Through Thick and Thin: An Interview with Hamid Naficy

Kaveh Askari <askarik1@msu.edu> is an Associate Professor of English and Film Studies at Michigan State University.

This transcript is an edited version of an eighty-minute interview conducted at Northwestern University on January 5, 2018 under the auspices of the Society for Cinema and Media Studies. The Fieldnotes project of SCMS aims to trace, through discussions of the career trajectories of pioneers of film and media studies, developments that have shaped–and continue to shape—the expanding field.

 

Kaveh Askari: Let’s start a little earlier than some professional biographies and talk about childhood experience, because it is something you have written about and something that scholars working in exile sometimes braid into their work.

Hamid Naficy: I was born and raised through high school in the city of Isfahan in Iran. As a kid, my first memory of movie-watching is going to the theatre and the movie-house with my dad. Thief of Baghdad was one of the early ones I remember. I also watched a number of films in the fifties that were based on literature, like King Vidor’s War and Peace and Jean-Paul Le Chanois’ Les Misérables. I had read the novels before. In this case, one medium sort of led me to the other. I think one of the early intersections of two media or intertextuality for me as a kid happened there. I had read the novels, I would go to see the movies. Then a neighbour of ours gave me a 35mm Agfa camera and I took this camera with me to see the movies. I clearly remember trying to take a picture of Audrey Hepburn in War and Peace; I was holding the camera like this, holding my breath, making sure that my hand wouldn’t shake when I took the picture. That’s how from early on I had a fairly multi-media relationship with film. Just to answer your question a little bit more, the role of foreign cultural societies in my childhood was very important. The Soviets had their Iran-Soviet Cultural Relations Society in Isfahan, the British had The British Council, and the Americans had the Iran-America Society, where they not only showed films, but also taught languages and had libraries. Interestingly, when I was in elementary school the United States Information Agency, USIA, began to train Iranians in making documentaries. They brought a whole new phenomenon of film screening in Iran, as well, which involved showing films via mobile film units. These were Jeeps that had a driver who was also the projectionist. He would carry 16mm Bell & Howell projectors with screens. He would come to our school every Thursday afternoon, the day before the weekend, and set up his screen in our library and show a USIA film.

KA: All USIA films or other kinds of films?

HN: USIA films, which included films on development and agriculture, Iran News newsreels shots in Iran, and newsreels about life in the United States. He would travel from that school to villages nearby and show the films. The thing which is remarkable for me is that I have a notebook that contains 16 film reviews which I had written of USIA films at age nine while attending that school. I don’t think that was based on my own initiative. I think that was a requirement by an enlightened teacher. So that’s another aspect of film viewing and reviewing and criticism which was embedded into my experience from early on.

KA: So, there are two different dimensions to the film-going that you are talking about. One is kind of an institutional dimension with USIA educational film; the other is commercial film-going. Were there overlaps between these two worlds in terms of film fans or was that something unique to your particular educational experience?

HN: I think anybody who was going to that elementary school (called Nemuneh Elementary) had similar experiences. By the way, that school was built by funding from USIA in Iran, and served as a model for modern schools. It had an open-stack library, which was very unusual.  All the libraries in Isfahan in those days were closed stacks. You had to go and ask for a book and somebody would fetch it for you. In this library students would just browse and find the books they wanted to read.  There was a film club which had just opened up and they would generally rent commercial cinema and show films Friday mornings, when nobody else would go to see movies. I attended that film club’s film screenings a few times. There were very few, like 10 or 12 people, in the huge cinema watching some arthouse film, mostly foreign stuff. When I was a kid I also tried to build a film projector and failed! That was miserable! I tried to build a radio receiver and I failed, again! I still remember the regret and sense of frustration, but that’s how it goes!

KA: What were you watching at the time you were contemplating studying abroad?

HN: The films that I remember were these literature-based films that I mentioned, as well as Richard Brooks’ The Brothers Karamazov.  I had read the novels and looked for their filmic adaptations.  Reading was a big thing in our family and all the kids had actually pulled together a children’s library which by the time of the revolution housed some 5000 volumes, many of them children’s books, which was an incredible treasure. So, we did a lot of reading and writing.

KA: And then your parents supported your desire to go abroad. You went to England first, is that right?

HN: Yes, I went for a year to the UK in the early 1960s. My dad was actually a well-known physician and for his heart specialisation went to Harvard. He also brought back with him a present for me which was one of those View-Master slide viewers with the disc and you click on it to change the slides. So, actually, for the first time through the agency of my dad I became Americanised; not only by watching American films with him before, but [also] through these slides of national parks and so forth I began to sort of imagining myself there. So, there were multiple strands that turned me towards media, in particular film, and also toward the States as a site for education and college.

KA: How was that experience of arriving and studying into the US?

HN: I came to the US in 1964 to go to school at University of Southern California. My intention was to major in dentistry. The first year I had to take science courses and pre-dental courses, but organic chemistry did me in, basically. I think I got 40. That was terrible. So, I said to myself, “I’m gonna take a course in this Department of Telecommunication, and if I like that course, I’ll change my major.” It just so happened that I took a course from Edward Borgers who was an old massive and voluble guy who had us analyse a classic television drama, like Playhouse Nightie, as well as TV commercials. I remember analysing for the first time a Marlboro cigarette commercial. I’d never seen anybody assign a 60-second commercial for analysis. Remember, those days filtered cigarettes were more regarded as female cigarettes, so for the first time they were trying to reassign filtered cigarettes to men, and the He-Man, the rugged cow-boy type, who was smoking filtered cigarettes was a new phenomenon. Anyway, that kind of textual analysis of the Marlboro man really attracted me tremendously, as it demonstrated how these lowly commercials were producing meaning. So, I switched to telecommunication, which in today’s parlance means Radio-Television. USC had a separate school of cinema. Telecommunication was in another school, so we didn’t have a lot of contact with cinema, but I did take a couple of courses there as well. I remember, George Lucas was a year or two ahead of me as a student in cinema. I was undergrad and he was, I think, either a grad or at the end of his B.A. I participated in a lot of activities in the telecom department. We had the KUSC-FM radio station, where I was a sound-effects man for a whole series of radio dramas. Then, I had my own weekly half-hour show on that radio station, called Non-Western Music. I played Indian, African, Persian, Arab and Asian music of various sorts. The format of my program was completely idiosyncratic, for I interspersed these musical numbers with my readings of the latest discoveries culled from Scientific American. This format satisfied my own interests, but nobody told me not to do it and nobody told me to do it.  USC was an interesting experimental place where I continued my combination of production and studies…

KA: So, film studies was there for you from the start, but your major was in production?

HN: Both. Not film production, but radio and TV production. Courses were generally broadcast- oriented, like management or analysis of history of radio, history of television, with a few production courses thrown in.

KA: And after that point you’d gone into MFA at UCLA.

HN: That’s right.

KA: That was in film?

HN: Yes. That was in the department of theatre arts which had both film and television. It was a heady time, from 1968 to 71, and the counter-culture movement, the anti-Vietnam war and the civil rights movements were all on. Students were actually taking over offices of the faculty at UCLA. I remember a group of students took over Howard Suber’s office. He said to me later that he evacuated his office and gave it to the students for a year to run things from it. Students took over the department’s remote van and went around campus filming various activities and demonstrations. Then, they took the van to different locations on campus and played back the tapes, so people could see. As a group of 11 students in the MFA production program, we petitioned the department to give us a course that we, the students, would design and manage, and the department agreed. It was an unusual thing, part of the counterculture ethos. So, we were eleven students running our own class, in which I made some of my early shows, both documentaries and surreal, experimental films and videos. I was at the time living in a leftist, hippie commune called Ellis Island, so I made a documentary, Ellis Island: A Commune (1969), which captured it during an important period of transition.

 

KA: Were there any particular interlocutors in the MFA programme that stand out to you? Because it seems like a very collective experience. 

HN: The faculty were very hands-off and that was an advantage for people who knew what they wanted to do, and I was one of those. I became interested in doing for my MFA a film, using computers, in the days when computers were primarily accounting machines. There was this hotshot group in the computer science department at UCLA. A young professor, Leonard Kleinrock was running it. I went to him and said I’d like to make a computer-animated film about the consciousness of the external universe and the internal human consciousness within us. And I said to him, “I would like you to be on my committee.” He said: “Fine, I’ll be willing to be on your committee, provided that you go on and take a Fortran class and do not bother my staff and graduate students, and you have access to the computer room only after 5 o’clock.” I said, “Fine” to all of his restrictions and conditions.  I went and took the courses and did well in them. In two years, by the time I was about to finish my MFA film, Salamander Syncope (1971), I had six system analysts and programmers on his money working on my project, one of whom is now a major figure in Google.  His name is Vint Cerf, the Chief Internet Evangelist at Google, often credited as the co-inventor of the Internet. My project was arduous, because I was moving out of the normal realm of the film production into a highly technological and evolving one involving the new medium of digital and analogue computers. So, it was a very good experience and UCLA was a very good place. My interlocutors at that point were really more computer guys than film guys.

KA: So that was your MFA film and you graduated. Did you go back to Iran immediately or start make films in L.A.?

HN: Again, I have an experimental side and always look for new things, like new media. After I finished my MFA, the first cable company opened up in LA. Theta Cable Television, Channel 3, opened up in Santa Monica, and I was one of the first people they hired as producer/director for their original programming. For two years I directed the daily newscasts, a weekly discussion show, and occasionally children’s programming, Theta Cable Fable Car. It was a fantastic experience at local programming and production. Then I got an invitation to go to Iran to help plan a new multimedia university that was patterned after Open University system in the UK. So, I returned to Iran where for three years I worked with a dynamic group on its planning and soon it became a reality, as Free University of Iran (Daneshgah-e Azad-e Iran). The Shah approved of the plan to start this multimedia university which was really innovative, because we didn’t have a main campus like most other universities. But we imparted our educational material through books that we published, for which the university established the largest publishing house in the country. In conjunction with the National Iranian Radio and Television Organisation we produced radio and television programmes. We produced science kits, which the students would receive and take home and with which they could conduct 150 experiments in their kitchens. There were twenty study centres in different parts of the country with tutors available to help students.  Copies of university’s radio and television programs were also available there. It was a very integrated and media-intensive situation. We had taken in the second year of our students when the tanks came into the streets and the revolution was on. About that time, my request for a sabbatical had come through, fortunately, so I decided to return to the US to see if I wanted to do further education and graduate studies or to continue filmmaking. So that was a major transition for me away from Iran.

KA: I’m curious about the collaboration between NIRT and this Free University. Was the university designed to work with these other institutions within Iran? I’m trying to get a sense of how those infrastructures were forming in the 1970s.

HN: The head of the university was Abdolrahim Ahmadi who was a well-known literary person, whose translation of Grapes of Wrath I loved when I was a high school kid. He had published it under a pseudonym. But he was a learned man, well connected to various institutions and had a mandate from the prime minster, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, to create this university as approved by the Shah. So, he had approval at the highest level. At the same time this university needed to connect with other institutions, as you mentioned. We brought in the entire editorial staff from Franklin Publishing, which was a major publisher of pocket books in Tehran, to come on board and become the editorial department for the book publishing in our university. We contracted with the Educational TV network to help produce and broadcast our radio and television programmes.   The Broadcast and Media Center, the unit that I directed at the university, hired the producers and directors and sent them to the BBC to be trained in production. Upon their return, they used the Educational TV’s studios and staff to produce our programmes. The heart of the university which, I think, was ingenious and was borrowed partly from the UK system, was a course team that designed and produced all the educational materials collectively. For example, the course team for the science course would consist of a physicist, a chemist, a biologist, and a mathematician, but it would also have a textbook editor, a radio and television producer, a kit designer, and an educational technologist. All of these would work together to decide on what material would go to the kit, to radio or TV, or to textbook. Together they produced the various components of the course.  It was kind of unusual in the atmosphere of authoritarianism and distrust endemic in Iran at the time. It’s interesting that after the revolution this university was divided up and dispersed. A lot of it went to form the Allameh Tabatabai University. The whole text production became Nashr-e Daneshgahi, the university publisher, which is the biggest publisher in Iran. But then a new Islamic Free University was created in its place which has none of these features we are talking about.

KA: And that was when you wrote your first book-length project on documentary?

HN: That’s right. It’s a good point, because at the same time that I was working at the Free University of Iran, I also taught in the College of Cinema and Television a course on the history and theory of documentary cinema. There was a lot of material written and published in Persian about documentary films, but there wasn’t a single book yet. So, as I began to teach and prepare my lectures, I saw the beginning of a book forming and it became a two-volume book in Persian, Film-e Mostanad (Documentary Film) which the Free University of Iran Publishing House published. As it was being published the revolution happened. The book sold out immediately and no more copies were produced, because the publishing house also was transformed. I received only three copies of the book after I returned to the US.  There was a great deal of interest in reprinting it, and in one of my return trips, the director of the new University Publishing offered to reprint the book if I amended it, particularly by removing some of the stills of women who showed too much skin, which were considered inappropriate for the new Islamic era.  I refused.  So, for many years the Xerox copies of the book were available in bookstores in Tehran. That is the story of my first major publication.

KA: And some of your other publications in journals like Jump Cut on documentary came out of the same project. 

HN: Yeah, gradually they came out of the same project…Jump Cut and Quarterly Review of Film Studies. In addition, I began to publish a series of interviews I had conducted with direct cinema documentarists the Maysles brothers and Richard Leacock, and with verité filmmaker, Jean Rouch. I had kept all of those interviews that I had done in preparation for my Persian language book and so transcribed and edited them and they were published in American journals.

KA: So, we’re kind of going back now to LA. You took a sabbatical from the Free University?

HN: Which became permanent! I came back to LA and began working in television for a while. The UCLA had an internal production house for producing educational shows and I became a producer-director in that outfit, one among seven producers-directors. While there I produced or directed several major series, like a twenty-part TV series, Mastery Teaching, designed to train teaching assistants, a 14-part TV show, The Tutors’ Guide, for training tutors, or a 14-part radio show called Power in America. Then I made a whole series of television shows for the American Medical Association on various topics like hearing loss, obesity, asthma, COPD, and sexually transmitted diseases. These were two-hour tapes plus study guides that we produced. It was very technical material, but it was fun and I enjoyed the process, having come from a family of doctors. As a result of making the hearing loss show I was also able to make another film that was award-winning.  It was called Beethoven: Triumph over Silence, for which I worked with a famous otolaryngologist, Dr. Victor Goodhill.  We basically tried to recreate what Beethoven would have heard before he lost his hearing and how he lost it and in what frequencies he lost it. Because after he lost his hearing, he communicated with people by writing in a notebook, and other people responded by writing in his notebook, and these notebooks exist today; we had a remarkably intimate record of what Beethoven thought and felt and said. We used these writings as part of the narrative of the film and recreated audio-wise how he would have heard, for example, when he conducted his 9th symphony and he went out of synch with it. We have his notes as to how terrible he thought of what he had done. But we were also able to recreate his hearing loss in the first, say, 30 seconds of the 9th, which conveys the drama and the tragedy that Beethoven felt to contemporary audiences.

KA: Was it around that time that you started thinking about doing a PhD?

HN: Yes, because I was on the UCLA campus all the time anyway, and also at this point I had gotten to know a lot of Iranian Studies and film studies people at the UCLA.  So, I applied for the PhD programme in film-TV and got in. Our professors were Nick Brown, Janet Bergstrom, Steve Mamber, Teshome Gabriel, Katherine Montgomery, Robert Rosen, and Howard Suber. These were the core faculty, but I worked mostly with Teshome Gabriel, who was my advisor and a friend.

KA: And you edited a book together. Was it while you were a student or after?

HN: I was still a grad student…almost finished. Working with Teshome I put together a special thick issue in 1991 of Quarterly Review Film and Video (combining three issues into one) on postcolonial cinema, which we later republished as a book, Otherness and the Media: The Ethnography of the Imagined and the Imaged. I had begun to study the Iranians in diaspora for my PhD. I remember Teshome advising me not to choose an Iranian topic. He said because you are going to be branded as an Iran specialist and pigeon-holed, which I think was a good advice, but I didn’t take it, because I was personally interested in that topic and I was very knowledgeable about it. I had followed all these Iranian exiles with their television and radio programmes and pop music. Iranians were very active in those days and media-savvy, because many of those who came to LA were media people already. Producers, dancers, singers, actors, directors, musicians, all kinds of people were there. In one decade, Iranians in LA produced nearly 90 periodicals in Persian language alone, and these were all commercially-driven, which means they had to have had fairly strong cultural and economic capital to invest in advertising and to sell products to Iranians. They produced over sixty television shows.  I began videotaping these programs and going to their studios and interviewing them. I had a lot of stuff that nobody else had, why give it up?  Plus, working on the Iranian exile meant I was also working on trying to figure out my own situation in exile.  By the way, all of the videos and research materials I collected for my dissertation project are now on deposit at Northwestern University Library Archives, where they are being processed and catalogued for use by other researchers.

KA: And that was the genesis of Iran Media Index and the dissertation project, right?

HN: They were two different things. That was the genesis of dissertation which in a couple of years became my next book, The Making of Exile Cultures, in which I basically paid attention to the totality of pop culture of Iranians in Los Angeles as an alternative home, the home that they didn’t have or had escaped because of the revolution, and the home that they longed to return to. So all of these feelings and nostalgia and longings were embedded in the shows and they were very political as well as cathected. I think that the book established a model for ethnic television studies which hadn’t been on the horizon very much yet.

KA: Just as follow-up to that, you were working on Third Cinema and post-colonial questions and then you choose to start with this television study. Could you say something about that choice?

HN: It’s because television and radio were the media for the Iranian exiles in LA to communicate not only with the exile community in LA, but also with the diasporic community of Iranians elsewhere and with Iranians in the homeland. Eventually these individual television shows which were broadcast on lease-access televisions at first became 24-hour satellite channels. Right now, there are somewhere around two dozen satellite channels in Persian language being broadcast out of LA and are received in Iran. They have become kind of a force in some of demonstrations that are going on this week, for example. So, this was a significant new development in the media and exile world. A lot of Iranian filmmakers who are in exile turned to television, because that was the medium with which they could communicate with large audience. So, film was put on the back burner for a while. But the thing that I want to mention is that around Teshome Gabriel a number of students gathered; not only students and faculty in film, but also those from literature, political science, anthropology, and other fields. We used to get together on Friday afternoons in one of the cafeterias of the UCLA (Lu Valle Coffee-shop), and just B.S. and talk about post-colonial theory, Third Cinema, Third World Cinema, etc. Eventually these gatherings led to the production of two magazines. Emergences was the one that I was involved with. This sort of led me to get involved in academic journalism. It’s interesting that at around this same time, Beverley Houston and Ron Gottesman, the editors of Quarterly Review of Film Studies which was at USC, asked me if I wanted to become the managing editor of their journal. Delighted, I accepted and, so as a graduate student, I was suddenly basking in the glow of all these academic film studies people in southern California and elsewhere. I was the traffic cop for the magazine.

KA: It was an important time for that journal, too.

HN: Yes. For the journal and for film studies. Because also the turn to theory had occurred, so there was an incredible excitement. Everybody was turning to feminism, psychoanalysis and cultural studies, deconstruction, postmodernism, etc. All of these concepts were coming into film and media studies and it was a very exciting period. That’s how I ended up being on so many editorial boards and advisory boards of culture and media journals, from Diaspora to Framework.

KA: And I want you to talk more about the turn to theory and how it figures in your own work at the time. But before we do that, I was trying to figure a good place in the chronology to talk about your programming work and I thought maybe talking about it early on can be an interesting place to put that question, because of all of the controversies surrounding some of your early programmes.

HN:  Actually, in terms of timeline it also works well, because my first major film programming occurred in 1990, the year that I was finishing my dissertation. I hit upon this idea of organising a film festival for UCLA. I proposed that we do a film series on Iranian cinema, ten years after the revolution, to sort of take stock of all the films that had been made after this destructive event, which targeted cinema and movie houses for elimination. Not many films after the revolution had been brought to LA for Iranians to see. And the atmosphere among Iranian exiles was highly partisan against the Islamic republic, because most people had sort of escaped the revolution for political or religious reasons. There were lots of Baha’is and Christians and Marxists and the royalists, from all kinds of places and [also] minoritarian Iranians [or] ethnic minorities who had escaped the enforced Islamisation. So, the atmosphere was decidedly against the Islamic republic…

KA: And many of them had left their careers at home too…

HN: That’s right. They had lost their careers and they were angry; personally angry. I was able to establish a relationship with the Ministry of Culture and Art. I asked for 44 films that I had selected. From them I selected 22 or 24 films for exhibition in this decade of Iranian Cinema event and I invited Abbas Kiarostami and Dariush Mehrjui to come and show their latest films and interact with the audiences. But as soon as we announced the festival, the Iranian television producers came out against it and said that it was a whitewash of the Islamic regime and we were being paid by Islamic republic and blah, blah, blah. On the night of the opening many well-known filmmakers, television producers, actors and so forth came out against it, holding placards [saying] “Down with the Festival.” I was walking with our guests Kiarostami and Mehrjui into the cinema [in] the Melnitz Hall, which was the site of the screenings when Kiarostami walked to one of them- I think it was Parviz Sayyad- and said: “Why don’t you give me your placard? I’ll stand in the line demonstrating against the festival. You go inside and look at the films and see if you still want to demonstrate.” The fact was that none of them had seen these films. They were just categorically opposed because they were made under the Islamic regime. The most interesting thing for me as a programmer was the response of the audiences coming out of cinema. Many of them were crying. These were adult people, professors, [who were] crying on my shoulder, thanking me for giving them the opportunity to see Iran from the point of view of Iranians inside Iran. Remember at the time Iranians had suffered the hostage crisis and so there was a very hostile atmosphere in the US media against Iran and Iranians, including those in the US. So, the image that was painted of Iran in the American media was very one-sided and stereotypically negative.  Everything was Islamic hard-liners and bearded people and angry fists in the air and women all covered up and so forth. So, for Iranian exiles that festival was sort of the first insider view of the Iran that they knew and loved. That festival became an annual event and still continues.

KA: So, in 1990 you probably showed Where is the Friend’s House but not yet Close Up?

HN: Close-up hadn’t come out yet. We showed it at the festival that I started in Houston. When I moved to Houston in 1992 to teach at Rice University I started another Iranian film festival with Rice Cinema and Museum of Fine Arts in Houston. That also became an annual festival which still continues.

KA: That’s actually a good transition to talk about your move to Houston. You moved there before The Making of Exile Cultures comes out?

HN: Yes, I got a Rockefeller post-doc at Rice to work on turning my dissertation into a book. It took me a year to do that. So, the following year, 1993, my book came out and that’s when Rice also announced a new position in film studies, their first fully-fledged film studies person.  I applied for that job, they did a national search and I got the job, so I stayed.

KA.: What was it like to develop your 1990s book projects in that environment? What interventions were you focusing on as you were writing them?

HN: I did another kind of programming there in addition to the film festival for the Museum of Fine Arts and Rice Cinema. I organised a major international conference on exile and diaspora studies and brought in a lot of people, including Homi Bhabha. The contribution from that conference formed the backbone of my next edited book, Home, Exile, Homeland in which we examined different ideas about home, like Vivian Sobchack did a chapter on the body as home. She had lost one leg due to cancer, so I asked her “What about the body as your home or un-home, when your own body is attacking you?” She wrote a really interesting article about that. Other people wrote about the house, as home.  Pat Seed wrote about the key to the house. She’s a medieval historian and she was studying the Muslims and the Jews who were thrown out of Spain due to Inquisition and they lost their homes, but when they were kicked out of the country they took with them the keys from their houses, and they put these keys above the doors of their new homes in exile as a reminder [that] “as long as I have these keys, I’m in exile.” She wrote a very interesting chapter. We did a variety of interesting intervention on the concepts of home, house, homeland. Then Teshome and I transformed the three special issues of Quarterly Review of Film and Video into a book. Teshome had gotten a post-doc at Rice, as well, so for a year he joined me there and we worked together on that. It was a very productive year. These three books: The Making of an Exile Culture: Iranian Television in Los Angeles; Otherness and the Media: The Ethnography of the Imagined and the Imaged; and House, Home, Homeland: Film, Media, and the Politics of Place were really pushing me towards theorising my next book, which was the idea of an “accented cinema.”

KA: You were talking about this personal dimension of exile, and this leading to books that are so intently focused on the feeling of exile [such as] claustrophobia, anxiety, dread, longing…those kinds of things. Could you talk a little bit about how affect works in these books?

HN: I think it came into my work not through theory first, but through my own experience of exile and displacement, of having an accent.  Everywhere I went as soon as I began to talk people would say “where are you from?” So, my “foreignness” and “outsider-ness” were already pointed out. On the other hand, I became much more cognisant of the affect, [like] the smell of a place or of a particular food, that would suddenly transport you 10,000 miles to somewhere else, or to 40 years earlier. The senses become a lot more important to you when you are displaced or out of place. I think that’s how affect came into my work through my own synaesthetic experiences of displacement, and then through paying attention to the theory.  My theorization tends to be bottom up.

KA: And what has the audience been for “An Accented Cinema” Have you traced its afterlife?

HN: It’s been taught in a lot of different places, like in Eastern European countries. I think it’s been translated into Turkish and Hebrew, but not into Persian, partly because some of these films are not readily available. They are esoteric films, made by smaller people, not well-known auteur directors. So, without access to the films, it’s very hard to see them and to teach and translate them. I think the internet is opening up access to some of these films. There are all kinds of openings that internet has created for alternative and minoritarian cinema. I think when the book first came out in 2001, we did have the internet, but not the kind of fast and high capacity internet that we have now, with streaming and YouTube and all of those things.

KA: So that book comes out and then shortly, after a few years you moved to Evanston, to this office. 

HN: Yes. I moved here, because I think Northwestern has one of the first radio-television departments in this country, if not the first. It has a long history of engagement with various media and also our Department of Radio-TV-Film has various programmes, among them film production, screen writing, documentary production, and a screen cultures PhD programme, with very good and diverse faculty. And there are many others in other departments who teach film and media.  So, it was very attractive for me to move here from Rice which had very few full-time film studies people who were in different departments and there was no cohesiveness to their efforts. So, I came right here to this office 11 years ago.

KA: Were those links between production and studies that happen here important for your decision as well?   

HN: Yes, because when I teach my PhD graduate courses, graduate students in documentary production oftentimes take it. I not only teach theory and history, but also bring in production issues that film studies professors may not bring in.  As a result, both the production and studies students get exposed to things that they probably would not get exposed to normally. Some of the MFA documentary students who have taken my “Accented Cinema” course have made their films inspired by that course. So, it’s fascinating to see how they interpret the material. I teach a graduate “Documentary and Ethnographic Film” course as well, which they have also taken, and they apply some of the things they learn in their studies courses in their work. It’s really nice to see what the takeaway is for them in their work. Of course, this is where my own production experience is also helpful, because I can talk in their language and point to the filmmaking techniques in terms of budgeting, styles of filming, how the group dynamic works, shooting arrangements and so forth. I think I can talk with certain authority to filmmakers who take my classes that average film studies person who doesn’t have a background in film production may not possess.

KA: This was also an important move in terms of finally finishing up this project that you’ve been working on for essentially your entire professional life.

HN: Yes, the four-volume A Social History of Iranian Cinema. With every article that I wrote and published on Iranian cinema or talk that I gave or every visit to an archive…that’s actually where my first English language book, Iran Media Index, comes in as well. For that book I went to a lot of archives in several countries. The whole project basically was to document from 1900 to 1981, all the documentaries, newsreels, and television news programmes that were made about Iran in the UK and the US. For that I went to many archives like, the National Film Archive in the UK, Iran’s National Film Archive, the US Library of Congress, the US National Film Archive, lots of commercial newsreel archives, etc., to produce this filmography. That sort of made me aware of the enormity of the material. Some of the findings from that book, were plugged into A Social History of Iranian Cinema when I was writing about the history of documentary filmmaking by foreigners about Iran. Likewise, other chapters were helped by the previous books that I had published. The three books that I did on exile and diaspora cinema became the impetus for a major chapter in volume 4 about the Iranian filmmakers in the diaspora. Originally, my project was to do a one-volume book, as specified by my contract with Duke University Press. After a few years of writing I realised that it was not going to be one volume.

KA: And in building an argument that runs through all three thousand pages that takes forty years to create, there were massive transformations in the files along the way. Can you say something about the way you adapted the project to the way the field changed, both in Cinema and Media Studies and Iranian Studies?

HN: As I was writing and doing the research, Iranian Studies came into its own, in the US at any rate. Really until the 90s, Iranian studies circles focused primarily on history, politics, anthropology, sociology and if they dealt with the arts, they were traditional arts [like] paintings, Saqqa-khaneh paintings or poetry and literature. Modern media were not really in the purview. So, one of the changes that was occurring in Iranian Studies was that modern media and pop culture gradually became acceptable topics, as a new generation of scholars were minted. In Film Studies we had, at the beginning, as I was mentioning earlier, to turn to theory that really revitalised academia in various fields, including in cinema. I was at the right time in the right place at UCLA, where a lot of these guys like Derrida, Lyotard, Habermas were coming to give talks or to teach courses. I was there and have sketches of all these people, because in all these lectures that I attended, I also sketched the individual speakers. So, I have thousands of sketches of these intellectuals with a little blurb identifying the gist of their talk. That was my notetaking.  I was kind of an inquisitive child, constantly absorbing both the field of Iranian Studies and Film Studies and Critical Theory, all of which were evolving. I incorporated them promiscuously perhaps, but I hope that I have done it seamlessly and creatively enough to make a coherent argument and not be pedantic or doctrinaire about it.

KA: I’m also thinking of how the field is giving more serious attention to non-theatrical media and to the links between television and film.  

HN: I think that is partly because I am intersectional. I’m interested in the intersections and interstices. I wrote a preface to the book Projecting Migration: Transcultural Documentary Practice, edited by Alan Grossman and Aine O’Brien, which deals with this topic; it was entitled “On the Global Inter-, Multi-, and Trans- —Foreword.” I’ve always been interested in connections and layers, in how things connect to each other. That’s where it comes from. I think the topic is also part of that autobiographical element. If you listen to and look at your own self and your own interests, you may discover that something new is there. But if you constantly try to follow the trends, you won’t discover anything new. The real newness is when you turn inward and inside and discover something there.

KA: Do you have a sense of how the book was received within the field of Iranian studies, maybe among film scholars writing in Persian in comparison with those working in film studies in North America? 

HN: It seems to have done very well, with many reviews published in Iranian studies and film and media journals. The first volume has already been translated into Persian.  There was a recent documentary that was made about me [called] Mouth Harp in Minor Key: Hamid Naficy In/On Exile. Just a couple of weeks ago this was shown at the Cinema-Vérité film festival [in Farsi: Sinama-Haghighat] in Tehran and did very well. Many fans had to sit on the floors because the cinema was so full and they scheduled new sessions for the film. The filmmaker, Maryam Sepehri, is now exploring international film festival and distribution circuits for that film.  So, through the publication of translation of the first volume of A Social History of Iranian Cinema, as well as through translations of my other works in article form, people had heard enough about me to come and see this documentary about this guy who is abroad. A whole bunch of reviews and interviews with the filmmaker are beginning to come out. So, I think it has had some impact. Given the kind of national hostility between my two countries, the US and Iran, which also affects travel- the Trump administration bans travel of Iranians to the US and the Iranian government labels Iranian bi-nationals who travel to Iran to conduct research as US spies, so any time you go there you fear that your research would be taken as spying- it is a very tough field to work in, but such is both the peril and privilege of interstitial existence!

K.A: What you are working on now, and what’s coming on the horizon?

HN: Actually, one of the projects that I’m working is apropos of what I was just saying. Because of the lack of formal relationship between the two countries of Iran and the US, most contact between Americans and Iranians has occurred via media, in cyberspace or on television or in film. As a result of the four-volume book, I’ve been working on this idea of public diplomacy between the two countries involving not only governments’ use of media, directly or through their allies and subterfuge entities, but also by citizens’ use of media, particularly social media. That may become another book, but that one is also an evolving animal.  Public diplomacy via media is a constantly evolving topic not only because of what the governments and social media do, but also because of the technological revolutions that are taking place right under our noses. So that’s one project I’m working on, on the side-line.

KA: Focusing mainly on things like social media or satellite broadcasting?

HN:  All of them. The totality of media which I’m calling media-work, which includes all of the Iran-related media-work, in Persian and also in English, coming out of the US and Iran, including the social media that Iranians mobilise, like during various periodic uprisings or demonstrations. The other [project] is a memoir that I’ve been working on for a while. I have a huge amount of material, as usual, so the challenge here is how to not turn it into a compendium of three thousand-pages, but into something cohesive and readable for the general public. That’s what I’m supposed to be working on this year while I’m on sabbatical.

KA: Thank you so much for being so generous with your time.

HN: Thank you for coming up here. I hope that this will be edited into a nice bouquet of flowers!

[Ramin Khanjani transcribed and contributed to the editing of this interview.]

French Secular Thought: Foucault and Political Spirituality

 

 Bryan S. Turner <The Australian Catholic University (Melbourne)>is the Professor of the Sociology of Religion at the Australian Catholic University (Melbourne), Honorary Professor of Sociology Potsdam University Germany and Emeritus Professor of Sociology, The Graduate Center, The City University of New York, USA, and a Fellow of the Edward Cadbury Centre University of Birmingham. He was the recipient of the Max Planck Award 2015. His recent publication, as the chief editor, is The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social Theory in 2017.

 

Introduction

In this article I note that “religion” was either largely absent from 20th century French social theory or appeared as a puzzle that would be resolved by history. Religion was a remnant of traditional culture that been challenged both by the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Marxist sociology, that was inspired by Louis Althusser, treated religion as merely an ideology that spread resignation or confusion among subordinate groups. The tradition of secular Marxist research on Islam in France is illustrated by the work of Maxine Rodinson. I focus on Rodinson as the most prominent secular scholar of Islam and the Middle East of his generation in order to make the contrast with Michel Foucault’s attempt to avoid looking at Shi’ism through the lens of Western secularity. Rodinson, who was highly critical of Foucault as simply “naive”, is credited with inventing the idea of “Islamofascism” to describe the Shia revolt as resulting in an Islamic theocracy.  Laicité ran deep in political life, in civil society and in the academy.

The Shia Revolution therefore presented a specific puzzle or anomaly – could archaic forms of religion actually act as a progressive force in removing a modernizing but authoritarian monarchy? I applaud Foucault’s attention to religion and find his account of the revolution unhindered by any privilege allocated to Western views of Shia religiosty. The difficulty with Foucault’s analysis of the revolution is that it was inconsistent with his theory of power as the ensemble of micro disciplines. How can we reconcile the notion of governmentality with the erruption of a mass movement against the Shah?

Foucault’s understanding of the revolution in terms of “political spirituality” was unsurprisingly ridiculed and he was further criticized for not retracting his understanding of Shia radicalism when the revolution assumed a post-revolutionary authoritarianism. However the post-revolutionary situation in Iran raises a deeper question about the nature of revolution itself. Were the two revolutions of Iran in the twentieth century – the Constitutional Revolution (1906-11) and the Shia Revolution (1978-9) to overthrow the Pahlavi Shah – both historical failures? Foucault’s sociology of the Islamic revolution raises a troublesome and enduring question about the negative unintended consequences of all forms of resistance and revolt.

 

History and Context: Post-War French Social Theory

To understand Michel Foucault’s intervention in the Shia Revolution and more importantly the response to his publications, we have to take into account the history of French secularism.  In this context I prefer to speak about “The Shia Revolution” following Vali Nasr’s The Shia Revival and not “The Iranian Revolution” to bring into the foreground its religious nature. By contrast with the United States and the United Kingdom, French culture in general and its elite intellectual culture in particular are profoundly and explicitly secular. While both France and the United States share a revolutionary origin, the United States has a secular constitution, but religion plays a large part in its politics and civil society. One basic aspect of American exceptionalism has been the overt role of religion in public life. To a large extent, France has remained much closer to the Enlightenment legacy of rationalism and secularism. For example, being engaged with the legacy of the Enlightenment has been one foundation of the anti-Catholic attitude of urban France. Laïcité, the French version of secularism, is the dominant feature of public life. This secularity was reinforced as a consequence of the devastation of two World Wars and German occupation.

After World War II, two secular traditions – existentialism and neo-Marxism – largely dominated the humanities and social science. Two key figures were Jean-Paul Sartre and Louis Althusser. In sociology, Althusser attempted to reformulate Marxist economic determinism by arguing that politics and ideology are conditions of existence of the economic.[1] He also reconstructed the Marxist theory of ideology by developing the idea that ideological relations are real and not simply reflections of the economy, but this insight was not applied to religion. The reproduction of capitalism in the modern world rests on what he called the “ideological state apparatus.” Althusser and Etienne Balibar[2] had considerable influence outside France; their ideas were explored energetically by a generation of British sociologists.[3] The other influential figure in this Marxist revival was Nicos Poulantzas.[4] These ideas were not ingested without criticism One other major figure in post-war French intellectual culture was Raymond Aron who was, as a disciple of Max Weber, critical of Marxist sociology. Despite ideological divergences in this post-war generation of intellectuals, the one thing they had in common was a total lack of interest in religion.[5] Prior to the political crisis in Iran, Foucault had also given little attention to religion, being mainly focused on madness, psychiatry, penitentiaries, sexuality and the origins of the human sciences. The revolution put radical Shi’ism on the foreign-relations agenda of the West and focused academic attention on the nature of the uprising.

Perhaps the oddity of post-war Marxism was that it also involved a revival of the legacy of Antonio Gramsci, but it did not include any significant acknowledgement of his recognition of the importance of religion in general and of the Roman Catholic Church in particular. Gramsci recognized the moral and cultural hold of the Church over society and that any successful political party of the working class would have to displace that moral control with its own educational and ethical systems.[6] At the popular level, Catholicism had a powerful hold over the masses.

Marxist sociology never developed much beyond Marx’s famous metaphor of “the opium of the people.” However if religion is far more than a collection of false beliefs that function as a narcotic, how can we understand its material force from a sociological perspective? Secular sociology tends to concentrate research on beliefs and attitudes because such data lends itself to easy quantification. Research on religious practices typically requires an ethnographic approach that does not readily produce large sets of quantitative data. In order to conceptualise the materiality of religion, I list five components. First, contemporary sociology of religion has returned to the idea of the axial age religions (800-200 BCE) which are said to have opened up “the age of criticism” by contrasting the unsatisfactory nature of our existence on earth with a future world to come.[7] The result was the creation of powerful narratives of suffering and justice involving possibilities of resistance and retribution. The camel cannot pass through the eye of a needle and the rich man cannot entire into paradise. Secondly, religions typically involve powerful symbols, signs and spaces that concentrate and condense these abstract narratives into collective memories and emotions that become conduits of the faith. Thirdly, there is an ensemble of daily practices such as diet, prayer and more formal rituals around birth and death that give concrete expression to the narratives, symbols and sacred objects. Fourthly, following Emile Durkheim, these beliefs and practices relative to sacred objects create a community of believers who can act in concert. Fifthly, religions typically operate in and through holy cities – one thinks of Mecca, Rome, Qom, Ankor Wat, and Jerusalem. These holy cities are the sites of pilgrimage, collective rituals, healing, and miracles. What secular cities have commanded such adoration over the centuries? Can Birmingham compete in the world of collective memory alongside Canterbury? Shi’ism with its narratives of suffering and martyrdom, its holy cities and global community, its moral codes and theology was a material force able to overthrow a rich and powerful state. Neither Marxism nor secular sociology have adequately grasped this “materiality” of the religious – its holy places, its cosmopolitan communities, its sacred figures, its histories of oppression and resistance, its emotions of resentment and revenge, and its narratives of justice and sacrifice. Given the force of religious movements, the modern state has sought to mobilize religious forces to bolster its own power. The religious and the political are almost inevitably intertwined and intertangled.[8]

Perhaps unsurprisingly French sociology did not produce any major figure in the sociology of religion in the twentieth century, because, I would argue, the civil religion of French society was deeply secular. The same is true for contemporary scholatship. While Pierre Bourdieu has made lasting contributions to sociology, his writing on religion is slight and coventional.[9] Luc Boltanski is equally influential for his work on capitalism, indignation, and justice, but he has not in any systematic way contributed to the study of religion.[10] The French case has been precisely described by Jose Casanova who argues that France has a secular etatist ideology or laicité that has the function of a civil religion in direct competition with an ecclesisatical religion.[11] France’s civil religion demands the strict privatization of all religious belief and practice. Insofar as sociologists paid any attention to religion, they were primarily engaged with approaches that treated secularization as a necessary feature of modernity. In fact the sociology of Islam did not begin to acquire significant attention in Western sociology until after 9/11.[12] With the growth of anti-Muslim sentiment, the sociology of Islam came to be dominated by an interest in Islamophobia, but this dominant focus has distorted research by cutting off other more fruitful channels of inquiry.[13]

While secular social science has been neglecting religion as a topic of serious research, religion in the world of global politics was very prominent in the 1960s. It was in Public Religions in the Modern World that Casanova identified major social movements in which religion played a critical role. He saw the revolution in Iran as a key example of the importance of “public religions” alongside liberation theology in Latin America, the Solidarity movement in Poland, and the rise of the Moral Majority in the United States.[14] In fact we might reasonably add that if anything Casanova underestimated the impact of the religious revolution in Iran. After 1978-9 tensions between Shi’ism and Sunni Islam were manifest in the growing revivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia that have been played out in Iraq and Syria, and more recently in Yemen, Qatar and Lebanon.

A critical turning point in the Church’s relationship to the world was Vatican II in which the Catholic hierarchy accepted the idea of political modernization. More recently Casanova notes that, “By my hermeneutic Catholic perspective I mean the fact that my theory of ‘modern public religion’ was very much informed by the experience of the official Catholic aggiornamento of the 1960s.”[15] He challenged the traditional notion of secularization as the slow but inevitable erosion of religion as measured within a positivist epistemology as the decline in church attendance, belief in God, frequency of prayer, recruitment to the ministry and priesthood, and so forth. Casanova’s publication drew attention to the obvious fact that around the world religion appeared, not to be simply a matter of private belief and practice, but a vital part of public life. The aggiornamento allowed the Church to shift from a state-oriented to a civil society-oriented institution, and as a result it disengaged from the authoritarian states of Latin America and embraced human rights as a basis for its actions. Subsequently modernized Catholicism has become a new transnational and de-territorialized global religion.

This transformation of Catholicism has had little impact on the Church’s relationship to laïcité. The principal development has been the emergence of ‘la nouvelle laïcité’ from 2003 onwards in which the state has extended its control of religion in public spaces by various legislative and judicial actions. The state no longer confines itself to the overview of religous symbols in schools, but claims jurisdiction over all public spaces including the street.[16] However the state is primarily concerned, not with Catholicism which is no longer regarded as politically problematic, but with Islam. Churches are regarded as part of the national heritage from a tourist perspective. Chartres is a good example. The real target of la nouvelle laïcité is Islam and specifically the veiled Muslim woman.

 

Marxism and Islamofascism

To understand the critical reception of Foucault’s journalistic commentary on the revolution, we need to understand both Marxism and Oriental Sciences. Foucault annoyed and irritated both Marxists and Oriental scholars. French academics had in fact been prominent in much early Orientalism and Islamic Studies in such figures as Jacques Berque, Louis Massignon, and Henry Corbin. Along with Claude Cahen, Rodinson was a member of the French Orientalist tradition that was influenced by Marxism and sociology. Rodinson had grown up in a Jewish household that was fervently anti-Israeli. His parents, who had escaped from earlier progroms, died in Auschwitz in 1943. Rodinson, like many secular Jews, had joined the Communist  Party in 1937, but turned against Communism in response to the autocracy of Stalinism. While rejecting Communism, his work was grounded in Marxist sociology. In his political career he published various works that were critical of Israel such as Israel and the Arabs (1982) and Israel: A Colonial Settler State? (1988). In the 1950s and 1960s, Marxism was “in the air” and Marxist categories were widely embraced by Arab intellectuals. However by the late 1970s, Rodinson lamented the decline of Marxist influence in the Middle East, noting that few regimes were committed to the struggle against the American hegemony and more broadly against the capitalist system. His Islam and Capitalism published in France in 1966 was the first publication to explore systematically the debate about the connections (if any) between Islam and capitalist development.

In my Weber and Islam I drew attention to the conundrum of secular sociology to make sense of the claims of charismatic prophecy and the extraordinary revelations of the Prophet.[17] In 1961 in Muhammad, Rodinson, as an atheist, responded to the Prophet’s revelation through a synthesis of Freudian psycho-analysis and Marxism to claim that the Qur’an had emerged in the Prophet’s unconscious and was forged from “his actual experience, the stuff of his thoughts, dreams and meditations, and memories of discussions that he heard.”[18] Perhaps not surprisingly the book was banned in many Muslim societies.

Rodinson dismissed the truth claims that orthodox Muslims make about the nature of their faith, the unique character of the Prophet, and their historical destination as a community of the faithful. What mattered for Rodinson was the role of Islam as a social movement alongside and comparable with twentieth-century Communism. However Marxism only takes us so far. The most important development of the historiography of Islam, according to Armando Salvatore, was undertaken by Marshall G. S. Hodgson whose three volume The Venture of Islam[19] remains the definitive social historical and sociological account of Islam from its origins until the twentieth century.[20] Hodgson developed a theory of world history and analyzed Islamicate civilization as a world order.  Whereas traditional Oriental studies had concentrated on the Arab world, Hodgson had an appreciation of Islam as a religious sytem connecting Europe, the Middle East and Asia into a global network. However Hodgson’s main concern was to document how the core of religious consciousness, or “Sharia-minded” spirituality as he called it, was compromised by the power elite and their economic interests. The logic of Marxist sociology is either in general to ignore the religious mindedness of social actors, down-play the historical role of Sufism and Shi’ism, or to reduce religion to a thin ideological veneer covering and disguising real economic interests with (from a rational point of view) false beliefs.

Whereas Foucault saw the Shia Revolution as a spiritual movement, many in the West were quick to see it as fascism. Rodinson allegedly coined the term “Islamic fascism” to describe the Shi’ite revolution, but there are however several other contending sources such as Michael Onfray who spoke of the Islamic revolution giving rise to “an authentic Muslim fascism” in his Atheist Manifesto[21]and another being Malise Ruthven[22] in an article in The Independent newspaper where he used the term “Islamofascism.” The theme was also taken up by Paul Berman[23] and even more extensively by Norman Podhoretz[24] in World War IV: The Long Struggle against Islamofascism.

It was inevitable that Rodinson emerged as a major critic of Foucault. He complained that the “great gaps in his knowledge of Islamic history enabled him to transfer the events in Iran, to accept in most part the semitheoretical suggestions of his Iranian friends, and to extrapolate from this by imaging an end of history that would make up for disappointments in Europe and elsewhere.”[25] Rodinson opposed the idea of “political spirituality” that had allegedly inspired the revolutionary movement; it failed to uncover the more material causes behind the discontent. The intolerant nature of the religious elements in the revolt had from the beginning contradicted the humanist sense that he had ascribed to it. In so doing, Foucault had demonstrated his political naivity.

In Rodinson’s world view, political opposition came through working-class movements that found their expression in trade unions, socialist political parties, nationalist organizations, working-class communities and organizations promoting international associations and not through movements inspired by a millenarian religion. He claimed that, “Multiple cases of political spirituality have existed. All came to an end very quickly.”[26] Would this claim also apply to the Pauline Christianity,[27]  or to the Protestant Reformation, or to Pentecostalism in the twentieth century, or to Islam itself? Surely these movements would fall under the idea of “political spirituality.”

Modern social movements are perhaps best illustrated by Occupy Wall Street, Occupy Sandy, the Arab Spring, the Umbrella Revolution, the Jasmine Revolution and the 20 February Movement. These movements are often driven by educated, largely middle-class, young people who have little trust or interest in organized politics (of the left or the right) and they use social media rather than community groups and trade unions to mobilize their members. They draw heavily on women, women’s associations and gender politics. Women have played a conspicuous part in these new social movements as they did in the Shia Revolution. The distance between Rodinson and contemporary social theory is defined by these gender issues, recognition of women in social movements and the public, feminist social theory, and LGBT identity theory. Foucault by contrast was closely associated with new theories of sexuality.

 

Foucault’s Theory of Knowledge-Power

Foucault’s interpretation of the revolution was in many ways inconsistent with his earlier work on discipline and the more general theory of governmentality. For Foucault, power is not concentrated in any single institution such as the state. Rather it is dispersed to more local and micro levels such as the school room, the doctor’s clinic or the psychiatric couch.[28] He thus rejected the idea, common in Marxist sociology, that power rests in the centralized apparatus of the state. He saw power as distributed through social institutions, especially medicine and psychiatry.[29] The panopticon of Jeremy Bentham obviously fascinated Foucault as an early example of governmentality where a large number of prisoners could be disciplined by the architecture of observation. This example however points to an important difference between Foucault and his critics over the character of power. For Foucault, power is about producing effects – the disciplined self – whereas Marxism was about the negativity of power in creating repressive regimes, and thereby avoiding social effects.

In Foucault’s account of subjectification, through socialization in the family and other primary institutions individuals acquire discipline that habituates them to society.[30] As a result individuals have a propensity to follow and obey the norms of society, because social conformity is psychologically rewarded. For Foucault, habituation plays a large part in the exercise of power, and it is partly for that reason that we can include Foucault into a canon of political sociology – at least broadly defined. Foucault was concerned to study how power/knowledge/ethics were woven into the quest to support a political system that constrained any challenge to its legitimate authority.

In a series of lectures that were eventually published as Security Population Territory he explored the growth of the Christian pastorate as an example of governmentality growing out of religious practices towards the laity.[31] This form of power was absent in Greek society, but generally manifest in the Eastern Mediterranean and especially among the Hebrews. Pastoral power was derived from the idea of a shepherd’s responsibility for his flock. It was not a power over territory but over a population and it was a beneficent power, directed at the well-being of the flock. In Christianity this art of governing men signals the beginning of the modern state. Governmentality is par excellence the rational and calculated practice of regulation, but it is productive (of subjectivities) not necessarily destructive. Thus the soft power of the patoral regume did not disappear with secularization. Instead it was built into the bureaucratic apparatus of the modern state.

Given Foucault’s views on governmentality and pastoral power, how was the Shia Revolution possible? In fact how is any revolt possible? Why therefore did the prospect of revolutionary change interest Foucault sufficently to bring him to Iran?  The most plausible account of Foucault’s vision of the revolutionary as a break with history is to be found in Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi’s Foucault in Iran: Islamic Revolution after the Enlightenment. The subtitle is a particularly important aspect of his general argument. Foucault did not want to deny the unique possibility of historical change and the prospect of a breakthrough the routines of subordination, and he attempted to go outside the dominant paradign of Western secularism to watch history in the making.

A charismatic breathrough is not unthinkable in modernity, but do revolutions ultimately fail? Ghamari-Tabrizi locates this question in the context of the pessimism of the Left when, after the 1968 student revolt, there was an atmosphere of political defeatism in France. He writes: “Foucault saw in Iran a moment of creative pause in, or even negation of, his theory of power and governmentality. The Iranian masses demonstrated the possibility of resistance without participating in or perpetuating a preconceived schema of power.”[32] Foucault did not recant his views because he did not want to rob the Iranian masses of the authencity of their protest and their success in removing the Shah. Foucault’s interpretation of the events that produced the revolution are not especially problematic once one accepts the notion contra Marxism that religion has independent effects and has a material force. In defence of Foucault, he did not wish to see the revolution through the framework of Western Orientalism. Published at the time of the revolution, Edward Said’s Orientalism identified several defining themes in the Western view of Islam and Islamicate cultures. Islamic societies were static and unchanging, and hence in need of modernization which could only come through external forces.[33] Secondly, Muslim societies were backward and could not understand the real causes of their lack of history and their backwardness. Only the West could truly understand the East. While Said’s criticism was largely addressed to literary works such as the novels of Jane Austin, there was ironically a parallel criticism of Marxism which in terms of the Asiatic mode of production which argued that radical social change could only come from outside the system.[34] Foucault to his credit was able to approach the Shia Revolution without the intellectual baggage of secular Marxism.

 

Conclusion: Foucault and the Fate of Revolutions

Foucault’s newspaper articles have been translated and much discussed. It is not my intention here to repeat these commentaries. Foucault has been much ridiculed and criticized for his support of religion and the revolutionary overthrow of the Shah. Foucault did not retract from his original position and evolution of the revolution into laïcité than with Foucault’s support for a spiritual revolution in spiritless times. The criticisms and ridicule of Foucault emerged from a culture that could not recognise the political significance of global religions. He has also been criticized for his silence with respect to the role of Muslim women in the revolution and its aftermath. These attitudes are also part of the legacy of laïcité. Whereas the modern secular French woman is free to enjoy and express her sexual freedom, the Muslim woman is covered, secluded and lacking in will. The veil which is an offence to the Republic “covers what ought to be seen.”[35]

The Shia Revolution can be said to have been succesful in removing an authoritaian and repressive regime, but in the long run it failed to reconcile two contradictory principles – velayat- e faqih or the Rule of the Jurist and the democratic will of the masses invested in responsible institutions by fair elections. The velayat- e faqih was an invention of the Revolution and has no precedent in Shia theology in which the just Ruler is the Prophet and the twelve Infallible Imams.[36] The constitution named Ayatollah Khomeini as Leader for life and created an elected Assembly of Experts that in practice has merely endorsed the rulings of the Leader. Consequently the “monarchy was replaced by an Islamic Republic, a novel combination of clerical theocracy and populist democracy.”[37] In many ways the most negative outcome of the revolution was the reversal of the liberation of family law in 1979 that had been passed during the Shah’s reign. Under the government of Ahmadinejad the Revolutionary Guards became ever more powerful.

It is on these grounds that Foucault was criticized for naivety in his notion of “political spirituality” and for his failure to retract his views. However, as I have indicated, this judgment raises a more general question as to whether revolts and revolutions are ever successful, and hence whether opposition to authoritarianism is justified. Criticism of Foucault raises a far deeper problem in political philosophy about the unintended consequences of action. Modern Western thought does appear to embrace a metaphysical pathos of despair in promotong the view that the unintended consequences of political action are always negative. In this pathos, revolutions have outcomes that are the opposite of the the intentions of social actors. This promotes the obvious question: why are there no good unintended consequences?  Fortune (Fortuna) looks unfavourably at protest?

Defeatism was in the air in the late 1960s.[38] Was the French Revolution itself another failed revoltuion in which the aspirations of 1789 descended into the violence of 1793? The student revolts of the late 1960s had also been of little lasting consequence. By contrast, the religious protests of 1978-9 had removed the Shah through a mass movement. Similar arguments might be raised against those who welcomed the Arab Spring and endorsed the overthrow of Mubarak in Egypt. To question Foucault’s endorsement of the Shia Revolution is therefore to question any mass movement against oppression and to resign oneself to the futility of protest.

 

[1]Louis Althusser, For Marx (London: Allen The Penguin Press, 1969).

[2]Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital (London: New Left Books, 1970).

[3]Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan S. Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis (London: Allen Lane, 1980).

[4]Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1970).

[5]Raymond Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals (London: Seeker & Warburg. 1957).

[6]Antonio Gramcsi, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: New Left Books, 1971).

[7]Arnold Momigliano, Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

[8]Bryan S. Turner, The Religious and the Political (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013a).

[9]Terry Rey, Bourdieu on Religion: Imposing Faith and Legitimacy (London: Routledge, 2007).

[10]Simon Susan and Bryan S. Turner, eds. (The Spirit of Luc Boltanski: Essays on the ‘Pragmatic’ Sociology of Critique (London: Anthem Press, 2014).

[11]Jose Casanova, “Public Religions Revisited,” in Religion: Beyond the Concept, ed.  Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 101-119.

[12]Tugrul Keskin, ed., The Sociology of Islam: Secularism, Economy and Politics (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2011).

[13] Bryan S. Turner, “Sociology of Islam: The Desiderata,” Sociology of Islam 1 (2013b): 107-109.

[14]Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

[15]Casanova, “Public Religions Revisited,” 106.

[16]Joan Wallach Scott, The Politics of the Veil (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007).

[17]Bryan S. Turner, Weber and Islam: A Critical Study (London: Routledge, 1974).

