcolonial.” These writings, argue Naficy and Gabriel, have produced much “interest not only because such issues and discourses question existing canons of criticism, theory, and cultural practice but also because they suggest a new sense of direction in theorization of difference and representation.”[36] The graduate school experience of many in Communication, and many others in social sciences and humanities, in the 1980s and the1990s in seminar after seminar consisted of efforts to address the question of “difference” and how post-structuralism would help answer that question. Naficy’s work remains a valuable resource in that regard.

The aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of “authoritarian populism” (i.e., Thatcherism, Reaganism),[37] “culture wars” and the discourse of “diversity” in the United States, the discourse of “multiculturalism” in Europe and in the United States, and the movement of populations, peoples which Naficy and Gabriel call “othered populations – diasporic immigrants, exiles, emigrés, expatriates, evicted, homeless and the undocumented,” all have “reawakened [in]difference and enhanced dialog across cultures and geographies.”[38] In their view, these and formerly othered populations have opened a new cultural and discursive space “where all kinds of resistive hybridities, syncretism, and mongrelizations are possible.”[39] These critical discourses have made their way to the academic settings where established canons of culture and cultural theory, including the category of representation, have been challenged and renegotiated.[40]

In his study of the representation of Iranians in the Western (news) media and popular culture, Naficy once again takes on the issue of representation of “othered” populations, offering new theoretical and methodological insights.[41] He questions existing approaches for their shortcomings in taxonomic classification (plot, character stereotyping and portrayal of social situations) and for insisting on “realism” (when media themselves are constructs). If media representations provide a framework in which we make decisions individually and as a nation, he argues, we need to account for that which mediates between social realities and their representations. That is his objective in this study of othered people. Following the Marxist and Freudian “depth models” of interpretations, Naficy posits “mediawork” (not unlike Freud’s “dreamwork”) as a theoretical framework to explain the “combined operations” of “signifying institutions” (e.g., media) that “help obtain hegemonic consensus.”[42] Naficy is interested in showing how these institutions manifest in their representations the “deep structures” of ideologies and beliefs, which remain latent. Because they are infused at the level of everyday discursive practices, and are presented as “common sense,” they “cannot be bracketed off from everyday life as self-contained set of ‘political opinions’ or ‘biased views.’”[43] After this initial introduction to mediawork, Naficy shows how it produces consensus through a number of processes that involve not only media and popular culture but also financial, industrial, and marketing institutions and processes. To students of International Communication, Naficy productively outlines connections between sociology of news production, political economy of popular culture and media, and ideological analysis as practiced by Cultural Studies.

The central element of theorizing “Othered populations” is the self-Other relationship (be it individual or collective selves). It is this aspect of Naficy’s work that places it at the intersection of Cultural Studies, post-colonial criticism, and media theory, one that is clearly indexed to the range of problematiques central to International Communication as a field of inquiry. On the one hand, consider the following as the foci of analysis in Naficy’s work: analysis of exilic and diasporic media and cultures and relationship to “host” cultures and societies and to “homelands;” analysis of “Third World Spectatorship,” and “self-othering,” theorized as “a postcolonial discourse on cinematic first contacts” in media theory and Cultural Studies.[44] On the other hand, consider International Communication’s focus on the problem of culture at the international level in the context of uneven structural relationships of domination and subordination between the center and the peripheries or “the West and the rest” (e.g., dependency theories, dependent-development theories, cultural and media imperialism thesis).[45] What unites these perspectives and theories is their critical orientation, a left-leaning politics that sees “domination” or subjugation or some form of structural asymmetry, against which it seeks to intervene. Cultural Studies, media theories informed by the assumptions of Cultural Studies, and post-colonial theory and criticism share this critical orientation with the vast majority of International Communication literature that places culture at the center of its analysis.[46] Even when “cultural imperialism” as a concept is abandoned in International Communication in favor of “hybridity” or “critical transculturalism,”[47] a work clearly influenced by Naficy’s writings on exilic culture, that critical orientation remains the thrust of the analysis.

At the heart of the literature in International Communication on “cultural imperialism,” and all the issues this label signifies, is the question of the encounter between cross-cultural content (e.g., Hollywood products) and audiences in foreign markets. If the cultural imperialism thesis has enjoyed such longevity, even as it has faced criticism, it is because there has always been a need for a critical enterprise that could address enduring structural asymmetry in international communication. Some of the critics of this thesis have tended to ignore that imbalance and the asymmetry (production and distribution). Instead, they have provided evidence about “active audiences” and their reading strategies, and how audiences might use such content as a “forum” to discuss local values (reception).[48] However, these accounts have tended to be largely sociological or ahistorical. Naficy’s work on cinematic spectatorship in the Third World, and his examination of “postcolonial discourse on cinematic first contacts” provide a compelling response to this cross-cultural encounter, one that is historically informed media theory and anchored in the “post-colonial” literature with the critical orientation of Cultural Studies.[49]

To state it briefly, Naficy’s approach takes into account not just production and distribution, but also reception of cross-cultural content all within a historically grounded framework. Explaining Iran’s relationship to colonial powers, Naficy argues that “Westernization was not so much imposed or injected from the outside as it became structured in dominance.” In the aftermath of the constitutional revolution of Iran (1906-11), “much of the new constitution and many of the laws and legislative, judicial, and executive bodies for the parliamentary monarchy were adapted from European models.”[50] In his analysis, “Westernization won over the traditional systems of thought and became overdetermined, that is, dispersed throughout the emerging modern but oppressive apparatuses and ideological institutions.”[51] In this historical context of first contacts, Naficy proposes a self-othering theory that deploys Lacanian “alienating identification paradigm to speculate about the manner in which early Iranian audiences were hailed by and haggled with Western films.”[52] Naficy’s account of “hailing the spectators” and “haggling with the movie” uses Althusserian notion of hailing in the formation of the subject’s identity (the effect of viewing technology and context) in self-othering, and “haggling” to establish local appropriations of the content in different ways. As he puts it, those are strategies “by which Iranian audiences interrupted, talked back to, translated, dubbed, fetishized, objectified, and haggled with the movies and the movie stars, transformed the cinema’s ‘work’ from one of hailing to haggling.”[53] In short, by “thus engaging with the movies, the spectators were no longer just their consumers but also the producers of their meanings.”[54] In Naficy’s analysis, the notion of an “active audience,” prevalent in International Communication literature, is fully contextualized in historical, theoretical and empirical terms.

Concluding Remarks

I have to admit that the task I had set myself up at the outset, that of writing a paper in which I draw connections between different writings of Hamid Naficy in order to re-present or reimagine them written from an International Communication perspective, proved to be more challenging than I had anticipated. I believe there are many more connections to make than I have space to do in a single paper. That is largely a testament to the scholarship that is before us: his is prolific, complex, challenging, theoretically-rich, and historically-informed. He might start with culture or media of Iran as a question, but he explains Iran in the process in the most illuminating manner possible. He has produced scholarship on a wide range of topics, many of which cover the Middle Eastern and Iranian cinema. I have argued that viewing his professional identity as a “film scholar,” and even as the foremost authority on Iranian cinema, might be accurate but it is too parochial and restrictive. In order to do that, I have written from a specific disciplinary location to show how his work is interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary, occupying a space at the intersection of Cultural Studies, “post-colonial” theory, and media theory, fields that have “interdisciplinary” status themselves. The connection between these areas is tied to specific articulations of borders, belonging, Otherness, (trans)national imaginary, states of liminality, movements of populations and the broader question of culture’s relationship to power and geopolitics. I made that argument by indexing Naficy’s work to a range of scholarly preoccupations (concepts, theories, topics) that have remained central to the field of International Communication in its history. That indexing works because the objects, institutions, and phenomena he writes about (e.g., cinema) are essentially and at once local and global (international). Another reason it works is that he writes about populations that are displaced, on the move or othered. Above all, Naficy’s oeuvre is best explained beyond the confines of cinema studies precisely because it engages and inhabits borders, and embodies the porosity of borders of various kind. His work, perhaps like his self, the kid from Isfahan roaming the city with his father’s Kodak Brownie box camera, is not “homeless” as much as he is at “home” everywhere.

[1]Meghan Morris, “Banality in Cultural Studies” in Logics of Television: Essays in Cultural Criticism, ed. P. Mellencamp (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 15.

[2]M. Semati, “Introduction” in New Frontiers in International Communication Theory, ed. M. Semati (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield). 1-16.

[3]J. Peters, “Genealogical Notes on “The Field,” Journal of Communication 43, no. 4 (1993): 132.

[4]Ibid., 132.

[5]Ibid., 133.

[6]Although he had presented elements of this social history in other works, the four volumes of A Social History of Iranian Cinema (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011, 2012) present the most comprehensive account.

[7]H. Naficy, A Social History of Iranian Cinema, vol. 3, The Artisanal Era, 1897-1941 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), xxi-xxii.

[8]Ibid., 10.

[9]H. Naficy, A Social History of Iranian Cinema, vol.3, The Islamicate Period, 1977-1984 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011).

[10]Ibid., 138.

[11]See H. Naficy, “Faster Than a Speeding Bullet, More Powerful Than a Locomotive: Mutual Instrumentalization of Culture, Cinema, and Media by Iran and the United States,” in Media, Power and Politics in the Digital Age: The 2009 Presidential Election Uprising in Iran, ed. Y. Kamalipour (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2010), 205-220.

[12]Ibid., 206.

[13]Ibid., 213.

[14]The term “Irangeles” was memorialized as the title of a book of essays about this community, published in 1993. See R. Kelley and J. Friedlander, eds., Irangeles: Iranians in Los Angeles (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993). Naficy’s contribution to this volume (325-364) is a concise introduction to the “popular culture of Iranian exiles in Los Angeles”, covering a wide range range of genres, artists and practices. See also H. Naficy, “The Making of Exile Cultures: Iranian Television in Los Angeles (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press).

[15]Naficy, “Faster Than a Speeding Bullet,” 205-220.

[16]See H. Naficy, “Narrowcasting and Diaspora: Middle Eastern Television in Los Angeles,” in The Media of Diaspora ed. K. Karim (London: Routledge, 2003), 51-62; see also H. Naficy, “Theorizing ‘Third World’ Film Spectatorship: The Case of Iran and Iranian Cinema,” in Rethinking Third Cinema, ed. A. R. Guneratne and W. Dissanayake (New York: Routledge, 2003), 181-201.

[17]Naficy, “Narrowcasting and Diaspora,” 51.

[18]Ibid., 52.

[19]Ibid., 52.

[20]For a comprehensive treatment of this genre, see Naficy’s book, The Making of Exile Cultures: Iranian Television in Los Angeles. [See n. 15.]

[21]Ibid., 53.

[22]For a discussion of flows, see M. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, vol. 1 (2nd ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010). Readers might be familiar with the equally influential idea of “scapes” (ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, finanscapes and ideoscapes) in A. Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).  For a discussion of flows and contra-flows, see D. Thussu, “Mapping Global Media Flow and Contra-Flow,” in D. Thussu, ed., Media on the Move: Global Flow and Contra-Flow (London: Routledge, 2007), 10-29.

[23]Thussu, “Mapping Global Media Flow and Contra-Flow.”

[24]Ibid., 10.

[25]H. Naficy, “Between Rocks and Hard Places: The Interstitial Mode of Production in Exilic Cinema,” in Home, Exile, Homeland: Film, Media, and the Politics of Place, ed. H. Naficy (New York: Routledge, 1999), 125-147.

[26]H. Naficy, “Teaching Accented Cinema as a Global Cinema,” in Teaching Film, ed. L. Fischer and P. Petro (New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 2012),  112-118.

[27]Ibid., 112.

[28]See H. Naficy, “Exile Discourse and Televisual Fetishization,” Quarterly Review of Film and Video 13, nos. 1-3 (1991): 85-116; H. Naficy, An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001; H. Naficy, “Teaching Accented Cinema as a Global Cinema,” in Teaching Film, ed. L. Fischer & P. Petro (New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 2012), 112–118; H. Naficy, “Iranian Émigré Cinema as a Component of Iranian National Cinema,” in Media, Culture and Society in Iran: Living with Globalization and the Islamic State, ed. M. Semati (New York: Routledge, 2008), 167–192.

[29]Naficy, An Accented Cinema, 4.

[30]Ibid., 4.

[31]Ibid., 4.

[32]Ibid., 4.

[33]Ibid., 10.

[34]H. Naficy, “Identity Politics and Iranian Exile Music Videos,” Iranian Studies 31, no.1 (1998): 51-64.

   [35]I highlight two major interventions here: H. Naficy, “Mediating the Other: American Pop Culture Representation of Post-revolutionary Iran”, in The US Media and the Middle East: Image and Perception, ed. Y. Kamalipour (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995), and H. Naficy and T. Gabriel, Otherness and the Media: The Ethnography of the Imagined and the Imaged (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Press, 1993). Naficy and Gabriel edited a special issue of Quarterly Review of Film and Video 13, nos. 1-3 (1990). The issue sold out quickly and it was revised, expanded and published as an edited volume in 1993, titled, “Otherness and the Media: The Ethnography of the Imagined and the Imaged.”

[36]Ibid., ix.

[37]It should be pointed out that in the United States, Communication departments became the institutional home for British Cultural Studies as it crossed the Atlantic. Here Stuart Hall’s work on culture and “authoritarian populism” (among other topics) was one connection between Communication and post-structuralist theory, albeit theory as “detour.” See Stuart Hall, “Popular-democratic Versus Authoritarian Populism,” in Marxism and Democracy, ed. A. Hunt (London: Laurence and Wishart, 1980), 157–187 and S. Hall, The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left (London: Verso, 1988).

[38]Ibid.

[39]Ibid., x.

[40]In his anthology titled, Home, Exile, Homeland: Film, Media, and the Politics of Place, Naficy collects into one volume important contributions from established scholars across disciplinary borders.

[41]Naficy, “Mediating the Other.”

[42]Ibid., 74.

[43]Ibid., 74.

[44]H. Naficy, “Self-Othering: A Postcolonial Discourse on Cinematic First Contact,” in The Pre-occupation of Post-colonial Studies, ed. F. Afzal-Khan and K. Seshadri-Crooks (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 292-310; H. Naficy, “Theorizing ‘Third World’ Film Spectatorship: The Case of Iran and Iranian Cinema,” in Rethinking Third Cinema, ed. A. R. Guneratne and W. Dissanayake, 181-201.

[45]Naficy has produced more recent scholarship in media theory that is of interest to International Communication, although limitations of space prevent me from discussing them here. Here are two examples: see H. Naficy, “From Accented Cinema to Multiplex Cinema,” in Convergence Media History (New York: Routledge, 2009), 3-13 for a discussion of “multiplex cinema”, the “emergence of a new mainstream cinema in the USA and Europe in our current moment of post-diasporic, post-internet, postmodern neoliberal globalization” (3); see also H. Naficy, Early Popular Visual Culture 6 , no. 2 (2008): 97-102 for the introduction of a theory of regional cinemas.

[46]Given the uneven “flow” of culture at the global level, it is inevitable that any literature addressing it will have to address this critical orientation. For an appraisal of this argument and a comprehensive treatment of the discourse of cultural imperialism, see J. Tomlinson, Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction (New York: Continuum, 1991). For an alternative to media imperialism or to hybridity perspective, see M. Semati and P. Sotirin, “Hollywood’s Trans-national Appeal: Hegemony and Democratic Potential?,” Journal of Popular Film and Television 26, no. 4 (1997): 176-188.

[47]M. Kraidy, Hybridity, or the Cultural Logic of Globalization (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2005).

[48]For two classic and influential examples of this evidence and research, see E. Katz and T. Liebes, “Mutual Aid in the Decoding of Dallas: Preliminary Notes from a Cross-cultural Study,” in Television in Transition, ed. P. Drummond and R. Paterson (London: BFI, 1986), 187-198, and I. Ang, Watching Dallas: Soap Opera and the Melodramatic Imagination (London: Methuen, 1985).

[49]See Naficy, “Theorizing ‘Third World’ Film Spectatorship,” and “Self-Othering.”

[50]Naficy, “Self-Othering,” 294.

[51]Ibid., 295.

[52]Ibid., 296.

[53]Naficy, “Theorizing ‘Third World’ Film Spectatorship,”190-191.

[54]Ibid., 191.

An Iranian Female Vampire Walks Home Alone and Disturbs Freud’s Oedipal Masculinity

cover

Introduction

A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night (Dokhtari dar shab tanhā be khāne miravad, 2014)[1] is tagged as the first Iranian vampire feminist romance. This debut feature by Anna Lily Amirpour is set in a fictional Iranian town, called Shahr-e Bad, The Bad City. The opening scene introduces the viewer to Arash, a James Dean look-alike in blue jeans and white T-shirt driving a vintage 1950’s Ford Thunderbird. Arash works as a gardener in rich neighborhoods while taking care of his addicted father. His father owes money to a violent tattooed drug dealer/pimp who takes Arash’s car as payment. The unnamed vampire is a young girl who wears a black flowing chador resembling classic vampire capes. She skateboards the streets of the Bad City at night, targeting “bad” men who are abusive to women and viciously attacks them with her fangs. It is interesting that her fangs grow as she becomes angry and aggressive, or when she is sexually aroused. She meets the pimp Saeed, who is abusive towards a sex worker named Atti. Saeed notices the lonely (vampire) girl and invites her to his house, but while he is trying to seduce her she bites his finger off and brutally kills him. One night the unnamed vampire comes across Arash, dressed as Dracula and high on drugs, stumbling home on his way back from a costume party. The lonesome vampire falls in love with Arash. Later we see Arash, who, fed up with his addicted father, throws him out of their house, who then takes refuge with Atti, the sex worker. He forces Atti to use drugs, which prompts the vampire to kill him. When Arash finds out about the death of his father, he decides to leave the Bad City with the female vampire. The film ends with Arash choosing to leave with the vampire even though he realizes she is his father’s killer.

 

The movie has had mixed reviews. Some have argued that it is an innovative art film for mixing several genres. Despite its entire Iranian cast of characters, Persian dialogue and sound track, and Persian iconography, it has received little or no attention among Iranians. It appears that being a highly stylized film in a genre that is virtually unknown to Iranians has made it rather indecipherable both inside Iran and in the diasporic community outside Iran. Perhaps a black and white vampire flick is expected to have a niche audience outside the confines of Iranian cultural influence. In that case, the exclusively Persian iconography of the film—which cannot be fully appreciated without familiarity with Iran’s political history, its religious, musical, literary and cultural traditions, the intricacies of Persian language, as well as the hybrid culture of the Iranian community of Los Angeles—leaves it open to the charge of self-orientalization. The charge of self-exoticization for the purpose of gaining a foothold in an already established genre may be supported on a few tenuous grounds; for example, Amirpour has candidly expressed her distaste for Iran as “a mess. Medieval. Suffocating.”[2] However, I take a poststructuralist stance and bypass discussions about the significance of the “author”, and speculations about her motives.

 

It could be argued that this is a feminist film for staging a lead female actor as the dominant subject with independent agency, identity and desire.[3] She is not a “projection of male values,” or a “vehicle of male fantasies,” or a “scapegoat of male fears.”[4] The film surely passes the Bechdel test, a test that despite its humorous roots (it started as a joke) can be used as a serious critical tool. The Bechdel test measures the mere presence of women in a film. To pass this test, a film must meet two of these three simple conditions: (1) there be at least two women in it, (2) who talk to each other (3) about anything other than men.[5] However, I will argue that the significance of A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night exceeds limited categorization as a vampire movie or a feminist art film. Perhaps reading a feminist agenda into this film has more to do with certain reviewers’ inclinations than the intention of its director.[6] In any event, the goal of this paper is not to settle this debate. It is to examine the ways in which masculinities are deconstructed and reconstituted as spectacle in this film, and in the process the patriarchal boundaries of pleasure are remapped and circulation of desire is destabilized. I will use feminist psychoanalytic film theory as an analytical tool to guide my inquiry. Theoretical efficacy of this perspective remains in its deconstructive trajectory. As Laura Mulvey states, it is “a political weapon, demonstrating the way the unconscious of patriarchal society” structures cinematic representations.[7] However, this theory leaves the specific contours of an alternative feminist counter-cinema unarticulated. Should a feminist counter-cinema embrace patriarchal techniques of representation or develop its own cinematic language? Can a feminist counter-cinema dismantle the visual regimes of patriarchal power relation and still remain faithful to aesthetics of visual pleasure? I will argue that by engaging these questions this film enhances our understanding of feminist film theory by instantiating an example of a feminist counter-cinema. It is also significant that exclusively Persian iconography of this film broadens debates within feminist film theory to include subjects (such as Muslim women, Iranian art and culture) whose epistemological roots extend beyond the horizons of Europe and the Americas. This film unsettles constructed boundaries that separate European from non-European subjects. As will be discussed below, this film does not offer a new model of masculinity outside the heterosexual patriarchal regime of representation and sexual identification. Rather, it uses patriarchal representational tools and tactics to produce a rupture in the purportedly homogeneous edifice of Oedipal masculinity, an opening towards yet obscure alternatives, the contours of which cannot be known in advance.

 

Feminist Psychoanalytic Film Theory and the Magic of Cinema

The mainstream cinema positions women as spectacles, objects of the male gaze, fantasies and pleasures and secondary or incidental to the narrative. When they speak to other women—if they ever do—it is hardly about anything other than men. The male gaze often positions the spectator to identify with the male protagonist. It reduces the female spectator to either enjoy adopting the male point of view or be reduced to the passive, often erotic, object of the spectacle. This is what Mulvey in her influential essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” calls “castration.”[8] The “pleasure” referred to in the title of Mulvey’s influential essay is a reference to the “scopophilic” pleasure that is controlled by the male and directed at the female, a concept Mulvey borrows from Freud.[9] Scopophilia operates either as sexually charged voyeuristic or narcissistic pleasure produced through spectator’s identification with the male point of view or the male protagonist. Just as an uncoordinated, helpless, speechless infant whose ego boundaries are yet to be formed recognizes his own image in the mirror as an “ideal ego,” a more complete image of himself, perfect and in control, the spectator too identifies with the male image and male point of view projected on the screen.[10] The results are fantasies of power, mastery and control, which hold a deep appeal for the human psyche. Freudian psychoanalysis explains that as humans we are haunted by a “lack” in the core of our being, a state of radical dependency and disempowerment at birth. This original lack of control, fragmentation and vulnerability in infancy on an individual level parallels the original lack and chaos on a cultural level. We are compelled to cover that originary lack through creative processes that create desires, religions, stories, myths, arts, fantasies, images and power structures such as patriarchy—none of which are pre-given. In the process we become subjects in what Jacques Lacan terms the “symbolic order.”[11] Theoretically this is articulated as a process of “suturing,” that is literally cutting and editing of the film which results in a desired and coherent narrative. Whether it is on a personal or a cultural level, the goal is to structure ego formation, but because the recognition of the self in the mirror (of whatever creative medium is employed: film, culture, etc.) is a misrecognition, the result is the fixation of the ego, closure of creative process and alienation of the subject. It is with reference to this split or alienation within the subject that the ego is held to be founded upon “imaginary, narcissistic, specular identification.”[12]

 

The signifier of the lack and desire to overcome it is the phallus, a symbolic configuration that represents an unattainable wholeness. No one can have the phallus, which means the universal lack is no other than symbolic “castration,” the condition that characterizes both male and female subjectivities. Therefore, as the privileged signifier which has no signified, the phallus should theoretically lead to an open process of creativity.[13] But in a self-serving patriarchal context, where the aim is to give order and fixed meaning, the open-ended process of meaning production is brought to a closure by binding the operations of the phallus entirely to the image of the castrated female. Mulvey writes: “An idea of woman stands as linchpin to the system: it is her lack that produces the phallus as a symbolic presence, it is her desire to make good the lack that the phallus signifies.”[14] Thus, in mainstream cinema woman is a mirror for the male’s sense of lack and loss. The projection of lack and fragmentation on woman has deep roots for example in the Bible and Islamic tradition.[15] It is upon the woman that the sense of alienation resulting from the misrecognition of the self in the “mirror” is projected. Hence, in order to successfully enter the patriarchal symbolic order, requisite acknowledgement of the female as a castrated subject is followed by distancing oneself from the female and all that is considered to be feminine. Cinematically this is rehearsed in every “buddy” movie in which the celebration of male bonding and comradery is contingent upon severing the bond with significant women in men’s lives (like mothers or wives). Michael Kimmel observes, “The male bonding celebrated in these films is a defensive reaction to patriarchal masculine failure; the men turn to each other because the world (and women) has failed them.”[16] However, male bonding is always through acts of power, domination and control and never translates into relationships of nurturing, caring and intimacy. Ostentatious homophobia, sexism, racism, and willingness to do violence are ways to ward off fears that male homosocial bonding may lead to homosexuality. The narcissistically male-centered “bromance” of modern pop culture, “an emotionally intense bond between presumably straight males who demonstrate openness to intimacy that they neither regard, acknowledge, avow, nor express sexually,”[17] is matched by its premodern institutionalized version of it, for example in Sufi brotherhoods of Perso-Islamic world.[18]

 

Against this background we can ask, what does a feminist counter-cinema look like? Earlier theorists like Mulvey dogmatically advocated for disregarding the classical techniques of cinema. They argued for the development of specific aesthetics of feminist experimental film and counter cinema. Their goal was to de-couple the look of the camera from the male gaze and develop specific aesthetics of feminist experimental film even if this meant doing away with visual pleasure.[19] Later on, feminist theorists like E. Ann Kaplan highlighted the heterogeneity and complexity of the narrative mainstream cinema, and argued that feminist cinema should use traditional filmic means, the master’s tool, so to speak, to dismantle the master’s house.[20] Teresa de Lauretis famously argued that instead of destroying narrative and visual pleasure, feminist cinema should exploit the manipulative power of cinema, to be “narrative and oedipal with a vengeance.”[21] In other words, instead of discarding narrative and conventional forms of pleasure in favor of the feminist content of a radical avant-garde cinema, feminist cinema should embrace female desire as well as contradictions of Oedipal scenario. A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night does precisely that.

 

Picture1

 

Enter the Vampire

A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night is a highly stylized and visually pleasing film to the point that many reviewers perceive an over-emphasis on visual pleasure at the expense of “substance”.[22] The film locates itself along the continuum of the horror genre depicting monsters lurking in the shadows or symbolically within our own beings—the graffiti word vahshat, meaning “horror” in Persian, is clearly visible in several scenes. Susan Hayward writes that after its heyday in the 1930’s, vampires disappeared after World War Two, but briefly came back during the 70’s in a more romantic light deserving love and affection. The AIDS epidemic of the 80’s caused vampire films to disappear, only to reappear in the 90’s.[23] Interestingly the early twentieth century Count Dracula movies used a female vampire as the first prototype of this genre. In these movies women were the predatory beasts with lesbian inclinations instead of bloodsucking killers of men.[24] However, female vampires were exceptions not the norm; vampire films centered on the male. The last literary female vampire was noted in a novel written in 1871.[25] A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night does not easily fit into the categories that compose post-war horror films. It is not a psychological horror (like Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho, 1960), and it is not a massacre movie (like The Texas Chainsaw Massacre, 1974). More importantly, she does not stand for maternal plenitude, relegating lack to a distant memory. She is not the mother who satisfies the infant’s every desire and serves the sadistic aesthetics of his desire. The question of her position in the existing relations of patriarchal spectatorship is posed by Atti, the sex worker surrogating as the mother, when she asks the vampire: “What are you?” What is significant about horror films is that they are better reflections of the ideological positions of their time. Because they “are linked to the unconscious they can represent that which other genres repress.”[26] For example, Hitchcock’s horror films of the 50’s had Cold War resonances where the “red-scare” mentality led Americans to seriously doubt believing who people claimed to be. The Massacre/slasher movies of 70’s were a backlash against the feminist movement of the time.[27] In the post 9/11 era, in addition to popular films (on zombies, epidemic infections, etc.), a whole range of media exploited fear as a political and marketing tool. For example, “fear permeate[ed] television ads running the gamut from antibacterial soap to SUVs, [and] institutional emergency notification systems.”[28] Real or imaginary Muslims have a special place among post-9/11 monsters and apocalyptic films. Sophia Arjana writes: “Movies provided a vehicle for Muslim monsters to be displayed, and, I would argue, they continue to serve as the most dominant cultural force in the modern American milieu—a space in which Muslim monsters continue to be generated.”[29] Muslims as feared monsters infecting European bodies and borders, corrupting bloodlines has deep roots in the medieval Europe and earlier, providing “an important tool,” as Arjana notes, “for understanding the history of Christian-Muslim relations.”[30] In rare cases when a Muslim female appears as a villain, she is often under the control of malevolent men—Nazis, Arabs, or other irredeemable types.[31]

 

To be sure, there are no explicit references to Islam or Muslims in the film, but as Megan Goodwin observes, “Given the marked Iranian influences throughout the film, Islam is conspicuous in its absence.”[32] In light of the “pervasiveness of Islamic influence in contemporary Iranian culture” that Goodwin speaks of, we can take the chador-wearing character of the vampire in this film as a departure from the Orientalist trope of submissive Muslim women in need of saving from brown men’s tyranny. Yet, she is not a violent feminist bent on the retributive violence. Her brutal killings, as in the cases of the pimp and Arash’s father, takes place with a moral clarity. She does pose a potential threat to all men. For example, in a significant scene she confronts a young boy, asking him if he is a “good boy.” When he answers that he is indeed a good boy, she threatens him and warns him that she will be watching him until the end of his life. Then she steals his skateboard.

 

If there is one prominent theme in this film, it would be the gaze. The gaze is a relation to power, leading Mulvey to conclude that the gaze of the camera is a “male gaze.”[33] Goodwin perceptively points out the disruption of the male gaze in this film “reflects neither heterosexual male desire nor Western fantasies of ‘good Muslims.’”[34] The vampire with her prominent black eyes accentuated by the lighting and her chador is not a passive object of the gaze. She is author of the gaze, returning the male gaze and making men uncomfortable. She is seen literally watching men of the city, keeping them under her own surveillance and punishing them when necessary. Her gaze and her character are the primary subject of the film, controlling the other characters and carrying the narrative to the extent that invites the spectator’s identification with her point of view. At one point, Arash’s father, while walking across the street parallel to the vampire, becomes very uncomfortable when he notices he is being followed. He stops and asks her: “What are you looking at?” When the vampire is the object of the pimp’s sexualized gaze and follows him to his apartment, the return of the gaze takes a violent turn. In this elongated pivotal scene, the pimp snorts cocaine to the sound of soft music as the vampire watches. Then he starts to dance slowly as he approaches the vampire. The vampire still in her chador stands motionless as the pimp run his fingers over her face while gyrating to the sound of music. In a sexually charged gesture she gently opens her mouth and the pimp slowly puts his finger in her mouth (no doubt his finger metonymically stands in for his penis). This is when his half open eyes gazing into the vampire’s eyes change to express horror and pain as she bites his finger off. She then proceeds to retributively violate him by shoving the severed finger into his mouth and kill him as he screams in agonizing pain. The male gaze is “disciplined” in another scene as well. When Arash’s father forces Atti to dance for him, sexually objectifying her body, he is murdered by the vampire.

 

Picture2

 

The vampire locates herself within the patriarchal cinematic order where all subjectivities are arranged according to the male point of view. However, by carrying the narrative and authoring the gaze, that is to say, by being the protagonist of the story, she subverts the male-centred conventions of cinema. More importantly, having the instrument of power and violence, that is, her vampire fangs that grow at the moment of her anger and arousal, she claims the power of the phallus. Of course, no one can have the phallus, which is precisely the meaning of lack and castration. The symbolic castration marks both sexes. The concealed phallus symbolizes an always absent guarantee of universality. It is precisely in its absence that the phallus in the Lacanian model can fulfill its potential function of freeing the signifying process and subject formation from the closed confines of cultural formations.[35] Yet it comes as no surprise that through obfuscated epistemic fault lines that separate the biological organ, the penis, from its unpresentable symbolic correlate, the phallus, male subjects deny their own castration. The result of this imaginary equation between the penis and the phallus is the spectacle which comprises the stuff of “dominant fiction” in a patriarchal society: “the images and stories through which a society configures consensus, images which films draw upon and help to shape … an imaginary equation between the penis and the phallus, which cements the male subject’s identification with power and privilege.”[36]

 

The vampire does not contest the phallocentric regime of signification, but works within its limits. She decouples the epistemological dependence of the phallus on the penis. As if the script was written à la Judith Butler, the film demonstrates that the penis does not have to always be the one and only privileged referent of the phallus and its signifying function, even though this privilege is always pre-emptively negated.[37] The phallus could symbolize other body parts, such as the vampire’s fangs, a functional metonymy for the penis. This is evident when her fangs are “erected” in what can only be interpreted as sexual arousal. In a sexually charged scene, Arash pierces the vampire’s earlobes with the pin of earrings at her own request. The vampire’s retractable fangs instantiate the same capacity for “turgidity,” which makes the penis uniquely favored to be a phallic organ.[38] The power of her fangs establishes her as the “phallic woman.” This is a departure from mainstream horror films in which penile instruments (such as knives and chainsaws) are used as “phallus replacement or substitute” for re-castrating the female in order to establish an independent/self-sufficient male subject.[39] Therefore, A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night recuperates that lost “radical political edge of gore cinema.”[40] The power of signification (meaning production as well as frightening, killing, and establishing her difference as vampire) rests on the vampire’s phallic power, signified by her fangs. She is therefore the “other” fully invested with the power of otherness, unravelling the self-referential narcissistic fiction of male subjectivity.

 

Masculinities

Displacing the penis from its privileged position as the primary referent of the phallus would have been enough to make this film a “feminist flick.” The narrative could have followed Butler’s theoretical insight that the displacement of the penis underscores the viability of the “lesbian phallus,” a potentially castrating formulation that Butler admits is contradictory in itself. The lesbian phallus parodies the dependency of the phallus on the penis as its one and only anatomical occasion, showing that the stabilizing effect of the phallus is entirely based on a reified phallus-penis relationship.[41] Butler writes: “In a sense, the simultaneous acts of deprivileging the phallus and removing it from the normative heterosexual form of exchange, and recirculating and reprivileging it between women deploys the phallus to break the signifying chain in which it conventionally operates.”[42] However, A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night takes a different route. Remaining phallocentric and decidedly heterosexual in its staging of desire and visual pleasures makes this particularly relevant to constructions of masculinity.

 

One of the male characters in this film, the pimp, is the first to be killed by the vampire, and in the most brutal manner. The pimp’s genealogy may be traced back to the popular “tough-guy” character of pre-revolutionary Iranian cinema who remains one of the two Iranian mimic figures that have been successfully transplanted into the exilic cultural sphere (the other is the perennial racist blackface figure of Haji Firuz).[43] But unlike the tough-guy type (whose historical roots go back to the premodern tradition of altruistic chivalry)[44], the pimp is more comparable to its counterpart in American pop culture, particularly in Blaxploitation films and Gangsta rap. The uncanny similarities between the pimp’s personal style in A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night and the stereotypical pimp of American cinema who is fond of “theatricality” is worth noting here.[45] Like a more grotesque hence darker imitation of his African American prototype, the pimp in this film could be a signifier of young Iranian men’s struggle to come to terms with their masculinity. The pimp’s carefully trimmed facial hair and tattoos, especially his prominent tattoo of jaakesh (“pimp”) in Farsi on the side of his head, and the huge Farvahar across his chest (a symbol borrowed from the Zoroastrian faith implying nationalistic-racial supremacy) could be an expression of displaced masculinity yearning for recognition. Or perhaps he is “a ghettocentric icon of upward mobility” for diasporic masculinities.[46] This is particularly significant in the United States’ body politics that render Iranian men’s diasporic masculinities “overexposed,” to borrow from Shahram Khosravi, to the racialized and securitized gaze of the normative white American culture.[47] Like the young black men in the United States, the pimp may be acting from a position of race and class marginality to acquire some measure of power and control in a subculture that is overinvested in the sexual economy of pimp-whore complex. This is similar to the experience of most black men in the United States, who, according to Cornel West, acquire power “by stylizing their bodies over space and time in such a way that their bodies reflect their uniqueness and provoke fear in others.”[48] West is quick to conclude that even though these acts of “resistance” in a hostile culture impose their own kind of order to chaos, in a society that exalts a “machismo identity” such forms of self-identification are self-defeating because they ultimately support the violent patriarchal status quo.[49] Without a vigilant consciousness of the intersectionality of structures of power, privilege and domination, the risk of reproducing violence and inequality through the very acts of resistance will always remain a possibility. A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night does not glorify the pimp as the prototype of the “bad boy” who is simultaneously feared and desired, but eliminates him as the worst expression of masculinity found in the Bad City.

 

Understanding the pimp’s function in a patriarchal society is important for the significance of the pimp’s violent death in this film. Pimps and patriarchs are different sides of the same coin: “The role pimps expected women to play is merely an imitation of the role patriarchs expect their wives and daughters to play. The passive subordinate demeanor expected of the prostitute is not unlike that demanded of all women in patriarchal society.”[50] The raw violence, charm and dependency of the pimp on “his” women is a brutal reminder of patriarchy’s suppressed underbelly. In psychoanalytical terms the pimp is a symptom of patriarchy, the mirror image of the patriarch. The appearance of the symptom “disturbs the surface of false appearances,” to use Slavoj Zizek’s description.[51] In clinical terms, eliminating the symptom is not good enough because unlike the medical model that views a symptom as an “index” of disease, psychoanalysis takes symptoms as “signifiers” of disease; if one signifier is removed it will simply be replaced by another.[52] The goal of intervention is thus to address the “structures” that give rise to symptoms. The killing of the pimp removes the immediate threat, but he would be easily replaced by another without any threat or disturbance to the structural power of patriarchy that brings about the conditions for his existence in the first place. The vampire’s murder of the pimp and “saving” Arash could lend support to Hamid Dabashi’s creative hypothesis that Iranian culture is essentially a communal Freudian Oedipal complex in reverse. He writes that instead of the son killing the father, in the Iranian cultural context it is the father’s killing of his son that produces the communal guilt and repression and subsequently takes on cosmic and metaphysical proportions. As examples, Dabashi notes the tragic deaths of Hussain, the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson’s death, and its parallel in the mythical deaths of Siavush, the son of King Kavus, as well as Sohrab, son of Rostam, the legendary pre-Islamic folk heroes of Iran.[53] He concludes that to the extent that Iranian culture is imbued with Shi‘ism it is a “son-religion,” which is “subconsciously aware of the guilt of infanticide (a religion of fathers afflicted by the guilt of having killed their son).”[54] By sparing the son killing or being killed by the father and removing the threat of the pimp, the vampire annuls both patricide and infanticide and the subsequent foundational guilt.

 

The structural power of patriarchy is best displayed by the character of the father, who has the most important function of imposing the fundamental principles of all social relations, which Lacan formulates as “the law.”[55] In A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night, it is the father who holds his son Arash in the grips of his power, despite being an addict, sick and begging his son for money (all indications of the intrinsic sickness of patriarchy). Yet his weaknesses would not diminish the key symbolic position of the “father” in what is theoretically articulated as the Oedipal scenario. The Oedipal scenario is “an almost universal principle of the operation of the film in the American cinema.”[56] The father may be a real person, but more significantly this is the paternal function that regulates pleasure, desire, activation of sexual identification, and differentiation.[57] It would not have made a difference if the father in this film was healthy and strong. Even in his sickness, addiction, and desperation, the father exerts his power. The killing of the father by the female vampire in this film is a step towards breaking out of the Oedipal structure of father-child-mother. Contrary to the Oedipal movement of mainstream cinema, which is towards the son entering the patriarchal structure through a direct relation to the father (accepting him, rejecting him, killing him, ignoring or rebelling against him, etc.), the narrative in this film moves the son away from the father of Oedipal scenario towards the female vampire. Instead of shifting the male’s experience of lack onto the figure of a woman who is then punished, possessed or discarded so the son could claim the paternal power, in this film it is the Girl who is the hero with power to terrify, to castrate and control desire and pleasure in the narrative. It is she who is accorded the prohibitive and legislative role, which is reserved for the father in the Oedipal scenario. For example, she violently intervenes in the sexual objectification of the street worker’s body by Arash’s father and Arash is castigated for sexually objectifying a female dancer in a party.

 

Herein lies the significance of the vampire. By stripping the enduring Oedipal scenario of its paternal agency, the vampire shows that desire is not a pre-existing given subsequently moulded and manipulated in film. Desire is a product of the created filmic experience. What and how to desire is created by imposing prohibitions that while confining desire and restricting its parameters, construct it as essentially the desire to transgress. Evan’s explanation of dialectical relationship between the law and desire explains this well: “Desire is essentially the desire to transgress, and for there to be transgression it is first necessary for there to be prohibition.”[58] It follows that if desire is not pre-given; the subject’s relation to desire is not “fixed” either. Therefore, subjective positions conditioned by film, such as the male gaze of the camera, the phallocentric nature of desire, and constructed masculinities do not have to be discarded. Hence, the vampire does not transgress the phallic economy of representation. It is good to be reminded here that transgression is produced by and supports what it purports to subvert. To paraphrase Lacan, transgression is the reverse of the law.[59] The same normative subjective positions that are used in mainstream cinema to narcissistically cover over the split of the subject (and result in the closure of the creative process and the narcissistic identification with the specular image on the screen) could be used to unravel the seamless suturing of Oedipal masculinity into the patriarchal symbolic order. Put differently, the transformative possibilities offered by the vampire are not invented outside of the phallocentric system of signification, but within in. As Mulvey reminds us: “There is no ‘way’ in which we can produce an alternative out of the blue, but we can begin to make a break by examining patriarchy with the tools it provides, of which psychoanalysis is not the only but an important one.”[60] This is demonstrated in the vampire’s killing of the most negative character of the film, the pimp by biting him and violating him with his own severed finger.

 

Considering the vampire as the phallic woman who defies the Oedipal trajectory of the mainstream cinema and the reifying male gaze is particularly significant in relation to the constructed masculinities in this film. She stands alone as the author of her own story, not in relation to any man. As indicated in the film, we do not know what exactly she is, but it is instructive to keep in mind what she is not. She is not Hollywood’s conventional strong female character, “the devouring vamp, origin of a dangerous enjoyment in which every man risks annihilation and against which he has to defend himself by establishing an ever more intimate brotherhood.”[61] Neither is she the “white male fantasy” of “bad girl” who is compelled to confront evil because of the trauma of her killed father; nor is she the “tough daughter” who successfully negotiates “deadly masculinist social scripts, restoring order to the father-son relationships by killing bad fathers and replacing weak sons.”[62] As the phallic woman, the vampire neither represents lack nor the illusory plenitude of fullness where the male spectator can return in order to experience a sense of completion. Neither is she impersonating a man nor “appropriating the penis in fantastical or plastic form.”[63] She remains a heterosexual woman, indicated in the film by her attraction to Arash. We can argue she is a source of visual pleasure for the (heterosexual) female spectator.[64] The source of her strength is precisely her being a fantasy which does not easily fit in the neatly organized Oedipal structure of patriarchy. Being a fantasy does not mean the vampire is an illusion opposing a correct perception of reality, as if reality could be perceived in a singular way or unmediated access to it were even possible.[65] Being a fantasy means the vampire is discursively constructed, demonstrating that reality too is produced through signifying processes, which means this film is about reality of reflection not a reflection of reality. She deconstructs the operations of the always already male gaze of the camera through which the male spectator in his Oedipal journey identifies with the specular image of the male hero of the mainstream cinema. She exposes the intrinsic flaws of such a journey, its gaps, dissonances, fragilities and lack in the process of image production that must be sutured in order to reflect back a spectacular image of the consolidated male ego. The female vampire with her phallic power is a fantasy, but a fantasy that tells the truth about the fantastic construction of Oedipal masculinity. This is perfectly captured in her meeting Arash, wearing a Dracula costume at night, a scene which could have been written according to Lacan’s insight that reality is accessible only through fiction, because reality “is structured like fiction.”[66] Behind the mask of Dracula worn by Arash is not his true self, but his location in the symbolic structure organized around the foundational Oedipal fantasy.

 

Picture3

 

Concluding Scene

The killing of the father by the vampire is not an intrinsically radical gesture—after all, the guilt of killing the father in the Oedipus myth makes his memory even stronger. However, it is the killing of the father that presents the opportunity for breaking out of the Oedipal impasse. In the concluding scenes of the film Arash is leaving the Bad City on a dark night with the vampire in his fancy car. When he notices that his dead father’s cat is among the vampire’s belongings, he realizes that his father was killed by the vampire. He is faced with a choice of either claiming a righteous rage and revenging his father’s death, or accepting the vampire as his liberator. The former option is a scripted reaction expected of him if he is to take his father’s position in the symbolic order and thus perpetuate Oedipal masculinity. It necessitates possessing or punishing the female, projecting lack and disempowerment unto her, and distancing himself from all that is feminine in order to secure a space for himself in the patriarchal power structure. But Arash chooses the vampire, gets in the car, and together they leave the Bad City. They disappear into the darkness, like the heroes of a Western movie, riding into the sunset. Whereas the hero of a Western film leaves the town folks and “the woman” behind, in A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night the female vampire, the primary agent of the story, rides into the darkness with the only good man of the city. The lone gunman of the Western film continues his journey alone after killing the villains, but the vampire drives away with Arash to where we can imagine it to be a better place, but the coordinates of which cannot be known in advance. Just as the gunman of a Western film riding into the sunset signifies the unfinished conquest of the West, the vampire and Arash disappearing into the darkness allude to the defeat and displacement of patriarchy as yet an unfinished project.

 

The solution offered by the vampire, therefore, is a modest one. She offers the young man a way out of the constraints of Oedipal deadlock (symbolic prohibitions of desire resulting from the father’s intervention, which become even stronger in the event of patricide). This “way out” is not a roadmap to a pre-Oedipal mother-child-phallus location where the son joins with the inaccessible object of his desire represented by the mother, who then satisfies his every need. That would have infantilized the son and required him to be the phallus for the mother, who presumably would be envious of men’s power (represented by the penis). Nor does the vampire in herself represent plenitude. She too is marked by lack; otherwise, she would not desire. She is both a phallic woman capable of castrating men, and vulnerable and flawed in her desire for Arash. The way out is simply an opening towards the unknown, a transformative open-ended possibility afforded by the phallus but foreclosed by the Oedipal deadlock.

[1]A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night, Vice Media, http://films.vice.com/a-girl-walks-home/. All images in this article are the property of Vice Media.

[2]Quoted in Megan Goodwin, “When the Vampire Looks: Gender and Surveillance in A Girl Walks Home Alone At Night,” Mizan, 18 April 2016, available at www.mizanproject.org/pop-post/when-the-vampire-looks/#_ftnref8.

[3]Julianne Escobedo Shepherd, “Watch the Trailer For the First-Ever Iranian Feminist Vampire Western,” Jezebel, 27 October 2014, available at http://jezebel.com/watch-the-trailer-for-the-first-ever-iranian-feminist-v-1651418042; Laura Barcella, “The Feminist Vampire Movie That Teaches ‘Bad Men’ a Gory Lesson,” Jezebel, 25 November  2014, available at http://jezebel.com/the-feminist-vampire-movie-that-teaches-bad-men-a-gory-1662788544; Holly L. Derr, “A Feminist Guide to Horror Movies, Part 7: New Beginnings,” Ms. Blog, 27 October 2015, available at http://msmagazine.com/blog/2015/10/27/a-feminist-guide-to-horror-movies-part-7-new-beginnings/.

[4]Molly Haskell, From Reverence to Rape: The Treatment of Women in the Movies, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 39, in Christa van Raalte, “No Small-Talk in Paradise: Why Elysium Fails the Bechdel Test, and Why We Should Care,” in Media, Margins and Pop Culture, ed. Einar Thorsen, Heather Savigny, Jenny Alexander and Daniel Jackson (New York: Palgrave, 2015), 15-27.

[5]Raalte, “No Small-Talk in Paradise,” 16-17.

[6]See Goodwin, “When the Vampire Looks.”

[7]Laura Mulvey, Visual and Other Pleasures (New York: Palgrave, 1989), 14.

[8]Mulvey, Visual and Other Pleasures, 14.

[9]Mulvey, Visual and Other Pleasures, 16.

[10]Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton and Company, 1977), 2.

[11]Synonymous with language, the symbolic order for Lacan is the most important register of the unconscious that governs all manners of exchange. See Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (New York: Routledge, 1996), 203-223.

[12]James J. DiCenso, The Other Freud: Religion, Culture and Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1999), 45, fn. 60.

[13]Jane Gallop, Reading Lacan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 140.

[14]Mulvey, Visual and Other Pleasures, 14.

[15]Regina M. Schwartz, The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 113-114; for a discussion of the projection of lack and fragmentation on woman in Islamic tradition, see Mahdi Tourage, “Towards the Retrieval of the Feminine from the Archives of Islam,” International Journal of Zizek Studies 6, no. 2 (2012): 1-25.

[16]Michael Kimmel, Manhood in America: A Cultural History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 207.

[17]Michael DeAngelis, Reading the Bromance: Homosocial Relationships in Film and Television (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2014), 1.

[18]Amanullah De Sondy, The Crisis of Islamic Masculinities (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 162.

[19]Mulvey, Visual and Other Pleasures, 25.

[20]Anneke Smelik, “What Meets the Eye: Feminist Film Studies,” in Women’s Studies and Culture: A Feminist Introduction, ed. Rosemarie Buikema and Anneke Smelik (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1993), 71.

[21]Teresa de Lauretis, Technologies of Gender: Essays on Theory, Film and Fiction (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), 108.

[22]For example see Emma Myers, “ND/NF Interview: Ana Lily Amirpour, ” Film Comment, March 19, 2014, available at www.filmcomment.com/blog/interview-ana-lily-amirpour/; and Keiron Tyler, “A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night: Style over Substance in the Supposed ‘Frist Iranian Vampire Western,’” in The Arts Desk, 21 May 2015, available at www.theartsdesk.com/film/girl-walks-home-alone-night.