[18]Maxime Rodison, Muhammad, 2nd ed. (London: Tauris Parker, 1971), 77.

[19]Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

[20]Armando Salvatore, The Sociology of Islam (Oxford: Blackwell Wiley, 2016).

[21]Michael Onfray, Atheist Manifesto: The Case Against Christianity, Judaism and Islam, trans. Jeremy Leggatt (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2007), 204.

[22]Malise Ruthven, “Construing Islam as a Language,” The Independent, 8 September 1990.

[23]Paul Berman, Liberalism and Terror (N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 2003).

[24]Norman Podhoretz, World War IV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism (New York: Doubleday, 2007).

[25]Maxime Rodinson, “Critique of Foucault on Iran,” in Khomeini and the Primacy of the Spiritual, 267-277, trans. from Maxime Rodinson, Le Nouvel Observateur, 19 February 1979.

[26]Rodison, “Critique of Foucault on Iran,” 271.

[27]Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: Foundation of Universalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 

[28]Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization (London: Tavistock, 1971); see also Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic (London: Tavistock, 1973).

[29]Michel Foucault, Power: The Essential Works 3 (London, Allen Lane: The Penguin Press, 2001).

[30]Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-1982 (New York: Picador, 2005); see also Michel Foucault, The Government of the Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France 1982-1983 (New York: Palgrave, 2011).

[31]Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978 (New York: Palgrave, 2007).

[32]Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, Foucault in Iran: Islamic Revolution After the Enlightenment (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2016), 68.

[33]Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).

[34]Bryan S. Turner, Marx and the End of Orientalism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1978).

[35]Joan Wallach Scott, “Secularism, Gender Inequality, and the French State,” in Islam, Gender, and Democracy in Comparative Perspective, ed. Jocelyne Cesari and Jose Casanova (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 63-81.

[36]Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban and the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

[37]Ziba Mir-Hosseini, “Islam, Gender and Democracy in Iran,” in Islam, Gender, and Democracy in Comparative Perspective, ed. Jocelyne Cesari and Jose Casanova (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ) 211-236.

[38]Ghamari-Tabrizi, Foucault in Iran, 68.

On the Borders of Documentary and Fiction in Kiarostami’s Homework and Close-Up

Persheng Sadegh-Vaziri teaches at Penn State Harrisburg’s department of Communications. Her current research is focused on documentary films and Iranian filmmakers. She has worked as a documentary filmmaker and producer on films focusing on Iran and Iraq, which were produced for KCET/Link TV, the National Geographic’s All Roads Project, Deep Dish TV, and independently. Her most recent film is Road to Kurdistan, which examines the Iran-Iraq Kurdistan region. Her graduate studies were in cinema studies at New York University and in media and communication at Temple University. 

Close-Up (1990) and Homework (1988) were completed one after the other and bear similarities that are notable and mark Kiarostami’s style, which often transgresses limited definitions of documentary and fiction. These films employ the documentary mode extensively, though Kiarostami resisted the label. They are about very different topics, but they share the director’s personal interest and curiosity in uncovering the motivations that lead the main characters, real life people who have acted against normative expectations. Homework (1988) was even defined by the director as a documentary report. It appears as a straightforward educational film about the problem of homework in elementary schools in Iran. It focuses on one school in a working- class neighborhood of Tehran and features interviews and statistics of parents’ involvement in their children’s nightly homework. However, the film is also reflexive and highlights the filmic process and Kiarostami’s presence and role in shaping it. Kiarostami’s patient and incisive questioning takes the film beyond the objective documentary stance to an engaged and interactive one. His acclaimed film Close-Up (1990) focuses on real characters and a real legal case. Hassan Sabzian was charged for impersonating the famous Iranian director, Mohsen Makhmalbaf and deceiving an upper middle-class family. Kiarostami approached this case after reading about it in Soroush magazine and was immediately intrigued.[1]

Close-up defines the complex way in which Kiarostami employs the real and gives it fictional elements to investigate the deeper meaning behind the characters’ motivations. Kiarostami was moved by this working-class man’s dreams of cinema, which led him to deceive a family and brought about his arrest. Through dramatized and controlled reenactments, the director intervenes to recreate Sabzian’s story. This paper examines the two films and explores how Kiarostami employs reality and the documentary form extensively, even while insisting his films are works of fiction.

The two films employ practices of documentary film, such as focusing on real characters and examining their real lives. The definitions and practices of documentary film have evolved over time from the strict observational mode practiced in the 1960s by Ricky Leacock and the Maysles. This kind of documentary required filmmakers to be invisible “flies on the wall.” As Iranian filmmaker and theorist Pirooz Kalantari explains it, documentaries no longer have to use realism stylistically. Documentaries are not defined by their portrayal of pure reality without intervention. They are defined by the interactions of the filmmaker with the real world, making that the main subject of films.[2] In Close-up Kiarostami manipulates the characters’ actions on film and recreates certain events that happened and at least one that did not take place in the historical world. However, his main subject is a real man and a real case. Sabzian is enamored by cinema and deceives a family in order to live out his dream. For Sabzian and the family, the simulacra of cinema is just as real as real life. Consequently, the film becomes a tangle of the real and the creative in the hands of Kiarostami. In the concluding scenes, Kiarostami and Makhmalbaf advise Sabzian that by performing the deception, he actualized his promise to the family – to have them participate in a film and meet the famous director.

The relationship between documentary and fiction has been addressed by many documentary theorists. Bill Nichols claims that documentary offers the viewer access “to a shared historical” world, not a constructed one, but “the world,” where bullets really kill and decisions can carry life and death consequences.[3] What distinguishes documentary films from reality itself is that not everything in the world that a documentary creates is discursive, “even if their meanings and social values are.”[4] The historical world extends beyond the filmed world and it is the director who shapes it and gives it meaning, whether by using interviews, observational footage, or reenactments. Michael Renov points to the problems of reproducing reality in documentaries, “The duplication of the world, even of what we know most intimately –  ourselves – can never be unproblematic…. Mimesis (even as photographic representation) means producing simulacra which are the equivalent of their historical counterparts. Signifying systems bear with them the weight of their own history and materiality.”[5]  This awareness of the gap between reality and its reproduction has led documentary filmmakers in recent years to move away from purely observational or expositional documentaries to freely use artifice and reflexivity in order to recount the historical world. Jay Ruby proposes that documentarians employ reflexivity to grapple with the problems of objectivity and the presence of the camera, as well as presenting the reality of their own understanding and feelings.[6]  In both films Kiarostami foregrounds the cinematic process to present the viewer with his interpretations of reality. In Close-up, he recreates certain events and places the characters in those situations. He intervenes in actuality in order for the viewer to understand and contemplate the character’s complex motivations. Jonathan Rosenbaum labels some of Kiarostami’s films, “controlled documentaries.”[7] He argues that in Homework and Close-up Kiarostami was deconstructing the documentary form.[8]

Is Close-up any less a documentary than Flaherty’s Nanook of the North, in which a pristine Inuit life, which had already been transformed by Western trade, was recreated for the benefit of audiences in the 1920s? When Kiarostami visited the Island of Aran where Robert Flaherty shot A Man of Aran, he commented on the gap between the reality of the island and how it is represented in Flahery’s film. His statement also sums up his outlook on the role of the director:

When we visit places where they have shot the films in, we are often surprised, and find it hard to believe the film was shot there… [In films] we are subject to the power of storytelling that offers us a reality much different than its true reality… We see it from the director’s point of view, his frame. Left on our own we tend to look around freely, and lack the kind of concentration we have in movie theatres. While encountering reality we are not concentrating and we are not guided. That’s why we roam around, and fail to see what we need to see…[9]

Kiarostami utilizes the documentary form but intervenes in it extensively to present his questions or perspective. He includes some observational elements in Homework – the images of children arriving at school or during their break. For most of the film he uses a formal interview set-up, a dark room with lights and the cameras. It makes the students quite aware of the filming process. However, by also including shots of the camera and himself and his voice, he signals viewers to be aware of the reality of the filmmaker’s process and presence.

Early in Homework Kiarostami explains to a bystander off-camera that the film is a visual exploration of children’s homework because his own kids have difficulty completing their work each evening. In Close-up (1990) the director or his voice is often present and visibly directs the events. He tells the judge presiding over the case that he is interested in the case because it is about cinema. There are shots of the rolling camera, the clapboard, and discussions about the cameras, which increases the visibility of the process. In the court scene in Close-up, he informs the accused that one of the cameras is framing him to record his explanations, establishing his own presence as director. The reflexive mode shows the viewer how the camera and the director intervene in the process of representation. Rather than letting us focus solely on the story or the topic of the film, it highlights the encounter between the filmmaker, the subject, and the viewer and allows us a space of awareness in relation to what we are watching.[10] This strategy serves a political function as well, since it casts doubt on the process of representation and the authenticity of documentary sound and image by calling attention to the intervention of the filmmaker.[11]

In the two films the social actors who play themselves are deemed guilty by those around them, but their stories are retold through the director’s examination of the underlying meaning behind their acts. The court scene in Close-up, for example, appears as a documentary scene, but was created by the director as a documentary style sequence to dramatize the accuser and the accused’s points of view.[12] In actuality, there was mediation between the family and Sabzian, where the charges were dropped and there was no need for a court appearance. In this way Close-up extends beyond the historical world to present the fleeting truth which Kiarostami seeks.

Nichols (1991) defines the interactive mode in documentaries as when the director is no longer just an observer behind the camera, but acts as instigator, provocateur, participant or mentor in the film.[13] There are ethical issues regarding how far the presence of the filmmaker provokes or interferes in the revelation of the truth. There is an inherent inequality between the director and the social actors, particularly if they are young children. In Homework, the interactive and reflexive modes remind the viewer of the filmed process and highlight the imbalances that the children endure when they are questioned by adults. In Close-up, the reflexive mode makes us aware of how cinema has intervened in Sabzian’s life, changed it, propelled it towards a cinematic resolution.

 

Homework     

Homework is ostensibly a documentary about the problem of homework in a public boys’ school in Tehran that mainly uses children’s testimonials. Kiarostami makes his presence and intervention prominent in repeated shots of his face and voice, of the camera, and cameraman. He listens to the school boys and guides them to explain the difficulties they face in completing their work. A range of first and second graders, nervous and teary, bold and shy, explain in interviewed examinations, why they have not completed their assignments. Kiarostami asks them about their home life after school. They are distracted by their chores, siblings, television, or family visitors. Most do not get adequate help in completing their work, as many of their parents are illiterate.

During this period Kiarostami was working for the state funded Kanoon (Center for the Intellectual Development of Children and Young Adults), which produced many documentaries. Hamid Naficy explores the counterhegemonic tendencies of those who worked at the Kanoon, including Kiarostami. These filmmakers often made films about children, with underlying messages about the ills of society.[14] The scenes of children in the school yard reciting slogans in support of the Iranian forces fighting Saddam or a young boy’s thoughts regarding the fighting at home, which Kiarostami likens to war, point to this analogy. The film also includes elements of a traditional documentary; it incorporates a montage sequence, where a female voice-over narrates the results of hundreds of questionnaires that were distributed among parents. It shows that in the late 1980s in that school, 37% of parents were illiterate and could not help their children and a large number were overworked and tired and requested the school to exempt them from having to help their children with homework.

From the first shots of Homework reflexivity is established as a dominant trope. On their way to school the children playfully address the camera and comment on being filmed. A group of them approach the director and ask what the film is about. Then the off-screen voice of a passerby is heard who questions the director on whether the film is documentary or fiction. Kiarostami responds that the film is not fictional and unlike his earlier film, The First Graders (1986) which was scripted, this film has no script and is based on an idea. He wanted to make it because he had difficulty with his own children regarding their nightly homework. It is not clear if the question was presented to him or if it was scripted.

A series of establishing shots show the start of a school day with the children lined up to sing anthems praising Islam’s Imams and supporting the Iranian war against Iraq’s Saddam Hussain (1980-1988). We then witness a series of formal interviews in which young boys speak directly to the camera and answer questions from the director. In the first interview set-up, an establishing shot shows the director, the interviewee, the camera, and lights, in a room prepared for the interview. Kiarostami comments about the lighting and gives directions to his cameraman. It is an unequal set up, where the director and his crew appear on one side of a typical teacher’s desk and a young, vulnerable boy stands or sits on the other side. Some answer shyly, some are reticent, some are outspoken, and a few are terrified. Kiarostami speaks gently with the boys and sometimes teases them about how much cartoons they watch. He addresses them like adults and for the most part does not interrupt their responses. Many of the interviews are long scenes that give us a full picture of the boy’s responses.

The director pursues the theme of punishment in several of the interviews, exposing the the underlying problem for the children. As Naficy states, it is a counterhegemonic strategy to let the children confess their pain of facing punishment by their parents or teachers.[15] A few boys cannot even define the meaning of “encouragement” or “praise”, but they all know the meaning of punishment. A traumatized teary-eyed child claims his brother doesn’t let him study and no one helps him. Following that interview an engaged parent appears in front of the camera and says he wants to express his views regarding this problem. He speaks for the director in stating the unreasonable pressures that parents and teachers place on the kids. During recess, a sequence of children is seen chanting slogans and beating their chests with religious songs. These scenes point to the institutionalization of physical pain and suffering in Shia Iran.

Documentary’s association with the observational or verité style is a strong element of the documentary form, where actual events are recorded in an unscripted and uncontrolled manner. However, most documentaries, even observational ones demonstrate the director’s control in shaping the film. In particular, the interview process is a set-up common to documentaries, where the director or interviewer poses the questions and directs the flow of the exposition. In this film, Kiarostami mainly uses the interview process to capture a number of testimonials from young children to distill several of the problems of the Iranian educational system in the late 1980s, only a few years after the Revolution and in the midst of an eight-year war with Iraq.

After several scenes of interviews with students posing similar questions, a pattern emerges of the difficulties students face with all the expectations placed on them. Following a few such interviews, Kiarostami pauses on Majid’s case. Kiarostami’s slow and methodical examination prepares us for the final revelation that clarifies why Majid cannot do well in school. It is not for a lack of effort, but because of the crippling fear of punishment. Majid is a traumatized young boy who can barely speak to Kiarostami. In the midst of his sobs he asks that his friend stay with him during the interview.

Kiarostami tries to calm him and persists to understand what the source of his anxiety is. Majid’s father is interviewed separately and he explains the troubles of his young boy, who may have learning difficulties. His young friend is also interviewed and explains that the teacher has punished Majid often and that is why he is terrified. After the boy finally calms down, with his friend by his side, he explains that he is upset because he has not prepared for his religion class. Kiarostami asks him if he can remember any of his lessons. He volunteers to recite a poem he has learned for the class. Surprisingly, Majid delivers the poem eloquently. With his friend close to him, in a strong voice he praises God’s beautiful creations – the stars and the universe, nature, the trees and the sky, and hearts full of joy. The film ends with a freeze frame of Majid and his friend. A choral sound-track emerges singing the same poem over the closing titles. This musical emphasis shows the director’s belief that young people need to experience joy. Majid’s transformation on camera is a moving revelation.

Over the course of his career Kiarostami has shown his genius in recognizing and resting on small stories and their power to uncover universal human themes. His complicated approach merits further examination regarding the relationship between the director and subject and the treatment of reality in films. Ziegfried Kracauer defines a strategy that Kiarostami seems to use. “Found stories” are important sources for documentaries – stories that are found in the material of actual physical reality. “When you have watched for long enough the surface of a river or lake you will detect certain patterns in the water which may have been produced by a breeze or some eddy. Found stories are in the nature of such patterns.”[16]

 

Closeup          

In Close-up the character of Sabzian, who impersonated the famed director Makhmalbaf, fascinated Kiarostami. He read about him in a magazine article and set out to research the story. In the course of the film, Sabzian emerges as a complicated imposter, a fallen hero, who with his confessions and actions makes us think deeply about cinema and the widespread desire to get close to and emulate a celebrated director. Kiarostami’s focus on this “found story” and Sabzian’s behavior point to a common human condition: the need to be seen and be counted. The film moves between documentary set-ups, as the director inquires about Sabzian and his case, and reenacted sequences in which all the people involved in the story play their own parts.

The film starts with a dramatized reenactment. The journalist who wrote the original story in a magazine takes two soldiers to arrest the accused Sabzian. In the taxi the journalist tells the driver the story of the man’s deception. Though we don’t know if the story happened in this precise manner or not, the reenactment has many elements of the real. All the characters play their own roles. Some of the conversations are improvised as they ask passersby for directions to the house of the plaintiffs, the Ahankhah family. When the police and the journalist go in to arrest the culprit, the camera remains with the taxi driver instead of following the main action. The bored driver walks around aimlessly, then kicks a spray can down the slope and the camera stays on a long shot of the can until it stops rolling. The lengthy shot which digresses from the main story points to the director’s lack of interest in showing what is obvious, but is rather interested in following the subtle details, which allow the underlying truth to emerge.

The sequences that follow feature Kiarostami himself researching the story in several reenacted or documentary scenes, including a police station, at the home of the Ahankhah family and in prison where Sabzian is held. In the home of the Ahankhahs, they complain that the magazine article showed them as a gullible family, and that various people like the journalist (and possibly the filmmaker) have come to them to gain something from their misfortune. They want to defend themselves and tell their side of the story. Kiarostami asks them where Sabzian is held and they guide him to Ghasr prison.

The camera is not allowed inside the prison visiting room and we watch through a window frame as Kiarostami meets Sabzian for the first time. Rosenbaum claims this scene was also recreated, though its framing, the characteristics of the location, and Sabzian’s behavior point to its documentary nature. There is a lot of activity going on in the background and Sabzian seems to be unaware of the camera. The director who is mic’d asks him if he can do anything for him and Sabzian responds that he wants his pain to be visualized. The camera zooms in to give us a closer shot of the two of them talking. We only see Kiarostami’s back and Sabzian’s face. As Rosenbaum states, Kiarostami’s approach throws the veracity of all scenes into uncertainty, which is the point.[17] Because truth is elusive.

Sabzian says he admitted to embezzlement but his motivation was his love for art and cinema. He asks Kiarostami to give his message to Mohsen Makhmalbaf – that he lives with the director’s film The Cyclist (1987). During this period, Makhmalbaf was Iran’s most famous director. He had emerged from a humble background, became a revolutionary filmmaker, and then a critically acclaimed cineaste, who made dramatic and surreal films about the plight of returning war veterans and the poor. The Cyclist is an allegorical film about a poor and desperate Afghani immigrant, who raises money for his ill wife’s medical care by riding a bicycle non-stop for a week. In the prison encounter, Sabzian is established as pensive and modest character that rises above his petty crime. Kiarostami’s deep study, the accused’s awareness of his motivations, and his identification with The Cyclist make us see him as he sees himself, in the role of a tragic hero of a neorealist film.

The next scene is in the offices of the judge, as Kiarostami requests that they expedite the proceedings. The judge doesn’t see the significance of the case for a film and explains that they deal with more interesting criminal cases that the filmmaker could use. He agrees to let Kiarostami film in the courtroom once he obtains the right permits. This scene is also devised by Kiarostami, since there was no actual trial. An Iranian film critic who accompanied one of the participants in the trial scene, explained that it was conducted just like a trial, with the presiding judge and the participants speaking from their own convictions.[18]

Bill Nichols, in his discussion of the documentary form explains that the objective world or reality is neither a text nor a narrative. In order for it to be defined or shaped it needs a system of signs, language or discourse. Both documentaries and fiction are texts that share “formal, ideologically inflected status.”[19] However, fictional worlds, even if they have a realist style, remain metaphorical. He states that both are constructs, but they differ significantly in their representations of the historical world. Nichols claims that in documentaries representation works with rhetoric and persuasion rather than with likeness or reproduction.[20] There are many indexical signs present in Closeup that problematize it as a work of fiction. In both Homework and Close-up something different happens. The social actors play themselves and the director engages them to participate in retelling their stories in a way that illuminates a deeper truth. He transgresses the documentary form when the real characters reenact a scene that did not take place, but perhaps had happened metaphorically. Kiarostami creates the courtroom scene, not to dramatize, but to force the characters into a space where they would speak their intentions.

The courtroom scene begins with the clapboard marking its fictional nature. It is also reflexive, signifying that we are indeed watching a film. The light stands are visible and Kiarostami appears to be more in charge of this scene than the judge. His voice intervenes in the beginning by explaining that two cameras are placed there to record the judge and the accused. He directs Sabzian to address one of the cameras when he explains his reasons behind his acts. The judge asks Kiarostami’s permission to begin and the session starts. Later in the sequence, the director interrupts to ask his own questions.

As discussed earlier, reflexivity in works of art challenges cinematic conventions, whether it is documentary or narrative, to bring awareness to the form itself, as well as to the inner “workings of society.”[21] By bringing attention to the position of cameras, including the director’s off-screen voice that interjects in the proceedings, the viewer becomes aware of the reality of the filmmaking process and the power of the medium. In a film about the main character’s love for cinema, the director aptly brings our attention to the artifice of film and makes us question whether Sabzian is any more duplicitous than a film director, in presenting an imaginary world and passing it on as real.

In the courtroom, the camera pans the faces of the attendants, the plaintiffs, the journalist, and the accused. The younger Ahankhah explains the family’s charges against Sabzian, whom they believe had plans to embezzle them. The courtroom sequence cuts to a dramatized flashback of Sabzian and Mrs. Ahankhah on a bus, when they first met and the deception began. In this scene, they sit next to each other on the bus and Mrs. Ahankhah asks Sabzian if he is the famous director and tells him about her son’s interest in cinema. Back in the courtroom Sabzian reiterates that his psychological motivation was his love for cinema, not money. For him Makhmalbaf’s films expressed his pain and he also sees himself as the main character in Kiarostami’s film The Traveler (1974). The Traveler is about narrative film about a child who is so passionate about football that in order to buy tickets to a game, he deceives his classmates and charges them for photographs taken with his fake camera. However, he falls asleep and misses the game. Sabzian says that he has also missed out in life.

After the plaintiffs state their complaint, again Kiarostami’s voice intervenes and asks Sabzian to explain more clearly why he took their money to pay for his taxi. Sabzian recounts that being Makhmalbaf empowered him. People responded to his requests. Then at the end of the night he would have to go home and be the same unemployed, desperate man who could not even afford to buy a bag of chips for his child. Navigating the two worlds was painful for him, but he was encouraged to continue because he felt empowered.

In another reenacted scene that reflects back to the first scene, we watch from inside the house as Sabzian is found out and arrested. He is talking to the family in the living room, but they appear distracted. The father leaves and talks to the journalist outside. The camera remains on Sabzian, while the journalist and the Ahankhahs leave to bring in the police. Sabzian remains alone in a long shot that emphasizes his loneliness. In a closer shot Sabzian pulls the curtain and watches helplessly and with apprehension what is about to take place. Once again, the camera remains not on the dramatic interchange, but on the trapped man. He paces the room, but is unable to leave. Kiarostami’s main concern is Sabzian’s psychological state and his behavior. In this reenactment Sabzian plays himself and convincingly shows the anguish he had experienced.

Later in the trial Kiarostami asks him pointedly if he prefers to act or to direct and Sabzian responds that he prefers acting. Kiarostami follows up to ask if he is acting now in the courtroom. Sabzian responds resolutely that he is speaking from the heart and it is not an act. Though the scene is set up by the director, Sabzian’s response is based on his real motivations – his inner experiences. Here through a fictional scene the director arrives at documentary truth.

Sabzian’s confession and his questioning by the judge and Kiarostami resemble the interviews Kiarostami conducted with the children in Homework. Sabzian responds to the questions that the judge and Kiarostami put to him, and the director prods him to go deeper to the source of his motivations for deceiving the family. Like the children he is in the hot seat and has to explain himself. Kiarostami often said that Close-up was his favorite film and explained in an interview that he could see that the children in Homework would grow up to be like Sabzian because they were all the products of the same society and system.[22] In this way Sabzian also takes on universal characteristics that we can identify with and becomes a tragic figure whose passion leads to his downfall.

The final sequence of the film features Sabzian’s release from prison. Kiarostami has arranged for Makhmalbaf to greet him and give him a ride on his motorbike to go to the Ahankhah home and apologize. Sabzian is so moved that he cries and can barely talk. We watch the encounter from inside the car where Kiarostami and his cameraman record the interaction. The sound is cuts off intermittently, presumably due to technical difficulties. Later in an interview Kiarostami admitted that he did not want to include all the banal conversations that Makhmalbaf and Sabzian were having, so he came up with the idea of cutting off the sound.[23]  Kiarostami’s car follows them; the camera frames their motorbike from behind the cracked window of their car. The crack is another reminder that accentuates the viewer’s separation from the main action and heightens the awareness of the filmmaking process.

 

Reality, Fiction, Documentary

Kiarostami approaches the documentary mode not as an end, but as a means to uncover reality; he uses it and goes beyond it, making the viewers aware of his interventions and his interpretations of reality. Several of the scenes in Close-up, including the police station, are difficult to define as reenactments or documentary sequences. Regarding Close-Up, Kiarostami said that he attempted to “reach fiction through the documentary.”[24] In another interview he said, “Reality is not particularly interesting to me. Its value is in bringing us closer to the Truth… that humans are ultimately alone – they ultimately have to face their issues alone. This is not selfishness, quite the contrary, it is with this lonesome self that one understands others.”[25] Sabzian’s act that brought him to trial and Majid’s refusal to cooperate with his teachers and parent exemplify our human condition – our predicament to ultimately face life alone.

In several interviews Kiarostami has declared that the documentary mode does not exist, but that we can approach reality through his interventions. His definition of documentary was restricted to recording pure reality, which is not the function of documentaries. His body of work mainly features fictional works that explore the relationship between films and reality. Many of them use reflexivity or borrow from the documentary mode. In Through the Olive Trees he foregrounds the process of filmmaking. In the endless takes and repetitions of the film within the film, the characters live their lives in between the takes. The non-professional actor, Hossein Rezai proposes to Tahereh while they wait for the filming to begin.[26]  However, those scenes were also set up and shot, as did the shots of the camera crew. They are no more documentary than the rest of the film. In Ten (2002) a woman drives her car in Tehran. She is going through a divorce and argues with her real- life son and picks up other women in her car. They confide their difficulties in their relationships to her. The entire film takes place inside the car – it was shot with two digital cameras that were fixed on the driver and her riders. Once again, its simple structure and long shots and improvisations give it the appearance of the documentary mode. Shirin (2009) is a conceptual film with a simple design that subverts our expectations of documentary truth. The entire film consists of close-ups of faces of more than fifty actresses, as they presumably watch an Iranian epic tragedy. We do not see the film, but hear it on the sound track. The film is purely artifice; it was not shot in a theatre and the actresses were not watching the epic. However, it is significant that he was using real actors, whose job is to perform. In Shirin, we are watching the reality of their acting.

In Certified Copy, the two leading characters discuss the differences between a real work of art and its copies as they drive in the Italian countryside. The female character, played by Juliette Binoche, takes a writer to see a famous work of art that is not an original, but a copy. Their discussion harkens to Walter Benjamin’s ruminations about the original work of art, its authenticity and aura, which is lacking in reproductions;[27] the writer declares that copies are no less valuable as they point us to their original and lead to self-inquiry. This brings us back to Kiarostami’s thesis, that his films are copies of reality but they are no less real. They push us to a focused examination of the nature of reality. In Close-Up, Sabzian’s act and Kiarostami’s intervention make us reexamine if his pretense was not the result of a society that values cinema very highly and where media have taken hold of our reality. We are led to conclude that both Sabzian and the boys in Homework are not guilty of anything, except for being vulnerable members of their society who are punished when they fail.

The two films are not confessionals nor do they operate like “Reality TV”, which may share some of the same motivations. Using the documentary mode extensively, they do not simply divulge what happened in the past, but build up to the conflict and the truth of the story within the diegesis of the film. In Homework, the climax of the film is presented in the last interview when the upset young boy is prodded by Kiarostami. He carefully prepares the stage for the boy and for us by interviewing the boy’s father and his friend, in order to uncover the difficulties at home and in the classroom. The educational documentary is transformed into a drama as the boy is inconsolable and breaks down, then relaxes and shows the director and the viewers that he is actually quite capable of doing good work, but only with support and encouragement. The film does not cross the boundaries of documentary, as their reality unfolds in front of the camera.

In thinking about the slippage between the real and the copy, Baudrillard asserted that reality is disappearing to make room for images.[28]  Simulation is what is left, as our mediated society dissolves the borders further and further with each movie, TV show, game, and technological innovation. Sabzian became entangled in the simulacra of films rather than in his problem-ridden life of struggle and unemployment and invented a new identity that attracted the Ahankhah family. Kiarostami uses Sabzian’s story to express how reality and a story about the real event are inextricably entangled. The film is designed to help us see the contradictions in punishing a powerless man of a crime for posing as a powerful director. Here, as James, the character in Certified Copy declared, the copy becomes more valuable than the original.

 

[1]Mehdi Sahabi, “Reenacting Reality, In Search of Reality,” (interview) Film Magazine 88, (1990), 66.

[2]Pirooz Kalantari, “A Longshot and a Close-up: A Glance at Kiarostami and Documentary Film,” Film Magazine 513, (11 September 2016), 21.

[3]Bill Nichols, Representing Reality (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), 109.

[4]Nichols, Representing Reality, 109.

[5]Michael Renov, Theorizing Documentary (London: Routledge, 1993), 26.

[6]Jay Ruby, “Reflexivity and the Documentary Film,” in New Challenges for Documentary, ed. Alan Rosenthal, (University of California Press, 1988), 71.

[7]Jonathan Rosenbaum, “From Iran With Love,” Chicago Reader (1995), www.jonathanrosenbaum.net/1995/09/from-iran-with-love/.

[8]Jonathan Rosenbaum & Mehrnaz Saeed-Vafa, Abbas Kiarostami, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 15.

[9]Jamshid Akrami, A Walk with Kiarostami, (video-recording, 2005), https://vimeo.com/214245067.

[10]Nichols, Representing Reality, 60-61.

[11]Nichols, Representing Reality, 61.

[12]Ahmad Talebinejad, “Memories of Kiarostami: Elegy for a Heavyweight,” Film Monthly 513, (11 September 2016), 26.

[13]Nichols, Representing Reality, 44.

[14]Hamid Naficy, A Social History of Iranian Cinema, vol. 2 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 404.

[15]Naficy,  A Social History of Iranian Cinema, 75.

16Ziegfried Kracauer, Theory of Film (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 245.

[17]Jonathan Rosenbaum, (2003), 17.

[18]Talebinejad, “Memories from Kiarostami,” 26.

[19]Nichols, Representing Reality, 110. .sing the documentary mode extensively, cted to recording pure reality, which is not the work of documentary filmmakers. he proc

[20]Peter Wollen, cited in Bill Nichols, Representing Reality, 66.

[21]Jamshid Akrami, “Kiarostami Interview in Cannes,” (video recording, 1997), www.youtube.com/watch?v=F9l_KD96E_M.

[22]Geoff Andrews, “Abbas Kiarostami,” The Guardian (28 April 2005), www.theguardian.com/film/2005/apr/28/hayfilmfestival2005.guardianhayfestival.

[23]Rashmi Doraiswamy, “Abbas Kiarostami: Life and Much More,” Cinemaya: The Asian Film Quarterly (Summer 1999): 18-20.

[24]Sahabi, “Reenacting Reality, In Search of Reality,” 66.

[25]Stephen Holden, “Film Festival Review: Blurring Truth and Fiction in Rural Iran,” The New York Times, 24 September 1994, www.nytimes.com/movie/review?res=9C04E1D6153AF937A1575AC0A962958260?.

[26]Walter Benjamin, “Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1995), 217-252.

[27]Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006), 144.

Hafez and Sufi Hermeneutics

Daryoush Ashouri was born in Tehran in 1938. His extensive scholarship examines historical, cultural and linguistic matters of Persia, also as a Third World country encountering modernity. He is author, compiler, and translator of more than 25 books. One of his major works is his hermeneutical, intertextual study of the Divan of Hafez, ‘Erfān o rēndi.

 

The usage of an equivocal and highly metaphorical language with its frequent references to historical, legendary, and symbolic figures of Semitic and pre-Islamic Persian origin, has made Divān of Hafez the most enigmatic piece of Persian literature for modern minds and, for this reason, the most challenging one. The mastery of its author in simultaneously playing with real, symbolic, and metaphorical meanings of the words in an equivocal manner, has made his poetry extraordinarily responsive to a spectrum of largely incompatible, and even contradictory, interpretative approaches from a host of differing and opposing ideological and philosophical horizons. In recent times, the endeavors of many scholars and enthusiastic admirers of Hafez, mostly Iranians, to decode the puzzle of its language of metaphors and symbols have produced a sizable interpretative body of literature.

 

The Sufi mystics, with their ancient tradition of reading and decoding poetic texts considered as symbolic expressions of their specific esoteric views, still see in him the most brilliant icon of the spiritual ascetic life, and in his words as authentic mystical exegesis of Qur’an. In this relationship, he is entitled as ‘tongue of the invisible world’ (lesān al-ghēyb) or a highly mysterious voice expressing godly secrets in an allusive language which could be deciphered only by ‘men of secrets’ (ahl-e rāz).

 

Others, rising out of the avant-garde movement of the modern Iranian intelligentsia, on the contrary, consider him the greatest libertine and blasphemous figure amongst the classical Persian poets. Still some interpreters of Hafez from the extreme right wing of Iranian nationalism carrying enthusiastic anti-Arab and anti-Islamic views, by referring to his frequent recalling of the historical and legendary political and spiritual figures of the ancient Persian history, like Jamshid, Dārā, and Zoroaster, in an extremely arbitrary way they consider his words as thoroughly allusive expressions of complete adhesion to the original ‘Persian’ world views which reflect an anti-Islamic spirit. They go so far to ascribe Hafez to a hypothetical esoteric sect, living until his time as a relic of the aboriginal pre-Islamic religion of Mithraism. Finally, some ardent leftists, driven by their essentially presentist concerns, depict Hafez as a severe social critic and, somehow, a politically militant figure.

 

In spite of my continuous study of the vast literature produced on the Divān of Hafez, my quest for disclosing the enigma of his poetry from a modern point of view never attained a satisfactory response for decades. In this way, his oeuvre remained for me, like many other readers, the most complex mystery of Persian culture, ultimately unattainable by a logically acceptable approach. In this regard, certain obvious obstacles have played a part in complicating the interpretive task. One example is the impossibility of arranging the ghazals of the Divān, except a few number, according to their exact date of composition, for disclosing clearly their possible biographical or historical connotations. Another important obstacle is the poet’s intentional playful tone which strives to conceal, in a mystical manner, its deeper layers of meanings expressed in a secret allusive tongue, indecipherable by ‘strangers’ (nā-mahramān). In the end, from a modern analytical point of view, it seems to me that the absence of a properly applicable methodological device, until now, has been the main obstacle for such a hermeneutical assignment.

 

Sufi hagiography interprets images, terms, and imaginary figures appearing as persons in the Divān in accordance with its own traditional way of reading. This tradition regards Hafez as a saintly figure inspired by the Occult World (ālam-e ghēyb), and, in this manner, sets him at the highest rank in its pantheon of poet-saints. But such readings hardly satisfy the modern mind that aims to understand the Divān as a text produced by its own specific historical circumstances. In this respect, the only factual element is the pervasive presence of the vocabulary, allusions, imagery and symbols in the Divān common to the poetics of mystical love in Persian language. This specific language establishes the undeniable genealogical affinity of the Divān to other Sufi or mystical (ērfāni) poetry in this language, as in the divāns of Attār, Rumi, Erāqi, Sa‘di, Khājū, and the works of numerous other poets among predecessors or contemporaries of Hafez.

 

Hafez’s obsessive concern with the themes and terms of Sufi literature, juxtaposed with his continuous harsh criticism of institutionalized Sufism and its representatives, in the name of an individualistic esoteric faith, reveals his very intimate acquaintance with Sufi literature and his enthusiastic engagement with key Sufi concepts, terms, spiritualistic claims, and practices. The constant presence of two central iconic figures– zāhēd (the ascetic), on one hand, and rēnd (the enlightened libertine) on the other– should be considered as the core discourse of the Divān. The bipolar characterization of these two central figures and their eternal contradictory positions on the matters of Truth and righteousness are the dominant themes in the poetry of Hafez, which essentially is adopted from his predecessors among Sufi poets, originally based on the Sufi exegesis of the Qur’anic account of the myth of the Creation.

 

Regarding the problematics noted above, intertextual approach seems to be the most fruitful method for disclosing the basic contextual meanings of the numerous terms, images, and symbolic expressions, that the Divᾱn of Hafez shares basically with the long and prolific tradition of the Persian Sufi literature, both in poetry and prose.

 

The Basic Implications of the Intertextual Approach

In recent decades, Iranian scholars have extensively explored the intertextual relations between the Divān of Hafez and other books of poetry, both Sufi and non-Sufi, composed by his predecessors and contemporaries. These explorations have clearly demonstrated Hafez’s wide reading of Persian literary works and, also, his considerable use of images, expressions, and even verbatim citations, in part or in full, from such works. But these comparative surveys, fundamentally, have been performed from a literary point of view. Therefore, the more fundamental issue, that is, the ideational relations between the basic images, symbols, figurative expressions, and concepts in the Divān and other texts of Sufi literature, have not been subject to a meticulous analytical investigation.

 

The comparative study of the Divᾱn[1]and certain classical Sufi Qur’anic hermeneutical

 

works in prose, which precede the Divᾱn by several centuries, performed by me, strived to use modern instruments of conceptual analysis in search of a positive intertextual affinity, at least in part, between the Divᾱn and those works. This study revealed the undeniable influence, impact, and echoing of those works upon the main thrust of poetic discourse in the Divᾱn of Hafez.

 

The intertextual approach proves to be the most effective method for contextualizing the Divᾱn in its proper historical setting and deconstructing its structure of meaning. This method ultimately discloses the genealogy of the complex allusions and key terms adopted from Sufi tradition of poetic tongue in the Divān. Set alongside certain studies done by Iranian scholars in recent decades on the abundant reflections of the Qur’anic verses in the Divān, some students of the Sufi literature have pointed out the reflections of Sufi Qur’anic hermeneutics in the Divān. Two texts are of special note in this regard: Kashf al-asrār of Rashid al-Din Meybodi (d. 520/1126), the great pioneering work of Khorasani Sufism, and Mērsād al-ēbād of Najm al-Din Rāzi (d. 654/1256), a fundamental Sufi work that appeared later along the same hermeneutical lines. To provide direct evidence of this influence, the section devoted to intertextual study in my book on Hafez cites numerous verses from the Divān alongside selected related passages from the two Sufi hermeneutical works mentioned above. This juxtaposition clearly demonstrates how many lines in the Divān repeat almost precisely the key terms and metaphors found in those texts, and strongly echo their hermeneutical approach to the Qur’anic myth of Creation. The difference, of course, is that what these Sufi authors describe through a lengthy and detailed prose treatment, Hafez expresses in a uniquely succinct and allusive poetical tongue.

 

The detailed and extended exposition of those terms and images in Meybodi’s work facilitates a clearer understanding of the referential role of many words and expressions obsessively repeated in the Divān. For example, we can confidently ascertain the meaning of the term salāmat— which is repeated many times in the Divᾱn—as expressed in a half line by him:

منِ سرگشته هم از اهلِ سلامت بودم…

(Man-e sar-gashtē ham az ahl-ē salāmat būdam…)

I, the wandering one, once belonged to the people of sound life…

Here, as in the other places, salāmat refers to the ‘sound life’ in the ‘House of Soundness’ (Dār al-Salām), Heavenly Abode, the Paradise. Thus, ahl-ē salāmat, as a term, refers to the inhabitants of Dᾱr al-Salᾱm. In this verse, the stable, sound, and delightful life in the ‘House of Soundness’, devoid of any disturbance, stands in contrast to the life of the narrator– the poet—living an earthly life, characterized as the life of a perplexed, homeless one, a ‘wanderer’ (sar-gashtē).

 

Through further investigation into the above-mentioned hermeneutical texts, we can realize that Hafez, in this verse as in many others, identifies himself, as ‘wanderer’, with his archetypal paradigm, Adam, the Father of humankind , after leaving the Paradise. According to Sufi hermeneutics of the Khorasani school, an extensive exposition of which appears in the section devoted to mystical interpretation of the Qur’an in Kashf al-asrᾱr, Adam’s ‘wandering’ in the Eternal Time was caused by his positive and courageous response to the invocation of Love while living in Paradise. Then, by committing the Original Sin, he chooses, deliberately, to desert the ‘House of Soundness’ (Dᾱr al-Salᾱm) and, by this action, alienates himself from its sound-living inhabitants (ahl-ē salᾱmat) to commence a life, full of hazards and dangers, in the mundane, terrestrial world (ālam-ē khāki), in order to fulfill the will of the Eternal Beloved (mahbūb-ē azali). The second half line of this verse reveals that the adventure of deserting the heavenly safe and sound life was caused by a love ‘trap’ put in his way (dᾱm-ē rᾱh) by the ‘curly hair’ of the Beloved. In this relationship we read in the Kashf al-asrᾱr,

فرمان آمد، :”یا آدم، اکنون که قدم در کویِ عشق نهادی از بهشت بیرون شو که این سرایِ راحت است و عاشقانِ درد را با سلامتِ دارالسلام چه کار!”[2]

A heavenly command came, “O Adam, now that you have passed into the quarter of love, get out of the Paradise which is the house of comfort. What the lovers of sufferings have to do with the sound life of the ‘House of Soundness’!”

 

By means of the intertextual study we come to understand the original reason for and meaning of the ‘wandering’ (sar-gashtēgi) of the poet. Another point, which provides strong support to this approach, is the use Hafez makes of the word ‘sar-gashtē’ in this context. This word is borrowed from Mērsᾱd al-ēbᾱd [3], where Rᾱzi is recounting the story of the Fall of Adam from Paradise, using this attribute to describe his ultimate ‘homelessness’. On another occasion, Hafez speaks of ‘man-ē sar-gardᾱn’ (me, the wanderer), which is again a term adopted from Mērsᾱd (ibid., idem.) in the same context, where Rᾱzi relates the words that Adam has told to God after the Fall, describing his own situation as ‘sar-gardᾱni’ (wandering).[4]

 

In fact, this very condition of ‘wandering’ is expounded in great detail in these Sufi hermeneutical works, where the myth of Creation of Adam according to the Qur’an is analyzed in details from a mystical perspective. Throughout his Divᾱn, Hafez makes repeated poetic allusions to this specific Sufi hermeneutical version of the story. Likewise, an intertextual study of the Divān alongside the mystical interpretation of Qur’anic passages in Meybodi’s work, clearly reveals the precise referential meanings of many other terms and expressions, such as: karāmat (god’s graciousness), malāmat (blame), peymān (pact), gharib (stranger), lotf-ē azal (pre-eternal grace), dām-ē balā (trap of afflictions), zāhēd-ē khod-bin (the conceited ascetic), etc. By the same token, the search for intertextual relationships between the Divān and the section devoted to the extended mystical interpretation of the myth of Creation in Mērsād al-ēbād of Rāzi, allows us to grasp the referential meanings of such terms and expressions as: ganj (treasure), kharābāt (‘Tavern of Ruin’), sowme‘a (cloister), rēndān-ē qalandar (wild roving libertines), gowhar-ē makhzan-ē asrār (the Pearl of the Treasury of Mysteries), and so forth.

 

Even more essential to our quest for the structure of meaning in the Divān of Hafez is the strong echo of the central point of the Sufi hermeneutics in the greatest number of his ghazals.

 

 

The Core of Sufi Hermeneutics

The intertextual study undertaken by this author reveals a very crucial point: the selected parts of the two Sufi hermeneutical works by Meybodi and Rāzi that exhibit the greatest affinity to the terms, images, and expressions in the Divān of Hafez, as mentioned above, are directly concerned with a mystical reading and interpretation of the myth of Creation in Qur’an. It is the focal point of all attempts made by Sufi exegetes to reveal the mysteries (asrār) of God’s Word (Kalām Allāh). To this end, they ventured a bold exegesis of those parts of the Qur’an which are mainly narrated briefly, being scattered in seven different suras. The Sufis who pioneered esoteric Qur’anic hermeneutics strongly believed that their adventurous quest for uncovering the secret layers of meanings in God’s Word, in reality, are heavenly inspirations. Through their unique and daring approach, the Sufi exegetes found themselves, as it were, being guided to their heartfelt knowledge, induced by God, to the safe harbour of a thoroughly original mystical theology, angelology, and anthropology. By this extraordinary hermeneutical leap of understanding, they could consider themselves as ‘God’s friends’ and ‘God-knowing’ ones (owliyā’ and orafā’), chosen by God to serve as treasurers of His mysteries (khᾱzine-yē asrār-ē ēlāhi).

 

In Meybodi’s work, which constitutes the first great Persian compilation of Sufi hermeneutics, we witness the author’s mission of disclosing the secrets of Adam’s creation by revealing his place in the teleological design of the World. To this end, the Sufi exegetes from Khorasan create their specific manner of reading and interpreting God’s Word. This strategy patently manifests itself in the very title of the Meybodi’s colossal work: Kashf al-asrār i.e. the discovery of the mysteries.[5] Following the legacy and tradition of earlier Sufi masters, Meybodi ventures to follow the three-way relationships between God, the Angels (including, specifically, Eblis), and Adam, as described in the Qur’an in a semi-dramatic style. Meybodi implements this strategy through a meticulous analysis of the words exchanged between the three parties and their behaviours toward each other during the process of the Creation of Adam and subsequent events, that is, the story of the primordial Sin and Fall.

 

Meybodi, as a compiler of the long tradition of Sufi hermeneutics, garners all the key Qur’anic segments related to the story of man’s Creation in the Heavenly World, and juxtaposes these with other relevant verses about the qualifications of man’s life in this World. Moreover, to expound upon the terse Qur’anic narrative, he supplies complementary materials drawn from the hadiths (Godly and Prophetic traditions), and ‘testimonies’ (khabar), including ideas and interpretations integrated from the Jewish and Christian scriptural hermeneutical traditions. In this manner, he strives to reconstruct the ‘full text’ of the story of Creation, delving into great detail to disclose its teleological mysteries. Close study of the strategy of Sufi hermeneutics provides essential clues for understanding how Sufi esoteric ‘discoveries’ (kashf) in this context played a crucial role in forming the spirit, subject-matter, and tongue of the later Persian Sufi literature, reflected specifically in its extraordinarily prolific poetical productions.

 

According to the Sufi hermeneutical analysis, as discussed in the two pivotal works by Meybodi and Rāzi, when God announced His resolve to appoint a successor (khalifa) on the Earth, the angels protested that this, yet unnamed, creature, i.e. the later Adam, would be a corrupt and bloodthirsty being (II:29). The Sufi exegetes tried to discover the angels’ hidden intention in those words by tracing their subsequent words and behaviors.[6] They concluded that the Angels’ disdainful words about Adam, or their hostile attitude toward him, derived from the pride they took in having served God for eons. It also reflected their jealousy for the special attention that God bestowed upon Adam. Hearing God’s Words and observing His long labor in shaping Adam’s mould of clay by His own hands, the angels saw the creation of favored being who, in spite of his low earthly origin, would be far closer to God than them. Hence, they objected against Adam to preserve their superior position as spiritual beings. God’s response to their objection, that ‘I know the things that you never know,’ (II:29) confirmed His secret intentions of creating Adam. Finally, the refusal of Eblis — an angel of the highest rank and knowledge– to prostrate himself before Adam, confirmed the eternal rivalry for closeness to God between angels, as heavenly creatures, and Adam, as the earthly being. While the God’s act of bestowing Adam from his own Spirit and making him enlightened by suggesting the knowledge of ‘all names’ in him from the treasury of His own absolute knowledge, puts great questions before the exegetes about the three partite relationships between God, Man, and the Angels.

The long quest of Sufi hermeneutics to penetrate the mysteries of the Creation of Adam through God’s Word, by centuries of elaborations, finally culminates in the belief in Adam’s moral and spiritual superiority to Angels; in spite of the apparent spatial closeness of the Angels to God in the Heavenly world and Adam’s Fall from grace reside in proximity of the Angels and God himself. Through their specific manner of interpretation, they arrived at this essential insight by contemplations on the real, but secretive, closeness of Adam to God. They finally find out Adam as the creature chosen by God for the role of the protagonist in the romantic epic of the Eternal Love story. This thesis found its justification in their meticulous analysis of the Myth of Fall (hobūt) of man.

 

Adam’s Fall and his punitive exile from Paradise to the inferior Earthly realm for disobeying God’s orders, is interpreted as a momentous secret plot willed by Him, in which the Angels came to participate unwittingly, unaware of the mysterious divine intent behind it. Indeed, the Creation of Adam remains an eternal mystery to the Angels because they are ontologically inferior to Adam by being deprived of Adam’s share in God’s Spirit and Knowledge. Therefore, Adam’s primordial sin, which led to the Fall, is interpreted as God’s disguised Eternal blessing (lotf-ē azal) for mankind, as Hafez reminds. This epochal event was fully pre-ordained as part of God’s pre-eternal resolve (mashiyat) for revealing the highest stage of all being: His Beauty. Thus, when coming to Adam and his ontological mission, we read in Kashf al-asrᾱr such words of exultation:

که داند سرِّ فطرتِ آدم! که شناسد دولت و رُتبتِ آدم! عقابِ هیچ خاطر بر شاخِ درختِ دولتِ آدم نه نشست!

دیده یِ هیچ بصیرت جمالِ خورشید-صفـوّتِ آدم درنیافت![7]

Who could know the mystery of Adam’s nature! Who could recognize the loftiness of the fortune and status of Adam! The eagle of no mind soared so high to sit on the branch of the tree of Adam’s fortune! The eyes of no insightfulness perceived the sun-like feature of Adam!

 

The fundamental reversal of meaning of the Fall in Sufi hermeneutics discloses Adam’s secret ontological mission. Then, in Sufi hermeneutics and Persian poetics of the mystical love, Fall (hobūt) finds an interpretive translation as safar, journey, of Adam, and, in this way, gaining an entirely positive connotation.  According to the Sufi exegesis, Adam voluntarily renounces the safe life of Paradise and embraces the hazardous earthly life only to fulfill God’s eternal Will. In contrast, the Angels, remain God’s absolutely obedient servants in the Kingdom of Heaven, and know Him only in His fearful, wrathful features that indicate His attributes of majestic authority (named as al-jabbār and al-qahhār: the Compeller, the Dominator).[8] As such, only the frightening despotic features of God is manifest to Angels, described, by His own Words, in His Names of Majesty.

 

But, these features are not the perfect manifestations of His Names. There are attributes of compassion and mercy for Him that their manifestation demands the existence of a rebellious, sinful creature begging His mercy. This creature is none other than Adam who, through his humble, earthly, and sinful nature, realizes and underscores the superior divine attributes of beauty and compassion. Thus, in this context, we can see clearly how Hafez could proudly identify himself with Adam in the ‘journey’ destined for the joyful ‘captivity’ in the love affairs originally willed by the Eternal Beloved.

من آدمِ بهشتی ام امّا در این سفر

حالی اسیرِ عشقِ جوانانِ مهوش ام.

I am the Adam, man of Paradise

But, now, in this journey,

Fallen captive to the love of the lovely young creatures.

In unraveling the secret core of Adam’s creation, Persian Sufi hermeneutics discovered the greatest and most precious jewel of knowledge within this narrative, namely, the eternal love relationship between God and Man from the very First Day of Creation (rūz-ē awwal, rūz-ē alast). The Angels, in spite of their spatial proximity to God, are denied Adam’s favored ontological position, elevated by God’s intimate love for Mankind. The resounding echo of the Eternal love story could be heard throughout the whole Sufi poetics of mystical love in Persian and most persistently in the Divān of Hafez.

 

In summary, the core of Sufi hermeneutics consists of the transmutation of the Myth of Fall into the epic of the Odyssey of Adam. He leaves Paradise with a heroic adventurous spirit for carrying the ‘burden of God’s trust’ (bᾱr-ē amᾱnat). The Odyssey of Adam in Kashf al-asrᾱr and Mērsᾱd al-ēbᾱd are narrated in fine masterly written examples of Persian prose, in its primary stage of development, that blends epic and poetic elements decorated by colorful couplets of love poetry. This tongue echoes the already fostered highly rhetorical and boastful discourse of Khorasani ode-composition (qasidē-sarᾱ’i) and colossal epic work of Ferdowsi, employed in the service of the Sufi discourse. The stylistic, highly refined literary tongue of the pioneering Persian speaking Sufis of Khorasan, like Bᾱyazid, abu Sa’id, and Ansᾱri, culminates in the colossal work of Meybodi.

The poetic prose of these early Sufi sayings and works must be considered as literary antecedents of the later eruption of the Sufi poetical literature from 6th/12th century. In the time line of Persian mystical works, one can follow the trail of these early works to the mature writings of such Sufi poets as Attᾱr, Erᾱqi, Rumi, Sa’di, and Khᾱjū.

 

Two Archetypal Models: Adam/Hafez versus Angel/Ascetic

The story of the Angels’ disapproval of Adam’s creation and their subsequent rivalry with him, especially the momentous hostile role played by Satan in the story of Adam’s primordial Sin and ultimate Fall, reveals two pre-eternal oppositional figures whose contrasting behaviors are pre-ordained. On the one hand, there is the archetype of the zāhēd (ascetic), represented by the thoroughly innocent life of the Angels who spend, according to Qur’an, eternally, ‘days and nights’, in constant prayer to their Lord. On the other hand, there is the archetypal model of the rēnd [9] (libertine), represented by Adam, characterized by his innate propensity to revolt against God and breaching his Lord’s Primordial ‘Pact’ (peymān)[10] which forbade his access to the famous tree (Qur’an II:35). According to narratives cited in Sufi hermeneutics, Eblis himself had a record of seven hundred thousand years of prayer and devotion to God. But the pride and arrogance stemming from that very piety, led to his disobedience before                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Gods order to all Angels to prostrate before newly created Adam,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                and ultimate banishment of him. This arrogance contrasts with Adam’s humility, his confession of guilt, and his plea for forgiveness, which endeared him to God. Thus, Hafez says:

از آنِ ماست بهشت، ای خداشناس، برو!

که مستحقِ کرامت گناه‌کاران اند.

 

Ours is Paradise, away with you, Godly one!

For it is the guilty who deserve forgiveness.

Hafez’s mockery of the ascetic life and his disdain of zāhēd and zohd (asceticism), alongside the glorification of the rēnd and rēndi appears extensively in Persian Sufi love literature from sixth/twelfth century onwards. This position relates to the dual and contrasting archetypes of ‘earthly Adam’ (ādam-ē khāki) and the angels. The former is destined to live in the ‘House of the Magi’ (sarā-yē moghān) in consort with other disreputable outcasts (rēnd‌ᾱn), like himself, while the latter reside as ascetics in the ‘Cloister of the Holy World’ (sowmē‘a-yē ālam-ē qods). Therefore, by identifying himself with his Eternal archetypal model, Adam, and proclaiming himself as his faithful descendant, proudly sharing his Eternal destiny of ‘sinfulness’ and ‘fall’, Hafez confirms his human way of life, depicted as rēndi (libertinism), is his pre-eternal destiny:

مرا روزِ ازل کاری بجز رندی نفرمودند

هر آن قسمت که آن جا رفت از آن افزون نخواهد شد

From the Pre-eternal day I was ordained to live but a libertine life

Nothing will be added to what was destined there

 

In the following verse, where Hafez clearly indicates Adam’s paternal status to him, and his relinquishment of the ‘recluse of asceticism’, and, therefore, deserting Paradise, as his eternally destined inheritance to live by.

نه من از خلوتِ تقوا بدر افتادم و بس

پدر-ام نیز بهشتِ ابد از دست بهشت

Not only I deserted the recluse of asceticism,

My Father, too, forswore the Eternal Paradise!

 

Thus, the Sufi hermeneutics by setting up a binary opposition between the two groups, ascribe such negative attributes as arrogance, hypocrisy, conceit, and piety-for-show to the so-called ‘heavenly’ ascetics. Curiously, these negative attributes are also present among the zᾱhēdᾱn, the earthly counterparts of the heavenly ascetics. In contrast, Adam, who represents the archetype of the guiltiness through his libertinism (rēndi), is characterized with the loftiest and most humane attributes, such as chivalry, universal kindness to all living beings, humility, righteousness, sincerity, and inner godliness, in spite of the apparent primordial breach of God’s prohibition. In this way, zāhēd versus rēnd, and their almost total opposition, in the ghazals of ecstatic Sufi literature, becomes main theme in the poetics of mystical love in Persian language and occupies the center of its discourse.

 

A Crucial Semantic Metamorphosis

In the Qur’an, angels are described as guardians of the divine Throne (‘arsh) and ordained as strict overseers of the behavior and uttering of human beings (Qur’an, L,18; LXXXII: 10-11). The key term here is raqib, which originally means overseer, used several times for God Himself in Qur’an (IV:1; V:117; XI:93; XXXIII:52). But, in Persian language, under the influence of Sufi hermeneutics of Khorasani origin, the meaning of this borrowed term gradually underwent a crucial transformation. Tracing of this transformation provides an essential clue for a deeper understanding of the archetypal dichotomy in the Sufi hermeneutics, which entails the ontological bipolarity of Adam/Angels, and Eblis, the so-called strongest ‘claimant’ (modda’i) among the Angels.

 

In Arabic, raqib has kept its meanings of watcher, guardian, and warden from its original Qur’anic usage to this day. In the early Islamic centuries, the Persian language borrowed this term which was used in its original sense by poets like Rūdaki, Nēzāmi, Khāqāni, and, even later, Sa’di. But from 6th/12th century onward, its meaning in Persian Sufi literature tended to transform to that of the ‘rival’ in a love affair. From the poetry of Attᾱr, Erᾱqi, Owhad al-Din Marᾱgha’i to Hafez and the later poets, we can follow and document the metamorphosis of the meaning of the raqib to rival. From early times to the time of Hafez, it gradually connoted the double meanings of watcher/rival in its allusive poetic usage. In later times, the meaning of rival in a love affair came to be dominant to the point of total disappearance of the original meaning in the Persian language. It was used many times interchangeably, with other pejorative appellations like modda’i, insincere claimant, zᾱhēd, the ascetic, often insincere, khasm, the enemy who is by its very nature filled with jealousy (hasad).[11] One can follow the abundant use of those emblematic words in the works of the Sufi poets from the early times of the fostering of the Sufi poetic tongue. Then, from the time of Hafez, raqib, and its infinitive, rēqᾱbat, gradually have got no other meaning in Persian language than rival and rivalry, or competitor and competition, used as such in the context of love affairs, sport events, commercial affairs, and the like.

This amazing semantic transformation cannot be explained without affirmative reference to Sufi hermeneutics. It conveys, through this hermeneutics, that the Angels were down-graded from their original superior position of overseers and ‘restrict watchers’[12], as told in Qur’an, to the semi-equal position of ‘rivals’ of Adam, and his descendants, in their mutual love for God, and their competitive striving to keep close to Him. Sufi hermeneutics viewed this ‘rivalry’ as having originated at the very moment when God proclaimed his resolve to create Adam as his ‘successor’ (khalifa) on the Earth. Therefore, raqib in the context of the Persian poetics of mystical love refers to the Angels collectively in its plural form (raqibᾱn), and in its singular form primarily to Eblis, who, as the resolute enemy of Adam and his progenies, by means of treacherous plots, out of jealousy, tries to block the access of the Lover to his Eternal Beloved.

 

The Great Pioneer of the Sufi Hermeneutics

We have mentioned how the refined poetic taste and epic tone of Sufi hermeneutics, as seen in Kashf al-asrᾱr and Mērsᾱd al-ēbᾱd, is the product of a cumulative process spanning centuries. One can trace it back, through citations of Kashf al-asrᾱr, to the first great Persian-speaking Sufi of Khorasan, Bᾱyazid of Bastᾱm (3rd/9th century). Bᾱyazid pioneered the use of the aphoristic, poetic-epic tone mixed for expressing his mystical paradoxes of longing and love. But Shaykh Abū Sa‘id ēbn-ē Abēl-Khayr (357-440/967–1048) must be considered as the decisive turning point in the development of mystical love in the Persian language, primarily appearing in Khorasan. We can consider him as the certain forerunner and founding father of the new style of Qur’anic reading and interpretation that vastly manifested itself in later Sufi literature.

 

Abū Sa‘id was a revolutionary figure in the arena of the already widespread Sufi culture in Khorasan. His radical contribution was to change the extremely phobic attitude inherited from his Sufi predecessors and prevalent among his notable contemporaries, such as Abol-Hasan Kharaqᾱni and Abol-Qāsēm al-Qoshayri (d. 465/1074). The Sufis of earlier times, struck by the horror-inducing tone of the ‘verses of agony’ (āyāt-ē adhāb) that suffuse the greatest part of the Qur’an, often seemed haunted by an obsessive fear of God’s omnipresence and His wrathful scrutiny of human misdeeds and sinful thoughts. This attitude is clearly described in their hagiographical and didactic works about the lives of many great Sufi figures of the earlier times. However, with his highly original way of reading Qur’an, Abū Sa‘id replaced this deeply traumatized and depressed attitude with a cheerful and jubilant spirit, seeing nothing in God’s attitude toward Man, and moreover to all living beings, but compassion and gracefulness.

Abū Sa‘id’s new revolutionary hermeneutics of God’s Word can be considered a great historical turning point in the Sufi culture of Khorasan. Reports of his life, recounted mainly by his grandchildren, tell us that he had experienced the rigours and exercises of asceticism in the extreme for decades. To purify his soul, he forsook the worldly life and lived in seclusion for many years. Eventually, however, he renounced asceticism and settled for a simple but joyful life among ordinary people. Abū Sa‘id was heroic, both in practicing asceticism and in renouncing it. He was pivotal in establishing the khānēqāh as a center for social life based on benevolent humanitarian principles. He breathed poetic life into the Sufi vernacular by reciting poems on every occasion, especially in his public preaching. He also introduced the practice of listening to music (samā‘) and dancing in the dervishes’ house (khānēqāh). Much of this behavior stood in stark contrast to the religious dogmatism of contemporary Sufis, whose wrath he incurred from time to time. By his original and courageous way of reading the Qur’an, the spirit of religious toleration, chivalry, graciousness, and humanitarianism took roots in Khorasani Sufism, breaking the conventional frameworks of ascetic, austere, and dogmatic attachment to sharia.[13]

 

Abū Sa‘id’s grandson and biographer, Ebn-ē Monavvar, relates that the master had destroyed his own writings. But the oral transmission of his memorable deeds and sayings, and their final recording after three generations, attests to his eminent posthumous reputation. His style of reading and interpreting the Qur’an seems had great influence on his disciples and was passed down to later generations as esoteric knowledge among Sufi circles for decades. In this way his hermeneutical tradition must have appeared broadly in Meybodi’s work, apparently mediated by Khāja Abdollāh Ansāri (396-1006/1006-1088).

 

An essential thought-provoking point about Abū Sa‘id’s style of reading the Qur’ᾱn is his selective approach to the verses. This is related in Asrār al-towhid, the hagiographical account of his life by Ebn-ē Monavvar. He recounts that Sheikh in his final years, when reading the Qur’an, recited only the ‘verses of compassion’ (āyāt-e rahmat) and ignored the ‘verses of agony’. When somebody criticized him that this way of reading distorts the order of Qur’anic verses, he replied: ‘What is related to us all are the verses of good tidings and absolution. The verses of agony belong to the others?’[14]This arbitrary bold way of reading the Qur’an must have had great appeal to the Sufis. Because it corroborates their self-conception as real friends (owliyā’) of God, whom He loves as His chosen people among all creatures.

 

 

A Basic Dichotomy in Sufi Hermeneutics

It seems that there has been a fundamental misunderstanding prevalent amongst modern students of the Sufi culture which stems from the conception of viewing the entire intellectual tradition of Islamic mysticism as a version of Neo-Platonism. Even such great pioneering scholars like R. A. Nicholson and Henry Corbin, in all their research, seem to have been directed by this conception.

Until recent times, the structure of the meaning and world view of the pivotal works of Sufi hermeneutics from Khorasan remained unexplored from a theoretical perspective. Perhaps the literary approach of these texts to theology and the strong presence of the poetic and emotive spirit, expressed in an allusive, symbolic language, did not submit itself easily to conceptual classification and analysis. However, the great Khorasani Sufis, and their counterparts in the other parts of the Persian speaking world, openly declared their anti-philosophical attitudes by rejecting and even despising the Greek way of thought. Thus, a meticulous examination of the Sufi hermeneutical works penned in Khorasan reveals their total renunciation from Greek philosophy. The Sufi poets and prose stylists of that line of thought and literary style often stress their revulsion for any rationalistic, argumentative approach to religious and theological matters. They disparaged the bewilderment in the uncertain realm of the human reason and renounced, in Rumi’s words, walking with the ‘wooden feet of the argumentative people’.[15] In contrast, they have always extolled extravagant spirituality and absolute submission to the God’s Will and His esoteric guidance. Their way of getting knowledge is immersion in inspirational moods of the moment (ahwᾱl), which is conferred upon them from the Occult World (ᾱlam-ē ghēyb). They recommend moving in the daylight of inspirations received through the center of affections, the heart (qalb), along the path of ‘mania’ (jonūn), spiritual drunkenness, ecstasies of experiencing love relationship with the Eternal Beloved, towards the final goal of the annihilation of one’s self in God.

 

The fundamental irrationalism of this line of Sufism expressed in poetical tongue, either in poetic or prose form, their enthusiastic disdain for Reason and glorification of madness, that we repeatedly encounter in their divᾱns, refers back to their hermeneutics of the myth of Creation and the dichotomous positions of its two main archetypal figures, Angels versus Adam. According to their hermeneutics of the myth of Creation, by listening to the invocation of Love and deserting the sound life of Paradise, Adam also deserted the cautious ways recommended by Reason and dauntlessly submitted himself to the demands of Love. By following the way of ‘madness’ through acceptance of all dangers arising from submission to the unconditional demands of Love, Adam, as archetypal model, stands in contrast to Angels who symbolize Reason and reasoning in Sufi poetics.[16] The clash between Reason and Love as two sources of attraction for man is a recurrent theme in their literature.

 

Certainly, there is a serious tension inside the Sufi world of thought between a highly sensational poetical manner of thought and a stream of theosophical thought producing, in its own style, argumentative mystical theology. The former developed mainly in Persian language in earlier centuries, while the latter was mainly expounded in the Arabic in later times. In spite of the blending of these two traditions thereafter, and dominance of the philosophical style theosophy, in general, it is possible to distinguish, by certain criteria, the Sufi theology of pure poetic tongue and outlook from theoretically influenced by, or based on, Neo-Platonic metaphysics formulated mainly by Ibn Arabi and Sohravardi.

 

Their oppositional conceptions of Time seems to be a clue for identification of these two trends. In Greek metaphysics, founded by Plato and Aristotle, the fundamental objects of philosophical investigation are non-temporal ideational or essential realities as eternal foundations of the temporal, ephemeral things of the sensible world. In the Platonic and Neo-Platonic account, the latter are viewed only as shadows of the eternal realities. God, in this conception, is the mute, unmoving source of the emanation of the Platonic ideas or Aristotelian essences. He exists in His transcendental seclusion eternally beyond the sensible world. But, in the poetic Sufi view of the world, the universe is created anew in every instant by an absolute power and free will that is not subject to any restrictions. This dynamic, omnipresent, omnipotent, articulate God is the Creator of infinite things out of nothingness in the uninterrupted sequence of time, and in the position of the ‘living’ (hayy) Being accompanies them as permanent observer and guide. The metaphysical realities, as propounded by Greek metaphysics, are comprehended by the faculty of reason in man, while senses and emotions have no part in the act of cognition of the transcendental realities. Their cognitive role is limited to the accidental world of the temporary sensible things. But in the poetic strand of Sufi theology, it is the emotional, sensitive nature of man that plays the greatest part in his relationship with God.

 

The theosophy of the Sohravardi and Ibn Arabi, with their Neo-Platonic frameworks, represent the metaphysical approach. They investigate timeless divine realities that govern the world and its history, and attempt to describe these realities theoretically. Their highly discursive efforts constitute a kind of mystical philosophy, which combines a rational, discursive, more or less systematic way of reading the Qur’an with the esoteric findings of the so-called mystical ‘discoveries’. In contrast, the Sufis with poetic inclinations, following a tradition developed in Khorasan and Fars, insist on the importance of vaqt (heavenly endowed moment), or even naqd-ē vaqt (the ‘cash’ of the moment), and hᾱl (mood, temperament) which is allotted constantly by God Himself, not only to human beings, but to all creatures. In the experience of the ‘importations of the moods’ (vᾱrēdᾱt-ē ahwᾱl) which are temporal and, therefore, temporary, reason and its volitional activity has no part. Indeed, the reason, or calculating faculty for self-preservation in man, is viewed as a disturbance that stands in the way of immediate bold experience of the presence of God. This experience is possible only by absolute submission to His Will through opening one’s heart and its receptiveness to what is sent by Him every moment.

 

In Persian, hᾱl also means the present time, allowing the superposition of both connotations of mood and moment in the colloquial and literary usages of the word. For the Sufi, ahwᾱl (moods) have different, even contradictory, modalities, from sorrow and depression (qabz) to happiness and euphoria (bast), to states of boundless ecstasy. Moods are not permanent. Sufis of this inclination called themselves ahl-ē hᾱl, or people of mood/moment. The term hᾱl, with both overlapping mood/moment connotations, remains in common usage in colloquial Persian. The submissiveness of the ahl-ē hᾱl to their destined mood/moment is thoroughly compatible to the poetic way of life and its manner of expression. Sufis given to the mood/momentary way of experiential, not theoretical, personal relationship with God, instinctively approached the poetical form of expression and developed in an extraordinary manner their own specific tongue in this domain for expressing their esoteric emotional experiences or mood/moments. Therefore, the original poets among Sufis were generally averse to the discursive language and systematic arguments about their creed.

 

The essential difference among the two groups is best reflected in their approach to language. The discursive type expresses its own ideas in detailed, semi-systematic, cold, prosaic manner, while the other expresses itself in the succinct, allusive, metaphoric, and emotive tongue of poetry. The ghazals of Sanᾱi, Attᾱr, Rumi, Erᾱqi, Sa’di, and Hafez reflect perfectly these characteristics. The original Sufi poets typically preferred telling tales and fables in the poetic frame of mathnavi for expressing their religious and moralistic ideas instead of using the dry tongue of formal arguments.

 

In later periods, we observe the emergence of a different kind of Sufi poetry (essentially of khᾱnēqᾱh-i type) that uses the metaphoric and symbolic language of this genre of poetry as clichés at the service of the conceptual Sufi theosophy. This kind of ‘poems’ are generally uninspired mass productions devoid of the sparkle of true poetic creation and its mood/moment. This pseudo-poetic literary productions appeared under the gradual dissemination and final supremacy of theosophical Sufism (ērfᾱn-ē nazari) in the later history of Sufi culture in the Persianate world.

 

Theosophical Sufism made instrumental use of the already developed poetic mystical tongue. It adopted the poetics of rēndi by fixing dry, rigid, and ascetic ‘real meanings’ for its metaphoric, symbolic terms. As a result, all its erotic and sensual symbolic terms and expressions were reduced to a standard, monotonous, conceptual lexicon, with the intent of washing out all their seemingly immoral, irreligious, or carnal connotations.[17]

 

However, the influence of the theosophical Sufism was limited to the circles of the ahl-ē hēkmat (men of wisdom, philosophers and knowledgeable pious Sufis), while the poetics of rēndi, especially through the vast popularity of the poetic tongue of Sa’di and Hafez, had a much greater share in shaping the mentality and literary tastes of the educated and refined people in the Persianate world. The pleasure of poetry, mainly the poetry of love with a taste of rēndi, has taken hold over many centuries far beyond the literate world to pervade public culture, even among the illiterate people in remote reaches of the Persian-speaking world.[18]

 

Conclusion

We have stressed how the intertextual study provides a solid basis for understanding the underlying discourse of the Sufi poetics of mystical love in Persian. A close look at the historical dynamics of Sufi hermeneutics reveals its crucial turning points. We examined the distinct ruptures between the early ascetic readings of the Qur’an and its subsequent mystical-ecstatic readings, especially as developed in Khorasan. The latter reading was based on the discovery of the pre-eternal mutual love relationship between the Creator and human creatures which already began on the ‘Day of Covenant’ (rūz-e alast). It caused a radical transformation in the earlier conception of this relationship which was predicated on the absolute divine authority, on the one hand, and absolutely servile, fearful obedience of man, on the other hand.

 

The Sufi discourse of love finally spread from Khorasan to other parts of the Persian-speaking world, like Fars, Kerman, and, finally, to the greater Persianate world. In Shiraz, this blossomed in the love poetry of Sa’di, where we observe a deeper exploration of rēndi and its implications for human life. In this context, rēndi, most probably under the influence of the Christian theology, was viewed as essential sinfulness inherited by mankind from their Eternal Parents, Adam and Eve. However, this momentous heritage later was embraced ecstatically as the pre-defined and primordial fate of man on earth.[19]Indeed, rēndi develops into an Eternal model for human nature which defines his teleological place in ‘two worlds’. It stands in contrast to the zohd (asceticism), characteristic of angels who are destined for eternal innocence and constant prayer to God.

 

Other novel developments in the poetics of love mysticism are noteworthy. In earlier stages of the Sufi poetics, developed in Khorasan, Sufi and ᾱrēf (man of deep esoteric knowledge and mystical experience) were considered identical, but in the last stage, which marks the culmination of rēndi poetics, developed properly in Shiraz by Sa’di and Hafez, Sufi and zᾱhēd (the ascetic) are usually identified and posited as unlearned arrogant hypocrites in contrast to ᾱrēf [20], the real enlightened connoisseur of God and godliness. Sa‘di is the pioneering figure of this stage, followed by Khājū and Hafez in subsequent generations. Sufi in this context alludes to the followers of the formal ascetic doctrines and institutionalized Sufism centered in dervishes’ houses (khānēqāhs). Hereafter, Sufi refers to the people who are still attached to the old ways of extreme piety and asceticism by rejecting, out of their very ignorance, the pleasures of earthly life in pursuit of illusory eternal enjoyments in Paradise. In opposition to the Sufi way of life, we have ᾱrēf, the bold man of gnosis with pronounced individuality and piercing knowledge of God’s infinite grace to human beings and all living world. Therefore, unlike the Sufi or zᾱhēd’, the ᾱrēf chooses to partake of earthly pleasures and manifestations of beauty as blessings emanating from the inexhaustible bounty of God showered upon His humble but favored creatures, as a sign of His unbounded graciousness. Such a gnostic, as Sa’di expressly pronounces, and Hafez after him, never deprives himself of the ‘cash’ of paradise (behesht-ē naqd) in the here-and-now in exchange for ‘childish’ desire after the heavenly one which already had been abandoned voluntarily by our ‘Father’ in pre-eternity.

چو طفلان تا کی، ای زاهد، فریبی / به سیبِ بوستان و شهد و شیر-ام

O Ascetic! How long will you so deceiving me, like children,

With the apple of the Garden and [streams of] honey and milk!

من که امروز-ام بهشتِ نقد حاصل می‌شود / وعده‌ی فردایِ زاهد را چرا باور کنم؟

With the ‘cash’ paradise within my reach Today,

Why should I believe the ascetic’s promise for Tomorrow (i.e. afterworld)

 

The strong and vibrant tongue of Meybodi in narrating and interpreting stories related to the Creation of Adam, which is the continuation and promotion of the poetic and aphoristic sayings of the great Sufis of Khorasan, can be considered as the most influential primary source for the great jubilation witnessed in later Persian Sufi literature. This tongue embedded the poetics of mystical love at the heart of Persian literature, and caused the later flowering of Persian as a highly refined literary language especially fostered for mystical (ērfᾱni) expressions. Going beyond Iran proper, this tongue and its literature spread throughout the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia, and many other lands, including realms of Ottoman Empire in Anatolia and Balkan. This revolutionary change of attitude in Sufi ontology engendered not only the enormous body of poetical literature, but a new mystical poetic language enriched with highly expressive sensual metaphors and symbolism.

The human-divine romance relationship, developed mainly in Kashf al-asrār, becomes the central theme and tale related with fervor and passion throughout the burgeoning tradition of the ‘religion of Love’ (maz’hab-ē ēshq) within the prolific Khorasani school of Sufi literature and its branch outs in other parts of the Persianate world. These poets wrote not only passionate pieces of prose and poetry expressing their devotion to God as Beloved, but poetically praised the revelation of His Beauty in the beautiful creatures of the natural and human world. Lastly, from the sixth/twelfth century onwards, among the followers of the Sufi way of love, one sees such prominent figures like Ahmad al-Ghazāli (d. 520/1126), and a century later, Owhad al-Din Kermāni (d. 635/1238) and Fakhr al-Din Erāqi (610/1213–688/1289), who show uncommon erotic behaviors in public, justified by development of the poetics of love and rēndi in Sufism. This trend finds its culmination in the ghazals of Sa‘di and Hafez as supreme rēnds amongst all Persian poets and great masters of the poetics of rēndi.

 

My friend, professor Assad Arjang, has kindly performed the editing of my English text and I am thankful of him.

 

 

[1]See Daryoush Ashouri, ‘Erfān o rēndi (Tehran: Nashr-e Markaz, 1379/ 2000), 68-139.

[2]Rashid al-din Meybodi, Kashf al-asrᾱr va ‘oddat al-abrᾱr, ed. ‘A.A. Hekmat (Tehran: Amir Kabir Publishers, 1331/1952), I:162.

[3]Najm al-Din Rᾱzi, Mersād al-ēbᾱd, ed. M. A. Riyᾱḥi (Tehran: Bongāh-ē tarjomē va nashr-ē ketāb, 1352/1973, repr. 1383/2004), 94.

[4]By having at hand these intertextual data, we can understand, with much certainty, the meaning of the ‘vagabond heart’ (dēl-ē harzē-gard) of Hafez, of which he speaks in the following line:

تا دلِ هرزه‌گردِ من رفت به چینِ زلفِ او

زین سفرِِ درازِِ خود عزمِ وطن نمی‌کند

Since my vagabond heart traveled to the land of his/her [long] curled hair

Never intends turning back from this prolonged journey to its homeland.

 

By returning to Kashf al-asrᾱr (VI:191) we find that ‘the homeland’ (vatan), here, is nowhere but the Heavenly Abode from which the Spirit, in the body of Adam, has started its ‘wandering’ or ‘prolonged journey’– as expressed by Hafez– to the Earthly House. By comparative study of the symbolic image of the ‘[long, curly hair’] (zolf) of the Beloved in the Divᾱn of Hafez (see Ashouri, 382-86) and other divᾱns of the Sufi love literature, such as Divᾱn-ē Shams-ē Tabrizi, we learn that the zolf, with its blackness and much twisted curly texture, and its ‘restlessness’ (ᾱshoftēgi, biqarᾱri) symbolically represents the Earthly World. Unlike Rumi, whose object of love is the heavenly sun-like, or moon-like, ‘face’ (rūy) of the Eternal Beloved, Hafez relates us of his falling in passionate love with the zolf of the Eternal Beloved already at the first glance on it at the ‘First Day’ (rūz-e avval /rūz-e nokhost) of Creation. He speaks, again and again, emphatically of remaining lovingly faithful to this ‘captivity’ in the ‘curl of the Beloved’s hair’ (kham-ē zolf-ē yᾱr), i.e. conditions of the Earthly life, which is, at the same time, ‘trap of afflictions’ (dᾱm-ē balᾱ). He accepts the Earthly World as the eternally ordained Human (Adamic) abode destined by Eternal Beloved, in contradistinction to the Heavenly World, the abode of the Angelic creatures. Pondering on this differentiation in the Sufi poetics of mystical love makes it possible to separate an earlier stage of its fostering, represented, highest of all, by Attᾱr and Rumi, from its ultimate stage in the poetry of Hafez (see Ashouri, 304-27; and ‘Conclusion’ in this article).

 

[5] A thorough study and analysis of Kashf al-asrᾱr is recently published. See Annabel Keeler, Sufi Hermeneutics: The Qur’an Commentary of Rashῑd al-Dīn Maybudῑ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

[6]Meybodi, III:570-73; Rᾱzi, 65-97.

[7] Meybodi, III, 297-98

[8] Meybodi, III, 571.

[9]Rēnd, as a disapproved attributive noun, originally used for the people who disregarded moral and religious laws, committed all kinds of sinful deeds, such as drinking alcohol, gambling, and visiting the defamed quarters of the town (kharᾱbᾱt), the site of taverns and brothels. As collective name (rēndᾱn), many times was used for groups of urban ruffians. Sufis adopted this word, alongside a group of others, like kharᾱbᾱt, maykadē (tavern) or mēykhᾱnē, and used them with metaphoric and symbolic meanings. It happened when the Persian Sufi hermeneutics, by its own way of reading the myth of Creation in Qur’an, discovered the two archetypes of zohd (asceticism) and rēndi (libertinism), represented, respectively, by Angles, as eternally innocent, and Adam, as the first human being and father of all humanity, who has committed the Original Sin. The attributive noun rēnd and its substantive form, rēndi is used almost by all Sufi poets (Attᾱr, Rumi, Erᾱqi, S’adi, and others) with real or mystical and symbolic connotations. But, it was Hafez who set it with extolment, as the highest spiritual position for a human being, as pivotal concept in his anti-ascetic poetics of rēndi.

[10]On the term ‘pact’ (peymᾱn), between God and Adam, see Meybodi, I:161.

[11]Innumerable lines of poems in the divᾱns of the Sufi poets, before and after Hafez, attest to this point:

Raqib as a couple of angels sitting on the left and right shoulders of every human being, assigned to record all their good and evil deeds:

خدایِ عرش مدام از فرشتگان دو رقیب / به نزدِ بنده نشانده است بر شمال و یمین (امیر معزّی)

رقیبِ دستِ چپ را مانده شد دست / زِ بس کردارِ تو بنوشت پیوست

رقیبّ دستِ راست آزاد از تو / قلم بر کاغذی ننهاد از نو (عطّار)

Raqib as devil (Ahrēman; the ancient Persian name for Eblis):

رقیب کی‌ست! که در ماجرایِ خلوتِ ما / فرشته ره نبرد، تا به اهرمن چه رسد! (سعدی)

Raqib as rival in the love affair:

همه‌شب نهاده ام سر چو سگان بر آستانت / که رقیب در نباید به بهانه‌یِ گدایی (عراقی)

روا مدار، خدایا، که در حریمِ وصال / رقیب محرم و حرمان نصیبِ من باشد (حافظ)

با تو بینم رقیب و من گذران / دیده بر هم نهاده، دل نگران (محتشم کاشانی)

Raqib as guardian, gatekeeper:

جان وصلِ تو بی‌رقیب جوید / دل رویِ تو بی‌نقاب خواهد (خواجو)

رقیبان غافل و ما را از آن چشم و جبین هر دم / هزاران گونه پیغام است و حاجب در میان ابرو (حافظ)

Raqib as faultfinder:

از طعنه‌ی رقیب نگردد عیارِ من / چون زر اگر برند مرا در دهانِ گاز (حافظ)

Raqib as the jealous one:

بکش جفایِ رقیبان مدام و جورِِ حسود / که سهل باشد اگر یارِ مهربان داری (حافظ)

 

Modda’i (insincere claimant) as rival in a love affair:

 

مدّعی را اگر آواره نسازم زِ دَرَش / از سگانِ سرِ آن کوی حساب‌ام نکنید (محتشم کاشانی)

مدّعی از رشک، بر در، چون نمرد امشب؟– که بود / بزم دلکش، باده بی‌غش، یار سرخوش، من خراب! (محتشم کاشانی)

شب‌ها به بزمِ مدّعی، ای بی‌مروّت، جا مکن / آرامِ جانِ او مشو، آزارِ جانِ ما مکن! (فروغیِ بسطامی)

Modda’i as zᾱhēd (ascetic [of the heavenly world; allusion to Eblis himself])

ای مـّدعیِِ زاهد، غرّه به طاعتِ خود / گر سرّ‌ِ عشق خواهی، دعوی زِ سر بدر کن (عطّار)

باده بیاور، که هیچ توبه نخواهند کرد / مدّعی از زهدِ خشک، اوحدی از شعرِِتر (اوحدیِ مراغه‌ای)

مدّعی بی‌خبر از عالمِ معنی ست، از آن / در سر از حجّتِ خُشک این‌‌همه دعوی دارد (عمادالدینِ نسیمی)

Modda’i as faultfinder = raqib as faultfinder

با مدّعی بگوی که، ای بی‌بصر، مکن/ عیبِ نظر، که دیده نبیند نظیرِِ او! (اوحدیِ مراغه‌ای)

ساقی بیار باده و با مدّعی بگوی / انکارِ ما مکن، که چنین جام جم نداشت (حافظ)

Modda’i, as the jealous one:

بَـَرش ادا نکنم مدّعایِ خود هرگز / که مدّعی زِ حسد بَد-ادایی‌اي نکند

(محتشمِ کاشانی)

Zᾱhēd as Devil (or Eblis)

زاهد ار رندیِ حافظ نکند فهم، چه باک / دیو بگریزد از آن قوم که قرآن خوانند

Alongside the interchangeable usage of raqib, modda’i, zᾱhēd, ḥasūd, essentially as allusions to Eblis, other appellations like doshman, khasm, ‘adū (all meaning ‘enemy’) in the Divᾱn of Hafez and other Sufi love poetry, refer to him too.

[12]The term of raqibᾱn-ē tond-khū as used by Hafez, most probably has reference to the raqibon ‘atῑd in Qur’an (L 18).

[13]See Terry Graham, ‘Abū Sa‘īd ibn Abī’l-Khayr and the School of Khurāsān,’ in The Heritage of Sufism, vol. 2, Classical Persian Sufism from its Origins to Rumi, ed. Leonard Lewisohn (Oxford: Oneworld 1999), 83-136.

[14]Mohammad ēbn-ē Monavvar, Asrᾱr al-towhid fi maqᾱmᾱt-ē al-Sheikh Abi Sa’id, ed. M.R. Shafi’i Kadkani (Tehran: Āgāh Publishers, 1366/1986).

[15]Jalᾱlu’ddin Mowlavi, Mathnawi, ed. R. A. Nicholson (Tehran: Hermes Edition, 1382/1993), I:97.

[16]As Hafez says in his famous ghazal (ed. Khānlari, n. 148) that explains metaphorically the fundamental conflict among the Reason and Love:

عقل می‌خواست کزان شعله چراغ افروزد / دستِ غیب آمد و بر سینه‌ی نامحرم زد

The Reason [in the Eternity] wanted to kindle its lantern from that flame [of love]

But, the Unseen Hand [of God] came and pushed out the stranger.

[17]The endeavors of Sheikh Mahmūd Shabastari, the author of Golshan-e rᾱz, in this direction has been greatly influential. See, also, as a very expressive example, Bahᾱ’ al-Din Khorramshᾱhi, ed., Tafsir-ē ērfni-ye Divᾱn-ē Hafez.

[18]The depth and extendedness of the influence of the poetical Sufism, especially the poetics of rēndi, into the general culture of the Persian speaking people could be measured by the strong influence of their vocabulary into the vernacular of the ordinary people. The prevalence of hᾱl in common daily usage and its numerous phrasal verbs and compound forms in the vernacular and literary Persian is a meaningful example, such as: hᾱl kardan (to enjoy, to be pleased of), hᾱl dᾱdan (to give pleasure), hᾱl gereftan (to displease), dar hᾱl būdan (to be in a pleasant mood), ḥᾱl rᾱ daryᾱftan (to enjoy one’s moment), az hᾱl raftan (to faint), bē hᾱl ᾱmadan (to be refreshed), hᾱl ᾱvardan (to make fresh), bᾱ-hᾱl (lively, pleasant), bi-hᾱl (faint, unpleasant), khosh-hᾱl (happy), bad-hᾱl (sick, in bad mood), etc. The more literary form of the hᾱl, that is, ḥᾱlat, is extensively used in the Persian poetic literature.

[19]Ashouri, 193-202.

[20]The scornful identification of the Sufi with zᾱhēd, in contrast to the praiseworthy ‘ᾱrēf, occurs many times in the Divᾱns of Sa’di and Hafez. Sa’di says, for example:

زاهد و عابد و صوفی همه طفلانِ ره اند / مرد اگر هست بجز عارفِ ربّانی نیست

The ascetic, the devout man, the Sufi, all are nothing but children in the [spiritual]path

There is no man in this way except the Godly Gnostic

Iraj Pezeshkzad and His Hafez: A Note on Hafez in Love

Iraj Pezeshkzad and His Hafez: A Note on Hafez in Love

Pouneh Shabani-Jadidi 

Instructional Professor of Persian, University of Chicago

Patricia J. Higgins

University Distinguished Service Professor Emerita, SUNY Plattsburgh

Iraj Pezeshkzad is well known as a writer not only in Iran but also in the West, largely because of his satirical novel, Da’i Jan Napelon (Dear Uncle Napoleon).[1] That novel, which features the antics of members of a pseudo-aristocratic family in Iran of the 1940s, pokes fun at many widespread Iranian beliefs and behavioral characteristics.[2] It became a bestseller and the basis for a wildly popular television series which aired in Iran in the late 1970s. Reportedly, the streets of Tehran would become eerily quiet whenever a new episode first aired.[3] While both the book and the TV series were banned for a time in the Islamic Republic of Iran, bootleg copies were still widely circulated.[4] The book itself has been translated into more than a dozen languages. The English version translated by Dick Davis and entitled My Uncle Napoleon was first published by a small press devoted to Iran-related topics.[5] My Uncle Napoleon won the Lois Roth Prize for Literary Translation from Persian in 2001, and in 2006 it was issued in a second edition by a major trade publisher[6] with an introduction by the well-known writer Azar Nafisi[7] and an afterword by the author himself.[8]

Da’i Jan Napelon is indeed a classic of twentieth-century Persian literature, but it is by no means the only thing that Iraj Pezeshkzad wrote. According to one obituary, “he wrote more than 17 satirical novels and more than a dozen scholarly books and essays on history and literature.”[9] While at least one of these essays has been translated into English,[10] none of Pezeshkzad’s other novels had been until we undertook to translate Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand (Hafez, heedless of advice),[11] now available as Hafez in Love.[12] We started this project in 2016 after reading several of Pezeshkzad’s other novels and particularly enjoying every sentence and every word of Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand.

 It was in October 2018 that we first contacted Mr. Pezeshkzad to ask for his permission to publish our translation. We made this contact through his son, who was introduced to us by Professor Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi of the University of Toronto and by Sorour Kasmai, who is the French translator of Pezeskzad’s Da’i Jan Napelon, Mon Oncle Napoleon.[13] We received a reply from Bahman, Mr. Pezeskzad’s son, the same day, saying that we had his father’s permission to publish the translation if Dr. Tavakoli-Targhi had given his blessing to our project. The same day, we called and spoke to Mr. Pezeshkzad as well. His voice was deep and kind, and after an explanation of our project and our qualifications, he told us that he would give us written permission to publish our translation, which we expected any publisher to want. At the age of 91, he had steady calligraphic handwriting (see Appendix); the date of the permission is October 11, 2018, and the place is Paris.

The next time we spoke with Mr. Pezeshkzad was in 2021 when we wanted to send him his complementary copies of our translation. He was as gracious and kind as he had been the first time that we spoke to him. He asked us to send him any reviews written on the book in English, which of course we agreed to do.

Later, we had the pleasure of inviting Mr. Pezeshkzad to talk about his works, including Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand, in the Heshmat Moayyad Lecture Series organized by the University of Chicago’s Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations Department. After Professor Franklin Lewis introduced Mr. Pezeshkzad and listed several of his books, Mr. Pezeshkzad began his talk.[14] This was October 2021, and it was the last talk that Mr. Pezeshkzad gave before his death in Los Angeles on January 12, 2022, a few days shy of his 96th birthday.

Like most of Pezeshkzad’s other works, Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand is at least in part a satire, and like several of his other works, it is a historical novel. Though Mr. Pezeshkzad told us he considered it more a historical novel than satire, the reader cannot help but notice the parallels between fourteenth-century Fars Province and Iran in the era of the Islamic Republic. Based on our experience, satire is one of the most difficult genres to translate because it contains cultural references and allusions that are sometimes impossible to recreate in the target language. Mr. Pezeshkzad’s satire is very subtle and clever, which makes the job of the translator even harder.[15]

Based on historical accounts, Pezeshkzad imagines a certain period in the life of Mohammad Shams al-Din Shirazi, arguably the best known and best loved Persian-language poet, better known by his pen name, Hafez. The time is 1354 CE and the beginning of Amir Mobarez al-Din Mozaffar’s rule over Fars and neighboring provinces. It is a time of political and social instability, which is arguably very similar to the situation of twenty-first century Iran. Just as in present-day Iran, in the novel the morality police are stripping the people of their freedom of speech and squelching the expression of any belief that goes against those of the ruling group. Similar, too, is the ostentatious religiosity of the ruling group and the expectation that those who aspire to power or favor will follow suit. Whether consciously or subconsciously, Pezeshkzad paints a vivid image of contemporary Iran in his depiction of the sociopolitical atmosphere in fourteenth-century Fars, the references of which are discernable by any Persian reader.

A reviewer of Hafez in Love suggests that the book can also be read as a commentary on the sociopolitical situation in the US in 2020 (although surely Pezeshkzad, writing in the early twenty-first century, did not intend that). This unnamed reviewer writes sarcastically,

Of course a ruler who favours executions, encourages mob violence, is anti intellectual and does not read, who has a nasty violent streak, who is not prepared to compromise but is full of his own self-righteousness, who does not know when his time is up, who appoints people to high positions purely on the basis of their loyalty rather than their competence and fires them at will and who pretends to be religious, while living a debauched life, is surely not something we could find in this era.[16]

That a novel set in fourteenth-century Iran written early in the twenty-first century speaks in this way to contemporary English-speaking readers is a testament to Pezeshkzad’s skill as a writer and to Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand’s candidacy for inclusion in world literature.

What makes the book especially interesting, yet challenging to translate, is the insertion of a number of poems, most by Hafez himself, some by his contemporary, ‘Obayd Zakani, as well as his predecessor, Sa‘di Shirazi, and others. The poems are so interwoven into the text that one wonders which came first in the writing process—whether it was the poems that inspired the author to write certain scenes, or whether the poems were selected and inserted after the framing of the story and the writing of the text.

For example, the narrator cites the following couplet several times as an example of Hafez’s carelessness in criticizing Amir Mobarez:

 محتسب شیخ شد و فسق خود از یاد ببرد

قصه ماست که در هر سر بازار بماند

The morality officer became a pious sheikh and forgot his debauchery

It is my story that remained throughout the bazaar.

As another example, when welcoming a female guest, the character ‘Obayd Zakani cites a couplet from Sa‘di:

کس درنیامدست بدین خوبی از دری

دیگر نیاورد چو تو فرزند مادری

No one this exquisite has ever come in through a door

Nor has a mother ever brought forth a child like you.

Twenty-seven of Hafez’s poems are included in their entirety and similarly woven into the story. For example, the poem that begins with the following couplet is said by the narrator to have been written during the months that Hafez was mourning the death of his young wife:

آن یار کزو خانه ما جای پری بود

سرتا قدمش چون پری از عیب بری بود

The beloved for whose sake our house was a fairyland

Head to toe, like a fairy, she was flawless.

Whichever may have come first in the writing process, the poem or the narrative, the book as a whole shows Pezeshkzad’s mastery as a writer, his breath of knowledge of Iranian history and literature, and his command of Persian classical poetry. That the book has reached its thirteenth edition in Persian indicates the success of the novel and the talent of its author, Iraj Pezeshkzad.

Susan Bassnett, translation theorist and scholar of comparative literature, argues that novels based on classic books are translations of a sort because they are a kind of interpretation of the classic texts, and they wouldn’t have existed if those classic works hadn’t existed already. “It is a matter of using the past,” she says, “to make sense of the present.”[17] Translation is bringing back to life a work written decades, centuries, and millennia ago. It can be argued that Pezeshkzad’s Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand is a translation of Hafez’s Divan and Pezeshkzad’s way of making sense of the present with the aid of Hafez’s poetry.

Most of the characters in Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand are real historical personages, and the large-scale events are historically accurate. Historians know very little of Hafez’s life, however, so the day-to-day events and the relationships between the characters in this book are largely the product of Pezeshkzad’s imagination as based on his reading of Hafez’s poetry. When asked why he depicted Hafez in this book as a playful young man, Pezeshkzad said he was sorry and disappointed that Hafez, this poet of love and joy, is always shown as an old man feebly holding a cup of wine with a beautiful young girl standing beside him. He said he did not at all picture Hafez this way when he was reading his poems; therefore, he wanted to make the readers see Hafez the way he sees him reflected in his poetry. In addition, he said he didn’t believe that Hafez was inclined toward Sufism, nor that he was a Sufi, but rather that he used Sufi and mystic expressions in his poems as a literary device.

Although Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand is a novel rather than a history book, Pezeshkzad relied upon several historical sources which he acknowledged at the end of the book. They include: 1) Tārīkh-i ‘aṣr-i Ḥāfiẓ dar qarn-i hashtom (History of the age of Hafez in the fourteenth century) by Qasem Ghani, 2) Nuzhat al-qulūb (Purity of hearts) by Hamdollah Mostafa Qazvini, edited by Seyyed Mohammad Dabir-Siyaqi, 3) Dīvān-i Ḥāfiẓ (Collected poems of Hafez), edited by Parviz Natel Khanlari (text and notes), 4) Kullyāt-i Sa’dī (Collected works of Sa‘di), compiled by Mohammad Ali Foroughi, and 5) Kullyāt-i ‘Ubayad Zākānī (Collected works of ‘Obayd Zakani), compiled by Parviz Atabaki. Nevertheless, there have been certain criticisms about the veracity of the historical facts in the Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand.[18] For example, the existence of someone by the name of Golandam (the narrator of the book, purported to be Hafez’s best friend and brother-in-law) is contested, as is the date of Hafez’s birth, and therefore the age of Hafez in 1354. Moreover, some of the historical personages who appear as characters in the book may not have actually been in Shiraz that year. One must remember, however, that this is fiction based on history and not history itself, so the writer can employ his imagination in developing scenes and relationships.

The Hafez depicted Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand is 23 years old, recently widowed, and still mourning the loss of his young wife, a cousin with whom he had been in love since childhood. His best friend and the first-person narrator of the story is Mohammad Golandam, who in reality is believed by some to be the author of the introduction to an early collection of Hafez’s poems—an introduction that provides most of what little we do know of Hafez, apart from his poetry. In the story, Golandam is married to Hafez’s sister who, along with her mother, is visiting relatives out of town for the entire several months of the story. While Hafez and Golandam spend their time with a bevy of male friends, some their contemporaries and some much older, the only female characters in the book are Bibi Khavar, an elderly woman caring for Hafez’s household in his mother’s absence; Jahan Malek Khatun, in real life and the story, a princess and poet; and Banafsheh, ‘Obayd Zakani’s housekeeper and servant.

Though Hafez is young in this story, his poetry is already presumed to be well known and widely admired not only in Shiraz but in far-off lands as well. For example, the narrator Golandam refers to “news from Anatolia, India, and Baghdad about the fame of Shams al-Din’s poems,”[19] and Pezeshkzad incorporates into the story the often-translated couplet,

به شعر حافظ شیراز می رقصند و می نازند

سیه چشمان کشمیری و ترکان سمرقندی

To the poetry of Hafez of Shiraz, they sing and dance,

The black-eyed beauties of Kashmir and the fair-faced Turks of Samarqand[20]

Pezeshkzad’s Hafez is a scholar as well as a poet, serving as secretary of the court archives under the previous ruler and doing research on such diverse subjects as mathematics, astronomy, and medicine.[21]

Despite such serious pursuits, Pezeshkzad’s Hafez is indeed joyful, and, for the most part, he takes great pleasure in life. He enjoys the company of his friends, appreciates the renown he has already received as a poet, and waxes eloquently over the natural beauty of Shiraz and its environs. He is rather intolerant, however, of hypocrisy, including what he sees as the hypocrisy of the new ruler, Amir Mobarez, and his followers. He makes his criticism of this group public through some of his poems and through his reluctance to join the ranks of the court poets. With his generally optimistic outlook, he refuses to see the danger that he has put himself in, and he ignores the advice of his friends to curb his tongue and make himself scarce for a time. (Hence the original title of the book, which can be translated as “Hafez, heedless of advice.”)

This Hafez is also playful, at times to a fault. He and the elder ‘Obayd Zakani (a writer of prose and poetry, often satirical and ribald, in real life as well as in the story) amuse themselves and others by baiting and then mercilessly making fun of fellow guests at literary gatherings. Further, he plays practical jokes, sending acquaintances on wild goose chases and then laughing boisterously that they took him seriously and fell into his trap. This joking at the expense of others gets Pezeshkzad’s Hafez into trouble, too, as he loses the support of some important allies at whom he has poked fun.

Other problematic characteristics of the Hafez portrayed in Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand are his manipulativeness and his sometimes-wanton disregard for the welfare of others. Early on in the story he pesters and needles Golandam until the latter agrees to accompany him to a party that Golandam thinks they both should avoid. Later on, he convinces Golandam, against the latter’s better judgement, to accompany him in the dead of night to check out the home of an acquaintance to see if the owner has returned from a journey. This escapade exposes him to arrest. While in jail, he prevails upon an admittedly quite willing admirer to smuggle out a letter for him, resulting in the man’s beating when he is caught with the letter while leaving the jail.

On the other hand, this Hafez does sometimes show concern for others, as when he expresses some regret at tricking a friend into preparing a long poem to recite in the presence of Amir Mobarez, who has no patience for long poems. “Then I became sorry,” he says, “that I had teased the poor guy. They say that if Amir Mobarez hears a long poem not only does he not listen, he also beats the poet.”[22] As another example, he decides to leave the home of an acquaintance who has given him shelter when he realizes the danger his presence poses for his host. “Whatever disaster might befall me,” he says, “it is better than that I cause trouble for the innocent Mehraban Ardashir.”[23]

In this book, Hafez’s lyric poetry is presented as addressing human beings and their strengths and weaknesses. In accordance with Pezeshkzad’s stated belief that Hafez was not a   Sufi, the beloved in his poems is interpreted in this story as human rather than divine. While many scholars believe that the beloved of most classical Persian poetry, when human rather than divine, is a boy or teenage youth, in this story Hafez’s romantic interest is solely in females. For this reason, we translated the genderless Persian third-person singular pronoun as “she” rather than “he.”

When reading Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand, one can imagine the young Pezeshkzad in the character of playful Hafez and the elder Pezeshkzad in the character of respectable, meticulous, and funny ‘Obayd. Hafez’s infatuation with Jahan Malak Khatun also has some resemblance to the first love of Pezeshkzad, with the object of which he was never united, yet who he mentions when people ask him how he came to write Da’i Jan Napelon.[24] In Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand, Golandam describes Hafez’s playfulness and sense of humor as what saves Hafez in a period full of atrocities and ugliness—“a safety line that does not allow [him] [. . .] to drown of harshness in a sea of grief.”[25] Perhaps Pezeshkzad’s sense of humor was his savior too, enabling him to bear the sociopolitical problems that he faced which led him to seek exile in France. By his own account, he sorely missed Iran and longed to return to the country, but never felt that he could.[26] Yet he turned the pain of exile into at least one humorous essay[27] and at least one novel.[28]

For a comparison of Pezeshkzad’s Hafez with Hafez as interpreted by other scholars, we invite English-speaking readers to refer to Dominic Brookshaw’s Hafiz and His Contemporaries: Poetry, Performance, and Patronage in Fourteenth Century Iran,[29] as well as some of the English translations of selections from Hafez’s poetry, including Faces of Love: Hafez and Other Poets of Shiraz by Dick Davis,[30] Hafez: Translations and Interpretations of the Ghazals by Geoffrey Squires,[31] Wine and Prayer: Eighty Ghazals from the Divan of Hafiz by Elizabeth A. Gray and Iraj Anvar,[32] and The Angels Knocking on the Tavern Door: Thirty Poems of Hafez by Robert Bly and Leonard Lewisohn.[33]

When we spoke with the author in 2018 to get his permission to publish our translation, he told us that he would like us to use the same cover image as on the Persian version, which is a painting by Abbas Moayeri (1939-2020). He urged us to use the original painting so that the black stripe that runs across the cover of the Persian version would not appear. He further told us that the reason for the black stripe is to cover the breasts of the girl in the picture. Many of Pezeshkzad’s books criticize censorship, lies, and hypocrisy, as does Hafez in his poetry. It seems appropriate, therefore, that he wanted to break free from the censorship imposed on the original cover image. We tried reaching the artist then, but unfortunately, we only heard back from him two years later when the cover image was already chosen and approved. Soon after, Abbas Moayeri passed away, in October 2020.

Pezeshkzad’s art is in bringing the heavenly Hafez onto earth for readers to meet and to experience vicariously the occasions for which some of his poems could have been written.[34] The writer does not try to interpret Hafez’s poems directly. Instead, he masterfully employs the poems to create a hypothetical situation which could have inspired Hafez to compose a certain poem. He explains the existence of alternate versions of some of Hafez’s poems by the poet’s presumed penchant for repeatedly revising (ornamenting and embellishing, he would say) his works and even creates a story to illustrate the fictional Hafez’s attitude about the circulation of various versions. This story is related by ‘Obayd to Golandam,

One day at a gathering I heard a minstrel sing this couplet of his [Hafez]:

راهی است راه عشق که هیچش کناره نیست

آنجا جز آنکه جان بسپارند چاره نیست

The road of love is an endless road.

There is no choice there other than yielding your soul.

Several days later at a different place the minstrel sang the first line of the couplet this way: The sea of love is an endless sea. When I asked Shams al-Din why he wouldn’t say which version was his, do you know what answer he gave? With a laugh he said, “It’s fine if it is both, because there’s no difference. And for laughs, it’s not bad.” When I asked, “What laughs?” he said, “The same way that for several years now there has been arguing, quarreling, and strife between two groups of Sufis about a single phrase uttered by a Sufi master, if by chance my poetry, like the poetry of Sheikh Sa‘di, endures, then a hundred years, two hundred years, three hundred years from now, a difference of opinion will be found among literary scholars. One will say sea of love is correct and road of love is an error, and the other will say road of love is correct and sea of love is an error, and they will take the life of one another over road and sea. The youth of that time will laugh over their fights, and my spirit will take pleasure from their laughter.”[35]

In the talk that Pezeshkzad gave virtually at the University of Chicago three months before his death, he started by joking about his age. He then gave us a synopsis of his biography and discussed what led him to be a writer rather than the physician that his father wanted him to be and rather than a lawyer, for which he had studied in France. He said that he began his writing career by translating stories from French into Persian and publishing them Iṭṭilāʻāt-i haftigī (Weekly Iṭṭilāʻāt). He admitted that it was in France that he was introduced to literary social satire as it was a very common genre in French in those years after the end of World War II. He added that in order to help him earn a living while working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he wrote literary satire pieces and published them in the journal Ferdowsi for four years—essays which were then collated into a book.

He also talked about several of his books and what led him to write them. At a certain period in his life, he was sent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a mission to Algeria, and since he had a lot of time on his hands, sitting idly in the embassy, he started writingAdab-i mard bih zi dawlat-i ūst taḥrīr shud (One’s manners outdo one’s wealth),[36] which he said is his own favorite among the books he has authored. He stated that this book was very well received in the theatrical scene of Iran, and it was transformed into a play by the prominent actor and director, Davoud Rashidi (1933-2016). Yet, it did not go on stage because of an unfortunate incident that happened to the main actress. He added that, after the revolution, they tried to bring it to the stage, but this was stopped by the Revolutionary Guards and the play was subsequently banned. Later, he mentioned that the first play he translated from French to Persian was Voltaire’s Nanine. It seems that Pezeshkzad had an ongoing interest in theater and playwrighting. This is likely the origin of one of the distinctive features of his writing: his mastery of dialogue, which he employs in his novels, short stories, plays, and any writing he has embarked upon during his productive life.

The style of the Persian in Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand is rather formal and literary. Perhaps having just finished writing another of his books, Ṭanz-i fākhir-i Sa’dī (The elegant satire of Sa‘di),[37] the author was influenced by Sa‘di’s language. Other than the few encounters with the cat, the rest of the text of Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand is written in a high register. Since the entire book is purported to be a manuscript written by Hafez’s close friend, this style helps the reader imagine the story being written in the fourteenth century. When we were translating this book, we tried to maintain this style to some extent. For example, we chose to use archaic or old-fashioned words in places where they seemed appropriate, such as “wenching,” “realm,” “tavern,” “mount” rather than “horse,” “goblet,” and “minstrel.” We also kept the sometimes quite elaborate expressions of politeness. For example, when the poet and princess Jahan Khatun enters the room, she is greeted by her fellow guests with several couplets of poetry. She responds in part by incorporating one of the poetic phrases: “[. . .] it is the presence of you dear poets that opens the door of blessing onto me.”[38] Because of this style, the English reader might find the text a bit stilted, pretentious, and verbose in places, but this is exactly how Pezeshkzad chose to write his historical novel. It is also how historic documents written in English sometimes sound to contemporary readers. Nevertheless, due to the existence of jokes here and there and the satirical nature of the book, it is not at all cumbersome to read.

Hafez in Love: A Novel, the English translation of Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand, won the 2021 Lois Roth Prize for Literary Translation from Persian, and it has been mentioned positively on several literary platforms. For instance, The Modern Novel website writes, “Pezeshkzad beautifully mixes in the various plot lines, so that we are always left wondering what will happen, while, at the same time, letting us enjoy the interchange between him and his friends, and the poetry of Hafez and his friends so that the book really is a joy to read.”[39] In his review of the book, Ali-Asghar Seyed-Gohrab comments, “Hafez in Love is an extraordinary English rendering showing why this Persian poet of wine, love, and honesty has been the most widely read author from the Balkan to the Bay of Bengal for seven hundred years in the Islamic world. [. . .]  A fantastic read to be recommended to everyone who loves Persia, Persian poetry, and historical novels.”[40] M. A. Orthofer writes about the novel and its translation in Complete Review: “Hafez in Love is a quite charming little historical romance, in a world that has become very unstable but where poetry also still matters. It’s an enjoyable read—and fans of Hafez and his poetry will certainly appreciate it, not least for how the poetry is cleverly employed in the novel.”[41]

As noted above, to date, the only books of Pezeshkzad that have been translated into English are My Uncle Napoleon and Hafez in Love. Yet, Pezeshkzad has written many more books that are waiting to be introduced to English-speaking readers, and we hope to see more of his books translated into English in the near future.

 

Appendix

Iraj Pezeshkzad’s handwritten note granting permission to the translators:

44

 

Translation of Iraj Pezeshkzad’s written permission to publish the English translation of his book:

Dear Ms. Pouneh Shabani-Jadidi,

Respectfully, in response to your letter dated October 8, 2018, regarding the publication of the English translation of my Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand, considering the information that you gave me about your scholarly and academic achievements, hereby, I express my consent.

Wishing you success,

Iraj Pezeshkzad

Paris

October 11, 2018

Pouneh Shabani-Jadidi is instructional professor of Persian in the Department of Near Eastern Language and Civilizations at the University of Chicago. Some of her publications include The Art of Teaching Persian Literature: From Theory to Practice (Brill, forthcoming), The Bewildered Cameleer: A Novel of Modern Iran (Mazda 2023), The Routledge Handbook of Persian Literary Translation (2022), Island of Bewilderment: A novel of Modern Iran (Syracuse University Press 2022), The Eight Books: A Complete English Translation (Brill 2021), Hafez in Love (Syracuse University Press 2021), The Routledge Handbook of Second Language Acquisition and Pedagogy of Persian (2020), The Oxford Handbook of Persian Linguistics (2018), The Thousand Families: Commentary on Leading Political Figures of Nineteenth Century Iran (Peter Lang 2018), Processing Compound Verbs in Persian (Leiden and University of Chicago Press 2014), and Translation Metacognitive Strategies (VDM Verlag 2009).