[23]Susan Hayward, Cinema Studies: The Key Concepts (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 208.

[24]Hayward, Cinema Studies, 204.

[25]Hayward, Cinema Studies, 208.

[26]Hayward, Cinema Studies, 211.

[27]Hayward, Cinema Studies, 209-210.

[28]Jennifer Skinnon, “Redemptive Motherhood and a Discourse of Fear in Contemporary Apocalyptic Film,” available at  www.asc.uw.edu.pl/theamericanist/vol/26/26_57-71.pdf.

[29]Sophia Rose Arjana, Muslims in the Western Imagination (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 6.

[30]Arjana, Muslims in the Western Imagination, 5.

[31]Arjana, Muslims in the Western Imagination, 149.

[32]Goodwin, “When the Vampire Looks.”

[33]Mulvey, Visual and Other Pleasures, 19.

[34]Goodwin, “When the Vampire Looks.”

[35]Lacan explains that the phallus can perform its signifying function only when veiled, “as itself a sign of the latency with which any signifiable is struck, once it is raised (aufgehoben) to the function of signifier.” Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, 288.

[36]Shohini Chaudhuri, Fem Film Theorists: Laura Mulvey, Kaja Silverman, Teresa de Lauretis, Barbara Creed (London, New York: Routledge, 2006), 107.

[37]Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993), 84.

[38]Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, 287.

[39]Hayward, Cinema Studies, 210.

[40]Hayward, Cinema Studies, 210.

[41]Butler, Bodies that Matter, 57-92.

[42]Butler, Bodies that Matter, 88.

[43]Hamid Naficy, The Making of Exile Cultures: Iranian Television in Los Angeles (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 183.

[44]Parviz Jahed, “Film Farsi as Mainstream Cinema,” in Directory of World Cinema: Iran, vol. 10, ed. Parviz Jahed (Bristol, UK: Intellect, 2012), 74.

[45]Christian and Richard Milner, Black Players: The Secret World of Black Pimps (London: King Flex, 1973), 112.

[46]Ronald L. Jackson II, Scripting the Black Masculine Body: Identity, Discourse, and Racial Politics in Popular Media (Albany: SUNY, 2006), 118; Eithne Quinn, Nuthin’ but a “G” Thang: The Culture and Commerce of Gansta Rap (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 122.

[47]Shahram Khosravai¸ “Displaced Masculinity: Gender and Ethnicity among Iranian Men in Sweden,” Iranian Studies 42, no. 4 (2009): 591-609.

[48]Cornel West, Race Matters (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 128.

[49]West, Race Matters, 128.

[50]bell hooks, Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism (New York and London: Routledge, 2015), 109.

[51]Slavoj Zizek, Enjoy Your Symptom! Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out (New York: Routledge, 2008), x.

[52]Evans, An Introductory Dictionary, 86.

[53]Hamid Dabashi, Shiism: A Religion of Protest (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2011), 16.

[54]Dabashi, Shiism, 14.

[55]Evans, An Introductory Dictionary, 101.

[56]Mathew Tinkcom and Amy Villarejo, eds., Keyframes: Popular Cinema and Cultural Studies (London, New York: Routledge, 2001), 13.

[57]Evans, An Introductory Dictionary, 62.

[58]Evans, An Introductory Dictionary, 102.

[59]In Lacan’s formulation, it is desire that is “the reverse of the law.” See Evans, An Introductory Dictionary, 99.

[60]Mulvey, Visual and Other Pleasures, 15.

[61]Paul Verhaeghe, “The Collapse of the Function of the Father and Its Effects on Gender Roles,” in Sexuation, ed. Renata Salecl (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2000), 140.

[62]A. Susan Owen, Sarah R. Stein, and Leah R. Vande Berg, Bad Girls: Cultural Politics and Media Representations of Transgressive Women (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 23-24.

[63]Carellin Brooks, Every Inch a Woman: Phallic Possession, Femininity, and the Text (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), ix.

[64]The disappearance of the female vampire in cinema is pointed out as “a great loss of possible identifications and visual pleasure of female audience.” See Anneke Smelik, “Feminist Film Theory,” The Feminist eZine, available at www.feministezine.com/feminist/film/Feminist-Film-Theory.html.

[65]See Freud’s explanation of “fantasy” in Evans, An Introductory Dictionary, 60-61.

[66]Slavoj Zizek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through Popular Culture (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1992), 18.

Waves of Stasis: Photographic Tendency and a Cinema of Kindness in Kiarostami’s Five (Dedicated to Ozu)

Abbas Kiarostami has often been described as a ciné-poet, an artist who moves between the visual and the lyrical to create a cinematic experience that moves away from “understanding” and dwells in the abstracted space of poetic reflection. His visual poetry is very much linked to a slowness, and often a stillness, that gives time to images rather than stories. While many of Kiarostami’s films feature the qualities of slow cinema, minimalist mise en scènes, long takes, and little to no narrativity, none have been quite as slow as his 2003 documentary, Five Long Takes: Dedicated to Ozu (hereafter Five). [2] The film consists of five long takes, four of which are set on the shores of the Caspian Sea, and one on a beach in Spain. For the most part, Kiarostami’s camera remains still, with periodic movement steered by surrounding winds. The film’s actors include passersby on a boardwalk, a piece of driftwood, a swarm of ducks, a herd of dogs, and several croaking frogs under the moonlight. If seen in its entirety, Five can be experienced as a time compression of a full day, with each take passing from sunrise, morning, afternoon, twilight and nightfall. Each take can be experienced as an extended or moving version of a series of photographic landscapes, each prolonged by the stasis of the camera, allowing the spectator to become attuned to moments that might otherwise be passed over in narrative cinema. Together, these takes compose a poetic reflection that yields no conclusive message or interpretation; instead, sound and images flow with time, some lost to memory, and others more enduring in our frame of consciousness. In this respect, Kiarostami’s spectators are not bound to the director’s intentions, but can link what they have seen or heard to their own dreams, and to creations of their own imagination. This is made possible through the power of Kiarostami’s filmic style, which incorporates sophisticated editing techniques while also remaining open to the contingencies of natural elemental forces. As rightly articulated by Alain Bergala, Five should be seen as “the very essence of the power, of all the powers, of cinema, of those which are used in pursuit of the revelation of reality and equality of those which seek to manipulate it.”[3] The boundaries of illusion and reality are further complicated by Kiarostami’s own receptiveness to the world’s chance opportunities. In Five, Kiarostami is particularly attuned to the temporal motions of the sea, as it poses an alternative temporal arrangement from the experience of narrative forms. By embodying the chance-driven temporality in the making of this film, Kiarostami’s final product is anything but final. Five offers viewers an open-ended temporality that invites reflections on the continuities of life and death, as well as those other vital patterns, unpredictable and hidden. 

Five takes a hybrid form that hovers between experimental art cinema and media installation. Kiarostami intended the film be viewed both as single projection as well as a media installation in five distinct parts.[4] Experiencing the film in both of these registers offers distinct spectator experiences, and yet the fundamental sense that narrative events do not dictate the film’s enduring affective presence remains true to both forms. With no dialogue or human characters, the film instead offers a set of images. How one appreciates these images, at what pace, and in what order, is wholly left to the spectator. What is more, Kiarostami himself rescinds totalizing power from his role as director and opens the film’s making to the unpredictable, the chance-like, and elements that are outside of our anthropocentric dominions of control. The resonances of these five long takes, still and in motion, make up the progression of the film. What is more, the non-diegetic music that emerges between each take stresses the passage of time and expresses the impermanence of the temporal moment that preceded.

Furthermore, the dialectical play between motion and stasis invites a probing of the fixed frame and the representation of photography within the moving image. The movement between the photographic and filmic blurs the boundaries between the two and reflects the porosity of both media, particularly as they relate to the passage of time. The aesthetic of Kiarostami’s moving landscape shots both participate in the temporality of the photographic and subvert readings of these images as purely past tense, even while maintaining traces of loss. This gesture defies narrative structure and allows the film to affect the viewer beyond the temporal constraints of both film and photograph. The experience of watching Five creates a dialectical movement between the conscious and the unconscious, and thus, extends the temporality of the filmic image, beyond the film itself. Moreover, the film posits a contemplative gaze towards the sea, a space whose movement carries its own cyclicality, yet smooth temporalization via flowing movements. The sea offers its own flow of temporality and allows for a counter-spectator experience from conventional narrative structures. By approaching this space as an image of its own making, Five’s photographic attunement allows the spectator to evade normative experiences of representative cinematic time, and enter a space of meditation open to change, as well as the ebbs and flow of life, and of death.

 

  1. Non-narrativity and a Kind Cinema

Kiarostami’s narrative slowness follows a lineage of filmmakers before him, most notably Yasujirō Ozu, to whom he dedicated Five. With a sense of reverence, Kiarostami once remarked on Ozu’s cinematic style, “Ozu’s cinema is a kindly cinema. He values interactions, natural relationships, and the natural human in all his films. His long shots are everlasting and respectful.” Embodying the kindness he cherished in Ozu’s films, Kiarostami’s films are at once poetically layered and still porous to the world. Therefore, they are amenable to a multitude of spectator interpretations. As such, Kiarostami’s filmic grammar does not believe in narrative structures that seek to manipulate or provoke his spectator’s vulnerable and receptive sensorium, instead he offers images imbued with profound kindness. The “kind” cinema Kiarostami espouses is one that trusts his spectators with gaps, and even moments of empty time within the unfolding of the film.

To think further about the landscape images Kiarostami offers his viewers and the ways in which they relate to perception, it will be helpful to explore the narrative compositions Kiarostami is working against. In a discussion regarding the dialectical structure of film, Walter Benjamin evokes the structure of cinema as a dialectic between production and consumption.[5] The consumption of film is a part of the industrial process to the extent that the viewer is operating on a conveyor belt to process a succession of images. In this mode of film spectatorship, the viewer is hitched to the mechanical apparatus of cinema. This mode of filmic experience binds the spectator to character movement and plot development (these gestures are themselves tethered to the apparatus) and likely unfolds in the same way other films of its kind have before, thus producing a shock experience that is both predictable and totalizing. For Benjamin, this relationship to the image on the screen is experienced simultaneously as comfort and as anxiety, comforting because it affirms our normative experience of film viewing and relies on the predictable unfolding of action, as well as anxiety ridden because our heightened sense of impending action relies on a relationship to temporality that constantly anticipates what is next before even fully digesting what preceded it. This mode of narrative storytelling entails staccato movements that leave the viewer anxiously anticipating the next move, bound to the screen, and wholly unaware of, yet manipulated by the film’s temporality. Kiarostami’s films, and Five in particular, free the viewer from such an oversaturation of images and movements of the cinematic event.[6] The concept of the Event carries a multitude of meanings in narrative discourse. For the purpose of this paper, Event is to be understood as a structure of time that captures the viewer and binds them to the narrative unfolding. Namely, the Event constitutes what ends and begins a series of sequencing connected to the temporality of reception. The Event itself evokes grand tropes condensed in time in order to elicit shock and fantasy. Often, linear narrative structures rely on Events to determine what happened in a text or a film. This understanding foregrounds the Event both within the narrative as well as in the reception, thus affecting and homogenizing the phenomenological experience of film viewing. Mary Ann Doane complicates the concept of the event by suggesting; “the event is on the cusp between contingency and structure, history and theory.”[7] Within the structure of cinema (the indexical recording of time), Doane identifies a destabilizing potential imbued with the contingent and the inassimilable.[8] This background is useful to further understand Kiarostami’s defiance of narrative logic and his gravitation towards images, poetic, and static in their form. In turn, Kiarostami’s shift from narrative emplotment offers a sense of respite from the screen and gives significance to the collective experiential participation of his spectators.

Shifting focus from narrative to image permits the spectator to encounter images without preconceived frames of narration. Images become approachable on one’s own affective terrain and sensory experience. By thinning narrative distance, film has at its disposal the capacity to give images a quality of eternal presence, and therefore center spectator experiences. Theodor Adorno takes a hopeful tone in articulating the potentiality of film in his essay “On the Transparencies of Film,”[9] where he explores film as the coalescing of technology and technique. Here, Adorno investigates the use of the photographic in the filmic and more interestingly, the movement of objects through the provocatively static character of certain films such as Antonioni’s La Notte. Kiarostami, like Antonioni, is a filmmaker who makes room for and further invites a spatial and temporal distancing from the continuous flow of images on the screen. This opening of temporality, however, is not as heavily reliant on the Event or pseudo-realism[10] as Adorno has described it. Instead, by creating a “real” realism in making time more salient, the pace of the film allows the audience to doze off for a moment and not feel completely alienated upon return. In a reflection on his aversion to the logic of narrative structure, Kiarostami stated:

I don’t like to engage in telling stories. I don’t like to arouse the viewer emotionally or give him advice. I don’t like to belittle him or burden him with a sense of guilt. Those are the things I don’t like in the movies. I think a good film is one that has a lasting power and you start to reconstruct it right after you leave the theater. There are a lot of films that seem to be boring, but they are decent films. On the other hand, there are films that nail you to the seat and overwhelm you to the point that you forget everything, but you feel cheated later. These are the films that take you hostage. I absolutely don’t like the films in which the filmmakers take their viewers hostage and provoke them. I prefer the films that put their audience to sleep in the theater. I think those films are kind enough to allow you a nice nap and not leave you disturbed when you leave the theater. Some films have made me doze off in the theater, but the same films have made me stay up at night, wake up thinking about them in the morning, and keep on thinking about them for weeks. Those are the kind of films I like.[11]

Here, Kiarostami’s declarative statements aspire to a vision of cinema committed to the spectator’s power to veer off course, precisely because no experiential course has been prescribed. As Kiarostami has himself characterized them, these are the films that allow for deeper and more active contemplation, perhaps throughout the actual viewing of the film, or even days later. In accord with Adorno, such filmic experiences might resemble more precisely the experiences of listening to music or looking at a painting, where the spectator is made conscious of temporal structure, but is not conscripted to mirroring it. Looking back at Five, Kiarostami echoed a similar sensibility in regards to a cinematic experience that “can in some ways form a relationship with poetry or with painting, and thereby free itself from the narrative obligation and the servitude of the director.”[12] It appears that Kiarostami and Adorno share a vision of cinema that simulates and prioritizes a phenomenological experience between spectator and image, rather than merely a relaying of stories (though as Alain Bergala has underlined, stories may very well surface in this type of cinema).

By prioritizing the experience of cinema, Kiarostami’s careful depiction of a day at sea does not determine how the viewer should experience the film. In an interview on the making of Five Kiarostami declared: “I can confidently say that you would not miss anything if you had a short nap. The important thing for me is how you feel once the film is finished, the relaxing feeling that you carry with you after the film ends.”[13] Thus, in experiencing Five— as in the experience of a short nap— the spectator is invited to give into its soothing tranquility. Kiarostami’s emphasis on feeling foregrounds the phenomenological aspects of cinema rather than features of narrative structure or storytelling. As such, the viewer’s ability to seek respite does not suggest the films passivity, but rather a generosity attuned to the world’s contingent and mediated patterns. Alberto Elena has called Kiarostami’s filmmaking “a radical call for a contemplative cinema.”[14] I would agree with this sentiment and also add that while Kiarostami invites contemplation in relation to his films, he also emphasizes the temporal duration of feeling that exceeds the cinematic frame. This is a feeling that you may take with you as you approach and attune yourself to the world outside of the film.

Contemplative cinema offers a relationship to temporality unbound from narrative events, therefore images are not limited to the confines of the film screen but are opened to the outside world. Adorno suggests that the power of film lay in its “uncinematic” capacity to “express, as if with hollow eyes, the emptiness of time.”[15]  In order to go against its technological origins and to channel the “uncinematic,” film must go outside and against its own medium through a consciousness of other mediums, and an opening of the unconscious, as advocated by the surrealists. The image of hollow eyes to which Adorno refers is found both in the artistic expression of filmmaking and its subjective mode of spectator experience. Such a surreal image brings to mind darkness, emptiness, and a seeing without sight. This is the image of dreams and the world of the unconscious. It is such a state of perception that pushes the limits of film’s technique and technology, carries a filmic quality that is interdisciplinary at its core (with a sensibility towards the photographic, the literary, the painterly and the musical), while also expanding the realm of realism from consciousness to the realm of the unconscious.

For film to become a liberated work of art, it should “wrest its a priori collectivity from the mechanisms of unconscious,”[16] and in doing so it will better attune itself to a subjective mode of experience. This type of perceptive experience, untethered to a constraining narrative structure, can be compared to one’s personal experience of the sublime in nature. Reflecting on the dream-like images that surface from this experience, Adorno imagines:

“A person who, after a year in the city, spends a few weeks in the mountains abstaining from all work, may unexpectedly experience colorful images of landscapes consolingly coming over him or her in dreams or daydreams. These images do not merge into one another in a continuous flow, but are rather set off against each other in the course of their appearance, much like the magic lantern slides of our childhood.”[17]

Adorno, like Kiarostami, approaches the image of landscape as a consolatory space of refuge that escapes the continuous flow of narrativity. But the landscapes that turn into dreams for Adorno are not unmediated by the technological qualities of the filmic. Rather, through a meditation of experiences that resist representation, Adorno envisions a radical contemporary cinema that can expand its own technique and relieve its spectator, or even propel her into the realm of the unconscious. In interlacing the literary, the cinematic, and the musical, the experience of viewing a film can open spatio-temporal conceptions of realism.[18] As a result, in becoming an interdisciplinary medium, film can bring to light its various movements and fragmentary images. Adorno’s ideal filmic experience seeks to escape the conventional mimetic impulse and instead enter the collective unconscious, making greater use of formalistic techniques to revivify the discontinuous flow of movements as is intimately tied to the experience of nature.

 

  1. Between Reality and Mediation

Kiarostami has reflected that Five is a film that performs a real realism. In his book on slow cinema, Ira Jaffe writes that in the making of Five, “Kiarostami rehearses his own death as auteur by going to sleep after setting his camera on an empty seashore.”[19] While this is true for one of Kiarostami’s takes, it is important to remember that although Five gives the illusion of being untouched by the filmmaker, it is in fact, deeply and intricately labored upon. Even as Kiarostami’s filmmaking process is entangled in chance elements, the final production is no mere depiction of naturalism or mimetic transparency. In fact, the film is rather elaborately edited. In a documentary about the making of Five, Kiarostami mentioned that this might have been one of the most difficult films he has ever made— but it doesn’t show on the surface.[20]

While each of the film’s long takes gives the illusion that Kiarostami himself pressed play and then went to sleep, as he allegedly did in the third take (Dogs, which features a pack of dogs sitting on the beach), the reality is far more complex. The pure and pristine depiction of nature we believe to be consuming is in fact carefully mediated by the filmmaker himself. For instance, in the first take (Wood) the camera undulates with the waves (this is the only take where the camera is not in complete stasis) and as spectators we are led to follow the continuous motions of the waves hitting a piece of driftwood, back and forth. The motions of winds that surround the wood magnificently possess the camera. This plasticity leads spectators to embody these very same winds and waves, and thus gives the false perception that the push of waves is what breaks the driftwood apart. It was in fact Kiarostami who manipulated this seemingly natural phenomenon by placing a small explosive in the driftwood to have it break apart by the end of the long take. Perhaps this “event” is so uneventful that it does not affect our perception of the movement to discover its mediation, though nonetheless it shows us that through film, even a non-event can be mediated. In take four, which is comparatively lively compared to the other takes, the camera returns to a midrange frontal angle of the shore, and we are bombarded by noisy ducks who cross the frame from left to right, and then from right to left across the screen. Kiarostami artfully manipulates the scene beyond the frame, and guides the ducks to move back and forth, as though unprovoked. In take five (Moon and Swamp); the final image appears as a single long take that depicts the reflection of the moon. This 28-minute sequence was in fact filmed more than 20 times over the course of several months, and each take was superimposed onto the others with invisible cuts. Interestingly, the final night sequence, which underwent the most amount of technological mediation, obscures the image and privileges the soundtrack. This sequence is by far the least reliant on visual change. The temporality is thus most felt through the rhythms and cadences of sound. The take carries the unbearable sound of frogs, or toads croaking, so harrowing, it suggests an indifference to human presence; what is more, it suggest that perhaps the film is not made for us.[21]

Akin to the detailed mediation of that which we do not see on the surface of the film, Five also contains a carefully crafted soundtrack. The use of music is noteworthy for a filmmaker like Kiarostami, who like Adorno, has often commented on music’s ability to distract from the filmic image. The film juxtaposes amplified diegetic sounds from various takes during a four-month mixing process. Music is used at the end of each long take, which itself signifies a sense of conclusion and transition to the next take. Overlaying the seemingly tranquil and self-contained visual images of the film, the soundtrack creates a hyper-sentient abundance that unsettles the natural backdrop. Thus, while Kiarostami’s active role in artfully configuring each take might seem to undermine the film’s non-anthropocentric nature, both the rich composition of sounds and the cloaked darkness of the final sequence exposes the growing impenetrability and esoteric quality of the vivid locality that Kiarostami conjures. Thus, while the film gives the impression that it expresses the emptiness of time through five uninterrupted long takes, it is in fact only a semblance of such an experience, since each take is heavily edited. The seemingly uninterrupted flow of images is in fact heavily fragmented in that it includes layers of images filmed at various points in time. Thus, it is through arduous labor that Kiarostami crafts the “realist” patterns of sound and movement in the shores of the Caspian Sea. It is upon reflection of these formal and perceptive qualities that the film puts forth its ultimate capacity to reveal clarity and abstraction and new relationships between nature and technology in the digital age.

Benjamin reflects on the possibilities within technology in his seminal essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproducibility,” where he focuses on the potentiality of film outside of the limited structure of the studio film. He writes:

In the studio the mechanical equipment has penetrated so deeply into reality that its pure aspect freed from the foreign substance of equipment is the result of a special procedure, namely, the shooting by the specially adjusted camera and the mounting of the shot together with other similar ones. The equipment-free aspect of reality here has become the height of artifice; the sight of immediate reality has become an orchid in the land of technology (my emphasis).[22]

Five’s use of digital film allows Kiarostami to give the illusion of reality and of the natural world as a space untouched by technology. Yet it is ironically through the technological apparatus, “the height of artifice,” that he brings to light an “orchid” in immediate reality, in the real world of the technological. For this reason, while Kiarostami’s films do approach nature as a space of reflection, they do not intend to portray this space as one that is dialectically unimpeded by the effects of the modern urban space or its inhabitants, and of course, they cannot. His cinematic signature of mediation followed by an act of self-reflexivity, gestures to the encounter between these two worlds.

 

  1. Kiarostami’s Photographic Tendency and Cinema of Stasis

Those who are familiar with Kiarostami’s photographic oeuvre know that most of his photographs are composed of landscapes devoid of human presence. Equally, many of his earlier films include moments of repose to meditate on the vast landscapes that carry and envelop life’s minutiae. Kiarostami has attributed his fascination with rural spaces and natural landscapes as refuge from the day-to-day patterns and shock experiences of the city. As a culminating artistic creation in Kiarostami’s career of minimalist aesthetics, Five presents the boundary between his photographic and cinematic oeuvre.  The film is attuned to the temporality of both mediums, and blends them to fluidly move between the antinomies of stasis and motion. In Five, time is measured by the flow of waves reaching the shore, constant yet ephemeral. Objects are both centered in their disruption of the constant flow of water, yet recede as the waves take precedence, visually and audibly, through each take. Amidst the empty time of the film, the breaking of a piece of driftwood can feel cathartic. In the following take, passersby and birds are only fleeting objects amidst constant sound of waves, arriving at shore, like an actress emerging center-stage. In the third take, a pack of dogs is abstracted as distant specks. Instead, the object of our gaze becomes the ripple of waves that move swiftly from the left of the frame to the right. As time passes, the image fades, like an old photograph might throughout time, culminating in total whiteness. All that remains are the wave’s sonic cadences.

In Five, each long take inherits integral qualities of the photographic, including stillness as well as the meditation that comes with it. This is in part because each passing moment does not make up a progressive succession in a narrative arc; instead it carries the continuous temporal flow of waves hitting the shore, a movement that is as eventful as it is mundane. Each passing moment is similar in its rhythm, perhaps even unidentifiable with what proceeds or follows. Thus, even with the composition of a singular long take that does account for changes and temporal flow, Kiarostami’s photographic landscapes preserve traces of the photographic to sensitively illuminate the mysterious patterns of the everyday. Five unfolds through the temporality of the earth’s everyday movements, predictable and yet, all the while, unpredictable.

Kiarostami’s work escapes the dichotomy of stasis and moving-image; instead they are presented as two interrelated poles, between which a complex pictorial process can unfold. Five is not the only film that exposes Kiarostami’s investment in uniting still and moving images. Many of the shots he has taken in his films are reminiscent of stills from a road movie. For instance, in Like Someone in Love (2012), one long take looks out at the protagonist during a car ride from the outside. The glass of the car window that covers her face appears as a picture frame and separates the external world, dividing the moving image from a windscreen that makes visible the image of the cityscape through the glass. This image brings to the fore both Kiarostami’s compositional interest in stasis and motion, as well as his acute and thoughtful treatment of landscapes and human action. This has allowed him to take a step back from the scene he is shooting, snap a shot, and reflect on the space that engulfs him. This cinematic gesture permits his films from fluidly moving between the photographic and the moving image. Other films in Kiarostami’s cinematic oeuvre such as Close-up (1990), Taste of Cherry (1997), and The Wind Will Carry Us (1999), to name a few, incorporate the long take to follow the movements of small objects as they traverse the earth’s windy landscapes. In these instances, our perception is oriented towards objects that would otherwise occupy the narrative’s background. Furthermore, Kiarostami’s camera is intimately bound up with the flow of nature and gravitates towards meditations of landscape shots, or close-ups, as moments of repose from the already slow narrative style. Unlike this style of moving long shots (commonly used in neo-realist cinema) that impress upon the viewer a sense of distance and empty expanses from place to place, Kiarostami’s long takes in Five are in stasis. The world of Five invites us to meditate in the harmonious cacophony of the sea, to enter its rhythm, with all its hidden creatures and chance patterns.

 

  1. The Spectator and the Sea

While I previously discussed Kiarostami’s ability to create a visual space of serenity oscillating between the still and moving image, I would now like to discuss the specific temporal configuration of the sea as it presents a counter-narrative to Evental cinema. By reflecting on the phenomenological experiences of this space, we will be able to better consider how the particular temporal structure of the sea opens itself up to new modes of spectator experience. Kiarostami makes the sea visually and audibly prominent, all other actors (including passersby, dogs, ducks, etc.) are only extras in the continuous and chance operated patterns of the waves. Waves themselves become central characters, like sea creatures, with each emerging and pushing into the other. By creating a film that has little to no external action, the ceaseless murmur of the sea as it ebbs and flows seemingly replaces any linear narrative flow, and introduces its own mode of temporal experience. In particular, the sea in Five produces a radically non-anthropocentric experience, not only because only one of five of the long takes includes people, but also because its temporal pattern and rhythmic assemblage do not privilege the linear logic of human perception. As such, the film bears witness to moments of a day from which an anthropocentric gaze might turn away. Though still mediated by the presence of both auteur and spectator, the film’s non-evental rhythm invites us to move in and out of it. Such a motion affirms its ability to go on without us (while, of course still being mediated by the filmic gaze). And at times, it does, just as the flow of the world’s oceans continues day after day, night after night, whether we are there to bear witness, or not.

In reflecting on the phenomenological experience of watching waves, Sean Cubitt interestingly notes: “The experience of watching water is of a now that extends indefinitely. The precise configuration of light in the frames that pass by is irreplaceable, but another, infinity or infinitesimally different, will always supersede it so that its timelessness is not of the philosophical absolute, but of an endlessly differentiating repetition.”[23] Five’s non-narrativity unfolds within the endlessly undifferentiated repetition of the sea’s waves. The experience of watching Five, emphasized by the slow and static nature of its images, submerges the viewer into a cinematic experience that does not progress towards an ending or narrative arc, rather its progression is felt as a loss of time passed and at once a recognition of its salience. Still, Five is not a film that seeks continuous or unchanging repetition. Rather, each take signifies the motion of time, with light as the index that time has in fact passed. No scene carries the weight of light as much as the final scene, which would remain invisible to the human eye if it were not for the radiant force of the moonlight reflected unto the water. Here, Kiarostami lends a nod to another worldly pattern. Nonetheless, Kiarostami’s vital meditation of both audible and rhythmic forces of nature, allows the natural flow of the sea to take the place of narrativity.

As each long take from Five is filmed at the boundary between land and sea, we are positioned to embody the gaze of our auteur as he shares his refuge in the open expanse of the sea. In a thoughtful reflection on ‘Water and Dreams,’ Gaston Bachelard writes that matter can disassociate itself from form and can be given value either through deepening (with mysterious, unknowable layers) or elevating (appearing as an inexhaustible force). In each case, he writes, meditation on matter cultivates an open imagination. The sea thus symbolizes a liquid materiality that can incite our imagination.[24] Certainly, this was true of Kiarostami’s own experience. Kiarostami viewed the landscapes he captured as oneiric experiences. In a 2000 interview conducted in Tehran about his photographic impetus, Kiarostami remarked, “my photographs are made of the same substance as my dreams.”[25] What are these substances, material and dream-like? This remark is perhaps attuned to the open flow of photographic landscapes, both vast and ephemeral. Through the stilled images of the sea, and the glaring light impressed upon the pond at nightfall, moments of beauty are experienced, reactivated, and at times they enter the unconscious, to emerge again, in a delayed state, outside of the temporality of the film itself. The illumination of these images through dream contributes to the spectator’s non-linear experience of the narrative, but further illuminates the importance and the recurrence of the fixed image in our perception of the moving-image. Furthermore, each long take points to the calm flow of another worldly pattern and gives the spectator the agentive power to construct his or her own subjective spectatorial experience.

Kiarostami is not the first to push the limits of slow cinema by meditating deeply on continuous and repetitive actions or space. Some might be prone to draw comparisons between Kiarostami’s cinematic style and other slow films such as Andy Warhol’s exhaustive anti-film in Sleep or Chantal Akerman’s tedious use of a kitchen in Jeanne Dielman. And while these films do embody a temporal slowness, I’m inclined to suggest that these films are not as sympathetic to their viewer, particularly in the experience of empty time, as in a Kiarostami film. His overall sensitivity to human action and even his deep meditation on the non-anthropocentric space of the sea offers his spectator a redemptive, versus a punitive, experience. Kiarostami’s filmic style does not seek to exhaust his viewer with excesses either in length or impenetrable visuals. Even while inviting his viewers to take a short nap, his film is meticulously designed to include only that which is absolutely necessary. For this reason, Five is successful in presenting each part of the day, sunrise, morning, afternoon, twilight, and dusk; all the while, each of Five’s long takes only last about 12 minutes, thus condensing a whole day to a little over an hour. Thus, it is important to reiterate that while Five certainly shares the company of others forms of slow cinema, its singularity lies in Kiarostami’s kindness that shares images made of dreams and invites an endless and bountiful imagination. His is a type of cinematic intimacy that stays with you.

 

  1. Cooperating with the Earth: Auteur as Spectator

In a reflection on the making of Five, Kiarostami articulated the operative force of chance in his work, “There are moments in my film that I must confess are not of my own making.” Kiarostami humbly rescinds his authorial power (including the technical logic of cinematic design) to allow his films to be propelled by contingent elements beyond his control. As such, Kiarostami himself shares his own spectatorial experiences with life’s accidental and hidden course. In the process of creating Five, Kiarostami cooperated with the hidden powers of the earth including the rhythms, vibrations, and cadences of the earth, wind, and water. The cooperative nature of Kiarostami’s filmmaking comes from a consciousness and curiosity for factors out of his control[26]. This refers both to the creative force of spectator experiences as well as life’s unpredictable chance formation. Kiarostami guides us to watch Five with an awareness to the power of the accidental and to contemplate what we cannot know. To see the assemblage of images in Five as both creations of chance and mediation illuminates and intertwines the chance patterns of the mundane with that of the mediating apparatus.  As auteur, Kiarostami cooperates with the earth and embodies the notion of participatory cinema even prior to the relationship of auteur and spectator through the operative powers of chance within the earth itself.

Kiarostami’s films call for a collision of worlds; in a first gesture, they share his own imagined experience. And like the flow of water, his films are receptive to elements outside of it. He invites his spectators to add to the depth of the world he has created, and to see beyond it, to take it with them. To see Kiarostami’s images is not to acquire knowledge, or even a story (even though many times, we do) but to affect one’s way of looking at the material world. Kiarostami’s slow and often-static shots compel us to be attentive to objects, elements, and other worldly patterns. His filmmaking is generous with its gaze and kind in its style, a filmmaking whose current will continue to leave its traces. Like the image of ripples in each of Five’s long takes, it constantly expands our way of seeing, transforms our gaze from the linear, or logically causal, and opens ourselves and our dreams to the felt rhythms of the earth.

[1]Donna Honarpisheh is a PhD student at UC-Berkeley’s department of Comparative Literature. She holds an MA from UC-Berkeley in Near Eastern studies and is a member of the designated emphasis program in Critical Theory. Her work focuses on the aesthetics and politics of Modernist Persian Film and Fiction, Francophone literature, and Postcoloniality.

[2]Five Long Takes: Dedicated to Ozu directed by Abbas Kiarostami (New York: The Kimstim Collection, 2003), DVD.

[3]Alberto Elena, The Cinema of Abbas Kiarostami (London: Saqi, 2005), 183. Elena also cites Alain Bergala, “Abbas Kiarostami: Les pleins pouvoirs du cinema,” 45.

[4]While I will not be exploring the experience of Five in its museum form, it is worth noting that viewing the film as an installation piece might prompt a different reading of the film. Specifically, focusing on the piece as an installation might provide an alternative experience for the relationship between material and viewer. MoMA acquired Five in 2004 after its world premiere at Cannes Film Festival and showed it as a part of a Kiarostami retrospective entitled: “Abbas Kiarostami: Image-Maker.” At MoMa, it was screened as a single theatrical projection as well as a media installation. As a media installation, the film was divided into five segments and projected in a continuous and synchronized loop onto five separate walls, with the audio of each take blending slightly together. MoMA describes this work as: “beautifully min[ing] the potential of digital imagery and sound while playfully investigating the fluid limits of documentary art practice.” It can be argued that as video installation, Five elicits what Alain Bergala calls the “re-education of the gaze,” with the spatiality of the museum adding its own way of looking for the spectator and his/her mobility within the space. See Elena, The Cinema of Abbas Kiarostami, 153.

[5]Walter Benjamin, “The Formula in Which Dialectical Structure of Film Finds Expression,” in The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media, ed. Michael W. Jennings and Brigid Doherty trans. Thomas Y. Levin and Edmund Jephcott (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 340-341.

[6]Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, and the Archive (Harvard University Press, 2002).

[7]Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time, 140.

[8]Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time, 141.

[9]Theodor W. Adorno, “Transparencies on Film,” in The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture, ed. J.M. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 1991), 3.

[10]By pseudo-realist, Adorno refers to films that claim to be realist in their heightened and exaggerated interpretation of human action through an uncritical use of technology. These are films that reify commodity culture and fetishize their means. They do not truly represent reality because they debase our sense of time and capture the spectator through shock-like effects and images, as though they are coming through a conveyor belt. Instead, Adorno calls for a meaningful relationship between technique, material, and content. See “Transparencies on Film,” 184.

[11]Abbas Kiarostami, The Taste of Cherry, video interview, https://youtu.be/uSDWtdJKrG0.

[12]Here, Alberto Elena cites Kiarostami’s statement in Alberto Barbara and Elisa Resegotti. See Elena, The Cinema of Abbas Kiarostami, 174.

[13]Abbas Kiarostami, Around Five: Abbas Kiarostami’s Reflections on Film and the Making of Five, directed by Abbas Kiarostami (2003; New York: Kimstim, 2005), DVD.

[14] Elena, The Cinema of Abbas Kiarostami, 183.

[15]Adorno, “Transparencies on Film,” 180.

[16]Adorno, “Transparencies on Film,” 183-184.

[17]Adorno, “Transparencies on Film,” 201.

[18]Adorno, “Transparencies on Film,”183. For Adorno, the interdisciplinary constellation of film is expressed most powerfully in Mauricio Kagel’s television film, Antithese.

[19] Ira Jaffe, Slow Movies: Countering the Cinema of Action (New York: Wallflower Press:  2014), 13.

[20]Kiarostami, Around Five.

[21]For more on Five’s non-anthropocentric nature and its object-oriented ontology, see Selmin Kara’s essay, “The Sonic Summons: Meditations on Nature and Anempathetic Sound in Digital Documentaries” in The Oxford Handbook of Sound and Image in Digital Media, ed. C. Vernalis, A. Herzog, and J. Richardson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 582–97. There, Kara argues that Five’s aesthetics provide an alternative to “human centered vision.” Instead, Kara writes, “Kiarostami’s sound and image editing in Five sets duration as a relative, matter- or object-oriented (instead of subject-oriented) term, deflating assumptions about continuity. His long-take night is a rhythmic assemblage, one that takes into account the temporal patterns, superimpositions, and cadences that might be observable among various nights on the Caspian shore, without privileging the linear logic of human perception.”

[22]Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” 35.

[23]Sean Cubitt, “Watching Waves” in Eco Media (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Rodopi, 2005), 49.

[24]Gaston Bachelard, Water and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Matter, ed. Edith R. Farrell (Dallas: Dallas Institute of Humanities and Culture, 2006), 1-2.

[25]Interview with Abbas Kiarostami, published in Abbas Kiarostami, Photo Collection (Tehran: Hunar-i Īrān, 2000), not paginated.

[26]In his documentary film, “Around Five,” Kiarostami beautifully recounts an old story to tell the difference between chess and backgammon, or logic and chance. He says: “It is said that in old times, a philosopher in India invented chess after much pondering, and presented it as a gift to the Maharajah of India. The Maharajah was so impressed with this logical and mental game of war, that he presented it to the Iranian emperor as a symbol of Indian intelligence. In doing this, the Indian Maharajah was delivering a philosophical challenge. Bozorgmehr, the wise vizier of the Iranian king, Anowshirvan, deciphered the secrets of this complicated game and the logical warlike thought behind it. He decided to respond to the Indian philosopher in the same way. Therefore, in return for chess, he invented backgammon, with two small cubes called dice. This game takes full control from the player and show him that there are other factors contributing to one’s destiny than skill, intelligence and experience, factors that many of us are unaware of…These factors may strike our life at any point and a wise person is one who allows for these accidents in the game.”

Interiority and the City Center: Locating the Gulistan Harem During Nasser al-Din Shah’s Reign

A whole history remains to be written of spaces – which would at the same time be the history of powers… from the great strategies of geopolitics to the little tactics of the habitat. -Michel Foucault[1]

In “Of Other Spaces: Heterotopias”, one of Michel Foucault’s later works, he argued for the importance of the spatiality of social life: the place in which the actually lived and socially produced sites and the relations between them are negotiated.[2] Foucault offered great insight into how we can interpret and produce knowledge based on human geographies, or as Edward Soja has noted, “how to see the ‘other spaces’ hidden in the more obvious and diverting multiplicity of real-world sights and situations.”[3] This paper takes the Gulistan harem (andarūn) and its surrounding areas as a complex set of spaces, whose architectural and material configuration structured the gendered, domestic, and social lives of its inhabitants in a myriad of complementary and contradictory ways. Focusing on the spatial dimensions, as well as human geography of Nasser al-Din Shah’s harem, and its location at the heart of late-19th century Tehran, the paper will examine the historical development and expanding physical structure of Gulistan, and the intricate relationship between urban space, architecture, and practices of inhabitation that informed it.

I hope to disrupt the monolithic and narrow interpretations of Middle Eastern harems as deeply private spheres of forced and uncontested gender segregation, and instead, examine the ways in which the Gulistan harem along with the multiplicity of its residents, resisted the dichotomy between private/public domains – a modernist European dichotomy which has often been imposed onto this institution in its historiography, and instead forged unique communal practices of co-habitation (Figure 1).

Fig. 1. Group of harem women and servant. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran. (210-6-1)

Fig. 1. Group of harem women and servant. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran. (210-6-1)

 

Furthermore, the Gulistan harem was not only a space of domesticity, and distinctive familial formation, but also, a place where various kinds of social contact and collective cultural practices were realized alongside equally significant geopolitical and diplomatic affairs, as well as various registers of engagement with Persian modernity.

This paper begins with looking at the historical evolution and expanding physical structure of the Gulistan Palace, and situates it in the simultaneous history of the emergence of Tehran as an urban metropolis. I then move on to explore the physical and material organization of the Gulistan harem, and the ways in which it was controlled, lived in, and subverted. The final section interrogates the question of what constituted private, interior, and domestic spaces respectively, when speaking of the royal Qajar harem – a space composed of multiple homes, within a larger palace, which was the administrative center of Qajar rule.

 

The Simultaneous Development of Tehran and Gulistan Palace:

The Gulistan Palace, like Tehran, the city which houses it, was built over the course of three centuries beginning in the 16th century, and continuing into the early 20th century. During this period, the palace went through a number of renovations, expanding to cover a huge area of land within the urban core of Tehran by the second half of 19th century, and later, in the 20th century under the Pahlavis, contracting to a smaller complex.[4] The historical formation and evolution of the palace was from the beginning intricately connected to the development of the urban metropolis that it was located within. Most notably, under Nasir al-Dīn’s reign, the Gulistan harem, placed within the larger boundaries of the royal citadel (arg), grew both physically and in terms of the number of its residents to its largest scale as compared to the harem of his predecessors. When Nasser al-Din Shah began his reign in 1848, Gulistan was a much smaller, though still remarkable court, mostly built by his grandfather Fatḥ-ʿAlī Shah, who reigned between 1797-1834, and who developed Tehran into the true capital of Qajar rule.

While the establishment of both Tehran and Gulistan date back to the Safavid dynasty, the expansion of the arg and the growth of city into one of the largest urban metropolis in the region, both took proper form during the Qajar dynasty. Under the Safavids, Tehran emerged as a modest fortified town with four gates. Tehran’s importance to the Safavids was mainly due to its location on the route from Esfehan, the Safavid capital, to Mashhad, the site of the shrine of the eighth imam, which is a significant destination for Shi‘a people. [5]  Later, during the brief Zand period, Karim Khan further developed the town through building a palace and the government headquarters within the gates of the city, and promoted it to the status of a military base. It was not until 1786 that Tehran was established as a capital city by Agha Muhammad, the first Qajar ruler who went on to dispose the last Zand ruler Luft-Ali Khan, and claimed the throne in 1796. Agha Muhammad, the founder of the Qajar dynasty, began the establishment of full-scale royal court in Tehran upon claiming the throne, and in order to legitimate and expand the newly found capital city. He was responsible for setting up much of the initial infrastructure for what later became the elaborate Gulistan royal court (Figure 2).[6]

Fig. 2. Oldest Map of Tehran by Russian military officer Naskov, 1826. The square on the top left- hand corner depicts the borders of the developing Gulistan Palace. Source: http://shahrefarang.com.

Fig. 2. Oldest Map of Tehran by Russian military officer Naskov, 1826. The square on the top left- hand corner depicts the borders of the developing Gulistan Palace. Source: http://shahrefarang.com.

 

The full realization of Gulistan into a grand palace, however, was accomplished only after Agha Muhammad’s death and during the thirty-five-year reign of Fatḥ-ʿAlī Shah (1797-1834).  Fatḥ-ʿAlī Shah was notorious for having one of the largest harems in Iranian history, with the number of wives estimated to reach over one thousand.[7]  Unlike his uncle, Fatḥ-ʿAlī Shah embraced a taste for luxury, reflected not only in the large number of wives and concubines in his harem, but also his love of extravagant ceremonies, which were a primary engine for the development of Gulistan Palace, beginning in 1806, less than a decade into his reign. This expansion phase included both the completion of structures which had been started by his uncle, and the initiation of new building projects, as well as the addition of large gardens, new barracks, and an extensive harem (andarūn) area to the north of the palace, which served as the residential quarter of the shah and his many wives. The most significant buildings constructed under his rule include the crystal building (imārat-i bulūr) on the north side of the court, the diamond hall (tālār-i almās) on the south, the wind tower (imārat-i bādgīr) as well as the marble throne (takht-i marmar) which was placed on the porch (tālār) of the iconic audience chamber (divān khānah), which remains to this day. The architecture of Gulistan during this period incorporated many traditional Persian design elements as a means of legitimizing Qajar rule over Persian territory. Jennifer Scarce, in her study of the architectural details of the some of the buildings inside the arg from this period, notes:

The plan and decoration of the dīvankhaneh and the marble throne is a direct visual reference to Fath ‘Ali Shah’s royal status. The plan of a spacious open reception hall supported on columns stresses both the antiquity and continuity of Iranian monarchy as it is found in pre-Islamic Achaemenid and Sasanid architecture as well as in palaces of Safavid Isfahan and Zand Shiraz.[8]

Within Iranian historiography, Fatḥ-ʿAlī Shah is considered the ruler who not only built the great arg which housed Gulistan Palace, but also developed Tehran as an urban center, and made it the core Qajar rule.[9] Most notably, during his reign, the bazaar, located to the south of the arg, was greatly expanded and the central square adjacent to arg, which connected the court to the bazaar, also witnessed considerable development.[10]

Perhaps the most significant addition was the building of the Masjid Soltanī – the first large-scale and substantial architectural structure, as well as public building, outside of the arg. Built between 1808 and 1813, it was the largest and most important mosque built under Fatḥ-ʿAlī Shah’s reign, and was located near the northern entrance of the bazaar (Figure 3).

Fig. 3. Illustration of Masjid Soltanī by French Orientalist painter Eugène Flandin made during his travels to Persia between 1839-1841.  Eugène Flandin, Voyage en Perse, avec Flandin, éd. Gide et Baudry, 1851, Vol. 2.

Fig. 3. Illustration of Masjid Soltanī by French Orientalist painter Eugène Flandin made during his travels to Persia between 1839-1841.  Eugène Flandin, Voyage en Perse, avec Flandin, éd. Gide et Baudry, 1851, Vol. 2.

 

 

This showcasing of the royal family’s close relationship to both the merchant class and the ulama, through physical and structural proximity, were simultaneous endeavors undertaken and accomplished during Fatḥ-ʿAlī Shah’s thirty-seven year reign.[11] As Ali Madanipour explains in his historiography of the development of Tehran, the structure of the city from the beginning had “a clear functional organization: a political authority (royal compound), an economic center (bazaar), a religious focus (Friday Mosque), and the living places of the towns people.”[12]

While Gulistan was developed to serve as the administrative center of the state and an assertion of its political authority, it was simultaneously the place of residence of the royal family and their large entourage, as well as the site of multiple forms of ceremonial gatherings and royal patronage (through the employment of various artists, craftsmen, tile workers, performers, servants and so on). While the walls and gates built around the citadel protected the court from outside intruders, the extensive structures on the inside of the court served as a gathering place for large audiences hosted by the royal family. In this sense, as I will discuss later, from the beginning, the boundaries between deeply private and hidden, and proudly public and social were constantly negotiated both inside and outside the arg, as well as its andarūn. This multi-functional dimension of Gulistan Palace, and the various political, social, cultural and familial affairs which took place within its boundaries, continued to define the development of the physical geography of the space in its various manifestations throughout the Qajar period.

However, despite the large scale development projects and new infrastructure that were set up in the city during the nearly four decades of Fatḥ-ʿAlī Shah’s rule, Tehran’s shape and size, number of gates, and border-defining walls remained essentially the same as when they had been built three centuries earlier.[13] During his short reign (1834-1848), Fatḥ-ʿAlī Shah’s successor, Muhhamad Shah’s modest contribution to urban development mostly focused on improving the Royal Square (miydan-i shāh) which connected the bazar and the arg. He also added large gardens to the interior of both the eastern and western quarters inside the arg.[14] It was, however, not until Nasser al-Din Shah’s reign that Tehran truly transformed into a 19th century cosmopolitan metropole, incorporating local, regional and Western ideas and aesthetics into a cityscape that was increasingly a destination point for both regional and international stake holders.

Nasser al-Din Shah officially took the throne in October of 1848, appearing on the takht-i marmar in the tālār of the divān khānah built by his grandfather inside Gulistan Palace (Figure 4).[15]

Fig. 4. Illustration of divān khānah and marble throne by French Orientalist painter Eugène Flandin made during his travels to Persia between 1839-1841.  Eugène Flandin, Voyage en Perse, avec Flandin, éd. Gide et Baudry, 1851, Vol 2.

Fig. 4. Illustration of divān khānah and marble throne by French Orientalist painter Eugène Flandin made during his travels to Persia between 1839-1841.  Eugène Flandin, Voyage en Perse, avec Flandin, éd. Gide et Baudry, 1851, Vol 2.

He continued the tradition of using the divān khānah for court ceremonies, receptions and festivities, though the number of such events, as well as the size of their audience increased steadily throughout his reign, as did the number of his wives and their entourage, leading to a number of different and significant phases of expansion of the Gulistan Palace.

The first phase of urban development under Nasser al-Din Shah began soon after he took the throne.  Amīr Kabīr Mīrzā Taghī Khān (1807-52), the shah’s reformist chief minister, during his short-lived three years appointment (1848-1851), made significant improvements to the urban infrastructure of Tehran. This included further expansion of the bazaar, the building of water canals throughout the city, and perhaps most significantly, in 1851, the construction of the dār al-­fanūn, the first modern education institution in Tehran located on the most north-east corner of the arg, just above the harem (Figure 5).

 

Fig. 5. dār al-­fanūn University, Tehran.

Fig. 5. dār al-­fanūn University, Tehran.

 

The building of the school marked a new era of development in the core zone of the city with Gulistan Palace at its epicenter. The school was primarily aimed at teaching modern sciences and its inauguration was the engine for bringing in a host of international scholars over the next few decades. In fact, much of Iranian historiography argues that dār al-­fanūn was the primary engine for modernization project in Iran. And yet, it is interesting to note that virtually no scholarship on either Gulistan or dār al-­fanūn has made note of the proximity between this focal point of modernization, and the royal Qajar harem, which was literally steps away to its south.

During this same period, directly to the south of the Gulistan Palace, and outside the main entrance of the arg, a bustling public square was expanded and renamed sabzi maydān. The square became a crucial nodal point connecting the palace to the developing metropolis (Figure 6).[16]

Fig. 6. Ilya Nikolaevich Berezin, Map of Tehran, 1952. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran.

Fig. 6. Ilya Nikolaevich Berezin, Map of Tehran, 1952. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran.

 

Concurrently, a substantial rebuilding and revitalization of the bazar quarter began and continued for over a decade, and in 1862, a major renovation project replaced the old bazaar structures with new modern buildings.[17]

A second phase of development began in 1867 and included the destruction of the old mud brick walls which made up the city border, and the enclosure of a much larger area with a wall designed by the French polytechnic engineer and teacher at dār al-­fanūn, General Alexandre Buhler.[18] Tehran expanded to four times its original size, as the area of the city grew from 3 square miles to 7.5 square miles, and the length of the border wall surrounding the city increased from 4 to 11 miles (Figures 7-9).[19]

Fig. 7. Map of Tehran prepared by dār al-­fanūn students in 1859 under supervision of Aligholi Mirza Etezadossaltaneh and technical guidance of Monsieur Kershish. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran.

Fig. 7. Map of Tehran prepared by dār al-­fanūn students in 1859 under supervision of Aligholi Mirza Etezadossaltaneh and technical guidance of Monsieur Kershish. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran.

 

Fig. 8. Map of Tehran in 1857, http://en.tehran.ir.

Fig. 8. Map of Tehran in 1857, http://en.tehran.ir.

 

Fig. 9. Map of Tehran in 1890, http://en.tehran.ir.

Fig. 9. Map of Tehran in 1890, http://en.tehran.ir.

 

This newly expanded octagonal shaped city parameter included significantly more space to the north, which was developed into an affluent residential area, and a total of twelve elaborately decorated gates.[20]

Much like other major cities in the Middle East, the development of Tehran during this period coincided with accelerated global flows, which included increase contact with both regional neighbors and Europe. Many have read this period as the birth of modernization in Iran, arguing that modernity came through contact with Europe, and meant the application and adaptation of Western civilization to a traditional Persian Islamic culture.[21] This is of course in line with how many European orientalists encountered Tehran in the second half of 19th century. British member of Parliament, George Curzon, for example, during his 1889-1890 trip to Tehran, describes Tehran as a new and modern city. Yet for him, the city has certain deficiencies rooted in its Eastern elements. He states:

At every turn we meet in juxtaposition, sometimes in audacious harmony, at others in comical contrast, the influence and features of the East and the West… European Tehran has certainly become, or is becoming; but yet, if the distinction can be made intelligible, it is being Europeanized upon Asiatic lines. No one could mistake it for anything but an Eastern capital.”[22]

This reading of Tehran takes it as a deficient emulation of a West model, with the inferiority squarely placed on the “Asiatic” elements of the city.

In the historiography of both Tehran and Gulistan, the 1867 International Exhibition, which took place in Paris, has been read as amongst the most important vehicle for the intensification of European influenced urban development throughout the Middle East. Persian officials, along with representatives from other regional centers like Cairo and Istanbul, visited the exhibition and were profoundly moved by what they encountered. In particular, the Ottoman section of the exhibition featured a blended style of traditional Islamic and Western design motifs, and became a major inspiration for emerging architectural trends in the region. It is important to note however that the trend was in fact based in part on the European rediscovery of the medieval Spanish Islamic style of Alhambra, and thus showcased the transnational and reciprocal flow of design influences between the regions, which also predated the era of modernity.[23] It is precisely this reciprocal nature of global flows and influences that Eurocentric and orientalist depictions of modernization in the region fail to account for.

The 1867 exhibition’s impact on municipal improvement plans in Tehran was also only one of several factors that influenced the ambitious expansion plan that were carried out in the city in the second half of the 19th century.[24] Other circumstances that contributed to the major development projects undertaken during this period were the accelerated rate of population growth and a catastrophic flood in May of 1867 which caused a great deal of damage in the north of the city and required a major rebuilding effort.[25] As such, European influence was one amongst the many factors that contributed to the intensified expansion and development of the city that took shape during his period.

The Gulistan Palace also went through a series of simultaneous and elaborate transformations. During his time as Prime Minister, Amīr Kabīr had ordered the purchasing of a major area of land to the east of the palace – though the development and incorporation of this land into Gulistan only took place later, after his death.[26] From 1867 to 1892, the arg, located now in the central part of the newly expanded city borders, grew to cover an enormous area of land, surrounded by its own new high walls and secured gates which closed it off from its surrounding exterior. Inside Gulistan, the first phase of expansion concentrated on building a large scale residential building, named Shams al-‘imārat , in the east side of the arg.

Designed by Dust ‘Ali Khan Nizam al-Dawla, and completed in 1868, the five-story building, the tallest of its kind in Tehran at the time, looked over the city and served as the royal family’s residence. The building was the first recreational tower in Tehran, as well as the first royal building which was clearly exposed to the outside public through its height (Figure 10).[27]

Fig. 10. Shams al-'imārah. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran. (209-4).

Fig. 10. Shams al-‘imārah. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran. (209-4).

 

Shams al-imārah was built with the intention of giving its inhabitants a unique view of the ever-developing city, while maintaining the royal family’s privacy. Significantly, the building also housed the first photo studio which was established by Nasser al-Din Shah in Iran.

European influence permeated the façade and architectural design of the building with features such as a large clock mounted on the central tower and a projected staircase that lead up to the multi-story building which was visible from outside of the arg.[28] At the same time, the interior architecture, which incorporated ceramic and tile-works with geometric Persian design and imagery, insured that residents were hidden from public view, thus maintaining Islamic tradition of andarūn privacy.[29] It is important to note that at the time, this was the most substantial building within the arg, and along with an expanded andarūn, located behind the divān khānah, it was the primary space in the arg occupied by the shah’s many wives and children.[30] This point highlights the significance of space occupied by women, familial life and domestic culture within the Qajar court. Shams al-imārah allowed its occupants to have a unique view from within the arg of the hustling urban center beyond its walls, while still remaining unseen. Significantly, it was also the first building to have direct access to the exterior with a gate which opened onto the bazaar. Combined, these features point to the ways in which residents within Gulistan Palace, including harem women, had multiple forms of access to the developing cosmopolitan life which was taking shape both inside and directly outside the arg, while still maintaining the Islamic principles of gender segregation.[31]

Another substantial building project during this period was the construction of Takkiya Dawlat to the south east of the palace – a permanent theatre erected between 1868-1873; the structure was built in the style of large amphitheaters, and could accommodate up to four thousand spectators (Figure 11).

Fig. 11. Takkiya Dawlat. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran (209-6).

Fig. 11. Takkiya Dawlat. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran (209-6).

 

Takkiya Dawlat was used primarily for the performance of ta’zīyi (passion plays) and ruzih khūnī (mourning rituals), and again, despite some European influence on its architectural shape, the building functioned to highlight the royal family’s strong link to Shia’ Islamic history, marking Gulistan as a public venue for the display of piety.[32] In her description of Takkiya Dawlat, where she was invited to attend a  ta’zīyi play, Lady Mary Sheil, wife of British Lieutenant Colonel Justin Sheil who served in Iran from 1844-1853, notes that the large audience of “several thousands” housed in the structure which “fulfilled all the purposes of a theatre”,  not only included the shah himself, his many ministers, wives and mother, as well as important foreign officials, but also “women of humble condition, who were great in numbers”.[33] She gives a detailed account of the collective mourning ritual that took place amongst this motely crew of audience members, highlighting women’s participation in public spectacles (Figure 12).

 

Fig. 12. Ta’zīyi play at Takkiya Dawlat, oil painting Kamāl-al-Molk. Gulistan Palace Museum, Tehran, Iran.

Fig. 12. Ta’zīyi play at Takkiya Dawlat, oil painting Kamāl-al-Molk. Gulistan Palace Museum, Tehran, Iran.

 

Both Shams al-‘imārat and Takkiya Dawlat are noteworthy structures within the arg because they present us with architectural examples that illuminate the intermingling of Islamic and European influences, and as I will argue in the second half of this paper, they also show the complex ways in which gender was negotiated both within the boundaries of arg, and beyond it through the spatial design, and the social and cultural practices which occupied them.

Gulistan harem’s physical proximity to the neighboring buildings and spaces both inside the arg, and outside in the ever-developing city of Tehran, cannot be underestimated. Far from being secluded, the residents of the Nasser al-Din’s harem were situated at the very heart of one of the largest metropoles in 19th century Middle East. There are many examples of the relationship between harem and bazaar. For example, in his diaries, Muīr al-Mamlik, the shah’s grandson, makes reference to music played inside the harem announcing the different parts of the day for both court residents and those in the bazaar. He states:

At 2 in the afternoon, a drum roll would announce that it was time to start packing up the bazar and at 3pm, a different sound would announce the bazaar closure. There was a curfew at night, so dinner would be served early inside the harem so that cooks and servants who did not reside inside could leave before the curfew.[34]

These tangible connections between the bazar and the harem illustrates that physical proximity had clear material implications. It also functions to demystify the understanding of the Qajar harem as a deeply private and isolated interior space and shows its intrinsic connection to the busy commercial quarter it neighbored.

The final and most drastic development phase of Gulistan under Nasser al-Din Shah reign took place after his first visits to Europe in 1873. The expansion of the court after this period was deeply influenced by the Shah’s desire to assert Tehran’s place within the increasingly global cosmopolitan culture. This is evident in the newly built divān khānah (built between 1873 and 1882) whose façade boasted tall European-style windows and semi-engaged classical columns, as well as an expanded Museum Hall which housed the courts mounting collection of local, regional and European art. Most interestingly, this phase also included the building of an extensive new andarūn (Figure 13).

Fig. 13. Map of the arg by Jean-Baptiste Feuvrier in Trois ans à la cour de Perse, Paris, 1900; 2nd ed., Paris, 1906.

Fig. 13. Map of the arg by Jean-Baptiste Feuvrier in Trois ans à la cour de Perse, Paris, 1900; 2nd ed., Paris, 1906.

 

The newly developed living quarter covered approximately one third of the palace grounds and was located on the north side of the court, to the east of the new divān khānah, and south of dār al-­fanūnI (Figure 14).

Fig. 14. New andarūn under construction. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran (343-4).

Fig. 14. New andarūn under construction. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran (343-4).

 

Its expansion was a bold statement by Nasser al-Din Shah that the Islamic domestic tradition of harems was not antithetical to Persian modernization efforts and could in fact, develop and evolve simultaneously with other large scale urban modernization efforts.

The newly built harem was accessible through two entrances, both of which were secured and guarded in order to shield harem women from the intrusion and gaze of non-relative males. They opened onto separate vestibules with long corridors which linked the andarūn to the court and the outside, respectively.[35] The first entrance was to narinjistān, an orangery located in the north-east quarter of the palace. This was the entrance most commonly used by both harem residents, as well as the shah himself, for entering and leaving the andarūn. According to Muīr al-Mamlik, about 20 elder eunuchs guarded this corridor.[36] The other entrance to the harem was the diamond door (dar-i almas) which opened onto the street, and was generally kept locked with a court eunuch also in charge of the keys.[37]

Built around a massive courtyard, the new andarūn featured a series of smaller structures around a rectangular enclosure. The courtyard served as the heart of the harem, connecting all the buildings, and giving every house a clear view to the andarūn entrance, as well as all other houses. Each of the buildings was assigned to one of the shah’s wives or sighes, though eventually, many of them were occupied by multiple wives and children as the number of residents in the harem steadily increased during this period (Figure 15).[38]

 

Fig. 15. View of harem women posing in tālārs of andarūn buildings. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran (682-16).

Fig. 15. View of harem women posing in tālārs of andarūn buildings. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran (682-16).

 

The buildings inside the new andarūn featured deep columned porches (tālārs) which had openings on one or three sides and served multiple functions. The variously sized tālārs were used as an entrance, a small audience hall, a sleeping area in hot weather, or a balcony used for sitting and eating.[39]  These versatile spaces could offer accommodation and hospitality to all members and relations of extended family, as well as royal guests, or be used for the everyday domestic and leisure activities of their residence. Their placement at the outer limit of each building also meant that they were both a part of the interior of their respective homes, and accessible and visible to the exterior courtyard – a design feature particular to the Qajar court that again complicates the assumed notion of a clear separation between interiority and exteriority.

The most architecturally significant building in the andarūn, situated in the middle of the enormous courtyard, was the Shah’s sleep quarters (khāb gāh) – an elaborate two- story building, whose design borrowed from Ottoman palaces (Figure 16).

Fig. 16. The khāb gāh. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran (209-2).

Fig. 16. The khāb gāh. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran (209-2).

 

The majestic building was quarantined from the surrounding area by a large fence with an iron door.[40] While the placing of the khāb gāh in the middle of the andarūn can be read as an assertion of the centrality of patriarchal rule within this space, it is important to note that this space was most often an empty signifier since Nasser al-Din was frequently not physically present within the harem. The shah was notorious for going on long vacations and spent most summer months, with some, but not all of his wives and children, outside of Gulistan. As such, despite its location, and architectural weight, it would be a mistake to see the khāb gāh as the heart of the harem. In fact, as numerous sources attest, social life of the harem revolved most often around its female residence and eunuchs, and the power negotiations between them, and took place within various women’s homes, tālārs, and gardens with the gated khāb gāh merely serving as a place holder for harem hierarchy.

For example, a note-worthy buildings in the new andarūn, which, unlike the khāb gāh, was frequently occupied by multiple residents and visitors, was the home belonging to the shah’s favored wife, Anis al-Dowleh. The building looked out onto a private garden, bāgh-i tabāni, from the back, and housed a large reception hall on its upper level, which was the location of the many gatherings, often featuring visiting foreign women, hosted by the de-facto queen (Figure 17).

Fig. 17. Social gathering at Anis al-Dowleh’s home. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran (2010-2-3).

Fig. 17. Social gathering at Anis al-Dowleh’s home. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran (2010-2-3).

 

Her house was amongst the few notable ones which also had a bathing room, though she still continued to frequent public baths with other harem women as a collective activity.[41]

Directly outside the bed chamber and facing its entrance was the residence of Amin Aghdas, another of the Shah’s significant sighehs. This house was noteworthy both because of its larger size in comparison to most other harem buildings, and the fact that it served as the residence of important figures in Nasser al-Din’s court including at different points, his beloved cat Bībī Khānūm, the young boy Malijak, who was the object of his obsession after the death of his cat, and Khānūm Bāshī who was a beautiful young recruit to the shah’s harem in his final years, and one of his last sighes.[42]

As we’ve seen, at every step of development and expansion, both the arg and its harem paralleled shifts, advances and progress that Tehran was going through as it transformed into a modern metropolitan city. In fact, throughout Nasser al-Din Shah’s reign, Gulistan, much like the city that surrounded it, was almost perpetually in a state of renovation and expansion. Far from being designated as a space which preserved and maintained tradition, Gulistan was in fact usually the first place of transformation and development in the city center. As such, both Tehran and Gulistan, in very material ways, were the epicenters of the Qajar’s engagements with Persian modernity (recall the first photo studio appearing in shams al emarat).

 

Inside Out: Biruni, Andaroon and Movements within Gulistan

Throughout its history, and the various phases of renovation and expansion under Qajar rule, Gulistan Palace maintained the basic Islamic domestic principle of a division between an administrative and presumably male dominated exterior part (bīrūnī) and the private, familial and predominately woman dominated interior (andarūn). This form of gender segregation was of course a normative practice of Islamic social and moral order and, as such, served as a source of legitimation for political authority of the Qajar rulers. The distinction between male and female space is more generally one of the most important defining characteristics of Islamic cities.[43]

Within European accounts, gender segregated space in general, and the domestic space of the harem in particular, carried a particularly heavy symbolic burden, as a bordered space which was impenetrable by European male gaze, and represented Eastern patriarchy and imprisonment of Muslim women’s bodies in its most material form.[44] While such orientalist assumptions about the Muslim world have by now been adequately critiqued, most notably by scholars such as Meyda Yegenoglu and Inderpal Grewal,[45] the basic premise that the harem, in its material form, represented an extreme form of private space occupied by women, and segregated from the male dominated public sphere, has continued to hold sway in the historiography of 19th century Iran.[46]

Gender-segregated spaces within Islamic cultures however, do not correspond to the modern European divide between public and private spheres as easily or as neatly as many historiographers of the Islamic world have assumed. From the outset, for example, the notion of interior (andarūn) and exterior (bīrūnī), both refer to areas that constitute the domestic sphere of the home. That is to say, in the context of a traditional Iranian home, and in particular, one belonging to an elite member of Persian society, the house itself was divided into two sections: the andarūn (‘inside’ or ‘innards,’) was the space designated for women, religiously permitted men (maḥram), and in the case of very elite households, their servants and eunuchs, and the bīrunī (‘outside’ or ‘public,’) was reserved for the male head of the household, and the visitors he would receive.[47] This is in stark contrast to European understandings of private and public spheres where the former refers to the home and the latter to the social world outside of the home.

Habermas has famously argued that in Europe, the division between the private and public spheres began to emerge towards the end of the 18th century with the rise of bourgeois culture, and was a central feature of the modern European state. According to him, there was a set of historically specific and unprecedented circumstances that allowed for the emergence of this liberal bourgeois phenomenon in Europe which in turn changed the principles and nature of state power.[48] For Habermas, this notion of public sphere grew at the same time as ideas about the intimate and private sphere of the conjugal family. The private sphere was constituted as the necessary counterpoint to the public sphere, and in the industrial era, the divide became highly gendered as men dominated the public arenas of politics and work, while women were closely associated with family and home. The European bourgeois social order relied on this gendered separation of these spheres and lead to the emergence of the nuclear family as the ideal social unit. [49] This form of conjugality is what in fact allowed citizens (read: male citizens) to have economic autonomy, play an active role in the market, and develop a liberal understanding of their rights which they could foster within the public sphere.  Love and intimacy were relegated to the private realm of the home and were to play a central role in the formation of the conjugal family and as the premise of marriage, though notions of a union between two people from different parts of the social-ladder was still highly frowned upon. [50]

By now, many feminist scholars, most notably, Nancy Fraser, have pointed out the gender blind bias of Habermas’s understating of the different spheres, arguing that “public” and “private” are themselves categories that once subjected to historically rigorous scrutiny, don’t adequately account for the nuanced ways that people divide up their intimate, social and political lives.[51] Similarly, the notion of domestic interior and social exterior spaces as oppositional and gendered has its own complex legacy in the European context. In The Emergence of the Interior, Charles Rice argues that understandings of domestic space as interior and private space began to take shape in Europe beginning in the 19th century.  According to Rice, “the interior emerged historically as the context for newly articulated desires for privacy and comfort, the consolidation of gendered and familial roles in life, and domestic practices of consumption and self-representation”.[52] Both as concept, and as material manifestation, the notion of a separate domestic space was a modernist European phenomenon which reflected the newly articulated and increasingly widespread desires for privacy and comfort, the consolidation of specific gendered and familial roles in life, as well as a newly emerging consumer culture which set specific rules for domestic arrangements. Rice argues that discourses about domesticity as a naturalized, stable and timeless aspect of living, is a misconception, albeit a powerful one, which in fact only emerged in 19th century Europe.[53]

Such understandings of family, conjugality, and civic life, and the rigid binaries that structured European societies in their idealized form, were not always present in other societies. In fact, family and conjugal relations in the royal Qajar harem were distinctly different than their European counterpart. The harem constituted a familial formation composed of multiple wives, with both permanent and various levels of temporary status, their relatives, as well as a large constellation of nannies, eunuchs and servants all co-habiting and collectively raising children in a communal setting. Multiple family portraits of harem women from the period attest to the complex nature of conjugality within this context (Figure 18).

Fig 18. Harem women, children and servants. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran (210-5-3).

Fig 18. Harem women, children and servants. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran (210-5-3).

 

 

Despite these glaring differences however, the Islamic architectural tendencies of royal courts and elite families, which were structured around the division between a bīrūnī and an andarūn, have generally been the site of cultural comparisons that regard such practices as material evidence for the severe gendered division between public and private life within Islamicate societies. Both European accounts of the Gulistan court, and more contemporary analysis of this space found in the English language, tend to rely heavily on such presuppositions in their spatial accounts of the palace and its harem.

For example, Jennifer Scarce, a notable architectural historian of the Qajar period, has argued that despite the modernization plans for Tehran in mid to late 19th century, a central component of Nasser al-Din’s expansion plans of Gulistan was the maintenance of the “traditional segregation of public and private areas” through the clear and gendered distinction between bīrūnī and andarūn of Gulīstan, and the walls surrounding the complex which protected these elements from public.[54] Throughout her body of work on Qajar architecture, she argues that such division is in accordance with Islamic tradition, where “[p]ublic life takes place in the streets, the service and commercial sectors, while private life looks inwards to courtyard and rooms within wall”.[55]  She notes that while there was a visible attempt by the Qajars to modernize Gulistan, (and visibility for her is apparent through the gesture of incorporating European architectural details such as clock towers and columns), the presence of traditional Islamic social order continued to foil full-scale modernization efforts. She thus makes a clear distinction between modern forms and structures, and traditional practices which occupy them. However, Scarce fails to account for the fact that the notion of a clear division between public and private space, and in particular, domestic interiority and public civic life, was a decidedly 19th century European phenomenon associated with European modernity, which was quite distinct from the traditions and practices which defined the Qajar court – a space that was arguably the very focal point of 19th century Iranian modernity. In fact, most objects and practices associated with modernity, from fashion and technology, to arts and literature made their first appearance in Iran within the walls of Gulistan.

In reality, in the context of late Qajar elite culture, this form of gender segregation was not informed by a distinction between private and public realm, but was instead the product of Islamic ordering and enforcement of gender segregation in both public and private life, and one which was not deemed by many to be incompatible with modernization. Furthermore, far from being “secluded” in the andarūn of Gulistan, there is no shortage of references to harem women from the period moving through the bazaar and the streets of Tehran, visiting public shrines, or traveling throughout the country, within the archives of the period – spaces which clearly fall outside the harem or domestic sphere of the arg (Figure 19).

Fig. 19. Harem women traveling with court eunuchs. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran.

Fig. 19. Harem women traveling with court eunuchs. Gulistan Palace Visual Document Center, Tehran, Iran.

 

Within such accounts, the basic rules of gender segregation apply either through women covering themselves, or the various ways in which men were forbidden from public areas that harem women were passing through.

A noteworthy incident, which illustrates this point well, took place in the summer of 1883, when Samuel Benjamin, the first American ambassador to Iran, was traveling with his daughter from Tehran to Shimīrān to escape the heat of the city. On route, his caravan reached a coffee house where a number of horses and carriages were parked. They decided to stop and take a break, but almost immediately upon arrival, they were attacked by a group of court eunuchs and severely beaten. The reason for this attack, which caused some diplomatic tensions at the time, was that the coffee house was at the time occupied by harem women who were also on route from Tehran to their summer destination. In such instances, it was not permissible for men to enter public spaces occupied by harem women.  The beating in fact only stopped when one of the shah’s wives recognized Benjamin and his daughter, and ordered the guards to stop.[56]

This is one of several examples of harem women occupying space outside the confines of the harem gates. In fact, these women spent most of their time socializing in various public gatherings, attending weekly public baths, and going on trips and pilgrimages collectively. During such outings, men were to stay clear of their paths and if they were to get a glimpse of harem women, it was men who would be punished. [57]

Moonis al-Dowleh, one of Anis al-Dowleh’s servants, in her memoirs, for example, gives a detailed account of harem women visiting kūhi bībī shahrbānū, a shrine located in the south east of Tehran. She states:

Men and women often visited shrines together with set rituals which they would follow. There was however, one shrine that no men and not even boys were allowed to visit – the kūhi bībī shahrbānū shrine. Legend had it that bībī shahrbānū was still alive and roaming the mountains and as such, no male visitors were allowed there. Because of this, women loved to visit this shrine where they did not have to cover themselves and could frolic freely.[58]

She describes how differing classes of harem women made the journey with their eunuchs and would partake in collective leisure activities such as singing, eating meals and reading omens (fāl khūndan) for the duration of the trip.[59]

Visits to the bath house is another example of public outings that harem women partook in, generally on a weekly basis. Shireen Mahdavi gives the following account of women’s public bathing rituals:

For the women, the public baths (apart from their original purpose of a location for being cleansed) were a form of amusement and distraction from daily life. It was a social meeting place where the women would go with their extended family and arrange to meet their friends. They would usually spend a whole day there, having their hair and nails dyed with henna, eating sweetmeats and meals, telling stories and anecdotes, and smoking hookahs. There were also baths for special occasions, such as on the tenth day after giving birth to a son or prenuptial baths which would be preceded and proceeded by female musicians and dancers.[60]

While such collective homosocial activities have been well documented in the historiography of Qajar women, most notably by Afsaneh Najmabadi, few scholars have paid adequate attention to the spatial manifestation of such activities –namely that they often took place in outdoor or public spaces throughout the city which the traditional historiography has deemed inaccessible to harem women.

Even within the arg, there was no shortage of large scale gatherings and social affairs in which women took part. Muīr al-Mamlik, for example reports in his memoirs that on a few nights each month, the entire arg (so not just its andarūn, but also its bīruni) would be closed off to visitors so that the shah and the residents of the harem could tour the grounds. They would spend time in the dīvan khanih and the garden, and musicians and entertainers would perform for large audiences. Harem women would often end the evening by sharing a collective dinner with the shah in the diamond hall building (tālār-i bilirīān). [61]  Thus, even the bīruni section of the arg was regularly accessible to harem women and their servants.

Furthermore, the characterization of the royal andarūn as a private space in and of itself requires further interrogation. Understandings of the harem as a “private” sphere of domesticity ignore both the spatial configuration of it, as well as the ways in which the women living within it constituted a public in their own right, which was in constant contact with both the court and the many bodies and identities which surrounded and passed through it. In her description of harem life, Taj Saltaneh, the one of the shah’s daughter’s notes:

His Imperial Majesty, my father, had about eighty wives and concubines, each of whom had about ten or twenty maidservants and domestics. The number of women in the harem thus reached some five or six hundred. Moreover, every day the wives, concubines, or domestics received numerous relative and visitors, so that there was a constant flood of about eight or nine hundred women in the harem.[62]

It would be hard to argue that a space occupied by 800 to 900 bodies should be considered a private domain. In fact, looking at accounts of the Qajar harem from the late 19th century, one is struck by the amount of sociality and communal practices that made up the day-to-day life of the resident even within the andarūn. Many of the architectural details which were explained in the last section, were developed specifically for this purpose – let’s recall for example the large tālārs that were built into certain buildings, or Anis al-Dowleh’s guest room on the second floor of her home which is referenced in the many accounts from the period.

 

Conclusion:

In a letter written to Nasser al-Din Shah, the writer informs the shah of a physical altercation which has taken place between harem servants and workers outside of the harem. Āghā Bāshī, the Shah’s loyal eunuch is mentioned as the arbitrator of the fight. According to the letter, Āghā Bāshī makes the harem servants promise not to “loiter on the street and pick fights”.[63] This letter is interesting in that it shows that while, in some sense, there was in fact a desire to keep a separation between the harem and its exterior, the boundaries between the interior and exterior were regularly crossed, in this case, by harem eunuchs who were perhaps the most mobile figures between these two realms.

Thinking through the material space of late 19th century Gulistan, its immediate surroundings, and its location in the heart of a fast-developing urban center, allows us to move beyond fetishizing the harem as a token of idealized Eastern patriarchal sexuality or denouncing it as a prison house of Muslim women, and instead, interrogate certain social relations in late Qajar Iran through their spatial manifestation at the very heart of the empire.

Both textual and photographic evidence point to the fact that the Gulistan andarūn was at once a space of domesticity within which, for example, children were raised in a collective environment, a space of sociality wherein a constant barrage of guests, both familial, local and transnational, were entertained, a host of rituals both secular and religious were performed, as well as a series of politics, both local, national and international interrogated and negotiated. This folding in of deeply private and extremely public activities within the same space is perhaps the most unique and interesting feature of the royal court, and one which has been severely understudied. What was particularly unique about this space was that for the most part, the day-to-day affairs of the harem occurred outside of male control. Seen in this light, the Gulistan harem was a kind of heterotopic liminal zone where gender, ethnic and class differences intersected, and where the successive development of the space both formed and was informed by the domestic, leisure, cultural, and political practices that took shape with

[1]Michel Foucault, “The Eye of Power” in Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 149.

[2]Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces, Heterotopias,” Diacritics 16, (Spring 1986): 22-27.

[3]Edward Soja, “History: Geography: Modernity” in The Cultural Studies Reader, ed. Simon Duing (New York, London: Routledge, 1999), 113-125.

 

[4]While the Pahlavis still maintained Gulistan as a royal palace which they used for formal receptions during their reign, they moved their place of residence into the newly built Niavara House to the north of the city.

[5]Fatema Soudavar Farmanfarmaian, “Politics and Patronage: The Evolution of the Sara-ye Amir in the Bazaar of Tehran” in The Bazaar in the Islamic City: Design, Culture, and History, ed. Mohammad Gharipour (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2012), 205.

[6]For a complete discussion of the different phases of development of Gulistan and Tehran prior to and during the early Qajar period, refer to Sadiqeh Golshan’s “Gulistan-i Bagh Gulistan: arg dar tarikh-i Tehran,” Soffeh Architectural Science and Research: The Journal of the School of Architecture and Urban Planning, nos. 21-22 (1996).

[7]Abbas Amanat, Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din and the Iranian Monarchy (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2008), 19.

[8]Jennifer Scarce, “The Architecture and Decoration of the Gulistan Palace: The Aims and Achievements of Fath ‘Ali Shah (1797-1834) and Nasir al-Din Shah (1848-1896),” Iranian Studies, vol. 34  (2001): 110.

[9]Amanat, Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din and the Iranian Monarchy, 12.

[10]For a complete discussion of the development of the Tehran Bazaar, which expanded to include many more structures, and its architectural details, refer to Fatema Soudavar Farmanfarmaian’s “Politics and Patronage” in The Bazaar in the Islamic City.

[11]In her study of the bazaar, Farmanfarmanian argues that the grand scale of the mosque served as a source of legitimacy for the new dynasty (206). Masoud Kamali, in his book Revolutionary Iran, Civil Society and State in the Modernization Process (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1998), also argues that the Qajar’s desire to legitimate themselves as a faithful Shi‘a dynasty was realized in this way

[12]Ali Madanipour, Tehran, the Making of a Metropolis (Chichester: John Wiley, 1998), 30.

[13]John Gurney, “The Transformation of Tehran in the Later Nineteenth Century” in Téhéran, Capitale Bicentenaire, ed. B. Hourcade, S. Adle (Paris: Téhéran: Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, 1992), 51.

[14]Edmund Bosworth, Historic Cities of The Islamic World (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007), 508.

[15]Abbas Amanat offers a detailed account of the ceremony in his section “Ascending the Throne” in Pivot of the Universe: Nasser al-Din Shah and the Iranian Monarchy, 89-108.

[16]Gurney, “The Transformation of Tehran in the Late Nineteenth Century,” 52.

[17]Bosworth, Historic Cities of The Islamic World, 509.

[18]The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 7, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 892.

[19]Gurney, “The Transformation of Tehran in the Late Nineteenth Century,” 53.

[20]Reza Shirazi, “The Orient veneered in the Occident” in The City in the Muslim World: Depictions by Western Travel Writers, ed. Mohammad Gharipour and Nilay Özlü (Abington and New York: Routledge, 2015).

[21]Many historians of Iran have applied this simplistic definition of modernization as mimicry of the west, in particular in relation to the development of Tehran. For examples, refer to Hafez Farman Farmanian’s “The Forces of Modernization in Nineteenth Century Iran: A Historical Survey” in Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East, The Nineteenth Century, ed. W.R. Polk and R. L. Chambers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); and Ervant Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982).

[22]George Nathaniel Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1892), 306.

[23]Ernest Tucker, The Middle East in Modern World History (New York: Routledge, 2013), 83.

[24]Jennifer Scarce, Domestic Culture in the Middle East: An Exploration of the Household Interior (Edinburgh: National Museums of Scotland in association with Curzon Press, 1996), 21.

[25]At the turn of the 19th century, during the summer months, the population of Tehran was estimated at 15 000. By 1867, during the same months, the population had increased to 100 000 (Bosworth, Historic Cities of The Islamic World, 510).

[26]Sadiqeh Golshan, “Gulistan-i Bagh Gulistan: arg dar tarikh-i Tehran”, Soffeh Architectural Science and Research: The Journal of the School of Architecture and Urban Planning, nos. 21-22, (Spring and Summer 1996): 45.

[27]Iranian Culural Heritage, Handcrafts, and Tourism Organization, “Nomination of Golestan Palace for Inscription on the World Heritage List Report (Tehran: UNESCO World Heritage Convention, 2012), 3.

[28]Sadiqeh Golshan, “The Influence of European Design on Bagh-e-Golestan: The Qajarid Garden,” The International Journal of the Arts in Society, no. 5 (2010): 393.

[29]For a discussion of European influence on the Palace structure during this phase, refer to Gurney, “The Transformation of Tehran in the Late Nineteenth Century,” 64-65.

[30]Scarce, The Architecture and Decoration, 114.

[31]Hassan Azad, Posht-e Pardeh-ha-ye Haram-sara  (Oromiyeh: Anzali, 1985), 398.

[32]Scarce, The Architecture and Decoration, 115.

[33]Lady Mary Sheil, Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia (London: John Murray, 1856), 127.

[34]Muīr al-Mamlik, Dūst-Alī-Khān, Notes of Private Life of Nasserad-Din-Shah (Tehran: Nashr-e-

Tarikh-e-Iran, 1983), 21.

[35]Scarce, The Architecture and Decoration, 116.

[36]Muīr al-Mamlik, Dūst-Alī-Khān, Notes of Private Life of Nasserad-Din-Shah, 18.

[37]Joannes Fauvrier, Three Years in Persia’s Royal Court, trans. Abass  Eghbal (Tehran: Elm, 2006), 399.

[38]Gholām Ali Aziz al-Sultān Malījak, Ruz-nāma-ye ḵāṭerāt Gholām Ali Khān Aziz al-Sultān, ed. Moḥsen Mirzāʾi, vol. 1, Tehran, 1997, 373.

[39]Scarce, Domestic Culture in the Middle East, 34.

[40]Muīr al-Mamlik, Dūst-Alī-Khān, Notes of Private Life of Nasserad-Din-Shah, 15-16.

[41]Cyrus Sadvandian, Khāterat-i Mūnis al-Dowlih: Nadīmih’ haramsarāy-i Nasser al-Din Shah (Tehran:  Zarrin Books, 2010), 237.

[42]Azad, Posht-e Pardeh-ha-ye Haram-sara, 373.

[43]For a discussion of the significance of spatial gender divisions in Islamic cities, refer to Janet Abu-Lughod’s “The Islamic City: Historic Myths, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary Relevance, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.19 (May 1987): 155-176.

[44]For a discussion of European attitudes towards Middle Eastern harems, refer to Marilyn Booth’s introduction to the 2011 edited book Harem Histories: Envisioning Places and Living Spaces (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010).

[45]Meyda Yegenoglu, Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Inderpal Grewal, Home and Harem: Nation, Gender, Empire, and the Cultures of Travel (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996).

[46]This is both true in European accounts of the city from the period (James Bailey Fraser, Mary Shiel, Lord Curzon, Carl Serena, Ferrier…) as well as historical scholarship (Amanat, Scarce…).

[47]A. A. Bakhtiar and R. Hillenbrand, “Domestic Architecture in Nineteenth Century Iran: the Manzil-i Sartip Siddihi near Isfahan,” in Qajar Iran Political, Social and Cultural Change 1800-1925, ed. E. Bosworth and C. Hillenbrand (Edinburgh: Mazda Publishers,1982), 383-402.

[48]Jürgen Habermas, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964),” trans. Sara Lennox and Frank Lennox, New German Critique, 3 (1974): 49-50.

[49]Joan Scott, “Sexularism”, Ursula Hirschmann Annual Lecture on Gender and Europe, European University Institute, Florence Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies Distinguished Lecture, 3 April 2009, 12.

[50]Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991).

[51]Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: MIT press, 1992).

[52]Charles Rice, The Emergence of the Interior: Architecture, Modernity, Domesticity (Abington and New York: Routledge, 2007), 1.

[53] Rice, The Emergence of the Interior: Architecture, Modernity, Domesticity, 4.

[54]Jennifer Scarce, “The Royal Palaces of the Qajar Dynasty; a Survey” in Qajar Iran: Political, Social, and Cultural Change 1800-1925, ed. Edmond Bosworth and Carole Hillenbrand (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1992), 339.

[55]Scarce, Domestic Culture in the Middle East: An Exploration of the Household Interior,13.

[56]S.G. W. Benjamin, The Life and Adventures of a Freelance, being the observations of S.G.W. Benjamin (Burlington: Free Press Company, 1914), 384-391.

[57]Azad, Posht-e Pardeh-ha-ye Haram-sara, 233.

[58]Sadvandian, Khāterat-i Mūnis al-Dowlih: Nadīmih’ haramsarāy-i Nasser al-Din Shah, 137.

[59]Sadvandian, Khāterat-i Mūnis al-Dowlih: Nadīmih’ haramsarāy-i Nasser al-Din Shah, 138.

[60]Shireen Mahdavi, “Amusements in Qajar Iran”, Iranian Studies, vol.40 (September 2007): 494.

[61]Muīr al-Mamlik, Dūst-Alī-Khān, Notes of Private life of Nasserad-Din-Shah, 25.

[62]Taj al-Saltanan, Crowning Anguish: Memoirs of a Persian Princess from the Harem to Modernity, ed. Abbas Amanat, trans. Anna Vanzan and Amin Neshati (Washington DC: Mage Publishers, 2003), 88.

[63]The National Archives and Library in Tehran, document 295-2592.

The Untold Stories of the Wolf: A Comparative Study of “The Wolf” and The Call of the Wild

مقدمه

با نگاهی به ادبیات تاریخ طبیعی، درمی‌یابیم که گرگ، چنان که امروزه آن را می‌شناسیم، طی اعصار اولیه به سبب رقابت بر سر شکار مشترک همواره با نوع انسان در نزاع بوده است. انسان و گرگ همیشه رقیب و گاهی اوقات دشمن یکدیگر بوده‌اند، چون احتمالاً همیشه در مجاورت یکدیگر زیسته‌اند.[1] گرگ‌ها غالباً موجوداتی اجتماعی‌اند، با این همه، گرگِ تنها نری جوان است که معمولاً در جستجوی قلمرو و جفت خویش است و در حاشیۀ قلمرو دیگران می‌چرخد، بی‌آنکه زوزه‌ای سر دهد.[2]

شاید به علت همین قرابت انسان و گرگ بوده است که افسانه‌ها و داستان‌های محلی بسیاری راجع به این حیوان نقل شده و در ادبیات آمده است. کلاریسا پینکولا اِستِس با مرور این داستان‌ها در زنانی که با گرگها میدوند: افسانهها و قصههایی دربارۀ کهنالگوی زن وحشی (Women Who Run with the Wolves: Myths and Stories of the Wild Woman Archetype) به نزدیکی زنان و گرگ‌ها اشاره می‌کند و بیان می‌دارد که گرگ‌ها و زنان سالم در خصوصیات روحی و روانی ویژه‌ای مشترک‌اند که از آن جمله‌اند احساسات قوی، سرزندگی و بازیگوشی و توانایی عظیم برای ایثار.[3] به گفتۀ او، گرگ‌ها و زنان ذاتاً اجتماعی و کنجکاوند و از ظرفیت تحمل و قدرت بالایی برخوردارند، قوۀ درک و شمی قوی دارند و به شدت به فرزند، همسر، و خانواده‌شان علاقه‌مندند.

در تحقیقات دیگر به اهمیت کهن‌الگویی گرگ اشاره شده است که از قرابت این جاندار با انسان ناشی می‌شود. اهمیت کهن‌الگویی گرگ هم دلالت بر جنبۀ شرّ دارد و هم بر جنبۀ مثبت و معنوی. گرگ همچنین در ادبیات و فرهنگ نشان‌دهند‌ۀ جمع تضادها بوده است.[4] اسطوره‌ها و داستان‌های نقاط متفاوت جهان دربارۀ گرگ تناقض‌هایی دارند: در بعضی از آنها تصویر گرگ به حیوانی وحشی و ترسناک دلالت دارد که ممکن است نشانۀ مرگ و شیطان باشد. در عین حال، گرگ همراه الاهۀ آرتمیس (Artemis) و خدای اسکاندیناوی،‌ اودین (Odin)، است. تناقض در تصویر گرگ در تقابل بین ماهیت زنانه و مردانه هم نهفته است. ماهیت مردانۀ گرگ در بسیاری فرهنگ‌ها به صورت رفتار ستیزه‌جویانه نشان داده شده است. ماهیت زنانۀ آن هم به شکل الاهه‌ای در قالب ماده گرگی که روموس (Remus) و رومولوسِ (Romulus) دوقلو را بزرگ می‌کند و نژاد رومی‌ها را پدید می‌آورد یا در اسطورۀ کورمک (Cormac)، شاه ایرلند که گرگ‌ها به او شیر دادند و همواره همراه آنها بود، به تصویر کشیده شده است. حتی در منابع اولیۀ کتاب مقدس تقابل بین گرگ وحشی، که نماد ویرانگری است،[5] با نماد گرگ و بره‌ای که با هم خوابیده‌اند، که نشان صلح و آمدن قانون مسیحایی است،[6] به تصویر کشیده شده است. قرآن هم سه بار در سورۀ یوسف به گرگ اشاره کرده و فقط تصویری درنده‌خو و وحشی از آن ارائه داده است که خطری برای انسان محسوب می‌شود.[7] در قرون وسطا هم تقابل بین تصویر گرگ به منزلۀ شیطان و چونان نمادی از قدیس فرانسیس آسیسی (Saint Francis of Assisi) مشهود است که گرگ را رام کرد.[8]

در منظومه‌های حماسی ایران هم نه فقط مردمان، که موجودات و عناصر طبیعت هم نقش مهمی ایفا می‌کنند. از میان جانوران، گرگ یکی از بازیگران حماسه‌های ایرانی، از جمله شاهنامه فردوسی، است که مضامین و بن‌مایه‌های متفاوتی را به خود اختصاص داده است. رضایی اوّل و شامیان ساروکلائی در تحقیقی تحت عنوان ”گرگ در منظومه‌های حماسی ایران“ مضامین و اشارات مرتبط با با گرگ را در شاهنامه و ده منظومۀ حماسی پس از آن (بانوگشپنامه،‌ برزونامه، بهمننامه، جهانگیرنامه، سامنامه، شهریارنامه، فرامرزنامه، کک کوهزاد، کوشنامه، و گرشاسپنامه) بررسی کرده‌ و مهم‌ترین بن‌مایه‌های عرضه‌شده دربارۀ این جانور را استخراج کرده‌اند که از آن میان می‌توان به موارد زیر اشاره کرد: ”اهریمنی بودن، سکونت در غار (جهان زیرین)، مردارخواري، سخندانی، تیرگی پوست، سرو داشتن، سوار شدن پهلوان بر گرگ، توتم گرگ، پرورش کودك با شیر گرگ، گرگ‌کشیِ یلان، پیکرگردانی به سیماي گرگ، گرگ و گرگساران، و گرگ و انجمن مردان.“[9]

از این خصوصیات هم جنبه‌های مثبت و هم منفی دریافت می‌شود. برای مثال، یک جنبۀ منفی اهریمنی بودن این جانور است که در متون دوران باستان و از جمله اوستا و متون پهلوی چون بندهش و ارداویرافنامه به آن اشاره شده است.[10] در منابع پهلوی و پازند همۀ موجودات، چون گیاهان و جانوران، یا به دست هرمزد آفریده می‌شوند یا اهریمن و گرگ و گرگ‌سردگان (گونه‌های گرگ) از جمله آفریده‌های اهریمن‌اند.[11] مثالی از جنبۀ مثبت بن‌مایۀ اسطوره‌ای-حماسی ”کودک و گرگ“ است که طبق آن، گاه کودکی در کنار گرگ و گاهی با شیر او پرورش می‌یابد. هر چند در شاهنامه و منظومه‌های حماسی پس از آن به این مورد اشارۀ دقیقی نشده است –جز تک‌بیتی در بهمننامه که در آن، بهمن شاه‌لؤلؤ را چنین خطاب قرار می‌کند که با بچۀ گرگ پرورش یافته است: همانا که تو شیر سگ خورده‌ای / چو با بچّة گرگ پرورده‌ای–[12] ولی چنین مضمونی در تعدادی از روایات ملی به چشم می‌خورد.[13] برای نمونه در این روایات دربارۀ تولد زرتشت چنین آمده است که دیوان تلاش می‌کردند تا نشان دهند فرّه نشانه‌ای اهریمنی است. بنابراین، پدر زرتشت تلاش می‌کند که نخست با سوزاندن او و سپس با نهادنش جلوی گاوان و اسبان رمنده به زندگی او پایان بخشد. اما هر بار کودک نجات می‌یابد. حتی پدر زرتشت را در بیابان رها می‌کند، ولی ماده گرگی او را نجات می‌دهد.[14]

به علاوه، مردمان بسیاری از فرهنگ‌ها گرگ را مثل اعلای حیوانی غریزی می‌دانند. بیشتر افراد در مرحله‌ای از رشد روانی‌شان برای ادغام جنبه‌های روانی و فیزیکی وجودشان تلاش می‌کنند. تصویر گرگ در این فرهنگ‌ها برای نشان دادن هر دو جنبه به کار برده شده است.[15] چینی‌ها گرگ را نگهبان کاخ آسمانی می‌دانند و در ژاپن، گرگ به سبب درنده‌خویی، سرسختی و حملۀ سریعش ستایش شده است.

نکتۀ دیگر اینکه در فرهنگ‌ها و اساطیر گوناگون، تصویر گرگ بیشتر با زنان پیوند خورده است. برای نمونه، ارتباط گرگ با الاهه‌ها در آیین دینی لوپا (Lupa‌) یا فرونیا (Feronia) مربوط به روم باستان دیده می‌شود که از شه‌مادری سابین (Sabine matriarchy) به ارث رسیده است.[16] این الاهه، که بعضی اوقات با عنوان ”مادر گرگ‌ها“ شناخته می‌شود، قابله‌ای یزدانی و مادر ارواح نیایی هم بوده است.[17] بعدها به تندیس باستانی غار لوپرکال (Lupercal grotto، وابسته به پَن (Pan) خدای شبان‌ها و گله‌ها) تصاویری از نوزادان، روموس و رومولوس افزوده شد که احتمالاً الاهۀ پَن از آنها نگهداری کرده است. این مادهْ‌گرگ در جشنوارۀ پانزدهم فوریه پاس داشته می‌شد، جشنواره‌ای که هر سال در روم باستان بر پا بود. در این جشنواره، جوانانی که پوست گرگ بر سر می‌کردند در آیینی عبادی قصبه‌های مجاور کوه پالاتین (Palatine Hill) در رم را تقدیس و پاک می‌کردند. این مادهْ‌گرگ افسانه‌ای و دوقلوهای رهاشده کم‌کم به نماد روم تبدیل شدند. ارتباط مکرر بین پیکرۀ الاهه‌ها و توتم‌های گرگ ممکن است نشانه‌ی دیگری از این مسئله در نظر گرفته شود که از ابتدا زنان بودند که ارتباطاتی با گرگ‌ها برقرار و در نهایت آنها را اهلی کردند.[18]

گرگ امروزه هم نشانۀ ماهیت غریزی وحشی و طبیعی ماست.[19] پینکولا اِستِس معتقد است که درون هر زنی موجودی وحشی و طبیعی وجود دارد که سرشار از غرایز خوب،‌ شور و خلاقیت، و دانش بی‌زمان است.[20] این ”زن وحشیِ“ درونْ به مثابه کهن‌الگویی در نظر گرفته می‌شود که دربرگیرندۀ تصاویر، ایده‌ها و رفتارهای خاص بشر است. اِستِس عقیده دارد که هدیۀ طبیعت وحشی هم‌زمان با تولد در زنان به وجود می‌آید، ولی جامعه در بسیاری موارد سعی دارد این خصیصه را رام و متمدن کند و آن را به شکل نقش‌هایی ثابت درآورد که در جامعۀ مردسالار از زنان انتظار می‌رود. این سرکوب از طرف جامعه باعث نابودی این گنج درون شده و پیام‌های عمیق و حیات‌بخش روح را خفه می‌کند. در نتیجه، زنان به دام می‌افتند، زیاده از حد رام می‌شوند،‌ غیرخلاق شده و احساساتشان پر از بیم می‌شود. به منظور پیدا کردن روح واقعی‌ خود، زنان باید با طبیعت غریزی و وحشی‌شان مواجه شوند تا به موجوداتی آزاد، خلاق و بامحبت تبدیل شوند. اِستِس ایده‌های خود را با بیان داستان لالوبا (La Loba)، گرگْ‌زن، توضیح می‌دهد. کار لالوبا جمع کردن استخوان‌های گرگ و خواندن آوازِ زندگی در آنها بود. این داستان سمبلی از صدای روح است و راستی قدرت زن و نیاز به دمیدن روح در چیزی را می‌رساند که بیمار است یا نیاز به احیا دارد. زنان می‌توانند این امر را با کنکاش در عمیق‌ترین حالت عشق و احساس صورت دهند تا زمانی که احساس‌ آنها برای رابطه با خود وحشی‌شان سرریز شود و بعد در آن چارچوب روحشان را بیان کنند. زن وحشی کهن‌الگویی است که تصاویر‌، انگاره‌ها و رفتارهای خاص بشری را در خود دارد و به افراد کمک می‌کند تا روحشان را پیدا کنند.