Patricia J. Higgins is university distinguished service professor emerita at SUNY Plattsburgh. As an anthropologist of Iran, she has published her work in Iranian Studies, Human Organization, Journal of Research and Development in Education, and NWSA Journal and as chapters in edited volumes. Some of her publications include Island of Bewilderment (Syracuse University Press 2022), Hafez in Love (Syracuse University Press, 2021), and The Thousand Families: Commentary on Leading Political Figures of Nineteenth Century Iran (Peter Lang 2018). In addition, she is co-editor of Classics of Practicing Anthropology: 1978–1998 (Society for Applied Anthropology 2000). At SUNY Plattsburgh, she served as a faculty member, an associate vice president, and then interim provost and vice president for academic affairs.

[1] Iraj Pezeshkzad, Da‘i Jan Napelon (Dear Uncle Napoleon) (Tehran: Farhang-e M‘aser Publishing House, 1973).

[2] For relevant examples, see M. R. Ghanoonparvar and Homa Katouzian in this issue.

[3] Emily Langer, “Iraj Pezeshkzad, celebrated Iranian satirist and author of ‘My Uncle Napoleon,’ dies,” The Washington Post, January 18, 2022.

[4] Langer, “Iraj Pezeshkzad.”

[5] Dick Davis, trans., My Uncle Napoleon (Washington, D.C.: Mage Publishers, 1996, 2000).

[6] Dick Davis, trans., My Uncle Napoleon (New York: Random House, 2006).

[7] Azar Nafisi, “Introduction,” in My Uncle Napoleon, trans. Dick Davis (New York: Random House, 2006), vii-xv.

[8] Iraj Pezeshkzad, “Afterword,” in My Uncle Napoleon, trans. Dick Davis (New York: Random House, 2006), 501-503.

[9] Farnaz Fassihi, “Iraj Pezeshkzad, Author of a Classic Iranian Novel, Dies at 94,” The New York Times, February 23, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/middleeast/iraj-pezeshkzad-dead.htm.

[10] Iraj Pezeshkzad, “Delayed Consequences of the Revolution,” in Strange Times, My Dear: The PEN Anthology of Contemporary Iranian Literature, eds. Nahid Mozaffar and Ahmad Karimi-Haddad (New York: Arcade Publishers, 2005), 105-14.

[11] Iraj Pezeshkzad, Ḥāfiẓ-i nāshanīdah pand [Hafez, heedless of advice] (Tehran: Nashr-e Qatreh Publishers, 2004).

[12] Pouneh Shabani-Jadidi and Patricia J. Higgins, trans., Hafez in Love: A Novel (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2021).

[13] Sorour Kasmai, trans., Mon Oncle Napoleon (Arles: Actes Sud, 2011).

[14] Iraj Pezeshkzad, “A Conversation with Iraj Pezeshkzad” (Heshmat Moayyad Lecture Series, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, October 28, 2021), https://nelc.uchicago.edu/heshmat-moayyad-lecture-series.

[15] For similar discussions, see Dick Davis in this issue.

[16] “Iraj Pezeshkzad: Hafez-e nashenideh pand (Hafez in Love),” The Modern Novel, accessed September 3, 2022, https://www.themodernnovel.org/asia/other-asia/iran/iraj-pezeshkzad/hafez-in-love/.

[17] Susan Basnett, “Living in Translation,” keynote lecture presented at Bristol Translates lecture series, Bristol University, Bristol, England, July 5, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ih6wBl-n9qw, accessed September 3, 2022.

[18] Ahmad Madani, “A Critical Look at Hafez-e Nashenide Pand (Hafez, heedless of advice) by Iraj Pezeshkzad,” Artistic-Analytical Journal, Café Catharsis, https://cafecatharsis.ir/20127/نگاهی-انتقادی-به-رمان-حافظ-ناشنیده-پند/, accessed September 3, 2022.

[19] Shabani-Jadidi and Higgins, Hafez in Love, 156.

[20] Shabani-Jadidi and Higgins, 182.

[21] Shabani-Jadidi and Higgins, 13-14.

[22] Shabani-Jadidi and Higgins, 148.

[23] Shabani-Jadidi and Higgins, 82.

[24] Pezeshkzad, “Afterword,” 501-504.

[25] Shabani-Jadidi and Higgins, Hafez in Love, 23.

[26] Fassihi, “Iraj Pezeshkzad.”

[27] Pezeshkzad, “Delayed Consequences.”

[28] Iraj Pezeshkzad, Khānavādah-yi nīk’akhtar [The Nik-Akhtar family] (Tehran: Ketab-e Abi Publishing House, 2001).

[29] Dominic Brookshaw, Hafiz and His Contemporaries: Poetry, Performance and Patronage in Fourteenth-Century Iran (London: I. B. Tauris, 2019).

[30] Dick Davis, trans., Faces of Love: Hafez and the Poets of Shiraz (New York: Penguin Books, 2013).

[31] Geoffrey Squires, trans., Hafez: Translations and Interpretations of the Ghazals (Miami, FL: Miami University Press, 2014).

[32] Elizabeth A. Gray and Iraj Anvar, Wine and Prayer: Eighty Ghazals from the Divan of Hafiz (Ashland, OR: White Cloud Press, 2019).

[33] Robert Bly and Leonard Lewisohn, trans., The Angels Knocking on the Tavern Door: Thirty Poems of Hafez (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2008).

[34] Kayhan London, “In Commemoration of Iraj Pezeshkzad: This Playful Hafez,” News and Views for a Global Iranian Community, https://kayhan.london/fa/1400/11/03/270528/, accessed September 3, 2022.

[35] Shabani-Jadidi and Higgins, Hafez in Love, 108.

[36] Iraj Pezeshkzad, Adab-i mard bih zi dawlat-i ūst taḥrīr shud [One’s manners outdo one’s wealth] (Tehran: Safi Ali Shah Publishing House, 2002).

[37] Iraj Pezeshkzad,Ṭanz-i fākhir-i Sa’dī [The elegant satire of Sa‘di] (Tehran: Shahab Saqeb Publishers, 2002).

[38] Shabani and Higgins, Hafez in Love, 42.

[39] The Modern Novel, “Iraj Pezeshkzad.”

[40] Ali-Asghar Seyed-Gohrab, Review, https://press.syr.edu/supressbooks/3471/hafez-in-love/, accessed September 3, 2022.

[41] M. A. Orthofer, The Complete Review, https://www.completereview.com/reviews/iran/pezeshkzad.htm, accessed September 3, 2022.

Weststruckness: Its Trials, and Its Tribulations

 

Weststruckness: Its Trials, and Its Tribulations

(With Morad Moazami)

Abstract

From the late nineteenth century onwards, ‘Weststruckness,’ under some moniker or another, has remained prevalent in Iranian sociocultural discourse. Its message, however, has largely been distorted and misunderstood by way of its weaponisation as a political, indeed, revolutionary tool. In this paper, we trace the history of the concept from the late nineteenth century through to the Constitutional Revolution and the Pahlavi period, up to the Iranian Revolution of 1979. We describe the evolution of the concept by analyzing the sociopolitical ideas of Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri, Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh, Ahmad Kasravi, Fakhreddin Shadman, Ahmad Fardid, Jalal Al-e Ahmad, and Ali Shariati. We will then demonstrate how the concept of ‘Weststruckness,’ originally expressing distress over the intrusion of Western culture into Iran, was stripped of its inherent cultural content and fashioned only into a pejorative slogan.

Historical Background

‘Weststruckness’ (and its kindred terms such as ‘Westoxication,’ and ‘Occidentiotis’) is an English rendering of Jalal Al-e Ahmad’s Gharbzadegi (1962). The subject, however, is much wider as well as older than that. The fear of the intrusion of European culture goes back to the second half of the nineteenth century, when the culture of modernisation was beginning to take form inside Iran.

    In the nineteenth century, such fears not only contributed to Naser al-Din Shah’s decision to disband the upper-class intellectuals’ pseudo-Freemason club called Farāmūshkhānah, but they also influenced the cancellation of Reuter’s Concession in 1872, intended as a wide programme of mainly economic modernisation of the country, including the construction of railways. Naturally, the concession would have also meant the employment and influx of large numbers of European personnel, from managers downwards, who would bring their Christian and European lifestyles with them. This, of course, was believed to impact the Muslim fabric of society.

When, after the shah’s death in 1896, constitutionalism began to gather momentum, two central notions came to the fore with respect to what a constitutional government must entail. First and foremost was the abolition of arbitrary rule; and second was the modernisation of state and society that the younger and secularist intellectuals had long advocated. Some naively believed that the two projects necessarily overlapped.

In particular, the prospect of secular modernisation frightened Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri and his disciples into effectively opposing constitutionalism by advocating mashrūʻah (as opposed to mashrūṭah) which at best meant that the government should apply religious law. Among their concerns was their opposition to the equality before the law of religious minorities, participation of ‘Frankish Madames’ (mādām’hā-yi farangī) in mixed meetings; newspapers; and even whistling and clapping. For example, Nuri’s party wrote in one of their major statements that, at first constitutionalism was about the abolition of arbitrary despotism, but now other non-Islamic ideas have been put forward, such as:

[…] the education of women and the founding of schools for girls, and the usage of funds hitherto used for religious congregations and the pilgrimage of sacred shrines for investment in factories and the paving of roads and streets, and in the construction of railways and acquiring European industries.[1]

Nuri and his disciples, however, lost their cause completely when they sided with arbitrary rule in the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution, paying a mortal price for it.

  Yet, the uneasiness over the dislocation of Iranian traditions in favour of modernism were far from past. Indeed, a prime illustration of this unease can be found in Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh’s short story, “Persian is Sweet,” published in 1921, about an Iranian peasant finding himself trapped in a prison with two Iranians whose language he cannot understand. One of them was a well-dressed, novel-flicking, and mustachioed “farangī’ma’āb” (Europeanist) amusingly addressed as “Mr. Monsieur,” who speaks only in a Franco-Persian hybrid.[2] Another piece of literature written in the same period, which also ridiculed the farangī’ma’āb type, was Hasan Moqaddam’s (penname, Ali Nowruz) play, Ja‘far Khan has Returned from Europe.[3]

Pseudo-Modernism

While the triumph of constitutionalism had not immediately led to secularism and modernism around this time, it had indeed planted the seeds for it. These seeds continued to grow steadily until Reza Khan and his supporters won their power struggle and launched their pseudo-modernist programme in the 1920s. The term ‘pseudo-modernist’ is explained by the fact that there was a rush to emulate some of the most superficial aspects of life in Europe, not only widening the streets by demolishing whole buildings, including monuments, but even ordering the people to wear European-style hats, the resistance to which ended in bloodshed.[4]

Regarding this subject Mokhber al-Saltaneh (Mehdiqoli Hedayat, who had been Reza Shah’s prime minister for almost six years) wrote in his memoirs:

In an audience the shah took my [chapeau] hat off my head and said, ‘Now what do you think of this?’ I said it certainly protects one from the sun and the rain, but the hat, which we had before had a better name [meaning ‘the Pahlavi hat’, which also had been forced on men a few years before]. Agitated, his majesty paced up and down and said, ‘All I am trying to do is for us to look like [the Europeans] so they would not ridicule us.[5]

Perhaps no better critic of pseudo-modernism than Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh could show the extent of the sentiments against it.  In January 1920, in the first issue of the new series of Kāvah which he and Jamalzadeh published in Berlin, Taqizadeh wrote that “Iran should both in appearance and in reality, both physically and spiritually become Europeanized and nothing else.”[6] Taken out of context, these words do suggest pseudo-modernist thinking, although a study of other articles written mainly by Taqizadeh on the subject in Kāvah reflect a higher level of sophistication than shown by the above sentence. At any rate, this was taken and repeated as gospel by the young nationalist and pseudo-modernist elite at the time and later. By the same token, when in the 1960s and 70s, as a result of a backlash against pseudo-modernism there was an emotional and unrealistic rejection of the West and everything Western, Taqizadeh was singled out as the demonic harbinger of ‘Weststruckness.’

  Long before the outburst against ‘Weststruckness,’ however, Taqizadeh had argued that his view had been misunderstood and misinterpreted, although this involves some exaggeration. He himself did acknowledge once that, earlier, he might have gone a little too far in his zeal for promoting progress and development along European lines. The occasion on which he extensively and most emphatically disowned and denounced pseudo-modernism was in his correspondence with Abolhasan Ebtehaj, the able and honest governor of Bank Melli Iran (then a commercial bank as well as the central bank). Taqizadeh had criticised the Bank’s extravagance in building a lavishly modern new branch in the Tehran bazar on the ruins of the perfectly sound Takyah-i Dawlat, the public hall built by Naser al-Din Shah for social occasions, pick-axed for the purpose. In response, Ebtehaj wrote and reminded him of the famous sentence in the article in Kāvah twenty-seven years before. In his reply of January 1948 to Ebtehaj’s letter, Taqizadeh wrote that his point had been misunderstood, and that in a country which suffers from so much “misery, homelessness, hunger, nakedness, disease, illiteracy and filth,” to construct “pharaonic and Parisian buildings” in emulation of rich Western countries is “the deadliest sin and tantamount to religious infidelity:”

And if, as you have pointed out, twenty-seven years ago I encouraged the people to adopt ‘the European civilisation both in appearance and in reality, both physically and spiritually,’ my intention was never such mad and idiotic imitations of luxury. By apparent civilisation I meant such things as clean clothes, adequate housing and public health […] and good manners […] and […] valuing time. And regarding spiritual civilisation, I meant science, scholarship, foundation of universities, publication of books, improvement of the situation of women […] and removal of corruption and bribery and still thousands of other spiritual, legal, moral and behavioral matters which would take another ten pages to enumerate […] Unfortunately, we acquired neither the apparent civilisation of Europe, nor its spiritual one. Of the apparent civilisation, we did not learn anything except prostitution, gambling, sartorial aping and making ourselves up with imported material, and of the real civilisation, none other than rejecting the religions without having faith in any other moral code or principle […] [7]

Ahmad Kasravi

Under the rapid pace of pseudo-modernisation during this era, nostalgia was slowly beginning to break out. In turn, Ahmad Kasravi’s 1932 book, Āyīn, emerged both as a prime illustration of this mode of thinking, and more deeply, the cultural unease that these modernist programmes had prompted.

A former religious scholar and preacher who had left that profession to become a modern lawyer and later, a vociferous campaigner against Shiism and Shia clerics, his argument in Āyīn was simple and clear: Modern technology and secularism had led to irreligion and immorality everywhere, and while Iran should acquire from modern European products what was necessary for its survival, it should reject ‘Europeanism’ (urūpā’yī’garī). His argument resembled Jean- Jacque Rousseau’s who, put in a few simple words, believed that the march of material and scientific progress had not led to the greater happiness and fulfilment of the human race, but the reverse was true.

Written as early as 1932, Kasravi’s discourse was global: there was no basic moral difference between East and West, except that the European machine age had led to moral decline and unhappy living in Europe as well as any society that had been copying it. However, he makes it clear in a footnote that, throughout the book, by Europe he means the whole of the West.

“Have modern European inventions added to human happiness?” asked Kasravi rhetorically. “Sadly not! Alas, not!” he replied.  “In fact, such inventions and the inevitable changes which they have brought with them have caused increasing trouble to human beings […] We ourselves remember well what a peaceful life we used to enjoy until twenty years ago when we still had our own Eastern mode of living and know what difficulties we face now that we have been polluted by Western style of living.”[8]

  Expanding on the previously popular farangi-ma’āb, the term urūpā’yī’garī was plainly concerned with the same decades-old fear: that the influx of European inventions and ways of life could lead the country towards a divergent and unfortunate path. Since Kasravi had, by then, already observed first-hand the transformations that the sudden and rapid employment of European inventions had brought about, this was far from a matter of mere nativism. Nativism, after all, “operates not as a reminder of one’s cultural history, but as a stark and closed interpretation of who belongs and who does not.”[9] Though written as a polemic, Āyīn’s differentiation between East and West served more as a cultural critique and warning. After all, the author was not denying the useful features of these innovations; rather, he was concerned that the Iranian Europhiles’ hastily implementing them lacked the “intellectual independence… [to pursue] an alternative path of progress and development that could detour the social and economic problems of Europe.”[10] Instead, they naively believed that European means and methods were superior, and therefore deserved emulation.

Kasravi, however, reminded readers that Europe was not necessarily superior to the rest of the world. Its innovations, despite their advantages, had caused great harm as well:

Europe claims that the machine reduces human suffering […] This use of the machine cannot be denied. But the damages which these instruments have caused to the world are also numerous. One must say that if the machine has relieved hands a hundred times, it has added to the suffering of hearts a thousand times.’[11]

He went on to argue that ever since Europe had begun to invent machines, it had risen against religion: “lack of faith is now one of the gifts that people of the East bring for their fellow citizens from Europe”[12]:

They will ask, ‘What should be done?’ We say, ‘we must turn our eyes off Europe and return to our old Eastern living. Governments would have to watch Europe and be aware of the intentions of the Europeans about the East so that they could protect their countries. And they should acquire newly-invented war materials and whatever is useful for government and administration, and enact the laws which are necessary for it.  But people must turn their eyes off Europe.’[13]

It is important to emphasise that Kasravi’s argument here, as in his many other books, comprises both a universal and a local element. Europe itself has declined almost in every sense since the Industrial Revolution, prompting the loss of religious faith and moral virtues. Therefore, the wholesale imitation of European customs and innovations could prompt Iran to go the same way. More importantly, the country could end up in the same situation unless Iranians take heed and retain their moral and spiritual life.

Similarly, by providing a historical context to European innovations so as to arrive at these conclusions, Kasravi is indicating that Iranian Europhiles might not be as cognizant of these developments in the first place, which has, in turn, led to the animated emulation of all things European without any thought given to its repercussions. For Kasravi, it is not just Iran’s adoption of Western ways that is problematic; even the West needs to rescue itself from its moral and religious decline in consequence of the rise of modern industry.

 

Fakhreddin Shadman

A quarter of a century later, in February 1948, Seyyed Fakhreddin Shadman—who, unlike Kasravi, had “stayed in Europe for fifteen years”[14]—wrote Conquering the European Civilisation, another book thematically concerned with the threat of Europeanism. Like Kasravi’s Āyīn, the book suffers from much repetition and its message is at times contradictory. If Kasravi’s preoccupation was with the ‘machine’ and its harmful consequences for clean and peaceful living by way of its undermining pure faith and the traditional public ethics, Shadman’s is the fear of European civilisation ‘conquering’ Iranian culture.

  Europe—by which he also means the entire Western civilisation—is highly advanced although despite what most educated Iranians believe, it is not perfect. Nevertheless, it has had great achievements, which should be acquired by Iranians such that they could then “conquer Europe” or European civilisation. To put it in a few words, Europe is Iran’s enemy out to “conquer Iran,” but Iran can ‘conquer’ Europe instead by cautiously acquiring Europe’s achievements. Indeed, the whole issue of ‘conquest’ and ‘counter-conquest’ revolves around these subjects, rather than political and economic domination, although that too has been mentioned in passing in a general critique of the West. And what are the instruments for conquering European civilisation? They are language, literature and culture, which he often summarizes under the category of ‘language.’

Shadman is first and foremost concerned with the risk of the decline of Persian language and literature, but combines this with an attack on ‘fukulī,’ or the pseudo-Europeanist dandy who he believed was mindlessly abandoning Persian language and civilisation in preference for imitation of half-baked European forms, norms, languages and ways of life:

In reply to the person who asks why fukulī is the greatest enemy of Iran, I would say that during the onslaught of European civilisation this domestic enemy is aide to the foreigner […] and in the hope that European civilisation conquers us as soon as possible, he would not shy away from betraying our language and our good cultural traditions. If we do not stop the onslaught of European civilisation, the people of Iran would be destroyed.[15]

Fokoli, based on the French faux col for a detachable collar, referred to a European-type Iranian dandy. And so, within the popular idiom of the time, a fukulī is a person who, having learned a few words from European languages thinks that he can introduce European civilisation, which he does not know, to Iranians; he is no different from Kasravi’s ‘Europhile’ or the farangī’ma’āb of old. What is remarkable about Shadman’s view is that, unlike pan-Iranian nationalists, he values both the Islamic as well as the pre-Islamic period of Iran’s history, and believes that missionaries are enemies, not just of Islam but of Iran itself:

The Iranian fukulī is an ignoramus who does not understand that the European missionary, due to grudge and prejudice, regards Islam as the source of Iran’s misfortune […] He is the enemy of our religion [and] not a friend of Iran. And if we were Zoroastrian, he would regard that as the reason for the catastrophes which are faced by today’s Iran. And if we worshipped the Trinity while his religion was Islam, he would still not leave us alone and say that the teachings of Christianity have ruined Iran…[16]

This seems senseless, because it assumes that under any and all circumstances Europeans are enemies of Iran. Unlike Kasravi, Shadman has no fear of the ‘machine’, of European inventions and the real Western achievements, yet he fears European civilisation—a kind of ambiguous, if not senseless, Europhobia—which he sees as an enemy of Iran and bent on the destruction of its culture. He points out that Iran has been defeated several times in history but has managed to survive, but the conquest of European civilisation will be a defeat from which Iran would never recover:

Do not look upon European civilisation as a plaything. If European civilisation conquers us, the history of one of the most important and oldest of the world’s great nations would come to an end, and the book which has been open for two thousand and five hundred years would be shut forever.[17]

What should therefore be done? Should Iranians turn their back to the great achievements of European civilisation, which Shadman enlists with great admiration? His answer is ‘no.’ He distinguishes between “rationally and cautiously” acquiring it rather than being conquered by it:

Either of two things should be done: either we should rationally and cautiously acquire European civilisation, or we should surrender before it, so it would sweep us away like a flood […] In my view the day that European civilisation conquers us will be the last day of the life of Iran; and the only escape route is for us to conquer it before we become captive to it.[18]

The simpletons who would like to be conquered by European civilisation do not realize that it is not our friend. A comparison of those countries, which surrendered before European civilisation in the last couple of centuries, with those that willingly adapted it clearly shows the advantage of rational and cautious acquisition as opposed to surrender before “this pitiless enemy:” Russia and Japan, acquired it and are now advanced nations; Algeria was conquered by it and is a miserable country.[19]

  Even though emotionally charged, this is a rational argument. Put in a few words, it says that Iran should rationally adapt Western civilisation, rather than purely imitate it. However, it is not clear in what sense this would result in Iran—by the force of the Persian language and culture—‘conquering’ it. Russia and Japan developed through modernisation, but this does not mean that they ‘conquered’ Western civilisation.

  Examining Kasravi’s and Shadman’s arguments, it becomes clear that neither of them could be authentically described as ‘nativist.’[20] True, their account is packed with idealisms of various kinds, but neither of them quite advocates complete insularity or a ‘return to self.’ On the contrary, both merely advocate a better historical understanding of the lifestyles and innovations that, they believe, Iranians have natively experienced.

  As we saw, Kasravi’s message is both universal and local. Since the industrial revolution, faith, humanity and morality have sharply declined, in the first instance, in the West itself. Therefore, Iran should not follow the West in this, especially without knowing of the consequences that these innovations wrought on European civilisation. This, for Kasravi, does not mean that Iranians should avoid Western physical and social products, since they need them for their use. Only caution is key. While, on the other end of the spectrum, Shadman makes a call to conquer Western civilisation rather than turning back on it, he also concludes that Iran should ‘rationally and cautiously’ adapt Western products but maintain its language and culture, if not promote them.

Even so, the critiques of Kasravi and Shadman hardly had an impact on the intellectuals and the educated, let alone the whole society. Although Ahmad Fardid had first used the term gharbzadegi in a different sense, it is Al-e Ahmad’s book that gave it its extensive and intensive currency. Within a few years, and especially after his death in 1969, gharbzadegi conquered Iran “as completely as the Holy Inquisition conquered Spain.” This is how John Maynard Keynes described the complete triumph of Ricardo over Malthus so that, as he continues, “argument ceased.” It is indeed an apt description of how the term gharbzadegi conquered Iran.

Ahmad Fardid

Before examining Al-e Ahmad’s gharbzadegi, however, it is important to look into Ahmad Fardid’s original conception of the term. Due to the sparseness of his writing, Fardid was largely an oral philosopher. His ideas were either transmitted through his lectures at the University of Tehran (where he taught philosophy from the 1960s onwards), or his weekly dūrahs (gatherings) dubbed “Fardidiyehs.” Among his noteworthy followers at the time were philosophers Dariush Shayegan and Dariush Ashuri, both of whom would also contribute to the gharbzadegi discourse later in their careers—which however did not include Fardid’s more extremist views, which came to the fore especially after the 1979 Revolution. [21]

Fardid’s gharbzadegi (introduced as a rendition of Yunānzadigī, meaning ‘Greekstruckness’) was concerned with the sizable influence of Greek epistemology across the history of European modernity, through to its effects on Eastern modernist thinking. Borrowing from the Nietzschean concepts of active and passive nihilism, Fardid considers gharbzadegi to be both a passive and passing era in Western as well as Eastern philosophy. This period, he maintains, will soon give way to a more active, questioning form of gharbzadegi that will lead to the renunciation of the Greek epistemological hegemony, and a return to a more spiritual, faith-based philosophical discourse.

Following a loose and mostly personalized historical account, Fardid claims (not quite correctly) that gharbzadegi entered into the Muslim world following the Crusades – the crusades happened long before the Renaissance! – only to ‘redouble’ as a “progressist, modernism-struck, and modernity-desiring” concept in the eighteenth century. This ‘redoubled’ form of gharbzadegi then set the stage for the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of the early twentieth century, fueled by Western philosophy’s “worldly” and “objectivized”[22] perspective. This Western epistemological worldview’s central flaw was that it posited “an existential separation between the human mind as the knowing subject and the external world as the object of study,” a concept inherently at odds with spiritual Oriental thought.[23]

  Moreover, upon closer inspection one can see that the French Revolution, by which Iran’s Constitutional Revolution was inspired, led to only “sin and heresy,”[24] with no trace of God or spirituality left in its wake. And so, in consequence, Iran’s Enlightenment-based Constitutional Revolution seems to have occurred around the time that Western philosophy was breathing its final breaths in the West itself, with the ultimate nail in its coffin being the “the Russian Revolution, which occurred against a similar kind of gharbzadegi.”

  A period of ‘redoubled’ gharbzadegi, as experienced in the Constitutional Revolution, is for Fardid marked by “its imitations of the West,”[25] and by the elimination of the deep-seated faith-based residue of an Eastern culture. It was during such a period, Fardid maintains, that the word millat, which connotes religion, was translated into ‘nation,’ even though ‘nation’ actually connotes race.[26] Indeed, for Fardid, these “constitutional translations” reeked of nothing other than the objectivized, worldly thinking of the West.[27]

As for the present day, Fardid claims that Westerners have begun to call out that “Oh sir, our minds have become warped! And this freedom isn’t really freedom, and this world is really moving towards collapse!”[28] Now, “after four hundred years, the history of the West has reached a dead end,” and the only way for Iran to avoid the same predicament is “mysticism”[29] (darvīshī) and “self-awareness” (Khud’āgāhī).[30] These terms actually echo Martin Heidegger’s admittedly irrational complex concept of ‘Being-in-the-world’ (Dasein), which also called for a more spiritual, mindful, and thus more authentic engagement with the physical world. For Fardid, this sort of self-cognizant mysticism is the only way to fight ‘spiritual poverty’ and counteract the West’s dead-end of epistemic objectivity, and thus, to fight against gharbzadegi.

  As we can see, even in Fardid’s case, a universal concept is utilized so as to arrive at a more local philosophical conjecture. Though written under a different— this time, philosophical—discursive umbrella, much of Fardid’s conception of gharbzadegi shares similarities with the previous, more cultural iterations of farangī’ma’ābī as well as urūpā’yī’garī. What is original in Fardid’s conception, however, is his conjecture that gharbzadegi is a necessary stage in human history, and one that had to be seen through to its very end. Analogously, this stage of gharbzadegi also comprises its own sub-stages, one that travails a passively nihilistic form of gharbzadegi, marked by its process of blind imitation, to a more active variation of it, ultimately marked by a newly self-cognizant interrogation of gharbzadegi with a more spiritual bent.

  While the West has already reached the stage of active gharbzadegi, the East continues to be passive. It bears noting that despite Fardid’s largely philosophical examination, echoes of Kasravi’s observation can be detected in his argumentation as well: the West has already discerned its collapse, while the East remains naively enchanted by its innovations.  As for what will result from these introspections, Fardid is unclear; for him, gharbzadegi is merely a historical stage, bound to wear out and give way to a new history thereafter.

Al-e Ahmad

For Jalal Al-e Ahmad, however, gharbzadegi was posited as both a mania and an underlying threat to contemporary Iranian culture. Repurposing Fardid’s philosophical conjecture, Al-e Ahmad focuses on the immediate repercussions of a cultural gharbzadegi. Contrary to Fardid, Al-e Ahmad does not claim that the threat of gharbzadegi lies in its being historically and essentially Western; rather it lies in the fact that Iranians have wholly given themselves away to Western products and habits of consumption, “copying the West outwardly and superficially,”[31] while making little effort to generate their own cultural products, to say nothing of their unwillingness to understand the mechanisms behind these new products and ways of life. At the heart of Al-e Ahmad’s critique is not the Western-ness of these products, but the passivity that they have instigated due to their inherent luxury and convenience.

  By the time Al-e Ahmad wrote Gharbzadegi at the age of thirty-nine, he was already an accomplished author, critic, and translator. Written in 1962, a year before the Shah’s White Revolution and the revolt of June 1963; and four years before an unknown person and Ali Shariati—one after the other—translated Franz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth into Persian in Paris, Gharbzadegi was not an anti-West manifesto; rather, Weststruckness, under Al-e Ahmad’s definition was:

[…] a characteristic of the period of our history that we have not yet acquired the machine and do not know the codes of its organization and construction. Weststruckness is a characteristic of the period of our history that we have not yet learned the premises of the machine, i.e. modern science and technology. [32]

Likewise, for Al-e Ahmad, the gharbzadeh is a character who has severed his ties with Iranian culture and tradition. This is an individual “with no connection to the past, and no idea about the future,”[33] who also attends only to the most superficial aspects of day-to-day life. This person only cares for ease and uses much of his time “to groom himself […] giving importance only to his shoes, his clothes, and the furnishings inside his home.”[34] Everything for the gharbzadeh is about looking like a European. Sometimes, he appears as though he has been “unrolled from some golden piece of foil or has just returned from some European maison.”[35]

It must be said that Al-e Ahmad was not opposed to Western culture either. Strictly speaking, he was concerned about ways that Iranians had taken up and employed these ‘machines’ without quite understanding their implications. Western modernism, he believed, was being applied at a time when Iranians did not yet “comprehend the actual nature, foundation, and philosophy of Western civilisation.”[36]

In fact, as the founding editor of the intellectual journal ‘Ilm-i Zindigī, Al-e Ahmad had actively tried to better familiarize readers with that civilisation through his translations of André Gide’s Return from the Soviet Union, Albert Camus’s The Outsider, Jean-Paul Sartre’s The Dirty Hands, Dostoevsky’s The Gambler, and (with Ali Asghar Khobrezadeh) Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon. Indeed, towards the end of Gharbzadegi, he even goes so far as to refer to Nabokov’s Lolita, and Bergman’s The Seventh Seal—which were among the most recent intellectually fashionable works to be published and screened in the West—so as to point to the cultural problems faced by the West itself.[37]

  However, we should distinguish between the book’s principal point and how it is presented. Indeed, much of the criticism should be levelled at the style of presentation, not least its polemical tone and its extensive use of the familiar Iranian conspiracy theory. A distinction must also be made between the first edition (1962) and the second edition (1967) of the book. The first edition speaks of the harmful influence of “the machine.” Indeed, having read the first edition in 1962, the present author pointed out to Al-e Ahmad that it smacked of Luddism, of the early nineteenth-century resistance against modern machinery, to which the latter responded by saying that he was in love with his own Hillman Minx motorcar.[38] However, he wrote in the second edition:

The point is that as long as we have not understood the nature, essence and philosophy of the West, and only superficially copy-cat it by consuming its machines, we are like the donkey who went into the lion’s skin…At any rate, it is two hundred years on that, as a crow, we pretend on being a partridge…And from all that we said something commonplace emerges, namely that as long as we are only consumers and not builders of the machine, we are Weststruck.[39]

The concept he introduced, indeed, was neither political nor anti-West; nor did he advocate any form of “return to self.” It merely served as a call to go beyond imitation, and to create as well as to appropriate imported cultures in line with Iranian customs. Contrary to the anti-western theories which were soon become fashionable even to the point of claiming that Western culture itself was rotten, Al-e Ahmad was not railing against Western culture as it was lived and practiced in the West itself. Instead, his cause for concern was simply the prospect of superficial imitation—of “being a crow and pretending to be a partridge”[40]— something that years before Gharbzadegi, he had also warned against when critiquing the contemporary press in Iran.[41] However, as indicated, by far the greatest weakness of his argument is his strong proclivity to conspiracy theory and his cavalier treatment of historical analysis.

  As with the large body of Weststruckness discourse, commonalities exist in Al-e Ahmad’s argumentation when compared to his predecessors: a call to caution with respect to modernism; insistence on a peculiar mimetic compulsion appearing among modernists, as well as a historically framed attempt to wipe away the romanticism often accorded to the Euro-American modernist way of life. However, each of these thinkers offer a different angle with respect to this discourse. In Al-e Ahmad’s case, his discourse—unlike those of Kasravi, Shadman, Fardid, and Shariati— was neither religious nor moral, nor even philosophical. And unlike Bazargan, Shariati and Khomeini, he was not advocating one or the other form of Islamic or Islamically-inspired government.

  Later misidentified as the father of a more politicized notion of gharbzadegi, Jalal Al-e Ahmad, though a dissident intellectual, never actually affixed himself to a political vision, much less an ideology, following his 1953 falling out from politics. Al-e Ahmad’s preoccupations were largely social and cultural, and his aspirations to social change vis-à-vis political oppression were never spelled out under any specific political or ideological umbrella.[42] And no way does it justify the retrospective and anachronistic accounts that pit him and his cultural output as harbingers of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

  By the 1970s, however, Al-e Ahmad’s iteration of gharbzadegi had become a slapdash idiom in the service of many. Adults, children, old and young people, men and women, the poor, the well-off, and even the rich all had begun to use it as a  pejorative term by which to discredit their interlocuters’ point of view or cultural identity. Indeed, any object of disagreement, dissent and disapproval, especially in the social and political spheres was attributed to gharbzadegi. For example, when a British-educated Iranian economist was trying to explain to a British-educated Iranian physicist, who was engaged in higher studies in Paris, that the first country to become capitalist could not now be “sous développé,” as she maintained Britain had become, she shouted ‘stop being Weststruck’ (gharbzadih nashū)! Just the same, this pejorative term’s admission into the contemporary idiom was less a direct result of the underlying message in Gharbzadegi itself than it was a consequence of the ideological weaponization of the term at the hands of ideologues inspired by Al-e Ahmad’s book but not necessarily informed by it. As Liora Hendelman-Baavur remarks:

The significance of Al-Ahmad’s treatise evolved over time, far beyond the reach of its author. In the prerevolutionary decades, Gharbzadegi was renowned for its criticism against the modernisation enterprise enforced by the Shah and the West’s imperialist exploitation. Following 1979, it was associated with the hegemonic discourse of clerical revolutionaries and, shortly afterward, with the anti-Western terminology of Ayatollah Khomeini, as well as guidelines for the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic.[43]

Ali Shariati

A name routinely put forward in connection to the more ideological flank of the gharbzadegi discourse is Ali Shariati. Much unlike Al-e Ahmad’s example, although Shariati’s influence was substantial—to the point that, not quite accurately, he is sometimes described as the ideologue of the Iranian revolution—it appealed much less to the secular than to the traditional individual.[44]

  Shariati’s works, mainly transcripts of recordings of his talks and lectures, run in tens of volumes. He was a prolific and eclectic thinker in the style of religious reformers and prophets. Still, it should be said it was not so much Shariati’s ideological analysis and evaluations that was most effective in attracting young men and women to his cause; rather, it was his simple discourse on Islam, society, and social change.

  Most of Shariati’s followers were born in traditional religious families. They had been affected by the modern secular environment in Iran and elsewhere; and they were also trying to hold on to their religious sentiments while at the same time pursuing a modern, revolutionary line of thought and action. French-educated scholar himself, Shariati made use of the gharbzadegi discourse to paint a picture of exactly such a predicament. However, he did so with a counter-ideology already in mind—something that cannot quite be said of his predecessors within the discourse. Shariati’s counter-ideology, infusing Marxism with his own configuration of Islamic philosophy, can be examined in 1971’s Bāz’gasht bih khvīshtan (‘Return to the Self’).  At the onset, Shariati reminds his interlocutors of the West’s history of imperialism:

The West, from the eighteenth century onwards […] is trying to provide the world with the thesis that ‘there is only one kind of civilisation, which is Western civilisation, and if any other individual wants to become civilised, they must consume the civilisation we have constructed, and if they wish to rebuff our civilisation, they will remain savages.[45]

Shariati then goes on to offer a personal anecdote so as to shed light on the sheer effectiveness of this mode of cultural imperialism. He recalls sitting next to an individual on an Iranian aeroplane, whose Persian accent was indeed so westernised (‘farangī’) that the author could not even understand what he was saying. Afterwards, he hears the individual speaking in a European language, only to find out that the boy cannot even speak that other language properly. “Just look at the pretension,” he laments, before pondering its cause out loud: “It is because such an individual cannot even stand himself, cannot stand where he belongs to, cannot stand anything that reminds him of himself.”[46]

  These statements echo Al-e Ahmad’s classifications of the gharbzadeh as well; an individual that had no relations to the past, and a person who no longer belonged anywhere at all. Shariati believed that this individuality had been sparked by the imperialistic tendencies of the West, which has made anyone Other feel themselves ‘condemned,’ and at the same time, ‘compelled to pretend, to gesture, to use make-up, and to live’ like the Westerner.[47]

Unlike his predecessors, however, Shariati actually outlines an ideological path through which to fight back against this cultural inferiority complex. Before doing so, however, he makes sure to remark that he is not advocating mere nativism. “If I were to say that we must return to a racial self, we would become prone to racism and fascism and tribal ignorance, and as such, it would all just amount to a reactionary mode of return,” he admits.[48] Neither does he approve of a historical or nationalist return, since, as he maintains, “such selves can only be discovered by historians, sociologists, scientists, and archeologists.”[49] Instead, Shariati advocates for a self that is more accessible, “a self, based on deep-seated sentiments and spiritual and humane values that exists within us […] that is still alive inside us.’[50] This self, he finally attests, is “a religious self, an Islamic self.”[51] Thus, in the end, his ‘return to self’ meant return to early, ‘Alid’, Shiism.

  With Marxism being highly popular both in Iran and elsewhere, Shariati also felt impelled to employ its concepts and categories, and to address the political sentiments arising from them. Still, he did so in his own fashion. He went as far as saying that “the socioeconomic order of Islam is scientific socialism, based on the worship of God.”[52] Likewise, he used dialectical analysis to explain the course of human history within a moral and spiritual framework. The anti-Marxist material which appeared under his name in the Tehran press shortly before he left for England, may have been an expedient move, as some critics have tended to believe. However, there is little in their substance that is contradictory both with his ideas and his politics.[53] In his view, “Islam, especially Shi’i Islam, was a radical ideology that could outdo Marxism in championing revolution and the class struggle, as well as in opposing feudalism, capitalism, and imperialism.”[54]

  In line with this, Shariati argued that Islam could and should be turned into an ideological weapon capable of successfully competing with both imperialism and Marxism, in order to bring about radical change in Islamic societies. At the same time, Shariati did not have faith in the religious leadership; indeed, he almost believed in an Islam and a Shiism without the clerics. Shariati, in his turn, castigated conservative religious leaders, and spoke of “two different Islams,” distinguishing between Alid Shiism (Tashayyu’-i ‘Alavī) and Safavid Shiism (Tashayyu’-i Ṣafavī), the latter of which he identified with the established Shiism of his time, holding it to be false and reactionary.[55] That is how he contrasted his version of revolutionary Islam to the Islam of Shia clerics.

  As we have also seen, contrary to the prevailing official nationalism which emphasised Iran’s pre-Islamic past, for Shariati, a ‘return to self’ meant returning to pure Shia and Islamic roots:

When we say ‘return to one’s roots’, we are really saying return to one’s cultural roots which in the case of Iran is not a return to pre-Islamic Iran, by which the masses of Iranians are not moved. Consequently, for us to return to our roots means not a rediscovery of pre-Islamic Iran but to a return to our Islamic roots.[56]

  In sum, Shariati advocated a revolutionary Islam with a modern face, which involved a return to an idealized early Shia culture and tradition—a Shiism virtually without the ulama—but one which was influenced by European intellectual and political developments of his time. As such, even if this concept can be described as a kind of ‘nativism,’ Alid Shiism is the past Shariati aspires to, which has its origins in Arabia, not Iran.

 

Conclusion

What, then, is the upshot of the above discussion on gharbzadegi or Weststruckness? First, it was shown that concern about the modern European impact on traditional Iranian society goes back as long ago as the mid-nineteenth century. This became an issue during the Constitutional Revolution, but it was one that did not impress the majority even of clerical constitutionalists. The issue began to be taken seriously in the post-constitutionalist era, and especially in consequence of uncritical emulations of Europe under Reza Shah and his wholesale attack on all things traditional.

  There were (sometimes significantly) different responses and reactions such a Taqizadeh’s social critique of pseudo-modernism and Kasravi’s moral and religious discourse on the decline of the industrialized West. To some extent, each comprised a similar plea: a call to stop imitating Western society, except for what was necessary for the safeguarding and independence of the country. Then came Shadman’s peculiar and somewhat self-contradictory argument about the need to ‘conquer’ Western civilisation before it conquered Iran. In the end, however, even Shadman came to the conclusion that Iranians should cautiously adopt Western products and at the same time develop the Persian language and Iranian culture. Yet, none of these ideas and arguments made a noticeable intellectual, let alone popular, impact on Iranian society, not even Fardid’s philosophical discourse, despite the fact that he was the inventor of the term gharbzadegi.

  Shariati’s modern Islamic ideology had an appreciably greater impact than theirs, and it came closest to what might be described as a ‘nativist’ advocacy for ‘return to self,’ although it must be stressed that not only is ‘the self’ here not Iranian but Arabian, but also that Shariati was quite aware of the nationalistic dangers of nativism, and accordingly endeavored to skirt its implications within his rhetoric. The fact that he also framed his Islamic ideology within Marxism, which was a chiefly European school of thought, also points to the flaws of a nativist argument made with respect to Shariati.

  All the same, it was Al-e Ahmad who gave the term gharbzadegi its quintessential currency with his cultural critiques.  And it was subsequent to that when it became everything to all men and women, its inherent cultural critiques spurned in favour of its use as a foolhardy pejorative term. The anti-West and Europhobic meaning that was attached to it was indeed far from the author’s original conception, which had only appealed for more specialization and a better contextual understanding of modernist innovations. Despite this, gharbzadegi became an ideological weapon in the hands of almost all the revolutionaries, but especially Islamists and Marxist-Leninists, who, in turn, rewrote both the history and connotations of the term so that it could serve their versions of the greater good.

 

[1] See Ahmad Kasravi, Tārīkh-i Mashrūṭah-yi Iran [Constitutional History of Iran] (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1994), 415-17.

[2] Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh, “Fārsī shikar ast,” in Yikī Būd va Yikī Nabūd (Tehran: Bongah-e Parvin 1922).

[3] Hassan Moqaddam, Ja’far khān az farang āmadih (Tehran, 1922).

[4] See Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926–1979, 1st ed. (London and New York: Macmillan and New York University Press, 1981).

[5] Mehdi Qoli Hedayat [Mokhber al-Saltaneh], Khāṭirāt va Khaṭarāt (Tehran: Zavvar, 1982), 407.

[6] Iraj Afshar, ed. Kāvah, 22 January 1920 (Tehran: Entesharat-e Asātir, 2005), 2.

[7]  Iraj Afshar, Zindigī-yi Tūfānī: Khāṭirāt-i Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh (Tehran: Mohammad Ali Elmi, 1368/1948), 672-73.

[8] Ahamad Kasravi, Āyīn, 1932, Part 1, reprint (Tehran: Nashr o Pakhsh-e Ketab, 1975), 6.

[9] Shirin S. Deylami, “In the Face of the Machine: Westoxification, Cultural Globalization, and the Making of an Alternative Global Modernity,” Polity 43, no. 2 (2011): 259.

[10] Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, “Ahmad Kasravi’s Critiques of Europism and Orientalism,” in Persian Language, Literature and Culture: New Leaves, Fresh Looks, ed. Kamran Talattof (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 230.

[11] Kasravi, Āyīn, Part 2, 13.

[12] Kasravi, Āyīn, Part 1, 13.

[13] Kasravi, Āyīn, Part 1, 47.

[14] See Seyyed Fakhreddin Shadman, Taskhīr-i Tamaddon-i Farangī (Tehran, n.p., 1948); reprinted in Abbas Milani, ed. Taskhīr-i Tamaddon-i Farangī (Tehran, 2003), 3.

[15] Shadman, Taskhīr-i Tamaddon-i Farangī, 22-23.

[16] Shadman, Taskhīr-i Tamaddon-i Farangī, 14.

[17] Shadman Taskhīr-i Tamaddon-i Farangī, 24.

[18] Shadman, Taskhīr-i Tamaddon-i Farangī, 30; emphasis in the original.

[19] Shadman, Taskhīr-i Tamaddon-i Farangī, 30.

[20] See Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996), for an in-depth investigation of what the author considers to be ‘nativist’ tendencies in the works of several notable Iranian intellectuals of the twentieth century, Shadman among them.

[21] For an extensive examination of Fardid’s life and thoughts, see Ali Mirsepasi, Transnationalism in Iranian Political Thought: The Life and Times of Ahmad Fardid (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[22] Sayyid Ahmad-i Fardid, “Gharbzadegi,” in Maqālāti az Seyyed Ahmad-e Fardid (Web: Ketabnak, 2012), 82.

[23] Ali Gheissari, Iranian Intellectuals in the Twentieth Century (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), 89.

[24] Fardid, “Gharbzadegi,” 82.

[25] Fardid, “Gharbzadegi,” 82.

[26] Fardid, “Gharbzadegi,” 82.

[27] Fardid, “Gharbzadegi,” 82.

[28] Fardid, “Gharbzadegi,” 83.

[29] Fardid, “Gharbzadegi,” 84.

[30] Fardid, “Gharbzadegi,” 84.

[31] Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Gharbzadegi. 1967 (Qom: Nashr-e Khorram, 2007), 20.

[32] Al-e Ahmad, Gharbzadegi, 26.

[33] Al-e Ahmad, Gharbzadegi, 117.

[34] Al-e Ahmad, Gharbzadegi, 123.

[35] Al-e Ahmad, Gharbzadegi, 123.

[36] Al-e Ahmad, Gharbzadegi, 20.

[37] Al-e Ahmad, Gharbzadegi, 187-88.

[38] Homa Katouzian, conversation with Al-e Ahmad in London, 1962. Katouzian’s copy, which was given to him by Al-e Ahmad himself, was lost in the 1996 fire in his library.  And efforts to find a copy of the first edition for use in this chapter proved unsuccessful. Hence, the general references to its substance here are from memory.

[39] Al-e Ahmad, Gharbzadegi, 20.

[40] Al-e Ahmad, Gharbzadegi, 20.

[41] See Jalal Al-e Ahmad, “Varshikastigī-yi Maṭbū’āt,” in Sih Maqālah-yi Dīgar, 2nd ed. (Tehran, 1342), 8–39.

[42] For a biographic analysis of Al-e Ahmad as well as the ideological dilemmas he was often faced with, see Michael Hillmann, “Introduction: Cultural Dilemmas of an Iranian Intellectual,” in Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Lost in the Crowd, trans. John Green, Ahmed Alizadeh, and Farzin Yazdanfar (Washington, D.C: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 1985).

[43] Liora Hendelman-Baavur, “The Odyssey of Jalal Al-Ahmad’s Gharbzadegi—Five Decades After,” in Persian Language, Literature and Culture: New Leaves, Fresh Looks, ed. Kamran Talattof (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 276.

[44] For a side-by-side examination of Al-e Ahmad and Shariati’s outlooks on westernisation (with an additional analysis of writer Samad Behrangi’s similar concept of ‘Amrikazadegi’), see Brad Hanson, “The ‘Westoxication’ of Iran: Depictions and Reactions of Behrangi, Al-e Ahmad, and Shariati,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 15, no. 1 (1983): 1–23; see also, Ali Mirsepasi, Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), which investigates both the politics and epistemology behind Shariati and Al-e Ahmad’s stances.

[45] Ali Shariati, Bāz’gasht bih khvīshtan (1350/1971), 7.

[46] Shariati, Bāz’gasht bih khvīshtan, 14.

[47] Shariati, Bāz’gasht bih khvīshtan, 12.

[48] Shariati, Bāz’gasht bih khvīshtan, 17.

[49] Shariati, Bāz’gasht bih khvīshtan, 18.

[50] Shariati, Bāz’gasht bih khvīshtan, 18.

[51] Shariati, Bāz’gasht bih khvīshtan, 18.

[52] See Ali Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shari’ati (London: I.B Tauris, 1998), 24

[53]  See his Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique, trans. R. Campbell (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980); Rahmena, An Islamic Utopian, chapter 22.

[54] Ervand Abrahamian, “The Working Class and the Islamic State,” in Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 269.

[55] See Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, reprint edition (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009), 119, quoted from Intiẓār (1980), 21.

[56] Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 116, quoted from Shariati, Bāz’gasht bih khvīshtan, 11, 30.

A Seventeenth-Century Prose Abridgment of the Shahnamah Produced by a Zoroastrian Priest

Iranian American Comedic Memoirs: Interrogating Race and Humor in Diasporic Life Writing

Leila Moayeri Pazargadi is an associate professor of English at Nevada State College, teaching composition, postcolonial literature, life writing, and Middle Eastern literature. She received her PhD in comparative literature with a certification in gender studies from the University of California, Los Angeles in 2012. Her research focuses on Middle Eastern women writers producing autobiographical material in fiction and nonfiction. In 2020, she was a visiting scholar at UCLA’s Center for Near Eastern Studies, researching Middle Eastern women’s memoirs for her upcoming monograph. She has been published in Biography, a/b: Autobiography Studies, Gender Forum, and the Getty Research Journal.

As an innovative aesthetic in transnational life writing, humor can facilitate an affective transmission of eyewitness experiences, particularly of past historical traumas. In Iranian American[1] diasporic writing, comedic writing has become an innovative and increasingly popular tool for recounting experiences of immigration from Iran to America during the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and for confronting ensuing acculturative and racist struggles. One early example of this subgenre occurred in 2004 when Firoozeh Dumas debuted her popular memoir, Funny in Farsi, offering readers a comparison of life in America before and after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. As part of her autobiographical self-disclosure, Dumas notes increased racial hostility against Iranians in America, using humor to explore themes of white passing, racism, and liminality in America. Yet, rather problematically, the author at times uncritically embarks on a racial transformation to socially ascend and pass for white as a French woman, perhaps as a way of coping with liminality. In contrast to Dumas’s earlier work stand two comedians who similarly employ humor in their memoirs, but complicate their experiences of racialization as Iranians in the American diaspora.

Maz Jobrani employs humor akin to Firoozeh Dumas in his 2015 memoir, I’m Not a Terrorist but I’ve Played One on TV: Memoirs of a Middle Eastern Funny Man, in order to bridge gaps between his Iranian identity and surrounding American fears about Iranians. Like much of his stand-up work, Jobrani’s memoir does not wade deep into controversial waters. However, it does manage to ruminate on changing perceptions of Iranian racial identity, particularly from his perspective as a brown Muslim man living in increasingly hostile America. Jobrani entertainingly uses humor to ease tensions between Iranians and his mostly non-Iranian audience, who might mistake Iranians for threatening terrorists.

To round out these comparisons, Negin Farsad’s 2016 How to Make White People Laugh approaches Iranian liminality from a space of Black power and allyship, as opposed to a position of white passing. Farsad uses humor to teach her audience about the nuanced liminality of Iranians, while disrupting neatly packaged narratives and exposing gaps of belonging. Like Jobrani, she offers a few suggestions to build bridges between peoples, but more so, she ruminates on the liminality of Iranian Americans. In this way, her humor takes Jobrani’s observations and criticisms one step further, speaking to the messiness of fitting into a neoliberal American social order that seeks to ostracize her. Farsad embraces her Otherness, while deftly employing critical race theory to outline a different positionality for Iranians living in the diaspora, one that rejects racial erasure.

Ultimately, through the stylistic aesthetics of humor, the structure of these comedic confessionals playfully offers alternatives to the more traditional form of memoir, thereby allowing for a rich exploration of Iranian American racial identity. Thus, this essay explores the ways in which Jobrani and Farsad reflect on the process of their racialization from white to brown, depending on how threatening they are perceived as being, especially after 9/11. This racialization fluctuates from rewarding Iranian Americans with whiteness when they are received as model minorities, to punishing them with brownness when they are perceived as threats. Ultimately, both Jobrani and Farsad touch on themes uncovered in John Tehranian’s and Neda Maghbouleh’s works that explore the legal paradoxes of government categorization of Middle Easterners as white compared with Iranian American perceptions of themselves as “Other.” Additionally, by applying Maghbouleh’s concepts of “racial hinges” and “racial loopholes” to these memoirs, this essay considers how Jobrani and Farsad use humor as a mechanism to confront and acknowledge their liminality in America. At the same time, they employ comedy to diffuse tension around racial stereotyping and identity fragmentation in order to carve out a space for Iranian Americans.

 

The Legacy of Racial Formation Theory: Racializing “White Ethnics” in America

In terms of life writing aesthetics, both Jobrani’s I’m Not a Terrorist but I’ve Played One on TV and Farsad’s How to Make White People Laugh use humor to expose racial paradoxes; at the same time, they propose views that challenge American stereotypes about Iranians and Muslims alike (since these identities often converge in stereotypes). Through their narratives, the authors employ a unique intersection of comedy and racial politics to interrogate identity in the United States and appeal to readers’ affective state. As Iranians in the American diaspora, the authors use humor to undercut the audience’s expectations that Iranian Muslims are threatening or terrorists, thereby diffusing tensions. Jobrani often claims that he is “brown and friendly,” as expressed in his 2009 comedy tour of the same name, while Farsad ups the ante by heralding the “Muslims Are Coming” in her 2013 comedy tour and corresponding comedic documentary. Both comedians mock American stereotypes about Iranians and Muslims, but in varying degrees: Jobrani mildly mocks the stereotype, trying to prove himself in an acculturative way, while Farsad identifies as a woman of color, borrowing from African American studies to align with Black Power movements to disrupt narratives of perceived whiteness. Compared with Dumas’s earlier examples, the narrative critiques of both authors go one step farther than Dumas’s polite acquiescence and assimilative approach to being Iranian in America. 

Central to both Jobrani’s and Farsad’s texts is an interrogation of racial politics that explores the boundaries of white designation for Middle Easterners, specifically Iranian Americans. To determine this process of racial self-selection, Jobrani and Farsad touch on debates about the racialization of perceived whiteness, which are stirring inside and outside the Iranian community. For instance, according to law professor John Tehranian, in his study of the racial status of Middle Eastern Americans in Whitewashed, Iranian Americans often work through the state’s designation of them as Caucasian and “white,” as opposed to their social Othering as “brown,” particularly after 9/11. In the American diaspora, this question has come to a boiling point given the ongoing war against terrorism, which simultaneously disrupts the settlement of racial categorization for Iranians. Under the umbrella of Middle Eastern American, Iranian Americans are categorized as white according to the US census; however, in practice they are socially excluded and politically marginalized as people of color. According to Tehranian’s assessment in Whitewashed, Middle Eastern Americans are discriminated against in their daily lives, but have little legal recourse to challenge this discrimination since the American government classifies them as white.[2] Relegated to the status of Other, Americans of Middle Eastern descent are not afforded the benefits of white privilege.[3] He echoes Anita Famili’s assessment that Middle Eastern Americans are “both interpolated into the category of Caucasian while simultaneously racialized as an ‘other’…Middle Eastern Americans do not appropriately fit into the prevailing categories of race. Rather, their ethnic/racial identity is constantly contested.”[4] This makes any type of integration that speaks to the American project of equality difficult to achieve.