در روان‌شناسی هم گرگ نماد درون‌روانی (intrapsychic) برای تفرّد (individuation ) در نظر گرفته می‌شود.[21] در این حالت، صدای منحصر به فرد نفس بر هنجارهای جمعی جامعه غالب است. تفرّد الزام به رشد و بلوغ درونی را می‌رساند. اِستِس مراحل تفرّد را حین توصیف سفر زن برای یافتن روحش نگاشته است.[22] او بر این باور است که نوزاد با ماهیتی وحشی، غریزی و خلاق به دنیا می‌آید. حینِ رشد، مادر و جامعه به او می‌آموزند که خود را با هنجارهای جامعه وفق دهد. از این رو، نفسِ خلاق و غریزی به خاک سپرده می‌شود و مشکلات به‌تدریج نمایان می‌شوند. از نظر گریفیث، مراحل این فرایند (تفرّد)، که برای زنان در سندپلی (Sandplay) تبلور می‌یابد، به شکل زیر است:

  1. خودِ شناختی (cognitive ego): طی این مرحله، شاهد نتیجۀ متمدن کردن ماهیت وحشی و غریزی بچه به دست جامعه و مادر به شکل نقشی انعطاف‌ناپذیر هستیم که بچه باید در آینده درون جامعه به خود بگیرد. در این حالت که بچه ارتباطش را با روح وحشی از دست داده است، ترسو و غیرخلاق و گرفتار و زیاد از حد رام می‌شود.
  2. آشفتگی و بازیابی شهود (intuition) در قالب پاگشایی (initiation): این مرحله شامل آگاهی از بقا، سوال از رشد اولیه و تشخیص قفس‌هاست. در این مرحله، افکار و احساس گم‌گشتگی و در دام بودن دیده می‌شود که با سرگردانی، سرسام، قفس پرندگان یا حیوانات،‌ گرگ تنها یا نمادهایی از تضادها به تصویر درمی‌آید.
  3. پرده‌برداری بیشتر از احساسات: در این مرحله، شخص به شکارچی تنها تبدیل می‌شود، با ماهیت زندگی/مرگ/زندگیِ عشق مواجه شده و روابطی را پدید می‌آورد که احساسات مرده‌ای را احیا می‌کند که غرایز را زنده می‌کنند.
  4. خودمحوری و بازگشت به خود: شخص آب پاک و روان را پیدا می‌کند، تغذیۀ زندگی خلاق را شروع و تمایلات جنسی مقدسی را بازیابی می‌کند.
  5. یافتن دستۀ خود و بازگشت به خانه: شخص،‌ مانند گرگ تنها، جفت و خانواده‌اش را دوباره پیدا می‌کند و زندگی خلاق خود را در محیط و جهان خود از سر می‌گیرد.[23]

در ادامه‌ این مسئله را بررسی می‌کنیم که مراحل فوق در دو داستان چه جلوه‌ای پیدا می‌کنند.

گرگ به شکل نمادین نشان‌دهندۀ نهاد غریزی ماست که ماهیتی وحشی و طبیعی دارد. گرگ همچنین ممکن است نشانۀ تجمیعی از تناقض‌ها و تضادها باشد. گرگ تنها ممکن است نمادی از قبول غرایز طبیعی باشد که در فرایند رشد و تفرّد به دست خانواده و جامعه از فرد جدا شده‌اند و گرگِ در حالِ زوزه کشیدن نشانۀ صدای درونی روح است که دوباره بازیابی می‌شود.[24]

هدف و روش تحقیق

مطالعۀ حاضر بر آن است که با بررسی تطبیقی آوای وحش جک لندن و ”گرگ“ هوشنگ گلشیری نشان دهد که به چه جنبه‌های مثبت یا منفی‌ از گرگ در دو داستان اشاره شده است و اهمیت نمادین و کهن‌الگویی گرگ،‌ مطابق آنچه بدان اشاره شد، چگونه در دو داستان تصویر شده است. همچنین، با توجه به اینکه گرگ در ادبیات کلاسیک فارسی بیشتر در نقش موجودی درنده‌خو و اهریمنی به تصویر کشیده شده است – برخلاف ادبیات غربی که در آن هم بر جنبه‌های مثبت و هم منفی گرگ اشاره شده است – مطالعۀ حاضر به دنبال کشف این موضوع است که آیا هوشنگ گلشیری در مقام نویسنده‌ای ایرانی در تصویر گرگ و برداشت‌ها و تلویحات او از این موجود از ادبیات بومی و کهن خویش بهره ‌برده است یا در حکم نویسنده‌ای نوگرا از خصوصیات گرگ چنان استفاده کرده که در ادبیات غربی به آن پرداخته شده است. به همین منظور،‌ این تحقیق کتابخانه‌ای، به شیوه‌ای کیفی و توصیفی داستان گلشیری را با رمان لندن مطابقت داده تا در صورت پیروی گلشیری از تصویر گرگ در ادبیات غرب، جنبه‌های مشترک این دو اثر را کشف کند.

بحث و بررسی

”گرگ“ هوشنگ گلشیری و آوای وحش جک لندن جنبه‌های مشترک بسیاری دارند. کمترین آنها شاید اشاره به کتاب‌های جک لندن در داستان گلشیری باشد، آنجا که راوی با گمان اینکه اختر،‌ زن دکتر، کتاب‌های جک لندن را خوانده است از قول او نقل می‌کند که ”من حالا دیگر گرگ‌ها را خوب می‌شناسم.“ در واقع، فصل‌ مشترک بارز این دو داستان وجود گرگ و سگ به منزلۀ محورهای اصلی این داستان‌هاست. در داستان گلشیری، گرگ و سگ نقش‌هایی محوری دارند، به قسمی که اختر جذب گرگی درشت‌اندام می‌شود، گرگی که در نقاشی‌هایش به صورت سگ، ”آن هم سگ‌های معمولی،“ ترسیم شده است. روایت لندن هم تماماً دربارۀ ”باک،“ سگ-گرگ قوی و عظیم‌الجثه‌ای‌ است که در ابتدا بین صاحبان متفاوت دست به دست می‌چرخد، ولی در نهایت به خاستگاه اصلی خود در میان دستۀ گرگ‌ها برمی‌گردد.

در واقع، اختر از باک یاد می‌گیرد که به دنبال طبیعت وحشی و من غریزی خویش بگردد. نقطۀ شروع این بازگشت هم در دو داستان مشابه است. باک اولین قدم در راه بازگشت به خاستگاه خود را زمانی برمی‌دارد که کشتی ناروال که از سیاتل در نواحی گرمسیر جنوبی راه افتاده است در نواحی شمالی متوقف می‌شود و فرانسوا سگ‌ها را از بند رها می‌کند و به عرشه می‌برد. توصیف مواجه شدن باک با برف برای اولین‌بار نشان می‌دهد که او چقدر با ماهیت غریزی و محیط طبیعی خود فاصله گرفته است، محیطی که در پایان با آن الفت می‌گیرد:

پای باک در نخستین قدمی که بر سطح سرد نهاد به چیزی سفید که بسیار به گِل شبیه بود فرو رفت. باک غرشی کرد و به عقب جست. از این چیز سفید باز هم از آسمان می‌آمد،‌ باک تمام بدن خود را لرزاند تا آن چیز بریزد، اما باز هم از بالا آمد و روی او نشست. با تعجب آن را بو کشید، سپس اندکی از آن را با زبان لیسید. مانند آتش زبانش را گزید و لحظه‌ای بعد، اثری از آن بر روی زبانش نبود. این نکته باک را مبهوت کرد. باز آن را آزمود و همان نتیجه را گرفت. تماشاچیان این صحنه به صدای بلند می‌خندیدند و باک شرمسار شده بود، اما نمی‌دانست چرا چنان شده است، زیرا که اول‌بار بود که برف می‌دید.[25]

رویارویی با برف نخستین قدم باک در راه بازگشت به خود است. در داستان دیگر هم برف نخستین محرک اختر برای بازگشت به طبیعت وحشی و خویشتن غریزی است. او که زنی لاغراندام و رنگ‌پریده است ”گاه‌گداری دم در بهداری پیداش می‌شد“ و ”وقتی هوا آفتابی بود، از کنار قبرستان می‌آمد ده و گشتی می‌زد.“ شوهر اختر برای اینکه سر زنش گرم شود پیشنهاد می‌کند که درسی به عهده‌اش بگذارند و او هم، با اینکه قبول نمی‌کند، گاهی اوقات مدرسه می‌رود و ”گاهی هم می‌رفت لب قنات، پهلوی زنها.“ با این همه، وقتی که برف اول می‌افتد، دیگر پیدایش نمی‌شود. زن‌ها او را می‌بینند که کنار بخاری می‌نشیند و چیزی می‌خواند. در همین زمان است که صدیقه، یکی از زن‌های ده، او را می‌بیند که کنار پنجره می‌ایستد و به صحرای سفید و روشن نگاه می‌کند. از قول او، ”صدای زوزۀ گرگ که بلند می‌شود، [اختر] می‌رود کنار پنجره.» برف دوم و سوم که می‌افتد، دکتر پیشنهاد می‌کند که زنش به دورۀ هامان برود. هر چند که این دوره زنانه نبود، اما ”اگر زن دکتر می‌آمد، می‌توانست پهلوی زن‌ها برود.“ اختر پیشنهاد شوهرش را رد می‌کند و اصرار دارد که ”من توی خانه می‌مانم.“ علت در خانه ماندن اختر این است که او محو گرگی ”بزرگ و تنها“ شده، چرا که ”صدیقه دو چشم براق گرگ را دیده بود و دیده بود که زن دکتر چطور خیره به چشم‌های براق گرگ نگاه می‌کند. وقتی هم که صدیقه صداش زده نشنیده است.“

دیدن برف اول زمستانی و رویارویی با گرگ خویشتنِ غریزی و وحشی اختر را بیدار می‌کند.[26] برای او زوزۀ گرگ ندایی غریزی و درونی است، چنان که با شنیدنش کنار پنجره می‌رود و صحرای پربرف و روشن را می‌نگرد. چنان که اشاره شد، زوزۀ گرگ نشان‌دهندۀ صدای درونی روح است که بازیابی شده.[27] زوزه کشیدن به سبک گرگ غرایز خفتۀ باک را هم بیدار می‌کند: ”و آن‌گاه که در شب‌های سرد و آرام بینی را رو به ستاره‌ها می‌گرفت و زوزه‌ای بلند و گرگ‌مانند می‌کشید، همان نیاکان او بودند که گرد و غبار شده بودند و اکنون به واسطۀ او از فاصلۀ قرون سر برمی‌داشتند و زوزه می‌کشیدند.“[28] برای باک که از هم‌آوازی با سگ-گرگ‌های اسکیمو لذت می‌برد، زوزه کشیدن ”سرودی کهن بود، در قدمت هم‌زمان نژادی . . . که آن را می‌سرود . . . این شکوا که آن‌قدر برای باک هیجان‌آور بود، مملو از غم و اندوه نسل‌های بی‌شمار بود.“[29]

نکتۀ دیگری که از خواندن داستان به ذهن می‌رسد ماهیت گرگی است که اختر جذب او شده است. در نهایت معلوم نمی‌شود که این موجود گرگ است یا سگ. دکتر گرگی بزرگ و تنها را پشت نرده‌ها می‌بیند که رو به ماه زوزه می‌کشد، ولی وقتی زنش آن را توصیف می‌کند، آن را ”درست مثل یک سگ گله [که] به دو دستش تکیه می‌دهد“ می‌بیند. طرح‌های اختر هم از این موجود،‌ به قول راوی، هم شبیه گرگ است و هم سگ: ”نقاشی‌های خانم تعریفی ندارد. فقط همان گرگ را کشیده بود. دو چشم سرخ درخشان توی یک صفحۀ سیاه، یک طرح سیاه‌قلم از گرگ نشسته و یکی هم وقتی گرگ دارد رو به ماه زوزه می‌کشد . . . یکی دو تا هم طرح پوزۀ گرگ است که بیشتر شبیه پوزۀ سگ‌هاست، دندان‌هاش به‌خصوص.“

علاوه بر این، زمانی که اختر و همسرش در برف شدید وسطِ تنگ گیر می‌کنند، دکتر گرگ را کنار جاده می‌بیند، ولی اختر اشاره می‌کند که او خیلی بی‌آزار است و ”شاید هم اصلا گرگ نباشد، سگ گله باشد یا یک سگ دیگر.“ این گرگ، که شبیه سگ‌هاست، می‌تواند همان باک در داستان لندن باشد. البته شباهت این گرگ با باک به همین‌جا ختم نمی‌شود. گرگِ داستان گلشیری بسیار ”باهوش“ است: وقتی که توی قبرستان تله می‌گذارند و یک شقۀ گوشت هم تویش قرار می‌دهند، از جای پاها می‌فهمند که گرگ ”تا پهلوی تله آمده، ‌حتی کنار تله نشسته،“ اما شقۀ گوشت دست‌نخورده باقی می‌ماند. در داستان لندن هم قبیلۀ ”یی‌هت“ از ”شبح سگی می‌گوید که پیشاپیش دستۀ گرگ‌ها می‌دود. اهل قبیله از این شبح در هراس‌اند، زیرا که حیلۀ این شبح از حیلۀ ایشان بیشتر است، در زمستان‌های سخت از اردوگاه ایشان دزدی می‌کند، از تله‌ای که می‌گذارند حیوان تله‌افتاده را می‌دزدد،‌ سگهایشان را می‌کشد و دلدارترین شکارچیانشان را ریشخند می‌کند.“[30]

گرگی که اختر را به خود جذب کرده بسیار شبیه چیزی است که باک بعدها در قالب آن به درۀ قبیلۀ یی‌هت سر می‌زند. این جانور در واقع ”یک گرگ عظیم است که پوششی باشکوه دارد و در ضمن که شبیه گرگ‌های دیگر است، شبیه ایشان نیست. این گرگ دشت پربیشه را تنها طی می‌کند و به فضای خلوتی میان درخت‌ها می‌رود“ و ”چون شب‌های بلند زمستان فرا می‌رسد . . . این گرگ دیده می‌شود که زیر مهتاب رنگ‌پریده . . . می‌دود.“[31]

حال این سوال پیش می‌آید که این سگ-گرگ از چه جنبه‌های دیگری در داستان گلشیری اهمیت دارد. اِستِس معتقد است که سگ نماد خویشتن غریزی است و گرگ‌های سالم و زنان سالم ویژگی‌های روحی مشابهی دارند.[32] او در جای دیگر با بیان داستان ”ماناوی“ به طبیعت دوگانۀ زنان اشاره می‌کند و معتقد است که در درون هر زنی دو نیروی قدرتمند زنانه سخن می‌گوید. از مجموع گفته‌های او می‌شود نتیجه گرفت که هر زنی به لحاظ نمادین یک سگ-گرگ است. اِستِس اعتقاد دارد که ”هر چند هر وجه طبیعت زن معرف ذاتیْ جداگانه همراه با کارکرد متفاوت و معرفت متمایز می‌باشد، هر دو طرف باید همچون دو نیمۀ مغز از یکدیگر شناخت داشته یا ترجمان یکدیگر باشند‌ و لذا، به مثابه یک کل عمل کنند.“[33] زنی که وجهی از طبیعت زنانه‌اش را پنهان کند یا بیش از اندازه به طرف دیگر متمایل شود، زندگی‌اش بسیار نامتعادل شده و دسترسی به قدرت کامل خویش از او سلب می‌شود. زنان باید هر دو وجه وجود خویش را با هم پرورش دهند. پس، زن باید برای رسیدن به تفرّد این دو نیروی درونی خود را بشناسد.

دسته‌ای از این نیروها با سگ ارتباط دارد و از آن جمله می‌توان مفاهیم وفاداری، مساعدت، حمایت و ارتباط را نام برد.[34] باک در داستان لندن، خودش مظهر این دوگانگی طبیعت است، به علت علاقۀ شدید نسبت به ”جان ثورنتون“ که جانِ باک را نجات می‌دهد و او را از شارل و هال و مرسده، یعنی صاحبان قبلی‌اش، می‌گیرد، اثر تمدن را از خود نشان می‌دهد، در کنار آتش او می‌نشیند، ثورنتون را هنگامی که در رودخانۀ خروشان رها می‌شود و در خطر سقوط از آبشار است از مرگ نجات می‌دهد و با از جا کندن و کشیدن سورتمۀ پانصد کیلویی باعث می‌شود که ثورنتون شرط هزار دلاری را ببرد.

دستۀ دیگری از این نیروها با گرگ ارتباط دارد که از آن جمله می‌توان به هوش،‌ حیله‌گری،[35] هشیاری، سرزندگی، بازیگوشی، و توانایی عظیم برای ایثار اشاره کرد.[36] در آوای وحش، باک که خصوصیات گرگ را هم دارد بسیار باهوش است. او به سرعت یاد می‌گیرد ”مردی که چماق در دست داشته باشد می‌تواند قانون وضع کند،‌ سروری است که اطاعتش واجب است، ‌هرچند اطاعت از او لزوماً در حکم آشتی با او نیست،“[37] حیله‌گر است و آشکار دزدی نمی‌کند، بلکه در نهان و با خدعه می‌دزدد تا رعایت چماق و دندان را کرده باشد،[38] همیشه مراقب اوضاع و جایگاه خود در گروه سگ‌های سورتمه‌کش است و برای نجات ثورنتون با پریدن در رودخانه جان خود را به خطر می‌اندازد. لندن هم به ویژگی سگ-گرگ بودن باک اشاره می‌کند و می‌نویسد که ”حیلۀ او حیلۀ گرگی بود و حیلۀ وحش: هوش او هوش سنت برنارد و سگ چوپان.“[39]

باک در نهایت با کشف همۀ استعدادهای نهفته‌اش و با آگاهی از قانون طبیعت به جایگاه اصلی خود، یعنی همان طبیعت وحشی میان دستۀ گرگ‌ها، برمی‌گردد. او فرایند تفرّد، یعنی مراحل رسیدن به خود غریزی را، که گریفیث به آن اشاره کرده،[40] یکی‌یکی طی می‌کند. در مرحلۀ اول، یعنی ”خودِ شناختی،“ ماهیت وحشی و غریزی باک در سرزمین‌های جنوبی رام شده است. مرحلۀ بعدی، یعنی ”آشفتگی و بازیابی شهود در قالب پاگشایی،“ با سوار شدن باک بر عرشۀ کشتی ناروال شروع می‌شود که با دیدن اولین برف زندگی‌اش، که نشانه‌ای از محیط زندگی طبیعی اوست، احساس سردرگمی می‌کند و در همان حال، اولین قدم را برای شناخت غرایزش برمی‌دارد. در مرحلۀ سوم، که ”پرده‌برداری بیشتر از احساسات“ است، باک به جستجو در سرزمین‌های شمالی می‌پردازد و احساسات مرده‌ای در وجود او دوباره احیا می‌شود که غرایزش را زنده می‌کنند. مرحلۀ ”خودمحوری و بازگشت به خود“ در طول داستان همواره در جریان است، ولی اوج آن زمانی است که باک در کنار آتش می‌نشیند و خواب می‌بیند که در مجاورت آتش دیگری دراز کشیده است که از آنِ مردِ پاکوتاه و پرمویی است که گویی از دنیایی دیگر آمده.[41] بعدها مرآی این مرد پرمو با آواز دعوتی که در دل جنگل‌ها همواره در حال پیچیدن است عجین می‌شود، آوازی که ”باک را دچار ناآسودگی شدید و آوازهای عجیب می‌کرد، موجب می‌شد که احساس شادی خوشی در باک راه یابد و باک توجه داشت که اشتیاق و التهابی شدید دارد، اما نمی دانست نسبت به چه.“[42] مرحلۀ آخر، یعنی ”یافتن دستۀ خود و بازگشت به خانه،“ زمانی روی می‌دهد که باک عاقبت این ندا را اجابت می‌کند، برادر جنگلی خود را می‌بیند و کنار او به سوی محلی که بی‌گمان آواز از آن برمی‌خاست (یعنی به سمت دستۀ گرگ‌ها) می‌دود. در این هنگام،

خاطرات کهن به سرعت به ذهنش باز می‌آمد و او چنان در برابر آنها برانگیخته می‌شد که در قدیم نسبت به واقعیاتی که این خاطرات سایۀ آنها بود برانگیخته شده بود. این کار را قبلاً نیز کرده بود، جایی در آن دنیای دیگر که مبهم با یاد می‌آورد این کار را کرده بود‌ و اکنون از نو می‌کرد، آسوده و آزاد، ‌بر برف‌های نافشرده و زیر آسمان باز می‌دوید.[43]

اختر نیز که دنباله‌رو باک است باید نیروهای درونی خود را بازیابد و همانند باک این مراحل را طی کند تا خود واقعی‌اش را پیدا کند که از نظر اِستِس همان ”زن وحشی“ است. اختر که روح واقعی و طبیعت غریزی‌اش بر اثر سرکوب‌ها و آموزش‌های جامعه و خانواده رام شده است از خویشتن غریزی خود دور افتاده و تا زمانی که آن را پیدا نکند نگران و آشفته است. این آشفتگی در اوایل داستان خود را نشان می‌دهد. برای مثال، قید می‌شود که اختر ”بچه‌ها را خیلی دوست داشت. برای همین هم بیشتر می‌آمد سراغ مدرسه.“ اما وقتی که به او پیشنهاد می‌شود که اگر بخواهد می‌توانند درسی به عهده‌اش بگذارند، می‌گوید که ”حوصلۀ سروکله زدن با بچه‌ها را ندارد.“ با آمدن برف اول و دوم، بعضی غرایز در او بیدار شده و بیشتر دنبال خود غریزی‌اش می‌گردد. برای او صدای زوزه‌ی گرگ، که با شنیدنش کنار پنجره می‌رود، در حکم همان آوایی است که باک از دل جنگل می‌شنود. وقتی که باک دنبال آن آوا می‌رود، گرگی می‌بیند ”بلند و لاغر که بینی را رو به آسمان گرفته و راست بر روی کپل نشسته“ است.[44] به همین شیوه، وقتی هم که اختر به دنبال زوزه کنار پنجره می‌رود، گرگی می‌بیند که ”درست آن طرف نرده‌ها نشسته، توی تاریک روشن ماه و گاه‌گداری رو به ماه زوزه می‌کشد.“ گرگی که به قول اختر ”درست مثل یک سگ گله به دو دستش تکیه می‌دهد“ و به پنجرۀ اتاق آنها خیره می‌ماند.

این دو گرگ (گرگ‌هایی که اختر و باک می‌بینند) در واقع نمادی از خویشتن غریزی اختر و باک‌اند و برای پیدا کردن خود واقعی‌شان این دو باید روزی به آنها ملحق شوند. باک در نهایت به دنبال آن گرگ به دستۀ خود برمی‌گردد و آخرین مرحلۀ تفرّد را طی می‌کند. اختر هم که جذب خود نمادین یعنی سگ-گرگ شده است دست آخر وسطِ تنگِ برف‌گرفته دکتر را رها می‌کند و می‌رود.

نتیجه‌گیری

بررسی‌های فوق نشان می‌دهد که هوشنگ گلشیری بر جنبه‌هایی از گرگ تأکید کرده که در ادبیات فارسی کمتر سابقه داشته است. در مقام نویسنده‌ای نوگرا، گرگ را به منزلۀ نمادی از خویشتن غریزی به کار برده که با تبعیت از آن شخصیت اصلی داستان به تفرّد می‌رسد. جایگاه او از این لحاظ مشابه جایگاه جک لندن در آوای وحش است، چراکه لندن نیز گرگ و آوای آن را چونان ندایی درونی و ماورایی برای باک در نظر می‌گیرد که او را به خاستگاه اصلی خود می‌خواند؛ خاستگاهی که باک را به ریشۀ اصلی خود نزدیک کرده و او را به تفرّد می‌رساند.

گلشیری در داستان خود گرگ را نمادی از منِ وحشی و آزاد اختر و در کل زنان در نظر گرفته و از این طریق به کهن‌الگویی اشاره می‌کند که بعدها اِستِس آن را ”زن وحشی“ می‌خواند. او به این طریق سنت حاکم بر جامعه را به چالش کشیده و خواستار رویارویی زنان با این سنت می‌شود؛ رویارویی‌ای که شاید آن‌گونه که از پایان داستان برمی‌آید به نابودیِ زنان بیانجامد. اما در آوای وحش چنین اتفاقی روی نمی‌دهد. آوایی که باک را به بازگشت به خویشتن فرا می‌خواند در پایان باعث می‌شود که او به خاستگاه اصلی خود میان دستۀ گرگ‌ها بر‌گردد و پیشاپیش آنها مسیر زندگی خود را پی ‌گیرد.

[1] J. Brandenburg, Brother Wolf: A Forgotten Promise (Minocqua: Northword Press Inc., 1983); L. E. Mech, The Way of the Wolf (Stillwater: Voyageur Press, 1991).

[2] J. P. Resnick, Wolves and Coyotes: Eyes on Nature (Chicago: Kidsbooks, Inc., 1995); M. W. Fox, The Soul of the Wolf: A Meditation on Wolves and Man (New York: Lyons & Burford, Publishers, 1980).

[3] کلاریسا پینکولا اِستِس، زنانی که با گرگها میدوند: افسانهها و قصههایی دربارۀ کهنالگوی زن وحشی، ترجمۀ سیمین موحد (تهران: نشر پیکان، 1389).

[4] M. Griffith, “The wolf in Sandplay,” Journal of Sandplay Therapy, 2 (1996), 113-129.

[5] Bible, Ezekiel, 22:27; Jeremiah, 5:6.

[6] Bible, Isaiah, 65:25.

[7] قرآن، سورۀ یوسف، آیات 13، 14 و 17: [یعقوب] گفت: اينكه او را ببريد سخت مرا اندوهگين مى‏كند و مى‏ترسم از او غافل شويد و گرگ او را بخورد (13). [پسران] گفتند: اگر گرگ او را بخورد با اينكه ما گروهى نيرومند هستيم، در آن صورت ما قطعاً [مردمى] بى‏مقدار خواهيم بود (14). . . گفتند: اى پدر، ما رفتيم مسابقه دهيم و يوسف را پيش كالاى خود نهاديم، آن‌گاه گرگ او را خورد، ولى تو ما را هر چند راستگو باشيم باور نمى‏دارى (17).

[8] J. C. Cooper, An Illustrated Encyclopedia of Traditional Symbols (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1978).

[9] مریم رضایی اوّل و اکبر شامیان ساروکلائی، ”گرگ در منظومه‌های حماسی ایران،“ نشریۀ دانشکدۀ ادبیات و علوم انسانی دانشگاه تبریز، سال 52، شمارۀ 211 (1388)، 105-134.

[10] منیژه عبداللهی، فرهنگنامۀ جانوران در ادب پارسی (تهران: انتشارات پژوهنده، 1381)، 909 و 911.

[11] هاشم رضی، تاریخ آیین رازآمیز میترایی (تهران: انتشارات بهجت، 1381)، 130.

[12] ایرانشاه ابن ‌ابی‌الخیر، بهمننامه، ویراستۀ رحیم عفیفی (تهران: انتشارات علمی و فرهنگی، 1370)، 170، بیت 141/2172.

[13] رضایی اوّل و شامیان ساروکلائی، ”گرگ در منظومه‌های حماسی ایران،“ 120.

[14] وستا سرخوش کرتیس، اسطورههای ملل (1): اسطورههای ایرانی، ترجمۀ عباس مخبر (چاپ 2؛ تهران: انتشارات مرکز، 1384)، 66.

[15] Griffith, “The wolf in Sandplay.”

[16] B. G. Walker, The Woman’s Encyclopedia of Myth and Secrets (San Franscisco: Harper San Francisco, 1983).

[17] O. Rank, The Myth of the Birth of the Hero (New York: Vintage Books, 1959).

[18] E. Neumann, The Great Mother (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1955).

[19] A. De Vries, Dictionary of Symbols and Imagery (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1984).

[20] اِستِس، زنانی که با گرگها میدوند.

[21] Griffith, “The wolf in Sandplay.”

[22] اِستِس، زنانی که با گرگها میدوند.

[23] Griffith, “The wolf in Sandplay.”

[24] اِستِس، زنانی که با گرگها میدوند.

[25] جک لندن، آوای وحش، ترجمۀ پرویز داریوش (تهران: انتشارات اساطیر، 1368)، 22-23.

[26] وحشی به معنای طبیعی و غریزی، نه به معنای منفی امروزی آن.

[27] اِستِس، زنانی که با گرگها میدوند.

[28] لندن، آوای وحش، 39.

[29] لندن، آوای وحش، 54.

[30] هوشنگ گلشیری، ”گرگ،“ در نمازخانۀ کوچک من (تهران: انتشارات زمان، 1354)، 147.

[31] گلشیری، ”گرگ،“ 147-148.

[32] اِستِس، زنانی که با گرگها میدوند، 157 و 4.

[33] اِستِس، زنانی که با گرگها میدوند، 158.

[34] A. Venefica, “Dog Meaning and Symbolism,” at http://www.whats-your-sign.com/dog-meaning-and-symbolism.html/.

[35] A. Venefica, “Wolf Meaning and Totem Symbolism of the Wolf,” at http://www.whats-your-sign.com/totem-wolf-symbols.html/.

[36] اِستِس، زنانی که با گرگها میدوند.

[37] لندن، آوای وحش، 19.

[38] لندن، آوای وحش، 37.

[39] لندن، آوای وحش، 134.

[40] Griffith, “The wolf in Sandplay.”

[41] لندن، آوای وحش، 70-71.

[42] لندن، آوای وحش، 128.

[43] لندن، آوای وحش، 131-132.

[44] لندن، آوای وحش، 130.

Iraj Pezeshkzad as a Social Critic: A Look at the Satirical Aspects of My Uncle Napoleon and Āsimūn Rīsmūn

Iraj Pezeshkzad as a Social Critic: A Look at the Satirical Aspects of My Uncle Napoleon and Āsimūn Rīsmūn

M. R. Ghanoonparvar

Arguably the most sophisticated Persian satirist of the 20th century, Iraj Pezeshkzad (1928-2022) occupies a unique position among modernist Persian writers for his talent as a literary artist and a humorist social critic.[1] Among post-World War II Persian works of fiction, few novels can be found that have been able to attract the attention of the Iranian public, that is, both the educated, including the smaller percentage who read books, as well as everyday people and even the illiterate, than Pezeshkzad’s Da’i Jan Napelon (translated into English as My Uncle Napoleon).[2] The illiterate, of course, throughout Iran became fans of the story, since a few years after its publication it was made into a most successful television serial directed by the well-known movie director, Naser Taqva’i.[3]

Perhaps the Persian phrase around which Pezeshkzad’s novel revolves and with which several generations of Iranians were familiar is “zīr-i sar-i īngīlīsīhāst” (“It is a British conspiracy”). With that phrase, many Iranians blamed the British for every true or untrue ill event, whether social, political, or even personal. Regarding the social and political roots of such a belief, much has been written, both in connection with this novel by literary critics and in other contexts by social and political historians, which is beyond the scope of this discussion.[4] Of interest here is how Pezeshkzad, by creating the character of Uncle Napoleon, casts a critical glance at Iranian society through a satirical lens; paints a picture of the cultural and social climate of a particular era of Iranian history; contemplates the words, actions, lifestyle, and beliefs of his compatriots; and makes other Iranian readers ponder and wonder.[5]

Satirically, and through the eyes of his protagonist, in My Uncle Napoleon, Pezeshkzad presents a black-and-white world in which the Self is presented as good, and even when an evil Other does not exist, at times, the Self fabricates the evil Other.

The locale of My Uncle Napoleon is Tehran, and the timespan is just before World War II and during the Allied occupation of Iran in the early 1940s. For the most part, the characters are members of an extended aristocratic family, who live in a compound of several houses and surrounding gardens. Uncle Napoleon is the patriarch of the family, who is held in respect and some degree of awe by the other members; but at the same time, privately, they shun his somewhat autocratic attitude, and his Anglophobia in particular, which they find laughable, often evoking subdued giggles. In fact, Uncle Napoleon’s boundless admiration for and obsession with the French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte have been the source of his nickname, which the children have given him among themselves. This admiration and obsession is such that he had ordered his other family members to read every book they could find about him; and he quotes and even fabricates quotes from Napoleon, and tries to copy him in everything he does. His obsession with Napoleon, however, is the direct result of his adversity to the British, whose hands he sees in every deed and misdeed and happening and mishap within or outside his family and compound.

Claiming that he had fought and defeated the British in his younger days, Uncle Napoleon seems possessed by his fear of the British, and he is certain that the British have been biding their time for a suitable opportunity to avenge their defeat at his hands. At various times, he becomes suspicious of some members of the family and thinks that they are British spies. On one such occasion, accusing his devoted servant, Mash Qāsem, of being a British spy, Uncle Napoleon arms himself with a rifle and tries to kill Mash Qāsem. Interestingly, the servant is so consumed by his master’s phobia of the British that he even confesses that he has become a British spy unbeknownst to himself with the assignment of killing his master.[6]

Pezeshkzad’s portrayal of all his characters, but particularly that of Uncle Napoleon, is rather complex, since it kindles comic sympathy for someone with a familiar political obsession, thereby subtly creating a distance between his reader, who may recognize aspects of Uncle Napoleon in themselves, and that character’s Anglophobia. This is also true of his portrayal of other characters, such as Asadollah Mirza, a naughty diplomat whose constant jokes are coloured with sexual innuendos; Shamsali Mirza, a former examining magistrate who is a strong advocate of interrogations in all cases; Dustali Khan, the bungling brother-in-law of Uncle Napoleon whose incompetence is the butt of the family’s jokes; Dr. Nasrolhokama, an old physician who seems to know next to nothing about medicine; Shirali, a roughneck butcher who defends his cheating wife’s honor; and Mash Qāsem, a country bumpkin whose character and language are a mixture of his childhood and an imitation of the language and character of his master, all of whom are to a great extent caricatures of people in the Iranian society of a certain class and specific era.

Even though through his humor in this novel Pezeshkzad tries to gently alert his compatriots of their certain prejudicial attitudes and beliefs, in many instances, especially when they watched the television serial of the novel, they found reaffirmation of their beliefs, for instance, regarding the British. Still pervasive among certain groups of Iranians, in recent decades, even Iranian government officials still see British hands behind many incidents. For example, according to Azar Nafisi in her review of My Uncle Napoleon, after the bombings in London in July 2000, “the powerful Iranian cleric Ahmad Janati, chair of the Council of Guardians of the Revolution, claimed in a nationally broadcast sermon that ‘the British government itself created this situation.’”[7]

Perhaps the most important secret to the success of My Uncle Napoleon is due to its author’s mastery of satire. In general, satire refers to a literary or other work of art which uses humor, irony, exaggeration, or ridicule to expose and criticize human or individual vices, follies, or shortcomings. Satire is a genre which, despite its long history in Persian literature, has been rather rare in much of modern Persian fiction.[8] This novel, however, is not the first work in which Pezeshkzad experiments with humor and satirical writing. In a series of weekly writings that were originally published in Ferdowsi magazine from 1955 to 1960 and were first published in 1963 in book form as Āsimūn rīsmūn (Balderdash),[9] he had already honed his skills and displayed his talent in this genre. Āsimūn rīsmūn is perhaps Pezeshkzad’s most representative work, since it exemplifies his sophisticated satirical approach to social issues and in particular to what he calls the “amazing chaos that governed the press and publication of books and journals” in the mid-1950s.[10] In his prefatory remarks to the fourth edition of the book, which was published in the United States in 1997, Pezeshkzad describes that period as a time when “the customs inspector and the neighborhood herbalist wrote medical books and presented Pasteur, one of the greatest people to serve humanity, as the enemy of mankind and even a thief,” or a writer would attack Sa’di “for having said that humans are all parts of the same body, and would not only advocate racial discrimination, but would even regard the innocent rabbit as deserving torture and punishment because it is not Aryan.”[11]

Pezeshkzad’s satire is precisely so effective and biting because he often merely quotes from the works of his victims without any additional commentary, and simply recommends to his readers to take advantage of the teachings of a “learned” author by reading their book. From the author referred to earlier, Pezeshkzad quotes: “The rabbit is not an Aryan creature. For this reason, it is a coward, even if it lives in Germany. But the animal about whose Aryan origin there is no doubt is the lion. The lion in Africa is a German in exile.”[12] For the Iranian reader in the 1950s to early 1960s, when these satirical pieces appeared first in a magazine and later as a book, the obvious humor was due to the continued sympathy of some Iranians toward Germany as a result of the Nazi Aryan racist supremacist propaganda before and during WWII, which declared some Europeans as well as Iranians as members of that race. This was of course also due to growing Iranian nationalism, which stemmed from old animosity toward England.

One of the effective and clever devices that Pezeshkzad utilizes to soften the blow of the satirical attacks on his victims, who include some of the best-known literary and political figures of his day, is the creation of a fictional editorial board, which he calls the “adjunct members of the Supreme Council of Āsimūn rīsmūn.” These include: A. P. Ashna, Managing Director; His Learned Eminence, Mr. Seyyed Abu Taleb Khan; Eminent Professor Directeur Mammad Khan; Super Master Professor Eslam Khan; and student, Azizollah Khan. The use of these characters helps make his satirical remarks less direct and less personal, especially at times when, contrary to Iranian traditional respect for poets, writers, scholars, and other well-known and prominent people, as Pezeshkzad puts it, if one opened “any magazine or newspaper, one would see at least one column of attack against some poor creature or a group of poor creatures of God.”[13]

The charm of Pezeshkzad’s humor is due to a great extent to his mastery of the Persian language and his knowledge of various Persian and non-Persian sources and genres.[14] His parodies of the works of well-known poets are indicative of his facility with traditional Persian verse, which he spices with colloquial and non-poetic expressions, somewhat reminiscent of the poetry of Iraj Mirza.

Here is an example, with the necessary background context, of his facility with parodying traditional verse, in which he first cites a poem in free verse by a contemporary poet and then produces the same poem in traditional metered and rhymed verse (which of course cannot be accurately duplicated here in translation).

 

New, Second Hand, and Old Section

Since we are approaching time for the exams of our honorable student consultant, Azizollah Khan, and our duty as his friends dictates that we exercise more care with regard to his education, this week we have assigned him more arduous homework.

Composition Homework: Convert the following New Poem, “Gift,” composed by contemporary poet Mr. Mahmud Kianush, which was published in the literary monthly Sadaf, on the basis of the meter of the poetry of either Abu Abbas Marvazi or Hakim Feyzi-Dakani, making certain not to leave out any word or content.

                     هدیه

خوشه ئی از گلبرگ یاس؛

خوشه ئی از ستاره های سبز رؤیا؛

خوشه ئی از لبخند پاک چشمه ها

در بازی نسیم

و رقص مهتاب

و نوازش سکوت؛

*

خوشه ئی شاداب و سرخ

مطبوع وسبز،

خندان و سپید.

خوشه ئی از همه رنگها

و همه عطرها

*

خوشه ئی تا بنشانمش

میان سه همسایه:

میان شب

خورشید

برف

بخار آبنوس

عطر آتش

شهد مروارید

آویزی برای گوشهای تو

با نام پیوند.

نمی دانم،

من تنها در جستجوی هدیه ئی هستم

هدیه ئی برای تو

کوچک

صادق

سزاوار

دیماه 1337

Gift

A cluster of jasmine petals

A cluster of green stars of dreams;

A cluster of the pure smile of springs

In the playfulness of the breeze

and the dance of the moonlight

and the caress of silence;

*

A fresh red cluster

Pleasant and green,

Laughing and white.

A cluster of all colors

And all scents.

*

A cluster so that I plant it

Among three neighbors:

Among night

The sun

Snow

Vapors of ebony

The aroma of fire

The nectar of pearl

Earrings for your ears

Grafted to your name.

I do not know,

I only search for a gift,

A gift for you

Small

Truthful

Worthy

M. K.

December 1958

                     هدیه

خوشه ئی از گلبرک یاس و خوشه ئی از اختران

زختران سبز رؤیا نقطه ویرگول بعد از آن

خوشه ئی از لبخند پاک چشمه ها اندر نسیم

رقص مهتاب و نوازشهای خاموشی عیان

خوشه ئی شاداب و قرمز سبز ومطبوع و سپید

خوشه ئی پر عطر و الوان چون گل شیرین بیان

در میان این سه همسایه شب و خورشید و برف

خوشه ئی خواهم که بنشانمش همچون سنان

در بخار آبنوس و شهد مروارید و عطر

گوشواری بهر تو با نام پیوند جهان

من نمی دانم ولی در جستجوهستم مدام

کوچک و صادق همی جویم برایت ارمغان

Student’s name: Azizollah Khan

Gift

A cluster of jasmine petals and stars all in a cluster

Green stars of dreams followed by a semicolon to muster

A cluster of the pure smile of springs in the playfulness of the breeze

The dance of the moonlight and caresses of silence all to seize

A fresh red, green and pleasant and white

A cluster of aromas like sweetroot, colors and delight

Among these three neighbors, night, the sun, and snow

I want a cluster to plant like a spearhead all aglow

In the vapors of ebony, nectar of pearl, and aromas unfurled

Earrings for your ears with the name Grafted to the World

I do not know, but I am searching constantly adrift

Small and truthful, I seek to bring you as a gift

Worthy

(With apologies to the honorable examining committee, no matter how your humble servant tried, one word, “worthy,” has remained unable to be used.)

Student Azizollah Khan was given oral commendations for fitting the words and content precisely; however, because of utilizing certain similes such as sweetroot, which are frowned upon in New Poetry, in addition to his being unable to include the word “worthy,” which is the most pleasing word in the entire poem, he was issued a written reprimand.

*

Pezeshkzad also makes extensive use of dramatic format, the themes of which are adapted from famous poems or popular books published at the time. The caricature-like characters with their particular idiosyncrasies that Pezeshkzad creates in these short plays and their interaction presented in intricate dialogues are obviously a precursor to his novel, My Uncle Napoleon.

The targets of Pezeshkzad’s satire include many self-promoting authors, some of whom claim to have written a hundred books by the age of forty[15] or discovered the cure to every disease known to man,[16] or poets who think that if their divan had not been published, “there would be no poetry.”[17]

Given the popularity of Pezeshkzad’s column in Ferdowsi as a magazine with relatively high circulation, his satirical treatment of the works of these authors sometimes provoked reactions from them, which would provide even more ammunition for the satirist. Regarding the more serious authors, Pezeshkzad reports in the introduction to the American edition that the famous scholar and poet Parviz Natel Khanlari and the poets Nader Naderpur and Forugh Farrokhzad “would tolerate the mild and almost painless sting Āsimūn Rīsmūn” and Khanlari would especially ask Pezeshkzad to read the piece about him aloud, to which he would respond with a “pleasant smile.” On the other hand, he mentions the novelist Mohammad Hejazi and the poet Ahmad Shamlu as among those who had less tolerance for his witty reviews of their works.[18]

Among the well-known Persian fiction writers, Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh, Sadeq Hedayat, and Mahshid Amirshahi devoted some of their work to satire, while other less-known writers, such as Khosrow Shahani, devoted most of their writing to this genre. Perhaps the stifling social and political atmosphere in the country was not conducive to more works in this genre, and satire was not taken as seriously as it had been in the previous centuries. In the over four decades since the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of a theocratic regime in Iran, however, under the often austere social, political, cultural, and religious climate that has governed the country, some talented voices have emerged whose works appear in newspapers, magazines, and books. Government censorship, of course, is even more restrictive when it comes to the humorous treatment of personalities and actions of individuals in power who insist on being taken more seriously than satirists do. But, like their predecessors, these younger writers and artists have also found ways to circumvent the censors, even though they have been caught at times and jailed because of their sense of humor. Among the most notable younger satirists in Iran is Ebrahim Nabavi, who has distinguished himself with his writing in several newspapers and magazines.[19] In terms of style, use of language, use of satirical devices, and tone, Nabavi’s works, similar to those of many others, owe much to the pioneering work of Pezeshkzad, especially his sketches in Āsimūn Rīsmūn.

All translations from Persian in this article are my own.

R. Ghanoonparvar is Professor Emeritus of Persian and Comparative Literature at The University of Texas at Austin. He has published widely on Persian literature and culture in both English and Persian. His latest books are From Prophets of Doom to Chroniclers of Gloom (Mazda, 2021) and Iranian Cities in Persian Fiction (Mazda, 2022). His forthcoming book is “Disease, Dying and Death in Persian Stories.”

[1] This article is an amalgamation of several pieces published previously in different forms, including my review of the English translation of Pezeshkzad’s Dā’i Jān Napelon by Dick Davis in Iran Nameh, vol. XIV, no. 4 (Fall 1996): 669-672; M. R. Ghanoonparvar, In a Persian Mirror: Images of the West and Westerners in Iranian Fiction (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993), 61-63; and my review of Iraj Pezeshkzad, Asemun Rismun in Iranian Studies, vol. 32, no. 4 (Fall 1999): 590-592.

[2] Iraj Pezeshkzad, Da’i Jan Napelon, (Tehran: Safialishah Publishers, 1970). For the English translation of this novel, see Iraj Pezeshkzad, My Uncle Napoleon, trans. Dick Davis (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 1976).

[3] For instance see Dick Davis’ “Preface” to his English translation of My Uncle Napoleon (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 1996), p. 7.

[4] See for example Masha’allah Ajudani, Mashrūṭah-i Īrānī [Iranian Constitution] (Tehran: Akhtaran Publishers, 2003). For examples of literary works on this topic, see Simin Daneshvar, Savushun, trans. by M. R. Ghanoonparvar (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 1989) and Mohammad Hoseyn Roknzadeh-Adamiyyat, Dalīrān-i Tangistānī, 7th ed. (Tehran: Eqbal Publishers, 1975).

[5] See Katouzian, Davis, and Shabani-Jadid and Higgins in this issue.

[6] For more on this point, see Homa Katouzian, “My Uncle Napoleon and Iranian Anglophobia” in this issue.

[7] Azar Nafisi, “The Secret Garden.” The Guardian. 13 May 2006. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2006/may/13/featuresreviews.guardianreview26

[8] For an examination and examples of satire in classical and modern Persian literature, see Hasan Javadi, Satire in Persian Literature (London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1988) and Homa Katouzian, “Satire in Persian Literature,” in A History of Persian Literature XI: Literature of the Early Twentieth Century From the Constitutional Period to Reza Shah, ed. Ali-Asghar Seyyed-Gohrab (London: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 161-239.

[9] Iraj Pezeshkzad, Asemun Rismun, 12th printing (Bethesda, MD: Iranbooks, 1997).

[10] Pezeshkzad, Āsimūn rīsmūn, v.

[11] Pezeshkzad.

[12] Pezeshkzad, 36.

[13] Pezeshkzad, 1.

[14] See Davis in this issue.

[15] Pezeshkzad, Āsimūn rīsmūn, 141.

[16] Pezeshkzad, 226-234.

[17] Pezeshkzad, 66.

[18] Pezeshkzad, vi.

[19] For information on Ebrahim Nabavi’s background as a writer, satirist, and political activist see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ebrahim_Nabavi

Soundscaping Diaspora and the Affective Politics of Listening

Soundscaping Diaspora and the Affective Politics of Listening

Nazli Akhtari

The global proliferation of podcasts and other kinds of audio-blogging has been particularly useful for facilitating transnational conversations in diasporas. By the same token, there has been a surge within the last decade in podcasting on a range of subjects in Persian in Iran and its global diaspora. These podcasts cover topics that run the gamut from journalism and oral histories of modern Iran, informal chats about cultural taboos and celebrity fandom communities, to intersectional feminist conversations about gender, space, discrimination, and sexual and ethnic minorities in contemporary Iran.[1]

This essay focuses on how, in the context of the global Iranian diaspora, podcasts break open histories of sound and listening media within modern Iranian political history. By listening closely to Radiochehrazi, one of the earliest projects podcasted in Persian, this essay aims to provide a historical overview of older audio media in Iran to contextualize the use of podcasts as new media in diasporas. One of the pioneer sound projects in the Iranian diaspora, Radiochehrazi used the podcast platform as an artistic undertaking linking sonic performance to the cultural histories of sonic media in Iran. Over the course of one year, from March 2013 to February 2014, the anonymous group podcasting Radiochehrazi published twenty-one short episodes on SoundCloud from Briarcliff Manor in New York. Most of the historical milestones of sonic media in modern Iranian history have used listening for control and resistance and have clear political intentions in deploying modern communication technologies to engage mass participation through performative and affective registers of listening. Sonic remix, performance, and affective listening in Radiochehrazi provide an example of Iranian diasporic cultural production in which sound remix becomes a proto-political practice that reanimates cultural and media histories yet counters the common political use of sound technologies. I use the term “diasporic imaginary” throughout this essay, aiming to capture the shifting and alternative imaginary that diasporic sites such as the soundscape in Radiochehrazi produce. Diasporic imaginaries trespass the here and now, connecting generations on the basis of the return to polyphonic and emerging narratives of the cultural past. This essay argues that, unlike most media examples, the diasporic imaginaries in sonic performance projects such as Radiochehrazi are politicized because of affect and through sound’s affective power to change us and be changed by us.[2]

Combining several theoretical frameworks including Brian Massumi’s notion of affect, this research examines the affective politics of listening in diaspora. Massumi understands affect to be a non-conscious bodily intensity that cannot be named but only felt. His Politics of Affect considers affect and politics as inseparable. In this formulation, change is the primary factor that makes affect immediately political. Furthermore, Michael Warner’s essay, Publics and Counterpublics, informs the performance studies vantage point in this essay’s analysis of sound and media. In addressing the complexities of diasporic cultural productions, I consider such podcast series as counterpublics because most podcast producers in diaspora including Radiochehrazi’s creators maintain an awareness of their projects’ subordinate status. Warner contends that counterpublics are “spaces of circulation in which it is hoped that the poesis of scene making will be transformative, not replicative merely.”[3] Warner’s notion of counterpublics shapes the theorization of sonic performance in this essay because by performing on the periphery of several dominant (national and transnational) publics, the collaboration and artistic work examined here extends beyond representations of ideological and political conflict. Performance of sound instead opens up spaces of circulation where scene making will be transformative—spaces that heavily depend on performance to bring about oppositional interpretations of diasporic identities and desires.[4]

Understanding sound as performance offers approaches to the body, the archive, and media that can be generatively challenged by listening in place of narrativity. For instance, the narrative context of this essay’s case study, Radiochehrazi, is important to consider; however, the experience of listening to this project through sonic nuances of narrative interruptions and qualities such as repetitions and abrupt transitions provide complexities that are central to the reception of its unfolding narrative. Remixing layers of sound objects and qualities allows Radiochehrazi to depict diasporic identity fragmentation through the metaphor of madness. The artists use sound remix as a compositional strategy in order to expand the metaphor of madness from narrative composition to remixed forms reanimating Iranian cultural histories. Through a historical overview of listening in relationship to its media in post-Islamic Iran, I demonstrate how projects such as Radiochehrazi reperform the cultural-media relevance of listening, a cultural practice that commands an embodied, gendered, and performative subject, whose subject is always socially improvised, performed-with, and in-relation-to.[5]

In order to understand performances of sound, we also need to consider how we listen to these sounds and how that listening engages us in sensual and sensory affective processes. Even in its most inattentive forms, listening is never just listening. Deaf percussionist Evelyn Glennie extends our understanding of sonic experience: “Hearing is basically a specialized form of touch. Sound is simply vibrating air which the ear picks up and converts to electrical signals, which are then interpreted by the brain. The sense of hearing is not the only sense that can do this, touch can do this too.”[6] Sound, therefore, is one of the few ways through which performances can literally (and metaphorically) touch the bodies and bounce in-between humans, animals, objects, environments, and technologies. Sound can touch us even further if we consider its cultural meanings, cues, and particular diasporic affinities that link sound to our listening bodies. The body is itself the “echo chamber,” responding to sound’s inner vibrations as well as outer attentiveness as philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy would phrase it.[7]

Sound is always embodied, affective, and deeply cultural, which explains why sound and music make up the largest portion of diaspora cultural productions. Listening always already entails reception and collectivity by inviting listeners to actively write with the sounds they hear, which are key aspects of diaspora cultures. Attentive listening to these series of podcasts also brings to the fore cultural histories that shape a diasporic engagement with sound remix in performance. Gender is central to an understanding of the political roles that listening media play in negotiating agency in everyday life in contemporary Iran. I contend that since the Islamic public uses the male/masculine voice to dominate the soundscape, so its counterpublics and practices are always already sexed/gendered.[8] Radiochehrazi builds off the role auditory media play in establishing social hierarchies and negotiating agency in everyday life, and so through absence and drag performances of the female/feminine voice, their performance foreshadows the central position of sex/gender vis-à-vis the affective politics of sound in Iran and Iranian diasporas. Scholarship on listening in relationship to a variety of media in post-Islamic Iran informs my analysis of Radiochehrazi. I begin with a brief description of the recorded sonic project and further examine excerpts of this podcast to demonstrate some of the ways in which this archive of sonic files stored on a digital platform transgresses the sonic register by commanding an embodied, performative listening experience.

Radiochehrazi: Podcast as Performance

By creating a dark yet funny piece of radio drama, Radiochehrazi reflects on the oft-criticized ideology of the post-revolutionary generation formed around memories and experiences of modern Iranian political histories. For instance, on several occasions throughout the podcasts, the speakers mock the criticism that the Iranian diaspora receives for the safety of its remote online participation in the Green Movement of 2009. Radiochehrazi’s performance disrupts linear temporality and narrativity and instead represents various temporalities that slide through one another. The dramatic narrative uses madness as a metaphor to depict the distorted experience of time and space in diasporas. The topics engaged range from pop culture and childhood nostalgia to issues like Islamic and secular feminisms, diaspora, chain murders of political activists in 1988-89, the student movement of 1999, and Iran and Arab-world conflicts.[9] Their main focus, however, remains on the events around the Green Movement of 2009 and its well-known use of social media campaigns.[10] To contextualize the histories of each political event that these podcasts address calls for and deserves the writing of an elaborate historiographical account which goes beyond the scope of this essay.

Experimenting with podcasts as a platform for radio drama offers diasporic artists a space free of the burden of commercial interests, the traditions of broadcasting, and persecution by state authorities or other controlling structures. Podcasting in the contemporary context of knowledge transmission could be considered as fast-knowledge. Listening to podcasts offers cheap and easy access to selective content we have an appetite for. As auditory soundscapes, podcasts rarely demand full attentive listening and can be listened to in the background as we go on with everyday life. They satisfy our constant craving for information and social connection. Similar to other social media platforms that litter everyday experience of the neoliberal subject, podcasts are used for many different purposes including public pedagogy and entertainment as well as dissemination of misinformation and political propagation in the post-truth era.

Radiochehrazi does not use podcasting to these ends or any of the main reasons podcasts are normally used for. They titled the project “Radio” despite having an online digital spectatorship/audience in mind. The longest episode is just under twelve minutes, and within the last seven years, each episode has had between eighty and 280 thousand listeners as of the day I write this essay.[11] The duo chose to be anonymous, and this series is their only public sonic project. Despite their anonymity, and considering the issues that the project brings up, the music and literature it remixes, and the references it makes to Iranian (trans) national icons and cultural stereotypes, it is possible to make assumptions about the creators’ age, education, class, and sex/gender. The performer-creators of the project were most likely born after Iran’s Islamic Revolution (1978-9) and have gone through the higher education system in Iran. Naming the project “Radio,” despite their awareness of media distinctions between radio and digital podcasts, indicates in itself a gravitation toward memory and history. More precisely, this sonic project aligns with recent experiments with new modes of storytelling and artistic expression. Theatre, performance, and dance artists and companies have started experimenting with social media platforms and smartphone applications to make artistic work. Radiochehrazi, too, uses remix and a set of non-normative auditory production techniques to create a radio drama, an audio-performance project on SoundCloud. The collective’s main preoccupation is the artistic collaboration that grew out of a friendship formed on the basis of the creators’ diasporic experience. I return to the acknowledgment that the single speaking voice extends in the epilogue, “I had to write to you that radio and other things are the outcomes of a much bigger thing […] Friendship is at times insane, at times frustrating, quiet, with sunsets and a train of glasses.”[12] Madness, anguish, and time are key themes that come up in this epilogue: “There is madness so is anguish. It seems as though we were born to anguish. We miss every single little thing so much […] I cherish your madness and anguish.” An introduction to hope arrives right at the end: “all things aside, who knows friendship gives birth to new things every day!”[13]

Thematically, hope arrives late, but arguably the creators have been attesting to it all throughout the series. This is manifest in how space is claimed on a mainstream digital platform to accomplish what Jasmin Zine, speaking about counterpublics as a hopeful generative space, calls “small acts of subversion.”[14] Podcasts offer a playground for the remixing of various acoustic objects, sounds, voices, noises, and silences. Podcasting helps the project by expanding space in a democratic way for a more discursive and confrontational encounter. Space is internal and mental for a noncontiguous countercommunity to forge through listening—as opposed to the more traditional contiguity of the nation. Anahid Kassabian argues that listening makes possible a “nonindividual subjectivity,” or “distributed subjectivities, . . . a field over which power is distributed unevenly and unpredictably, over which differences are not only possible but required, and across which information flows, leading to affective responses. […] Humans, institutions, machines, and molecules are all nodes in the network, nodes of different densities.”[15] In this way, podcasting also utilizes a communication platform that has the capacity to link here to elsewhere in a utopian way—a communication that is responsive to demands of diasporic spatial and temporal dislocations. Using performance, audio, and textual analysis, I focus on excerpts from three episodes: “0,” “1,” “3,” and the epilogue, “20.”

The first episode, “0,” remixes a collage of different radio announcements and music tracks recorded by the well-known national radio stations and the Iranian diasporic music and broadcast industry. In an immersive listening experience, it is especially episode “0” that introduces a set of expectations for the listeners. Like every other episode, this track opens and closes with an identical alarming sound similar to what one can expect to hear on radio programs in Persian. The opening to all preceding episodes includes reciting the formal phrase “Bismillah al-rahman al-rahim (In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful).” This stresses the formal manner as if replicating the Iranian National Radio and Television program’s official format to create a pastiche of formal and informal elements. The two radio hosts emphasize that the project is podcasted in different episodes, each episode engaging with a special topic related to culture, art, politics, entertainment, or public discourse. The introduction pounds the listening ear with repetitions and intertextual references. The episode announces commercial breaks, featuring mock advertisements (for example, they present ads for a cellphone carrier company and for RADO watches) to mockingly bring to the fore broadcasting’s commercial and corporate models. These faux ads are followed by extending an invitation to the listeners to place their ads in Radiochehrazi. The phrase “this episode is about” is routinely repeated, each time followed by a different topic (society and work, youth and unemployment, history of underground rock music in Iran, tourism and recreation, human rights, family medicine, food, and nutrition). These repetitions prompt a mental game that informs the expectations of the listening subject. By the end, the listener is assured that the episode never really gets started—a perfect allegory for the underwhelming promise of new beginnings in the cultural and political life of the diasporic subject.

Podcasts open up space for Radiochehrazi to create and remix various acoustic elements such as music, sound effects, and dialogue. For example, one scene presents an interview with a journalist covering an accident in Antalya. The journalist’s report from Antalya is remixed with traditional Turkish music in a parody of “on-spot reporting.” At other moments of the same episode, Iranian music, classical piano, and other sonic objects such as whispers, laughter, sighs, and chatter come in to augment the text. Radiochehrazi’s introduction is fragmented and ambitious, ensuring the listener of a hoax. Considering the working limits and scope of these podcasts, the joke is obvious: what they set out to accomplish, to cover all the proposed topics and to do everything possible in the world of radio broadcasting, is impossible. The hosts announce the line-up, a long and impossible list. The joke is most evident when they discuss a special program that utilizes user-generated content: they promise an episode in which listeners can send in photos to show on the radio, and the radio will feature scents in a special episode. Accomplishing the impossible encompasses engaging with sensual and perceptual modes that the podcast or radio as media simply cannot accommodate. The fun but jolting listening experience invites the listening subject to leave her expectations at the click of the play button.

Sounding Madness and Displacement

Episode “3” renders audible the project’s key strategy, hovering above the shared affective register with madness to decentre regimes of truth and to undo official history.[16] In this episode, the creators start a fictional drama with two male characters and one female character. Confined in the Chehrazi mental hospital, these mad companions collectively launch a radio station to escape the humdrum of their everyday institutionalized life. The project is named after Dr. Ibrahim Chehrazi who returned to Tehran in 1937 after completing his doctoral degree in medicine in Paris, France. As soon as he arrived home, Chehrazi assumed leadership in teaching at the University of Tehran’s School of Medicine, directing the Centre for Neurology at Razi hospital, as well as consulting the State’s Justice Department and the National Iranian Army. This was not atypical for someone like Chehrazi. He made enormous scholarly and professional contributions to his field by the time he died in early 2011, at the age of 102, in his second home in the United States. Among all his contributions, there is one specific project that inspires the podcasts of Radiochehrazi. Within the first three years of his return, Chehrazi established the very first institutional asylum in Iran in 1940. He is the first scholar to adopt and build a Western institutionalized system for the governance of psychotic patients in Iran.

The mental hospital, a place of confinement and isolation, serves as a metaphor for displacement. The dialogues suggest co-relations between the characters’ madness and disorientation in finding one’s place in a distinct reality from the one imagined before the diaspora. The narrative of madness highlights a conditional relationship to temporality and spatiality for the diasporic Iranian subject who keeps time using bi-cultural calendars and navigates space through multimodal embodiments. For first-generation diasporas, the lived experience of spaces of home—now far from material conditions that define home—exists in memories, photographs, and other virtual representations that are available in digital form and in online spaces. For instance, when grandparents videocall, we are transported into the background of their kitchens where we used to dine together back home. In this sense, the everyday embodiment in relation to space becomes multimodal as memories and sensations related to these lived spaces and objects that define them overlap in virtual view.

A featured edition on Nouruz (the celebration of spring equinox and the Iranian new year) in episode “3” adds dramatic narrative into the remix. The co-host, who soon will be performing the voice of the protagonist, announces: “this episode is about Spring, Jamshid, and Delbar.”[17] Melancholic music plays. Time and space change as the program switches into a radio play. The protagonist (his name is Habib) starts off by a simple description of how his day started. What follow are dialogues between the two main characters and Delbar as they encounter each other in the hallway of the hospital. The conversations introduce us to the characters’ clashing outlooks on life. Jamshid believes in beauty and life’s simple pleasures. He convincingly insists that “the world of the insane is the most beautiful.”[18] During this scene, the listener is repeatedly reminded of Jamshid’s optimism about a possible happy simple life. Every time he joyfully digs his fist into Samanou, a Norouz’s delicacy, we hear from him or other characters about Jamshid’s jolly act. Jamshid’s positive outlook is in constant contrast to the protagonist’s whiney attitude that hinders his ability to receive love from Delbar, his crush. He continuously complains about the unfair accidents of life, hopelessness, lack of love—and, of course, he is skeptical of Jamshid’s empty optimism. As the protagonist tries to leave Jamshid to get fresh air and smoke a cigarette, he cross passes with Delbar in the hallway. Delbar is concerned with his pessimistic mood. His encounter with Delbar tells us that in fact Delbar loves him back, and that the main problem is the protagonist’s inability to see reality beyond his pessimism. As the protagonist is about to pass Delbar, he hears a voice from the hospital’s office calling his name. The office pages a patient’s name when they have visitors. Having a visitor promises hope, a long-awaited interaction with the world outside. However, the scene abruptly ends before we get to hear from or about the visitor. Instead, we hear a newly admitted patient asking the protagonist: “Since your neck is so long, which way is the Spring?”[19] This uncanny question shows us how the metaphor of madness unsettles language and the obsession with meaning and making sense, as it situates the character and Spring in a world with alternative dimensions and temporal relations. Madness both reflects an anguished diasporic experience and creates opportunities for new affective experiences. The voice performing the protagonist switches back to the co-host and closes the episode on a happy note about Spring and the new year. Left with the same alarming music track that comes at the end of all the series’ episodes, we are reminded of other episodes of Radiochehrazi and other things that happen in this world.[20]

Radiochehrazi uses the metaphor of madness in composing the narrative, but more importantly it reflects on madness in their formal use of remixed sounds to reanimate cultural pasts. In addition to this narrative, the project’s remix techniques entail a performative multi-modal experience as sonic performance. The artists seemingly build the allegory of madness on existing Iranian cultural traditions and literatures. For instance, madness and mysticism coalesce as key themes in Persian classical poetry (tenth to fourteenth centuries AD). In the poems of Nizami, Saʿdi, Rumi, and Hafez, the mad characters (almost always male identified) are reoccurring figures, who depending on their poet’s historical context and body of work, symbolize states of happiness, love, lust, freedom, poetic genius, knowledge, or self-indulgence. The best example of the cultural specificity of madness can be studied in the verse of the twelfth-century Persian poet Nizami. Often compared to Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, Nizami Ganjavi’s Laylá va Majnūn has become the iconic love story of the Middle East.[21] The male lover’s affection for Laylá materializes in his madness and causes disturbance to the social economy of transactional marriages. Madness is also a regenerative site for poetic composition, while Majnun (whose name literally translates into crazed, insane, or mad in Arabic) is often portrayed through allegorical representations that place him among animal worlds in the wilderness depicted in desert life. Majnun as such embodies “a locus of transgressions,” as Prashant Keshavmurthy puts it.[22] Majnun’s madness, wildness, and unruly love is a threat to the political, social, and economic order and therefore the source for his abjection, ostracism, and ultimately displacement.

A Brief Cultural Background for Public Sounds

The sonic remix in Radiochehrazi stresses sound’s media-specific attributes that shape a diasporic engagement with audio. This reference to sonic media in particular reminds the listeners of the critical role sonic platforms such as minaret, rooftops, radio, and cassette tapes have historically played in the construction of national publics and counterpublics throughout modern Iranian history. An effective way to trace this history of what I term “media-determined listening” in post-Islamic Iran is to look at older theological media. I use the term “media-determined” in referring to older media such as minarets, rooftops, megaphones, voice recorders, and electronic amplifiers, because, as soon as they project, sound permeates into social and public spaces. Listeners are not given any choice. These media control the omnipresent distribution of theological and other politically controlled forms of sound in public life. Thus, it is the medium that first and foremost determines social listening.[23] All these older projection platforms for instance have been and continue to be used for disseminating the Azan (call for prayer in Islamic cultures). I refer to analog media as “older media,” not as to suggest that these media are no longer used, but to distinguish them from new/digital media, as they continue to define everyday orientations to time and space via sound in the Islamic public space. Using examples of theological media neither suggests that the public soundscape is only theological, but shows how the masculine projection of theological sounds has been used to mute other vocal registers that frequent the public sphere.

Thinking about the relevance of older auditory media helps to understand podcasts and other new sonic communication technologies and also to assert the important role that listening media play in organizing everyday experience for the Iranian diasporic subject. An alternative approach to this historiography is to focus on the relationship between listening and its counterpolitics in Iran. The use of cassette tapes in the 1970s is an example of aural media’s impact on organizing political action in the years preceding the Iranian Revolution. In his Iran Writings, for instance, Michel Foucault cites cassettes and radio broadcasts among the modern media that Islamists in Iran innovatively deployed as means of resistance to Pahlavi’s regime. Mixing traditional religious discourse with modern communication technology was at the crux of engineering the Iranian Revolution. Foucault’s writings on Iran mark his transition from his musings on “technologies of domination” to his thoughts on what he refers to as “the technologies of the self, as the foundation for a new form of spirituality and resistance to power.”[24] While Foucault’s main interest rests on the integration of modern technologies in the construction of resistant revolutionary movements, the pursuit of spiritual resistance through practices of embodied listening is inseparable from what he names “technologies of the self.” One study that attends to the inextricable relationship between media and embodiment is Charles Hirschkind’s book, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics. To study the rhetorical styles of sermons, and the practice of listening to cassette sermons, Hirschkind immerses himself in interacting with a khatib and other local people in Cairo, Egypt. He argues that cassettes as media are not simply a means of disseminating ideas, implanting religious ideologies, or spreading propaganda. Instead, he argues that they are media with considerable affective influence on the emotions, moods, receptivity and awareness of their audience. Hirschkind follows the history of the circulation of these cassettes and attendant listening practices in Egypt, linking them to the pre-1979 Islamic revolutionary political activist movements in Iran as the starting point for the mass distribution and use of cassettes for Islamic and political argumentation and deliberation. The book’s proposition is that listening to cassette sermons creates an Islamic counterpublic that debates and argues the complexities of devout, pious, and ethical traditions as they confront increasingly secular perspectives in everyday life in Egypt. Hirschkind pays close attention to listening and critically examines the dissemination of cultural knowledge through embodiment, emphasizing the importance of cassettes as media within the postmodern context where mass media is of great significance.[25]

Cassette tapes are also discussed in Negar Mottahedeh’s book, #iranelection: Hashtag Solidarity and the Transformation of Online Life, in which the author similarly refers to the historical and political significance of Ayatollah Khomeini’s recorded voice during the 1979 revolution. Mottahedeh gives an account of the more recent protests following Iran’s “fraudulent” 2009 presidential election and the Green Revolution’s use of #iranelection as the first long-trending international hashtag. The distribution of cassette tapes and the listening practices they conditioned in the 1970s offer a precedent-setting media technological model for trending hashtags today.[26] Ayatollah Khomeini recorded his sermons and views about a utopian Islamic republic on these tapes during his exile in Iraq and France. Then he sent his recorded voice to Iran where copies were made and distributed amongst different political parties. The cassette tapes, along with other “small media,”[27] helped him prepare for his insurgency against Pahlavi’s regime. In Small Media Big Revolution: Communication, Culture and the Iranian Revolution, Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi and Ali Mohammadi remind us that “the complex interplay and cultural resonances of traditional and modern, religious and secular, oral and printed, was what worked so well, not simply that small media were put to audacious new uses. Two main forms of ‘small media’ were used in the Iranian movement: first, cassette tapes, which acted like an electronic pulpit (minbar), and second, photocopied statements, known as i‘lāmīah.”[28] The cassette tapes and their medium-specific structure supported the performative and affective aspects of listening and auditory media. Ayatollah Khomeini’s voice arguably exhorted various political parties and reinforced Iranian people’s mass participation in the revolution.

Listening to cassette tapes entailed gathering in secret spaces and private residences and forming counterpublics to resist mainstream everyday public soundscapes including mainstream radio broadcasts, the Azan, and Friday congregational prayer.[29] In the present day, listening to podcasts for Iranian diasporic subjects produces similar counterpublics that are conditioned by the histories of listening as a cultural and political practice in Iran. These counterpublics take form against the main (trans)national broadcast programs outside Iran, such as those catering to the diasporic music, entertainment, and news industries in Los Angeles, Toronto, and London,[30] as well as the mainstream media in the host locale. Listening to podcast projects such as Radiochehrazi as a counterpractice is also conditioned by such projects’ means of production. We may call them indie collectives, who protect their creative processes against the compromises of governmental, institutional, and corporate interests. This is also evident in the last episode of Radiochehrazi, when one of the creators gives a tribute speech to his collaborator, offering the listener the only chance of a structured interview with the creators. This poetic epilogue[31] reveals valuable details about the inspirations for the project, the nature of their collaboration, and the reasons why they stopped recording.

The Gendered Nature of Listening and its Media

In engaging these media histories and highlighting their role in developing practices of control and resistance, Radiochehrazi also foregrounds the significance of sex/gender in understanding media histories and socio-cultural dimensions of listening. The connections between sex/gender, practices of listening, and various media offer valuable insights into how the everyday is organized and controlled in the Islamic public space and how counterlistening practices are formed in turn. Just as theological sounds amplify in the auditory sphere, most structures of control are enforced according to sex/gender, giving public platforms to the male voice while silencing all other voices. It is impossible to study a project such as Radiochehrazi as an attempt to create a generative space for subversive acts without considering the role of sex/ gender in the subversive politics of sound. Just like their sounds, I argue that aural media are sexed/gendered. Minarets, for instance, assume a male sex, not only through their figurative resemblance to an erect phallus, but also by always explicitly projecting a male voice. Historically built to provide a visual focal point as well as sonic cues, the minaret controls the everyday orientation of the subject in public space/time. This archetype of Islamic architecture is the perfect example of what Harold Innis would phrase as a “time-biased medium.”[32] Through longevity and speech, which Innis considered a time-biased medium,[33] the minaret encourages the extension of an Islamic public within a limited geographical zone but throughout centuries. Minarets facilitate a communication that cannot be transported across longer distances. However, as an architectural piece it communicates power and control via enduring over long periods of time. In doing so, the minaret assumes a male sex, and explicitly discharges masculine and theological frequencies into the public sphere.

The minaret is one example amongst many other sonic platforms that are concerned with the development of social hierarchies, in which the female/feminine voice along other non-male/masculine voices (an exception would be the feminine voices of young boys, who occasionally work as muezzins) are always pushed into the private realm. Excavating the female voice from the margins of the history of listening media and their counterpolitics in Iran also brings to the fore how Radiochehrazi stresses the role that sex/gender plays in formations of diasporic media and their counterpractices. Cassette tapes, for instance, were first used to expand Ayatollah Khomeini’s message beyond exile and into the privacy of Iranian households in the years preceding the revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini’s sermons were addressed from the diaspora to an arguably male general public inside the national borders of Iran. As the leader of his fiqh,[34] Ayatollah Khomeini’s first confrontation with the Pahlavi regime was through the oppositional stand he took against women’s suffrage in 1963. It is only after the revolution that Ayatollah Khomeini recognized the crucial impact that the Iranian women’s movement had on mobilizing the revolution and saw the potential in women’s participation in the life of the Islamic Republic. Nevertheless, his later views on women’s issues remained problematic. He was rightfully criticized and mocked for his motto when he finally arrived at a realization of his recognition for women: “From the woman’s skirt, the man goes to the ascension,” which was to endorse women solely for their reproductive and child-rearing responsibilities which offered men and the Islamic state their means for social and biological reproduction. Gender disparities in Ayatollah Khomeini’s views—in the way he wrote women’s rights in the constitution law of his newly formed state and his denial, dismissal, and mistreatment of female as well as non-confirming bodies—were partly to blame for the criticism that Foucault received for his fascination with Ayatollah Khomeini and his support for his writings on the revolution in Iran.[35]

Shortly after the 1978–79 revolution, however, the same cassette tapes that facilitated the Islamic Revolution transformed into the main communication media for distribution of what was banned by the Islamic State, and more specifically the female voice in Iran. The newly formed government pushed waves of Iranian immigrants and refugees to Europe and the US. As these diasporic communities formed in different regions, Los Angeles situated itself as the main site for the Iranian diasporic pop and rock music industry. A contested diasporic counterpublic Tehrangeles[36] evoked fantasies of escape to the American dream, while for some it represented “low culture” and the persistence of anti-intellectual aspects of prerevolutionary entertainment industries. The most efficient and democratic way to import and circulate diasporic soundscapes of Tehrangeles’ pop music inside the country was through cassette tapes. During the 1980s and the early 90s, cassette tapes played an extremely potent role in defining public and private space via projecting the female voice. To this day, cassette tapes are an iconic communication medium in Iran of the 1970s, 80s, and 90s—marked by the seduction of a forbidden female voice and associated fantasies of escape, freedom, and diaspora. The female voice continues to redefine the public space through either its absence or interventionist presence, and most importantly through resisting embedded patriarchal structures that control the everyday public soundscape in Iran.

Another example links the early use of cassette tapes in Iran to women’s movements during the 1970s. In her recent book, Whisper Tapes: Kate Millett in Iran, Negar Mottahedeh listens to more than ninety hours of recorded tape along with papers written by feminist activist Kate Millet, who traveled to Tehran less than a month after the revolution to join Iranian women in a celebration of International Women’s Day on March 7, 1979. Without any working knowledge of Persian, Millet and their partner used a tape recorder during this visit.[37] The recordings are an important archival source for studying the continuation of the women’s movement in pre- and post-revolutionary Iran. By listening to women’s voices and other recorded sounds, Mottahedeh fills in some of the gaps in Going to Iran, the manuscript that Millet published after attending women’s demonstrations in Tehran. Whisper Tapes uses these audio sources located at the Duke University archives to recover the lost history of the women’s protests that followed quickly on the heels of Ayatollah Khomeini’s ascent to power as the leader of the Iranian Revolution.[38] Cassette tapes as earlier sonic media thus facilitate diasporic communication because they make possible sound distribution across long distances. Thereby, they provide great examples of sonic media that can expand our understanding of podcasts as new sonic communication platforms in the Iranian diasporas.

Through these links to female voice, the women’s movement, feminist and other counterdiscourse and practices they have facilitated, cassette tapes also offer a stark contrast to the sexed/gendered nature of minarets. To return to Innis’s notions pertaining to the bias of communication, cassette tapes are “space-biased” media;[39] they are built to be easily transported over long distances but as material they do not last for long. This transportable quality explains cassette tapes’ diasporic usage as earlier examples of sonic media. A similar transformation and repurposing takes place with the rooftops as sound platforms. Once offering performative venues for political dissent during the years preceding the Islamic Revolution of 1978-9 and the Green Movement of 2009,[40] urban rooftops, much like cassette tapes through their counterpositionings, have transformed into the main platforms for mega concerts as well as indie underground music, such as deep-house in contemporary urban Iran. These histories of transformation also prove that as much as media have always contributed to enforcing structures of control and dominance, they have facilitated tools and techniques of resistance. They render visible the impossible task of identifying resisting and subversive media without considering sex/gender. I contend that if the Islamic public dominates the soundscape through the male voice, then its counterpublics and practices are always already sexed/gendered. Thinking about media such as minarets, rooftops, radio, and cassette tapes as sexed/ gendered helps to assert the important role that listening media play in negotiating agency in everyday life and provides a historical context for the practice of listening and its sexed/gendered relevance in Islamic cultures. The history of this relationship helps to identify a media technological dynamic for analyzing new listening media like podcasts as media that facilitate counterpublics. Podcasts as free online platforms perfectly replace subversive media such as cassette tapes, through which the female/feminine voice can counter the main public soundscapes.

Radiochehrazi’s choice of podcasts recognizes the relevance of sex/ gender in regard to media, as it grapples with the dynamics between counterpublics and the affective politics of listening. The project’s concern with sex/gender vis-à-vis medium is evident not only in their choice of medium, but also in the content they remix. Listening closely to episode “1,” which they title “Zan (Woman), ” reveals that the artists are well aware that podcasts can create a subversive space to tackle gender disparities enforced by the structures of control and (trans) national institutions. On March 11, 2013, Radiochehrazi published this short track. The full three minutes and twenty-seven seconds are dedicated to mocking the treatment of women’s rights issues including Ayatollah Khomeini’s motto and the (re)presentation of Iranian Islamic and secular feminisms in national and transnational broadcasting and social media. The episode is a movement through forced passages. It all begins with a speaker who takes centre stage. He recites poetry rhyming with “Zan,” and playing with the nominal similarity between the noun and the verb “Zan” that can mean: to strike, to hit, to play a musical instrument, to do, or to perform. The poetry slam soon jump cuts to listing names of female public figures. The speaker jokingly announces “the best women of our time include: Shadi Sadr, Shirin Neshat, Shirin Ebadi, Anoosheh Ansari […] and Obama’s wife.”[41] Listening to how the list continues foregrounds the etymology of feminine names in Persian: sweet, happy, and grandiose. These soft feminine qualities prepare us for the surprise juxtaposition at the end of the line. Listing Michelle Obama not only stresses Obama’s hyped-up popularity in the diaspora and more generally amongst Iranians, but more importantly ending the list of the Iranian female public figures with “Obama’s wife” comments on the culture of sexism that often names a woman through her affiliations to a male figure such as a husband, father, brother, or son.[42]

The transition between the two passages at the beginning of episode “1” exemplifies the sudden interruptions and jump cuts that echo a sense of confusion. This confusion further materializes halfway through the episode, when one of the speakers takes the spotlight and breaks into a deliberately poor performance of Ziba Shirazi’s song, “I’m a woman.” He sings in drag, screaming “I am a woman, I am a strong woman, I am like a flower petal, I am softer than a flower, I am a woman. Yes I am a woman!” The poor performance of the song along with the stereotype of the female pop singer scrutinizes the limitations that pop music industries, of Los Angeles and London especially, impose on female singers. The track is a sonic confrontation, moving quickly through too many voices that bring places, temporalities, histories, and memories into the sonic foreground.

Returning to episode “3,” the track adds a dramatic narrative into the remix and introduces the metaphor of madness to the listeners. The dialogues also offer additional insights into Radiochehrazi’s engagement with sex/gender in the content they remix. The main dramatic passage is performed through two male vocal actors. The main event is the encounter between two friends Jamshid and the protagonist, Habib, in the Chehrazi hospital’s hallway. We hear about Habib’s feelings as he is falling for a female patient, Delbar. The listener gets to listen in to the conversation between the protagonist and Delbar. Delbar’s character represents gender and the treatment of her sex/gender in the world of the Iranian liberals. She repeatedly and powerfully breaks stereotypes projected onto a contemporary young Iranian woman. On the one hand she embodies a beautiful conforming woman who wears “makeup and skirts,” and on the other hand she is opinionated, with a complex personality that negotiates her place between tradition and modernity in a patriarchal society.43 The modern Iranian liberal man is portrayed amongst a generation that has not yet come to terms with his relationships with women. Delbar, just like the female pop singer, is performed in drag by a male speaker. Performance in cross-gender emphasizes the absence of a female voice, and further brings to the fore the confusion of the Iranian liberal man in regard to sexual/gender politics (see Appendix E for more examples).

Conclusion

Listening closely to these selections from Radiocherazi brings to the fore the artists’ thematic engagement with diasporic and displaced identities. But this essays also listens closely to identify how the medium of the podcast breaks open histories of listening in relation to sex/gender highlighting media’s role in facilitating counterpractices and tools and techniques of subversion. I argue that Radiochehrazi uses sonic remix to also activate the shared affective register between displacement and madness. As one of the burdens of controlling structures and making possible diasporic communications that are political, not based on shared ideologies, but based on the affective exchanges they offer. By using podcasts, the artists form developments in new online platforms such as Clubhouse as well as a range of live streaming media, engendering an urgent need for scholarship on Iran and its global diaspora to consider how media facilitate counterpublics and offer crucial sites of everyday performance of Iranian transnational and diasporic identities. Sonic media particularly make possible counterlistening environments that have the potential to transcend the limited possibilities of mainstream, quotidian, and public soundscapes in Iran and its global diaspora. The prominent role media and technologies hold in connecting the global Iranian diasporas in our contemporary moment calls for a media history approach to further examining media and their critical role in the construction of national publics and counterpublics throughout modern Iranian history. This essay only begins to inquire into media history scholarship, and, by adding to the emerging field of Iranian diaspora studies, in considering new media as historical subjects.

Appendices

The Persian transcriptions of Radiochehrazi episodes and their close translations in English have been provided by the author in this appendix only to assist the reader by making the sonic archive of the essay more accessible in the context of the discussion. The literary quality of English translations has not been the focus and regardless the text in translation fails to capture the intertextuality, humor, and sonic qualities within the original transcriptions.

A. Epilogue, or Episode 20, February 10, 2014

مجری: دیر زمان بود که می خواستم به هزار بهانه  برای تو بنویسم

 کیفیت هایی هست که من ندارم و دلم می خواست می داشتم

 اما راهش انگار پیدا نمی شود

شاید هم راست راستی دلم نمی خواهد

 یکی اینکه مدام از یادم میرود یاد افراد بیاورم چقدر قدرشناس مهربانیاشان هستم

بده کاری انقدر سنگین شد که ناچار باید بیرون میزد من هم گرفتار میشوم

اگر بنا به گفت و گو باشد

دیر شده اما چیزی کم نشده

اصل کار هم گمانم همان است

باید به تو می نوشتم که همه روزها و شبها را یادم هست

تیمار بی انتهای تورا که نبادا تنهایی عارض شود

 مبادا ابرهای غصه ببارند

مبادا دبه روغنم خالی باشد

مبادا کبد و ریه و جوارح ام از کار بیفتد

بی خانمانی و سردرگمی و کلافگی و پارک و جلسه هم آره یادم هاست

مهمتر از اینها جنون و بی قراری بی انتها را هم یادم هاست

مثل دو نفر رهگذر غریبه که یک عصر بارانی توی پیاده رو به هم میرسند

ومی گویند پخشه اسب

چه دیوانه وار بودیم

 هیهات

مثل همان باران

کاش نگه داشته بودی میکروفونه فکسنی سر طلایی را

رادیوچهرازی هم از میان همین روز و شبها پیداش شد

مثل هزار چیزه دیگر که پیدا شد و کسی نمی داند

حالا دیگر رفته اما یادم هاست چقدر شلتاغه مرا تاب آوردی با اینکه اینهمه دوستش داشتی

رادیو رو می گویم

 منتظر بودی

 چون من بد حال بودم

چرا؟ هر چی

 ولی منتظر ماندی

هر گربه ای که رقصاندم گفتی قبول

از همه بدترش همان که گفتی

فکرش را که می کنم می بینم واقعا آن نفردیگر چه گناهی کرده که باید بیاید میان نمایش لوتی وانتری تو

ولی ان نفر دیگر منتظر ماند

 چون دوستان منتظر می مانند و طاقتشان به این راحتی طاق نمیشود

دوستان از بلند شدن دوستانشان بلند می شوند

چشمشان میخندد آن طور که تو بودی

همینطورها زنده ماند رادیوچهرازی

 وگرنه

تا حال صد بار رفته بود لای دستان سایرین

یادم هست می خواستم کسی نداند

 گفتی قبول

عشق و بوس و لوپ کشیدنش سهم من شد

کسی هم زیاد دست گیرش نشد که اینها همه کار توست

اما باک نیست من که یادم هاست

اصلا هم انگار همان هاست

حالا فارق از این آدمها که رفتند میانه فایل های کامپوتری صداشان مانده و جایشان

خالیست

 باید به تو می نوشتم که رادیو و سایر چیزها حاصل یک چیز بزرگتر است

 ومن ان چیز بزرگتر را شبانه روز یادم هاست

دوستی گاهی جنون آمیز است

 گاهی خلسه ناک و گاهی ساکت و غروب و قطار لیوانها

گاهی از میانش چیزهای اینطوری پیدا می شود

گاهی هم سرش را توی لاک خودش می برد

 اما دوستی مثل هیچ چیز نیست

دلمان تنگ شده برای آسایشگاه بی شک

باید رهاشان می کردیم بروند جاهای خوب

اما دوستی مثل کوه سره جایش هست و مدام توی دیگش چیزهای نامنتظرانه می جوشد

جنون هست البته دلتنگی هم هست اصلا انگار ما با دل تنگ زاده ایم

دلمان برای هر چیزه کوچک چقدر تنگ است

باید برای تو مینوشتم قدر دان حامی دوستی جنون و دلتنگی هستم

آدمی به فرد می میرد

تنها به جمع است که زنده است و معنا دارد

و من جمع  را یادم هاست قدرش را می دانم

گیرم سال تا سال دهانم به گفتنش باز نشود

اینطور انگار آدم رازهستی را می داند

خیالش تخت است لااقل

تازه اینها به کنار کسی چه می داند دوستی هرروز چیزهای تازه می زاید

از طرف خودم و تو سلام روزگار نو

خداحافظ رادیو چهرازی

نوزده بهمن 1392

The co-host: I wanted to write to you, I have thousands of excuses There are qualities that I lack but I wanted to have

There’s no way though Or perhaps I don’t really want to For one, I always forget to remind people how much I’m grateful for their kindness My debt has become so heavy that he had to give it up

I’d be too preoccupied

Only if it were up to words

It’s late but nothing is lost

That’s the main thing I guess

I had to write to you that I remember all the days and nights

Your endless worries

Lest loneliness comes

Lest clouds of sorrow rain

Lest my oil jar goes empty

Lest liver, lungs, and organs fail

Homelessness, confusion, crankiness, park, and meetings

I remember them all

Most of all I remember the never-ending madness and restlessness Like two strange passersby crossing each other on a sidewalk on a rainy evening

And they arbitrary say “Horse play”

How mad we were

Alas! like the same rain

I wish you kept the useless golden microphone

Radiochehrazi was found in the midst of these days and nights Like the thousands other things that came about and no one knows about Now it’s gone

But I remember how you tolerated my whiny complaints

Despite how much you loved it

I’m talking about the radio

You waited Because I was a mess Why? Whatever!

But you waited

Any show I’d put up, you went along

The worst thing

What you said

When I think about it I see

Really what did the other person did wrong to deserve to be in the middle of my clown show? But that other person waited

Because friends wait and don’t give up enduring easily

Friends go high with their friends going up

Their eyes smile

Just like the way you were

This was how Radiochehrazi lived

Otherwise

It would have fallen into the wrong hands time after time

I remember that I wanted no one to know

And you said ok

All the love, kisses, and recognition came my way

No one noticed that this was all your work

Never mind though I do remember

And it seems that’s what matters

Now despite these people that disappeared amidst the digital files

Their voices live and they will be missed

I had to write to you

That radio and other things are the outcomes of a much bigger thing

And day and night I remember that other big thing

Friendship is at times insane

At times frustrating, quite, with sunsets and train of glasses

Sometimes things like this end up happening

And sometimes it crawls its head inside its shell

Friendship is like nothing else though

No doubt I miss the asylum

But we had to let them go good places

Friendship, like a mountain, stays firm on its base

And constantly boils new things in its pot

There is madness so is anguish

It seems as though we were born to anguish

We miss every single little thing so much

I had to write to you that I cherish your madness and anguish

Human dies an individual

It is only in group that she lives and means something

And I remember the group and I am grateful for it

Despite not opening my mouth to say it

This way it seems that one knows the secret to existence

She is carefree at least

All things aside, who knows friendship gives birth to new things every day!

From me and you

Hello to new times

Goodbye Radiochehrazi

February 8, 2014

B. Episode 7, April 20, 2013

مجری: اخه پلیس امریکا خیلی وارده‫. اصن قیامته من خودم با خودم عهد کردم اگه قسمت شد یروز یه پلیس امریکا دیدم فورا باش روبوسی کنم‫‫.

  ماشالا قد و هیکل چشا نافذ بعضیاشون زن ان‫. حالا اگه مردن دوس دختر دارن‫. حالا به هر حال بعد از انفجار پمپ مسوولین پستن اومدن و گفتن نگران نباشید ما مظنونین رو چیز می کنیم‫. البته مردم آمریکا دل گندن نگران نمیشن دیگه شما ببین کارت به چه استخوانی رسیده والا تا اینکه دیروز صبح زود در دوربین نشون داد دو نفر با کلاه و کوله پشتی از چچن رد میشدن‫. که پلیس گفت آقا یدقه نگر دار بزن عقب بزن عقب‫. اره همینه دیگه اینجا وقتی ما فهمیدیم از چچن هستن و ایرانی نیستن یکم خیالمون راحت شد‫. پاشدیم رفتیم با بچه ها یه چند تا سیگار کشیدیم‫‫.

رادیو چهرازی، اپیزود هفت

The co-host: The American police know what they are doing; they are on top of everything. I promised myself that if one day I see an American police I would kiss them. Tall and nice build, sharp eyes. Some of them are women or they have girlfriends. Anyways, after the pombing of Poston, the authorities of Poston came and assured us not to worry because they got the suspects. Of course, American people are very relaxed, they don’t get anxious, but this case was knife to the bone. Until yesterday morning, when they showed the footage of two guys with hats and backpacks from Chechen and Police said, ‘Pull over! Back! Back!’ Here we realized that they are from Chechen, not Iran. We were relieved and went outside with the kids to smoke a few.

C. Episode 4, March 31, 2013

 

مجری: ایران بر یک دسته است: متوسط. متوسط یعنی وقتی آدم لباس موسیقی می‌پوشد و همه فیلم‌ها را نقد می‌کند و سیگار یا گیاهخوار می‌کشد. یکی از ویژگی‌های متوسط، اجتماعی و مجازی است. در این‌جا آدم با بقیه‌ی متوسط‌ها حرف‌های اسمارت می‌زند و بیش‌تر افکارش درباره‌ی عصر ارتباطات، دهکده‌ی جهانی، کلیک، دهکده‌ی المپیک، بیک، […] می‌باشد. متوسط خیلی مظلوم و دوست‌داشتنی‌ست؛ چون در کارهای خیلی خوبی شرکت می‌کند و تحصیلات دارد. اما بعضی این‌ها رُ تحت‌فشار قرار می‌دن و اینا ناراحت هستن. در سال‌های اخیر بیش‌تر آدم‌ها متوسط هستند، چون یه‌حالت خوبی توش هست… کلید واژه‌های متوسط عبارت از کف مطالبات و کیوسک و بی‌عملی‌ست. جاهای متوسط عبارت از کافه هفتاد وُ هشت، کافه هشتاد وُ هفت، هشت‌صد وُ هشتاد وُ هفت، هفتاد وُ هشت، هشتاد وُ هفت و دم‌نوش گاوزبان و گل‌های رضائیه است. فعالیت‌های متوسط عبارت از خستگی و مهمانی‌های تعداد متوسط و گیزگیزی و نقد فیلمی است. گرفتاری متوسط عبارت از مطبوعات آزاد و سیزن لاست …است. بهترین بازیکن فوتبال کریم باقری است، چرا که همیشه وسط توپ می‌زده است. بهترین بازیکن متوسط استیلی است. توصیه‌های متوسط: وسط را گرفته کن، از همه بهتره. در گذشته یک‌جا متوسط دیگه عصبانی شد و نزدیک بود با استفاده از ابزارهای اجتماعی از قبیل فیس‌بوک رژیم رُ استاد کنه…. یکی از مهم‌ترین چیزها در متوسط زیرزمینی یا همان موسیقی است. آهان راستی متوسط خیلی شهریه…. زیرزمینی بیش‌تر یه‌حالت اعتراض توش نهفته است؛ نسبت به‌ بقیه و چون بقیه اخم‌وُتخم می‌کنند و متوسط هم خیلی مدبر و عمل‌گرا و با عقل است، به زیرزمین می‌رود که حریف را کلافه کند…. الان هفتاد میلیارد نفر از نخبگان در خارج و لندن هستند و از اون‌جا نهضت متوسط رُ با همون اجتماعی و مجازی و چیزهای زیرزمینی چیز می‌کنند، از راه‌های دور وُ نزدیک.

 

The co-host: Iran is one category. Middle. Middle means when the person wears music clothes and criticizes all the films and smokes cigarettes, or is vegetarian. One of the features of the middle is being social and virtual. In this place, the person talks with other middles about smart things and most of their thoughts are about the age of communication, the global village, click, Olympic village and Bic. The middle is nice and attractive. Because they get involved in things with positive causes and they are highly educated. But some people put pressure on the middle and so the middle is annoyed. In recent years, most people are middles; because it’s cool… the key words middle uses are: ‘minimum expectations,’ ‘kiosk,’ and ‘passivity.’ The places for the middle are Café Seventy-Eight, Eighty-Seven, Eight Hundred and Eighty-Seven, Eighty-Seven and herbal tea. The middle’s activities are fatigue and small parties for film criticism. . . . The middle’s problems are free press, and the season of Lost… The middle’s favorite soccer player is Karim Bagheri because he always passes the ball in the middle and the best middle soccer player is Estili. The middle’s advice: take the middle, it is the best. In the past, the middle got mad and it started with social tools like Facebook to teach the regime a lesson… one of the most important things for the middle is underground or music. By the way, the middle is very cosmopolitan… the underground is for protest against the others because they frown and the middle is intelligent and skillful, so he goes underground to hank the enemy… Right now seven milliard intellectuals are abroad and in London and they run the middle movement with that social, virtual, and underground thing. From far and near…

D. Episode 3, March 23, 2013

مجری: بسم الله الرحمان الرحیم، برنامه های ما الان نوروزی میشه. این برنامه بهار، جمشید، دلبر.

موسیقی غمناک در زیرمتن همواره به گوش می رسد.

حبیب: سر صبحی دوباره پا شدیم اومدیم خسته باشیم، جمشید پرید وسط گفت ببین چه قدر سمنو داری. ببین زندگی هنوز خوشگلیاشو داره.

گفتیم جمشید الحق که دیوونه ای. بیا بشین یه دقیقه خسته باش جای این جلافتا سر صبحی. دستشو تا مچ کرد تو کاسه گفت یعنی می خواهم بهت بگم دنیای دیوونه ها از همه قشنگه. بذار دهنت. هرچی نداره صفا داره

پا شدیم تا این فضای خستگی ما را مبتذل نکرده زدیم بیرون یه سیگار ناشتا بگیرونیم، له بشیم، حالمون جا بیاد. کبریت نکشیده جمشید پرید وسط گفت نیگاه امسال عدس سبز کردیم جای گندم. پارسال برف زیاد نشست سر درختی ها همه رفتن زیر سرما. گفتیم جمشید پس تو کی خسته می شی سگ مذهب.  صدای قهقه. کسی کلمه دیوونه را زمزه می کند.  گفت مگه چته باز؟ گفتیم بابا پامون سرصبحی مستقل از خودمون خورده به در سیاه شده، انصافانه است؟ چشممون به در خشک شده کسی نیومده ملاقات. آهنگ بهار دلکش با صدای شجریان به گوش می رسد.

حبیب: بهار دلکش رسیده دل به جا نباشد، انصافانه است؟ دلبر یه اینقدر به فکر ما نباشد، گردنمون کوتاه شده، انصافانه است؟ باز خسته نیستی، هی عدس عدس؟  جمشید گفت یعنی می خواهم بهت بگم زندگی هنوز خوشگلیاش رو داره. پاشو یه دوش بگیر بریز همه رو تو یه چاهک بره پی کارش. جاش ماهی دودی بیار لقمه کنیم شب عیدی. گفتیم جمشید الحق که دیوونه ای. تا اومدیم بریم زیر دوش دلبر پرید وسط گفت اوی مگه کوری دیوونه؟  صدای قهقه. کسی کلمه دیوونه را زمزه می کند .

 حبیب: گفتیم احترامت واجب، خاطرخواهی هم سرجای خودش، طرف زنونه اون سر راهروست. گفت چرا دوره دهنت سمنو مالیده؟ گفتیم اگه مالیده چرا گردنمون کوتاست؟ باز چرا رفته برگشته نیستی؟ خاصه در بهار؟ اشاره به شعر مرگ نازلی اثر شاملو دارد.

حبیب: گفت کوری دیگه. کور نبودی سوال نمی کردی. اونور کن روت رو سرم بازه. تو دلم رخت می شورن. اومدیم بریم تو درگاهی حموم پامون دوباره گرفت به در. هیچ کی نبود ببینه مرد کوه درده. خواستیم بکشیم به مذهب جد و آبادش چند تا آب نکشیده ببندیم شنیدیم مدریت صدا می زنه ملاقاتی. ملاقاتی ملاقاتی داری چند بار تکرار می شود. صدا پا شنیده می شود.

حبیب: پوشیده نپوشیده زدیم تو راهرو. دلبر پرید وسط گفت یعنی می خواهم بهت بگم کوری دیوونه. جمشید بهش گفت اذیتش نکن. خوب میشه. مرخص میشه. نیگاه گردنش رو شده یه متر. راهرو رو می رفتیم رو به حیاط یکی از تازه واردها سیگار به دست اومد گفت آقا ما خسته ایم شما که گردنت بلنده می تونی بگی بهار کدوم وره؟ جمشید از پشت سر گفت یعنی می خواهم بهت بگم هنوز خوشگلیاش رو داره. تو دلمون گفتیم جمشید کله پدرت از بس دیوونه ای. آهنگ غمگین به گوش می رسد.