This is not unlike the established racial dissonance between other minorities who were classified as white and treated as marginalized. Tehranian draws on long contemplations of the racialization of “white ethnics,” such as the Irish, Italians, and Jews who immigrated to the United States. Building on notions of liminality, he expounds on increased Islamophobia since the 9/11 attacks, which compounds racism for Iranians and Middle Easterners (regardless of religious identity or belief). Very briefly, many critical race theory scholars have found that white ethnics, for lack of a better phrase, have experienced the paradox of white legal classification along with racialized mistreatment. Drawing on Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s seminal theory of racial formation, scholars note the social constructions of race that shift along with social mores. As legal scholar Kevin Johnson observes, “The slow social assimilation, or ‘whitening,’ of various immigrant groups, such as the Irish and Jews, evidences how concepts of races are figments of our collective imagination, albeit with real-life consequences.”[5] Indeed, Steven Belluscio notes in his study of Jewish American and Italian American writers in To Be Suddenly White: Literary Realism and Racial Passing that Italian and Jewish American writers historically were posed as part of the white majority, but were simultaneously considered as ethnic Others, and denied privileges associated with whiteness.[6] Similarly, in Matthew Frye Jacobson’s Whiteness of a Different Color, the author focuses on the concept of race as a social construct in evaluating how society has historically regulated white privileging in America. In his discussions of Jewish Americans, he notes that a non-Christian prototype for Iranians exists, suggesting that Iranians are also simultaneously white and Other.[7] Jacobson focuses on visual cues of race, describing the way in which anti-Semitism is centered on appearance since “race is social value become perception; Jewishness seen is social value naturalized and so enforced.”[8] Most notably, Karen Brodkin adds to these conversations, showing How Jews Became White Folks since many Jewish Americans were perceived as outsiders, but opted for model minority status and assimilated to the American way of life.[9] Of course, all of these theories and discussions are much more nuanced and complex than presented here, but for the purposes of this study, their overview is helpful for identifying the trajectory of critical race theory and its relevance to the discussion of Iranians and race.

Returning to the discussion of Iranian Americans, what ensues from this discourse is a paradox that supports Tehranian’s observations about Iranian Americans’ navigation of whiteness. In the racial spectrum of America, Iranians forge a separate identity in a liminal, tertiary space. His case studies and legal references, in addition to previous conversations about the racialization of white ethnics, are helpful in determining the way in which Iranian Americans are paradoxically classified as white but socially denied the status.[10] Consequently, he makes the case for new racial classifications and official designations for Iranian Americans, especially on the census.

Building on Tehranian’s work, Neda Maghbouleh similarly observes in The Limits of Whiteness: Iranian Americans and the Everyday Politics of Race that everyday experiences of racism and racialization simultaneously occur alongside legal designations of whiteness and internalized “racial covering.”[11] Iranian Americans often Anglicize their names (at least their first name) so as not to easily draw attention to their difference.[12] Moreover, they may obscure their national identities and ties to Iran, instead fabricating points of origin or focusing on former residences in countries lived in prior to immigration to America. This process of racial covering (as Tehranian puts it and on which Maghbouleh expands) attempts to reconcile the legal paradoxes of government categorization of Middle Easterners as white compared with their mistreatment by the Transportation Security Administration, law enforcement, and border patrol officers, who perceive Iranian Americans as Other.[13] They must adapt to access whiteness, since they are left with little legal recourse to challenge discrimination in light of their legal classification as white.[14] Maghbouleh also evaluates the scholarship extending from Omi and Winant’s racial formation theory to show how “racial categories involving liminal groups expand, contract, and transform through social, economic, and political force.”[15]

While Tehranian points out the legal issues for Iranians, Maghbouleh takes the material a step further by offering an innovative theory for articulating the process of racializing Iranians. Her concepts of “racial hinges” and “racial loopholes” are pertinent to the racial explorations of Jobrani’s and Farsad’s identities in America. According to Maghbouleh, the concept of “racial hinges” touches on how “the geographic, political, and pseudoscientific specter of a racially liminal group, like Iranians, can be marshaled by a variety of legal and extralegal actors into a symbolic hinge that opens or closes the door to whiteness as necessary.”[16] Furthermore, “racial loopholes” diagnose the daily “contradictions and conflicts that emerge when a group’s legal racial categorization is inconsistent with its on-the-ground experience of racialization or deracialization.”[17] Racial loopholes is another way of referring to the racialized paradoxes that Tehranian notes about the dissonance between the white status of Iranian Americans and their everyday marginalization.

Taken together, these concepts are useful to show the paradoxes noted in Jobrani’s and Farsad’s memoirs. Combining these paradoxes with notions of humor and affect inherent in the aesthetics of comedic memoirs, these two Iranian American comedians provide plenty of thoughtful fodder for those left wondering about the complexity of racial categorization concerning Iranian Americans. They both use humor and draw upon their stand-up comedy routines to evoke laughter from the audience, so that readers can take in the irony, the mockery, and the light-hearted approach to heavier topics like racism, dispossession, and un-belonging. Furthermore, a comedic approach allows for the bridging of gaps and the diffusing of racial tensions in creating an affective response in readers, who might reexamine their biases and prejudices. In so doing, through the power of their autobiographical disclosure, these comedian-cum-authors attempt not only to entertain but also to instruct audiences about how to coexist.

I’m Not a Terrorist but I’ve Played One on TV 

In my discussion about the racialization of Iranian Americans, it is first useful to discuss Maz Jobrani’s memoir, I’m Not a Terrorist but I’ve Played One on TV: Memoirs of a Middle Eastern Funny Man, since he takes a less critical and more exploratory approach to racial dynamics than does Negin Farsad in her memoir. In his debut memoir, Jobrani addresses the elephant in the room by announcing through his title that he is not in fact a terrorist, contrary to American stereotypes about Iranians and Muslims. This notion is even more pronounced by the cover of Jobrani’s memoir, which shows him wearing a suit with a keffiyeh and a lit bomb, accompanied by a puzzled look that casts doubt on the whole scene. From the very beginning, Jobrani regales his audience with tales of how television producers and film directors attempted to dress him in a random assortment of stereotyped clothing meant to look like Islamic terrorist chic. Throughout this discussion about Middle Eastern and Muslim stereotypes, Jobrani notes that he refuses to take these roles, considering the damage that they do for Iranians and the broader Middle Eastern community. It is with this frame of mind that Jobrani opens his memoir in discussing stereotyping and racialization of Iranians.

In his memoir, Jobrani discusses his early childhood in Iran, his move to Northern California at six years old, his acclimation to America, and his rise to becoming a world-traveling comedian. As a 1.5-generation immigrant,[18] he uses humor to cope with the liminality of leaving Iran and moving to America, particularly during the aftermath of the 1979 American hostage crisis in Iran. Just like many other Iranian Americans, the Jobrani family’s journey was a bit unexpected: they “packed for two weeks” but “stayed for thirty years.”[19] Immediately, Jobrani recalls classmates making fun of him in the predominately white city of Tiburon in Northern California. But what ensues is a comedic approach to discussing issues like racism, racial profiling, and double consciousness as a way of addressing Iranian Americans like him. In so doing, he means to reeducate American and Iranian readers about one another as he attempts to dispel negative stereotypes about Iranians as threatening, particularly the misperception that they are terrorists. For Jobrani, memories of being teased at school are undercut by his public reprimands of a school bully in his memoir.

While microaggressions against him started during his childhood, Jobrani recounts how they continue throughout his life and career. Even so, he finds the capacity to laugh, using humor to inject his own critiques while undermining racially motivated slights and teasing. Through his comedic approach, Jobrani attempts to tackle the past trauma of his childhood with scathing sarcasm:

My attempt at blending in failed miserably when I was in the fourth grade. I was met with a verbal confrontation by a sixth grader named Jim who somehow figured out that I was the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Marin County. After all, I had a funny name, beautiful furry eyebrows, strange-sounding parents, and a dad who drove a better car than his dad. I had to be involved with the hostage crisis somehow – I looked the part. This sixth grader came up with a clever nickname, calling me a Fucking Eye-ranian. That’s what people called Iranians back then: Fucking Eye-ranians. “First of all,” I explained, “it’s pronounced Ee-ron-ian, not Eye-ranian. Second, you’re bigger than me so it’s whatever you want it to be. Third, I’m not sure where you heard a rumor that I’m Iranian. I’m not. I’m totally Italian – ciao!”[20]

Jobrani’s Iranian and Muslim identities are read as Other, particularly through his perceived foreignness as evidenced through his “funny name,” “furry eyebrows,” and “strange-sounding parents.” At the time of the hostage crisis, when tensions were high, Iranians in the United States were treated as enemy combatants—even when they had nothing to do with the crisis. The epithet “Fucking Eye-ranian” is doubly damning since it not only includes a forceful expletive, but it also willfully mispronounces Iranian to provide further ridicule. Countless others can attest to having experienced the particular barb embodied by the word Eye-ranian, which unleashes its sting as it is transformed from a noun to a verb in its mispronunciation. Through learning about Jobrani’s experience, at the beginning of his acclimation to America, the reader is able to glean a few points: first, Jobrani is considered an outsider; second, through his use of comedy, he makes a joke to diffuse the tension; and third, he hints at Iranians obscuring their origins and passing for Italian, which is a practice that resurfaces throughout his memoir.

Just as in the rest of the book, here Jobrani relies on humor to create a cathartic release regarding this specific racial tension. Reflecting on this specific instance, he employs what Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson refer to as the “narrating I,” which is the autobiographical voice aware of crafting a memoir during the process of narration.[21] This usually occurs during chronological jumps forward and backward in time when Jobrani (and other autobiographical writers) revisits a memory from the past with a new perspective. Employing the “narrating I,” he notes, “Years later, while doing stand-up comedy, I began talking about these incidents. It felt like I was opening up an old wound, but it was good to talk about the childhood troubles I had with Jim.”[22] In the practice of comedy, autobiographical confession is often mixed with a sense of irony or satire, which can help to heal “old wounds,” as Jobrani says. Specifically, the relief theory of comedy suggests that “humor enables a release of psychic energies otherwise deployed in restraining the primal impulses and emotions like hostility, anger, or sexual desire; laughter saves energy otherwise spent on self-control.”[23] Indeed, humor is a coping mechanism and tool that allows Jobrani to reevaluate his childhood traumas. This is not surprising, since life writing often allows for catharsis, particularly for those who have been marginalized. Even more so, the use of humor allows a comedic writer to work through past trauma to show racism and bigotry to be just as reprehensible as other atrocities.

Additionally, and perhaps significantly, Jobrani’s early experiences with racialization in America touch on Tehranian’s research on racial covering. Not unlike the earlier example of Dumas’s passing for French, Jobrani also jokingly attempts to pass for another white ethnic: Italian. He mentions this numerous times, making jokes via name changes and Italian words and phrases like ciao, eventually pointing out the absurdity of this habit carried out by many Iranian Americans. In the earlier example when he notes he had a “funny name,” what is indeed funny about his name is that Maziyar is an ethnically Persian name that is neither Arabic nor Muslim in origin (as it is mistakenly perceived), and Jobrani, which is also Persian, sounds Italian in its foreignness. It is not surprising that Jobrani is able to pass for Italian, even if it is a practice that increasingly frustrates him. In fact, these modes of white passing become vexing for Jobrani, who attempts to encourage Iranian Americans to embrace their authentic identity. For example, he admits that many of his friends changed their names to “Tony” after Not without My Daughter debuted in the United States and depicted Iranian men as particularly threatening and abusive toward women. Jobrani recalls:

They went from being named Shahrokh, Mahmoud, and Farsheed to all being named Tony. I’m not sure why they all chose Tony, but it seemed odd to me that women wouldn’t question you when you would introduce your friends this way: “I’m Maz. This is my friend Tony. Over there, next to Tony, is Tony. Over there next to Tony and Tony is Tony. Yes, they’re all Italian. Very Italian. Me? I’m Iranian. Wait, where are you going? Did I say Iranian? I meant Persian, like the cat. Meow!”[24]

This passage includes a punch line that Jobrani often repeats—“Persian, like the cat. Meow!”—which often elicits laughter from Iranians and non-Iranians alike. Here, he attempts to turn the tables on an ignorant audience who associates Persians only with cats. In this way, laughter is used to build a coalition amongst other Iranians, while they are laughing at American stereotypes about Iranians. Jobrani’s humor also creates space for non-Iranians to laugh at themselves and their own ignorance, eventually moving on from that unawareness. Lastly, there is another layer of humor since the word Persian is used by some Iranians as a form of racial covering designed to obscure their supposedly undesirable origins. Whether through his stand-up or his memoir, Jobrani often makes fun of the way in which some Iranians attempt to become associated with a more romantic origin.

Throughout the passage, Jobrani affirms his identity as Iranian and notes the way in which other Iranians around him attempt to pass for Italian, especially via an appellative transformation to “Tony.” Regarding this type of appellative passing, Tehranian observes that Iranian men in particular would change their name to “‘Mike’ for Mansour, ‘Morty’ for Morteza, ‘Al’ for Ali, and ‘Moe’ for Mohammed” as a way of passing for white.[25] About racial covering, Tehranian observes that the more someone associates with the white community, the more accepted and assimilated they will be. Their whiteness will become more legitimized through association with “credible” whites. Furthermore, associational covering can use financial success as a signpost for whiteness, which explains the Iranian American community’s preoccupation with wealth and status, and more specifically, the Jobrani family’s emphasis on driving a nice car. Group affiliation is another form of covering, wherein Iranian Americans purposely mislead or fail to correct their ethnicity when mistaken for Italian, French, or another more preferable identity. All of this is done to avoid the stigma of being associated with terrorism, hostage takers, and general foreignness.[26] But these measures are also taken because they point to the precarious situation in which Iranians find themselves: their legal classification is white, which is incongruous with their marginalization.

There is little legal recourse for these chasms between legal and perceived racial identities for Iranian Americans, yet steps like legal identification on the census would help ameliorate racial ambiguity. When discussing the US census, Jobrani, like Tehranian, Maghbouleh, and Farsad, finds the lack of ethnic and racial choices frustrating. Jobrani notes that because many Iranian Americans want to fit in, they often indicate “white” on the census. As he sarcastically observes about the question concerning ethnic background, in an affected Persian accent, “Ethnic background? Vhite. Or Italian. Or whichever ethnicity is not currently making headlines.”[27] The census is a sticking point for Jobrani and for many Iranian Americans because as Tehranian points out, “white privilege still reigns supreme, and, naturally, immigrant groups still seek white recognition”; they often check “white” due to an unwillingness to relinquish legally sanctioned whiteness, or for lack of a better option.[28] Despite changes to the 2000 census, which allowed Middle Eastern individuals such as Iranian Americans to identify themselves as “Other,” Tehranian notes that “it appears that very few Iranian Americans took the opportunity to do so. In fact, only 338,266 individuals in the United States identified themselves as Iranian.”[29] Surprised, Tehranian remarks that “any visitor to Los Angeles (often referred to as Tehrangeles or Irangeles) can attest that there are probably 338,266 individuals of Iranian descent living in Southern California, let alone the rest of the country.”[30] 

Even a nearly decade later, Jobrani, who was part of the 2010 census effort to encourage Iranian Americans to identity as Other and “write in” Iranian so that they could be counted, laments:

Iranians continue to mark the box that reads “white” and move on with their lives. Based on the last census in 2010, there are about 300,000 Iranians in America. Based on my personal experiences in Westwood, California, there are at least 300,000 Iranians at most Persian weddings. There have been estimates between 300,000 and 1.5 million Iranians in America. The reason for this wide discrepancy is that Iranians are not into filling out census forms. That’s because they want to lay low and avoid the government.[31]

His take is more humorous than Tehranian’s, but it confirms the same quagmire concerning race. Iranians attempt to pass for white, particularly as they see the denigrating mistreatment toward African Americans and other minorities. The solution is to change the census to offer more inclusive categories. In her memoir, Farsad adds that the United States should change the census: “How can we build policies or have a basic understanding of our country with that? We have five categories, but why not have 105 categories? [. . .] Let us figure out who actually lives in this country, how they identify, and what they need!”[32]

This attachment to whiteness for Iranians predates coming to America, as it was part of Pahlavi-era nation making that tenuously claimed Iranians were descendants of Aryans, just at a time when modern nation making in the Middle East attached itself to European self-determination movements.[33] Zia-Ebrahimi elaborates on Pahlavi-era revisionist narratives about nezhad-e ariyayi (Aryan race), noting Leon Poliakov’s observation that “le mythe aryen”[34] found its roots in Reza Shah’s renaming of Persia as Iran, or “land of the Aryans” and through Mohammad Reza Shah’s self-styling as ariyamehr or the “Light of Aryans.”[35] The myth, as Zia-Ebrahimi notes, “divides humankind into several races, and considers most Europeans, but also Iranians and Indians, as members of the Aryan race.” While it was first philologically used to categorize Indo-European languages, it soon took on a political connotation through European claims to whiteness. As Zia-Ebrahimi observes, “Aryanism’s political charge, infused with romantic imagery, intensified over time, propagating claims that the Aryan race was bestowed with a special destiny, that of supremacy over what were now deemed to be the ‘others,’ the ‘inferior races.’”[36] It is not surprising, then, that both Pahlavi regimes, and by extension, Iranians involved in nationalization projects, would refer back to the ancient word ariya and wrongfully appropriate it as the malapropism ariyayi, in order to make a tenuous connection to Aryans reimagined as white Europeans.[37] The national revisions taking place throughout the twentieth century begin to account for the legacy of attachment to the myth that Iranians come from a Europeanized Aryan stock, particularly when they clutch for claims to whiteness in Euro-American spaces.

Both Jobrani and Farsad poke fun at these misconceptions of Aryanness. In his memoir, Jobrani cites the Aryan myth as the reason for many Iranians’ attachment to white racial identity. He explains:

Growing up, most of my friends were white with a few Persians sprinkled in here and there. Before I go any further, I know that any Iranians reading this right now are thinking: But Iranians ARE white! That is true. Iranians are ethnically white. The word “Iran” derives from the word “Aryan.” Our ancestors can be traced back to the Caucuses, so that makes us Caucasian – the original white people. Yes, Aryans were originally dark complexioned people with thick, hairy eyebrows. This is a point that many educated Iranians in the West insist on making.[38]

In this instance, Jobrani turns his comedic gaze to Iranians and addresses the old guard, in particular, who are attached to their whiteness vis-à-vis the Pahlavi romanticization of a distant past. Tehranian similarly observes, “they will tell you that the word Iran comes from the Sanskrit word meaning ‘Land of the Aryans’ and that they, not the Germans, are the original Aryans.”[39] Gelareh Asayesh might put it best: “This tenuous link to the global ruling class permits Iranians to look down on the other people of the Middle East, most notably the Arabs, who had the temerity to defeat the faltering Persian Empire in the seventh century.”[40] Maghbouleh also finds that for first-generation parents—who were “socialized into an Aryan and anti-Arab national history, ‘Caucasian’ geographic location, and concomitant white racial identity as children in Iran”—relinquishing these ties is hard, particularly when challenged by their children (second-generation immigrants), who might perceive themselves as people of color.[41] As Jobrani points out in his earlier observation, it is the Iranians educated in the West (the 1.5- and second-generation immigrants) who note that Aryan ancestors of Iranians who migrated from the Indian subcontinent were probably swarthy people of color as opposed to images of the fair-skinned Aryans reimagined by Hitler. Although there is an ambiguity in this passage concerning Jobrani’s stance on Iranian whiteness, elsewhere throughout his memoir and in paratextual material, he refers to Iranians as people of color.

While Jobrani emphasizes the many instances wherein Iranians might consider themselves white, he also makes reference to their unfair marginality via their perceived brownness. As evident in the naming of his “Brown and Friendly” comedy tour, Jobrani attempts to educate Iranians and non-Iranians alike that Iranians can be racialized as brown and Other. He seems to refer to himself as a person of color, though he spends little time explaining his own racial self-perceptions. He admits, “In the West, despite our Caucasian heritage, Iranians are seen as more brown than white. If you don’t believe me, try this test. Get an Iranian with a thick Persian accent and a unibrow and have him run up to the front of an airplane before the doors close for takeoff and tell the stewardess he doesn’t feel well and needs to get off the plane.”[42] What he goes on to imply is that Iranians can be stereotyped as threatening because of their perceived difference from white Americans. Per usual, he uses humor to trouble a stereotype with which he disagrees. To explain the racial ambiguity of Iranians further, Tehranian notes that “Middle Easterners are consistently subjected to a process of selective racialization” that renders them as white when they socially advance and exhibit positive values, and conversely as Other when they are seen as committing a transgression.[43] Here, Maghbouleh’s notion of racial hinges is also helpful, since it describes the mechanisms for which doors seem to open for Iranians who are perceived as white as opposed to racial loopholes and opportunity loss for Iranians perceived as brown. As Maghbouleh notes, the racial hinge is symbolic, opening and closing access to whiteness depending on social demands, dramaturgy, and sometimes, legal codification.

 

How to Make White People Laugh

On racial hinges and racial loopholes that account for the double consciousness experienced by Iranians in the diaspora, Negin Farsad’s memoir, How to Make White People Laugh, is both entertaining and instructive. Farsad, who is a second-generation Iranian American, sees her navigation of race a bit differently from Jobrani. Rather than dance around questions of race and color, Farsad embraces her identity as a woman of color, often comparing her experience to other intersectional minorities in the United States. Like Jobrani, she employs humor to skillful effect. Her title makes clear references to her targeted audience: they are white people, and she intends to make them laugh. This title is visually echoed via her book cover, which features a silhouetted Farsad standing in front of—what we later learn to be—her TEDx PowerPoint visual, which inspired her ensuing memoir. In both cases, her life storytelling mixes humor, anti-racism discourse, and social justice principles to cogently discuss the liminality of Iranian Americans who feel estranged from whiteness.

Farsad’s approach is refreshing for Iranian Americans who have felt alienated from or dissatisfied with their legal white designation. From the very first words in her introduction’s title, she heralds her ensuing reflections with “I Used to Be Black,” which automatically signals an identity apart from the usual Iranian claims to whiteness.[44] Of course, the past tense quickly reminds the reader that there has been some sort of change or evolution from this idea. Still, what she refers to is her internalized feelings of being Other, which naturally coincided with what she had known of African American studies and the Black struggle. She quickly clears up impressions that she is trying to appropriate Blackness by disclosing, “To be clear, I’m actually an Iranian-American Muslim female comedian-slash-filmmaker” and quickly corrects any misperceptions that she is putting on some sort of racial “black face.”[45] Elaborating further, she notes, “I used to feel black. Sometimes ‘kinda pretty black,’ occasionally ‘really black,’ and, depending on how drunk I was, ‘Don Cheadle.’ I’m Iranian, an ethnically brown Muz type, and definitely not black.”[46] Depending on the everyday racial loopholes that depict Farsad through a colorist spectrum, and on her personal sentiment and social mistreatment from others, her feelings of Otherness vary. Farsad signals a very different memoir from other Iranian American life writers who avoid answering questions about race. However exaggerated Farsad might be in her initial proclamations of Blackness, what seems sincere are her frequent pronouncements that she is brown and Muslim, and more authentically, that she is not in fact Black. It is funny to note that for many Iranians, as she points out, the fact that she is a female comedian also presents a marginalized community, albeit mostly amongst more traditional Iranians.

For Farsad, the attraction to Blackness stems from a desire to build coalitions between marginalized minorities. Especially because she grew up with immigrant parents, Farsad “felt like my minority and ethnic status was the flashpoint of national blame for some kind of social tension [. . .] So my still burgeoning mind decided to embrace the struggle, embrace that blackness. It was the only narrative around ‘otherness’ out there.”[47] Karen Brodkin observes that this sense of belonging to a racialized category “comes from racial middleness: of an experience of marginality vis-à-vis whiteness, and an experience of whiteness and belonging vis-à-vis blackness.”[48] Aptly, Farsad notes about this experience, “That’s what a lot of hyphenated Americans say to themselves when they glom onto the larger minority groups: close enough.”[49] For Farsad, what is at stake is racial self-determination for Iranians who want to authentically embrace their national, cultural, and ethnic identities in the United States.

This type of coalition building is a cornerstone for social justice work, about which Farsad is passionate throughout her memoir. Additionally, Farsad points out the precariousness of not being able to fully fit in. She feels a bit more at ease with the Black struggle and its fight, but at the same time, she is aware that she is white passing, admitting, “I can pass, but when the full scale of the whiteness hit me, I realized passing wasn’t my choice. I didn’t get to choose whiteness. You’re rewarded whiteness.”[50] This speaks to Maghbouleh’s notion of Iranians and model minorities as racial hinges who are rewarded with whiteness and the privileges thereof. But even more so, it speaks to the racial ambiguity and complexity concerning Iranian social status, which Farsad is quick to point out. This ambiguity and complexity are not surprising, since “Iranians, who have from their arrival in the United States been legally situated inside whiteness, have been simultaneously escorted, framed, and deported out of its everyday social limits.”[51]

After struggling with her racial identity, Farsad realizes that she must reject extra-cultural affiliations and articulate the paradoxes of Iranian American identity to bring her identity into existence. About her racial epiphany and self-acceptance, she observes:

And that’s when it struck me: I wasn’t black, or Mexican or Asian or Russian. I was an Iranian-American Muslim female (the comedy, filmmaking, and honey-mustard enthusiasm didn’t come till later). To large swaths of the American public, that meant I was a possibly dangerous brown person who potentially sympathized with Al Qaeda or

Hezbollah. To other swaths of the American public, I was the kind of person who pronounced “Iran” in a way that didn’t make it sound like a past-tense verb.[52]

Farsad’s proclamations that she is both brown and an “Iranian-American Muslim female” are significant and direct identifiers, particularly because she acknowledges, like Jobrani, terrorist stereotypes lodged against Muslims. To counter this, she notes the potential power of intersectionality, stating, “The fight in being a woman and the fight in being a person of color is the same fight, but being a woman and a person of color just adds twelve extra steps.”[53] This witty disclosure at the end of her observation injects some humor to vary the sting of her critique that evaluates her limited mobility in American society with respect to race and gender.

These identity struggles speak to Maghbouleh’s research on the differences between first-generation and second-generation Iranian immigrants and their navigation of race. Maghbouleh finds that second-generation Iranian American immigrants come of age, “chafe against their social position at the limits of whiteness [. . .] by eschewing the ‘white’ category altogether.”[54] In fact, Maghbouleh adds that because second-generation Iranian immigrants are “pushed outside the limits of whiteness,”[55] they operate in an in-between space, functioning as racial hinges, “crafting political identities as racial outsiders, banding together with other youth [. . .] and practicing an antiracist and strategically inclusive Iranianness [. . .] They are becoming brown by choice and by force.”[56] This self-selection of brownness is significant because it allows Iranian Americans to properly address racial loopholes that allow for their everyday discrimination, while more powerfully reclaiming an identity that has been whitewashed by political machinations in Iran and in the United States.

Considering the revival of anti-Iranian and anti-Muslim sentiment after 9/11, the acceptance of Iranian and Muslim identities as people of color can allow Iranian Americans to push back against their liminal positions between whiteness and Blackness. In response to post-9/11 racist surges of what Farsad calls “Muz-hate,”[57] the author sagely observes “the need to shoehorn Islam as the major reason for everything in post-9/11 America defines so much of how we see mainstream American Muslims. We’ve created an arsenal of icons based on this shoehorning, and those icons do not represent me or fit my worldview.”[58] The word me is significant here as it highlights Farsad’s ownership over her Muslim identity and her repudiation of Islamophobia, which does not fit her world view. Furthermore, she spends some time discussing Islamophobic iconography, demonstrating the intensifying stereotyping of Muslims as backward and threatening. As she notes about white Americans’ perceptions of Muslims, “Islam = the promotion of violence. Muslims = violent people with dusty faces always running around the desert. The Middle East = a place full of violent people with dusty faces always running around the desert, plus women shrouded in what appear to be blankets.”[59] Throughout the text, Farsad pays particular attention to the way stereotyped images become recycled and reified, drawing attention to the “violent” and “dusty” qualities that have permeated Euro-American orientalist imaginations about the Middle East for centuries, from the paintings of Jean-August-Dominique Ingres to the ravings of Bill Maher.

Fully acknowledging these multiple identities and their subsequent marginalization by the white majority, Farsad finally concludes that there is not a neat racial construction of her intersectional identities. She refers to this liminality as a “Third Thing”: “I’m a Third Thing- Islam doesn’t explain me, Iranian poetry doesn’t explain me, and apple pie doesn’t explain me. And yet I understand all of these things. Being a Third Thing is a designation for people who straddle worlds, who may have a foot in every door yet their butt is hovering between door frames and they may even have more than two feet, and either way they’re definitely going to pull a groin muscle.”[60]

Farsad hits the nail on the head for many Iranian American Muslims: they are hybridized in a tertiary space where they experience becoming a “Third Thing” that exists between worlds. There is a “thirdness,” perhaps even a triple consciousness, that allows Iranian Americans to be aware of their difference, which speaks to the way in which Iranians have to identify themselves in distinct racial, ethnic, and religious categories (not just lumped in with whites). Consequently, Farsad notes that when one is “the de facto voice of your people’s Third Thing subgroup [. . .] the people in the First and Second Things aren’t necessarily going to like it.”[61] Farsad, who attended graduate school for a master’s degree in African American studies, is surely referencing Stuart Hall’s and Homi Bhabha’s works on liminality, hybridity, and the “Third Space.” Briefly, in Hall’s prolific body of work, the author often points to hybridity as a way for those with diasporic cultural identity to negotiate a footing in liminal spaces. In particular, through creolization of cultural practices, those in the diaspora can start to describe themselves in new tertiary terms, as opposed to binary ones of tradition and opposition.[62] This relates well to Bhabha’s notions of hybridity in The Location of Culture, wherein all cultural statements and systems are constructed in a negotiated “Third Space” that defies binary positionality between the colonizer and the colonized.[63] In the in-between third space, there is a burden for producing new cultural modes of belonging that recognize the complexity of transcultural identity. For Farsad, this third space signals the possibility for a hybrid identity that blends together her Muslim faith, Iranian ethnicity, and American surroundings.

The mention of becoming a “de facto voice” begins to touch on Farsad’s mission throughout her memoir: to use humor to collapse binary categories and unsettle seemingly established truths. Farsad notes the impact of accepting her multilayered identity on her comedy and ability to use her voice. Her sense of urgency is announced at the beginning of the memoir:

I needed to come out of the closet. I wasn’t helping anyone by glossing over my real identity. This was my struggle, and I had work to do! There [were] 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide whose identity was being hijacked! People needed to know that secular, fun Muslims who smell nice are the norm- more the norm than the dusty brown people we were seeing on television. And I had to let people know it with the only tool I had: comedy.[64]

Returning to those “dusty brown” stereotypes, Farsad senses the importance of coming to terms with her identity instead of culturally affiliating with Black identity or other ambiguously ethnic identities. Rather, Farsad takes up the mantle of diversifying images about Muslims, carving out a space for herself as a secular Muslim, despite white American expectations and Islamic hardliner denials that she may not be Muslim enough to make these claims. These rhetorical and comedic approaches, which she dubs “social justice comedy,”[65] enable Farsad to engage in “educational accounting,” a strategy of informing cultural outsiders about one’s culture in order to help non-Iranians to confront their ignorance.[66] In fact, in her conclusion, Farsad highlights the importance of this educational accounting: “Do people ask where you’re from? That’s great! Let ‘em know. Don’t assume that they’re otherizing you [. . .] you’re a teacher. Yeah, I know you didn’t sign up to be a teacher.”[67] Using her oft-employed sarcasm, Farsad acknowledges what she is asking of her readers: to either take the time to educate others or to be educated as part of her plan to build coalitions in her social justice work.

In order to understand her motivations for using comedy and penning her memoir, it is important to consider the following rhetorical question posed by Farsad: “Why aren’t minorities in the United States building bridges and finding the commonality?”[68] It is a central question that births her comedic memoir since she makes the argument that comedy can propel people to laugh and “start fewer wars.”[69] Continuing, she notes, “I think laughter is the key to all sorts of conflict resolution, and in these pages I want to show you how, why, where, and when this laughter is useful [. . .] Comedy is the great lubricant, metaphorically, for easing people into tough discussions [. . .] I wanna lube up the whole nation [. . .] I won’t stop until we all just get along.”[70] This last reference to getting along is similar to the messages echoed throughout Dumas’s and Jobrani’s memoirs. It is interesting that despite their varying approaches to navigating race, they all agree on taking a moderate approach that aims to establish common ground.

Additionally, on an aesthetic level, comedy and its use in life writing can allow authors like Farsad and Jobrani to inspire change and provide conflict resolution. According to Indira Ghose, “One of the most insidious fallacies is the belief that laughter is trivial. The function of laughter is to make things trivial—and thus gain mastery over whatever threatens to overwhelm us. Laughter is a serious matter [. . .] Laughter is a strategy of self-defence that enables us to face sources of fear or pain.”[71] Humor and its byproduct, laughter, are certainly helpful tools for releasing tension. This is because “humor is inextricably linked with power, and can be used both to reinforce and to challenge dominance and power; the marginal humor [of those in socially disadvantaged positions] may empower the powerless, may invert and subvert the status quo.”[72]

In Farsad’s case, she mentions numerous times throughout her memoir that she wishes to educate those (namely, white people) who are interested in evolving their views about Iranian Americans. According to Farsad, that is the ultimate point of her memoir: to use her voice to educate white people, who possess so much control and power in America. Discussing her reasons for writing, Farsad offers two motivations. First, she declares, “I want to give voice to the multi-hyphenated Americans caught in the margins. I want to give voice to all those feelings of self-censorship and cross-cultural pressures that they feel. I want mainstream American culture to take note, because we can’t be ignored anymore, and recognizing us is a matter of social justice.”[73] Using one’s voice and asserting one’s agency is very important to Farsad, particularly as she attempts to counter invisibility because she advocates standing up and speaking out as a woman of color. Her second motivation pertains to audience: to address white people, who hold so much institutional power. Anticipating questions about her book’s title and focus, Farsad reflexively asks, “Why do white people matter anyway? Because, here’s the thing: White people (still) sorta control stuff.”[74] As a way to undercut that power, Farsad employs humor to “break up the truth” by unsettling accepted notions of race.[75]

Ultimately, as an innovative aesthetic, humor has the ability to undercut traditional beliefs, while at the same time, create connections between comedian life storytellers and their captive readers. Both Maz Jobrani and Negin Farsad aim to laugh at life’s hypocrisies and absurdities with their readers. If they are laughing at anyone, it is themselves. Furthermore, they both reevaluate traumatic moments from their lives and expose the barbs that racists hurled at them. But, as each comedian advances from childhood to adulthood, they refocus their attention on using comedy to explore their racialization. Along the way, they also reject stereotypes lodged against them, ranging from model minority to terrorist. In contrast to other Iranian American memoirists, both Jobrani and Farsad ask challenging questions about the way in which Iranians have been legally categorized as white but paradoxically mistreated as Other. While many Iranian Americans cling to whiteness—and by extension, white privilege—these two authors poke holes in those arguments. They assert themselves as people of color who use comedy to build bridges and coalitions with other ethnic minorities who also find that they are unchecking the white box.

[1]Because I do not want to neatly situate or categorize identity, I do not hyphenate Iranian American identity. Rather, I would like to draw attention and bring awareness to the tension and difficulty in reducing identities to distinct ethnic categories.

[2]John Tehranian, Whitewashed: America’s Invisible Middle Eastern Minority (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 3; Neda Maghbouleh, The Limits of Whiteness: Iranian Americans and the Everyday Politics of Race (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2017), 3.

[3]Tehranian, Whitewashed, 3.

[4]Anita Famili, “What About Middle Eastern American Ethnic Studies?” (paper presented at Undergraduate Research Opportunities Programs Symposium, University of California, Irvine, 17 May 1997); Tehranian, Whitewashed, 3.

[5]Kevin R. Johnson, “The End of ‘Civil Rights’ as We Know It? Immigration and Civil Rights in the New Millennium,” UCLA Law Review 49 (2002): 1481–1511. Quote on pp. 1488–89. Tehranian, Whitewashed, 22.

[6]Steven Belluscio, To Be Suddenly White: Literary Realism and Racial Passing (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006).

[7]Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 174.

[8]Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 137.

[9]Karen Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says about Race in America. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998).

[10]Tehranian, Whitewashed, 3–4.

[11]Maghbouleh, Limits of Whiteness, 4; Tehranian, Whitewashed, 65.

[12]Tehranian, Whitewashed, 6.

[13]Tehranian, Whitewashed, 38. As a member of the Iranian American community, I have also personally observed cases of racial covering and appellative passing amongst many Iranians in the diaspora.

[14]Tehranian, Whitewashed, 6.

[15]Maghbouleh, Limits of Whiteness, 170.

[16]Maghbouleh, Limits of Whiteness, 5.

[17]Maghbouleh, Limits of Whiteness, 5.

[18]Sociologist Ruben Rumbaut coined the term 1.5 generation to “describe the situation of immigrant children who are socialized and begin their primary schooling abroad but immigrate before puberty.” Ruben Rumbaut, “Assimilation and Its Discontents: Between Rhetoric and Reality,” International Migration Review 34 (1997): 923–60. Quote on p. 950.

[19]Maz Jobrani, I’m Not a Terrorist but I’ve Played One on TV: Memoirs of a Middle Eastern Funny Man (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), 31.

[20]Jobrani, I’m Not a Terrorist, 52.

[21]Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting Life Narratives (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 73.

[22]Jobrani, I’m Not a Terrorist, 53.

[23]Ambreen Hai, “Laughing with an Iranian American Woman: Firoozeh Dumas’ Memoirs and the (Cross-) Cultural Work of Humor,” Journal of Asian American Studies, no. 2 (2018): 263–300. Quote on p. 275.

[24]Jobrani, I’m Not a Terrorist, 58–59.

[25]Tehranian, Whitewashed, 80.

[26]Tehranian, Whitewashed, 105.

[27]Jobrani, I’m Not a Terrorist, 46.

[28]Tehranian, Whitewashed, 75.

[29]Tehranian, Whitewashed, 77.

[30]Tehranian, Whitewashed, 85.

[31]Jobrani, I’m Not a Terrorist, 46.

[32]Negin Farsad, How to Make White People Laugh (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2016), 226.

[33]Tehranian, Whitewashed, 85; Maghbouleh, Limits of Whiteness, 11.

[34]Reza Zia-Ebrahimi, “Self-Orientalization and Dislocation: The Uses and Abuses of the ‘Aryan’ Discourse in Iran,” Iranian Studies 44 (2011): 445–72. Quote on p. 447.

[35]Zia-Ebrahimi, “Self-Orientalization and Dislocation,” 446.

[36]Zia-Ebrahimi, “Self-Orientalization and Dislocation,” 448.

[37]Zia-Ebrahimi, “Self-Orientalization and Dislocation,” 447.

[38]Jobrani, I’m Not a Terrorist, 46.

[39]Tehranian, Whitewashed, 85.

[40]Gelareh Asayesh, “I Grew Up Thinking I Was White,” in My Sister, Guard Your Veil; My Brother, Guard Your Eyes: Uncensored Iranian Voices, ed. Lila Azam Zanganeh (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006), 12–19. Quote on p. 12. Tehranian, Whitewashed, 179.

[41]Maghbouleh, Limits of Whiteness, 11.

[42]Jobrani, I’m Not a Terrorist, 47.

[43]Tehranian, Whitewashed, 73.

[44]Farsad, White People Laugh, 1.

[45]Farsad, White People Laugh, 1.

[46]Farsad, White People Laugh, 1.

[47]Farsad, White People Laugh, 3.

[48]Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks, 2.

[49]Farsad, White People Laugh, 6.

[50]Farsad, White People Laugh, 86.

[51]Maghbouleh, Limits of Whiteness, 171.

[52]Farsad, White People Laugh, 8.

[53]Farsad, White People Laugh, 102.

[54]Maghbouleh, Limits of Whiteness, 171.

[55]Maghbouleh, Limits of Whiteness, 171.

[56]Maghbouleh, Limits of Whiteness, 172.

[57]Farsad, White People Laugh, 7.

[58]Farsad, White People Laugh, 143.

[59]Farsad, White People Laugh, 7. Emphasis in original.

[60]Farsad, White People Laugh, 144.

[61]Farsad, White People Laugh, 146–47.

[62]Stuart Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora,” in Identity: Community, Culture, Difference, ed. J. Rutherford (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), 222–37.

[63]Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), 37.

[64]Farsad, White People Laugh, 8.

[65]Farsad, White People Laugh, 9.

[66]Amir Marvasti and Karyn D. McKinney, Middle Eastern Lives in America (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).

[67]Farsad, White People Laugh, 227.

[68]Farsad, White People Laugh, 62.

[69]Farsad, White People Laugh, 27.

[70]Farsad, White People Laugh, 27.

[71]Indira Ghose, Shakespeare and Laughter: A Cultural History (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 7.

[72]Hai, “Laughing with an Iranian American Woman,” 274.

[73]Farsad, White People Laugh, 24.

[74]Farsad, White People Laugh, 24.

[75]Susanne Reichl and Mark Stein, ed., Cheeky Fictions: Laughter and the Postcolonial (New York: Rodopi, 2005), 10.

The Beginning of New Education in Nineteenth-Century Iran

 

David Menashri is a professor emeritus and the founding director of the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University. Prof. Menashri has authored and edited ten books. His book Education and the Making of Modern Iran has been translated into Persian as Nezam-e Amuzeshi va Sakhtan-e Iran-e Modern, published by Hekmat Sina in 2017. He is currently completing a book titled tentatively “Iran: Domestic Challenges and Regional Ambitions.”

 

Toward a New Education System

The progressive deterioration of Iran’s internal situation and the expanding contacts with the West, including the military defeats and the humiliating treaties of Golestan (1813) and Turkmanchay (1828) with Russia, sustained awareness of the country’s weakness and spurred the desire to adopt new methods to meet the growing challenges facing the country. All these promoted—much as they did in the Ottoman Empire and in semi-independent Egypt—the twin processes of imitation and change. The Middle East could no longer ignore the threatening strength of the West and sought to “discover and apply the elusive secret of its greatness and strength.”[2] The West, thus, provided both the impetus for change and the model for imitation, generating a conspicuous tension between the urge to reject and the desire to emulate.[3] As the challenge was noticed primarily in the battlefield, the response was first sought in imitating Western military technology. Gradually, it was realized that modern military techniques and technologies could not be implanted into an otherwise unchanged society. The fabric of the social, economic, and political order needed to be reshaped. In the view of a growing number of Iranian thinkers, education was one of the main secret sources of Western progress and its adoption the main route to progress.

In Muslim lands, the value placed on education was readily received. Western models and Indigenous tradition reinforced, rather than battled, each other in recognition of the value of knowledge. In Iran, both the pre-Islamic and Islamic traditions commend education. Both understand it as a twofold process: acquisition of knowledge and character formation. This is reflected in the two-term expressions used to connote the educational process: ta‘lim va tarbiyyat or amuzesh va parvaresh (a neologism derived from old Persian roots). The Avesta contains numerous references to education and educated people. Of even greater relevance to the realities of modern Iran is the prominence of knowledge in Islam. Islamic tradition makes the search for knowledge (talab al-‘ilm) “a duty of all Muslims . . . from the cradle to the grave” and in any place, “even in [distant] China.”[4] Even greater importance is attached to ‘ilm in the tradition of the Shia—the religion of Iran since the early sixteenth century. The ultimate aim of ‘ilm is the knowledge of God and, thus, traditional schools—maktab or madrese—concentrate on religious subjects. The admiration Iranians have for classical literature and poetry further stresses the importance of knowledge. Sa‘di, for example, devoted a chapter in Golestan to tarbiyyat. Human beings’ ability, he said, is based on knowledge. A phrase from Ferdowsi’s Shahname became the motto of the Ministry of Education in the 1930s: “Capable is the one who possesses knowledge” (tavana bavad an ke dana bavad), or in modern parlance, “education is power.” Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the motto was changed to ta‘lim va tarbiyyat ‘ebadat ast (“education is worship”). With all the differences in their approach, both terms glorify learning.

Such proud traditions notwithstanding, the school system in the early nineteenth century was incapable of responding to the momentous challenges of modern times. Yet the plea for change was confronted by the forces of tradition, with the ‘ulama’ (prominent clerics) at their head. Customarily, they rejected innovation as un-Islamic—bid‘ah (unlawful innovation)—and regarded it as their “religious obligation” to oppose any idea imported from the infidel West.[5] By and large, political dignitaries and social elites, too, rejected any change likely to jeopardize their status. Crown Prince ‘Abbas Mirza thus complained in 1812 that his brother and political rival, Mohammad ‘Ali, had rendered him and his reform plans odious by arguing that “in adopting the customs of the infidels,” he was subverting Islam.[6] Still, some channels for the infiltration of new ideas gradually opened during the century, not from any ideological preference but because of exigencies of the situation.

Since weakness was most painfully sensed on the military front, the first steps were to acquire Western military technology. A French training mission was invited to Tehran (1807–9), followed by a British one. In keeping with the growing contacts with the West, the first Iranian diplomatic mission was set up in London in 1809, followed by resident embassies in other European capitals. Living in Europe, the diplomats and their companions became acquainted with Western culture and politics and, no less important, learned foreign languages, which was instrumental in transferring ideas. The first steps to obtain the benefits of Western schooling were the government’s initiatives to finance students to study at European universities. The process was slow and limited in numbers, but in retrospect, the contribution of returning graduates to the process of change was invaluable. It was no less than groundbreaking change for the government to take upon itself responsibility for the education of its people (hitherto the exclusive domain of religion), and to send their children to learn from the infidels.

In 1811, the first two Iranian students left for London, placing them among the first Middle Eastern students to do so, followed by another five in 1815. Five more left to France in 1845 (but were rushed home because of the political change in Paris and the shah’s death in 1848). Three others studied in Russia and another in Italy. The initiative was accelerated under Nasser al-Din Shah (1848–96). In 1856–57, three students left for France; two years later, forty-two students left for France. This group stands out not only because of its unprecedented size, but also because all its members were graduates of Dar al-Fonun (discussed below), and thus were better prepared for studies abroad than were their predecessors. The early choice of England soon made room for a preference for France, which was to last well into the twentieth century. Almost all students came from prominent, wealthy families.

Returning graduates were appointed to prestigious positions upon their return and rose rather quickly to prominent positions; but their positions often had little to do with the fields of their studies. Given their social background, they would have been assured of a fine career in any case; nevertheless, new education—particularly European education—was of growing weight in their elevation. Gradually, upper-class families came to feel that the careers of their children had to be underpinned by educational qualifications. Appreciation of Western science and technology, coupled with the curiosity toward these “explorers” of Europe, turned the graduates into a focus of social attention. People were not interested much in their academic credentials; what mattered more was that they had had a glimpse of the West and its secrets. As Malkom Khan—one of the most influential proponents of change in the late nineteenth century—put it, anyone who had wandered in the cities of Europe for a few days was regarded as a source of knowledge.[7] In “Shaykh va Shukh,” the author conveys that it did not matter how much the graduates had actually learned of Western science; they were lionized just for having been to Europe. Shukh comments: “Whoever walked in the streets of Paris is appointed upon his return to a directorship in a government hospital [. . .] build[s] himself a large house, is granted a title, earns a good salary, [and] obtains decorations?”[8]

The first six graduates were initially appointed to positions related to their fields of study. Many of those who studied in Europe between 1845 and 1848 did not complete their studies, which explains why most of them served in positions where they could make use of their general education and knowledge of foreign languages, rather than specific training. Those sent out by Nasser al-Din Shah did complete their studies yet usually proved reluctant to work in their fields of expertise. Clearly, the returning graduates and their families preferred political, diplomatic, or administrative appointments. Mirza Asadollah Khan was exceptional in expressing annoyance at such a turn of events. Having studied paper manufacturing and then been assigned to a senior position in the post office, he cynically remarked: “Thanks God, I still have business with paper; although I am not a maker of paper (kaghaz saz), I still play with paper (kaghaz baz).”[9] Already in the early 1850s, such practices limited the contributions that the specialists were capable of making to the community. While this turn of events was not intended by the initiators of the program, in the wider process of change, the participation of the specialists with new education in the country’s social, political, and cultural life contributed significantly to the overall process of modernization.

The establishment, in 1851, of the Dar al-Fonun (polytechnic college), was the natural outgrowth of the motives that had led to the dispatch of students to Europe—to acquire Western technology. It was the first educational institution in modern Iran to be set up by the government, and the first to hire European instructors to teach Western sciences. Amir Kabir, the initiator and driving force behind the college, had modeled it after similar schools in Russia (where he had traveled in the 1820s) and the Ottoman Empire (where he had spent a long time in the late 1840s). In Russia, he was particularly impressed by the technical college at St. Petersburg, and in Istanbul, by the Maktab ‘Ulum Harbiye and by the wider educational reform in the 1840s. At Dar al-Fonun, Amir Kabir expected to gain the same benefits as were derived from sending students abroad, without incurring the heavy expenses of travel abroad and without exposing them to the “negative influences” of residence in a foreign country.[10]

Opposition to Dar al-Fonun came mainly from the ‘ulama’, who opposed setting up schools outside their influence and resented the teaching of modern subjects modeled on Western design. The founders tried to smooth tempers by incorporating religious studies into the curriculum and by holding public prayers at school, but to no avail. Having failed to prevent its establishment, the ‘ulama’ pressured the shah to deny support for the school, arguing that it was bound to foster anti-monarchical philosophies. Their pressure increased with the spread of the liberal movement in the Ottoman Empire and the approval of a constitution there in 1876, and later with the growth of the liberal movement in Iran, in which graduates of Dar al-Fonun and of foreign universities played a significant part. Even before its opening, the assassination of Amir Kabir had removed the school’s most vigorous supporter. Later, the shah’s initially enthusiastic support for the school gave way to indifference, before turning more favorable again in the late 1870s. In all, the status of the school alternated according to the shah’s arbitrary and inconsistent approach.[11]

Dar al-Fonun became the cornerstone of modern education, and some scholars view its establishment as signaling the beginning of new education in Iran. It trained relatively large cadres of Iranians and acquainted them with Western technology and general education. Many of its graduates later pursued their higher education in Western countries. Dar al-Fonun itself turned into a cultural center, hosting public lectures and discussions and publishing newspapers, textbooks, and translations of Western literature. Graduates, in the high positions they came to occupy, worked hand in hand with graduates of Western universities to support the overall process of change and reform.

Dar al-Fonun owed its existence to a government initiative and relied on its support. The government appointed its academic and administrative staff, drafted the curriculum, selected the entrants, and managed the employment of its graduates. This benefited the school as long as leading state figures (such as Amir Kabir, Mirza Hosein Khan Sepahsalar, Moshir al-Doula, and, at times, Nasser al-Din Shah) supported it, but harmed it when those in power turned against it. In all, the school contributed significantly to the development of modern education and to the larger process of Westernization. Hekmat’s conclusion that its graduates were of “the most important service for the advancement of Iran,”[12] and Safa’s assertion that they were an “important source for ideological, scientific and literary change,” do not seem to be exaggerated.[13]

Almost half a century later, several ministries founded schools of higher learning to provide them with expert staff in their ministries. An important feature of these schools was that they were the first to go beyond imitating the military or technological feature of Western education. In the stormy years of the early twentieth century, Madrese-ye ‘Ulum-e Siyasi became a center of intellectual activity. In 1907–8, its graduates founded the Sherekat-e Ma‘aref (Association for Education), which organized cultural events and founded new schools. These institutions of higher learning later became the building blocks of Tehran University.

New elementary and secondary schools were opened in Iran beginning in the 1870s (missionary schools started earlier). Their establishment was made possible largely through the collaboration between reformist intellectuals and politicians supportive of their vision. Most prominent among the latter were Sepahsalar (in the 1870s) and Mirza ‘Ali Khan Amin al-Doula (end of the century); the ministers of education Ja‘far Qoli Khan and Mirza Mahmud Khan Ehtesham al-Saltane; and to a degree, Shah Mozaffar al-Din himself. In 1873–74, Sepahsalar established in Tehran the first public secondary school, named Moshiriye in his honor. A similar school was established in Tabriz in the same year, to be followed by military high schools in Isfahan (1882–83) and Tehran (1884–85). Public elementary schools were opened in 1890, first by Mirza Hasan Roshdiye and later mainly by Sherekat-e Ma‘aref. Schools for girls were founded in the late 1890s, in addition to already-existing missionary schools and classes in private houses for the affluent. By 1918–19—over a century after the first contacts with Western education—there were a considerable number of new elementary and secondary schools, with a total of no less than thirty thousand students.[14] The curriculum and pedagogical approach differed from one school to another according to the educational philosophy of the founders. It was, as ‘Isa Sadiq (a student at such a school and later minister of education) noted, a period of “experimentations with a new education.”[15] However, each school differed thoroughly from the traditional system: the curriculum went far from what was taught in the maktabs, including new sciences and foreign languages. The majority of the teachers and headmasters were graduates of foreign schools or of Dar al-Fonun.

Few reasons made the opposition by the ‘ulama’ to the new elementary schools more forceful and passionate than their resentment of Dar al-Fonun or of the dispatch of students to Europe. They viewed the elementary schools as a threat to the students’ faith and resented their own lack of control over education, especially as such schools dealt with young children in a sensitive phase of their life. Also, unlike the earlier, numerically limited initiatives, they feared that the new elementary schools would lead to sweeping change embracing the entire country. Sending students abroad or to Dar al-Fonun did not threaten the madrese, but the opening of new elementary schools often resulted in the closure of maktabs. Eventually, the ‘ulama’ also deplored the loss of an important source of income by the akhunds (junior clerics). To the clergy, the struggle against the new elementary schools was a struggle for their faith and a defense of their traditional privileges and functions.

Consequently, the struggle over new elementary schooling turned into an acute cultural battle. The ‘ulama’ pressured the government to refrain from supporting the new schools, threatened the schools’ headmasters and staff, and brought pressure to bear on the students and their families. Roshdiye, the driving force behind such schools, suffered takfir (accused of apostasy), and his school in Tabriz was destroyed by tullab (theological students). His father had warned him that by founding new schools, he would be branded as an infidel.[16] In 1903–4, a fatva (religious ruling) by four mojtaheds (prominent clerics) from Najaf urged the shah to forbid the foundation of new schools. The supporters of modern education persuaded the shah to reject the request.[17] Opponents then argued that the new education was harmful to Iran and to Islam, and served as a tool for foreigners to advance their imperialist schemes. Nonetheless, the advocates of the new education overcame clerical opposition. Once the crucial early years had passed, and mainly under Reza Shah (1925–41), the expansion of the new school system—and the concomitant closure of the maktabs—became irreversible.

With all its quantitative and qualitative limitations, the new education of the nineteenth century became the cornerstone of twentieth-century education. In a manner neither planned nor foreseen by its initiators, the new education became extremely significant to the overall modernization of Iran. Beyond the academic contribution, it signified two major innovations: there was a deliberate, even methodical, attempt to learn from the West; and the state assumed responsibility for education, dislodging the religious establishment from its monopoly. These remained major features of Iranian education until the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

 

The Educated Class as a Motor for Change

The new educated class played a crucial role in the nineteenth-century reforms and the liberal movement that led to the Constitutional Revolution. Although too weak to mobilize mass support for their new ideologies, the members of this class were successful in mobilizing some key politicians to endorse reforms, contributing to the growing intellectual enlightenment and promoting new schools. The fact that many recipients of new higher education had moved into politics, government, or various cultural engagements, coupled with the social prestige that went with being Western educated, rendered them all the more capable of promoting the overall modernization of Iran, despite not working in the fields in which they had been trained. In the hectic years of the late nineteenth century, they proved instrumental in promoting Western concepts and offering the ideology to underpin both the Constitutional Revolution and the tobacco movement. Considering their small numbers, graduates of new schools, overseas and at home, had an astounding influence on the spread of liberal thought and the modernization of Iran. In due course, a number of influential reformist politicians emerged. Most prominent among them were the Crown Prince ‘Abbas Mirza and his chief minister Mirza Abu-Qasem Qa’em-maqam early in the century, Amir Kabir in mid-century, and Sepahsalar in the 1870s. A growing number of intellectuals, most of them graduates of foreign universities, joined their entourage.

One of the most important testimonies to the influence of Europe on the first students is the travel book of Mirza Saleh Shirazi, who studied in London (1815–19).[18] He expanded upon his impressions of the political system; personal liberties; the supremacy of law; the limits of royal authority; the concepts of freedom, religion, and the state; and the education system. The notion of political freedom so captivated Shirazi that he referred to England as the “Realm of Freedom” (velayat-e azadi). With much amazement, he described how the regent (George IV) wished to build a new street (to be named after him) but failed because a shopkeeper refused to sell his property. Even all the army, Shirazi maintained, could not force the shopkeeper to sell his property against his will, nor could the regent cause him any harm. All citizens—from the poorest to richest—were subject to the same law and enjoyed the same liberties. Even more illuminating is his remark that azadi (freedom) did not contradict entezam (public order). He wrote of the separation of powers, and tried to make it comprehensible to his readers that the people elected their representatives freely and, thus, became responsible for their destiny; that members of parliament enjoyed unlimited freedom; and that their decisions had sovereign force. “If necessary,” he exclaimed, “parliament can even change the religion.”[19] He took note that, unlike Islam, Christianity was a religion of conscience rather than practice. This led him to conclude that the ‘ulama’ were an obstacle to the progress of Muslim societies.[20]

If his was not the first Persian book to describe the European political system,[21] Shirazi was the first student—from anywhere in the Middle East—to set out his impressions of the West for the benefit of his countrymen. Study abroad influenced the students’ personal conduct and behavior and, with the prestige that went with studying abroad, they influenced many others. Shirazi’s descriptions of England were illuminating for Iranians, contrasting Western practices with the situation in Iran. Finally, rather than in its details, the importance of Shirazi’s book lies in the positive image of the West that it conveyed.

Though not entirely divorced from their Persian–Muslim heritage, the Iranian thinkers found new inspiration in the West. Their writings showed traces of French eighteenth-century thought on education, and some betrayed the influence of the founding fathers of the United States, who held that freedom and illiteracy were irreconcilable. Yet promoting new ideas was not easy. Given the prevalent religious ambience, some of them sought—often unconvincingly or awkwardly—to accommodate Western ideas with Islam. In 1876, Malkom proposed that reformists should present their desired innovations in Islamic terms to make them more easily acceptable. He labeled his approach “reformation of Islam”[22]—a concept reminiscent of the contemporary Egyptian thinker Mohammad ‘Abduh’s “Islamic modernism.” Yet in the second half of the nineteenth century, a new group of reformist thinkers managed to introduce some new ideas and advance the wheels of change.

The interrelation between education, freedom, and progress became the mainstay of intellectual argument then. In numerous treatises, Malkom drove home his view of education as the prerequisite for progress in general and constitutional order in particular. In his Shaykh va Vazir, a fictional dialogue between the shaykh (conservative) and the vazir (reformist), the latter argued that the secret of the strength, welfare, and the survival of nations depend on knowledge, and opined that unless it adopts Western education, Iran will fail to equal the achievements of the West.[23] In Neda’-ye ‘Edalat, he stated that only the spread of education had enabled the West to establish a political order based on justice. Iran is poor because it lacks legal justice (‘edalat-e qanuni) and because of its leaders’ failure to perceive the importance of education.[24] Sepahsalar was concerned primarily with the establishment of a constitutional order as a guarantor of freedom and social justice. To achieve these, he held that a European-style education was essential. ‘Ilm va Jahl, attributed to him, stressed: “The key to spiritual and material progress is knowledge,” adding that “one can achieve perfection only by knowledge.”[25] Mirza Yusef Khan Mostshar al-Doula attached similar importance to the spread of education, but considered a constitutional regime its prerequisite. In Yek Kalame, he claimed that “a single word” contained the key to progress: “Law.” However, without education the reign of law would not survive.[26] In a report to the Crown Prince Mozaffar al-Din, he opined—apparently for the first time in Iran—that education was also vital for fostering national unity.[27]

At the turn of the century, intellectuals’ appeals to expand new education turned more insistent, as was their critique of traditional schooling. Inaugurating a new school in Tehran (1898), Malek al-Motakallemin gave vent to his boundless expectations: “Only through knowledge can mankind achieve the highest peaks of progress; only under its aegis is it possible to establish justice and bring redemption to the world.” Turning to the young students, he said: “Having come to study at these factories for producing human beings (karkhane-ye adam-sazi), you ought to know that the destiny of the world, the fate of your nation, your own future and that of your children—[all] depend on knowledge alone.”[28] In Malkom’s Shaykh va Vazir, the shaykh queried, “How is it at all possible to adopt the principles of infidels?” just for the vazir to respond: “I do not deny that they are infidels. My only claim is that the strength of Europe derives from their unique mechanisms [. . .] The ‘ulama’ should either permit us to imitate the principles of Europeans’ strength, or bring some squadrons of angels down from heaven to rescue us from European rule.”[29] Abul-Qasem Khan Nasser al-Molk, a statesman educated in Britain, regarded constitution as “the origin of happiness, nobleness, and honor.” However, in Iran it may become the “origin of chaos, destruction, suffering, insecurity, and [. . .] sore evils,” because Iran lacked “the knowledge and potential” to turn it to good use. Constitutional order could not survive in an illiterate society as progress did not depend on the formal approval of a constitution but on the spread of education. He added passionately: “In the name of Allah, we need educated people. In the name of the Ka‘ba, the prophet and faith [. . .] we need educated people. The one and only way toward progress, equality, justice, happiness, sovereignty and pride is through spread of knowledge and existence of people who are educated according to the requirements of the times.”[30] For ‘Abd al-Rahim Talebov (Talebzade), the “lack of knowledge and spiritual poverty” were not only the “enemies of freedom,”[31] but education also had a significant economic value. In line with Adam Smith, he regarded “human potential” (este‘dad) as “economic wealth” and education as the main means for its cultivation. In his words, “If we will have a constitution, we will have education, and will possess wealth, order (nazm) and independence. But if we ignore these truths, we will be nothing but fools who betray their nation, homeland and religion.”[32]

At the end of the period under review, the intellectuals’ optimism was further fueled by the modernization of Japan. Its victory over Russia (1904–5) fired the imagination of Muslim intellectuals and breathed confidence in the East’s ability to equal and, eventually, outpace the West. They were impressed by the way the Meiji restoration benefited from educational reform. The fact that Japan, an Eastern country with a constitution, defeated a Western power with no constitution was especially illuminating for them. Ignoring what was unique in the Japanese experience, Iranians used it as a paradigm, a proof of the linkage between education, constitution, and advancement. They often seemed to view education—and in a way also parliamentarism and constitutionalism—as an entity isolated from social, economic, and political structures, one that could be easily transplanted from one country to another. Malek al-Motakallemin and Malkom Khan attested to their underlying sentiment by referring to schools as “factories for producing human beings.” Just as industrial factories “take in raw materials and turn out final products,” Malkom opined, the schools “take in ignorant children and turn out engineers and accomplished thinkers.” Setting up several such “factories” would enable Iran “to advance by 3000 years in the space of three months.”[33] Similar sentiments were expressed by Talebov in his fictional book Ketab-e Ahmad (inspired by Rousseau’s Emile) in a dialogue between the author and his sons, Ahmad and Mahmud. Soon after Ahmad entered a new school, the father told him that in only four months, “you have gained more knowledge than Mahmud, who is attending the maktab for over three years.” Before the age of nine, students at the new schools learned the history of their nation, religion, geometry and arithmetic, geography, physics, chemistry, literature, and several foreign languages. “While the tullab, even at the age of seventy, are still stuck in the laws of taharat (purification), wondering how to spell that word.”[34]

Graduates of universities abroad and Dar al-Fonun were also the driving force behind the first newspapers. The first newspaper, Kaghadh-e Akhbar, published in 1837, eventually led to the publication of Vaqaye‘-e Ettefaqiye in 1851 at Dar al-Fonun, which lasted until the Constitutional Revolution. Later, official or semi-official papers—such as Iran, Sharaf, and Ettela’, still habitually praising the shah and his conduct—also included some educational and literary articles. Much more important were the newspapers published in the diaspora by expatriates mainly from the 1870s onward. Free from supervision or censorship, they argued for reform and for a constitution. The most significant of them were Malkom’s Qanun (London, first published in 1890); Akhtar (Istanbul, 1876); Habl ul-Matin (Calcutta, 1893); and Thoraya and Parvaresh (Cairo, 1890s). Many more were published closer to the Constitutional Revolution. Altogether, Browne lists 371 newspapers published until the revolution, some of which were of “a very high order, and afford examples of a prose style, forcible, nervous, and concise, hitherto almost unknown.”[35]

Another important avenue for intellectual discourse was translation and critical writing. Most prominent among the early translators was Mirza Reza Mohandes (studied in Paris), who translated (in 1829–30) Voltaire’s essays on Peter the Great and Charles XII of Sweden and later Edward Gibbon’s The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Many more books appeared with the establishment of Dar al-Fonun. In addition to textbooks, they included translations of European classics, such as Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, Moliere’s plays, Dumas’s The Three Musketeers, Verne’s Around the World in Eighty Days, and, of particular significance for Persian readers, Morier’s Hajji Baba of Isfahan. Additionally, biographies of Napoleon Bonaparte, Nicholas I (Russia), Frederick the Great, William I (England), and Louis XV, and short histories of Rome, Athens, France, Russia, and Germany also became available in Persian. The shah likely commissioned some of these translations to glorify the monarchy, but they inadvertently allowed for unflattering comparison, contrasting the shahs and the prevalent poverty in Iran with famous world leaders and an advanced Europe.

In the last quarter of the century, numerous original books were also published, usually conveying critical messages. Most influential were the books by Talebov (such as Ketab-e Ahmad and Azadi va-Siyasat), Zayn al-‘Abedin Maraghe’i (Siyahat Name-ye Ebrahim Beg), Mostshar al-Doula (Yek Kalame), the treatises of Malkom, and the publications of Mirza Mohammad-Hasan Khan E‘temad al-Saltane (who studied at Dar al-Fonun and later in France). It is not certain whether the last actually wrote and translated the countless books appearing under his name, or if some of them were written by the team that he headed in the Ministry of the Press, but they are believed to reflect his views. Among such books are the Salnames, Mir’at al-Boldan, Matla‘at al-Shams, and Al-Ma‘ather va al-Athar. His sharp criticism of the mismanagement of Iranian affairs came out most clearly in Khalsa (Ecstasy), also known as Ketab-e Khab (Dream Book). Like Maraghe’i’s Ebrahim Beg and Talebov’s Ketab-e Ahmad, Khalsa adopted a loose fictional framework—a poetical dream—to castigate Qajar dignitaries for the decline of Iran. In Khalsa, the nineteenth-century chancellors were called upon to confess their sins in a tribunal “in the presence” of the great rulers of Persian history, standing accused of Iran’s decadence. Reviewing the Qajar period through their actions, eight years later, Seyyed Jamal-al-Din Wa‘ez, Malek al-Motakallemin, and Sheykh Ahmad Kermani wrote Ro’ya-ye Sadeqe (True Dreams), making the dignitaries, clerics, and governors account for their sins at the Last Judgment. Among the charges against the ‘ulama’ was their opposition to new education.

Gradually, many more intellectuals felt an urge to make their newfound views public. Though merely “inexperienced youngsters,” Hedayat wrote about the returning graduates, “each holds under his arms a thesis (resale) about the French Revolution and wishes to play the role of Robespierre or Danton.”[36] Writing about the leading intellectuals of that time, Mangol Bayat stated that they perceived themselves “as the new apostles,” spreading reason, science, liberty, and progress.[37] They did not necessarily share the same perception of Western civilization, nor did they want to imitate it in every respect, but they were impressed by what they witnessed and viewed borrowing elements of it as indispensable. However, a major barrier was the perception that change and innovation are un-Islamic (tantamount to bid‘ah). Yet throughout the century, intellectuals managed to mitigate such concerns, at least to some degree and in certain limited groups.

The urge to publish was supplemented by a desire to read. The reading public fed on political treatises, periodicals, and newspapers. Banned publications were smuggled into the country and read avidly, even at the shah’s court. Iranians, with their traditional admiration for verbal skill, marveled at the new idiomatic style and popular language of such books. “The intricate tales and excitements of this new literature were so fascinating [. . .] that families used to gather to hear them read aloud.”[38] The urge to write, however, seemed stronger than the aptitude to read. There is some truth in what Hedayat grieved: “Of books we have enough; what we lack are readers [. . .] The customers are illiterate.”[39]

Thus, when it came to mobilizing mass support for the tobacco revolt (1891) or the Constitutional Revolution (1906), the intellectuals needed elite groups as a driving force. The main contribution of the intellectuals was in influencing the influential segments of the elites, including some ‘ulama’ and officials, not the populace. When political change was finally in the offing and revolutionary forces were searching for an ideology to unite the divergent components of their camp, the intellectuals offered their ideology as the cohesive element. Freedom, parliamentarism, and constitutionalism were their contribution, and the wording of the constitution of 1906 carried their imprint. In the 1970s, their fellow intellectuals could not claim as much.

In all, the nineteenth century was a significant phase in transition from traditional schooling to new education inspired by the West. It was a slow process—in fact, too slow—involving severe ideological and political clashes between contradictory convictions. The following overly picturesque description by Mojtaba Minovi, a prominent twentieth-century historian, seems to properly illustrate the situation. He compared the role of the recipients of new education to spreading seeds in an uncultivated soil, where the land had not been fertilized or irrigated, and weeds and stones had not been removed. Some of the seeds, therefore, fell on spots where they could not germinate, but a few fell on fruitful soil and yielded the crop of progress.[40]

 

Conclusion

In the search for a path to confront the challenge of modernism, Iranian political thought over the last two centuries has fluctuated between extremes. From the Islamic doctrine that characterized the country’s general outlook until the late eighteenth century, Iran gradually underwent a phase of change, inspired by the West, that was exacerbated in the generation preceding the Islamic Revolution in 1979.

Integral to the general fabric of society, education has been a catalyst for change and an element itself subject to transformation. In the contest between traditional-religious and new, Western-style schooling, which took on the nature of a Kulturkampf in the late nineteenth century, the latter emerged triumphant and the religious establishment lost its age-old monopoly over education. Once the government had control, it changed the structure and content of the schooling system. New subjects, not previously included in the traditional curriculum, became the stock-in-trade of the new education. The new education of the nineteenth century was only the prelude, still limited at the end of the century. This initial change was underpinned by the Pahlavi monarchy (1925–79).

Perhaps the most significant testimonial to the value of the new education and to the degree to which it has become rooted in Iranian culture has come from the Islamic regime. With all the opposition of the ‘ulama’ to Western-style education, the elementary school system, despite significant changes in the content, follows the new patterns. Even as they became firmly in control in the first four decades of Islamic rule, the ‘ulama’ did not reverse the process. Education, with the exception of the madrese, has remained much closer to Westernized education than to traditional schooling. New sciences are included in the curriculum, and English language is taught at schools. Universities, closed for Islamization immediately after the revolution, were reopened after two years with their overall structure intact. The clerics in power have used the fruits of modern education in the service of their revolutionary goals in spite of their initial opposition. In a way, they seem to aspire to turn the wheel back to where it had been at the outset of the period discussed, when a distinction was made between (desirable) Western science and technology and (undesirable) Western culture. There is no reason to think that it is more feasible to make such a distinction now than it was then.

Finally, Iran’s historical identity has long been based on two main pillars—which did not necessarily live in harmony throughout the centuries—ancient/imperial/Persian and Islamic/Shi‘i. Since the nineteenth century, a third layer of Iranian identity seems to have emerged—modern/Western. Together, they shape Iran’s new distinctiveness. New education has had a significant role in introducing Western-style education and, through it, has influenced other aspects of Iranian life. Constitutionalism, parliamentarism, and nationalism, as well as modern education—deeply entrenched in modern Iranian history and endorsed also by the Islamic regime—are borrowed from Western culture. The question, it seems, is not if Western civilization and local traditions can live together, but rather if it is at all possible to totally separate them.

 

[1]This article has been reproduced from my book Education and the Making of Modern Iran (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992). This book was translated into Persian in Tehran in 2017: Nezam-e Amuzeshi va Sakhtan-e Iran-e Modern, by Hekmat Sina.

[2]Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 45.

[3]Gustav von Grunebaum, “Acculturation and Self-Realization,” in The Contemporary Middle East, ed. B. Rivlin and J.S. Szyliowicz (New York: Random House, 1965), 141–42.

[4]Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam (Leiden, NL: Brill, 2007), 89–91, 295.

[5]A lecture by Malkom Khan in London cited in Fereshte Nura’i, Tahqiq dar bare-ye Afkar-e Mirza Malkom Khan, Nazem al-Doula (Tehran: Ketabha-ye Jibi, 1973–74), 48–52.

[6]James Morier, A Second Journey through Persia, Armenia and Asia Minor (London: Longman, 1818), 213.

[7]See Malkom Khan, “Dastgah-e Divan,” in Majmu‘e Athar-e Mirza Malkom Khan, ed. Mohit Tabataba’i (Tehran: Danesh, AH 1327/AD 1948–49), 73–95. Quote on p. 78. All translations are mine unless otherwise stated.

[8]“Shaykh va Shukh,” in Afkar-e Ejtema‘i va Siyasi va Eqtesadi dar Athar-e Montasher Nashode-ye Dowran-e Qajar, ed. Fereydun Adamiyyat and Homa Nateq (Tehran: Agah, 1977), 144–49. Quote on p. 149.

[9]As cited by Mohit Tabataba’i, Shafaq-e Sorkh, “Tarikhche e‘zam muhasel beh Orupa,” (6 Murdad 1312/28 July 1933).

[10]‘Abdollah Mostowfi, Tarikh-e Ejtema‘i va  Edari Dowre-ye Qajariye, vol. 1 (Tehran: Tehran Mosavvar, n.d.), 70; Hajj Mirza Yahya Doulatabadi, Tarikh Mo‘aser ya Hayat-e Yahya, vol. 1 (Tehran: Ibn Sina, 1957–58), 324–28; Hosein Makki, Zendegani-ye Mirza Taqi Khan, Amir Kabir (Tehran: ‘Ilmi, 1958), 183.

[11]Mostowfi, Tarikh-e Ejtema‘i, 86; Doulatabadi, Tarikh Mo‘aser, 327–29; Mehdi Qoli Hedayat, Khaterat va Khatarat (Tehran: Rangin, 1950–51), 75.

[12]‘Ali Asghar Hekmat, “Ta‘limat-e ‘Aliye: Notq-e Jenab-i Aqa-ye Hekmat . . .,” Ta‘lim va Tarbiyyat, sal 6, shumareh 4 (Tir 1315/June–July 1936), 249–60. Quote on p. 251–52.

[13] Dhabihollah Safa, “’Madrase,” Iranshahr, vol. 1 (Tehran: Daneshgah-e Tehran, 1963), 736. See similarly Mostowfi, Tarikh-e Ejtema‘i, 86; Hedayat, Khaterat va Khatarat, 94.

[14]Sazeman-e Barname va Budjeh, Markaz-e Amar, Bayan-e Amari-ye Tahavvolat-e Ejtema‘i va Eqtesadi-ye Iran dar Dowran-e [. . .] Pahlavi (Tehran: 1976–77), 35–36; ‘Isa Sadiq, Tarikh Farhang-e Iran (Tehran: Daneshgah-e Tehran, 1976), 354–59.

[15]Sadiq, Farhang, 359.

[16]Doulatabadi, Tarikh Mo ‘aser, 180–84; “Roshdiye Pir-e Ma‘aref,” Amuzesh va Parvaresh, Dawreh 14, Shumarah 10 (December 1944), 543–46; Mehdi Malekzade, Tarikh-e Enqelab-e Mashrutiyyat-e Iran, vol. 1 (Tehran: 1948–49), 150.

[17]Doulatabadi, Tarikh Mo‘aser, 238–43.

[18]Mirza Saleh Shirazi, Safarname (Tehran: Razun, 1968).

[19]Shirazi, Safarname, 325.

[20]Shirazi, Safarname, 427.

[21]Two others had preceded him: Mir ‘Abd al-Latif Shushtari, Tuhfat al-‘Alam va Zayl al-Tuhfah, ed. Samad Muvahhid ([Bombay: s.n., 1847]; Tehran: Tahuri, AH 1363/AD 1984), 363–67; Mirza Abu-Taleb Khan ibn Mohammad Esfahani, Masir Talebi fi Bilad al-Faranji (Tehran: Ketabha-ye Jibi, 1973).

[22]Wilfrid S. Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt (London: 1907), 83–84.

[23]Malkom Khan, Nazem al-Doula, Kolliyyat-e Malkom (Tehran: n.p., 1907), 88–95.

[24]Malkom Khan, “Neda-ye ‘Edalat,” in Majmu‘e Athar-e Mirza Malkom Khan, ed. Mohit Tabataba’i (Tehran: Danesh, AH 1327/AD 1948–49), 193–217. See also Nura’i, Afkar-e Mirza Malkom Khan, 35–57.

[25]Guity Nashat, The Origins of Modern Reform in Iran, 1870–1880 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982), 144.

[26]Mehdi Bamdad, Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran dar Qorun-e 12-14 Hejri, vol. 4 (Tehran: Navar, 1968–69), 490–93; Ferydun Adamiyyat, Fekr-e Azadi va Moqaddame-ye Nehzat-e Mashrutiyyat (Tehran: Sokhan, 1961–62), 182–211.

[27]See the report in Nazem al-Islam Kermani, Tarikh Bidari-ye Iraniyan, vol. 1 (Tehran: Bonyad-e Farhang, 1967–68), 206–11.

[28]Malekzade, Tarikh-e Enqelab-e Mashrutiyyat, 152–54.

[29]Malkom, Kolliyyat, 89–91.

[30]Nazem al-Islam Kermani, Tarikh Bidari-ye Iraniyan, vol. 2 (Tehran: Bonyad-e Farhang, 1967–68), 214–23.

[31]Mirza ‘Abd al-Rahim Talebov [Talebzade], Azadi va Siyasat (Tehran: Sahar, 1978–79), 111–13.

[32]Mirza ‘Abd al-Rahim Talebov, Ketab-e Ahmad, vol. 2 (Istanbul: 1895–96), 80–84, 89–90.

[33]Tabataba’i, Malkom Khan, 8–13; Hamid Algar, Mirza Malkum Khan: A Study in the History of Iranian Modernization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 28.

[34]Mirza ‘Abd al-Rahim Talebov, Ketab-e Ahmad, vol. 1 (Istanbul: 1895–96), 10–11; Talebov, Ketab-e Ahmad, vol. 2, 5–7.

[35]Edward Browne, The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1914), 27–153; Edward Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909 (London: Frank Cass, 1966), 127–28.

[36]Hedayat, Khaterat va Khatarat, 150.

[37]Mangol Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1982), 134.

[38]Hassan Kamshad, Modern Persian Prose Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 28.

[39]Hedayat, Khaterat va Khatarat, iii.

[40]Mojtaba Minovi, “Avvalin Karavan-e Ma’refat,” Yaghma 6 (1953–54): 181.

Ten Theses on Iranian Cinema

Sara Saljoughi <sara.saljoughi@utoronto.ca> is Assistant Professor of English and Cinema Studies. She has published articles in Iranian Studies, Camera Obscura, Feminist Media Histories, Film International, and Jadaliyya. Her current book project, Burning Visions: The Counter-Cinema of the Iranian New Wave, examines the aesthetics and politics of art cinema in Iran during the 1960s and 1970s. She is the co-editor of 1968 and Global Cinema (Wayne State University Press, 2018).

In memory of Abbas Kiarostami, 1940-2016

The study of Iranian cinema has blossomed over the past two decades. Where it was once dominated by the study of auteur cinema made in the context of the new film industry of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it now spans the history of the moving image in Iran. New studies push forward earlier understandings of the field by introducing new periodization, critical genres, and new methods of reading and interpretation. Alongside the expansion of topics and approaches is a breadth in disciplinary methodologies. Current research in Iranian cinema is informed by fields as diverse as Middle Eastern studies, film studies, comparative literature, history, and anthropology, to name a few. It is now crucial to signal this shift away from earlier studies that tended to focus on the social and political dimensions of cinema, at the cost of examining other equally important aspects of film. Insofar as fields of study form by first offering an account of objects, it is especially important to chart how the field has changed and, more specifically, the ways it has opened up and expanded. Alongside that opening must necessarily come some questioning of the object itself. While it is certainly useful to ask “what is Iranian cinema?” we might also want to ask how we have told the stories of Iranian cinema and how we might alter and change those stories as we begin to utilize new interdisciplinary paradigms.

The present essay takes this opening of the field as the occasion to propose ten theses on Iranian cinema that open possibilities for rethinking the field as well as key moments in its history. The title of the essay is a nod to Abbas Kiarostami’s Dah/Ten (2003), a text that represents dynamic shifts, both in the work of the filmmaker and in the broader Iranian cinematic landscape. In attempting to attach ten theses to Iranian film history, the essay borrows the experimental, fragmented structure of Ten in order to imagine a new synchronic history.

  1. Iranian cinema has always been attentive to the politics of looking.

From its earliest years of production, Iranian cinema has concerned itself with the politics of looking. While an engagement with the politics of looking might be inherent to the moving image itself, investigations into contemporary Iranian cinema overwhelmingly suggest that attention to the look is the province of post-revolutionary film culture and its focus on an Islamic cinema. Doubtless, this emphasis is part of an overall tendency to equate the new film culture post-1979 as representing a radical departure from previous film practices. This is certainly true in terms of the guidelines on screen representations of women and of heterosexual relations. But beyond this, there are questions of aesthetics and politics that persist throughout the history of Iranian cinema. One of these is the question of fascination with the image and how that fascination prompts us to look in particular ways—at each other, the world, and ourselves. Haji Agha, Aktor-e Sinama/Haji Agha, the Cinema Actor (1933, dir. Ovanes Ohanians) one of the earliest feature length films made in Iran, explores this fascination with the image in the context of skepticism of the new technology of the film camera. In particular, the film asks us to consider how propriety is implied and/or challenged by the looks the cinema engenders. The question seems urgent because the moving image differs in significant ways from the images that had circulated in Iranian culture prior to this moment. It was not just the images that differed but the manner in which they were exhibited and seen. 

Haji Agha, the second feature by Ohanians—who is also credited with the first Iranian feature film Abi and Rabi (1930), can be read as a critique of a reactionary society that wishes to modernize but is deeply suspicious of the changes that come with modernization, such as new technologies. Ohanians acts in the film as a director looking for a subject for his film. He lands on the titular Haji Agha, a rich conservative with community importance. Haji Agha’s daughter and son-in-law conspire with the director to capture Haji unawares. In an exaggerated manner, when Haji Agha sees his own image in the finished film, he is captivated by it, forgetting the suspicion he previously held. Seeing himself reflected on screen completely transforms his position on the cinema, which he comically comes to appreciate. The politics of looking as presented in the film can be read as an allegory for the push-and-pull effect of modernization; on the one hand, it is seen as the road to the dilution of so-called tradition values (that might try to restrict certain looks), while on the other hand it offers a seductively new way of understanding the world around us.

The fascination with the image, as it is explored in Haji Agha, opens out in later Iranian cinema as a potential of the frame. The film shows us, through Haji Agha’s altered stance on cinema—indeed, his transformation—the possibilities of the frame as a device for shaping our vision of the world. Nowhere is this explored more explicitly than in Kiarostami’s cinema. The windows and cars that abound in Kiarostami’s films are suggestive of multiple ways to frame vision, even within a single shot. Kiarostami often have us think about looking by framing and reframing, but also by playing with light to introduce new types of images. In 2010’s Copie conforme/Certified Copy, we see Elle (Juliette Binoche) and James (William Shimell) through the windshield of a car, which reflects buildings and cobblestones that lie in the road ahead. We also see straight through the car and out the rear window, seeing what they have passed and what Elle, the driver, might see in her rearview mirror. Throughout the film, Kiarostami plays with these multiple viewpoints, suggesting different possibilities for looking.

One of the implications of this long history of interest in looking is that the modesty guidelines imposed on Iranian cinema after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran are not novel in their attempts to write overlooking as a troubled and troubling act. Throughout the history of Iranian cinema, filmmakers have used various types of looks to trouble any notion of straightforward visuality and looking relations.

 

  1. Sabzian is Iranian cinema.

Sabzian, the cinephile star of Abbas Kiarostami’s Nema-ye Nazdik/Close-Up (1990) states, quite baldly, “I am interested in cinema.” This declaration is more than the admission of a hobby or interest; it is the crux of the man’s journey of self-transformation.

Hossein Sabzian infamously impersonates Mohsen Makhmalbaf to an impressed and impressionable Tehran family, thereby gaining access to their home, lives, and eventually, financial support. Close-Up is one of Kiarostami’s most revered films for the manner in which it restages the real-life events of the Sabzian case with the social actors playing themselves. The reenactment allows for reflection on what occurred and its repetition in front of Kiarostami’s camera. Through the reenactment, the depth of Sabzian’s desire to become Makhmalbaf compels viewers to contemplate this very bewildering form of cinematic embodiment. In stating his interest in cinema, Sabzian symbolizes something much larger than the scope of the film. It is a statement that calls forth a radical subjectivity, which mirrors the transformative moment in Iranian cinema within which the film takes place.

To speak of his interest in cinema, Sabzian described an inclination toward cinema. It is a statement of cinephilia, but one so deep that it performs the work of transforming the subject into cinema itself. It is as though Sabzian is stating he is the cinema. The statement is reflective of the official status of cinema post-revolution. If Sabzian is the cinema, then it bears asking what we know of Sabzian and what that might tell us about cinema. He is a pious, working class man struggling to survive. He belongs to the segment of Iranian society that the nation-state (following the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran) projects. He then must also be implicated in the state’s opposition to cinema as a technology of imperialism. Sabzian embodies the cinema by becoming what he knows of it—seemingly a sole film by Mohsen Makhmalbaf, The Cyclist (1987). He is thus a condition of possibility for the rebirth of Iranian cinema for his very existence implies that watching film is a transformative experience. The regime too, as Negar Mottahedeh has argued, imagines a heterosexual male as its ideal spectator, for the manner in which screen codes are oriented always toward that subject’s projected desire.[1] The notion of becoming and transforming though the act of spectatorship is one implicit in the very position the state took toward cinema after 1979. This is the case both in terms of restrictions and guidelines, as well as in Khomeini’s famous vote of confidence for the productive possibilities of revolutionary cinema. Sabzian’s transformation into Makhmalbaf, even if dubiously intended, suggests that cinema holds possible an endless variety of such transformations. The relationship between cinema and subjectivity then opens out onto different configurations, which may or may not align with the project of the nation-state. In other words, the state may wish to engender a particular type of citizen at various points in history but this may or may not “work” in the spectatorial experience.

 

  1. Iranian cinema is in intimate dialogue with other Iranian arts.

Through its engagement with a variety of Iranian arts, such as poetry, painting, and drama, Iranian cinema is in a constant state of questioning about cinema’s relation to these arts and its pivotal position in national culture.

“Cinema is not cinema as we know it.” This could be the message of Shirin (2008), one of Kiarostami’s more experimental films. One of the film’s central concerns is the nature of cinema, how viewers understand the medium, and what process best enables thinking through these questions. The viewer of Shirin watches a number of women—all well- known actresses—watching a film at the cinema. The film they are watching is an adaptation of the twelfth-century epic poem, “Khosrow and Shirin.” Kiarostami’s spectator is never permitted to watch the film-within-the-film, seeing only the faces of the women as they watch and react to the events on the screen. The film attempts to make an ontological statement about cinema by breaking image from sound. It also robs us of the point-of-view of the women who watch the film, as we never see a reverse shot from their perspective. These challenges to our understanding of film language break open what we consider cinema—that composite whose elements are often seamlessly combined. The story of Khosrow and Shirin becomes as important as Kiarostami’s film because it is the sonic accompaniment to our observation of the women spectators. This is a novel take on adaptation better described as a kind of marriage. Here we have the persistence of the old, through the re-imagining of such an important cultural text. Through this juxtaposition, we are invited to re-think cinema and also to re-imagine the ways in which cinema and other Iranian cultural traditions relate to one another. In this, the gambit of Shirin shares much with the contrapuntal stance of Sabzian. It is the proximity of cinema to other arts, the intimacy of the moment of suture for the spectator (regardless of the ideological outcome) that makes cinema such a vital part of the politics of Iranian culture.

The relationship of cinema to Iranian literature is a long one. As Hamid Naficy discusses, there has been a long history of stories and poems from Iranian mythology and folklore adapted for the screen, as well adaptations of contemporary Iranian literature in the mid-twentieth century.[2] During the heyday of the Iranian New Wave in the 1960s and 1970s, dissident literature by writers such as Gholamhossein Sa’edi and Houshang Golshiri were adapted into relatively successful screenplays for films that were understood to be critiquing the regime of Mohammed Reza Shah. Through this intimate relationship, cinema gained a degree of gravitas as a serious art form through its encounter with literature and poetry. This collaboration between cinema and other forms is evident not only in terms of literature providing the narrative content of films but also in terms of the aesthetics of various forms. The very notion of a poetic cinema (most often ascribed to documentary in the Iranian context) owes much to the historical encounter between cinema and poetry. Poet Forough Farrokhzad’s film editing, which begins with Golestan’s A Fire but comes into full fruition in her film, Khaneh siah ast/The House is Black (1962), put forward a groundbreaking collaboration between the two forms. The rhythm of Farrokhzad’s poetic language fuels her experiments with montage, while the worldview of the film provides an intertextual link to the social consciousness of her poetry.[3] The sensibility of this encounter between poetry and cinema can be traced in Iranian art cinema over the last half century.

If we consider Iranian cinema to have always been in collaboration (rather than only “dialogue”) with other Iranian arts, then we have opportunity to imagine anew the emergence of cinema in Iran. One of the dominant theses regarding cinema in Iran posits that we can consider the form as co-emerging with modernity.[4] While there is certainly much to suggest this historically, the relationship of cinema to Iranian art provides a model for thinking cinema beyond the model of an imported Western technology. To conceptualize the development of Iranian cinema in a local and national context allows us to see the ways in which the status of cinema can be understood differently in different historical situations.[5] Future work that expands existing insights into the relationship between Iranian arts such as pardekhani and cinema could help develop knowledge in this area.

             

  1. Iranian art cinema pays homage to the Persian miniature.

If Iranian cinema is intimately involved with earlier Iranian art forms, then the tradition of miniature painting is its most forceful example. The miniature has been described as “using a continuous space that infers a single temporal moment”—monoscenic, while at the same time representing multiple perspectives.[6] Multiple perspectives are particularly important to what David J. Roxburgh calls the visual logic of the paintings, for they “do not control the viewer’s bodily relationship to surface.”[7] As we look at a miniature painting, its compositional structure frees the viewer’s head and eyes to roam over the entire painting, moving in multiple directions. For Roxburgh, this opens up interpretational possibilities that supplant the temporality of the image.

This feature of the composition is striking for its compatibility with the temporal slowness of Iranian art cinema. There is a mutual relation of intermediality that is afforded and aided by this compatibility. The temporality of a film like Zir-e darakhtan zeitoun/Through the Olive Trees (Kiarostami, 1994) and its final scene, where the lovers weave through the trees and out into a clear field as we watch from an extreme long shot, brings to life the compositional possibilities of the miniature in its collision with cinema. Filmmakers such as Marva Nabili, director of Khak-e sar be morh/The Sealed Soil (1977), have noted the influence of miniature painting on the mise-en-scène of their films. This influence can take shape in several ways. We have, on the one hand, a mimicry of composition. In Nabili’s film this is expressed by way of the isolation of the human figure within a natural landscape. On the other hand, we also see in Iranian cinema a propensity to emulate the loose interpretative framework offered by the miniature form. Miniatures could be interpreted differently depending on the time of reading. They relied upon the person explicating the image and the context within which the explication took place.[8] In this way, we might argue vehemently against the charge of style over substance. This charge has been aimed, quite unsurprisingly given their fame, at directors such as Kiarostami. Indeed, David J. Roxburgh notes that this same charge of superficiality and surface was made against Persian miniature painting, aided by a disciplinary dependence on Western paradigms of analysis.[9]  But where one might see a lack of explicit political content—this is despite strategies of distanciation that are quite common in the filmmakers’ work—we might instead consider that lack as an interpretive openness whereby the moving image signifies in a multitude of political ways. This does not suggest that the films are so open that they are meaningless and flat. Rather, those who wish to analyze Iranian art cinema must look for aesthetic strategies such as citations of the miniature in addition to their more common identification of modernist techniques.

  1. Iranian cinema must be understood in the disciplinary context of film studies.

The interpretation of Iranian cinema reached a new horizon with the publication of Negar Mottahedeh’s Displaced Allegories: Post-Revolutionary Iranian Cinema (Duke University Press, 2008). This groundbreaking book presents a new moment in the study of Iranian cinema by re-reading post-revolutionary art cinema as a women’s cinema. This interpretive gesture aimed to re-think the new guidelines on screen representations of women and of heterosexual, non-familial relations. Importantly, Mottahedeh reads in directors’ interpretations of the guidelines not only the usual workarounds artists must do under censorship, but instead the seizure of an unparalleled creative opportunity. Filmmakers such as Bahrami Beyzai, Mohsen Makhmalbaf, and Abbas Kiarostami, Mottahedeh argues, were creating a new grammar for Iranian cinema, one based in part on the state’s projection of the ideal citizen-spectator. Mottahedeh’s reading of Iranian art cinema in the 1980s and 1990s is facilitated by an engagement with psychoanalytic and semiotic theories of cinema. It is her engagement with 1970s feminist film theory in particular that heralds the book’s new methodology for understanding Iranian film culture. In this way, Mottahedeh’s book represents the beginning of entirely new possibilities for understanding Iranian cinema within the framework of the discipline of film and media studies.

 

  1. The specter of fire haunts Iranian cinema.

It is possible to write a history of Iranian cinema as a history of fire. When we invoke fire in relation to Iranian cinema, we think first of the infamous Cinema Rex fire in 1978, an event that is a metonymy of the mainstream reaction to cinema in the lead-up to the 1979 Revolution. The Cinema Rex fire took aim at the trajectory of Iranian cinema, at the audacity of the moving image, and at the spectators who convened for the pleasures of the screen. Its perpetrators remain shrouded in mystery, with various theories as to which faction might have committed the crime. One thing is certain: the fire in Abadan led to many other copycat fires at cinemas across Iran. The year 1978 might be said to present the death of cinema in Iran, and it certainly appeared that way, even if its death was short lived. The metonymic fire flickered years into the post-revolutionary cinematic culture, as a quiet rage that had once stopped cinema in its tracks only to turn around and reignite its very language. Fire functions not only as the engine of death and change in Iranian cinema, but also as potential. It is renewal that persists. And we may think of the qualities of fire, such as burning, as metaphor for the utopian ideals of Iranian cinema prior to the revolution. Elsewhere I discuss the Cinema Rex fires as an eruption of energy and how that energy contained within it not just a reactionary dismissal of cinema, but also visions of how cinema could be used toward social transformation.[10] The repetition of the Cinema Rex story in so many accounts of Iranian cinema demonstrate the perception of fire as renewal in the collective unconscious of those who wish to tell the stories of Iranian cinema. Perhaps the burning oil fields of Ebrahim Golestan’s Yek atash/A Fire (1961) were prescient in more than one way. Golestan is associated with the tradition of poetic documentary in pre-revolutionary Iran and A Fire, which was edited by poet and filmmaker Forough Farrokhzad, sets forth a new film language.  The images of the industrial site of the oil fields, the images of workers and the landscape are paired with a poetic voice (Golestan’s own) describing the massive, seemingly unending fire and the efforts to contain it. The spread of the fire strikes us now as metaphor for Golestan and Farrokhzad’s influence on Iranian cinema, much of which bears the imprint of the poetic rhythm of their editing and the non-interventionist attitude to the social world conveyed by the films’ commentary. If the year of cinema burnings in 1978 managed to only briefly terminate the Iranian film industry, the story of the rebirth of Iranian cinema after the revolution is all the more compelling for such a powerful fire ceases only when it is transformed into something else.

 

  1. When we refer to Iranian cinema as a national cinema, we understand Iranian cinema as a distinctly international phenomenon.

A familiar way of looking at Iranian cinema has been through the category of national cinema. As Andrew Higson has argued, one of the ways a body of films comes to stand as the “national” cinema of a given nation-state is often through international perception of that nation’s cinema.[11] Moreover, as Higson argues, art cinema often comes to stand in for and define national cinema because it is in most cases the cinema that circulates at international film festivals and the like.[12] This could not be truer in the Iranian context. Think here of the appearance of Abbas Kiarostami on the cover of Cahiers du cinéma, with the question, “Qui-êtes vous M. Kiarostami?” signalling the recognition of Iranian cinema beyond its borders, but even more so, suggesting, with its questions, that recognition by European film circles confers upon non-Western cinemas an arrival of sorts.[13] This notion of art cinema standing in for national cinema raises the question of whether Iranian art cinema is too dominant in terms of the reception and understanding of Iranian cinema more broadly. What makes the films of Kiarostami and other auteurs examples of national cinema? Why not an immensely popular film such as Marmoulak/The Lizard (2004)? The conflict between art and popular cinemas is neither new nor unique to Iran, but it remains important to ask why a supposed “cinema of quality” is considered to speak for the nation. In the context of Iran, it is somewhat troubling that the period of political reform in Iran coincided with international audiences ascribing a relationship of paradox between Iranian cinema and Iran the state. The charming children and bucolic landscapes of Iranian art cinema were interpreted as salves for the more common media images of Iran circulating in the West—threatening and hostile crowds on the other side of a supposed civilizational divide. This type of praise is more than troubling for it posits cultural production as a kind of oasis, while also undermining the manifold nuances of a given film into a mere example of triumph under censorship.

It is the work of the international circulation of Iranian art cinema that write that cinema back into the nation’s “national” cinema. To call Iranian cinema an international phenomenon does not undo its “Iranian-ness,” but rather ascribes to this vast body of films a quality of mutability not dissimilar from the transformative effects of watching a film. The act of traveling, bringing with it encounters that inevitably change the traveler (whether human or here, an art object) can also function as bringing to the fore qualities that are less visible when rooted. When we discuss the politics of reading in the Anglo-American academy, we often interrogate the practices of reading non-Western art as an act rife with assumptions about the object in question. In particular, it is the tendency to allegorize non-Western art as always nationally oriented that collapses the particularities of the work.[14] But if we consider that strange object—the Iranian film abroad—as a thing quite distinctly its own and therefore only representative of “national cinema” in that context, we can begin to clarify the different ways in which the “national” in national cinema comes into being. The stakes of this letting go are a more productive mode of inquiry that might allow us to see the ways in which Iranian films themselves are persistent in their interrogation of the national. Indeed, “which Iran?” as the protagonist of Ferydoun Rahnema’s Pesar-e Iran az Madarash Bikhabar Ast/The Son of Iran Has No News from His Mother (1976) asks.

  1. Iranian cinema, as a field of study, is in the midst of a significant transformation.

How do we understand and write the history of Iranian cinema? The publication of Hamid Naficy’s four-volume opus, A Social History of Iranian Cinema (Duke University Press, 2011-12) represents a major turning point in the field. Until Naficy’s book, there had been virtually no account, in English, that covered the breadth and longevity of Iranian cinema. Beginning with the dawn of cinema in Iran and taking the reader through to the contemporary moment, with all its transnationalism and box office successes, Naficy’s history of Iranian cinema is a robust treatise on the diversity of what we call “Iranian cinema.” Discussing everything from artists’ film to queer cinema and diasporic film, the books present numerous new areas for research. These areas would undoubtedly bring with them new research methodologies. Where the study of Iranian cinema was once rather limited to studying the effects of the revolution on film and visual culture, a more expansive understanding of film cultures in Iran and the Iranian diaspora allow for a more multifaceted understanding of cinema.

Studies of cinema after 1979 focused rather significantly on auteur­-based studies or works that emphasized the social dimensions of cinema. Newer works, such as Blake Atwood’s Reform Cinema in Iran: Film and Political Change in the Islamic Republic (Columbia University Press, 2016) put forward new critical genres. Atwood argues that to simply label Iranian cinema after 1979 “post-revolutionary” is to gloss over the significant differences between revolutionary cinema (that which came with regime change in the immediate years after the revolution) and reform cinema, which was closely aligned with the politics of the reform movement and former President Mohammad Khatami.[15] Atwood reads the relationship between cinema and politics as mutually determining, which marks a departure from the way this relationship has been understood in the field. New concepts require new methodologies and here Atwood’s book is also illustrative of the changes underway in the field. In Reform Cinema, the political dimensions of cinema are considered in tandem with an analysis of the aesthetics and formal strategies of films. What these new approaches to studying Iranian cinema demonstrate is that the field is opening up and in that opening, reveals itself to be capacious for different modes of reading. The opening of the field to accommodate new approaches also operates at the level of individual films, which can only deepen in significant when understood through different approaches at various points in the history of the field.

 

  1. This is not a thesis on Iranian cinema.

Jafar Panahi’s In Film Nist/This is Not a Film (2011) made under house arrest after he was sentenced to time in prison and a twenty-year ban on filmmaking, raises significant questions about the conditions of film production in Iran. The film cheekily claims it is “not a film” in order to bypass the restrictions on Panahi’s activities. But it is also not a film insofar as the activity of making it frustrates Panahi’s expectations of what a film ought to be. In a crucial scene, Panahi and his co-director Mojtaba Mirtahmasb sit on the floor of his living sketching an outline of frame composition in a scene, and Panahi writes off his “film” as not at all a film for its lack of story or plot. Blake Atwood discusses the manner in which This is Not a Film uses the question of medium specificity to investigate who has the right to tell stories and how they are told.[16]

This is not a thesis on Iranian cinema. To have a thesis on “Iranian cinema” would be to work against what I have described here as its mutability, its volatility, and its openness to transformation. The act of watching Panahi’s film makes us ask, if I am watching it, is it a film (even if the director claims it is not)? And so we might ask, in our attempt to theorize Iranian cinema, what is Iranian cinema? Who decides that its history can be chronicled, or that its objects are known and therefore closed to interpretation? Who decides its parameters? To avoid a definitive answer would allow the thing itself—the object—to escape our grasp, and it is precisely what might allow us to think with these films and non-films.

  1. The future of Iranian cinema is…

Why write ten theses on Iranian cinema? I have proposed ten arguments for thinking Iranian cinema, which range from an analysis of the aesthetics of Iranian cinema, its relationship to other arts, and ways of understanding the changing field of Iranian cinema studies. What repeats in these theses is the mutual existence of historical discontinuity and, what remains a steadfast feature of Iranian cinema—its ability to engage in transformation. This transformation, whether in the spectator-screen relation, or as a way of understanding the object as it circulates globally, belies the determined nature of a project of “ten theses.” Not only do multiple theses suggest the impossibility of one, but they also represent a desire to resist a grand narrative that collapses the particularities of aesthetics and politics in Iranian cinema.

Kiarostami’s Ten, the inspiration for this piece, represents a particularly generative moment for thinking Iranian cinema. It is widely known as Kiarostami’s first digital film, and it is also his first film to feature a female protagonist. It maintains some of Kiarostami’s recognized cinematic signatures, such as working without a script and the use of non-actors. It represents at once the pre-‘79 period of cinema, during which Kiarostami began his career, as well as the celebrated elements of the post-‘79 period, most notably the interplay between reality and fiction). Ten also represents the future of Iranian cinema, both in its digital mode and its emphasis on women’s experiences. In its signalling of new directions in Iranian cinema, Ten represents the engagement from Iran’s celebrated auteur with a democratic form of filmmaking. With digital cinema, more young Iranian filmmakers had access to creating moving images and participating in cultural production. In the contemporary political moment, these young filmmakers bring new political questions and renewed formal strategies, thereby expanding our understanding of “Iranian cinema,” beyond the long-held dichotomies between “popular” and “art” cinema, and “tradition” and “modernity.”

[1]Negar Mottahedeh, Displaced Allegories: Post-Revolutionary Iranian Cinema (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).

[2]Hamid Naficy, “Iranian Writers, Iranian Cinema, and the Case of ‘Dash Akol,’” Iranian Studies 18.2, no. 4 (1985): 231-251.

[3]For a more detailed discussion of this relationship, see Sara Saljoughi, “A New Form for a New People: Forough Farrokhzad’s The House is Black,” Camera Obscura Feminism, Culture, and Media Studies 94, vol. 32, no. 1 (April 2017): 1-31.

[4]See Hamid Naficy, A Social History of Iranian Cinema, Volumes 1-4 (Durham: Duke University Press), 2011-2012 and Hamid Dabashi, Close Up: Iranian Cinema Past, Present, and Future (London: Verso, 2000).

[5]For a discussion of distinctly local cinematic practices, see Shahab Esfandiary, Iranian Cinema and Globalization: National, Transnational, and Islamic Dimensions (London: Intellect, 2012).

[6]David J. Roxburgh, “Micrographia: Toward a Visual Logic of Persianate Painting,” RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics 43 (Spring 2003): 12-30: 23.

[7]Ibid., 27.

[8]See Christiane Gruber, “Questioning the ‘Classical’ in Persian Painting: Models and Problems of Definition,” Journal of Art Historiography 6 (2012): 1-25.

[9]Roxburgh, “Micrographia,” 15.

[10]I explore this concept in my manuscript on the aesthetics and politics of cinema in Iran during the 1960s and 1970s, provisionally titled Burning Visions: The Counter-Cinema of the Iranian New Wave.

[11]Andrew Higson, “The Concept of National Cinema.” Screen 30, no. 4 (1989): 36-47.

[12]Ibid., 41.

[13]“Qui-êtes vous Monsieur Kiarostami?” Cahiers du cinéma (July 1995).

[14]This tendency is encapsulated by the response to Fredric Jameson’s, “Third World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism,” Social Text 15 (1986): 65-88. See also Aijaz Ahmad, “Jameson’s Rhetoric of Otherness and the ‘National Allegory,’” Social Text 17 (1987): 3-25.

[15]Blake Atwood, Reform Cinema in Iran: Film and Political Change in the Islamic Republic (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 14.

[16]Ibid., 203.

Risking Prophecy in the Modern State: Foucault, Iran, and the Conduct of the Intellectual

Dr. Corey McCall <cmccall@elmira.edu> is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Elmira College in upstate New York.  His teaching and research interests include 19th and 20th century European philosophy, American philosophy, postcolonial literature and thought, and the history of philosophy more broadly.  Recent and forthcoming publications include the co-edited volumes Melville Among the Philosophers (2017) and Benjamin, Adorno, and the Experience of Literature (Forthcoming in 2018).

 

For too long, Foucault scholars have kept Foucault’s Iranian writings at arm’s length.  Considered a curiosity at best, the essays and dispatches that stem from his two visits to Iran in the fall of 1978 were long thought extraneous to Foucault’s writings.[1] With the publication in recent years of Foucault’s Collège de France lecture courses, we can begin to see how misguided this earlier view of these writings truly was.  The initial effort in this direction was made by the compilers of Foucault’s Iranian writings in English, Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson.[2]  While the Afary and Anderson volume was certainly valuable as a compilation of Foucault’s Iranian writings, their interpretive essay that introduced the volume contained serious misunderstandings of Foucault, Iran, and Foucault’s writings on Iran.[3]  Initially, many readers and scholars of Foucault’s writings reacted to these texts on events in Iran with puzzlement, if not outright embarrassment. Indeed, Afary and Anderson’s interpretive essay can be seen as the culmination of this initial phase of the scholarly reception of Foucault’s Iranian texts.  Despite the fact that it attempts to place these writings within the broader context of Foucault’s thought, it offers a thoroughly inadequate reading of Foucault’s work.

More recently, Foucault scholars have attempted to place Foucault’s writings on Iran within the broader context of his published writings and his lecture courses. Melinda Cooper’s essay “The Law of the Household: Foucault, Neoliberalism, and the Iranian Revolution” is a good example of this more recent approach to Foucault’s Iranian writings.[4]  Cooper’s essay contextualizes Foucault’s writings in terms of his analysis of two very different revolutions (the neoliberal “revolution” and Iranian Revolution) by reading Foucault’s dispatches from Iran alongside his 1978-1979 Birth of Biopolitics lecture course.  My own approach will be similar to Cooper’s, but I wish to examine these writings through the lens of the course that Foucault delivered just prior to visiting Iran, the 1977-1978 lecture course subsequently published as Security, Territory, Population. In this course Foucault develops the concepts of conduct and counter-conduct that represent both a shift in how he conceives power relations and an anticipation of his later work on the care of the self.  Like his Iranian writings, Security Territory, Population should be read on its own terms as well as seen as a text that serves as an incubator for subsequent work.  In other words, these writings are transitional, provided that we understand this transition as the work of transforming his previous writings and conditioning what comes later rather than a simple move from one position to another.  Just as Melinda Cooper suggests that we read Foucault’s lectures on neoliberalism in terms of his Iranian writings and in anticipation of his later work on the care of the self, I want to trace another trajectory that runs through counter-conduct and its attendant risks, the Iranian Revolution, and parresia read through the lens of governmentality and the intellectual’s political attempts to understand, critique, and ultimately contest modern technologies of government.[5]  I hope to contribute to this more recent interpretive trend by examining how governmentality and parresia (or at least anticipations of these) can be seen to function within Foucault’s writings on Iran.  

Foucault becomes increasingly interested in parresia (frank or fearless speech) in his lecture courses of the 1980s, but we can glean the origins of this later concern with fearless speech through Foucault’s conception of counter-conduct as developed in Security, Territory, Population.  The first section of this essay focuses on the role that governmentality plays in Foucault’s Iran texts before making the connection between governmentality and parresia plain.  The second section focuses on various anticipations of parresia in Foucault’s writings on the Iranian Revolution beginning with Foucault’s understanding of the intellectual’s political role and his claim that we understand philosophy as “the politics of truth” before turning to Foucault’s ambivalent remarks concerning the intellectual’s prophetic voice.  Finally, I conclude with some general considerations of Foucault’s conception of the modern intellectual, based upon insights from his Iranian writings and his collaborative work in the early 1970s with the Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons (GIP) and his characterization of Ali Shariati as the intellectual voice of the Iranian Revolution.

  1. Governmentality and Modern State Power in Iran

With the publication of Foucault’s lecture courses, it becomes much easier to see the coherence and hidden congruencies within his work.  The earliest reception of Foucault’s work was driven by a belief that his work consisted of distinct periods in which the work of the later period superseded that of the earlier period.  The conception of the later Foucault rewriting the work of his earlier self is the basis of Hubert Dreyfus’ and Paul Rabinow’s influential study Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics.  Indeed, their approach makes it seem as if the works of the later Foucault constitute an erasure and revision of the earlier one, for by their account, Foucault senses that his archaeology led to a methodological dead-end so he develops his genealogical method.  However, such an interpretive approach forces the reader to discount Foucault’s own claim that he was doing both archaeology and genealogy in his later works.  More recently, Thomas E. Flynn has argued more convincingly for a prismatic approach that finds Foucault’s work coalescing around three main themes, that of knowledge, power, and ethics.  Flynn’s interpretive strategy provides a better account of the relationship between the lecture courses and the published work, for Foucault did not strive to provide the final word on anything.  In the lecture courses, we can see him constantly returning to what he has previously said and rethinking it—not in order to correct it, but to open it up for new exploration.  The lecture courses do not provide the last word, nor should they take precedence over the published works, but do they help us to better grasp Foucault at work.

If we keep these methodological considerations in mind, we can better grasp how Foucault’s lecture courses relate to each other and how his occasional writings in turn relate to both the lecture courses and the published works.  No doubt Foucault proceeds through fits and starts, and we would not want to minimize various discontinuities and dead ends present in his lecture courses, but we find correspondences and connections within them as well.  Here, I wish to focus on the connection between Foucault’s treatment of governmentality (understood as the conduct of conduct) on the one hand and the two of the forms that resistance to governmentality may take, counter-conduct and parresia.  From this connection we can see how Foucault conceives of the conduct of the intellectual in his lecture courses and how this conception informs Foucault’s Iranian writings.  In other words, the conclusion of this section will examine the question of whether Foucault reconceives his conception of the intellectual’s role in contemporary society as a result of the events witnessed in Iran.  In the next section I will show how these related concepts provide insights into Foucault’s Iran writings and his conception of the intellectual during the last years of his life.