مجری: بهار عیدی داد. عیدی مبارک!

The co-host: Besme Allah e Rahmane Rahim (in the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful). Our program now takes the spirit of Nouruz. This episode: Spring, Jamshid, Delbar.

Habib: Early in the morning, I got up to feel tired. Jamshid jumped in the middle and said

Jamshid: Look how much Samanu (a sweet paste made with germinated wheat (young wheatgrass), which is prepared especially for Nouruz: Samanou) we have! Look at life! It still has its beauties!

Protagonist: I said, Jamshid! indeed you’re insane. Come sit down for a moment and be tired, instead of all these shenanigans, this early in the morning. He pushed his fist into the bowl (of Samanu) and said:

Jamshid: I mean to say that the world of the insane is the most beautiful. Put Samanu in your mouth. It might be lacking everything but it is jolly.

Protagonist: I got up. So before exhaustion destroys me went outside to smoke a morning cigarette to feel better. I was about to strike the match when Jamshid jumped in again and said:

Jamshid: Look this year we grew lentils instead of wheat. Last year it snowed a lot on top of the trees. They all went under the coldness.

Protagonist: I said, Jamshid! When would you get tired at last, dog? We hear laughter. Someone whispers the word ‘insane.’

Protagonist: He said

Jamshid: What’s wrong with you?

Protagonist: I said dude, my foot has hit the door on its own and it hurts, is it fair? My eyes dried up looking at the door, waiting for visitors, no one showed.

A classical music score plays. This is mixed in with an Iranian Avaz, Bahare Delkash

(Orphic Spring).

Protagonist: The orphic spring (Bahareh Delkash, the title of Shajarian’s Avaz) is here, but we’re not in the mood for it. Is it fair? Delbar is not thinking of us, our neck has shorten. Is it fair?

Still, aren’t you tired lentil lentil? Jamshid said

Jamshid: I mean to tell you that life still got its beauties. Get up and take a shower. Pour everything down the little sinkhole. Let it go. Bring some smoked fish to make sandwiches for the new year’s eve!

Protagonist: I said, Jamshid indeed you are insane! As soon as I stepped into the shower, I saw Delbar jumped in the conversation and said

Delbar: Are you blind crazy?

We hear laughter. Someone whispers the word ‘insane.’

Protagonist: I said you got some respect. I have feelings for you, alright! But the ladies room is on the other side. She asked.

Delbar: Why is there Samanu all around your mouth and face?

Protagonist: I said if it’s around my face, why is my neck so short then? Why did you go and come back? you are not here yet?

Especially in the spring? She said.

Delbar: Because you’re blind. If you weren’t blind, you wouldn’t keep asking questions. Look away, I don’t have a scarf they’re washing clothes in my heart.

Protagonist: I came to go pass the door, again my foot hit the door. There was nothing too see. Man is the mountain of pain. I was about to swear filthy word to his ancestors, when I heard the management announcing in the speakers you have visitors, visitors (echoes) you got visitors.

We hear footsteps.

Protagonist: Half-dressed, I started to walk when Delbar jumped in again.

Delbar: I mean to tell you, you are a crazy blind.

Protagonist: Jamshid told her,

Jamshid: Don’t hurt him. He’s gonna get well. He’s gonna get released. Look at his neck it is a metre long.

Protagonist: I was on my way to the yard when one of the newcomers with a smoke in his hand came to me and said, man I wanted to ask since your neck is long which way is Spring?

Jamshid said from the back.

Jamshid: I mean to tell you, it’s still got its beauties.

Protagonist: I said to myself, Jamshid you crazy bastard!

The melancholic song returns for a few seconds.

The co-host closes the episode: “spring gave us so many gifts, happy spring and happy new year!” The episode ends with the same closing track.

E. Episode 1, March 11, 2013

 مجری: بسم الله الرحمان الرحیم، بنا بر استقبال شما از برنامه های ما برنامه های ما برنامه های ما هم اکنون شروع میشه. این برنامه زن.

 قسمتی از صدای زنی از شخصیت عمومی در ایران به گوش می رسد که می گوید: در دوره های مختلف. صدای ناگهان و بلندی صدای زن را قطع می کند.

 مجری: زن در زندگی همه ما نقش خوب دارد. مثلا از جمله در زندگی ویگن.

  قطعه ای از آهنگ زن ایرونی تکه اثر ویگن شنیده می شود. 

 مجری: یا در زندگی ویگن.

 قطعه ای از آهنگ زن زيبا اثر دیگری از ویگن به گوش می رسد. 

 مجری: یا کمتر زن شانه. یعنی بیشتر کارهارو مرد باید انجام بده. امروز بهترین زنها عبارت اند از شادی صدر، شیرین نشاط، شادی و نشاط شیرین احیا خاطره و پروانه، پروین و اردلان شادی و اردلان  مهرنگی پوپک راد شیرین عبادی انوشه انصاری و زن اوباما.

  صدای زنی از شخصیت عمومی دوباره به گوش می رسد و دوباره با صدای ناگهان و بلندی قطع می شود.

مجری: بسم الله الرحمان الرحیم.

 خواننده ای زن که به نظر می رسد  یکی از مجریان مرد با صدای زنانه این نقش را بازی می کند شروع به آواز می کند )اشاره به آهنگ من زنم اثر زیبا شیرازی دارد( :

خواننده: من زنم. من یک زنم. من یک زن قوی هستم.  من زنم. من زنم مثل برگ گل از گل من که از گل بهترم من زنم. من زنم. آره من زنم. مصاحبه ای بین خواننده زن و مجری.

مجری:  میشه زن برای ما رو در یک جمله توصیف کنید؟

 خواننده: بله البته ولی میدونید که من در واقع زن نیستم. من یک دختر هستم. من یک دخترکم، دخترک باکره. باکره ای که گلهای لاله میریزه ازش. من زنم.

 مصاحبه به پایان می رسد.

مجری: زن از دو جنبه حائز اهمیت است. یک حقونه زن در این زمینه یک لطیفه از آقای محمود شهریاری اینجا نقد می کنیم. چرا حقوق زن رو…

 صدای خنده حرف مجری را قطع می کند.

 مجری: چرا حقوق زن رو نمیدن…

 صدای خنده دوباره حرف مجری را قطع می کند.

مجری: به نام خدا. سلام.  جنبه دوم همون مسئله زن در اسلام یا در فرهنگ شیعه است و اشارات مکرر به این مساله رو می شود در سطوح مختلف متون و رهنمود های اسلامی مشاهده کرد. صدای در نقش کسی دیگر.

 سیره نظری، سیره نبوی یا همون پیامبر . سیره اهل بیت. سیره همه امام ها به غیر از امام یازدهم  چون در اونجا زن تو انگور زهر ریخت که اون سیره ی خوب نیست. زنی ز نی زدن نیزنی خوشش آمد. این خوب نیست نه؟

زن عبارت است از کسی که صورتش از مرد قشنگ تر و بدنش استادتر است. دامن می پوشد و به خودش صنایع دستی می بندد.

زن ها تا قبل از ۳۰ سالگی تحت عناوینی مانند: خواهر، دوسته دختر، دانشجوووور،عکاس و غیره فعالیت می کنند. اما بعد از سی سالگی زن نامیده می شوند و چون دامن می پوشند، از دامن اونها مرد به معراج می رود. معراج اسم خیابانی در آریا شهر می باشد. زن ها گاهی انسان را خیلی اذیت می کنند که از عوارض بارز آن دل درد، اسهاله استاروفوکی، ویسکی، سیگار و بگو بخند بیش از حد میباشد. در مجموع زن ها خیلی خوب هستند و ما مدام دوست داریم درباره آنها حرف بزنیم. همانطور که عبدالله خواننده زیر زمینی گفت: زن زنم زن همدموم زن مونسوم زن. فردا هوای تهران ۱۴ درجه بالا صفر و هوای شيراز ۲۷ درجه بالای صفر خواهد بود. اینجا هم هوا بهتره درخت ها از صبح در حال موز دادن هستند. کبوتر کره کرده کاش بودی و میدیدی.

 رادیو چهرازی، اپیزود اول

The co-host: The second episode in the series opens with the same formal music track and reciting the phrase Besme Allah, the hosts announce the official lunch of the program proceeding the listeners’ overwhelming reception of the first podcast. They soon introduce the topic of discussion: “This show is about Woman.” A few sentences of a speech cut from an interview with a feminist public figure on Iranian national TV is mixed in, she explains “Woman throughout different historical eras,” soon one of the hosts interrupts the speakers’ female voice. His male voice takes over: “woman has a significant role in all of our lives for instance in Vigen’s life.” A song by Vigen, the Los Angeles Based Iranian pop singer, plays. Vigen’s music is typical of the Iranian diasporic pop songs of the 1980s and 90s produced in LA, most of which pursue a balance between objectifying and praising woman, and more importantly Iranian women. The emerging music scene of the Iranian diasporic in Los Angeles reflects gender politics and negotiations of what it means to be an Iranian woman. This reflection is in direct response to the newly formed Islamic government who takes the female body as an instrument to enforce the states’ religious and political control and domination over public life. The episode plays with the nominal similarity between the word “Zan,” which is the noun referring to “female gender or woman” in Farsi and have multiple meanings a verb. Depending on the sentence, the verb can mean “to strike, to play a music instrument, to do or to perform.” The co-hosts recite poetry rhyming and versioning with the verb zan. The poetry slam is jumped cut into speaking a list of well-known Iranian female public figures, “the best women of our time include: Shadi Sadr, Shirin Neshat, Shirin Ebadi, Anoosheh Ansari, and Obama’s wife.” The list of the names plays with the words meanings in Farsi, most of which have positive feminine connotations such as Shirin: sweet, or Neshat and Shadi meaning happiness. Sadr meaning grandiose. The list is interrupted by jumping back the same female voice cut from the Iranian TV program. Her voice is again cut by a crashing sound. This is flashed back to the formal opening, followed by one of the hosts breaking into an intentionally poor performance in a gender-cross role about the experience of being a woman “I am a woman, I am a strong woman, I am like a flower petal, I am softer than a flower, I am a woman. Yes I am a woman!” The song evolves into an interview with the other co-hosts. He asks the character of the female singer “in one sentence describe woman for us.” The female singer says “Of course, but you should know I am in fact not a woman, I am a virgin girl, I am a girl, I am a little girl, I am a virgin girl who sheds tulips flowers.” The interview ends with the female singer screaming “I am a woman.” The interviewer mansplains “woman is worthwhile from two aspects,” point out to an inappropriate joke made by a celebrity TV host, Mahmood Shahriari, on the Iranian National Television made “ why don’t they give women their rights?” This conversation continues to explaining the second aspect, “the role of women in Islam and prophet’s teachings,” hinting to the negative representation of women in the religious narrative, when the eleventh imam was poisoned and killed by his wife. The episode returns to the word-play with the nominal similarity of the noun Zan and the verbs. The co-host continues his mansplaining by defining woman:

‘Woman’ is someone who has a more beautiful face and body. She wears a skirt and craft jewelry. Before thirty years, women are referred to as sister, girlfriend, student, photographer, and etc. But after thirty, they’re called woman and because they wear skirts, from the skirt the men ascend. Ascension is the name of a street in Aria City. Women sometimes irritate too much, which has side effects such as stomach ache, diarrhea, whiskey, cigar, and too much chatter and flirt. In general, women are very good, and we love to constantly talk about them. As Abdollah the underground singer said ‘Woman! My woman! My companion! My friend my! Woman!’ Tomorrow the weather in Tehran is fourteen degrees and weather in Shiraz will be twenty-seven degrees. Here too, the weather’s been nice. Since this morning the trees are fruiting bananas and the birds have munchies. I wish you were here and could’ve seen!

The episode fades out playing the same ending track to each episode.

F. Episode 5, April 7, 2013

اومد یواش گفت لاک می زنی؟ گفتم چشت درآد. گفت قرمزه؟دلبر:

گفتم درآد

گفت دلبر

 زن اگه قلابی باشه از مردم بدتره ها

خیلی کاردی شدم خوابوندم زیر گوشش. دوماد مو فرفری بو خاک می داد. بو رودخونه می داد. دستشو دراز کرد توش گوشواره بود. برق می زد. رنگ فیروزه بود. رنگ رودخونه بود

رادیوچهرازی، اپیزود پنج

Delbar: He came close and asked: nail polish?

I said, fuck off.

He said is it red?

I said fuck off.

He said, Delbar! A fake woman is worse than a man.

I got pissed off. I slapped him under his ear.

The Curly Haired Groom smelled like dust, he smelled like river.

He opened his hand: there was a pair of earrings. They shone. They were blue. They were the colour of the river.

[1] See, for instance, Radio Marz (2018), Radio Nist (2019), Radio Tragedy (2020), and Radio Nesyan (2022).

[2] Brian Massumi, Politics of Affect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015).

[3] Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 88.

[4] Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, 85.

[5] Nathaniel Stern, “The Implicit Body as Performance: Analyzing Interactive Art,” Leonardo 44 (2011): 234.

[6] Evelyn Glennie, “Hearing Essay,” January 1, 2015, www.evelyn.co.uk/hearing-essay/ (accessed

July 25, 2020).

[7] Jean-Luc Nancy and Charlotte Mandell, Listening (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007).

[8] The use of “sex/gender” together and pairing “sexed/gendered” across this essay are my way of insisting on the coextensive role of sex and gender in formation and expression of subjectivity. The intention is to refuse erasing transgender identity in my discussion of sonic media and production of cisheterosexual social publics in Iran and its global diaspora. To read more on the use of “sex” and “gender” together see Viviane K. Namaste, “‘Tragic Misreadings’: Queer theory’s Erasure of Transgender Subjectivity,” in Queer Studies: Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Anthology, ed. Brett Beemyn and Mickey Eliason (New York, NY and London: NYU Press, 1996), 183–203 or see Amelia Jones, “Introduction” in In Between Subjects: a Critical Genealogy of Queer Performance (Abingdon, Oxon;: Routledge, 2021), 1-34.

[9] See appendix B for a sample transcript.

[10] See appendix C for sample transcript.

[11] Radiochehrazi. SoundCloud audio, 2013 www.soundcloud.com/radiochehrazi-1 (accessed July 25, 2020).

[12] Radiochehrazi, 2013.

[13] See appendix A for a full translation of the episode.

[14] Jasmin Zine, “Honour and Identity: An Ethnographic Account of Muslim Girls in a Canadian Islamic School,” Topia: Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies 19 (2008): 56.

[15] Anahid Kassabian, Ubiquitous Listening: Affect, Attention, and Distributed Subjectivity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 24-5.

[16] Petra Kuppers, Stephanie Heit, April Sizemore-Barber, VK Preston, Andy Hicky, and Andrew Wille, “Mad Methodologies and Community Performance: The Asylum Project at Bedlam,” Theatre Topics 26 (2016): 221.

[17] Radiochehrazi, 2013.

[18] Radiochehrazi, 2013.

[19] Radiochehrazi, 2013.

[20] See Appendix D for a complete translation of the scene.

[21] Nezami Ganjavi, Layli and Majnun, trans. Dick Davis (Washington, DC: Mage, 2020).

[22] Prashant Keshavmurthy, “Niżāmī Ganjavī’s Leylī u Majnūn as a Negative Genealogy of Lyric” (lecture, Department of South Asian Studies & the South Asia Centre, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, February 5, 2021).

[23] Friedrich A. Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

[24] Janet Afary, Janet and Kevin B. Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 4.

[25] Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).

[26] Negar Mottahedeh, #iranelection: Hashtag Solidarity and the Transformation of Online Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015).

[27] Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi and Ali Mohammadi, Small Media Big Revolution: Communication, Culture and the Iranian Revolution (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 119.

[28] Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi, Small Media Big Revolution, 119.

[29] Every Friday, each city in Iran hosts a public prayer at a centralized square or mosque where a religious leader delivers a sermon followed by the prayer.

[30] Radio Farda, Voice of America, Manoto channel, BBC Persian, etc.

[31] See Appendix A for a translation of the epilogue’s transcript.

[32] Harold Innis, The Bias of Communication (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 35.

[33] Innis, The Bias of Communication, 35.

[34] Islamic jurisprudence.

[35] Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 5–6.

[36] Farzaneh Hemmasi, Tehrangeles Dreaming: Intimacy and Imagination in Southern California’s Iranian Pop Music (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2020).

[37] Denise Gomez, “Not Even Past,” December 9, 2019, https://notevenpast.org/whisper-tapes-2019/ (accessed July 25, 2020).

[38] Negar Mottahedeh, Whisper Tapes: Kate Millett in Iran (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019).

[39] Innis, The Bias of Communication.

[40] Roshanak Kheshti, “On the Threshold of the Political: The Sonic Performativity of Rooftop Chanting in Iran,” Radical History Review 121 (2015): 51–70.

[41] Radiochehrazi, 2013.

[42] See Appendix E for more samples. 43See Appendix F for examples.

Analyzing the Headings in the Zoroastrian Manuscripts F1 and E1: The Beginning Texts

The Complete Persepolis: Visualizing Exile in a Transnational Narrative

Leila Sadegh Beigi received her PhD in English literature from the University of Arkansas, where she is an instructor of literature. Her writing focuses on the intersection of gender, exile, and translation in contemporary Iranian women’s literature. Her recent publications include “Simin Daneshvar and Shahrnush Parsipur in Translation: The Risk of Erasure of Domestic Violence in Iranian Women’s Fiction” in the Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies (Duke University Press, 2020) and “Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis and Embroideries: A Graphic Novelization of Sexual Revolution across Three Generations of Iranian Women” in the International Journal of Comic Art (John Lent, 2019).

Contemporary Iranian women writers create a voice of resistance in fiction by questioning and redefining gender roles, which are defined by culture, tradition, and state law in Iran. They narrate their stories of resistance in a state of exile, a condition rooted in marginalization independent of geographical location. In this article, I will examine and analyze The Complete Persepolis, written by Iranian writer, artist, and filmmaker Marjane Satrapi, as a transnational narrative written in exile. A transnational perspective challenges the binary division between the Eurocentric “First World/Third World” framework of modern global feminist analyses.[1] Satrapi’s narrative in The Complete Persepolis focuses on a gendered and discursive manifestation of women, culture, and identity, problematizing “a purely locational politics of global-local or core-periphery in favor of viewing the lines cutting across these locations.”[2] I argue that The Complete Persepolis expands the notion of exile through the visual representations of the author’s concerns about the status of women in exile at home and abroad. The portrayal of internal exile, or exile at home, relies on images of women struggling with gender discrimination, sexism, and censorship, all of which limit and marginalize them as female citizens. In the portrayal of external exile, or exile abroad, Satrapi offers images of women experiencing racism, stereotyping, and marginalization in the West.

The graphic representation of human emotions through the perspective of a young girl experiencing gender discrimination at home and racial discrimination abroad creates a space of empathy and understanding for readers. As Scott McCloud argues, “The wall of ignorance that prevents so many human beings from seeing each other clearly [can] only be breached by communication.”[3] Satrapi breaks the “wall of ignorance” through strong visual imagery unveiling the identity of Iranian women. As a transnational hero, the protagonist, Marji, breaks cultural, ideological, and geographical barriers, and calls for global solidarity, understanding, and equality for immigrants in exile. Of course, not all immigrants are exiled subjects. What lies at the heart of exile is the lack of choice. Edward Said writes: “Exile is not, after all, a matter of choice: you are born into it, or it happens to you.”[4] Exile, banishment, and stigmatization are described by Said as distinguishing factors and specific characteristics of exile.[5]

My argument is in line with two critical debates on the neccessity of reshaping transnationl feminism. The first is Chandra Mohanty’s model of transnational feminism in her articles “‘Under Western Eyes’ Revisited: Feminist Solidarity through Anticapitalist Struggles” (2003) and “Transnational Feminist Crossings: On Neoliberalism and Radical Critique” (2013). In “Under Western Eyes Revisited,” Mohanty suggests that “a transnational feminist practice depends on building feminist solidarities across the divisions of place, identity, class, work, belief, and so on.”[6] Mohanty calls for individual and conscious effort to use these differences to connect; “Under Western Eyes Revisited” focuses on “decolonizing feminism, a politics of difference and commonality, and specifying, historicizing, and connecting feminist struggles.”[7] A decade later, in “Transnational Feminist Crossings,” Mohanty emphasizes the importance of “re-commit[ting] to insurgent knowledges and the complex politics of antiracist, anti-imperialist feminisms.”[8] Mohanty writes: “I believe we need to return to the radical feminist politics of the contextual as both local and structural and to the collectivity that is being defined out of existence by privatization projects.”[9] She emphasizes the significance of a systematic analysis of power which depoliticizes the resistance and the social movements by the privatization of organizations and feminist antiracism in the neoliberal academic landscape. This is not about the risk of homogenization and stereotyping of differences of women in the Global South, which Mohanty discusses in an earlier article, “Under Western Eyes” (1986); this is a critique of the institutionalization of radical feminist antiracism, which aims to erase the race and class divisions which unite the voices of women locally and globally to preserve power.

The second critical debate, Nima Naghibi’s articulation of transnational feminism, discusses cross-cultural feminist misunderstandings in her book Rethinking Global Sisterhood: Western Feminism and Iran. Naghibi writes: “The problem of sisterhood remains, however, the inherent inequality between ‘sisters.’ Often using the veil as a marker of Persian women’s backwardness, Western and (unveiled) elite Iranian women represented themselves as enlightened and advanced.”[10] Like Mohanty, Naghibi calls for destabilizing and reinterrogating transnational feminism’s elimination of race and class divisions between “the civilized nations” and “rogue nations.”[11]

Satrapi’s Persepolis contributes to these debates on transnational feminism by portraying Iranian women’s struggle to manifest the powerful and thriving feminist voices of the nation. Satrapi’s discursive approach to diversity, oppression, and resistance is interwoven with culture and politics of local and global feminist discourse calling for unity and solidarity. The narrative criticizes gender discrimination in Iran, but it also questions racial discrimination in the West. Persepolis examines the visual representation of discrimination against women and gender-based violence in Iran, and it problematizes the demonized representation of Iran and Iranians in the West resulting in global marginalization of Iranian women. While the visual medium influences the writer’s ability and effort to push the boundaries of Iran’s traditional society in the narrative’s demands for a democratic space to include women, the medium also offers an antiracist reading of women from the Global South in the West.

The concept of exile is significant in understanding Persepolis as a transnational narrative because exile encapsulates the space for a transnational exchange of culture. Exiled subjects leave their homeland, and they build a diaspora community in their new country, operating as transnational identities to represent their homeland, culture, and literature. While both Iranian women and men in diaspora have contributed to the Iranian literary tradition, “women writers have been largely responsible for making Iran and the postrevolutionary immigrant experience visible in literature. Women writers of the Iranian diaspora especially appear to have comfortably left behind any concerns about adhering to the tradition of Iranian letters and have instead made writing one of the most important media for representing their particular experiences of exile, immigration, and identity.”[12] Although both diaspora and exiled writers inform transnational and intellectual identities, the exiles are particularly grounded in the notion of punishment due to their radical political views. Drawing on Said’s discussion of exile, I prefer to use the term exile in this article because exile is not always defined as the state of being away from home; rather, in the case of contemporary Iranian women writers, exile could also be defined as the state of being marginalized and alienated from the public in their own country due to their capabilities of writing about women’s limitations.

In the case of Satrapi, exile has provided a condition for her to visualize her memories, practicing her radical criticism of the political landscape locally and globally, which resonates with Said’s definition of intellectuals in exile who have obtained a “sharpened vision.”[13] For example, Satrapi problematizes Western media as representing Muslims as “terrorist[s],” and Iran’s media as “making anti-Western propaganda.”[14] This is an example of her fairness in criticizing both governments in their policies. Satrapi’s laser sharp focus on cultural and political representation in Persepolis perfectly illustrates that her narrative, as Said puts it, “provides a different set of lenses” to read her homeland.[15] Persepolis not only represents her sharp critical vision in exile, but it also provides an alternative lens through which to view Iranian women. Analyzing Persepolis as the first graphic novel in the Middle East written by an Iranian intellectual woman in exile offers a feminist version of exile challenging the conventional understanding of intellectual exile discussed by Said.

The subversive potential of female heroes in Iranian culture and literature is not censored or erased in Persepolis. Nevertheless, Satrapi’s commentary on the lack of freedom of artistic expression in Iran draws attention to one of the most important aspects of exile at home: artistic productions being subject to censorship under Islamic law. Despite her success in obtaining an art degree at the graphic school in Tehran, Satrapi suffers from a lack of freedom, this time as an artist in Iran. Censorship in art makes Satrapi ask herself, “where is my freedom of thought? Where is my freedom of speech? My life, is it livable?”[16] There are limitations for presenting women’s bodies not only in painting, but also in any other art form. To do so, an artist is required to obtain consent from the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. Marji resists these oppressive conditions in her brave objection to the female students’ dress code at the university. In a scene where the university has organized a lecture on the theme of “moral and religious conduct,” Marji opposes the lecturer’s views on the female dress code, saying that “you don’t hesitate to comment on us, but our brothers present here have all shapes and sizes of haircuts and clothes. Sometimes, they wear clothes so tight that we can see everything.”[17] She also questions the lack of freedom in drawing faces and bodies in the art studios (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 299. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS 2: THE STORY OF A RETURN by Marjane Satrapi, translated by Anjali Singh, translation copyright © 2004 by Anjali Singh. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

Figure 1. Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 299. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS 2: THE STORY OF A RETURN by Marjane Satrapi, translated by Anjali Singh, translation copyright © 2004 by Anjali Singh. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

She finally faces her double exile by leaving Iran for France to build her identity as a successful writer and artist in a country where she does not face restrictions or censorship in producing art and publishing her stories. Inspired by Satrapi’s living in exile, her performance in The Complete Persepolis is the embodiment of a discursive manifestation of women and culture.

Crossing the borders and breaking the barriers of thoughts and ideas enables writers in exile to see with a “different set of lenses” using “exile’s situation to practice criticism.”[18] While Satrapi’s graphic novel fits Said’s definition of being able to see problems in the West as well as in her own country, it also uses a gendered lens to show women intellectuals in exile. Satrapi is critical of the Eurocentric behavior she witnesses in Vienna at several points in the novel. For example, in a scene in the religious school she attends, Marji is punished for eating in the TV room. A nun tells her, “it’s true what they say about Iranians. They have no education.”[19]

Satrapi rediscovers her new Iranian identity in the West by acknowledging Third World–women’s struggle to survive, and she depicts women’s resistance, subversion, and rebellion to confront the restrictions on their appearance and behavior in public (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 302. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS 2: THE STORY OF A RETURN by Marjane Satrapi, translated by Anjali Singh, translation copyright © 2004 by Anjali Singh. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

Figure 2. Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 302. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS 2: THE STORY OF A RETURN by Marjane Satrapi, translated by Anjali Singh, translation copyright © 2004 by Anjali Singh. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

Persepolis captures the nuances of Iranian society by depicting Iran as a dynamic nation and underscoring the significance of women’s resistance. While Satrapi’s approach to depicting women in Iran celebrates the vibrancy and power of Iranian women, her storytelling in Persepolis is inclusive, with its multi-perspective lens on culture, class, politics, faith, and gender in Iran.

The distance from home poses challenges for exiled writers, who risk creating “single story” narratives about their home country;[20] however, Satrapi’s inclusive narrative does not reflect a “single story” narrative about Iran. The Nigerian novelist Chimamanda Adichie discusses how culture is composed of multiple stories and the authenticity of depictions of culture depends on the representation of the multiple stories about it.[21] It is not possible to know in totality a culture without engaging with all possible stories about those people or places. Adichie observes that “the single story creates stereotypes, and the problem with stereotypes is not that they are not true, but that they are incomplete.”[22] Although it is not the job of one writer to represent a culture in its totality, it is the responsibility of a writer not to distort or misrepresent the culture. In this article, I discuss the multilayered representation of culture and women in Persepolis, highlighting its subversive narrative, which circulates to transnational audiences multiple representations of women’s resistance.

Satrapi responds to the political tensions between Iran and the West by creating Marji, her transnational hero. Marji narrates her observations of Iran, which has been less known to the West and Western audiences since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Diego Maggi argues that Satrapi’s Persepolis “complicate[s] and challenge[s] binary divisions commonly related to the tensions amid the Occident and the Orient, such as East-West, Self-Other, civilized-barbarian and feminism-antifeminism.”[23] My argument in this article builds on Maggi’s argument about how Satrapi pushes the boundaries to bridge the gap between worlds. For example, Satrapi depicts the political turbulence through her childhood memories by opening the novel when she is only ten, and as a result of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, she is wearing the hijab while sitting in a sex-segregated school (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 3. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS: THE STORY OF A CHILDHOOD by Marjane Satrapi, translation copyright © 2003 by L’Association, Paris, France. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

Figure 3. Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 3. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS: THE STORY OF A CHILDHOOD by Marjane Satrapi, translation copyright © 2003 by L’Association, Paris, France. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

In another scene, she reveals the ordinary life of people trying to survive under the strict Islamic regime, a difficulty which has become compounded by the country’s new restrictions on ordinary activities like dancing and throwing parties (Figure 4). She writes: “In spite of all the dangers, the parties went on. ‘Without them it wouldn’t be psychologically bearable,’ some said.”[24] Revealing a new version of reality through the portrayal of the private and public in her narrative, Satrapi tells the story of ordinary people, reminding Western readers that people are people, with common interests and ideas despite the cross-border differences in cultures.

Figure 4. Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 106. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS: THE STORY OF A CHILDHOOD by Marjane Satrapi, translation copyright © 2003 by L’Association, Paris, France. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

Figure 4. Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 106. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS: THE STORY OF A CHILDHOOD by Marjane Satrapi, translation copyright © 2003 by L’Association, Paris, France. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

Satrapi offers an understanding of the cultural and political complexities of Iranian society, and as an intellectual in exile, she consciously uses these differences to connect to the struggle of women globally. In her book, Women, Art, and Literature in the Iranian Diaspora, Mehraneh Ebrahimi discusses the creation of visual arts as well as graphic novels by diaspora writers and artists in the humanities as an essential factor to inform a global community and to combat xenophobia. By showing women’s struggle for freedom and peace in a local and global context, Persepolis decolonizes the narrative about Iran as evil Other and Iranian women as victims. Marji’s experience traveling across borders accounts for her hybrid identity and resists projecting a stereotypical representation of Iran and Iranian women as “Other.” For example, Marji draws attention to cross-cultural behaviors and attitudes when it comes to religious extremists, who exist in all societies. As mentioned earlier, there is a scene where Marji carries her food to the TV room to enjoy while watching a show in the religious school in Vienna (Figure 5). When she is told to watch her behavior by “the mother superior,” Marji says, “but here, everyone eats while watching TV.” The mother gets angry and says, “it’s true what they say about Iranians. They have no education.”[25] After this confrontation, the nuns decide to expel Marji from school, and Marji thinks, “in every religion, you find the same extremists.”[26]

Figure 5. Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 177. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS 2: THE STORY OF A RETURN by Marjane Satrapi, translated by Anjali Singh, translation copyright © 2004 by Anjali Singh. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

Figure 5. Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 177. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS 2: THE STORY OF A RETURN by Marjane Satrapi, translated by Anjali Singh, translation copyright © 2004 by Anjali Singh. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

Race, class, and gender differences rooted in sociocultural and political aspects are historicized in Persepolis for a Western audience. The narrative combats the West’s binary understanding of Iran and the West as black and white and instead offers an alternative image. The visual imagery in Persepolis unveils the culture and history of Iran and the identity of Iranian women for the Western audience. As an intellectual Iranian woman writer, Satrapi captures the key events from pre-revolution, post-revolution, and wartime, and their social problems to perfectly communicate with the audience through her privileged position as an elite. Although she tells the audience what life was like for a girl of her generation, class, and family background, her narrative does not suggest the life story of “all” Iranian girls during the years the book is set. For example, the stories of the girls who were terrified and traumatized by war and were forced to come to Tehran because their houses were destroyed are not included in Persepolis. These girls were misplaced in the schools in Tehran. While they had already faced the trauma of war in their hometowns, the atmosphere of the metropolitan capital intensified their repression. They faced struggles because of their accent, different skin color, and different appearance, but they still had to obey the strict rules for hijab at schools and in public.

A full and accurate representation of Iranian women requires a multilayered narrative that gives equal voice to women with different experiences and backgrounds. Many scholars discuss Satrapi’s narrative as being close to the facts in its portrayal of Iran and Iranian women. For example, Farzaneh Milani writes: “Marjane Satrapi celebrates the Iranian people’s history of resistance, subversion, and rebellion as much as she bears witness to the miseries and injustices caused by political and religious dogmatism.”[27] Women’s struggle of resistance is not lost in Persepolis; instead, the traumatic experience of the years after the Iranian Revolution and the Iran–Iraq War is part of the focus. Indeed, Satrapi responds to Iranian women’s literary tradition as a contributor to that tradition. Persepolis depicts three generations of female characters: Marji, her mother, and her grandmother are portrayed as women conscious of their rights and their identity in fighting back against oppression. These characters bring their unique perspectives on the sociocultural issues that affect women’s everyday life in Iran. For example, Marji’s mom joins the demonstration against compulsory veiling, Marji shouts at the two guardians of the revolution who stop her in the street and warn her not to run, and the grandma removes the stigma around divorce when Marji is full of fear and hesitation after her divorce.[28]

By expressing their sexual experiences, adventures, and concerns through the portrayal of their personal lives, these characters represent strong women with activist perspectives as active agents during the years the novel is set. The narrative provides the Western audience with a glimpse into the joy and pleasure in the lives of women amidst their constant struggle for peace and equality, creating empathy and understanding that transcends borders.

Satrapi’s Persepolis attempts to reflect the voices of Iranian women as being in resistance to oppression rather than as being submissive. The high rate of readership of this graphic novel among Western readers is due to Satrapi’s success in showing a compelling and alternative image of Iranian women. Women writers exiled abroad risk telling a “single story” narrative about Iran, but they may take a similar risk in representing their homeland by catering to Western preconceptions about it. Hamid Dabashi discusses this risk in his book Brown Skin, White Masks, demonstrating “how intellectuals who migrate to the Western side of their colonized imagination are prone to employment by the imperial power to inform on their home countries in a manner that confirms conclusions already drawn.”[29] Because Satrapi’s narrative is critical of both Iran and the places she lived in the West, I don’t find it problematic that Persepolis is written for a Western audience. Indeed, the dual nature of women’s resistance to the oppression is portrayed through the author’s double critique of Iranian fundamentalism and Western imperialism. While Persepolis depicts the conflict between democracy and dictatorship in the shah’s regime, it simultaneously problematizes democracy and fundamentalism under the Islamic Republic. In fact, by criticizing the pro-American shah, Satrapi criticizes imperialism and American and British interference in Iran.[30]

As a very popular form of storytelling in the West, the graphic novel integrates text with imagery. While the use of visuals helps to interpret the author’s imagination, those images are also open to readers’ interpretation. In Persepolis, Satrapi remembers her past through a “process of visualization,” which indicates the multiplicity of ways her culture can be interpreted.[31] It also speaks about her exilic perspective, providing her with a hybrid identity with multitudes of lenses. Satrapi’s combination of dialogue, interior monologue, and image promotes myriad ways to understand Iranian culture. Satrapi presents Iranian culture as complex and filled with strong female figures, including the protagonist herself.

Women’s common struggle connects Satrapi to the struggle of other Iranian women writers, her foremothers despite their differences in time, language, and genre. Iranian women writers have depicted women’s struggles against the patriarchal system, traditional gender roles, and limitations for women under the Pahlavi regime and Islamic Republic. The struggle of women through different historical periods in Iran reflects the type of struggle the female protagonists face in novels written by Iranian women. Marji’s radical thoughts and her criticism of the sociopolitical discourse of Iran, particularly in the 1990s, represents the evolving generation of women performing an alternative role as the symbol of change and innovation.

Satrapi contextualizes sisterhood in her narrative and brings migrant women to visibility by showing her observation of discrimination and marginalization as an immigrant woman in Vienna. In Persepolis, Satrapi fairly represents the disciplinary nature of fundamentalism and oppression for women both in Iran and in the West. For example, she represents two “Guardians of the Revolution” in the streets of Tehran, whose jobs were “to arrest women who were improperly veiled,” such as herself (Figure 6). Later, the nuns in the Viennese religious school try to control the girls’ behavior in public (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 133, 177. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS: THE STORY OF A CHILDHOOD by Marjane Satrapi, translation copyright © 2003 by L’Association, Paris, France. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS 2: THE STORY OF A RETURN by Marjane Satrapi, translated by Anjali Singh, translation copyright © 2004 by Anjali Singh. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

Figure 6. Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 133, 177. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS: THE STORY OF A CHILDHOOD by Marjane Satrapi, translation copyright © 2003 by L’Association, Paris, France. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS 2: THE STORY OF A RETURN by Marjane Satrapi, translated by Anjali Singh, translation copyright © 2004 by Anjali Singh. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

By juxtaposing the visual imagery of Iranian and Austrian fundamentalists who are dressed in similar fashion, with head coverings and concealing clothing, Satrapi points out the similarities of religious fundamentalism, which oppresses women cross-culturally. This juxtaposition highlights the fact that while religious-based oppression occurs in Iran, similar oppression occurs in the West, though those living in the West often overlook the latter. This resonates with what Mohanty believes to be the importance of “cross-border feminist solidarities,” which are based on women’s struggles for emancipation in various parts of the world.[32] Though the religions are different, their power to oppress and subordinate women is grounds for alliance.

Satrapi’s struggle as a woman living in exile is portrayed through the moments that Marji faces racial discrimination in Vienna based on the stereotypes of women from the Global South. For example, Satrapi depicts her bitter experience when her Austrian boyfriend’s mom accuses Marji of “taking advantage” of her son; in Marji’s words, “She was saying that I was taking advantage of Markus and his situation to obtain an Austrian passport, that I was a witch” (Figure 7). When Marji is forced to leave her boyfriend’s house, she goes home and surprisingly finds similar aggression at her own house when her landlady calls her a prostitute (Figure 7). Later, her landlady accuses Marji of stealing her jewelry, saying that “I lost my brooch. I’m sure that you’re the one who took it.”[33] The narrative criticizes the condition of women in exile abroad in the West and the West’s treatment of immigrant women.

Figure 7. Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 220, 221. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS 2: THE STORY OF A RETURN by Marjane Satrapi, translated by Anjali Singh, translation copyright © 2004 by Anjali Singh. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

Figure 7. Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 220, 221. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS 2: THE STORY OF A RETURN by Marjane Satrapi, translated by Anjali Singh, translation copyright © 2004 by Anjali Singh. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

Persepolis is not aimed at vengeance for the author’s traumatic experience in the West; it is aimed at questioning the very idea of sisterhood through the book’s critical approach to women’s oppression in exile. Satrapi’s portrayal of racism resonates with Naghibi’s call for destabilizing and reinterrogating transnational feminism to eliminate race and class divisions between “the civilized nations” and “rogue nations.”[34] Persepolis calls for reconsideration both of sisterhood and of race as the foundation of transnational feminism, and urges its audience to not overlook the significance of an antiracist feminism anchored around women’s common force of resistance across the globe. Satrapi’s diverse and discursive manifestation of racial and cultural diversity through the black-and-white panels in Persepolis is in itself commentary on the reductive Western division of the world into black and white.

Iranian women’s unequal status at home, rooted in gender discrimination, and their marginalization in the West, rooted in Islamophobia and racial discrimination, is central to Satrapi’s model for change and reformation. Her critique of the representation of Iran and Iranian women in the West underscores how these misrepresentations create inequality between women of different cultures, which in turn problematizes sisterhood. Female bonding and friendship, which is portrayed at multiple points in her narrative both in Iran and in Vienna, is a direct reference to the significance of solidarity. Satrapi’s demand for inclusion and equality in Persepolis resonates with Naghibi’s argument on the significance of an “alternative model to sisterhood.”[35]

The power and importance of sisterhood in making peace and sharing pains and sorrows to resist oppression is portrayed at several points in Persepolis. For example, during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88), Marji’s family host and support Mali’s family after their house is bombed during Iraq’s attack on the south of Iran. When Mali, a family friend, with her husband and two kids, knocks on the door of Marji’s family home in the middle of the night to seek shelter, Marji’s mom hugs Mali and says, “hey, it’ll be OK, calm down…you did the right thing to come here.”[36] They laugh and cry together to get through the devastation of wartime and to get Mali’s family back on their feet.[37] Later in Vienna, Marji’s classmate Julie introduces Marji to new friends with whom Marji feels loved and gains a sense of belonging, making her life more bearable.[38] Marji’s roommate, Lucia, noticing Marji’s loneliness before Christmas break, takes Marji to stay with her family in Tyrol for Christmas. After this trip, Marji loves Lucia like a sister (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 172. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS 2: THE STORY OF A RETURN by Marjane Satrapi, translated by Anjali Singh, translation copyright © 2004 by Anjali Singh. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

Figure 8. Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis, 172. Graphic Novel Excerpt from PERSEPOLIS 2: THE STORY OF A RETURN by Marjane Satrapi, translated by Anjali Singh, translation copyright © 2004 by Anjali Singh. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

My own perspective as an immigrant scholar who has experienced life and work in Iran and the United States has been shaped by Eurocentric behavior aimed at marginalizing me and people like me. With the presidency of Donald Trump and the growth of Islamophobia after he called Iran a “terrorist nation,” the situation grew worse. At that time, I was teaching Persepolis in my World Literature class at the University of Arkansas and observed firsthand the power of Persepolis to transcend borders. Persepolis was welcomed by the students, who were accustomed to hearing and thinking about Iran as a land of horror and evil. As my students experienced, Persepolis opens the audience’s eyes to the differences that are historically and politically constructed. Indeed, Satrapi problematizes both Western and Iranian media in using political frames to portray the enemy by demonizing and dehumanizing the whole nation.[39] This is an example of her fairness in criticizing both governments in their policies, a criticism that points to the politics of differences in a global context. Her narrative doesn’t promote Islamophobia and hatred; it questions the political framework between Iran and the West in representing the other side as evil.

The transnational circulation of people’s lives, ideas, events, and culture through the eyes of Marji plays a significant role in facilitating for the Western audience an understanding of Iran and what it means to be an Iranian woman. As Amy Malek argues, “Persepolis is an exemplary model of both memoir and Iranian exile culture in that it pushes the boundaries of both and that Satrapi’s position of liminality allows her to use a third space position from which to complete her cultural translation, in which she addresses issues of identity, exile and return.”[40] Mobilizing popular culture from the Middle East in the West for the first time, Persepolis draws attention to the relationship between the regions. This is in line with Mohanty’s argument on the necessity of uniting the voices of women in resistance around the world regardless of the divisions of race and class. Persepolis is a vivid picture of the Iranian sociocultural context concerning women’s issues during and after the Iranian Revolution.

The alternative representation of Iran that Satrapi provides without censorship invites the audience to rethink stereotypes of Muslim women as passive victims and of Iran as a backward and barbarian nation. The narrative is free from censorship and has not been co-opted to help the West to advance their agenda in the Middle East. Indeed, the transnational hero, Marji, breaks the barrier of ignorance and misunderstanding about the Middle East as Evil Other. By sharing her observation of events, women, and culture through images and words that communicate to the Western audience without the interference of governments, Marji enters the hearts and minds of readers around the globe. The oppression and struggle of Iranian women for equity and peace is a different struggle based on the specific sociopolitical atmosphere in Iran. However, what makes the narrative in Persepolis transnational and cross-border is its representation of women’s resistance and power during the political upheavals and wartime in Iran. Persepolis has great potential to shift the focus from understanding Iranian women as lacking agency, as they are presented in Western media or books like the bestseller Reading Lolita in Tehran. Persepolis marks the first time that Iran has been represented through images in a graphic novel created by a woman from the Middle East, and signifies the need for renewal and reshaping cultural exchange.

In conclusion, Persepolis’s representation of contemporary Iran offers interdisciplinary ways to know Iran for the new generation. It opens the space for discussion on how gender, religion, and politics work in Iran. The narrative shows that to find solidarity in sisterhood, we need to understand our differences and appreciate our commonalities. The divisions between class, race, religion, culture, and ethnicity as shown in the narrative point to, as Mohanty discusses, the “politics of difference and commonality, and specifying, historicizing, and connecting feminist struggles.”[41] Persepolis educates the Western audience on Iran as a different civilization to explore. Satrapi stresses the significance of self-education at several points in the novel, saying that “one must educate oneself.”[42] In the transnational world we live in, education is the key to expanding our vision across geographical boarders. Persepolis offers hope that the progress of women’s rights can be made through mutual understanding and support in solidarity with sisters across the world.

What lies beyond the race, class, and culture divisions in my argument is the significance of storytelling that reflects resistance in exile. I believe that Satrapi’s experience of exile at home and abroad, the traumatic condition of marginalization, provides a sharp focus in the creation of her narratives that question the status quo and depict women’s nuanced resistance to oppression. The cost of Satrapi’s resistance appears in the author’s exile. While throughout history exiles share similar “cross-cultural and transnational visions,” as Said argues,[43] Satrapi’s Persepolis is a byproduct of the West’s imperialism and Islamophobia alongside religious fundamentalism in the twenty-first century, and stresses the common force of oppression. Persepolis represents the author’s observation of the disciplinary nature of fundamentalism and oppression against women both in Iran and in the West, contributing to Valentine Moghadam’s argument in her book Globalization and Social Movements: The Populist Challenge and Democratic Alternatives. Moghadam argues that the mobilizing forces of uniting women at the “macro level” and “micro level” create a “collective identity” to overcome the differences across the globe.[44]

The visualization of the estrangement, alienation, and homelessness through the exiled hero, Marji, cultivates the imagination to move beyond the self and differences. Drawing on cross-continental conversations amongst people and in particular women from around the world, Persepolis focuses on solidarity in exile. The contemporary themes of emigration, Otherness, exile, and identity connect Satrapi’s transnational narrative to the stories written by women from other cultures like The Distance Between Us: A Memoir by the acclaimed Mexican writer Reyna Grande and Americanah by Adichie. The global intersections and parallels in exile literature connect human experience cross-culturally, and manipulate transcultural visions in storytelling which connects women and culture to find solidarity and seek healing and collaboration. Persepolis is a provocative account of the Iranian people’s everyday life and concerns, much like those of many other people in the world, who struggle with their belief systems and those of their governments. Persepolis suggests that in order to maintain collective identity, we need to subscribe to women’s emancipation and gender equality in all cultures and nations. Persepolis provides a stellar example of the creativity and power of Iranian women writers’ storytelling abilities.

[1]Susan A. Mann, Doing Feminist Theory: From Modernity to Postmodernity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 362.

[2]Mann, Doing Feminist Theory, 363.

[3]Scott McCloud, Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art (New York: William Morrow, 1994), 198.

[4]Edward W. Said, Reflections on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 184.

[5]On the differences between exile, refugees, expatriates, and émigrés, see Said’s discussion in Reflections on Exile, 181: “Although it is true that anyone prevented from returning home is an exile, some distinctions can be made among exiles, refugees, expatriates, and émigrés. Exile originated in the age-old practice of banishment. Once banished, the exile lives an anomalous and miserable life, with the stigma of being an outsider. Refugees, on the other hand, are a creation of the twentieth-century state. The word ‘refugee’ has become a political one, suggesting large herds of innocent and bewildered people requiring urgent international assistance, whereas ‘exile’ carries with it, I think, a touch of solitude and spirituality. Expatriates voluntarily live in an alien country, usually for personal or social reasons. Hemingway and Fitzgerald were not forced to live in France. Expatriates may share in the solitude and estrangement of exile, but they do not suffer under its rigid proscriptions. Émigrés enjoy an ambiguous status. Technically an émigré is anyone who emigrates to a new country. Choice in the matter is certainly a possibility. Colonial officials, missionaries, technical experts, mercenaries, and military advisers on loan may in a sense live in exile, but they have not been banished. White settlers in Africa, parts of Asia and Australia may have been exiles, but as pioneers and nation-builders, they lost the label ‘exile.’”

[6]Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “‘Under Western Eyes’ Revisited: Feminist Solidarity through Anticapitalist Struggles,” Signs 28 (2003): 499–535. Quote on p. 530.

[7]Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Transnational Feminist Crossings: On Neoliberalism and Radical Critique,” Signs 38 (2013): 967–91. Quote on p. 977.

[8]Mohanty, “Transnational Feminist,” 987.

[9]Mohanty, “Transnational Feminist,” 987.

[10]Nima Naghibi, Rethinking Global Sisterhood: Western Feminism and Iran (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), xvii.

[11]Naghibi, Rethinking Global, 141–46.

[12]Persis M. Karim, “Reflections on Literature after the 1979 Revolution in Iran and in the Diaspora,” Radical History Review 105 (2009): 151–55. Quote on p. 152.

[13]Said, Reflections on Exile, xxxv.

[14]Marjane Satrapi, The Complete Persepolis (New York: Pantheon, 2004), 322.

[15]Said, Reflections on Exile, xxxv.

[16]Satrapi, Complete Persepolis, 302.

[17]Satrapi, Complete Persepolis, 297.

[18]Said, Reflections on Exile, xxxv.

[19]Satrapi, Complete Persepolis, 177.

[20]Chimamanda N. Adichie, “The Danger of a Single Story,” July 2009, Oxford, UK, TED, transcript, 18:33, www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_story.

[21]Adichie, “Danger of.”

[22]Adichie, “Danger of.”

[23]Diego Maggi, “Orientalism, Gender, and Nation Defied by an Iranian Woman: Feminist Orientalism and National Identity in Satrapi’s Persepolis and Persepolis 2,” Journal of International Women’s Studies, no. 1 (2020): 89–105. Quote on p. 89.

[24]Satrapi, Complete Persepolis, 106.

[25]Satrapi, Complete Persepolis, 177.

[26]Satrapi, Complete Persepolis, 178.

[27]Farzaneh Milani, Words Not Swords: Iranian Women Writers and the Freedom of Movement (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 231.

[28]Satrapi, Complete Persepolis, 5, 301, 333.

[29]Hamid Dabashi, Brown Skin, White Masks (London: Pluto, 2011), 23.

[30]Satrapi, Complete Persepolis, 19, 20.

[31]Nima Naghibi, Women Write Iran: Nostalgia and Human Rights from the Diaspora (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 107.

[32]Mohanty, “Transnational Feminist,” 987.

[33]Satrapi, Complete Persepolis, 233.

[34]Naghibi, Rethinking Global, 141–46.

[35]Naghibi, Rethinking Global, 109.

[36]Satrapi, Complete Persepolis, 90.

[37]Satrapi, Complete Persepolis, 91, 92.

[38]Satrapi, Complete Persepolis, 166, 167.

[39]Satrapi, Complete Persepolis, 322.

[40]Amy Malek, “Memoir as Iranian Exile Cultural Production: A Case Study of Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis Series,” Iranian Studies 39 (2006): 353–80. Quote on p. 369.

[41]Mohanty, “Transnational Feminist,” 977.

[42]Satrapi, Complete Persepolis, 327.

[43]Said, Reflections, 174.

[44]Valentine M. Moghadam, Globalization and Social Movements: The Populist Challenge and Democratic Alternatives (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2020), 164.

Sovereignty and Statehood in Early Qajar Rule: An Exercise in Conceptualization

Behrooz Moazami is Patrick G. O’Keefe Distinguished Professor of History at Loyola University New Orleans, and founder and director of the Middle East Peace Studies program. For more than two decades before joining academia, Moazami was a professional political activist and contributed to a number of Iranian dissident publications. While living in Paris in exile (1983–92), he co-founded and coedited Andisheye Rahai, a Persian review of politics, theory, and society. Moazami is a trustee of the Ardeshir Mohassess Trust, formed to preserve the legacy of the artist and to help gravely ill artists in need.

  • How was sovereignty understood and practiced in the early Qajar period, both as a concept and as a social contract? Why did the Qajars, similar to the established Safavid rulers before them, call the territory they ruled mamalek mahruse Iran, the “Guarded Kingdoms/Domains of Iran”? What does the epithet mamalek mahruse imply? Is it a substitute for the term empire? What are the implications of identification on the nature of sovereignty, rule, and the state when this term is used? What implications did it have for the future of Qajar statehood? How were Iran’s interactions with the larger world influenced by the early Qajar statehood? How did sovereignty and state rule in Iran differ from a hypothetical Westphalian state where centralized states allegedly have hegemony over the means of coercion, the states exercise their power over a defined territorial domain, and their right to exercise power in their domains is recognized or tolerated by others? What do these differences tell us about the limits of a Eurocentric theory of state and state formation, and how can a more nuanced and historically informed theory of sovereignty and state be developed?
  • This study—still in its primitive stage—focuses on these questions by concentrating on border wars in Iran, Russia, and to a lesser extent the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly over Caucasia. Yet this is not a study of borderlands and frontiers (like the works of Sabri Ates, Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, and Alfred J. Rieber)[2] despite its references to the frontier wars. Rather, this study focuses on the interactions among these three powers and the impact of their wars on the early Qajars’ sovereignty and state formation in Iran. The number, length, and intensity of the wars these Euro-Asian military forces engaged in during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are indeed staggering: Persian–Russian wars of 1722–23, 1795–96, 1804–13, and 1826–28; Persian–Ottoman wars of 1722–27, 1730–36, 1743–46, and 1821–23; and Russian–Ottoman wars of 1710–12 (part of the Great Northern War), 1735–39, 1768–74, 1787–91, 1806–12, 1828–29, 1853–56 (part of the Crimean War), and 1877–78.

I have two goals here. The first is to provide a framework for understanding Iran’s interactions with its powerful neighbors beyond the more accepted analytical frameworks of “the Persian question,” “the Eastern question,” “the Great Game,” and their derivatives, such as “defensive developmentalism,” which look upon the political development of Iran and the Ottoman Empire as responses to the pressures of Western imperialism. The second is to look afresh at the process of state formation in non-European settings.

No doubt forces of Western imperialism were deeply involved in shaping the course of history in Iran and in the broader region, particularly by the end of the eighteenth century, but I am considering a more complicated framework by focusing on the long interactions among Iran, Russia, and the Ottomans and how they interacted with the Western forces as a system. The Western imperial forces intervened on a global scale, but they needed to interact with an existing system. It is the interactions of these two systems (Western and Euro-Asian) and their long-term impacts, rather than the international machinations, or responses of these individual powers to the changing global order, that interest me here.

Others have also implicitly or explicitly taken steps in a revisionist direction and treated the interaction of Iran with other forces not as a “one-way street.”[3] Yet I am articulating this interaction as a theoretical concept for the transformation in regional reconfiguration of power through the lens of what—using Janet Abu-Lughod’s idea[4]—could be called “systematic change.” By comparing the formative phase of a tribal dynasty in an agrarian society, its concept of sovereignty, and its practice of statehood with that of a hypothetical nation–state in an industrial setting, I am continuing my efforts at developing a state theory that is more appropriate in explaining political structures in non-European settings. Here, also, I am not alone. Others have done this for different non-European settings.

The historical, political, and social environments that gave rise to the Iranian, Russian, and Ottoman states, along with their frequent wars and interactions with Western powers, gradually transformed the extent of these states’ territories, power structures, and physiognomies. By absorbing or losing territories and people, these states redefined their scope of operation and resources and, to a certain extent, their religious orientations, and attempted to homogenize their subjects. In this process, the local and regional powers lost their relatively autonomous powers and became more dependent on the central rulers, or changed their loyalty before being absorbed by larger political entities.

As it is difficult to discuss the impact of this process under one rubric, I describe this transformation as gradual changes in a state’s capacity and strategy to rule, partly deliberate and partly as a result of the system’s evolution. In doing so, I treat the state as a political community that is exercising rule over a certain territory. While formation of a modern and centralized army became the main strategy of these powers, and they ended up developing traits similar to those of European nation–states, their evolution followed a different trajectory and outcome. Iran used the Ottoman and Russian models as the blueprint for its state-making strategy, rather than the European model. Ultimately, I argue that the geographical proximity of these Euro-Asian powers, their long history of interactions, and the lasting impact of the khanate system—a legacy of the Mongols—converged and transformed the structure and physiognomy of these states, despite differences in their political appearance and their own self-identification. They formed the basis of what could be called the Euro-Asian state system.[5]

Analytically, what I am discussing here could be viewed as the short-term impact of the restructuring of Euro-Asia in its regional and global interactions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In her seminal work, Before European Hegemony, Janet Abu-Lughod discusses the existence of a “world system” in the thirteenth century composed of “sub-systems,” none hegemonic over the others. The interaction among the units that later formed this world system stretches back to the time of the formation of the classical empires. The developments I discuss here are another restructuring of world history in longue durée, what Abu-Lughod calls “a systematic change.” This systematic change, she argues, “should be viewed as shifts in the direction and configuration of central trends.” In any systematic change, she argues further, “successive systems reorganize in a somewhat cumulative fashion, the lines and connections laid down in prior epochs tending to persist even though their significance and roles in the new system may be altered.”[6] Perhaps the chaotic world that we are witnessing now in Euro-Asia is another moment of this “restructuring.”

Historically, the process of the transformation of political structure that concerns me could be described as the incorporation of the khanate system of rules, as well as rules of fragmented tribal khans, beys, and local patriarchs, into a larger state ruling an extensive territory with diverse ethno-entities but similar religious affiliations. The Mongolian tradition of statehood based on the power of khanates reproduced itself and formed a different constellation of power than the ideal form in the Westphalian state system. In this process, the Euro-Asian states of the post-Mongolian period transformed, disintegrated, and evolved into a new system of states that were centralized and constitutionalized but still based on fragmented authorities. The Euro-Asian state evolved and restructured itself in several “systematic changes” in contrast to the ideal of a Westphalian state system, where centralized states have hegemony over means of coercion and freely exercise their power over a defined territorial domain.

State and Sovereignty  

In this context, I am defining state as follows: a political community with formal and informal mechanisms of rule consisting of juridical traditions or institutions and loosely yet institutionally organized religious authorities ruling over a large inhabitable territory and a sizable population with a sustainable history of socioeconomic and cultural interactions. The degree of this political community’s inclusiveness and the extent of formality or informality of institutional and organizational development of its judiciary and religious apparatus and type of socioeconomic and cultural interaction defines “the stateness”[7]—its character and physiognomy—and its strategy of rule. However, it does not change the essence of a state’s rule, which is a mechanism and strategy of rule. This definition of state could also apply to a contested state or a colonial state. My theoretical articulation on the relationship of state and sovereignty is based on this definition of state and its implied logic.

While a state has physical manifestations with tangible organizational and institutional capacities, sovereignty is imaginary and ideal. “In the state,” Marx argues, “man is the imaginary member of an imaginary sovereignty, divested of his real, individual life, and infused with an unreal universality.”[8] Yet “this unreal universality” has its own power. Rationalization of state power means providing conditions for its acceptance by its subjects. Its internalization, though imaginative and subjective, implies certain retroactive interactions between the state and its subjects. Hence, sovereignty is a conceptual abstract and a social contract. The ambiguity inherent in the ideal of sovereignty is, indeed, its source of power.

Sovereignty, as a formal and informal social contract, oversees the expectations and interactions of different parts of a society toward the political authority. How this social contract is constructed, understood, and practiced is altered by various factors: the state’s geographic position; cultural boundaries and characteristics; the shape and size of the population; and changes in the nature of the social composition of society, the nature and extent of power, and the origin of its ruling elite.

Sovereignty in micropolitical entities such as tribal chiefdoms is limited to their internal domains, and sovereignty in a vassal state is defined by the nature of the relationship of the vassal with the larger state—most often, changing loyalty is an act of survival or a calculation for further empowerment of the ruling elite. Sovereignty in large centralized states that are based on fragmented authorities is the sum total of sovereignties of related but autonomous domains defined through long-term historical and geographical relations, and is negotiated with the central power through local power holders. Suzerainty in this case is articulated through the degree of loyalty of the local magnate to the central power. In short, the structure of state power and its strategy of rule determine the type of sovereignty and vice versa, yet their interaction takes place in a regional and global environment and is affected by that environment. While in theory state power is based on the state’s available internal resources, the power of sovereignty, its mobilizing capacity, changes throughout time and takes different forms.

To narrate the trajectory of the development of sovereignty and state in the early Qajar period, I start with the Persian–Russian wars of 1795–96, 1804–13, and 1826–28, and make some brief remarks about the Russian–Ottoman wars of 1806–12 and 1828–29. I analyze the meaning of territories lost and gained, discuss some of the major treaties, and sketch a rough portrait of their consequences in the development of the Qajar state. The Persian–Russian wars were essentially frontier wars over Caucasia and helped to define the extent of the Iranian and Russian states, their sovereignties, and the sovereignties of the Caucasian khanates. The same logic is applicable to the Persian–Ottoman war of 1821–23, and the Russian–Ottoman wars of 1806–12 and 1828–29.

The Qajar state (1796–1925) was formed after seventy years of anarchy, coinciding with a major offensive of Western powers globally and regionally. I am using the example of the Qajar state to develop ideas about the interaction of Euro-Asia with the larger world through war and state formation.

 

The Persian–Russian War of 1795–96  

The formation of the Safavid Empire, which planned to revive the historic Iranian Empire, occurred at roughly the same time as the Ottomans’ Ghazi state transformed into an empire during the rule of Mehmed the Conqueror and Muscovite territory expanded during the rule of Ivan III, who proclaimed himself czar and “Ruler of all Rus” in 1503. These developments set the tone for the next three hundred years.

The Mongol invasion had already made different parts of Euro-Asia more connected, leading to a pattern of cooperation and conflict, and a synthesis of different cultural and political traditions and similar modes of operation. A system was already in place, and its transformation can be traced. These developments in Euro-Asia, coinciding with the European Age of Discovery, were the beginning of the restructuring of the regional and global order. The evolving empires of Euro-Asia all started the processes of forming a standing army, centralizing bureaucracy, and expanding territory before they had significant interactions with European powers.

The Safavid Dynasty emerged when followers of a small Sunni–Sufi order that had turned Shi’a operating in a predominantly Sunni region of northwestern Iran formed a coalition with the fighting forces of Qizilbash, an alliance of the Turkoman Shi‘a tribes of Anatolia, and declared themselves the first Iranian state since the Sassanids. Like the Sassanids, the Safavids adopted an official religion. While the Safavids were not originally Shi‘a and by all accounts Shi‘ism was not the religion of the majority of Iranians, it seems that adopting Shi‘ism as the official religion was one of the most efficient ways that the Safavids could establish a distinct identity and resist possible onslaught by the Ottomans. The state grew, and by 1576, Tahmasp I had secured almost the same borders as in the Sassanid period. At the height of Safavid power, Shah Abbas I officially ruled the territory called mamalek mahruse Iran, the Guarded Kingdoms/Domains of Iran. He transformed the state’s military, administrative, and fiscal structures by dismantling the Qizilbash tribal army and introducing an army based on Georgian and Circassian slaves and converting large tracts of land traditionally granted to tribal chiefs into crown lands that he taxed directly. The new state gradually mixed the Persian, Arabic–Islamic, and Mongol traditions of statehood, fusing them with Byzantine and Ottoman traditions.

By the mid-fifteenth century, the Ottomans had already started forming a centralized state and a standing army and were transforming themselves into an empire following the conquest of the Byzantine Empire. By the end of his reign, Mehmed the Conqueror had transformed from warrior sultan to emperor and was controlling two lands (Europe, Asia) and two seas (Black, Mediterranean). His death in 1481 brought instability, but soon Selim the Grim subdued revolts in Anatolia, fought with Safavid rivals at Chaldiran in 1514, and finally ended the Mamluks’ rule in Egypt, Syria, and Hijaz. In Cairo, Selim firmly established himself as the conqueror of the Arab lands and champion of the Islamic cause. The sharif of Mecca gave him the keys to the Grand Mosque in Mecca and the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina and bestowed on him the title of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. Historians debate whether Selim or others after him assumed the title of caliph, though most agree that the first recent international recognition of the title appeared in the Treaty of Peace (Küçük Kaynarca) in 1774 following the Russian–Ottoman War of 1768–74, which recognized the sultan’s capacity as “Grand Caliph of Mahometanism, according to the precepts prescribed to them by their law.”[9]

After Ivan III became czar in 1503, he claimed that Russia was the successor state of the Roman Empire, a claim that was acknowledged if not invented by the Orthodox Church. Czar was in fact the Russian version of the title caesar. The formation of the Romanov Dynasty and Russia’s aggressive expansion further reinforced the idea that the czar also held some religious authority. Under Peter the Great, the state centralized, and bureaucracy and education were reformed. These transformations were sometimes hailed as the Europeanization and secularization of Russia, but they did not stop the trends of expansion, identification with the Orthodox Church, and Russification of the conquered territory. Peter the Great began calling himself the emperor in 1721.

In the midst of these three emerging powers lay Caucasia, which had diverse ethnic and religious groups dispersed over a vast territory with military and commercial strategic importance. Caucasia was the natural battlefield of these emerging powers, each claiming to defend a specific religious group and each administered by a number of small and medium-sized kingdoms, tribal chiefdoms, and khanates acting autonomously or as vassals of the bigger states. The Iranian and the Muscovite (later Russian) states were concerned with South Caucasia (the Russians call it Transcaucasia) and North Caucasia. Russia had already become Iran’s neighbor when it annexed the khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan on the shores of the Caspian Sea during the reign of Ivan IV.

The strategy of state building in the region that began in the sixteenth century included a number of wars that led to the formation of buffer states and vassal states, and the annexation of khanates into larger states. Expanding and securing the frontiers was symbolic of the power of these states, each identifying with a religion. Armenia and Georgia, being overwhelmingly Christian, were important to Russia, and Iran’s disintegration after the fall of the Safavids made Russian advances more possible.

The Qajars, possibly a blend of Tatar and Turkish tribes, traced their own descent to the Tatar Tamerlane, and through him to the Mongols. A relatively small tribe that constituted part of the Qizilbash forces that fought to establish the Safavid Dynasty, the Qajars hoped to revive the Iranian Empire. The formation of mamalek mahruse was their aim. Perhaps nothing more than timing and the manner of the coronation of Agha Mohammad Khan, the founder of the dynasty, can explain his continuation of the policy of securing contested borders as his state-building strategy. He set out to establish the Guarded Kingdoms/Domains of Iran before controlling the whole of Iran and crowning himself king using the ceremonial sword of the Safavid shahs.

Agha Mohammad Khan fought for ten years to gain control of northern, northeastern, central, and southern Iran. In 1783, Erekle II of Georgia, a former tributary state of the Safavids (and long before that a vassal state of the Sassanids), had shifted Georgia’s allegiance to Russia and was formally under the protection of the Russian empire. Noting that Catherine the Great was more focused on her European neighbors than on Iran, Agha Mohammad Khan mobilized a huge army and sacked Tiflis in 1795, reportedly massacring 100,000 Georgians and taking at least 15,000 men and women as slaves. It was only after securing the frontier that Agha Mohammad Khan crowned himself monarch in 1796. He opted to take the eastern part of Iran, still in the hands of his rivals, and planned to reclaim Herat in Afghanistan. As Avery suggests, “Iranian history may in fact be seen as alternating between attempts by a single paramount power to suppress Iran’s fragmentation and once again realize the dream of Empire.”[10]

Catherine II sent forces to avenge the sack of Tiflis and to consolidate Russian power in Caucasia, compelling Agha Mohammad Khan to abandon the plan of retaking Herat. The death of Catherine II in 1796 and the later assassination of Agha Mohammad Khan postponed the wars for the time being, but a large disputed region remained: “The disputed borderland extended from Georgia and Yerevan east to the Caspian Sea and from the southern slopes of the Caucasus to the Aras (Araxes) and Kura rivers, although along the coast the zone exceeded these limits in both directions, from Derbent in the north to Talesh in the south.”[11]

Before the narration of these wars over Caucasia continues, the meaning of mamalek mahruse needs to be considered. Why was it used—and it was used frequently—and what does that imply? The term consists of mamalek, the Arabic plural of molk (domain, estate, city, province, or country) and the Arabic mahruse (guarded, protected). When used together, the words denote an aggregation of different domains or kingdoms, highlighting the importance of a central power protecting the entire territory. Protection by a political authority is certainly suggested. The term can have a religious connotation as well, as in protection against certain evil. While the word domain can indicate the territory within borders, it can also have a more flexible meaning related to the extent of a political authority’s power. The term domain is used in Arabic, Turkish, and Persian with the same pronunciation and meaning. The Qajars and the Ottomans used it as the official title of their empires until their demise. Is mamalek mahruse, in fact, an epithet for an empire and its domain?

It should be noted that there is no Persian, Arabic, or Turkish word for emperor, though sometimes Ottoman sultans used the term to express their power. The term emperor was not used by the Achaemenids (550–330 BC), who created the world’s first empire 2,500 years ago, or the Sassanids, who coincided with the Roman and, later, Byzantine Empires. In Persian, the term shahanshah or shah shahan (king of kings) was used to indicate the centrality and empowerment of one ruler over less powerful rulers. In Arabic, the term used was malake al-muluk, meaning “king of kings,” and in Turkish, padishah (with a similar meaning), which was originally Persian. The point is not semantic here; it is political. These terms had similar connotations as emperor but denoted a different type of rule.

An empire’s domain in Persian has not always been called mamalek mahruse. According to Abbas Amanat, “For at least two and half millennia Iranians called their land Iran.” Further, he continues: “At least since the third century CE there was a well-defined political concept, an imperial entity with a centralized authority, called Iranshahr (Kingdom of Iran) and located it [sic] in Iranzamin (the land of Iran).”[12] The term mamalek mahruse was rarely used in Iran before the Mongolian period, and its usage developed only gradually in the post-Mongolian period. Mamalek mahruse should be read as a particular form of statehood based on a coalition of a small but armed and powerful tribal minority within the existing ruling bodies, a fusion of Mongolian–Turkish military power and previous forms of statehood. Mamalek mahruse Iran was the gradual reincarnation of the Iranian spirit and Iranian history in the form of political rule.

Despite the importance of the term mamalek mahruse and its frequent use, particularly during the Qajar period (it was also the official name of the Ottoman Empire[13]), I have not found much literature on the term’s origins, use, or implications. The only comprehensive study I have found is a short article in Persian by Bagher Sadri-Nia from 1995.[14] According to Sadri-Nia, the term first appeared during the Ilkhanid (1256–1335) period and then again during the reign of Tamerlane (1370–1405). First used in reference to cities and provinces, it gradually came to mean the larger territory under Mongol control, including Persia and a majority of khanates. The fusion of the term with the name of Iran seems to have occurred during the reign of Shah Abbas I (1587–1629). The Qajars adopted it as the official name of Iran and used it until their demise.

The PersianRussian Wars of 1804–13 and 1826–28: Further Restructuring

The Persian–Russian wars of 1804–13 and 1826–28 were a continuation of the 1795–­96 war, yet they unfolded in a different regional and international environment. The eighteenth century ended with Napoleon invading Egypt and Syria, and the nineteenth century started with the British and the Ottomans together defeating France. Russia was expanding and at war with France and Sweden and officially at war with Britain, though actually not fighting. The Ottomans were in retreat, and the Qajars were busy setting up a tribal state. The Persian–Russian War of 1804–13 became a part of the Napoleonic Wars, as did the Russian–Ottoman War of 1806–12. Iran officially entered the wars on the side of France before growing closer to Britain. The restructuring of Euro-Asia was the order of the day, and the wars fought among Iran, Russia, and the Ottomans were part of a larger transformation.

In December 1800, Czar Paul I annexed Georgia to Russia as competitors of Fath Ali Shah were challenging the rule of the new king in Iran. In 1804, Czar Alexander I continued this policy of Russian expansion by capturing Ganja and advancing toward Armenia in South and East Caucasia, beginning the Persian–Russian War of 1804–13. Russia had several advantages in its war against Iran. They included a mechanized professional army, Georgian forces providing continuous reinforcements, and the ability to capitalize on Christian–Muslim enmity. The Iranian army, mostly a seasonal army organized along tribal lines and that recruited soldiers through the buniche system—taxing villages in men, horses, and food—were no match for a European army in a long-term war. Although the French and British had assisted in training the Iranian army, almost all the existing accounts suggest that it remained inadequate because of a lack of infrastructure and organizational skills. According to Muriel Atkin, “By 1812 ‘Abbas had a European-trained army of about 13,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery (of which most were infantry).”[15]

By the end of the nine-year war, Fath Ali Shah and his crown prince, Abbas Mirza, recognized the czar’s sovereignty over the contested territories of Georgia, Mingrelia, Abkhazia, Ganja, Qarabaq, Qobba, Darband, Baku, Dagestan, and Sakki under Article 3 of the Treaty of Golestan. The treaty reflected the changing power equation. It was dictated by the Russians and, in fact, written in Russian. Sir Gore Ouseley, the British ambassador to Iran, was heavily involved in drafting the text, and it was negotiated by Mirza Abolhassan Khan Shirazi, an Anglophile Iranian politician and the shah’s representative for the peace talks, at a time when Britain was an ally of Russia against France. Article 4 of the treaty gave Russia permission to intervene in the succession to Iran’s throne as “help and support” to maintain security. This article, which was a blueprint for Russian intervention in Iran, was similar to what the Russians were demanding in other victories. The basis of the Treaty of Golestan was status quo ad presentem, meaning that each side essentially kept the territory then under its control. This satisfied neither side. The Iranians had lost territory, and the Russians wanted more. This was a recipe for further war.

The Persian–Russian War of 1826–28 also arose from internal court conflict in Iran, British intrigue, and the activities of the usuli ulama,[16] who, representing the proto-orthodoxy of Shi‘ism, were drawing attention to Russian atrocities toward the Muslims of Caucasia as a pretext for jihad. (Most likely, the British had a hand in the ulamas’ agitation.) Abbas Mirza started the war in September 1826 by advancing toward Ganja and Sosa. The Russians fought back, and after some early Iranian victories, marched all the way to Tabriz, capturing the city in October 1827. By January 1828, they had taken over Ardabil, the first Safavid capital. This unprecedented defeat forced the Iranians to sign the Treaty of Turkmenchay.

The new treaty replaced the Treaty of Golestan. Iran recognized the sovereignty of Russia over the Erivan and Nakhchivan khanates (East Armenia) and the remainder of the Talesh khanate (northern Iran). The treaty also set Iranian frontiers, determining the Aras River and part of the Caspian Sea to be the natural border and giving Russia full rights to navigate all of the Caspian Sea. In addition, the treaty further expanded Russian interference in Iranian succession disputes and recognized Abbas Mirza as the crown prince, guaranteeing the continuation of his line of succession. Russian merchants were given the right to trade freely throughout Iran, and imports of Russian and Iranian goods were subject to a single 5 percent tax. As a result, Russia became Iran’s main economic partner until 1935.

The Persian–Russian War of 1826–28 and the Russian–Ottoman War of 1828–29 that followed further strengthened the Russian position in the Balkans and Caucasia. These wars changed the nature of war making and state making, and gradually transformed the regional and international political order, intensifying the ongoing restructuring. The new political configuration that was evolving after the Conference of Vienna has been characterized as the restoration of the ancient regimes. However, it was more than that. It was a prelude to further Russian expansion in Asia and Europe and, more importantly, to the ascendency of British hegemony in the new evolving world system based on industrial capitalism. In political terms, the Eastern question became a part of the Great Game that paved the way for British hegemony. Aggressive British trade policies that immediately followed these wars, such as the Anglo-Ottoman Treaty of 1838, which abolished all Ottoman trade monopolies, perhaps were a sign of this global transformation.

 

Conclusion

The internationalization of these regional conflicts did not homogenize the political transformation of the Euro-Asian states, casting them in the European model. Rather, it further shaped the Euro-Asian states as a distinct state system. Centralization of state power as an aggregate of a fragmented power structure continued. Many of the khanates and territories that were absorbed by Russia or the Ottomans maintained some of their power, which later became a basis for a claim of statehood or actual statehood.

Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, Russia continued to expand, and the Ottomans maintained their power. Until the end of the Qajar period, Iran called itself mamalek mahruse Iran. It built up its standing army on the model of the Russian Cossacks, and in fact, Russia led and paid for Iran’s army for much of the Qajar period. Iran’s state reforms were based on the Russian reforms and Tanzimat reforms (1839–76) of the Ottomans. In all three societies, a central power ruled over its periphery by negotiating and making alliances with the existing fragmented authorities. As the bureaucracy and laws of Iran, Russia, and Turkey developed, they incorporated many common features. All three states had a religious dogma as the basis of their governance. Even as Iran, Turkey, and Russia moved in different ideological directions under different political leadership following the disintegration of their empires, a similarity in their state structures remains apparent. None reproduced what has been seen as the ideal form of the Westphalian state system.

[1]This paper was first presented at the workshop “Dissections: New Approaches in Middle East and North African Studies,” The Graduate Center, City University of New York, on February 20, 2015. The aim of publishing the present version is to start a fresh debate on state theory and state formation in Iran as a part of Euro-Asia.

[2]Sabri Ates, Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804-1946 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Alfred J. Rieber, Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands: From the Rise of Early Modern Empires to the End of the First World War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[3]Stephanie Cronin, ed., Iranian Studies: Iranian-Russian Encounters: Empires and Revolutions Since 1800 (Florence, KY: Routledge, 2012).

[4]Janet Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–­1350 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

[5]Ariel Salzmann, Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2003); Behrooz Moazami, “The Making of the State, Religion and the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1796–1979)” (PhD diss., The New School for Social Research, 2004); Behrooz Moazami, State, Religion and Revolution in Iran, 1796 to the Present (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

[6]Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, 368.

[7]J. P. Nettl, “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” World Politics 20 (1968): 559–92.

[8]Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher (1844), ed. Andy Blunden, Matthew Grant, and Matthew Carmody (2008–9), www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/.

[9]Treaty of Peace (Küçük Kaynarca) (1774), Article 3, fass.nus.edu.sg/hist/eia/historical-texts-archive/.

[10]P. W. Avery, “Dream of Empire,” in War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and Present, ed. Roxane Farmanfarmaian (Florence, KY: Routledge, 2008), 13–16. Quote on p. 16.

[11]Muriel Atkin, Russia and Iran, 1780–1828 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 10.

[12]Abbas Amanat, “Iranian Identity Boundaries: A Historical Overview,” in Iran Facing Others: Identity Boundaries in a Historical Perspective, ed. Abbas Amanat and Farzin Vejdani (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 1–33. Quotation on p. 4.

[13]Selim Deringil, Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998).

[14]Bagher Sadri-Nia, “Pejoheshi dar bareh estelah mamaleke mahruse Iran” (“A Research on the Term of Protected Kingdom/Domain of Iran”), Iran Shenakht 1 (1995): 65–85,

 www.ensani.ir/storage/Files/20120506081611-7012-11.pdf.

[15]Atkin, Russia and Iran, 145.

[16]The religious scholars of the Usuli school of Shiʿite jurisprudence, developed in contrast to the Akhbari (traditionalist) school. They argue for the primacy of the ulama as interpreters of Islamic law and prophetic and Imami traditions.

The Chamber of Commerce and Internal Conflicts among Merchants of Bushehr in the Early 1950s

 

Soheila Torabi Farsani is an associate professor of history at Islamic Azad University, Najafabad Branch. Her research interests are the economic history at the time of the Constitutional Revolution, historical sociology, the social history of Iran, and women’s studies. Her publications include From Merchants Representatives Council to Iran Chamber of Commerce (Entesharat Majlis Shoraye Eslami, 2013) and Women in Transition from the Tradition to Modernity (Nashre Niloofar, 2018). Her Persian translation of a collection of essays by Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi was published under the title Social Classes, State and Revolution in Iran (Nashre Niloofar, 2008).

 

Introduction

Up until the Constitutional Revolution, the presence of foreign competitors, who were strengthened in the so-called “concessions era,” was more and more evident due to political and economic shifts that changed the traditional fabric of commerce in Iran: social upheavals and a lack of social security, on one hand; and a lack of positive action on the part of the state to protect the interests of Iranian merchants against the intrusion of foreign capital, on the other. In the immediate decades prior to the Constitutional Revolution, these factors resulted in a shift in the process of commercial activities conducted by merchants. Thus, on top of engagement in diversified economic activities, merchants also tried to attain an independent social identity.

At the time, state bodies such as the Ministry of Trade had become a financial resource for the minister of trade, rather than a resource that would see to merchants’ pleas.[1] The Ministry of Trade charged every merchant a sum of money for every plea.[2] Because the position of minister of trade was attained by giving a large sum of money to the shah and his courtiers, that position was more like a resource to make money than a position designed to help merchants.[3] The minister, too, assigned the affairs of merchants in the provinces to minor officials in return for a sum of money as a “gift.”[4] Ultimately, when extortions on the part of the minister of trade became intolerable, merchants protested and sent a plea to Naseroldin Shah himself, demanding establishment of an independent body named Majlis-i Vokkalay-i Tojjar (Merchants’ Representatives Council), which was proclaimed by a royal decree in 1883.[5] This council was the first-ever merchants’ independent body in the Qajar era, and it was active in upholding the merchants’ mutual interests, preventing state officials from interfering in merchants’ internal affairs, and seeing to their pleas.

The idea behind such a council—composed of merchants’ representatives who would make decisions on merchants’ behalf and issue verdicts accepted by them—was to set up an institution that would act for the mutual benefit of merchants. This differed from the prevalent traditional ways of pleading to state bodies or the person of Reisoltojjar (head of the merchants’ guild). The council’s constitution clearly stated that one task of the council was to see to merchants’ pleas and arbitrate in the cases of their claims.[6] At this time, merchants had gained such social maturity that they had managed to set up an independent institution to solve their problems—a civil institution that would in due time help them not only to form their collective identity and thus solve their own problems, but also to organize a collective course of action in the face of state officials who would try to encroach on merchants’ interests.

This course of action was also followed after the constitutional movement began. Merchants had high hopes of the new political order and expected that the arbitration of the trade court would be in their favor and provide them with financial security. Therefore, the merchants’ association, one among many associations which had sprung up after the Constitutional Revolution, maintained relations with Majlis (parliament) deputies.[7] The merchants’ association had branches in provinces and also at overseas centers of commerce, and was actively engaged in protecting merchants’ interests. At the first Majlis, merchants participated actively and pursued their interests there, and the law pertaining to trade associations was discussed. However, that was the one and only occasion on which merchants’ demands were addressed at the Majlis.[8]

Many factors combined to provide a basis for the merchants to strengthen their internal class structure: the increase in violence in Iranian society, the culmination of anarchy and insecurity immediately after the victory of the Constitutional Revolution, and the bombardment of the Majlis and destruction of constitutional institutions; a decrease of merchants’ political influence in the second Majlis; the occurrence of World War I; and a culmination of political, social, and economic crises, widespread insecurity and strengthening of divergent social forces, and the weakness of the central government and incompetence of the Majlis. After the end of World War I, on the 12 Rabiolavval AH 1338/1920, the constitution of ‘Heiat-i Ettahadiye-i Tojjar (Merchants’ Union) was ratified, and the union was formally founded under Chair Haj Mohammad Hossein Aminolzarb. On top of its commercial and industrial goals, the Merchants’ Union aimed to solve commercial issues arising between merchants, and this was enshrined in its constitution.[9]

The union had a solid organizational structure with contacts all over Iran, and had its own internal regulatory mandates. Its solid organization and importance were particularly evident in the commercial skirmishes with the Soviet government over its trade restrictions on Iranian merchants, skirmishes that became known as Nahazat-i Eqtesad (Economic Movement). The collection of letters and announcements of the Economic Movement in protest to the Soviet government showed a similar and collective position on the part of merchants within a civil institution called the merchants’ union, which was separate from ‘Heiat-i Ettahadiye-i Tojjar.[10]

In the Pahlavi era, too, merchants were totally aware of the necessity for having and upholding trade associations. But as the centralizing Pahlavi state pursued initiatives to bring every sphere of social activity under its control, the Ministry of Public Works was called upon to found the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, according to a law ratified by the cabinet. In May 1926, the Tehran Chamber of Commerce was officially founded on the basis of an internal merchants’ election, and thus, the ‘Heiat-i Ettahadiye-i Tojjar was transformed from a non-governmental organization into a pseudo–state body which acted as the functioning arm of the Ministry of Public Works, and in effect as liaison to establish relations between the ministry and merchants. For this same reason, the Tehran Chamber of Commerce was financed by the government, and this financial setup may have caused the delay in founding other chambers of commerce.[11] After a while, the government announced that it could not afford to finance the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, and merchants themselves had to come up with financial resources for that purpose.[12] From then on, the chamber of commerce increasingly functioned as an executive agent and tended to pursue regulations made by the ministry.[13]

 

Prelude to the Foundation of the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce

In 1929, there were attempts to found chambers of commerce in large and middle-sized cities and Iran’s major commercial centers. On 2 October 1930, the law pertaining to founding chambers of commerce was passed; up to this time, merchants in every city and commercial center were organized in their respective unions and were totally out of the reach of state executive bodies, seeing to their own affairs in an autonomous manner and according to guild solidarity norms. The first article of this law stated that in order to found a chamber of commerce in a major commercial center, merchants first had to send an application letter to the Ministry of National Economy. But seemingly, merchants already organized in their unions did not show any real inclination to that effect. Thus, nearly a month after the ratification of the law, the Ministry of National Economy, in an October 1930 letter to the Ministry of the Interior, asked for assistance: “With all due respect, please ask provincial governors in every city and commercial center to invite the more established merchants and to inform them of regulations pertaining to chambers of commerce law [. . .] and persuade the gentlemen [. . .] to apply for foundation of the chamber of commerce in their respective cities [. . .] and ask the governors to send on the application letters, as soon as possible, through the interior ministry, or directly to this ministry.”[14]

Even so, it seemed that merchants were reluctant to disband their civil organizations and gather in a state-controlled or pseudo-governmental institution. Two months after the passing of the law and one month after the dispatch of the letter to the Ministry of the Interior, the fact that merchants would still not send up application letters to found chambers of commerce left the Ministry of National Economy no choice but to send yet another letter in November 1930 to the Ministry of the Interior. This second letter, while mentioning the previous letter, stated: “As up to this moment there is no clear sign of what steps respected governors have taken [. . .] please ask them to expedite their actions as to the effect, and get the application letters prepared immediately and dispatch them to the central offices.”[15]

In spite of reluctance and disregard on the part of merchants, ultimately chambers of commerce were founded in every city and major commercial center. Bushehr, a major port city and an important commercial center, saw its chamber of commerce founded as early as 1929. In a document dated September 1933 and listing cities where chambers of commerce had already been founded, Bushehr is listed as item number ten of thirty-six cities.[16]

 

Bushehr Chamber of Commerce and Its Various Functions

After the capitulation and occupation of Iran by the allies during World War II, which resulted in Reza Shah Pahlavi abdicating the throne, there commenced a twelve-year period beginning in September 1941 and ending in August 1953. This period entailed a process of increasing weakness on the part of the central government, and a proportionate prevalence of relative liberties in the country.

The more governmental executive bodies lost their power and centralizing function, the more autonomous agency in political, social, and economic spheres increased on the part of various social classes and layers. One group among these who tried hard to engage in autonomous action was the merchants. One example of this is an attempt by Bushehr merchants to supply wheat for the daily consumption of the Bushehr populace through the chamber of commerce. Beginning in February 1931, all commodities exported from or imported into Iran were required to have due government permits according to the act passed by the Majlis which effectively nationalized foreign trade. Prior to the arrival of the allied forces in Iran, the country saw a bad harvest in 1940 due to drought. After the occupation of the country, the need to feed foreign troops, the fact that Soviet forces tended to export Iranian wheat to their country, and the continuation of the drought, feeding the Iranian populace and supplying its main staple food—that is, bread—became a grave problem.

Bushehr, like all other cities in Iran, faced a bread shortage. Through the chamber of commerce and in an autonomous course of action without state officials’ involvement, Bushehr merchants got into direct negotiations with the British consulate general in Bushehr, to import wheat from India, then a British colony, to provide the populace with bread. According to a letter from the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce to the British consulate general,

the volume of wheat supplied by the Finance Economy Office to the bakers is not enough at all; thus, according to negotiations in an extraordinary session of the chamber of commerce on the subject of feeding the populace [. . .] it has been decided that merchants with the help of the consulate general import wheat from India to the effect of 1,500 tons. Thus referring to negotiations with the consul and his endorsement, please provide the permit to Bushehr merchants to import the said wheat from Karachi.[17]

In the meantime, as war and occupation had caused a sharp increase in the prices of staples and the expenses of haulage, the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce sent a letter to the Bushehr Office of the Finance Department stating that

as the populace finds it hard to provide themselves with staple bread due to a lack of wheat and are in great despair and face starvation, the chamber of commerce in an emergency session has decided to seek help from your office in order to make merchants able to import 1,500 tons of wheat [. . .] from India. To gain permission to that effect, there are already negotiations with the British consulate general in Bushehr underway and they too have agreed to the plan [. . .] please ask the Ministry of Finance to exempt the said wheat from customs tariffs.[18]

This shows that autonomous agency on the part of merchants allowed for the intervention of state bodies only where merchants asked for exemption from customs tariffs. Even so, state bodies, too, welcomed the move on the part of the chamber of commerce. The governor-general of Bushehr announced: “This move is totally according to my hearty blessings and hopefully the government will agree with the exemption of customs tariffs.” But he also signaled his unhappiness that merchants attempted to interact with the government on their own: “Now, for your information a copy of the decree number [. . .] issued by the Ministry of the Interior is enclosed [. . .] that from now on whatever demands and actions must be processed through the governor-general.”[19]

On the other hand, a year after the August 1953 coup, a totally different approach was taken by the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce when facing a commercial issue. After the coup, the state had once again maintained centralization in all spheres and had the final say in all matters. At this time, the new Shahpoor port was boosting with business, and as a result, older ports, including Bushehr, were facing a downturn in business. Thus, to boost business in Bushehr port, the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce decided to encourage shipping lines to more often frequent the port. But this time, contrary to the twelve-year period of 1941 to 1953, the chamber of commerce had to contact state bodies and refrain from any independent action.

Thus, the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce asked the governor-general to provide facilities for at least two ships to frequent Bushehr port on a monthly basis, to carry goods intended for exportation. In a letter to Bushehr’s governor-general, the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce stated:

Considering the enthusiasm on the part of merchants engaged in export trade to send their goods through Bushehr port, and as exportation from Bushehr is totally in their best interests, and to enhance trade and provide jobs in the Bushehr area, we thereby ask to have an order from the governor-general to oblige the [. . .] shipping lines to send at least two ships on a monthly basis to Bushehr in order to carry exporting goods. At this moment, a substantial amount of goods is already in depot in Bushehr and a substantial amount is also ready to be sent to Bushehr.[20]

Bushehr’s governor-general, in turn, informed the officials in the provincial government who, in a subsequent letter to the Ministry of the Interior, stated: “The copy of the letter sent by the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce is enclosed, whereby they have asked to have two ships to monthly frequent Bushehr port in order to carry exporting goods. Please inform us of your decision.”[21]

The Ministry of the Interior, in turn, referred the subject to yet another state body. A letter to the Ports and Shipping Department stated: “The copy of the letter by the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce concerning two ships frequenting Bushehr port in order to carry exporting goods has been received through the seventh province officials [. . .] Please inform the Ministry of the Interior of your decision.”[22]

The subject raised by the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce would have been resolved at once had it not been referred to multiple state bodies as a result of state centralization. This red tape was an excuse for state bodies to write and receive letters; and the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce, in the meantime, refrained from any autonomous action.

 

Internal Conflict in the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce

In the aftermath of the August 1953 coup and downfall of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, the new government attempted to, once again, establish its unrivalled authority, and to centralize all executive affairs in all spheres of social life. First in a series of actions to achieve this was to annul all laws passed during Mossadeq’s time in office. Furthermore, on 28 December 1954, a new law concerning the establishment of chambers of commerce was passed. Articles of this law were as follows:

  1. Chambers of commerce to be founded by the Ministry of National Economy,
  2. The right of the minister or his representative to preside over sessions of chambers of commerce and to participate in discussions and decision-making, and
  3. Establishment of an association on the orders of the Ministry of National Economy and monitored by the governor-general and representatives of the Ministry of National Economy and Bank Melli [the national bank] in every city in order to pick out members of chamber of commerce three months prior to expiration of previous members’ term of office.[23]

After a few years, the Bureau of Chambers of Commerce was ceded from the Ministry of National Economy and put under the auspices of the Ministry of Trade.[24] The bureau’s duties were as follows:

  1. Providing bookkeeping for chambers of commerce to control their earnings and expenditures,
  2. Keeping track of properties and office facilities of chambers of commerce,
  3. Controlling statements concerning earnings and expenditures,
  4. Announcing the time on which elections to chambers of commerce were held, and
  5. Controlling chambers of commerce to report on their agendas in their sessions.[25]

As the aforementioned demonstrates, laws ratified by the government after the coup increasingly made chambers of commerce act like offices subordinate to government ministries. At this very moment in the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce, a conflict occurred between some merchants, on one hand, and the presidium of the chamber, on the other. Contrary to what normally would have been the case—that is, to let the aged and well-established members issue a verdict on the matter (Kadkhoda maneshi)—the course of the conflict took the shape of writing letters to the Ministry of National Economy, thereby getting a government body involved in the matter.

The conflict, at least on the surface, centered on the question of the continuation of the presidium’s term of office. Even after their term of office expired, the presidium—in particular, its head, a person called Zareii—did not hold a new round of elections and continued to hold office. In a letter to the Ministry of National Economy, a merchant called Poostchi stated:

At the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce, the term of office of the presidium has come to the end of its lawful term of office a year ago, and normally, and like all other chambers of commerce, has to abstain from all its activities, and its internal affairs should be governed under the auspices of the representative of the Ministry of National Economy [. . .] or under the auspices of the Bushehr governor-general, or under the auspices of a committee including the governor-general, attorney general, and head of the Finance Department. But, in defiance of the law, the present presidium [. . .] governs the chamber [. . .] the disbanded presidium which is the legacy of the imposed third round of elections does not have the right to sign documents and letters of the chamber [. . .] what reason and what cause is there to have the affairs of the chamber in the hands of the disbanded presidium [. . .] to do, arbitrarily, whatever they wish.[26]

Poostchi mentioned two issues: first, the fact that the presidium’s term of office had already expired, and second, that this presidium was running affairs in a way to profit from it and causing loss for the other merchants. In another letter to the Ministry of National Economy, two more merchants who were also protesting the issue stated:

The Bushehr Chamber of Commerce term of office has ended one and half a years ago, and the unlawful election of the previous round has finished, the one that imposed a number of unrighteous people as the presidium, and even so, those particular people are still holding office [. . .] the head of the chamber, Zareii, who in fact is really the previous head, says that he has spent bribe money at the National Economy Department of the Seventh Province, and also at the Ministry of National Economy itself, and thus has influence and connections there who would not allow his dismissal, and even if it takes thousands of years to hold new elections, he would still occupy his position. And it really seems to be the case.[27]

These two merchants repeated Poostchi’s claims and also added that the present head of the chamber had gained office not through free consensus of the merchants themselves, but rather through personal influence in state bodies. If true, this shows the high extent of involvement on the part of state bodies in the affairs of the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce, which seemingly was a civil institution. Naturally, when the influence and involvement of state bodies in the affairs of chambers of commerce is so pervasive, civil institutions cannot be expected to take any autonomous course of action.

In a letter to the Bureau of Chambers of Commerce, another merchant called Jamali spoke of “conflict and differences” among Bushehr merchants, and stated that the cause of the issue is that “Zareii, after nearly two years have passed since expiration of his term of office, and thus with no legality, still regards himself the head of the chamber.” Jamali added that Zareii says “he would not care about what orders may be issued in Tehran or Shiraz; his connections in those two cities would not let his dismissal occur.”[28]

Yet another merchant, Faghih Beladi, wrote a letter repeating the previously mentioned claims and calling Zareii a “smuggler.” He continued: “Zareii, in order to influence the head of Bank Melli by his position in the chamber and to get loans and impose promissory notes issued by Gulf Textile factory, where he is the chief executive officer,” would not leave office. On top of that, Beladi claimed that Zareii, “in compliance with the governor-general, head of Bank Melli, and the mayor, has received 200,000 tomans as a loan for Gulf Textile factory and thereby has taken advantage of his position at the chamber.” This merchant, too, stated that Zareii had said that “he has connections in the Ministry of National Economy, and thus he will be the head of the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce for life, whether it be lawful or otherwise.”[29]

In response to the protests by Bushehr merchants, Abdolrahim Jafari, director of the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce, stated in a letter to the head of the Office of Internal Trade at the Ministry of National Economy:

As a result of conflicts among merchants that have divided them into a few opposing groups, the situation at the chamber is unclear [. . .] as feuds are culminating, the merchants are willing to get the chamber itself involved too [. . .] please specify that at this period of recess of the chamber, who is the rightful person to take care of affairs at the chamber [. . .] in Bushehr, we are witnessing a strange and pitiful situation [. . .] and merchants are constantly writing conflicting letters and petitions to the Bushehr office, and even to offices in Shiraz.[30]

The director, in his letter, tried to show that the conflicts were among the merchants themselves, without mentioning any reasons, to imply that the presidium of the chamber was not involved in the feuds. Jafari also asked for a formal order to be issued by the authorities at the Ministry of National Economy to install a “caretaker” for the chamber of commerce during “the period of recess,” which is in itself a sign of the extent to which chambers of commerce were obliged to follow and obey the ministry’s orders. Following that, the National Economy Office of the Seventh Province, too, in a letter to the Office of Internal Trade at the Ministry of National Economy, implied that the whole affair was nothing but a conspiracy:

Lately, there have been many petitions against Mr. Zareii, head of the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce, with different signatures, but almost the same handwriting; it was understood that these petitions have to be groundless and based on the malicious self-interest of one particular person. Thus, the petitions were sent to the Bushehr branch of the Office of Internal Trade, who were asked to investigate the affair and to identify the petitioners. At present, we have received a copy of a letter from the Bushehr police department which confirms the viewpoint of this office.[31]

This formal letter implied that the petitioners were unknown, but that every letter had been signed by one of the protesting merchants, and that the police department had succeeded in solving a grave crime by “identifying” the petitioners. Seemingly, the affair had now grown from a case of pseudo-legal obeying by the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce toward state bodies, to ultra-legal actions taken by the Bushehr police department.

At last, in March 1955 new elections were held at the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce. The head of the Bushehr branch of Bank Melli was “elected” as the head of the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce. Zareii, too, was “elected” as the first assistant to the head of the chamber,[32] which was obviously a formality and actually a way to let him continue to govern the chamber’s affairs.

The internal conflicts in the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce in the 1950s are a clear sign of the fact that the more state centralization increases, the less merchants find the opportunity or the will to take autonomous actions, the more group solidarity decreases, and the more merchants as a social grouping are swept aside to the margins of the arena where political and social agency is played out.

 

Conclusion

The endeavors of merchants as a social class in their conflicts with the state in Iran fluctuated between autonomous agency, on one hand, and dependence and apathy, on the other. The different courses of action adopted by Bushehr merchants are a clear sign that whenever the state’s centralizing efforts decreased, merchants embraced autonomous agency and demonstrated their class and group independence in many different ways. And whenever the state succeeded in the process of centralization, merchants and other social classes alike became dependent on executive bodies of the state and deprived of any possibility of autonomous agency. In the aftermath of the August 1953 coup, when the state, after a twelve-year interval, once again gained a high degree of centralization, at the Bushehr Chamber of Commerce a conflict occurred among merchants on the matter of holding new elections. This time, state centralization and the increasing dependence of chambers of commerce on state bodies made protesting merchants pursue their petitions not in an internal manner, as they were used to, but through correspondence with state bodies. This particular affair and its ultimate conclusion was a clear sign of an end to any autonomous course of action on the part of Bushehr merchants and the chamber of commerce.