In the “Course Context” to Security, Territory, Population, Michel Senellart places the 1978 lecture course within the broader trajectory of Foucault’s writings.  The lecture courses from 1976-1979 form a triptych in which Foucault broaches the topic of biopower and biopolitics, but always haltingly and indirectly.  He announces the project in his 1976 course Society Must Be Defended as well as in the conclusion to the first volume of The History of Sexuality.  As Senellart points out, it is as if this conception of the various mechanisms that govern life can only be approached obliquely.  He announces the biopower project (biopower understood here as the various modern technologies of power that take populations as their object) toward the end of Society Must Be Defended, but he does not begin to develop the concept until 1978 (Foucault did not offer a course at the Collège de France in 1977).  Even here, the lectures quickly turn away from a general analytic of biopower and toward a more specific analysis of governmentality; indeed, by the fourth lecture, governmentality and pastoral power have taken center stage.[6]  Similarly, Foucault begins The Birth of Biopolitics by announcing that he will focus that year’s lectures on biopower but quickly takes up the birth of neoliberalism.  “What is actually involved in both cases is bringing to light the forms of experience and rationality on the basis of which power over life was organized in the West. But at the same time the effect of this research is to shift the center of gravity of the lectures from the question of biopower to that of government, to such an extent that in the end the latter almost entirely eclipses the former.”[7]  Whether it is because Foucault realizes that he cannot say anything about biopolitics without first developing the concept of governmentality itself (in Security, Territory, Population) and neoliberal governmentality (in The Birth of Biopolitics) or for some other reason, one of the interesting consequences of this decision to focus on governmentality in these lectures is that the anticipation of the later work becomes readily apparent. Senellart points this out: “Breaking with the discourse of the ‘battle’ employed from the 1970s, the concept of ‘government’ would mark the first shift, becoming more pronounced from 1980, from the analytics of power to the ethics of the subject.”[8]  Foucault completes the Security, Territory, Population lectures in April of 1978 and is sent to Iran by the Italian newspaper Corriere della serra in the fall of 1978, so it seems reasonable to surmise that we would find some connections between the material in the lecture course and Foucault’s writings on Iran.

Governmentality plays various roles in Foucault’s Iranian writings, though never a central one.  I shall focus on two instances where Foucault uses the term in ways that indicate its growing significance in his work during this period.  But first, a few words about one of the common criticisms of these texts: it has often been claimed that Foucault fails to adequately understand the Iranian Revolution on its own terms but instead imposes categories from his own European frame of reference upon these events.[9]  This criticism is true to a certain extent; furthermore, such a practice is likely unavoidable for someone who lacks expertise in these fields.  Nevertheless, it does not follow that Foucault is the latest in a long line of European thinkers engaging in an Orientalist project to understand the Middle Eastern and Asian cultures in European terms, nor is he dazzled by the exotic sights he witnesses in Iran.  Rather his claims concerning parallels between, say, power relations in European contexts and cross-cultural parallels to places such as Iran or Japan remain invariably probing and tentative. Connections between his work and what he witnesses in Tehran or Qom are not dogmatically asserted but instead remain searching and hypothetical.

Stuart Elden has recently traced the chronology of Foucault’s work during this period, and he reminds us that Foucault concluded Security, Territory, Population in April 1978 and then proceeded to travel to Japan, where he gave two lectures and visited a Zen monastery.[10]  Elden suggests we read these lectures as well as many of his Iranian writings as attempts to test whether his re-conceived notion of power as governmentality has anything like cross-cultural validity.  He is not attempting to impose this schema upon other cultural conceptions of power, but rather determining whether it can be applied.  And this is a useful way to approach the Iran texts as well: Foucault is testing a hypothesis in order to see whether his conception of power as government (as “the conduct of conduct”) provides something more than merely a European matrix for understanding power relations.[11]

As evidence, we can first consider this reference to government found in “Tehran: Faith Against the Shah”: “I do not feel comfortable,” Foucault writes, “speaking of Islamic government as an ‘idea’ or even an ‘ideal.’ Rather, it impressed me as a form of ‘political will.’  It impressed me in its effort to politicize structures that are inseparably social and religious in response to current problems. It also impressed me in its attempt to open a spiritual dimension in politics.”[12] Readers are often puzzled by the introduction of the term “political spirituality” in these texts; Foucault employs the term here to characterize this distinctive form of government introduced in Iran by the revolutionaries, a form of government that was developed through opposition to the Shah.  That is, Islamic government was shaped through opposition, through the counter-conduct that eventually led to the shah’s ouster.  In other words, Islamic government is a set of concrete practices that politicize domains that had previously been free from governmentalization.

In both Security, Territory and Population and The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault’s concerns lie not only with the innovation and proliferation of arts of government characteristic of modernity, but also with the limitations imposed upon these innovative arts of government, either externally or through self-limitation.  In The Birth of Biopolitics, one of the key differences he emphasizes between previous forms of government and eighteenth century forms of liberalism is that prior to the eighteenth century both innovations in governmentality and limitations on government were imposed from the outside.  Liberal and later neoliberal theorists held that government ought to restrict itself. At the end of the eighteenth century, “there is a shift of the center of gravity of public law.  The fundamental problem of public law will no longer be the foundation of sovereignty, the conditions of the sovereign’s legitimacy, or the conditions under which the sovereign’s rights can be exercised legitimately as it was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The problem becomes how to set juridical limits to the exercise of power by a public authority.”[13]  Liberal governmental rationality consists of self-imposed limits that will ultimately help it achieve its aims through “the management of risk”:

A number of consequences follow from this. First, we can say that the motto of liberalism is: “Live dangerously.” “Live dangerously,” that is to say, individuals are constantly exposed to danger, or rather, they are conditioned to experience their situation, their life, their present, and their future as containing danger. I think this kind of stimulus of danger will be one of the major implications of liberalism. An entire education and culture of danger appears in the nineteenth century which is very different from those great apocalyptic threats of plague, death, and war which fed the political and cosmological imagination of the Middle Ages, and even of the seventeenth century.[14]

Risk is the complement of liberty, and by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the main task of liberal governmentality in Western states had become the management of risk.  Individuals and corporations are obliged to assume risk within society, but the truth of liberalism lies in the calculation of that risk.  Drawing on the work of neoliberal economists such as Gary Becker, Foucault develops this theme of individual risk in liberalism and neoliberalism later in the lecture course by considering the neoliberal account of crime and the criminal.  The criminal is one who “invests in an action, expects a profit from it, and who accepts the risk of a loss.”[15] Consequently, the penal system targets the conduct of the criminal: “It has to concern itself with a conduct or a series of conducts which produce actions from which the actors expect a profit and which carry a special risk, which is not just the risk of economic loss, but the penal risk, or that economic loss which is inflicted by a penal system.”  That is, the penal system provides a set of reactions to the “supply of crime.”[16]  The management of risk gives rise to various techniques of neoliberal governmentality that develop around the economic calculation of risk, with criminal justice as just one dimension of this economization.  In other words, neoliberalism sees everything through an economic lens, and the penal system becomes subject to economic analysis for the first time. Although it may not initially appear so, this conception of governmentality, understood as “the conduct of conduct,” and various forms of resistance (“counter-conducts”) to it, lies in the background of these writings on the Iranian Revolution.[17]

Foucault’s claim that Islamic government represents a new form of political will occurs in the final section of his article “What Are the Iranians Dreaming About?” entitled “The Inventors of the State.”[18]   He concludes the article with four observations, two about the present and two about the relationship between the present and the distant past.  First, he remarks that the intensity of this political will precludes a moderate solution, but secondly he also wonders at its depth, whether it is “rooted deeply enough to become a permanent factor in the political life of Iran, or will it dissipate like a cloud when the sky of political reality have finally cleared […]?” These questions indicate present concerns, but Foucault has deeper concerns that center around state power, governmentality, and resistance; that is, that concern conduct and counter-conduct from a historical perspective.  “At the dawn of history, Persia invented the state and conferred its models on Islam. Its administrators staffed the caliphate. But from this same Islam, it derived a religion that gave to its people the power to resist state power.”[19] So, Foucault asks, how does the present revolution relate to this longer history of the state and resistance to the state?  With the Iranian Revolution, are we witnessing a re-invention of this state, or something new? His second historical question concerns political spirituality: “For the people who inhabit this land, what is the point of searching, even at the cost of their own lives, for this thing whose possibility we have forgotten since the Renaissance and the great crisis of Christianity, a political spirituality. I can already hear the French laughing, but I know that they are wrong.”[20] The crisis of Christianity occurred during the same period as the initial proliferation in arts of government: in both cases, we see a close connection between spiritual matters and governmentality.  An Islamic government, in other words, would be one that institutionalizes and governmentalizes political spirituality.

With the exception of Khomeini, Foucault harbors no illusions regarding whether the Shi’ite clergy themselves might constitute a revolutionary vanguard, but he remains open to the possibility that Shi’ism itself can.  Foucault detects a split in the opposition, between those he terms “politicians” who believe that Khomeini has no concrete governing program and the people themselves, for whom Khomeini’s charisma, which Foucault characterizes as “a mysterious current that flowed between an old man who had been exiled for fifteen years and his people,” is irresistible.[21] He notes in several places in these texts that what the world is witnessing is a revolution from below in the name of Islam.  Of course, this scrambles the neat Western dichotomy that draws a rigid distinction between revolution and religion, with religion seen as a conservative force within society that seeks to maintain its hold on tradition.  One source of this rigid distinction between revolution and religion is Marx himself, who famously claimed that religion was “the opiate of the people,” but another source of it can be found in the Enlightenment legacy of bourgeois humanism that contrasts progress in society in such fields as science, technology, and politics with the benighted realm of religious superstition.  One of the things that fascinates Foucault about what he witnessed in Iran was that the revolt against the Shah was in the name of religion: it was a religious revolt that scrambled this neat distinction between religion and revolution.[22]  Foucault reports that he never once heard the word “revolution.” Instead, the people are clamoring for “an Islamic government,” which was what Ayatollah Khomeini repeatedly claimed was the aim of resistance to the Shah as well.[23]  Foucault distinguishes two possible meanings for this term.  “Islamic government” may mean a “utopia” or, alternatively, “an ideal” that refashions ancient meanings into something qualitatively new. “At any rate, it is something very old and also very far into the future, a notion of coming back to what Islam was at the time of the Prophet, but also of advancing toward a luminous and distant point where it would be possible to renew fidelity rather than maintain obedience.”[24] In other words, the demand for Islamic government is a demand for the creative renewal of Islam that will transform its current legalism.[25]  He continues that “it is first and foremost about a movement that aims to give a permanent role in political life to the traditional structures of Islamic society.  An Islamic government is what will allow the continuing activity of the thousands of political centers that have been spawned in mosques and religious communities in order to resist the shah’s regime.”[26] Foucault gives an example of an earthquake in Ferdows that devastated the city.  When the authorities presented their rebuilding plan, it was rejected by the people, who, under the guidance of a religious leader, raised the money to rebuild the city at a nearby site that was dubbed Islamiyeh.[27]  This is the sort of political creativity at the heart of a revolt focused squarely on a revolutionary transformation of the present.

It is simultaneously this demand for Islamic government and the focus on the present that fascinates Foucault here.  While this makes some amount of sense given Foucault’s self-description as an historian of the present, it contrasts markedly with his understanding of European historico-political discourses prior to the nineteenth century.  In their recent analysis of Foucault’s work on state and civil society, Mitchell Dean and Kaspar Villadsen remind us of this forgetting of the present in eighteenth-century discourses on both state power and the various resistances to it, as documented in Foucault’s 1976 course Society Must Be Defended:

In the old eighteenth-century historico-political discourse the present is always viewed as             a moment of profound forgetfulness. More precisely, the present was understood to be     permeated by a complex of shifts and alliances between rival forces that had rendered the             fundamental and primitive state of war muddled. The present was negatively valued         because the objective was to awaken form or cure oneself from this forgetfulness.[28]

This nostalgia for a national past changes at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, when thinkers begin to prize the present for its own sake rather than seeing it as a “muddled” moment of oblivion during which the nobility demanded a reawakening of past glories.[29]  Late eighteenth-century and nineteenth century thinkers become simultaneously more focused on the present and more forward-looking.  The European nobles in Foucault’s 1975-1976 lecture course sought a return to the archaism of the nation as a way to call into question the legitimacy of the absolutist state.  In his last published text, Foucault will claim that it is Kant’s focus on the present that marks him as an Enlightenment thinker.  Foucault knows that Kant is not the first philosopher to reflect on the present, but he believes that he is the first to reflect on the present on its own terms, and not, as a dimension of world history (Plato), or as a sign pointing to the future (Augustine), or a transition to something new (Vico).  Instead, Kant sees the present as an Ausgang or exit from self-incurred immaturity that precludes thinking and acting for oneself, both at the level of the individual and the social.[30]

This return to Kant in Foucault’s late texts seems to have perplexed some readers, but it really shouldn’t.  After all, Foucault began his intellectual career with the publication of a translation and interpretation of Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, and Foucault’s various engagements with Kant extend throughout his career.[31]  The next section focuses on one aspect of this engagement.  I focus on the conception of intellectual praxis that we find in Foucault’s engagement with Kant’s work in the late 1970s and how it relates to his Iranian writings.  Ali Shariati, the thinker who is often cited as the ideological prophet of the Iranian Revolution, will provide my focus.

  1. Contesting State Power: Kant, Shariati, and the Risks of Resistance

The question concerning the intellectual’s role in modern societies has been a recurring theme throughout Foucault’s writings, though this theme manifests itself more in his occasional writings and lecture courses than in his published writings.  This is an enduring concern that can be traced to quite early in Foucault’s career.  For example, “Intellectuals and Power,” which is a dialogue between Foucault and Gilles Deleuze conducted in March of 1972, addresses the changing role of the intellectual in modern European societies.[32]  This piece dates from the pair’s involvement with the Groupe d’information sur les Prisons (GIP), a loosely-affiliated group of intellectuals and activists who sought to provide French inmates with a platform so that they could draw attention to the squalid prison conditions in France.  It was important to the intellectuals involved that the prisoners be given an opportunity to speak for themselves instead of acting as their representatives.  Hence, one of the topics of this dialogue was representation, i.e. an analysis of the various conditions under which the intellectual is authorized to speak on behalf of another.

Foucault has already begun to contest the Marxist conception of the engaged intellectual, according to which the intellectual both speaks on behalf of the exploited proletariat and attempts to get the members of this class to see their wretchedness.  By 1972 Foucault sees that this conception of the engaged intellectual, one that extends from Marx and Engels at least through Sartre, was inadequate.  He endeavors to replace this Marxist conception of the engaged intellectual who speaks on behalf of others and serves as their representative with the conception of the specific intellectual.  Among other things, this individual does not pretend to have privileged knowledge that remains inaccessible to those she represents.  Foucault here discusses the role of the intellectual in much the same way that he will some seven years later in his interview with Baqir Parham.  He notes that the intellectual’s political status in bourgeois society typically stems from two sources: either it results from her position within society, “the position as an intellectual in bourgeois society, in the system of capitalist production, in the ideology which that system produces or imposes” or from the “intellectual discourse itself, in as much as it revealed a particular truth, uncovering political relationships where none were before perceived.”[33]  The first reason for politicization of the intellectual is due to the fact that many intellectuals exist on the margins, either ignored or actively persecuted by the authorities.  The second reason for the intellectual’s politicization within bourgeois society stems from her role as a critic.   This figure of the marginalized intellectual who engages in social critique provides the basis both for Foucault’s analysis of intellectual counter-conduct (what he with some hesitation labels “dissent” in Security, Territory, Population) and his understanding of the political role that the intellectual plays in the Iranian Revolution.  This is most evident in his understanding of the significance of Ali Shariati as a prophet of the Revolution, whom Foucault characterizes in startlingly Kantian terms.

One of the most important continuities between Security, Territory, Population and Foucault’s other writings during this period can be found in his attempt to develop this insight from 1972 and his work with the GIP that intellectuals are always imbricated in the political.  Despite various attempt to tenaciously cling to an apolitical, objective stance that remains above the fray, intellectual labor always has specific political implications.  This is put most succinctly in Foucault’s re-conception of philosophy at the beginning of the Security, Territory, Population lectures that philosophy ought to be understood as “the politics of truth.”  As I noted above, Foucault begins the lecture course by claiming that his aim for that year will be the study of biopower, though he quickly becomes ensnared first in the study of governmentality and then of pastoral power as the antecedent of modern arts of government.  He begins by presenting a series of “indications” or “principles of intent” regarding where he hopes the investigation of biopower that year will lead.  After noting that these indications will neither yield a general definition of power relations nor a conception of power as an essence that exists independently of the relations constituting it.  He concedes that the analysis may indeed lead to a general analysis of society, but that possibility will not guide him.  Rather, this project is a philosophical one, provided that we understand philosophy as “the politics of truth,” that is a discipline whose “role is showing the knowledge effects produced by the struggles, confrontations, and battles that take place within our society, and by the tactics of power that are the elements of that struggle.”[34]  Indeed, he seems here to be taking up Deleuze’s suggestion in “Intellectuals and Power” that theories be seen as a tools in a tool box, or, as Foucault says in 1972, that theory be seen as a “local and regional” praxis:

A struggle against power, a struggle to bring power to light and open up where it is most invisible and insidious.  Not a struggle for some ‘insight’ or ‘realization’ (for a long time consciousness as knowledge has been acquired by the masses, and consciousness as subjectivity has been taken, occupied by the bourgeoisie)—but a struggle to undermine and take power side by side with those who are fighting, and not of to the side trying to enlighten them. A ‘theory’ is the regional system of this struggle.[35]

The intellectual remains immanent within society and not a privileged member of it.  Furthermore, society is here understood as a site of struggle that forms the basis for state power and its technologies of government.  Hence the problem with treating the intellectual as an authoritative prophet is that this status assumes privileged knowledge that she would share if only her fellow members of society would listen.  Foucault underscores this position in a series of interviews he gave with the Italian Marxist journalist Ducio Trombadori after his return from Iran at the end of 1978.  In the final interview, included in the 1991 collection Remarks on Marx as “The Discourse on Power,” Foucault makes his reservations regarding the modern intellectual’s role within society plain.  Trombadori attempts to get Foucault to admit that the intellectual has some general political role to play in society, and Foucault responds:

My role is to address problems effectively, really: and to pose them with the greatest        possible rigor, with the maximum complexity and difficulty so that a solution does not arise all at once because of the thought of some reformer or even in the brain of a political party.  The problems that I try to address, these perplexities of crime, madness,            and sex which involve daily life, cannot be easily resolved. It takes years, decades of         work carried out at the grassroots level with the people directly involved; and the right to speech and political imagination must be returned to them.[36]

The intellectual’s task is direct involvement “at the grassroots level.”  Instead of speaking on behalf of people due to the peculiar authority of the intellectual, the intellectual must work to restore what the people have lost, the right to speech and political imagination.  Foucault continues: “I carefully guard against making the law. Rather, I concern myself with determining problems, unleashing them, revealing them within the framework of such complexity as to shut the mouths of prophets and legislators: all those who speak for others and above others.”[37]  This concern with speaking for others and its attendant problems of representation and misrepresentation had already been addressed in the 1972 interview, and Foucault remains concerned with it here.  In his conversation with Trombadori, Foucault seems to categorically deny that the intellectual any prophetic role.  However, if we return to the Iranian writings, we see that Foucault’s emphasis on political imagination and the right to speech (what he will subsequently term parresia) render this condemnation of intellectual prophecy less categorical.  While he never advocates the view that the intellectual be seen simply as a prophet, once we examine what he has to say about Iranian intellectuals in general and Ali Shariati in particular we can surmise that Foucault would likely endorse this qualified sense of immanent intellectual prophecy—the intellectual as a specific prophet rather than a general one.

In his discussion with Trombadori, Foucault’s main worry about understanding the intellectual in terms of a prophet or a legislator is that these conceptions provide the intellectual with prescriptive authority.  According to these two conceptions, the intellectual does not simply analyze and describe how things are; in addition, she assumes a position of authority that makes it possible for her to render the phenomena or actors involved in her social analyses and critiques as objects of research who must submit to her authority and in whose name she speaks.  There is another worry here, though, and it is this worry that provides the basis for a modified conception of the prophetic intellectual, one not subject to Foucault’s reservations.  The typical prophetic intellectual is able to secure a position that minimizes her risk, one that might be literal or figurative.  For example, a professor employed by a university generally assumes fewer risks than the intellectual who is not part of such an institutional setting.  The intellectual might find a way to comment on events (on a blog or in the media) and thereby avoid becoming implicated in the social events that occasion her analysis thus remaining above the fray.  So, does Foucault offer us a way for the intellectual to be both prophetic and assume the risks borne by individuals who lack the intellectuals’ various institutional advantages?

An adequate answer to this question would require a fuller examination of Foucault’s lectures on parresia during the final years of his life than I will be able to provide here.[38]  Instead, I would like to examine two moments that anticipate his later work on parresia.  In addition to contributing to an account of the development of this idea in Foucault’s work, it will also help us to see the role of the prophetic intellectual in Foucault’s writings on Iran.  I will begin with Foucault’s remarks on the intellectual found in his interview with Baqir Parham.  I conclude by discussing Foucault’s remarks on Ali Shariati as an exemplar of the prophetic intellectual who risked speaking out against a tyrannical government.

Foucault begins his dialogue with Parham by reiterating his claim that one’s status as an intellectual entails political engagement, but he rejects previous attempts to define the intellectual in purely theoretical or objective terms.[39]  The salient question, then, is what sort of relationship to politics the intellectual ought to have: will it be characterized by the intellectual’s attempts to remain aloof from engagement, or will she embrace it?  And, if she embraces it, then how best to do so? Since the French Revolution, Foucault claims, the intellectual has “played the role of a prophet, a foreteller of the future society.  In other words, the intellectual was one whose responsibility was to deal with general and universal principles for all of humanity.”[40]  Due to various changes in modern society, this pretension to speak on behalf of all humanity has been undermined.  He continues, “In my opinion, today the intellectual must be inside the pit, the very pit in which the sciences are engaged, where they produce political results.”[41]  It is necessary, Foucault claims, to begin anew, “to construct another political thought, another political vision, and teach a new vision of the future.”[42] In other words, the intellectual’s task remains oriented to the future, but a specific future in which she can no longer speak for all.  This is how Foucault understands his role in Iran, and it is how he characterizes the role of Ali Shariati.

Foucault characterizes Ali Shariati as the intellectual hero of the Revolution. In “Tehran: Faith Against the Shah,” Foucault writes about Ali Shariati in a way that anticipates his formulation of the Kantian present as an “Ausgang” or “exit” in his final writings. Shariati dies in June of 1977, but his work provides the basis for Foucault’s conception of political spirituality.  Indeed, Foucault claims that the present is haunted by the spirit of Ali Shariati.  In terms that echo the famous opening lines of The Communist Manifesto (“A specter is haunting Europe—the specter of Communism”), Foucault characterizes Shariati as the ghost that haunts Iran today:

But one dreams also of another movement, which is the inverse and converse of the first [i.e. an Islamic government].  This is one that allow the introduction of a spiritual dimension into political life, in order that it would not be, as always, the obstacle to spirituality, but rather its receptacle, its opportunity, and its ferment. This is where we encounter a shadow that haunts all political and religious life in Iran today: that of Ali Shariati, whose death two years ago gives him the position, so privileged in Shi’ism, of the invisible Present, of the ever-present Absent.[43]

Shariati defines the present for a Shi’ism in revolt, just as Kant had defined the Enlightenment for liberal Europe two centuries before.  Furthermore, Shariati constitutes a public outside the university through his teaching.  Foucault continues: “His ‘luck’ was that persecution forced him to go to Tehran and to have to teach outside of the university, in a room prepared for him under the protection of a mosque. There, he addressed a public that was his, and that could soon be counted in the thousands: students, mullahs, intellectuals, modest people from the neighborhood of the bazaar, and people passing through from the provinces.”[44]  The distinction Foucault draws here between a life devoted to university teaching and one devoted to a public one constitutes oneself echoes the distinction that Kant drew between the private and public use of reason.  Private reason is constrained by another, while public reason permits one to speak unfettered, in one’s own voice.

In May 1978, Foucault gives a lecture at the Sorbonne entitled “What is Critique?”  In this lecture, he gives a first sketch of what he terms here “the critical attitude” from the beginning in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and extending through Kant and the European Enlightenment.[45]  The significance of this critical attitude can only be understood in light of Christian pastoral power in which “every individual, whatever his age or his status, from the beginning to the end of his life and down to the very details of his actions, ought to be governed and ought to let himself be governed […] by someone to whom he is bound in a total, and at the same time meticulous and detailed, relation of obedience.”[46]  This is a summary of the genealogy of modern governmentality that Foucault had just traced from its roots in the Middle Ages administration of obedience in Security, Territory, Population.  Modernity witnesses “a veritable explosion” of these arts of governing.  What had been limited to the institutional site of the monastic life became both widespread throughout society and unmoored from its religious context.[47]  This laicization and proliferation of the arts of government prompt individuals and groups to find ways to avoid this governmentalizing tendency in society. The question in a wide variety of both sacred and secular contexts becomes, “How not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of these principles, in view of such objectives and b the means of such methods, not like that, not for that, not by them.”[48]  This “art of not being governed so much” is the essence of the critical attitude.  Foucault next provides three examples: the European Protestant refusal of the governing Church hierarchy, refusal of sovereign power in the name of natural rights, and questioning authority.  “I will say that critique is the movement through which the subject gives itself the right to question truth concerning its power effects and to question power about its discourses of truth.”[49]

This implicit association of Shariati with European Enlightenment critique becomes less jarring once we recall that Foucault characterizes his account of parresia in Fearless Speech as a genealogy of the critical attitude, “concerned with the question of the importance of telling the truth, knowing who is able to tell the truth, and knowing why we should tell the truth, we have the roots of what we could call the ‘critical’ tradition in the West.  And here you will recognize one of my targets in this seminar, namely, to construct a genealogy of the critical attitude in Western philosophy.”[50]  Foucault and Shariati both realized that critique properly understood is the political work to imagine other futures than the one that seems given.

[1]Indeed, in his otherwise excellent reconstruction of Foucault’s work during this period, Stuart Elden adopts this attitude by dismissing Foucault’s Iranian writings as mere journalism. See Stuart Elden, Foucault’s Last Decade (Cambridge: Polity, 2016).  On 101-102, he writes that “his reports, principally for the Italian newspaper Corriere del Sera [sic], have provoked controversy both at the time and since.  Much of their detail is now of historical interest, and the way that events have developed has outstripped what is, in truth, journalism and prediction rather than the more considered work of his lectures, books, or other writings.”  In a footnote Elden acknowledges those who have found these works to be a more significant part of Foucault’s corpus, but I believe he remains too dismissive of Foucault’s writings on Iran.   

[2]Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, eds., Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

[3]The inadequacies of Afary and Anderson’s interpretive essay were recognized in the first reviews of the book by Foucault scholars.  See, for example, James Bernauer’s review essay of Foucault and the Iranian Revolution in Philosophy and Social Criticism 32, no. 6 (2006), 781-786 and Richard Lynch’s review in Foucault Studies, no. 4, (February 2007), 169-176.  More recently, Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi has used Foucault’s Iranian writings as the basis to reinterpret the Iranian Revolution.  See Foucault in Iran: Islamic Revolution after the Enlightenment (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016).

[4]Cooper’s essay appears in the collection The Government of Life: Foucault, Biopolitics, and Neoliberalism, eds. Vanessa Lemm and Miguel Vatter (NY: Fordham University Press, 2014), 29-58.

[5]Melinda Cooper, The Government of Life, 32. In his dialogue with Baqir Parham, Foucault characterizes the intellectual as one whose action are always already political, and he claims that the since the French Revolution the role of the intellectual has always been understood in terms of prophecy.  He accepts this conception of the intellectual with the stipulation that the intellectual function specifically rather than universally.  He then proceeds to situate the intellectual within the context of revolutionary praxis and the risks of thought.  See Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 183-184.  We will explore this connection further below.

[6]Later in 1978, after he gives the Society Must Be Defended lectures and returns from Iran, Foucault gives a series of interviews with Duccio Trombadori.  In the last of these interviews, Foucault provides a helpful definition of governmentality: “And by ‘government’ I mean the set of institutions and practices by which people are ‘led,’ from administration to education, etc. It is this set of procedures, techniques, and methods that guarantee the ‘government’ of people, which seems to me to be in crisis today.” Michel Foucault and Ducio Trombadori, Remarks on Marx, trans. R. James Goldstein and James Cascaito (NY: Semiotext(e), 1991), 176.  I will return to Foucault’s account of the intellectual in this interview in the subsequent section of this essay.

[7]Michel Senellart, “Course Context” in Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 370.

[8]Senellart, “Course Context,” 370.

[9]This is one of the main critiques advanced by Afary and Anderson.  However, they manage to mangle Foucault’s thought so thoroughly that this criticism loses some of its force.  They freely state that they read Foucault’s genealogical method itself becomes “a suprahistorical grand narrative” that “privileges not modernity but the traditional social orders.” Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 13-14.

[10]Stuart Elden, Foucault’s Last Decade (Malden, MA: Polity, 2016), 101: “It [‘Sexuality and Power,’ one of the two lectures Foucault gave in Japan] closes with a return to the theme of pastoral power, which is of principal interest for its relation to Feudalism within Europe and Confucianism in the East.  On this trip Foucault also spent time in a Zen temple, clearly fascinated by the rituals and rules, in which he saw both parallels and distinctions from Christian monasticism and mysticism.”

[11]Ian Almond does a good job of capturing Foucault’s ambivalence toward non-European societies (indeed, often ambivalence can be indistinguishable from tentativeness).  He claims that Foucault wants to critique the otherness of Islam at the same time that he surreptitiously employs it.  “On the one hand, like Nietzsche, Foucault will always be aware of ‘the thousand-year old reproach of fanaticism’ that has been directed at Islam and the perennial outsider status it has been given by the West; on the other, the very European ‘outsiderness’ that Foucault analyses will simultaneously be of use. The complexity of Foucault’s approach to the Islamic Other—be it Tunisian demonstrators or Iranian Shiites—lies in this consecutive (at time even concurrent) analysis and appropriation of Islam’s alterity.” The New Orientalists: Postmodern Representations of Islam from Foucault to Baudrillard (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 22-23.

[12]Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 208.

[13]Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 39, cf.

[14]Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 66.

[15]Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 253.

[16]Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. Bernard Harcourt develops Foucault’s sketch of the transformation of criminality under liberal and neoliberal regimes of governmentality in The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).

[17]Governmentality must be understood in terms of conduct: it consists of the techniques whereby the conduct of individuals and groups is conducted. Cf. Corey McCall, “Conduct,” The Foucault Lexicon, eds. Leonard Lawlor and John Nale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 68-74.

[18]Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 208-209.

[19]Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 208.

[20]Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 209.

[21]Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 204-205.

[22]Melinda Cooper notes this in her essay “The Law of the Household” as well: “Foucault was convinced that something quite extraordinary was at stake here. The revolutionary movement in Iran, he contended, paved a way for a new form of politics, one which escaped the limitations of the two most salient models of revolution in European history—one the one hand, the liberal revolution which had introduced parliamentary democracy, citizenship, and ‘the monstrosity of the state; and on the other, Marxist revolution, with its tendency to reduce all conflict to class struggle.’” See The Government of Life, 34-35.

[23]Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 205.

[24]Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 206.

[25]Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 206.

[26]Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 207.

[27]Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 207.

[28]Mitchell Dean and Kaspar Villadsen, State Phobia and Civil Society: The Political Legacy of Michel Foucault (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 82. Cf. Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976, eds. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (NY: Picador, 2003), 227: “In the history and historico-political field of the eighteenth century, the present was, basically, always the negative moment.  It was always the trough of the wave, always a moment of apparent calm and forgetfulness.”

[29]Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 227.

[30]Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, vol. 1: Ethics, ed. Paul Rabinow (NY: New Press, 1997), 304-305.

[31]Michel Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, ed. Roberto Nigro (NY: Semiotext(e), 2008). See also Marc Djaballah, Foucault, Kant, and the Forms of Experience (London: Routledge, 2011) for an account of Foucault’s sustained engagement with Kantian critique throughout his career.

[32]Gilles Deleuze, “Intellectuals and Power,” Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (NY: Semiotext(e), 2004).

[33]Deleuze, “Intellectuals and Power,” 207.

[34]Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 2-3.

[35]Deleuze, “Intellectuals and Power,” 207-208.

[36]Michel Foucault and Ducio Trombadori, Remarks on Marx, trans. R. James Goldstein and James Cascaito (NY: Semiotext(e), 1991), 158-159.

[37]Foucault and Trombadori, Remarks on Marx, 159.

[38]Minimally, an engagement with Foucault’s 1981-1982 lecture course The Hermeneutics of the Subject, ed. Frédéric Gros, trans. Graham Burchell (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) and his final lecture course from 1983-1984 The Courage of Truth, ed. Frédéric Gros, trans. Graham Burchell (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).  Finally, his Berkeley lectures from the fall of 1983 published as Fearless Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson (NY: Semiotext(e), 2001) provide a succinct statement of the meaning and significance of parresia. 

[39]Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 183.

[40]Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 184.

[41]Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 184.

[42]Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 185.

[43]Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 207.

[44]Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 208.

[45]Michel Foucault, “What is Critique?” in What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth Century Answers and Twentieth Century Questions, ed. James Schmidt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 382.

[46]Foucault, “What is Critique?” 383.

[47]Foucault, “What is Critique?” 383-384.

[48]Foucault, “What is Critique?” 384.

[49]Foucault, “What is Critique?” 385.

[50]Foucault, Fearless Speech, 170-171.

The Abject Outsider: “The Story of Two Gay Men”

 

Introduction

In his “Homosexuality in Arabic Literature,” Frederic Lagrange offers the following categorizations regarding the presence of diverse sexualities, and representation of (male) homosexual characters in Arabic literature: “a typical aspect of traditional society, either to be denounced or simply neutrally described [. . .], a homosexual character, whether central or secondary, is often represented as undergoing a malaise and loss of self-worth, possibly leading to death or suicide; thirdly, homosexuality may be articulated in the traumatic relationship with the Other.”[1] While Persian literature, to some extent, suffers from a paucity of discussion about (male) sexuality, Amir Soltani and Khalil Bendib’s graphic novel, Yousef and Farhad Struggling for Family Acceptance in Iran: The Story of Two Gay Men (referred to as Yousef and Farhad hereafter), Arsham Parsi’s memoir, Exiled for Love, and Jean Beaini and Mohammad Khordadian’s biography, For the Love of Mohammad, provide us with homosexual characters similar to the ones in Lagrange’s categorization.[2]

 

Yousef and Farhad breaks the silence on diverse (male) sexualities and redefines masculinity as non-singular, rather than the outcome of a biological or social construction. The graphic novel chronicles the struggles of a gay man, Yousef, after coming out to his family. Yousef and his lover, Farhad, are exposed to harassment and violence after revealing their true sexual orientation.[3] They appeal for acceptance and dignity from their family and society, but are instead rejected and abandoned. The graphic novel illustrates that central to the construction of the dominant (heterosexual, middle-class) masculinity is the subordination of the gay masculinity as a repository for everything that heterosexual masculinity deems as weak and feminine.[4] This subordination of gay masculinity normalizes heterosexuality while deeming homosexuality as abnormal. Although today’s Iran is considered one of more than 75 countries globally that criminalize homosexuality by punishing with death, Soltani and Bendib show that the new generation of Iranian society is undoubtedly evolving toward a more tolerant and accepting relationship with the LGBTQ community. Exploring the characters, this paper considers Yousef and Farhad as the “abject outsiders” of their society, who simultaneously mark the boundaries and initiate the destabilization of hegemonic masculinity while their sexuality is constituted and defined in relationship to the dominant heterosexual and middle-class masculinity.[5]

 

To explore the hierarchy of masculinities in Iran within various genres, I also examine two memoirs: Arsham Parsi’s Exiled for Love and Jean Beaini and Mohammad Khordadian’s For the Love of Mohammad. Exiled for Love delineates Parsi’s coming to terms with his identity as a gay man in Iran and his attempts to bring the LGBTQ community together via the Internet, while raising awareness about the Iranian LGBTQ community in the world. It expounds on the torture and imprisonment of gay men (and all LGBTQ individuals), the brutal socio-cultural environment, and the harsh Islamic laws in Iran against homosexuality. For the Love of Mohammad discloses the complexities of a relationship into which a young gay man, the renowned Iranian male dancer Mohammad Khordadian, has been manipulated while in love with another man. It hints at the socio-cultural constraints mandating men marry women, and the fact that many gay men enter into these marriages to avoid ostracism, while maintaining a relationship with another man on the side. This type of secrecy within relationships not only elucidates the impact of such marriages on the lives of gay men, but also shows how such decisions alter the lives of the women involved. Utilizing Parsi’s and Khordadian’s accounts of lived experiences, this paper brings to light the influence of suppression and silencing on those whose lives are affected. Focusing on all three works, this paper attempts to show what has been excluded in the construction of the dominant masculinity and to address the public silences about diverse sexualities and sexual practices.[6] In Joan Scott’s words, “[W]orks such as these provide evidence for a world of alternative values and practices whose existence gives the lie to hegemonic construction of social world,” in this case to the hegemonic, socio-cultural construction of gender and sexuality.[7] By bringing Parsi’s and Khordadian’s experiences to the fore, the memoirs make visible the experiences of a group of men who are deemed different, and they simultaneously expose a long history of repressive mechanisms. While memoirs are viewed as more authoritative because they attribute a sense of authenticity to a narrative, graphic novels are often deemed less credible in academia. Nonetheless, this paper considers Soltani and Bendib’s choice of graphic novel as a means of subversion to the hegemonic discourses of not only masculinity in Iran, but also literature in academia.

 

Hierarchy of Masculinities

Regardless of the fact that the title of the graphic novel and the storyline revolve around the relationship between Yousef and Farhad, the character who provides us with the most pertinent characteristics regarding the question of masculinity is Yousef’s father, Mr. Jafari. Though he does not fit into the traditionally constructed category of a protagonist, he is not entirely an individual antagonist either. He can, however, be considered as the embodiment of heterosexual, homophobic masculinity in current Iran. Of course, Mr. Jafari is not the archetypal representation of the community’s hegemonic masculinity in his capacity as the head of the family; however, he can implement power over Yousef. As Connell points out, “The public face of hegemonic masculinity is not necessarily what powerful men are, but what sustains their power and what large numbers of men are motivated to support.”[8] The preferred hegemonic masculinity is “an unattainable ideal” that most men representing sub-hegemonic masculinities strive for.[9] Hegemony is established through the “correspondence between cultural ideal and institutional power,” which claims authority.[10] These dominant masculinities are those that benefit from the “patriarchal dividend” of the instituted hegemony, while not being subject to the risk of those few that do embody the wholly archetypical exemplar of that hegemony.[11] Mr. Jafari falls within this category of masculinities.

 

Since masculinity is a culturally specific construction, answers about Middle Eastern masculinities should be sought in the cultures where they are shaped.[12] The ideal of masculinity in Muslim societies generally, and in Iran particularly, revolves around the institution of family and procreation; that is, a man is expected to marry, have a wife, and father a child. Maleeha Aslam writes, “The most central and almost universal expectation from the masculine gender is to be and to perform like a breadwinner. Men fall down the appropriate gender order if they fail to fit into this assigned gender role.”[13] According to Amanullah De Sondy, “Masculinity is constructed around the tenets of power, and the powerful needs a power base. In the lives of most Muslim men this locus has become the heterosexual family.”[14] Since homosexuality is not a topic of discussion or debate in countries like Iran, Asia Siraj’s words ring true that “the accommodation of ‘deviant’ identities is considerably more difficult …. In countries … where Islam predominates, the subject continues to be clouded in ignorance and intentional neglect. Indeed, the traditional and continued silence on the issue prevents many with homosexual feelings from identifying themselves publicly.”[15] In such societies, “coming out,” which S. Seidman defines as “the dramatic quality of privately and publicly coming to terms with a contested social identity” is more often than not accompanied with violence and disavowal from family and society.[16]

 

In Yousef and Farhad, the very fact that Yousef is afraid to “come out” to his family and when he does, is faced with violence and abandonment, confirms the rationale behind this imposed public silence and neglect in regard to representations of diverse human sexuality, particularly homosexuality. In his memoir, too, Mohammad Khordadian echoes the complexity of this fear and public silence. He writes, “By the age of nineteen, I was already beginning to realize the implications of having been born into a culture and religion with many restrictions on how, who, or when one should love, and a pervading intolerance towards the crossing of those lines.”[17] It takes Khordadian experiencing a painful marriage and distressing struggles in exile to be able to “come out” to his wife, family, and friends. Likewise, in his memoir, Arsham Parsi chronicles similar traumatic experiences. It is only in exile that he is able to tell his family the truth about his identity. Regarding violence against the LGBTQ community in Iran, Parsi touches upon the grave matter of the criminalization of homosexuality and the brutal executions of homosexuals as well. He writes that murdering a homosexual “bestowed blessings on those that inflicted these punishments for they were carrying out the will of God.”[18] He keeps questioning, “How does a person feel when they discover that their life is worth nothing to those that hold the power in their society?”[19] While Khordadian’s and Parsi’s families seem to be understanding, such tolerance cannot be overgeneralized or extended to all Iranian families. Although Khordadian and Parsi critique society for upholding traditional beliefs regarding homosexuality, and the state for exerting strict laws and punishments, in Yousef and Farhad, the authors focus on the family’s struggles to come to terms with Yousef’s homosexuality. Of course, the truth is, behind the family’s troubles in accepting their sons are such thoughts as “what will others think?” and “I do not want them to hang him up”, giving voice to the aforementioned traditional and political perspectives operating against the idea of homosexuals as human and homosexuality as a crime against the state.

 

In Yousef and Farhad, once Mr. Jafari becomes aware of Yousef’s homosexuality, he reacts in a way that reveals exerts his hegemonic power position immediately. Soon after confronting Yousef, Mr. Jafari strikes him across the face and degrades Yousef and Farhad’s poetic correspondences, calling them “filth.”[20] He physically eliminates his son from his life, tearing down posters and impetuously throwing Yousef’s belongings out into the street. In order to further assert his son’s subordinate position, Mr. Jafari humiliates him by throwing him out into the rain, thus solidifying his position as a dominant heterosexual male, as well as the patriarch of the family.

Figure 1: Panels from p. 9 of Yusuf and Farhad in Persian. Here, Mr. Jafari, who has just become aware of Yusuf’s relationship with Farhad, slaps Yusuf, condemns him for his correspondences with Farhad, and throws Yusuf out of his house.

 

This illustrates that to the heterosexual Mr. Jafari, homosexual masculinities fall at the bottom of the gender hierarchy and must be subordinated. To Mr. Jafari (and by extension to all who desire to punish homosexuals), his son’s sexual orientation is what is banished from hegemonic definitions of masculinity. De Sondy discusses the hierarchy of masculinities in Islam referring to the “prophetic tradition [that] places emphasis on the valiant and heroic form of Islamic masculinity above the more softer form of Islamic masculinity,” exemplifying that traditions are always “partially subjective to suit the needs and desires of individuals who choose as they desire.”[21] In fact, Mr. Jafari’s understanding of his son’s gayness falls along those same binary lines which are distorted with homophobic notions that consider male homosexuality as the softer type of masculinity parallel to femininity. As Siraj argues, “Heterosexist norms construct heterosexual masculinity based upon a static binary of male/female; the antithesis of this construct is, in effect, the homosexual male.”[22] Therefore, through his self-identification, the homosexual male (and female) challenges the dominant gender binary and disrupts hegemony.

 

Discussing male homosexuality in Iran, Najmabadi argues that what made homosexuality “a cultural assault and moral insult [in Iran] was … the shame of being kuni. The most derogatory word in the realm of sexuality, kuni literally means anal, but in Persian it exclusively means to be receptive of anal penetration.”[23] Given the story was allotted a mere 20 pages for the tale of events to unfold, Yousef is almost immediately painted as a passive-receptive participant in the relationship. Such expediency helps explicate why Mr. Jafari deems Yousef’s actions defamatory toward the family reputation as well as actions that are not worthy of a living person. Mr. Jafari’s attitude is mirrored in another encounter Yousef has when a passerby in a vehicle approaches him as he is wandering the streets as a homeless youth. The driver yells out to Yousef, “Hey, Good Looking! How much?” and when Yousef denies giving his attention to the driver, the driver angrily shouts out, “You filthy homo! You’re too good for me?!”  Correspondingly, when his father initially throws Yousef out of his home, the neighborhood kids proceed to call him “faggot.”[24]

Figure 2: Panels from p. 11 of Yusuf and Farhad in Persian. After being thrown out of his house by his father, Yusuf is exposed to verbal harassment by the neighbors who call him a “faggot.”

 

These instances reify the lack of humanity and masculinity culturally associated with male homosexuality. The word that Soltani and Bendib use in the Persian text is “koonie” which harps on the passivity of one partner in same-sex relationships following the rhetoric of positionality. The importance of the word choice and limitation is emphasized in Khordadian’s memoir where he indicates, “Yet at the same time our language did not possess a single decent word for homosexual. A homosexual was a koonie, ‘one who gives arse’, and so I dared not speak of my love for this man who had captured my heart, because I did not want my parents to know or to suffer the shame of their youngest son being labeled in this derogatory way: a ‘koonie’.”[25] A conversation also comes up in Parsi’s memoir where he is asked if homosexuality means being a “sodomite.”[26] In another instance, Parsi is called a “faggot” which is a literal translation of the Persian word “koonie”.[27] The belief that the passive-receptive partner deserves condemnation is consistent with pre-modern Arabo-Muslim (also Greek) discourses on same-sex desire and relations which regard “a preference for the passive-receptive role in sexual intercourse … as the very antithesis of masculinity.”[28] Such discourses emphasize the importance of positionality; that is, the active-passive roles of the participants in the relationship.[29] In pre-modern Arabo-Muslim societies, the role of the passive-penetrated was perceived to be either feminine, diseased, pathological condition, or a great sin, as it was assumed the penetrated or passive partner enjoyed the act.[30] Traditional Arabic medical discourse, following the Greek, regarded a man who desired to be penetrated as being afflicted with a disease with prescribed remedies. This was considered an innate condition and was called ubnah. The individual afflicted with the disease was called ma’bun and was “perceived as being at odds with the ideal of masculinity.”[31] The belief in female-passive and male-active gender roles continues to this day as Najmabadi remarks that this gender-binary renders any fissures in hegemonic masculinity as effeminization.[32] While discussing his son’s homosexuality with Zahra and Miriam, not only does Mr. Jafari consider him feminine (passive-receptive partner), but also he distraughtly declares that his son has an incurable disease.[33]

 

Documenting the experiences of its characters as “abject outsiders,” Yousef and Farhad demonstrates how Yousef’s father continuously condemns his son’s membership in his family and even denies him human existence. Talking to Miriam and Zahra about his son, Mr. Jafari uses the past tense, completely dissociating himself from Yousef.[34] He considers Yousef’s sexuality and vivacious self-embracement as a prudent attempt to defame and detract from his and the family’s honor and thus an unbelievable embarrassment in his life, asking, “How could you be so selfish, my son?”[35] When Yousef attempts to commit suicide, it is an even additional impudence and disgrace to Mr. Jafari, who remarks while sitting in the hospital waiting room, “First dishonor, and now this…,” an implacable comment when read alongside the one made previously to Zahra and Miriam suggesting that Mr. Jafari’s life would be painless if his son was actually dead.[36] Mr. Jafari’s aloofness and the insensitivity of his comment prompts Miriam to remind him to be thankful that Yousef is not dead.[37] Yousef’s “coming out” and public act of subversion through suicide is what Mr. Jafari believes has brought shame and dishonor to the family. Not only does Mr. Jafari view Yousef as the passive-receptive partner in his relationship, he also perceives Yousef’s suicide attempt as a weak and thereby non-masculine act.[38]

In addition to physically undermining subordinated masculinities, a very important factor in maintaining hegemony for heterosexual, middle-class men is denying “cultural definition and recognition as alternatives” to different sexualities.[39] In Yousef and Farhad, this denial is enacted through Mr. Jafari’s repudiation of Yousef’s humanity and a refusal to name him. When asked, “Who is this?” while looking at the torn fragments of Yousef’s photograph, he answers that “He has no name.”[40] This dismissive attitude about naming and acknowledging Yousef’s identity persists throughout the graphic novel. Mr. Jafari’s disinterest in acknowledging Yousef’s identity is parallel to renouncing Yousef altogether from the Jafari family. In this way, Yousef is stripped from his familial and societal identity. While Mr. Jafari is the one who estranges Yousef from his family, he is also the one character who is recognized by his last name (denied first name) only and is addressed by the honorific “Mr.” throughout the graphic novel. Mr. Jafari’s lack of identity, however, has a contrastive effect which makes him to be easily generalized as a representation of Iranian hegemonic masculinity.

 

Calling normative narratives into question, Mr. Jafari’s prejudice and homophobia are set at odds with his brother Taymour’s acceptance and support for his nephew. Teymour becomes the voice of reason for Yousef’s father as he points out the hypocrisy in the fact that Mr. Jafari had premarital sex with the woman who became his wife because they were so in love. For Yousef’s uncle, true love is true love, whether between a man and a woman or a man and another man. Yousef’s uncle draws connections between Yousef’s parents’ premarital sex and Yousef’s homosexuality, questioning Mr. Jafari’s beliefs about the superiority of iteration of one love over the other.[41] The two Jafari brothers’ physical appearances are, however, juxtaposed significantly (disused fully in the next section). Taymour is tall, broad, muscular, wearing a full beard, whereas Mr. Jafari is short, thin, gaunt-looking, with a thin mustache. While Taymour is respectably employed at his own print-and-copy store and Internet café, Mr. Jafari drives a taxi which he parallels with a coffin, and which is frequently associated with lower-income class of the society. The contrast between the brothers illustrates that the relationship between the dominant and subordinate group is not a fixed one. In particular situations, this power structure changes. This is further crystalized in the scene where another irritated driver confronts Mr. Jafari and proceeds to call him a “faggot.”[42] This greatly insults and enrages Mr. Jafari and results in a physical confrontation between the two drivers. Scott’s argument resonates with the scene: “Not only does homosexuality define heterosexuality by specifying its negative limits, and not only is the boundary between the two a shifting one, but both operate within the structure of the same “phallic economy” –.”[43] Even though Mr. Jafari (like other men similar to him) holds and exercises power in the society for being heterosexual, at any point, he too might be exposed to subordination by other masculinities that are higher than his on the hierarchy. However, these subordinations do not mean that those who are subordinate submit to the power structure. As we witness in the memoirs and graphic novel, they challenge and disturb such power structures.

Figure 3: Panels from p. 33 of Yusuf and Farhad in Persian. This is when the tables are turned and another driver calls Mr. Jafari a “faggot.” This name-calling drives him mad and he treats the other driver violently.

 

Mr. Jafari’s reactions to Yousef’s “coming out” demonstrate how family and home shape men’s public image. The domestic sphere or the home has a fluid, yet pervasive relationship with the male body.[44] The private sphere, although confined within the walls of the home, influences gender performances. The male self must not only act as a son, husband, or father in the private space of the home, but also wrestle with being a politically, culturally, and professionally active figure in society.[45] Likewise, openness is potentially deadly. Like Yousef, not all Muslim homosexuals are received with love and acceptance. The act of identifying as a gay man means risking rejection, because of which Yousef is forced to find a new space to enact his masculinity and social status.[46] The identification with the LGBTQ community and potential rejection from a previous community may require the drawing of new boundaries between private and public spaces. Judith Butler notes that gender is not stable; rather, gender is the combination of body movements, gestures, and acts that all constitute an illusion of a gendered self.[47] Butler’s definition of gender as performative, and not a rigid or fixed identity, pushes for a better understanding of gender as an identity. In Yousef and Farhad, Yousef must answer for himself what it means to embody masculinity as a man and as his identity, and perform it. Yousef’s abrupt, yet forced departure from home suggests his departure from the traditional male role and rejection of conformity. Yousef’s father not only forces Yousef out of a private space where his sexuality is no longer secret, but he also crumbles Yousef’s poems and throws them outside of his home. While walking in the rain and receiving insults from gossiping neighbors, in his mind, Yousef notes a line from the well-known thirteenth century Persian poet Sa’di Shirazi: “I am in love with all of creation for all of creation emanates from the Creator.”[48] However, unable to retort vocally, Yousef chooses not to embrace the masculine emotion of anger. He chooses to cling to his own definition of masculinity while at the same time rejecting society’s identification of him as a “faggot”.

Figure 4: Panel from p. 18 of Yusuf and Farhad in Persian. This is the letter Yusuf leaves behind before his attempted suicide.

 

As a safer space, Yousef chooses the “third space of writing” where he can embrace his own definition of masculinity. The line of poetry that Yousef reads in his mind is suggestive of Yousef’s choice of love through Sufism rather than anger and resentment. Mr. Jafari’s denial and disavowal creates the possibility for Yousef to redefine and form his masculinity. Within the “third space of writing” in his letter to his family, he seeks forgiveness, engaging in a different masculine behavior—humility. Yousef’s departure from the domestic sphere reinforces his departure from his role as a child and offers him a way to reshape his masculinity. In this way, not only does Yousef challenge the hegemonic notions of masculinity, he also marks its boundaries as his own sexual identity is defined in relationship with that same hegemony.

 

Facial Hair and Bodily Form

To what extent does “the body, as the locus where experiments are played out and attitudes performed, both [replicates] the status quo and [provides] challenges to it[?]”[49] In Yousef and Farhad, whether the authors intentionally present stereotypical features or not, the characters’ outward appearances disclose much about their sexual orientation. Conventional beliefs dictating that a man who is gay should perform his sexual identity through make-up or hairstyle, form much of the public’s (mis)perception about the gay community. In his memoir, Parsi explains how while waiting to be interviewed by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, another Iranian waiting asked him why he was there. When he responded that it was because of his sexual orientation, he was perceived to be a liar because he had not shaved and he was not wearing make-up.[50] This type of interaction harks upon stereotypical views and highlights the public’s misunderstanding of gay individuals and their outward appearance.

 

In Yousef and Farhad, the characters’ physical features, especially the use of “feminine” features for Yousef and Farhad, are exaggerated. One aspect of these illustrations is the use (or lack thereof) of beard and facial hair. Historically in the Muslim world, beards and mustaches have been viewed as the most visible characteristics of masculinity and male honor.[51] Soltani and Bendib’s unbearded characters, Yousef and Farhad, challenge notions of dominant masculinity. In contrast, the other males of the graphic novel sport facial hair, mustaches and beards. Bendib chooses to omit facial hair on his protagonists so as to draw on typical stereotypes and perceptions of homosexuality as feminine. On the other hand, a beard, a mustache, or both features adorn his older, masculine subjects’ faces.

Figure 5: Panel from p. 13 of Yusuf and Farhad in Persian. This is when Yusuf is wandering on the streets after being thrown out of his house. He is verbally harassed, spends time with stray dogs, and uses the state-run newspaper “Keyhan” as a blanket.

 

Interestingly enough, Mr. Jafari and the stranger who harasses Yousef on the street lack a beard. The stranger boasts a thin, well-groomed mustache whereas Mr. Jafari wears a thick, untrimmed mustache. As he is walking on the street, Yousef becomes the object of this much older man’s desire. When Yousef rejects his invitation, he calls Yousef a “filthy homo.”[52] Yusef’s clean-shaven face provokes the driver’s stereotypical understanding of male homosexuality. It is important to note that this older man’s comment is a reference to a certain population of heterosexual men who besides their heterosexual marriages and families, have tendencies for homosexual sex as well. Ironically, Mr. Jafari lacks what Yousef and Farhad lack: a beard. Mr. Jafari’s thick eyebrows and the taxi driver’s angular and linear facial features serve as physical representations of their restricted, linear views on homosexuality. These contrasting bodily representations are an apropos reminder of the discourse that to shape his own subjectivity, a heterosexual individual needs an “abject other.” Judith Butler astutely comments that, “The forming of a subject requires an identification with the normative phantasm of “sex,” and this identification takes place through a repudiation which produces a domain of abjection, a repudiation without which the subject cannot emerge.”[53] Yousef and Farhad’s unbearded presence places them in the category of “abject outsiders” through the repudiation of those whom the heterosexual father and stranger use to assert their own subjectivity.