 

[1]Abbas Mirza Molkara, Biography, ed. Abdolhossein Navaei (Tehran: Babak, 1958), 168.

[2]Abdolah Mostofi, My Autobiography or Social and Administrative History of Qajar Era, vol. II (Tehran: Zavvar, 1991), 139.

[3]Mohammad Hassan Khan Etemadolsaltaneh, Diaries, ed. Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1971), 308, 377.

[4]Molkara, Biography, 168–69.

[5]Mohammad Hasan Aminolzarb to Naseroldin Shah, AH 12 Shavval 1301/5 August 1884, Aminolzarb petitions to the shah files, private library of Dr. Hossein Mahdavi. The letter is mentioned in Ferydoon Adamiyat and Homa Nategh, Social and Political and Economic Ideas in Unpublished Texts from Qajar Era (Tehran: Aghah, 1977), 308–9.

[6]Adamiyat and Nategh, Social and Political and Economic Ideas, 335, 336–40.

[7]Habl al-Matin, Number 145, 19 Jumadi II AH 1325/30 July 1907, 3.

[8]Muzakirat-i Majlis, Dawrah 1, 5 Rabiolavval AH 1326/7 April 1908, 9 Rabiolavval AH 1326/11 April 1908, 16 Rabiolavval AH 1326/18 April 1908, 4 Rabialsani AH 1326/6 May 1908 (Tehran: Majlis Publications, 1946), particularly on 499, 505, 512, 537.

[9]“Constitution of Tehran Merchants’ Union,” 12 Rabiolavval AH 1338/14 April 1908, pp. 1–2, Merchants’ Union documents, private library of Dr. Hossein Mahdavi.

[10]For more information about the Economic Movement, see Soheila Torabi Farsani, “Iran–Soviet Trade Relations and the Organization of Economic Movement in Early Years of Pahlavi Era,” Isfahan University Literature and Humanities Faculty Magazine, no. 30–31 (2002): 143–72.

[11]“Mutafariqat,” Habl al-Matin, Sal 35, Number 14–15 (24 Ramadan AH 1345/29 March 1927), 30–32, particularly 30.

[12]Ministry of Finance to Ministry of Public Works, 30 Azar AH 1305/22 December 1926, Ministry of Finance, [240]/288/42(42), National Library and Archives of Iran, Tehran; Majlis to Chamber of Commerce, n.d., gh-115515, Bonyad Mostazafan Archives, Tehran.

[13]Premier office’s to Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of Trade, 4 Bahman AH 1307/24 January 1929, 9/104001, National Library and Archives of Iran; Premier’s office to Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Public Works, 8 Mehr AH 1308/17 September 1929, [240]/9/104001, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[14]Ministry of National Economy to Ministry of the Interior, 6 Aban AH 1309/28 October 1930, 8720/5468, National Library and Archives of Iran. All translations are mine.

[15]Ministry of National Economy to Ministry of the Interior, 8 Azar AH 1309/29 November 1930, 9890/11033, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[16]Ministry of Finance, “List of Cities Where There Are Chambers of Commerce,” 9 Shahrivar AH 1312/18 August 1933, 4618, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[17]Bushehr Chamber of Commerce to British consulate general at Bushehr, 16 Farvardin AH 1321/5 April 1942, 345, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[18]Bushehr Chamber of Commerce to Bushehr Office of the Finance Department, 16 Farvardin AH 1321/5 April 1942, 35, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[19]Governor-general of Bushehr to Bushehr Chamber of Commerce, 18 Farvardin AH 1321/7 April 1942, 441, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[20]Bushehr Chamber of Commerce to governor-general of Bushehr, 17 Azar AH 1335/8 December 1956, 516, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[21]Provincial government of the seventh province to Ministry of the Interior, 10 Bahman AH 1335/30 January 1957, 22270, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[22]Ministry of the Interior to the Ports and Shipping Department, 29 Bahman AH 1335/5 February 1957, 10371/89189, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[23]Ministry of Trade, law pertaining to founding of chambers of commerce passed on 7 Dey AH 1333/28 December 1954, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[24]Ministry of Trade, legal bill pertaining to founding of chambers of commerce, 16 Shahrivar AH 1338/8 September 1959, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[25]Ministry of National Economy, 23 Esfand AH 1333/14 March 1955, 39897, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[26]Abdolah Poostchi to Ministry of National Economy, 18 Aban AH 1333/9 November 1954, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[27]Seyed Mostafa Asghari and Foroozan Najafi to Ministry of National Economy, 20 Aban AH 1333/11 November 1954, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[28]Haj Abbas Jamali to Bureau of Chambers of Commerce, Ministry of National Economy, 9 Aban AH 1333/31 October 1954, 20580, Prime minister’s office documents, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[29]Faghih Beladi to Ministry of National Economy, 20 Azar AH 1333/11 December 1954, Prime minister’s office documents, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[30]Bushehr Chamber of Commerce to Office of Internal Trade at the Ministry of National Economy, 23 Azar AH 1333/14 December 1954, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[31]National Economy Office of the Seventh Province to Office of Internal Trade at the Ministry of National Economy, 27 Dey AH 1333/17 January 1955, 2803, Prime minister’s office documents, National Library and Archives of Iran.

[32]Bushehr Chamber of Commerce, 23 Farvardin AH 1334/13 April 1955, Prime minister’s office documents, National Library and Archives of Iran.

Translating Race: Simin Daneshvar’s Negotiation of Blackness

 

Amy Motlagh is the Bita Daryabari Presidential Chair in Persian Language and Literature, and an associate professor of comparative literature and Middle East/South Asia studies, at UC Davis. She is the author of Burying the Beloved: Gender, Fiction and Reform in Modern Iran (Stanford University Press, 2012) and articles on topics including Iranian cinema, literature, and gender and race in the Iranian diaspora. She is currently at work on a manuscript called “Translating Race: A Cultural History of Racial Thinking in Modern Iran and the Diaspora.”

Born in 1921 in Shiraz, eight years before the formal abolition of slavery by Reza Shah in 1929, writer, intellectual, and translator Simin Daneshvar later acknowledged that many of her stories came out of her childhood. An important “clearing center” for the Persian Gulf slave trade, the Shiraz of Daneshvar’s childhood is most extensively memorialized in her first major novel, Savushun (1969), which is set in World War II–era Shiraz.[2] Daneshvar attended a British missionary school in Shiraz that enabled her to learn English at a very high level of competency at a time when it was not common, even for affluent Iranians, to do so. She published her first collection of short stories, Atash-e khamush (Extinguished Fire) in 1948, but later insisted that it not be reissued; she was embarrassed by this early effort. She started work as a translator and writer of occasional pieces for newspapers and radio to earn money while she was a university student, and she would continue to be a prolific translator for the duration of her life: her translations include not only literary works such as The Scarlet Letter; Cry, the Beloved Country; and The Human Comedy, but also bestselling self-help works like Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus. She remained interested in the implications of translation as a profession and a practice in Iran throughout her life, but perhaps her most complicated negotiation with translation was her engagement with ideas of race between an American context and an Iranian one.

Daneshvar’s first self-conscious intellectual encounters with the concept of “race” seem to have occurred during the Fulbright year she spent at Stanford University in the United States in 1952–53. Daneshvar always acknowledged the important impact the Fulbright year had on her writing, and she indeed credited one of her teachers at Stanford, Wallace Stegner (1909–93), with changing the way she wrote entirely.[3] We can see the legacy of this fellowship period and Stegner’s influence in her fiction, not just in the explicit ways she attributed to Stegner, but also in her deployment of Blackness and whiteness in the first story collection she published after her Fulbright, A City like Paradise  (Shahri chawn behesht, 1961).[4]

In Playing in the Dark, Toni Morrison suggests the ways in which Blackness functions as a foil for white masculinity in American fiction of the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.[5] For Daneshvar, the practice of racial thinking and interpretation of race in her writing may have been mediated not only through Stegner’s mentorship but also through her work as a translator. One of the first books she translated after her Fulbright year was William Saroyan’s The Human Comedy (Komedi-ye ensani, 1954).[6] Although she did not translate any of Stegner’s work, she was clearly influenced by his worldview and style, and continued to seek his patronage long after her Fulbright year ended.[7] Aside from her adoption of the by-now hackneyed phrase associated with the American “program year,” “show, don’t tell,” Daneshvar continued to correspond with Stegner for many years beyond the Fulbright and clearly regarded him as an important mentor.[8] Stegner’s most famous novel of the West (Angle of Repose, 1971) was yet to come, but he was already acknowledged by this time for a multitude of writings on the American West, including Big Rock Candy Mountain (1943). Among these were One Nation (1948), which generated an associated film focused on the “American Negro” section of that book and called by the same name. Shortly after Daneshvar’s Fulbright period, Stegner also contracted to work as a propagandist for what was then the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO).[9]

Daneshvar would also go on to translate other American works, with Stegner’s encouragement, including The Scarlet Letter (Dagh-e nang, 1955). For Daneshvar, American literature’s predilection for the “power of blackness” that Morrison critiques in Playing in the Dark may have come to her in part through education during the Fulbright year, and in part through translation. Stegner and Saroyan were both important architects in the development of a masculine mythology of the New West, and Stegner’s work has been both celebrated and critiqued for its depiction of the American West and of white masculinity.[10]

Daneshvar’s observations in her letters to her husband, Jalal Al-e Ahmad, complicate some of the accepted views about this remarkable writer, and shed a different light on her political affiliations and impressions of coeval political movements.[11] Her engagement with race is of particular interest, not just because of contemporary debates and attention to race globally as a consequence of police brutality in the United States, but also because it has been so much overlooked in her work. The way that she saw (or didn’t see) race is notable—not because, as many Iranian scholars and scholars of Iran erroneously suggest, Iranians are effectively color blind, but because Daneshvar’s understanding of and engagement with race reflects an attempt to grapple with a different racial paradigm in the United States. There, she witnessed some of the aspects of life that gave rise to the Civil Rights Movement, and later witnessed some of the major protests involved with that movement. Also, Daneshvar herself dealt in her own writing with race in ways that are at times profoundly troubling.

Unfortunately, scholars of Iran to date have also not been able to fully face the complicated ways in which Iranian intellectuals have negotiated race and the legacy of slavery in Iran, either in terms of its connections to race or in terms of the way that they viewed racial thinking and slavery in other contexts, especially in the United States. In her dissertation, Seeing Race (2018), Beeta Baghoolizadeh suggests that the move to preemptively distance and separate Iran’s history of slavery from any association with other histories of slavery was in effect an attempt to whitewash Iran’s past.[12] As Baghoolizadeh shows, this was a self-conscious national effort during the Pahlavi period, but one which continues into the present, and with which Iranian scholars have to some extent collaborated.

This discomfort with the legacy of slavery in Iran’s past is evident in Behnaz Mirzai’s A History of Slavery and Emancipation in Iran 1800-1929 (2017).[13] The result of extensive archival research by Mirzai, this monograph nonetheless teleologically reads the story of slavery and its abolition as the inevitable triumph of the secular nation–state in Iran. Consequently, Mirzai spends little time considering the painful and enduring effects or consequences of the enslavement of Africans on their descendants. Moreover, Mirzai declines to engage the issue of racism, selectively citing the work of other scholars to insist on a distinction between the American history and experience of slavery and the history of slavery in the Islamic world.[14] Regrettably, this denial is a trope of the genre of Iranian writing on the history of slavery.

In a similar vein to Mirzai’s approach, Haleh Afshar’s uncomfortable essay “Age, Gender and Slavery in and out of the Persian Harem: A Different Story” (2000) remembers the “freed slave” who lived in the Afshar home, a woman who had originally been bought for the harem of Muzaffar al-Din Shah Qajar.[15] When she was “freed” (i.e., the harem could no longer support so many slaves), this woman, called only Sonbol Baji (Sister Hyacinth), became Afshar’s nanny.[16] Afshar uses what she says is a framework drawn from Audre Lorde’s notion of “bio-mythography,” and describes the impulse for this article as the desire to give voice to someone who never acquired the necessary literacy to write her own story. Yet Afshar struggles to reconcile this personal history of her family’s slaveholding with the liberal racial politics required of her in her adopted country (the United Kingdom). Instead, she relies on odd assertions that suggest Sonbol Baji found her time as a slave “empowering,”[17] and that “for Sonbol Baji her colour had been one of her major attractions. The king had wished for a beautiful ‘black’ girl in his entourage and had acquired Sonbol when she was a small child.”[18] Throughout the essay, Afshar deploys the words slave and black in quotation marks, and indicates that she finds these terms insufficient and possibly foreign to the context of Iran, even though the word commonly used in Persian to describe Afro-Iranians is siah (Black).[19]

An unintended visual critique of the history that Afshar offers comes in Pedram Khosronejad’s collection of Qajar photographs, Qajar African Nannies (2017), in which a photograph of Afshar and her brother Kamran with Sonbol Baji is published.[20] Although we cannot extrapolate too much from a single photograph, I believe we can see the photograph as a critique of Afshar’s characterization. The photo shows an Afro-Iranian woman holding a large Iranian boy, perhaps two years old; a plump little Iranian girl wearing a European dress and bow in her hair is posed in front of the woman, and a (white) doll is posed at the girl’s feet. The woman’s face is shadowed, but it is weary and expresses sadness, possibly even fear. As Khosronejad observes in his introduction to the volume, “The faces of all the Africans in the photographs of this collection confirm their deep sadness and the horror that encapsulated their entire lives.”[21]

The introduction aside, this volume does not attempt to interpret the photographs deeply. Khosronejad has indeed largely eschewed critical engagement with these photographs, saying that he sees his role largely as an archivist gathering material for others to interpret.[22] His discomfort with some aspects of this process is evident, and he has commented on the fact that these photographs of enslaved persons were taken without the consent of the subjects, but would theoretically belong to the descendants of the subjects, who, in his view, are impossible to locate owing to the destruction of documents related to their ancestors’ enslavement. Instead, the photographs have become the subject of dispute between different “owners”—the Qajar families, who claim them by right of inheritance, and the Iranian government, which confiscated them during the revolution.[23]

Other evidence also points to a discomfort with a critical scrutiny of the legacy of slavery, particularly enslavement of Africans, in Iran. Even a book ostensibly dedicated to the study of race, Reza Zia-Ebrahimi’s 2017 The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race and the Politics of Dislocation,[24] which focuses on the development of an Aryanist-inflected Iranian nationalism, elides the way in which Aryanism was not simply staged at the expense of other “white” minorities in Iran, but also and in ironic ways, at the cost of effacing the history of slavery and its aftermath.[25] Anthony A. Lee, in a preface to his work recovering the history of the enslaved individual Fezzeh Khanom in nineteenth-century Shiraz, notes the results of the 1868 census, which showed that in Tehran, the population of Afro-Iranians was then 12%, a fact that has been ignored or glossed over in the historiography of the period.[26] In his portrait of Fezzeh Khanom, Lee draws on Bahai historiography, which constitutes one of the few sources to record even obliquely the lives of these slaves, but notes, “while it is commendable that the presence of these African slaves is acknowledged, their significance to history is ignored.”[27]

On the evidence presented by Daneshvar herself, her family likely enslaved people. Daneshvar never (to my knowledge) discussed this fact directly or put it in any explicit comparative framework with the legacy of slavery she saw in the United States. Yet she acknowledged that a character from the story “A City like Paradise” (“Shahri chawn behesht,” from the collection by the same name), Mehrangiz, was based on her own dadeh siah (Black nanny), an Afro-Iranian slave-cum-servant, who lived with her own family.[28] Elsewhere, I have argued that this figure of the freed-slave-cum-female-domestic functions in Daneshvar’s work, and in the imaginary of Iranian modernity, as a sign of a disjuncture, an irreconcilability.[29] In particular, I have focused on the way in which even as women’s rights and status came to the fore of public attention as important aspects of Iran’s modernization, neither reformist Iranians, including feminists like Daneshvar, nor the law itself could acknowledge female domestic servants (including former enslaved persons like Mehrangiz or Sonbol Baji) as women. Mehrangiz is perhaps the closest Daneshvar comes to showing real sympathy for a female domestic, and this attitude is clearly derived from Mehrangiz’s helpless abjection in the household.

Even for feminists, the personhood of servants existed outside the law, and the status of manumitted slaves who had become, perforce, domestic servants was particularly precarious. Yet in spite (or perhaps because) of this denial of their personhood, the figure of the servant persists in important ways in modern Iranian fiction. In my book, I argue that this trace in the literature is as important as any legal document. In literary texts as well as in political discourse, female domestic workers would increasingly become the Other to the imagination of a central, dominant Iranian womanhood, which defined itself not only in contrast to the traditional wife, but also to the household servants.

Many of Daneshvar’s short stories and novels prominently feature domestic servants, especially women, and Daneshvar often thematizes their position in the household in her stories. Only the eponymous story in A City like Paradise, however, thematizes the status of a former female Afro-Iranian slave. As alluded to above, this story follows the life and finally the death of Mehrangiz, who is now serving as a nanny, maid-of-all-work, and de facto concubine in the middle-class home of her former master’s daughter, to whom she was given as a wedding gift.[30] With the onset of modernity and Reza Shah’s reforms, which included land reforms and the Manumission Law of 1929, elite slaveholders saw a rearrangement of their fortunes. Here, we see that dramatized in the case of this married daughter, who cannot afford another person in her household, resents Mehrangiz’s sanctioned intimacy with her children (and unsanctioned intimacy with her husband), and treats her as subhuman and with immense cruelty. Although the story clearly evinces sympathy for Mehrangiz, the character portrayed as the true victim is Ali, the son of Mehrangiz’s mistress, who loves Mehrangiz more than he does his mother, and whose inability to achieve the signposts of manhood (e.g., employment, marriage) is obviously signaled as the true tragedy of the story, even though it concludes with Mehrangiz’s abject death.

If Daneshvar and other leftist and feminist intellectuals had difficulty seeing domestic servants as having souls—in other words, as “real” people[31]—we might also say that she had difficulty seeing the problems with the deployment of Blackness as abasement.[32] In the two additional stories in A City Like Paradise that also foreground race, “The Iranians’ New Year” (“‘Ayd-e iraniha”) and “The Playhouse” (“Suratkhaneh”), Daneshvar deploys the use of blackface in two Iranian cultural traditions to comment on the situation of the (non-Black) Iranian. “The Iranians’ New Year” tells the story of an American expatriate family living in Iran and their two young sons’ naïve fascination with a young man whose occupation is playing the Hajji Firuz character associated with the Persian New Year, Nowruz, while “The Playhouse” revolves around an actor playing the siah in a traditional theater.

In “The Iranians’ New Year,” the mediating sensibility is that of two American expatriate children in Iran in the 1950s, when Americans were beginning to be present in Iran in larger numbers, but the site of sympathy is the Iranian young man they patronize. The two children, Ted and John Michaelson, are fascinated by the blackface Hajji Firuz character, which is an important ritual aspect of the Nowruz holiday, and they become by extension fascinated by the young man living on the margins of their neighborhood who plays this character professionally. The boys adopt a charitable attitude toward the young man and his father, who is a shoeshiner, and build, unbidden, a kiosk shack for the men, decorating it with American symbols, such as the American flag and Mickey Mouse. When one day they find the shack abandoned and open to the rain and wind, which has destroyed their decorations, the younger boy first imagines that “red Indians” have attacked the place; then, when his brother pooh-poohs this idea, insists that it must have been “black men with masks” and that they must be “lynched.”[33] The story is very obviously a critique of American expatriates in Iran in the 1950s, when they had begun to look like representatives of a colonial presence, especially after the 1953 coup engineered by the CIA and MI6. The evocation of Blackness here comes in the form of the Hajji Firuz character, as well as in the comments made by the two boys in their mistaken understanding of what has happened in the kiosk. The young man’s father has died, and the boys do not understand the reasons for the poverty in which the young man and his father lived, or that their “help” does not in fact save a man who has spent his life shining shoes by the side of the road.

As in “A City like Paradise,” here it is not the plight of any Black person that is dramatized (or a critique of the strangeness of the Hajji Firuz blackface tradition), but rather, the abased condition of non-Black male Iranians. The boys are foolish (if naïve) white Americans, but in the story, they take on sinister qualities nonetheless: their innocence, which is protected by their whiteness and their privilege as Americans, enables them to feel self-satisfied at the pathetic help they offer impoverished members of a society whose language they don’t speak and whose customs they don’t understand. Yet Daneshvar does not attempt to unpack the Hajji Firuz tradition at all. Here, as in “The Playhouse,” she deploys blackface but does not interrogate it as a problematic or dehumanizing practice. Hajji Firuz, like Zwarte Piet in the Netherlands, is a historically mysterious and contested aspect of the Nowruz celebration. Explaining the origins of this figure has become part of an apologia related to contemporary Iranian negotiations of race.[34]

“The Playhouse” follows a few days in the life of Mehdi Siah (whose name essentially translates to “Mehdi the Black”), a blackface performer in the “low” dramatic tradition that was still popular at the time of the story’s creation. In this tradition, as the story confirms, the siah is the central character in the drama—the mediating character with whom audiences are invited to identify.[35] Mehdi Siah gets caught up in the tragedy of one of the other players, a young woman who has become pregnant out of wedlock and plans to ensnare the rich amateur who has recently joined the troop, wanting to “study” Mehdi Siah. Here, Mehdi Siah reluctantly chooses class solidarity by allowing the subterfuge and entrapment of the young man to progress without intervening. Here, too, as in “The Iranians’ New Year,” the reader’s sympathy is directed toward a disenfranchised Iranian male, whose condition of abasement is made manifest in both stories by wearing blackface.

Taken together, these stories suggest a significant change in Daneshvar’s sensibilities regarding race. Her previous writings show no such attention to race at all, suggesting that her time in the United States during the Fulbright fellowship radically changed her perspective on race (as well as on class). For this reason, I am suggesting the paradigm of translation to discuss Daneshvar’s negotiation of race. While translation has become so capacious a concept in contemporary scholarship that it risks the loss of any meaning at all, I believe it can be a useful metaphor here for thinking about the negotiation of “race” because it is so clearly a concept or idea that does not fully translate between languages.

Although Iranians began to go to the United States and Europe for education in large numbers in the 1960s and 1970s, Daneshvar was not part of that wave, by virtue of her age.[36]  However, she was one of the first, if not the only, Iranians to record experiences of racial encounters during the height of the civil rights movement, and the language she uses is tentative and does not conform to any preconceived or prescribed vocabulary for discussing race.[37] Her letters suggest her fascination with race as an operative concept in the United States that structures relations between Black and white Americans. She struggles to see how she herself is understood within this paradigm, and refers to herself as “just a shade lighter” than the African Americans she meets. Against this uncertainty about where she falls in the American color continuum, we must also acknowledge the fact that Daneshvar and Al-e Ahmad, whose family was from northern Iran, clearly had a running private joke regarding her color. He sometimes refers to her in their letters as his “black girl from Shiraz” (dokhtar-e siah-e Shiraz) or “my black one” (siah sukhteh-ye man), and she frequently signs herself in the same way, or as “your black Simin” (Simin-e siah-e to).[38] On the other hand, Daneshvar is at times patronizing toward the Black Americans she meets: she seems confused and, at times, horrified or bemused at some of the situations racism in the United States engenders. She tells Al-e Ahmad the story of Dorothy, a young Black woman who lives in Daneshvar’s dormitory at Stanford and figures in the letters as someone who is remarkable for her beauty.[39] She answers a phone call intended for another girl, and when that girl is not available, the caller asks if he can take Dorothy out for a date. She accepts and waits for the caller in the dormitory’s lobby. When he arrives and discovers that she is Black, he berates her and says he won’t take her out. A female custodian for the dormitory, who is also Black and unnamed but frequently referred to, yells at the man and threatens him. Daneshvar ends the story by relating how she and another (white) friend intervene by coming home from the cinema and telling the custodian to stop, or she might be fired. Daneshvar sees herself as having helpfully intervened.[40]

Neda Maghbouleh’s important work on Iranian American racialization and racial thinking suggests some critical framework for Daneshvar’s difficulty placing herself on the color spectrum, and her ambivalent (dis)identification with Black Americans: “The specter of Iran was a racial hinge between white Europe and non-white Asia: a face, a body, a culture, and a concept that could open or close the door to whiteness as needed.”[41] Daneshvar’s descriptions of her interactions with Americans, as in the account above, show that her “blackness” is something she elects to participate in, but can step back from when she wants to do so, and take the position of whiteness.

Two comparatist Americanist scholars, Ebony Coletu and Ira Dworkin, have investigated some of the important but often overlooked moments of identification between contemporary Egyptian intellectuals, who selectively courted and rejected the idea of Egypt’s status as an African nation, and Black activism in the United States. In the article “A Complicated Embrace,” Coletu examines the reception and translation of Alex Haley’s novel Roots in the Arab world in the 1970s and 1980s, where it was enormously popular.[42] The plight of protagonist Kunta Kinte became a metaphor for the condition of Egyptians, especially Egyptians working in the Gulf, at the same time that Egypt was practicing racist policies directed at Sudanese refugees and Nubian Egyptians.[43] Coletu compares this use of Roots to Eve Troutt Powell’s powerful investigation of racial politics in Egypt during the period of the Sudanese condominium (1899–1956). Coletu comments that while the use of blackface in Egypt at that time was a way to “visualize stubborn resistance to the ‘civilizing mission’ of the British colonial project while reifying support for Egyptian cultural transformation under European influence [. . .] [t]he rhetorical plasticity of Kunta Kinte as a resistant figure and a slave marked by blackness resonates with this local history even as it conveys a distinct story about Atlantic slavery and diasporic survival in the United States.”[44] Coletu goes on to note that the use of Roots by Egyptian intellectuals such as Sonallah Ibrahim tended to exploit the metaphor of slavery elsewhere to explain the plight of intellectuals such as himself, rather than to shed light on contemporary practices of racism. She also points out that “legacies of slavery are also reworked over time and in Egypt, reference to slavery as debasement has been visually coded to blackness in the last century,”[45] a point echoed by Baghoolizadeh’s examination of racial artifacts and discourse in Iran in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Dworkin is concerned with the personal history and writings of Radwa Ashour (1946–2014).[46] Ashour, an Egyptian intellectual and writer married to prominent Palestinian poet, writer, and activist Mourid Barghouti, had long been interested in Black political movements before she began work on a doctoral degree in 1973 at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Dworkin argues that it was her long association with Shirley Graham Du Bois, who lived in Cairo for many years, that led her to choose UM Amherst’s Department of English, where she specialized in African American literature and was closely associated with the Department of Afro-American Studies. Ashour’s dissertation discussed in depth the First International Congress of Negro Writers and Artists in September 1956, and specifically, the “applicability” of the “colonial thesis,” as put forward by writers like Aimé Césaire, to the situation in the United States. Dworkin uses Ashour’s 1983 autobiography and the later quasi-historical novel Siraaj: An Arab Tale (1992), which relates the tale of a slave rebellion on a fictional east African island, to argue that Ashour’s engagement of African American cultural politics influenced her fictional and autobiographical writing in Arabic in ways that had broader (but largely unexamined) consequences for the modern Arabic novel. Her profound interest in African American politics notwithstanding, Dworkin notes that Ashour was unable to endorse the critique made by her mentor and friend Du Bois of racism in contemporary Egypt. Dworkin also argues that—similar to Coletu’s findings regarding Roots in Egypt—“the particular appeal of African American culture [for Ashour] lies more in its broad-based engagement with colonial histories of oppression than with the particular contours of racism within the modern state.”[47]

Something similar is at work in Daneshvar’s engagement with the politics of race in the United States, and her attempt to translate what she sees for Al-e Ahmad. Daneshvar was not interested in opening a referendum on race in Iran, but she clearly did see the condition of Black intellectuals in the United States as having some parallel to the situation of intellectuals and artists in Pahlavi Iran, where any critique of the shah was censored and the author blacklisted or flagged for surveillance. However, insofar as Daneshvar did see the condition of Black Americans as a metaphor for some Iranian experiences, clearly Blackness for her meant degradation or abjection. While her writerly sympathies remained with the politically downtrodden, they did not always embrace those who were class or racially suppressed. Her representations of non-Persians (and specifically, Indians and Azeri Turks) in Savushun can be charitably described as “Othering,” and her treatment of lower-class woman, especially, was often contemptuous and deployed for satire.

In the summer of 1963, Daneshvar returned to the United States for a second extended stay, to participate in the Harvard International Seminar, and she would again record her impressions in letters to Al-e Ahmad. (The collection A City like Paradise had been published two years earlier, and while on her trip, she writes irritably to Al-e Ahmad of an unfavorable review of the book by a young man she doesn’t know.)[48] Notably, she writes on several occasions, and at length, about the civil rights movement in the United States, which was foregrounded in the seminar. The filmmaker Richard Leacock screened and discussed his documentary The Chair (1962), which follows the attempt to commute the death sentence for Paul Crump, who was convicted for his participation in the killing of a security guard during an armed robbery in Chicago. The participants were taken to a Boston “slum” (Daneshvar’s word) to see conditions of life there, and were offered social experiences in self-consciously integrated settings.[49] Daneshvar also records Ralph Ellison’s visit and presentation to the seminar, which was clearly an important part of her experience that summer.

Ellison, author of Invisible Man, made a profound impression on Daneshvar, and she speaks of his work with great respect and interest, recording quotations from his speech to the seminar, and observes that he is someone who has used literature to overcome the enormous obstacle of race, which “might otherwise have defined him.”[50] She describes to Al-e Ahmad how she has begun reading Ellison’s novel and is so impressed by it that she has ordered it for Al-e Ahmad in French (he could not read fluently in English).[51] She also discusses how Ellison, in spite of being made financially comfortable by the success of Invisible Man, continues to teach. She clearly sees him as a kind of comrade, viewing him as a model for herself and for Al-e Ahmad; later in the letters, having finished Invisible Man in its entirety, she indeed compares Ellison’s style to Al-e Ahmad’s.[52] In Ellison, the avowed engagé writer, Daneshvar recognizes a commonality.[53] She tries to explain how the struggle to deal with racism and the legacy of slavery in the United States is mirrored in their own struggle for greater freedoms in Iran, but falters.[54]

Daneshvar also comments on James Baldwin, whose work she had already come into contact with during her Fulbright year. On this later occasion, Jack Ludwig, whom she calls “our professor” at the Harvard Seminar, has given her a copy of The Atlantic. While Daneshvar doesn’t really care for Ludwig’s story, she admires a story by Baldwin in the issue (she doesn’t name it, but from her description and the date, it must be “This Morning, This Evening, So Soon,” 1960), calling it a “masterpiece” (shahkar).[55] Later, however, she compares him unfavorably to Ellison.[56] Again, both Daneshvar and Al-e Ahmad seem to admire what they see as Ellison’s desire to transcend race: Al-e Ahmad comments that while he will always be Black, he doesn’t have to always be a Black writer like Baldwin; he can just be a writer.[57] Both are snide and superior about Baldwin’s open homosexuality, and refer to Ellison as mardak (little man, a derogatory term in Persian), which can simply be a highly colloquial expression, but feels unusual in Daneshvar’s language (if not in Al-e Ahmad’s).[58]

Daneshvar’s comments also suggest a sense of being above, and separate from, what she saw as an American problem. Since a large part of the program at the Harvard Seminar was about racial conflict in the United States, Daneshvar reflects: “In summary, right now the most difficult political issue in America is the solution of the case between whites and blacks, and the Don Juans of the [American] universities and colleges are thick-necked blacks, and the white and blonde girls who don’t have a black friend have lost their chance. But my dear, I’m sure you’re weary of hearing my explanations. . .”[59] The casual racism in this comment is profoundly disturbing. Yet at the same time, and in spite of making light of the situation as she does above, Daneshvar cared enough about what was happening in the United States to attend (without Al-e Ahmad’s permission!) the March on Washington. As she records it in the letters, she wanted to “be part of history, be a witness to history.”[60] She goes on to say that it had a profound effect on her: the march was organized and peaceful, and the police, both Black and white, were helpful. She observes that “the Black race is truly a beautiful one,” and that the Black and white people participating in the march, to her surprise, “were kissing each other.”[61]

Daneshvar was a self-stated critic of the injustice she saw in the world around her, and her engagement with race, both in these letters and in her post-Fulbright collection of stories, presents some uncomfortable truths about the contradictions of the politics espoused by Daneshvar and the Iranian left in the Cold War period.[62] She did not attempt to connect or critique her own contact with practices of enslavement, or the practice of enslavement and its legacy in Iran more broadly, with what she witnessed in the United States. Rather, Daneshvar’s (and Al-e Ahmad’s) representations of Blackness in Iran and the United States were deployed as metaphors for the victimization of suppressed classes, including the suppression of Iranian intellectuals, at the hands of the Pahlavi state. However, their deployment of Blackness in their writing did not enable them to see or critique their own racial thinking. For Daneshvar, in both her letters and her fiction, Afro-Iranians, Africans, and Black Americans remain an Other that cannot be remediated through narration. Instead, they become a way of “playing in the dark,” deploying Blackness to clarify and critique the position of non-Black Iranians in the Pahlavi era.

 

[1]I wish to thank Fatemeh Shams and Ira Dworkin for their helpful comments on this essay. This essay is offered in honor of Dr. Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak, whose erudition and mentorship have guided so many of us. 

[2]I am using Willem Floor’s expression “clearing center” from his Encyclopaedia Iranica article “BARDA and BARDA-DARI: From the Mongols to the Abolition of Slavery,” 2000, www.iranicaonline.org/articles/barda-iv.

[3]This is on page 33 of Honar va adabiyat-e emruz:  goft o shenudi ba doktor Simin Daneshvar va Parviz Natel Khanlari (Contemporary Art and Literature: Interviews with Dr. Simin Daneshvar and Dr. Parviz Natel Khanlari), ed. Nasser Hariri (Babul, IR: Ketabsara-ye Babul, AH 1366/AD 1987).

[4]Simin Daneshvar, Shahri chawn behesht (Tehran: Kharzmi, AH 1381/AD 2002).

[5]Toni Morrison, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination (New York: Vintage, 1993).

[6]William Saroyan, Payk-e marg va zendigi ya komedi-ye ensani (The Messenger of Life and Death, or, The Human Comedy), trans. Simin Daneshvar (Tehran: Ibn Sina, 1954).

[7]Daneshvar’s letters to Stegner are housed in the Stanford University Library. Daneshvar writes to Stegner while she is at the Harvard Seminar in 1963 to ask for his help in finding work in the United States. She also invites Stegner to visit Iran (which he does), and generally praises the positive influence he has had on her writing.

[8]See her letters in English to Stegner, which are part of the collection “Wallace Earle Stegner Creative Writing Program : correspondence and manuscripts, 1949-1992,” and which are held at the Department of Special Collections, Green Library, Stanford University.

[9]The story of Stegner’s association with ARAMCO is itself a fascinating story, as told by Robert Vitalis in “Wallace Stegner’s Arabian Discovery: Imperial Blind Spots in a Continental Vision,” Pacific Historical Review, no. 3 (August 2007):  405–38.

[10]Why I Can’t Read Wallace Stegner and Other Essays: A Tribal Voice (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996) by Elizabeth Cook-Lynn is one such work.

[11]Simin Daneshvar, Nameh-ha-ye Simin Daneshvar va Jalal Al-e Ahmad (The Letters of Simin Daneshvar and Jalal Al-e Ahmad), vols. 1 and 3, ed. Mas‘ud Ja‘fari Jazi (Tehran: Nilufar, AH 1385/AD 2006).

[12]Beeta Baghoolizadeh, “Seeing Race and Erasing Slavery: Media and the Construction of Blackness in Iran, 1830–1960” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2018).

[13]Behnaz Mirzai, A History of Slavery and Emancipation in Iran 1800-1929 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2017).

[14]Mirzai, History of Slavery, 19–25.

[15]Haleh Afshar, “Age, Gender and Slavery in and out of the Persian Harem: A Different Story,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, no. 5 (2000): 905–16.

[16]African slaves in Iran were often given the names of flowers or gems, possibly to connote value or beauty; these were not their birth names, which are most frequently erased from history. For a historical attestation to this practice, see Bahman Katiraˈi, “Yaddasht-hayi darbareh-ye Emsal o hekam (taˈlif ‘Ali Akbar Dehkhoda)” (“Some Notes on the Proverbs and Wise Sayings [Written by ‘Ali Akbar Dekhoda]),” in Miyan-e reshteh-ha: daneshkadeh-ye adabiyat va ‘olum-e ensani-ye daneshgah-e Tehran (Between Fields: The Faculty of Literature and Humanities of the University of Tehran), nos. 5–6 (AH 1347/AD 1968): 505–32.

[17]Afshar, “Age, Gender and Slavery,” 905.

[18]Afshar, “Age, Gender and Slavery,” 909. For a fuller discussion of how liberalism in the United States and Europe has been practiced as “racial liberalism,” see Charles Mills’s Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[19]Many words are used in Persian for slave, but not all of them have the same historical connotation relating to enslavement of Africans. Some terms used to denote African slaves include bardeh, dadeh siah, kaka siah, gholam, and khvajeh. As in English, “I am your servant [slave]” (bandeh-ye shoma hastam) is a common polite expression, and bandeh is used as a polite personal pronoun in certain types of discourse. For one discussion in English of this form of discourse, see William O. Beeman’s useful (if now dated) Politics of Language and Status in Iran (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986).

[20]Pedram Khosronejad,  Qajar African Nannies  (Stillwater: Dr. Ali Fazel Visual Archive, Media Collection and Digital Resources, University of Oklahoma, 2018). Exhibition catalog.

[21]Khosronejad, Qajar African Nannies, vi.

[22]Pedram Khosronejad (lecture associated with photo exhibition “Qajar African Nannies” at UC Davis Alumni Center, Davis, CA, 10 May 2018).

[23]Khosronejad, lecture.

[24]Reza Zia-Ebrahimi, The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race and the Politics of Dislocation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).

[25]Akhundzadeh, a major focus of Zia-Ebrahimi’s study, was himself a person of partially African descent through his mother (H. Algar, “AKUNDZADA,” Encyclopaedia Iranica, 2011, www.iranicaonline.org/articles/akundzada-playwright).

[26]Anthony A. Lee, “Enslaved African Women in Nineteenth-Century Iran: The Life of Fezzeh Khanom of Shiraz,” Iranian Studies, no. 3 (2012): 417–37.

[27]Lee, “Enslaved African Women,” 429.

[28]Honar va adabiyat-e emruz, 11.

[29]Amy Motlagh, Burying the Beloved: Gender, Fiction and Reform in Modern Iran (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).

[30]Daneshvar acknowledged in several interviews that Mehrangiz was based on her own nanny.  See, for example, p. 11 of her interview with Hariri.

[31]Manijeh Nasrabadi deploys the terminology of affect, as articulated by Deborah Gould, to discuss the complicated engagement of Iranian feminists in the pre-revolutionary educational diaspora with leftist politics. Of woman members of the Iranian Student Association (ISA) in the United States, she notes, “women in the ISA were deeply invested in human liberation, including their own” (131). Some of what she attributes to these activists in that movement can also be said of Daneshvar, who, by virtue of her age, was not part of the wave of student mobilization abroad but may have anticipated some of their experiences. Manijeh Nasrabadi, “‘Women Can Do Anything Men Can Do:’ Gender and the Affects of Solidarity in the U.S. Iranian Student Movement, 1961–1979,” WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly, nos. 3 & 4 (Fall/Winter 2014): 127–45.

[32]For an important reading of the notion of “abjection” in Black diaspora discourse, see Darieck Scott, Extravagant Abjection: Blackness, Power, and Sexuality in the African American Literary Imagination (New York: New York University Press, 2010).

[33]Simin Daneshvar, “The Iranians’ New Year” (“‘Ayd-e iraniha”), in Shahri chawn behesht (Tehran: Kharzmi, AH 1381/AD 2002): 37–44. Quote on p. 42. All translations are my own.

[34]Several scholars have insisted that Hajji Firuz’s blackened face has nothing to do with racial signaling, but is about the fading blackness of winter, since the Iranian New Year is the vernal equinox and many of its rituals have to do with banishing winter and welcoming spring (e.g., Chaharshanbeh suri, or “Burning Wednesday,” when celebrants jump over bonfires and shout “My yellowness for your redness,” meaning my jaundiced [yellow] color for your ruddy [red] color). Scholarship on this topic continues to attempt to distance its racial aspects from the history of enslavement of Africans in Iran; some scholars, indeed, make no note of this possible connection. See, for example, Niayesh Purhassan’s “Hajji Firuz: performans: barrassi va mo’arefi-ye ‘Hajji Firuz’ va negahiye- tatbighi beh namayeshgaran az manzar va didgah-e performans” (“Hajji Firuz: Performance: Research and Introduction to “Hajji Firuz” and a Comparative Look at the Performers/Actors from a Performance Perspective”), in Me’mari va honar (Architecture and Art): Namayesh, nos. 125–26 (AH 1388/AD 2009): 42–47. In contrast, and for an interesting discussion of the contemporary controversy in the Netherlands over Zwarte Piet and a comparison to the Hajji Nowruz tradition, see Angelita D. Reyes, “Performativity and Representation in Transnational Blackface: Mammy (USA), Zwarte Piet (Netherlands), and Haji Firuz (Iran),” Atlantic Studies, no. 4 (2018): 521–50.

[35]For discussion of this theatrical tradition, see Bahram Beyzai, Namayesh dar Iran (Drama in Iran) (Tehran: Chap-e Kaviyan, 1965); Baghoolizadeh, “Seeing Race”; and Maryam Khakipour’s 2010 film Siah Bazi: The Joymakers (New York: Icarus Films, 2010).

[36]See, in particular, Chapter 3 of Matthew K. Shannon, Losing Hearts and Minds: Iranian-American Relations and International Education during the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017) for a fuller discussion of the Iranian student movement in the United States.

[37]The words historically used to discuss the practice of enslavement in Iran, bardegi; the people who were enslaved, bardeh, kaniz, gholam; and Afro-Iranians, siah, differ from the translations of terms used in the Iranian press to describe race, racism, or Black people when they occur elsewhere (nezhad, nezhad parasti/garayi, siah pustan). The latter terms have the quality of neologisms—they are not deployed in this way in historical documents (including literature) dealing with the trade in enslaved Africans or other peoples in Iran.

[38]See, for example, Daneshvar, Nameh-ha, vol. 3, 284, 286, 291, 318. See also Judith Butler’s reading of Nella Larsen’s Passing for an interesting comparison: the protagonist of Passing, Clare, is married to a racist white man who ostensibly does not know her ancestry, but calls her by the nickname “Nig” (Butler, Bodies That Matter [London: Routledge, 1993], 167–86).  When I presented an early version of this work at UC Irvine in 2017, a participant in the seminar took me aside and told me that he had heard that Daneshvar herself had African ancestry, and that this would explain “the way she looked.” When I asked for evidence of this, the person promised to send it to me but did not. I mention this to suggest how Daneshvar has herself been racialized in ways that do not always make it into print.

[39]Black students did not matriculate at Stanford until ten years later, in 1962. Although there was not the violent hostility to Black matriculation that occurred at southern US universities, one student in this cohort, Sandra Drake, remembers, “Once a girl came up to me and said: ‘I’ve never talked to a Negro.’ We were ‘Negroes’ back then.” See Roy Johnson, “What It Was Like to Be an African-American Freshman in 1962,” Stanford Magazine, September 2017, stanfordmag.org/contents/what-it-was-like-to-be-an-african-american-freshman-in-1962.

[40]Daneshvar, Nameh-ha, vol. 1, 384–85.

[41]Neda Maghbouleh, The Limits of Whiteness: Iranian Americans and the Everyday Politics of Race (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2017).

[42]Ebony Coletu, “A Complicated Embrace,” Transition, no. 122 (2017): 138–49.

[43]Roots was published in a Persian translation by Alireza Farahmand in AH 1357/AD 1978 and has never been out of print. Recently, on the occasion of the publication of a new edition of the translation by Amir Kabir Press, Farahmand was interviewed by the newspaper Hamshahri. He mentions his own interest in the history of slavery in the United States, and how he had the opportunity to meet Alex Haley on two occasions; according to Farahmand, Haley was interested in him as a Muslim, since Haley had written The Autobiography of Malcolm X. “Farahmand: Risheh-ha yeki az hezaran ast,” interview with Alireza Farahmand, Hamshahri, AH Azar 1392/December 2013, www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/241770/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B4%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7-%DB%8C%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%87%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA.

[44]Coletu, “Complicated Embrace,” 143.

[45]Coletu, “Complicated Embrace,” 144.

[46]Ira Dworkin, “Radwa Ashour, African American Criticism, and the Production of Modern Arabic Literature,” Cambridge Journal of Postcolonial Literary Inquiry, no. 1 (2018): 1–19.

[47]Dworkin, “Radwa Ashour,” 6.

[48]Daneshvar, Nameh-ha, vol. 3, 257.

[49]Daneshvar, Nameh-ha, vol. 3, 396.

[50]Daneshvar, Nameh-ha, vol. 3, 381.

[51]Interestingly, Daneshvar never mentions the possibility of translating Invisible Man herself, though she did translate several other American novels, and Ellison’s novel has still not been translated into Persian, in spite of a flourishing translation industry in Iran that is not regulated by international copyright laws since Iran is not a signatory to the Berne Convention.

[52]Daneshvar, Nameh-ha, vol. 3, 395.

[53]An odd footnote to Daneshvar’s and Al-e Ahmad’s encounters with Ellison at the Harvard International Seminar is the fact that Ellison later dined with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi at the White House at the invitation of President Johnson. Arnold Rampersad, Ralph Ellison: A Biography (New York: Vintage, 2008), 447.

[54]On p. 395 of vol. 3 of their letters, Daneshvar tells Al-e Ahmad that she sees Ellison as a “serious” writer. She goes on to characterize Invisible Man as a work that is focused on the hopelessness and exhaustion of (American) intellectuals, who are worn down by the petty battles of right and left politics, implicitly reading their own situation onto that of the protagonist in Invisible Man, and eliding the racial component central to the novel. Al-e Ahmad later wrote a treatise on this theme, On the Service and Treachery of the Intellectuals (Tehran: Ravagh, AH 1343/AD 1964).

[55]Daneshvar, Nameh-ha, vol. 3, 366. Baldwin’s “This Morning, This Evening, So Soon” first appeared in The Atlantic in the September 1960 issue (pp. 37–44).

[56]Daneshvar, Nameh-ha, vol. 3, 374. Both Daneshvar and Al-e Ahmad refer to Baldwin as Jimmy at times rather than James—an informality which, like their use of mardak to describe Ellison, may be a linguistic marker of friendly familiarity or an affectation meant to mirror American slang, but in context, reads as a kind of belittling. When I presented this work at the seminar “Roads Not Taken: Literary Translation in Iran” at UC Irvine in December 2018, it was pointed out to me that mardak is not always a sign of disregard, and that Al-e Ahmad often used this term much as contemporary American parlance uses dude. While I take the point, this is a usage unusual for Daneshvar and remarkable in her letters.

[57]Daneshvar, Nameh-ha, vol. 3, 543–44. Al-e Ahmad would later write “The American Husband” (1966), the only short story of his to actively engage an American setting. In this story, much of the plot revolves around an Iranian woman’s discovery of her American husband’s actual profession as a gravedigger, which is depicted as shameful not only because of its contact with the dead—a taboo—but also because his fellow diggers are Black (p. 77).  “The American Husband” (“Showhar-e amrikayi”), in Panj dastan (Tehran: Ravaaq, 1977), 67–82.

He would also write a series of ethnographies that included recording of racial aspects of the people of Kharg, an island in the Persian Gulf that was a major slave trading post. Dorr-e yatim-e khalij, jazireh-ye Khark (The Pearl of the Gulf, the Island of Khark) (Tehran: Majid, AH 1339/AD 1960).

[58]Al-e Ahmad would later meet Ellison when he himself participated in the Harvard International Seminar in 1965. Although Roy Mottahedeh mentions this meeting in passing (and more generally attributes Al-e Ahmad’s being chosen to his being one of the obvious intellectual leaders of Iran, rather than through his wife’s advocacy, which is clear to anyone who reads their correspondence), he does not, in my view, read Al-e Ahmad’s participation correctly and generally uses this to fit into his own view of Al-e Ahmad. Historical or biographical views of any individual may (indeed must) change over time, but I see Mottahedeh’s work as feeding into the hagiographical view of Al-e Ahmad, which sees him as a prefiguring martyr of the revolution. More recent research has sought to revise these views somewhat. Golnar Nikpour’s comparison of Al-e Ahmad’s hajj memoir Khasi dar miqat (published in English under the title Lost in the Crowd) with the account of Malcolm X’s hajj experience in The Autobiography of Malcolm X is an important comparative attempt, but misses out on Al-e Ahmad’s explicit engagement of Malcolm X’s ideas in his letters to Daneshvar and elsewhere. Golnar Nikpour,  “Revolutionary Journeys, Revolutionary Practice: The Hajj Writings of Jalal Al-e Ahmad and Malcolm X,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, no. 1 (2014): 67–85.

[59]Daneshvar, Nameh-ha, vol. 3, 385.

[60]Daneshvar, Nameh-ha, vol. 3, 428–29.

[61]Daneshvar, Nameh-ha, vol. 3, 428–29.

[62]One of the most interesting implications of observing these changes in Daneshvar’s work and tracing their possible sources is that it makes us look in different ways at the nativism that Al-e Ahmad came to espouse in his late work. Even before Gharbzadegi, it is clear that Daneshvar’s accounts of the United States and race had an impact on Al-e Ahmad.