 

In addition to their facial hair, Yousef and Farhad are characterized with long eyelashes, sensual, quasi-feminine lips, and fluid curves. Their long, slender fingers intertwine and embrace one another. In the scene where Yousef and Farhad rekindle their love under the nighttime sky, both gaze at the other with large, beautiful, narcissus-eyes during their night together. But Yousef and Farhad are not exclusively drawn with feminine physical traits, an attempt to break away with stereotypes. In their intimate night in the mountains, within their own private space, Yousef and Farhad are shown to embody broad muscular physiques, and hairy arms. Their fit, muscular bodies differ from the jolly, curvy, husky bodies of Yousef’s uncle, Taymour. Their bodies also differ from Yousef’s scrawny, angular father. However, Bendib does not zoom-in on the eyes or lips of his “masculine” men, rather, Mr. Jafari’s thick eyebrows and angular face are emphasized. The contrasting aesthetics of Yousef and Farhad and the heterosexual males of the story are an attempt to show the prevalent hierarchy within masculinities, to disclose the public’s stereotypical misperceptions of the gay community, and to break away from those conventional perceptions. Through image and text the authors emphasize that “both masculinity and femininity are learned performances, affected but not dictated by genetics and societal expectations, with as many nuances and meanings as there are individuals who adopt, embody, or redesign them.”[54]

Figure 6: Panel from p. 8 of Yusuf and Farhad in Persian. This is an image depicting the intimate moments between Yusuf and Farhad in the mountains. Here, they use symbolic religious and Sufi language.

 

Religion and Sufism

The relationship between religion and gender is interdependent, with religion at the male ego’s service, as Aslam notes.[55] However, in Soltani and Bendib’s graphic novel, religion is not portrayed as the problem or root of the issues the young gay men are having. For the authors, cultural norms, state laws, and familial expectations regarding male sexuality and masculinity are the key issue while religion, particularly Sufism, is seen as a potential solution. Soltani and Bendib’s narrative seeks to subvert heteronormative discourses about male sexuality through the use of Sufi discourse and religious symbolism.

 

Throughout Yousef and Farhad, allusions to, and imageries of, the twelfth hidden Imam in Shi’ism, Mahdi, abound.[56] Yousef’s movement between social spaces or states of being in relation to his community can be compared to Mahdi’s occultation. To draw these parallels, looking at Soltani and Bendib’s other graphic novel, Zahra’s Paradise, is necessary. In Zahra’s Paradise, Soltani and Bendib tell the story of a young man named Mehdi, gone missing after participating in the 2009 protests in Iran following Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s re-election to presidency, and of Mehdi’s mother and brother’s search for him. Though Mehdi’s (the character) occultation is slightly less concrete than that of Yousef’s since he is not actually present in the story, both are seeking “refuge” in response to personally targeted injustice. Mehdi’s mother Zahra, her Armenian friend, Miriam, and Yousef’s father are actually present in both novels, and it is in Zahra’s home that Yousef and Farhad begins. When Mr. Jafari relates his struggle with discovering his son’s sexuality to Zahra and Miriam at the beginning, he is unwilling to speak frankly about it, forcing the women to guess the source of his vexation. Once it is revealed that Mr. Jafari is grieving his son’s sexual identity, Miriam asks, “So he’s not an addict, not a thief and not a murderer…but worse than all of them combined?” to which Zahra replies, “Almost sounds like my murdered son, Mehdi….”[57] When Zahra mentions that the situation reminds her of her murdered son, Mr. Jafari says “your Mehdi may be dead, but lives inside you. Mine is alive, but he’s dead inside me.”[58] Here, Soltani and Bendib seem to be making a point about the way in which being homosexual in Iran is perceived. The authors adequately demonstrate the inanity of viewing homosexuality as worse than murder. Yousef has not harmed any individual by theft or violence, and yet he is like Mehdi, someone who stood against the state. So, Yousef is standing against the state and in danger of the same fate as Mehdi simply by being who he is. This idea is further supported when Mr. Jafari throws Yousef out of the house and rips a “One Love” poster down from his wall, drawing another parallel to the poster and music in Mehdi’s room and the shirt sporting the same design that Mehdi wore during the protests when he disappeared.[59] The descriptive terms used by Mr. Jafari to denote his son’s supposed “devious” act all focus on family shame and dishonor. At a later point in the story, after Yousef’s suicide attempt, Mr. Jafari gives him the money saved for his future wedding and tells him to “go find another country” after informing him that there are “no gays in Iran.”[60] This is an obvious jab at the comment made by former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but also a statement about the ways in which “homosexual” and “Iranian” are seen as mutually exclusive identities.[61] Yet at no point does Mr. Jafari specifically use an Islamic reference or religious source to condemn Yousef’s love for another man, although he does refer to the fact that the state punishes gay men by hanging them from the crane.[62] Hence, the problem comes from culturally based gender constructions of masculinity and the theocratic state laws against diverse sexualities, and not an inherently religious adjuration of same sex love.

 

Soltani and Bendib audaciously utilize Sufi symbolism and metaphors to shine a positive light on Yousef and Farhad’s love for each other. In the scene where the two exchange a tender moment in the mountains, they reference the well-known medieval Persian Sufi poet Rumi and his master-beloved, Shams, as lovers.[63] The relationship between Rumi and Shams and the reference to them in the graphic novel hints at the Sufi philosophy of shahed-bazi which allows “the possibility of love between man and creator, and … accept(s) the likelihood of a beatific vision or of an experience leading to the presence of God.”[64] According to this Sufi philosophy, considering all God’s creatures as His emanations and contemplating their beauty, the individual is led on a spiritual path toward union with the divine. The beauty of God’s creations becomes the shahed, witness or testimony, to God’s beauty and love. While Soltani and Bendib might have this philosophy in mind, their view of Sufism is also in line with D. S. Ahmed’s argument that “Sufism glorifies contemplation and a passive-receptive attitude. The word ‘Islam’ itself has profound connotation of submission, acceptance and surrender – all resounding, stereotypically feminine attributes.”[65] It would follow then, that much like homosexuality, Sufism challenges the dominant discourses about strict religiosity, surrender, and acceptance.

 

In addition to the allusion to Imam Mahdi, Yousef and Farhad also make use of religiously charged terms such as “Kaaba” and “pilgrimage” in their declarations of love to one another.[66] Teymour also uses religious language and emphasizes the beauty of everything God creates. He tells Yousef after his suicide attempt that “we have enough martyrs” and that he should “practice resurrection.”[67] Eventually, Yousef is taken to Qom, a city with much religious significance in Iran, and given refuge with Farhad’s uncle, an ayatollah. Farhad describes his uncle as a “friendly fanatic” which evokes the question “a tolerant ayatollah? Isn’t that an oxymoron?” from Yousef.[68] We find the ayatollah working in his garden commenting on nature as part of God’s beautiful creation. In line with Sufi beliefs, this comment gives the impression that the ayatollah sees Yousef and Farhad, as well as their love for each other, as part of what God creates. Yousef is surprised by the ayatollah’s acceptance of his sexual orientation, yet his acceptance is indicative of Sufi teachings of love. Through love, the characters in Yousef and Farhad are able to find peace and acceptance. The ayatollah is associated with knowledge as he lives in Qom, the center of theological learning, but he also seeks love, and shows action by giving refuge to the young couple.

 

Graphic Novel as a Means of Subversion

Historically, the comic and graphic novel mediums have been shunned for depicting serious topics. There is a stigma surrounding the use of graphic novels, as they are believed to depict lighthearted subjects, mainly appealing to adolescents. Graphic novels have been stereotypically presented as “intellectually devoid fodder.”[69] However, there have also been a number of graphic novels which conveyed a serious message such as Maus, Art Spiegelman’s classic graphic novel which tells the story of a boy learning about his father’s experiences during the Holocaust. Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis is another example which “introduced personal biography to the form.”[70] While many scholars look down on the graphic novel as an inferior art form devoid of any intellectual fodder, it is gradually gaining recognition as an alternative for portraying evocative messages, due to the creative expression in literary form that primarily deals with the arrangement of images and words to emphasize points in a story, or to dramatize an idea.[71]

 

The use of the graphic novel medium is an interesting choice to depict the love story of Yousef and Farhad. Both the medium by which the story is told, and the story itself are unconventional, and draw parallels from each other, such that they force the reader to seek a different approach in understanding the struggles of the characters, the disavowal of homosexuality in Iran, the hierarchy of masculinities, and the lack of legitimacy that graphic novels are given in the world of academia. The story and medium encourage the acceptance of alternate forms of not only masculinities, but also writing styles. In Yousef and Farhad, a few elements of visual imagery particularly invite critical thinking. One such scene is the presence of a dog when Yousef is thrown out of his home and walks the neighborhood.[72] The dog is seen later again when Yousef rests at the bench.[73] In traditional Islam, dogs are considered impure and contact with them is to be avoided. It may be inferred that among his family Yousef’s newfound identity as a homosexual is equated to the impurities of a dog, and therefore has cast an obscene light on him, which is insupportable to his family. Furthermore, it can be interpreted that Yousef’s homelessness is a circumstance directly caused by the laws of the state, as is seen in the image of Yousef lying on the bench covered in Kayhan, a state-run newspaper, with the crescent moon and stars in the background sky.[74] These are but a few small examples found throughout the novel, but references like these make the graphic novel, contrary to popular belief, a notable method of storytelling as it forces the reader to be more analytical and conscientious of what is on the page in terms of visual cues and text, versus simply analyzing blocks of scholarly text, which is often done in academia.

 

Using graphic novels as non-traditional sources of information in higher education challenges the conventional hierarchical notions of appropriateness in academia.[75] Nevertheless, in the special case of homosexuality in Iran, it seems as though a nontraditional mode of storytelling fits the mood for portraying and celebrating the story of Yousef and Farhad, as the story of the LGBTQ community in Iran deserves recognition. Utilizing the graphic novel as their platform, the authors provide a combination of thoughtful images and key words that require the reader to use critical information literacy skills in deciphering the strong message that is being conveyed. Both topics of homosexuality in Iran as well as the stage of graphic novels have received much criticism for not living up to heteronormative standards that society has arbitrarily placed values on. Furthermore, both medium and subjects require the reader to question conformist methods and to appreciate the vast multitudes in differences of perspective that every writing medium as well as every lifestyle and person has to offer.

 

[1]Frederic Lagrange, “Homosexuality in Arabic Literature,” Imagined Masculinities: Male Identity and Culture in the Modern Middle East, ed. Mai Ghoussoub and Emma Sinclair-Webb (London: Saqi Books, 2006), 175.

[2]Amir Soltani and Khalil Bendib, Yousef and Farhad Struggling for Family Acceptance in Iran: The Story of Two Gay Men (OutRight Action International, 2015); Arsham Parsi and Marc Colburne, Exiled for Love: The Journey of an Iranian Queer Activist (Halifax: Roseway Publishing, 2015); and Jean Beaini and Mohammad Khordadian, For the Love of Mohammad: A Memoir (U.S.: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014).

[3]The names of the protagonists might be of significance to our discussion in this paper. Yousef shares his name with Prophet Yousef (Joseph) who was one of Jacob’s twelve sons. In Islamic tradition, Yousef is the ideal of male beauty. However, Yousef’s male beauty and sexuality is contested as it is portrayed as fluid in Persian cultural productions throughout history. See Claudia Yaghoobi, “Yusef’s ‘Queer’ beauty in Persian Cultural Productions,” The Comparatist Journal 40, no.1 (Fall 2016): 245-266. Farhad is the name of the most important character in an ancient tragic Persian love story written by many poets including Nezami in his Khosrow and Shirin, which projects Farhad as the epitome of true and pure lover.

[4]See Raewyn W. Connell, Masculinities (CA: University of California Press, 1995).

[5]For a discussion of the relationship between homosexuals and heterosexuals see Clyde W. Franklin II, “‘Ain’t I a Man’? The efficacy of black masculinities for men’s studies in the 1990s?” in The American Black Male: His Present Status and His Future, ed. R. Majors and J. Gordon (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1994).

[6]Judith Newton, “White Guys,” Feminist Studies 24, no. 3 (Fall 1998): 575-560.

[7]Joan W. Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” Critical Inquiry 17, no. 4 (Summer, 1991): 773-797.

[8]Raewyn W. Connell, Gender and Power: Society, the Person, and Sexual Politics (CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 185.

[9]Connell, Gender and Power, 185.

[10]Connell, Masculinities, 77.

[11]Connell, Masculinities, 79.

[12]See D. D. Gilmore, Manhood in the Making: Cultural Concepts of Masculinity (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1990) and Misogyny: The Male Malady (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001).

[13]Maleeh Aslam, “Gender Theory,” in Gender-Based Explosions: The Nexus between Muslim Masculinities, Jihadist Islamism and Terrorism (Tokyo: UNU Press, 2012), 85. Regarding the importance of establishing family in perception of masculinity, see also Marcia Claire Inhorn, The New Arab Man: Emergent Masculinities, Technologies, and Islam in the Middle East (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012).

[14]Amanullah De Sondy, “Feminists’ Nonothering Hermeneutics,” in The Crisis of Islamic Masculinities (London, NY: Bloomsbury Publishers, 2015), 72-3.

[15]Asif Siraj, “On Being Homosexual and Muslim: Conflicts and Challenges,” in Islamic Masculinities, ed. Lahoucine Ouzgane (New York: Zed Books, 2006).

[16]S. Seidman et al., “Beyond the Closet? The Changing Social Meaning of Homosexuality in the United States,” in Sexuality and Gender, ed. C. L. Williams and A. Stein (Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2002), 427.

[17]Beaini and Khordadian, For the Love of Mohammad, 25.

[18]Parsi and Colborne, Exiled for Love, 13.

[19]Parsi and Colborne, Exiled for Love, 13.

[20]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 7.

[21]De Sondy, “Introduction,” 10.

[22]Asif Siraj, “On Being Homosexual and Muslim,” 212.

[23]Afsaneh Najmabadi, Professing Selves: Transexuality and Same-Sex Desire in Contemporary Iran (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 138. I have used the spelling of the word ‘kuni’ or ‘koonie’ the way it has been spelled in various works.

[24]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 8.

[25]Beaini and Khordadian, For the Love of Mohammad, 27.

[26]Parsi and Colborne, Exiled for Love, 24.

[27]Parsi and Colborne, Exiled for Love, 37.

[28]Khaled El-Rouayheb, “Pederasts and Pathics,” in Before Homosexuality in the Arab-Islamic World: 1500-1800 (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 21.

[29]Janet Afary, Sexual Politics in Modern Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 107.

[30]El-Rouayheb, “Pederasts and Pathics,” 16. See also Frederic Lagrange, “Homosexuality in Arabic Literature,” 171.

[31]El-Rouayheb, “Pederasts and Pathics,” 19-21.

[32]Afsaneh Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards (CA: University of California Press, 2005), 3.

[33] Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 4.

[34] Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 2.

[35] Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 4.

[36] Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 13.

[37] Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 13.

[38] Yet, Yousef is not the only character that Mr. Jafari subordinates. In the same scene in the hospital waiting room, he confronts Farhad during his attempt to visit Yousef. He accuses the young man of corrupting his son, calling him a “bastard” and a “faggot” and asserting that he has “no rights” before harshly dismissing him with a threat of further violence (Yousef and Farhad, 13).

[39]Connell, Gender and Power, 186.

[40]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 2.

[41]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 15.

[42]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 20.

[43]Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” 779.

[44]Joanna De Groot, “The Bureaucrat, the Mulla and the Maverick Intellectual ‘at Home’: Domestic Narratives of Patriarchy, Masculinity and Modernity in Iran, 1880–1980,” in Raffaella Sarti, ed., Men at Home, Special Issue of Gender & History 27, no.3 (2015): 791–811. See also Joanna de Groot, “Brothers of Iranian Race”: Manhood, Nationhood and Modernity in Iran 1870-1914,” in Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History, ed. Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann and John Tosh (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 137-56.

[45]de Groot, “The Bureaucrat, the Mulla and the Maverick Intellectual ‘at Home’,” 795.

[46]de Groot, “The Bureaucrat, the Mulla and the Maverick Intellectual ‘at Home’,” 794.

[47]Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory,” Theatre Journal 40, no. 4 (December 1988): 519-531.

[48]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 8. This line is from Sa’di’s Ghazal number 13, which is considered to be his most mystical (Sufi) line. It refers to the belief in love mysticism where all creations are emanations of the divine and through contemplating and loving the creations, even if they are subversive, a Sufi or individual will be guided to divine beauty and love.

[49]Anthony Shay and Jennifer Fisher, ed. “Introduction,” in When Men Dance: Choreographing Masculinities Across Borders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 9.

[50]Parsi and Colborne, Exiled for Love, 1-2.

[51]El-Rouayheb, “Pederasts and Pathics,” 26.

[52]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 9.

[53]Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (London, NY: Routledge, 2014), 3.

[54]Shay and Fisher, “Introduction,” 12.

[55]Aslam, “Gender Theory,” 73.

[56]Shortly after the death of his father, the twelfth Imam, also called Mahdi, or “the one who is guided by Allah”, is said to have retreated into protective hiding or occultation (al-Ghayba). This hiding represented a withdrawal of Allah’s guidance from humanity as a result of the injustice in the world at that time, and when the end of time arrives and Mahdi is revealed again, it is the Shi’i belief that with him will come a time of perfect peace, justice, and rebirth.

[57]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 3.

[58]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 3.

[59]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 8; Soltani and Bendib, Zahra’s Paradise (New York: Macmillan, 2011), 95, 126, and 188.

[60]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 16.

[61]See www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-483746/We-dont-gays-Iran-Iranian-president-tells-Ivy-League-audience.html.

[62]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 16.

[63]Some scholars believe that Rumi and Shams were actually lover-beloved while others deny such a relationship.

[64]Dror Ze’evi, “Morality Wars: Orthodoxy, Sufism, and Beardless Youth,” in Producing Desire: Changing Sexual Discourse in the Ottoman Middle East, 1500-1900 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 81.

[65]D. S. Ahmed, “Gender and Islamic Spirituality: A Psychological View of ‘Low’ Fundamentalism,” in Islamic Masculinities, ed. L. Ouzgane (London and NY: Zed Books, 2006), 18-20.

[66]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 6.

[67]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 14.

[68]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 18.

[69]Steven Hoover, “The Case of Graphic Novels,” in Communications in Information Literacy 5, no. 2 (2012): 174-186.

[70]Jeremy J. Llorence, “Exploring Graphic Literature as a Genre and its Place in Academic Curricula” in McNair Scholars Journal 15. 1 (2011): 30-40.

[71]Hoover, “The Case of Graphic Novels,” 178.

[72]The dogs are present in Zahra’s Paradise where they are killed and thrown into the river, foreshadowing the incident which happen later to the youth, including Mehdi, during the protests. This symbolism refers to the fact that the subversive youth in Iran who challenge conventions are viewed as impure dogs that need to be eradicated.

[73]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 9.

[74]Soltani and Bendib, Yousef and Farhad, 9.

[75]J. B. Carter, “Comics, the Canon, and the Classroom,” in Teaching Visual Literacy: Using Comic Books, Graphic Novels, Anime, Cartoons, and More to Develop Comprehension and Thinking Skills, ed. N. Grey and D. Fisher (Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press, 2008), 47-59.

Abbas Kiarostami’s “Lessons of Darkness”: Affect, Non-Representation, and Becoming-Imperceptible

 

In the total darkness, poetry is still there, and it is there for you.

-Abbas Kiarostami

I dream not of being invisible, but imperceptible.

-Gilles Deleuze

 

On July 4, 2016 when the world awoke to the devastating news of the passing of Abbas Kiarostami, many netizens, including the Iranian filmmaker Jafar Panahi, paid tribute to the late director by replacing their avatar on social media with a black screen. This “non-image” stood as a shroud of mourning, lamenting Kiarostami’s untimely demise, but it also contained within itself the very force of his cinematic art and pedagogy of the image. In his films Kiarostami gave us both lessons of silence and lessons of darkness,[2] communicating a different vision of cinema. His cinema often plays with withholding sound, visuals, and discernible forms, all of which otherwise would rely on representational models of recognition. Babak Tabarraee has previously expounded on a variety of auditory absences in Kiarostami’s “cinema of silence,”[3] and my intention here is to focus on visual absences, or black screen sequences, in such films by Kiarostami as Taste of Cherry (1997), The Birth of Light (1997), The Wind Will Carry Us (1999), ABC Africa (2001), and Five Dedicated to Ozu (2003). These black screen sequences are not simply extended structural cuts to black. Following Saige Walton’s conception of baroque cinema, they can be approached as folds, in which light is folded into darkness and darkness into light, not contrasted or opposed, but enmeshed and entangled. Walton explores the affinities between cinema and the baroque in her writings, finding inspiration both in Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the fold and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notions of the flesh and the chiasm.[4] In particular, she analyzes baroque darkness, as found in Claire Denis’s films, describing it as ominous and threatening. As opposed to Walton and for my own purposes here, I will approach the modulation of darkness in Kiarostami’s films as vitalist, enabling, and liberating. To avoid sinister undertones, I will refer to the analyzed material as “black screen sequences,” not as “dark screen sequences.” In these sequences darkness acts as a camouflaged environment that takes us beyond established meanings, recognizable figures, and limits of perception.

In this essay I argue that the black screen sequences in selected Kiarostami films trigger a process of becoming-imperceptible through creative deterritorialization, transfiguration of surrounding environment, and transformation of registers of perception informed by habitual modes of living and being, including modes of institutionalized reception of images. These moments in his films encourage us to conceive of cinema not in terms of the passive reception of representation, based on the subject-object identification and the “dualism machines” of binary thinking,[5] but rather invite us to approach images through a non-representational lens. To facilitate the task at hand, this essay sets in motion a number of Deleuzian concepts that offer novel ways of engaging with cinema in a non-representational regime, such as “becoming-imperceptible,” “any-space-whatever,” “the fold,” and the “genetic power” of the black screen. As Brian Massumi famously observed, there is “no cultural-theoretical vocabulary specific to affect,”[6] and hence we could say the same of non-representation; however, Deleuze’s unique conceptualization of the world permits speaking nearby,[7] if not directly about, non-representation.

 

Non-representational theory gained momentum in the mid-1990s, originating from within the field of human geography, where it set about to describe embodied everyday practices of social life .[8] According to Phillip Vannini, non-representational theory is an experimental, nomadic, and non-dogmatic approach, engaged with works that aim “to rupture … and reverberate rather than report and represent.”[9] Often linked to the philosophy of Deleuze and Félix Guattari, it offers a much-needed break from the succession of “-posts,” but is still rather underdeveloped in terms of its methodology. Recently, such fields as art, philosophy, media theory, and film studies have also begun exploring the potential of “negative” prefixes, such as non-philosophy, non-photography, non-cinema, and non-representation.[10] As Gregory Seigworth observes, there is a tendency in affect studies to make use of such prefixes and “pre-” or “–non,” as in “pre-personal” or “non-representational.” With respect to the latter, however, it is important to understand that “-non” does not equal “anti-,” nor is it a negation or elimination; it is “not less.” Instead, the attention is shifted to “the ‘more than,’ the ‘other-than,’ the ‘different-than,’” or, in other words, “the saturating/magnetizing circumambience of everything,”[11] which destroys identity and imitation as such. In contrast to the legacy of structural, post-structural, and psychoanalytic models of analysis, heavily informed by the language of representation, meaning, and signification, these new approaches deal more with experience, emotion, and force of sensation. As Simon O’Sullivan aptly notes, this signals a shift from hermeneutics to heuristics, as a result of which an operative set of more familiar terms such as “representation,” “identification,” “subject” and “object” gives way to an alternative terminology of “movement,” “flux,” “assemblage,” and “transmission of affect.”[12] Such a turn in the cultural condition and visual regime underscores new modes of perception that offer unprecedented capacities and affordances for our emotional states.

“ [W]e see through a glass, darkly.”[13] The public has grown accustomed to the images of Kiarostami wearing dark glasses, even on the set of his films.[14] Kiarostami once confessed that he wore dark glasses both in public and in private for medical reasons:  “The retina in my left eye has remained open, and no matter what I do it remains open, and it lets too much light in. I have no idea what happened.”[15] Such a medical condition might be considered a handicap for a filmmaker, but Kiarostami’s (im)personal vision of the world through dark glasses signals a change in habitual perception, an attunement to the unseen and the imperceptible. In answering the question, “What Is Baroque?” in The Fold, Gilles Deleuze observes that the art of the historical baroque announced a new age of light and color, one in which the worlds of light and shadows are separated by the thinnest of lines, however, not set in opposition but effectually enfolded. Specifically, he asserts: “This is a Baroque contribution: in place of the white chalk or plaster that primes the canvas, Tintoretto and Caravaggio use a dark, red-brown background on which they place the thickest shadows, and paint directly by shading toward the shadows.”[16] Kiarostami’s practice of filming through dark glasses, his heightened sensitivity to the indiscernible, can be read as analogous to the Baroque artists’ application of a dark background instead of a white primer for their canvases. In this manner, that which would normally be obscured or overlooked in contrast to brighter figures is now engaged in the dynamic interplay of light and darkness, if not necessarily in equal measure. Kiarostami’s own photosensitivity demands that we reach outside of normative subjectivity and switch our registers of perception from representation to non-representation.

Image 1: Abbas Kiarostami wearing dark glasses in the final scene of Taste of Cherry

Image 1: Abbas Kiarostami wearing dark glasses in the final scene of Taste of Cherry

Kiarostami’s black screen sequences have been addressed before as part of an analysis of separate films, but not in comparison to one another as a unique characteristic of his cinematic style.[17] In many of the black screen sequences under consideration, feeble sources of lighting and dark shadows obstruct representational content, focusing on the material plane of the image and inviting the force of sensation rather than offering any form of signification. The low-light conditions reduce cinema to its essential resources of light and movement, so that “cinema is … distilled as an aesthetic that relies less upon light and more upon dark.” These types of “sunless images,”[18] according to Nadia Bozak, are dependent on “withholding light sources and thus foregrounding how the constant availability of this cinematic ingredient has become naturalized as part of viewing expectations.”[19] Despite their apparent minimalism, however, Kiarostami’s black screen sequences are incredibly rich. For example, one can trace a variety of light sources in them, whether natural or artificial. There is a gradual switch from the prolonged darkness of night to the first rays of solar light at the end of The Birth of Light and Five; lunar light is present in Taste of Cherry and Five; and we see flashes of lightning in ABC Africa, Taste of Cherry, and Five. In addition to natural atmospheric light, artificial light sources include a lantern (Where the Wind Will Carry Us); a lighter and car headlights (Taste of Cherry); a flashlight, hotel floodlights, and matches (ABC Africa). As Bozak states, the history of cinema can be traced to the energy of the sun, which is “the heart of cinema, its fuel and perhaps even its spirit.”[20] In the course of its development cinema depended on both outdoor sources of light as well as artificial light: “The cinema originated, at least in part, within the same imagination as the electric light bulb.”[21] So the condition for the appearance of images and cinematic technology in general lies in the interrelation between natural and artificial light. But as Bozak further observes, even though the cinematic image relies on the availability of light, it also requires darkness as the condition of its emergence.[22]

There is a characteristic switch from darkness to light, night to day, and death to life that is traceable in all the black screen sequences. Henry Corbin once called the twilight, a common motif in Iranian poetry, a moment of “in-between, where one side looks towards the brightness of day, and the other side towards the darkness of night.”[23] Importantly, Kiarostami does not set darkness and light in opposition but rather explores their interrelation as a creative interplay of folding and unfolding matter that gives birth to images. Deleuze suggests thinking of the fold in connection to Heidegger’s concept of “Zweifalt, not a fold in two … but a ‘fold-of-two,’ an entre-deux, something ‘between’ in the sense that a difference is being differentiated.”[24] We can only think of darkness through light, death through life, non-representation through representation (and vice versa) in the moments when the two intersect, intermingle, bend, and re-fold: “Non-representational theory needs ‘a hinge-logic, a hinge-style.’”[25] Darkness and light, black and white act as the genetic forces of cinema, providing material out of which the visible appears and into which it recedes. Deleuze holds that the genetic power of the black or white screen in time-image cinema “restor[es] our belief in the world,”[26] invoking the Nietzschean concept of an eternal return to origins for renewed value. The energy of the sun acts as a source and force of not only images but also life in general: “sun makes the world visible,” but it also “makes it possible.”[27] In Kiarostami’s films, all moments of darkness end with an affirmative gesture of the “birth of light,” suggesting that life regenerates itself and goes on: “[a]s long as there is sun, the earth’s fossil fuels could in fact be renewed.”[28]

Darkness also acts as a fuel: it becomes a driving force for the viewer’s imagination. Kiarostami’s unfinished cinema retains its secrets because it “requires gaps, empty spaces like in a crossword puzzle, voids that it is up to the audience to fill in.”[29] Because this is an experience at the limits of perception, the rarefied sensory-motor aspect is driven to connect with the affective and cognitive modes. Many of Kiarostami’s films produce new visions for possible becomings, such as a becoming-woman, a becoming-animal, a becoming-minor, and a becoming-molecular, which run counter to traditional structures of the visual world. “Becoming,” a pivotal concept in this discussion, is regarded by Deleuze and Guattari as a constitutive process of existence, the condition of continuity and sustenance of life. Becoming is not about imitation or identification but about transformation and change. Deterritorialization through darkness in particular involves a becoming-imperceptible, the ultimate chain in a flow of becomings. Deleuze and Guattari describe it as a type of perception that no longer pertains to the subjective-objective view of the world (which could serve as a capsule definition of representation), but approaches life in the context of non-personal affect and intensity, which is inherently non-representational. Imperceptible does not necessarily mean invisible: rather it is a stage (but not a state) in which perception becomes molecular, when we “arrive at holes, microintervals between matters, colors and sounds engulfing lines of flight, world lines, lines of transparency and intersection.”[30] As Simon O’Sullivan observes, art can reveal “other ‘planes’ of reality” that may become discernible through changing temporal and spatial registers.[31] Abbas Kiarostami is often described as a filmmaker who does not engage in manipulating the medium. But in what follows I show that Kiarostami points to the imperceptible by relying specifically on the prosthetic technology of cinema, sometimes under the guise of darkness. By mobilizing our perceptual fields in an attempt to address and renew the very limit of what is perceivable, the black screen sequences in Kiarostami’s films bring into the open the degree to which we are caught in the flow of habitual and deep-seated perceptions.

The Meeting of the Wind and the Leaves: Poetry, Secrets, and the Darkness of the Screen-Cave

 

The Wind Will Carry Us (1999) takes place in the Kurdish village of Siah Darreh, or “Black Valley,” where a crew of filmmakers has arrived to record the mourning rituals for the local centenarian, a woman who has stubbornly refused to die on cue. The man in charge of the crew, Behzad (Behzad Dorani), observes a young woman from the village bringing fresh milk to a well digger, Yossef, a man burrowing deeper into the valley. Behzad is determined to follow this fresh milk to its source. First directed to “Kakrahman’s house,” Behzad is then shown into a dark cellar, stooping beneath the low ceiling and carrying his milk pail. He is a disbeliever, uninitiated in local rituals: “Why is it so dark here?,” he asks, hesitating on the threshold. As he moves forward, he advances on the camera position until his own body blocks the remaining light from the low door—most likely, an invisible cut[32] occurs here, and the screen goes completely black for several seconds.

(Image 2: Zeynab is milking the cow in The Wind Will Carry Us)

(Image 2: Zeynab is milking the cow in The Wind Will Carry Us)

Behzad has entered a pitch-dark cellar, with only the sounds of his tentative footsteps, the bleating of a goat, and the lowing of the cow to orient the viewer. Miss Zeynab appears out of the darkness carrying a hurricane lantern, which does not illuminate the girl’s face throughout the scene of the milking which follows. Behzad is reminded of the opening lines of Forough Farrokhzad’s poem, “Gift” (Hediyeh): “I speak out of the deep of night / Out of the deep of darkness / And out of the deep of night I speak,” as he is suddenly inspired to recite the second stanza of the poem.[33] Taking Zeynab by surprise, he declares, “If you come to my house … Oh, kind one, bring me the lamp and a window   through which I can watch the crowd in the happy street.”[34] After asking Zeynab’s permission, Behzad then recites to her another of Farrokhzad’s poems, “The Wind Will Take Us,”[35] which lends the film its title. In his reading of this scene, Hamid Dabashi regards the recital of Farrokhzad’s poems in the darkness of the cellar as that of “a vulgar man intruding into the private passions of a young woman.” He also calls the milk “a substance with mischievously sexual connotations” and notes that “the protagonist leaves with a bucketful of milk and a satisfied grin on his face,” condemning the whole scene as “ocular masturbation.”[36] He concludes, hyperbolically, that the “stable sequence is one of the most violent rape scenes in all cinema.”[37] Dabashi’s emphatic interpretation of the scene has been met with some apprehension, and a few film critics, such as Joan Copjec and Chris Lippard, offered alternative readings of this poignant moment in the film. In contrast to Dabashi, whose attention was focused on the male figure (it is notable that he never identifies Zeynab by her name, referring to her only as a “milkmaid”),[38] Copjec shifts the emphasis from Behzad’s shameless behavior to “the awakening of shame in Zeynab,”[39] who “requires an intervention, the presence of others as such, in order to emerge from the milking, from the gerundive form of her impoverished existence, as a subject.”[40] This approach itself is an important feminist intervention of reading from a woman’s point of view, illustrating the impact of a female character who is placed in a more active subject position. Copjec continues, “In Dabashi’s reading of the encounter between Behzad and Zeynab, it is Behzad who brings shame to Zeynab. This misreading depends on the reduction of shame to the product of a simple intersubjective relation in which the belittling or degrading look of another person is sufficient to ignite shame. I would argue, however, that it is not Behzad who occasions shame in Zeynab, but the erotic poem by Forough Farrokhzad, ‘The Wind Will Carry Us.’”[41] Two important observations by Copjec invite another reading, one that transcends the subject-object relationship. My Deleuzian approach to this scene draws inspiration from an affective encounter that takes place in the darkness of the cave and poetry as a deterritorializing creative force.

 

Dabashi’s representational analysis is deeply locked within the subject-object position (a brutal man “raping” a helpless milkmaid) and is, most likely, informed either consciously or unconsciously by his knowledge of the peculiar system of codes in Iranian cinema. As Copjec and others explain, the system of sartorial modesty, or hejab, is quite pervasive in Iranian culture. Its influences can be traced in cinematic representations after the Iranian revolution, which dictated that female characters had to remain veiled in the presence of their onscreen husbands (and also, by extension, the off screen male spectators).[42] As bodies and feelings had to be cloaked, “[p]oetry became the only option for expressing intimacy, at first primarily for the men.”[43] For example, in his analysis of Rakhshan Banietemad’s The May Lady (1998), Hamid Naficy describes an exchange between Foruq, whose name is a nod to Forough Farrokhzad, and Mr. Rahbar, who “exchange letters and, using one of the favorite Iranian devices of intimacy, sexuality, and love, quote poetry to each other.”[44] In trying to find the key to the cryptography of the scene, Dabashi interprets the recital of the poem solely as a means of indecent and immoral seduction. But rather than portraying the scene as unbecoming, I propose instead that it invites multiple becomings.

 

“You’ll get used to it if you stay here,” says Zeynab to Behzad, for whose benefit she has lit the hurricane lantern. He replies, “I’ll be gone before I get used to it.” For both Behzad and Zeynab, this encounter offers a new connection, another relation to the world other than the one they are used to. Behzad descends into the cellar from the sunlit world outside, while Zeynab spends her days in the dark. They both momentarily undergo a reaching out to something that is outside of their habituated experience, an “experimental milieu” outside of their normal selves .[45] The habitual modes of their existence are interrupted by an affective moment in the cellar, where a switch in perceptual orders takes place. For Behzad, the darkness of the cellar and Zeynab, the keeper of its secrets, exist on a different perceptual register. For Zeynab, the stranger’s presence interrupts her existence through the light of the lamp cast on her while she is milking. The poem Behzad recites brings her a “window” into the world through which she can “watch the crowd in the happy street” out of her windowless cellar. “The wind is about to meet the leaves,” continues Behzad and, after a pause, he explains this line to Zeynab: “the two are meeting.” He tries to find a more accessible way to explain the affective power of poetry through language that would be understandable to Zeynab and adds, “It’s like when you went to see Yossef” (who likewise spends his days in the dark and whose face we never see). This scene, however, is not just about an ordinary meeting between Zeynab and Yossef, or Zeynab and Behzad; rather, it is an encounter with an asubjective power of affect. As O’Sullivan points out, “affect is a more brutal, apersonal thing. It is that which connects us to the world. It is the matter in us responding and resonating with the matter around us.”[46] The meeting of “the wind and the leaves” in the darkness of the cellar affects both Zeynab and Behzad, inviting becomings. This affective desire is “connected to the feminine, defined as fluidity, empathy, pleasure, non-closure, a yearning for otherness in the non-appropriative mode, and intensity.”[47] For both Behzad and Zeynab, it starts with an opening to a becoming-woman. Behzad steps into the zone of dark quarters occupied by Zeynab, and Zeynab, who went to school approximately the same number of years as Forough, “becomes-woman” through and with her poetry.

 

Kiarostami urges us to look for poetry even (and especially) in complete darkness. In her illuminating study Khatereh Sheibani describes the influence of modern Persian poetry on Kiarostami’s filmmaking. In her discussion of the film The Wind Will Carry Us, Sheibani observes that “the concept of binaries, which suggests a fixed-reality scheme through which many of us perceive the world, is problematized” here.[48] The film invites an overstepping of the “black and white” alternatives,[49] or for that matter the urban and rural, above and below ground, life and death, male and female, and subject and object pairings. The film abjures these “rationalizing” linguistic patterns in favor of the assemblage of disparate expression, “this way or that,” “both good and bad,” that can be found in the poetics of Farrokhzad and Sohrab Sepehri.[50] In their discussion of becoming-music, which can also apply to lyric poetry, Deleuze and Guattari remark that “musical expression is inseparable from a becoming-woman, a becoming-child, a becoming-animal” because it participates in a form of “creative deterritorialization.”[51] Zeynab is (in)visibly affected by Forough’s lines. Unlike in the classic affection-images (the close-ups of Joan’s face) in Carl Dreyer’s The Passion of Joan of Arc (1928),[52] we are unable to see the traces of affect on Zeynab’s face, as it is obscured by darkness. We can only sense her affect, as her re-action is suspended and remains non-actualizable, in a state of virtuality and potentiality. Male and female, subject and object, voyeur and observed are swept up in the creative deterritorialization of poetry.

 

Dabashi considers the scene an obscenity, but it is only because he is examining what is perceptible to the voyeur. Instead, this scene invites us to explore the process of becoming-imperceptible, through the pathways of poetry and secrets. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the “secret has a privileged … relation to perception and the imperceptible.”[53] The secret issues an invitation to becoming-imperceptible, though it may do so in part through what it reveals as much as through what it withholds, in its form and in its content. To Behzad and the spectator, Zeynab remains a secret, an enigma: “The protector of the secret is not necessarily in on it, but is also tied to a perception, since he or she must perceive and detect those who wish to discover the secret.”[54] The choice of a dark cellar in this film, as well as the choice of a grave in Taste of Cherry is quite notable. Both, as subterranean grounds, offer a tangibly material contact with the earth’s innards. A meeting point between the Cosmos and the Brain, caves have taken center stage in many religions and philosophies. Yulia Ustinova connects the importance of caves in ancient Greece to the recent findings in neuroscience, building on the concept of altered consciousness. According to her, the descent into a dark cave (catabasis), immersing oneself in a state of sensory and significatory deprivation, provided a path to the ascent (anabasis) of the mind.[55] As Ustinova also observes, “[c]aves hid awe-inspiring secrets and treasures.”[56] The prehistoric caves of Lascaux, the underground spring of the ancient oracle at Delphi, and even a rough-hewn cellar in a remote Kurdish village—such underground precincts hold hidden secrets and mysteries precisely because they are sealed off from the perceptible world. The secret remains hidden in the dark, the unseen, the becoming-imperceptible, for those who seek it. It is not too much, perhaps, to suggest that at the same moment in which Behzad and the viewer enter the realm of darkness, he/we experience an altered state of consciousness, as the mind lets go of its dependence on habitual vision and the appearance of things. But if for Behzad the reaching out to an “experimental milieu”[57] outside of himself is triggered by his passage into a dark space, for the spectator this happens through recourse to the “experimental night”[58] that cinema spreads over us, thereby affecting “the visible with a fundamental disturbance, and the world with a suspension, which contradicts all natural perception.”[59] This scene prompts us to put normative perceptions and expectations into flux, distorting the habitual cinematic codes that usually rely on visibility and audibility. For the spectator, becoming-imperceptible is not about disappearance but about reconstituting the nature of one’s perceptual field and changing the threshold of the perceivable world. The secret of the scene in the dark cellar lies in “a perception that seeks to be imperceptible itself”[60]: “Listen / Do you hear the darkness blowing?”[61]

 

Modification of Speeds I: Drugs and the Darkness of the Screen-Grave

 

The critical response to Kiarostami’s Taste of Cherry (1997) has emphasized its minimalist techniques, often at the expense of its vision, including its long, uninterrupted takes, lack of apparent action, long shots that encompass a barren landscape, and extended durations without dialogue.[62] For most of the film Mr. Badii (Homayoun Ershadi) drives through Tehran and the surrounding countryside in zigzagging patterns seeking an accomplice for his planned suicide. This departure from the Hollywood action film model led critics such as Roger Ebert to declare the film “excruciatingly boring,” because from the perspective of western feature cinema, there was almost nothing to see.[63] What Ebert fails to see are the imperceptible changes: each time Badii travels to the same spot with a pre-dug grave and a tree next to it, he undergoes a series of transformations, not unlike Behzad in The Wind Will Carry Us. Behzad also repeatedly drives up the winding road to the top of the hill (where the cemetery is located) in search of a signal whenever he receives a call from his Tehran boss. Even though the route is repeated, it is never the same journey for either Behzad or Badii. Every time they come to “the same” location, they arrive there in a renewed state, transformed by a series of affective encounters with the villagers (Behzad) or the car passengers (Badii).

 

The final sequence of the film, after Mr. Badii has recruited an Azeri taxidermist to throw earth on his body if the latter finds him dead in the morning, demands a changed perspective. First, we watch Mr. Badii from a distance moving from one room to another in his apartment. He appears to take into his mouth what we can only infer is an overdose of sedatives or some other drug. Then, under the guise of night, the taxi with Mr. Badii in it heads on a zigzagging path up the hillside to the spot of the open grave. If we look at the scene in a planar dimension, instead of inferring three-dimensional space, then what might be a pair of headlights presents a folded line of flight in the dark with relation to what might be a scattering of streetlights or lit domiciles. Without the changed perspective of holes in space or lines of transparency, without drawing our attention away from the world of perceivable objects and toward the molecular realm of becoming-imperceptible, we cannot appreciate what is about to transpire at the gravesite. We next see the seated Mr. Badii with his back to the fixed camera, framed against the darkened landscape just described. He smokes his “last” cigarette after fighting with his lighter, which stubbornly refuses to work. He then takes his position inside the grave waiting for the drugs to take effect. Drugs of various sorts can be inducements to altered consciousness, “All drugs fundamentally concern speeds, and modifications of speed. What allows us to describe an overall Drug assemblage in spite of the differences between drugs is a line of perceptive causality that makes it so that (1) the imperceptible is perceived; (2) perception is molecular; (3) desire directly invests the perception and the perceived.”[64] The face of Mr. Badii, recumbent in his shallow grave, is momentarily illuminated by the moon and then obscured by the clouds passing above him, lit by a flash of lightning and then cast into a blackout that, in screen time lasts for over a minute but, as Mr. Badii passes into the imperceptible, unfolds for an eternity. As Rosi Braidotti poignantly intones, “What we most truly desire is to surrender the self, preferably in the agony of ecstasy, thus choosing our own way of disappearing, our way of dying to and as our self. This can be described also as the moment of ascetic dissolution of the subject; the moment of its merging with the web of nonhuman forces that frame him/her—the cosmos as a whole.”[65] The prolonged blackout will be irritating to those who wish for only the conventionally perceptible in cinema, to know “what happened.” But for those more conducive to a changed perspective, it invites us to an experience of becoming-imperceptible in the disappearance of the subject, the collapse of the subject-object dichotomy.

(Images 3 and 4: The obscured moon in Taste of Cherry and Un Chien Andalou)

(Images 3 and 4: The obscured moon in Taste of Cherry and Un Chien Andalou)

The effect of the blackout, the obscuring and eclipsing of light, recalls the famous play on cuts in Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dali’s Un Chien Andalou (1929), when thin clouds are passing in front of a full moon and a straight razor is drawn across a woman’s wide-opened eye.[66]

In Taste of Cherry we hear the sound of distant thunder and in the split second of the lightning flash, we can see that Mr. Badii’s eyes have closed. The extended black screen, or cut, is simultaneously the occluded moon, Mr. Badii’s shut eyes, his presupposed diegetic passing, and our experience of the darkened theater in which we view Taste of Cherry.[67] But the imperceptible cut that takes place here suggests that the black screen is not simply a “symbol” of death or an “emblem” of a funereal cloak. As darkness comes to its end, we first hear and then see—but in the differing vision and framing of video—a troop of soldiers marching along the winding road in full daylight. It is not the morning after, or the arrival of the taxidermist, but a completely different season and a grainier camcorder footage of Kiarostami, Homayoun Ershadi,[68] and the film’s crew and cast, shooting scenes or relaxing between takes, as the soundtrack introduces Louis Armstrong’s jazz dirge, “St. James Infirmary Blues.” If the latter seems culturally disparate, it is a funeral march that celebrates life rather than mourns death. As Deleuze claims, “Becoming imperceptible is Life, ‘without cessation or condition’ … attaining to a cosmic and spiritual lapping.”[69] The videotape coda is an assertion that for the past ninety minutes we have been watching not an act of self-annihilation but of creative deterritorialization, one that affirms life on the plane of immanence. Nagisa Oshima once said of his method of banishing green, “No matter how severe a human confrontation you are portraying, it immediately becomes mild the instant that even a little green enters it. Green always softens the heart.”[70] The switch from a barren landscape to a scene with bright greenery promises regeneration and rebirth. The extended black screen, then, serves as a “fold-of-two,”[71] as the processes of life and death are materially enmeshed together rather than separated in the either/or of the “dualism machine.” An invitation to becoming-imperceptible is achieved through the treatment of the medium itself, in which the cut from 35 mm film to videotape not only transfers and enfolds the two media within one another but the two ontological registers as well. The black screen is neither erasure nor negation but the locus of an encounter. There is no cessation in the flow of matter, but rather a fold of two world lines, the intersection of which situates itself in the realm of the imperceptible and explored through the very materiality of the medium. As spectators, we reach this creative deterritorialization of seemingly opposed states of life and death, disparate media, and levels of ontology through the imperceptible blackout that they share.

 

Modification of Speeds II: Time-Lapse Effects and Any-Space-Whatever

 

The short film The Birth of Light (1997) and the documentary Five Dedicated to Ozu (2003) eschew conventional narrative development and typical character representation. Instead, the attention in both films is shifted to alternative planes: animal, inanimate, molecular (a becoming-dog, a becoming-duck, a becoming-wood, a becoming-wave). They also invite us to explore the threshold between the perceptible and the imperceptible. The Birth of Light and the final section of Five emerge from a primordial darkness into the first emanations of light. The initial darkness in The Birth of Light, first through a thin ray of light that becomes stronger, transforms into dawn as the sun rises over the distant mountains. The short film was commissioned by the Locarno International Film Festival, with photography by Bahman Kiarostami and music by Peyman Yazdanian. Rumor has it that it might have been intended for inclusion in Lumière and Company (1996), an anthology of films by international directors who were encouraged to use the vintage Cinématographe of the Lumière brothers to commemorate the centennial of motion pictures.[72] One might be tempted to explore the link between the birth of cinema and the birth of light (lumière); however, the film is not in black-and-white, but in color, and much longer than the anthology’s required fifty-two seconds. Curiously though, two aspects of this short film link it to Kiarostami’s final film-compilation, 24 Frames (2017), alternatively known as 24 Frames Before and After Lumière. The Birth of Light runs just under five minutes, which is approximately the time (about four-and-a-half minutes) of each segment included in the compilation. In addition, both projects examine the boundary between still and moving images, real and artificial, manipulation and non-manipulation. If the still images in 24 Frames, mostly personal photos by Kiarostami, come to life through imperceptible digital techniques, The Birth of Light relies on a time-lapse effect, animating a seemingly static image of the mountain landscape.[73]

 

Five, also known as Five Dedicated to Ozu, is an ensemble of non-narrative shorts. In Five (as well as in The Birth of Light and 24 Frames) Ozu’s “pillow-shots”[74] become extended meditations on backgrounds, which come to the fore in a non-representational style. According to Vannini, backgrounds are the “sites that fall outside of common awareness, the atmospheres we take for granted, the places in which habitual dispositions regularly unfold.”[75] In these films Kiarostami abandons representational dramas of the foreground in favor of the backdrops that often pass unnoticed. The segments in Five are separated by black or white screens overlaid with music, which are ontologically different (as straightforward structural cuts) from the final black screen sequence. This section is the longest and runs to nearly thirty minutes. It begins in total darkness, and then light is gradually reflected on shallow, dappled water, appearing and disappearing into darkness again. The wind susurrates, a thunderstorm brews and raindrops splash on the water’s surface, frogs croak and waterfowl squawk. Or so it seems, with a sort of Zen consciousness and placidity that we could ascribe to Ozu. But like the planar screen that we observed in Taste of Cherry, the image is so rarefied and difficult to discern that we become aware that we are watching the projection of light and not (only) observing a contemplative nature-scape. The liminality between the imperceptible and the perceptible is at issue here, defined in Deleuze and Guattari as “zones of indiscernibility”: “The Cosmos as an abstract machine, and each world as an assemblage effectuating it…. To be present at the dawn of the world. Such is the link between imperceptibility, indiscernibility, and impersonality—the three virtues. To reduce oneself to an abstract line, a trait, in order to find one’s zone of indiscernibility with other traits, and in this way enter the haecceity and impersonality of the creator.”[76]

(Image 5: Light reflected on the water’s surface in the final segment of Five)

(Image 5: Light reflected on the water’s surface in the final segment of Five)

The impressionist appreciation of what appears to be a single long take—perhaps so long as to try the patience of the distractible filmgoer, and indeed Five also doubled as a gallery installation piece—was “achieved only after filming several ponds over an extended period.”[77] This segment is an artfully composed montage, painstakingly achieved through the manipulation of the shot(s), concealing the edits in what appears to be the diegetic blackness of the screen. We are led to believe that the light of the moon reflected on the surface of the pond is eclipsed by the passing clouds as we are plunged into complete darkness. But as we saw in Taste of Cherry and Un Chien Andalou, it might be just a subtle nod to the cinematic cut. Like the dawning in The Birth of Light, the muted grays, low contrast, and barely discernible surfaces are eventually tinged by Homer’s “rosy-fingered dawn” and the crowing of a cock. The appearance of such “naturalness,” however, is only arrived at through the technical manipulation of film, the use of time-lapse montage.[78] As discussed earlier, one entrée into the virtue of imperceptibility is speed. Just as drugs affect humans in various ways, speeding up or slowing down bodily functions (Mr. Badii who takes his sleeping pills), the effects of modifying of speeds, such as time-lapse, high-speed, or slow-motion effects, change the metabolism of cinema. It only takes about “five minutes” for the darkness to be transformed into light in The Birth of Light. In time-lapse cinematography, the frame rate is lower than the speed used to watch the sequence, so that the processes that would appear imperceptible to the human eye can become perceptible. Deleuze and Guattari tell us, “Movements, becomings, in other words, pure relations of speed and slowness, pure affects, are below and above the threshold of perception. Doubtless, thresholds of perception are relative…. What we must do is reach the photographic or cinematic threshold … according to variable speeds and slownesses.”[79] The becoming-imperceptible is all around us; it is, among other things, happening at speeds that are either above or below the threshold of human perception: the geologic time of continental drift or the beating of a hummingbird’s wings; or, the rotation of the planet that brings dawn and dusk each day. The kino-eye, as demonstrated throughout the manipulation of frame rate, grants the spectator an entrance into the imperceptible.

 

The black screens in The Birth of Light and Five are instances of what Deleuze describes as the rarefaction of the image (“less information”), in which little or no light penetrates and observable objects are minimal or few.[80] Blackness and whiteness can be conceived—cosmically and cinematically—as either the fundamentals out of which all the stuff of the world begets or the elementals into which it disintegrates. In Kiarostami darkness is not negative, but enabling, and the vitalist forces always prevail. In both films, a new day arises out of the darkness of night, a characteristic of Kiarostami’s themes of birth, death, and regeneration. Deleuze references the concept of any-space-whatever in his descriptions of the affection-image of classical cinema as well as in the depiction of the movement-image crisis and time-image films. Extending as far as the void, these any-spaces-whatever manifest their genetic power: “Nothingness itself is diverted towards that which comes out of it or falls back on it, the genetic element, the fresh or vanishing perception.”[81] No coordinates can be assigned to these spaces, instead, they exhibit independent qualities and forces outside of belonging to any actual locations.[82] Famously, Deleuze describes Joris Ivens’s Rain (1929) as no longer a direct representation of any concrete rain, but a qualisign, a pure quality of rain as an affective state achieved through an accumulation of images in rapid montage.[83] In the last segment of Five the rain abruptly begins and ends, and there are irregular flashes of lightning, illuminating the black screen, not unlike irrational cuts in experimental flicker films, which render the space in a fragmented and disconnected manner. Kiarostami’s waterscape, as any-space-whatever, is not any localizable basin of water, but a space of virtual dimension, deterritorialized and indeterminate. As affect overflows the frame, it becomes a “pond of matter in which there exist different flows and waves.”[84]

 

“The Electricity is Off”: Power Cuts and Any-Space-Whatever in Minor Cinema

Kiarostami’s documentary film, ABC Africa (2001), was made at the invitation of the UN’s International Fund for Agricultural Development. The director and his assistant, Seifolah Samadian, travel to Uganda, where they spend ten days recording digital video of the many children orphaned by AIDS and warfare, being cared for by the Uganda Women’s Effort to Save Orphans. One night, as Kiarostami and his assistant discuss the day’s shooting, they observe a swarm of mosquitoes around the hotel’s floodlights. As soon as they are told that the electrical power will be cut off by the local authorities at midnight, they (and we) are immediately plunged into darkness.[85] We are reminded of the moment in The Wind Will Carry Us when Behzad finds himself in complete darkness in the cellar, and in response to his bewilderment, Zeynab explains, “We have a flashlight. The electricity is off.” In a rural Kurdish village, episodic power outages might be a fact of life. For the cosmopolitan Tehrani Behzad, however, darkness disrupts habitual systems of sensory perception as he struggles to acclimate himself to an utterly different mode of existence. When Kiarostami and his assistant find themselves in a similar situation in Uganda, they are equally unable to cope, nor have they brought a flashlight as recommended by the authorities: “How can they live in this darkness?,”[86] they ask each other. The videorecording rolls for another seven minutes in the dark as the filmmaker and cinematographer attempt to find their way by a single matchlight and, eventually, flashes of lightning through the window. For a filmmaker reliant upon the electrical grid for production, and with light being the constituent medium of cinema, the unexpected power loss is profound. They observe of the locals, “The sun is gone, life is gone,” but they could equally be speaking of their own work. “With no candles, no lights, no television and no internet [and we could add, no cinema]. I can’t think of anywhere in this world where the sun could be more precious and welcome,” they say, referring to Ugandans. In Bozak’s words, during this moment we get a glimpse into the “privileged world without its natural mechanisms of power and structure … deprived of its electrical supply.”[87]

(Image 6: The matchlight in ABC Africa)

(Image 6: The matchlight in ABC Africa)

Kiarostami makes us aware of how much we rely on the habituation of our motor-sensory faculties to carry ourselves through our daily (and nightly) activities. When any one of those faculties is disturbed, we are paralyzed, fixed in place like a bat suddenly unable to echolocate its position in a cave. Groping in the dark, Kiarostami and his assistant continue conversing, “They live half their lives within these dark walls, like blind people. We can’t even handle five minutes of it.” But, of course, it is not only the director and the cinematographer who are deprived, we, the spectators in the theater, or perhaps streaming this sequence on our laptops, likewise feel unable to handle five minutes of the black screen—a veritable eternity in our habituation to an ever-flickering image—so that we experience something like anxiety, claustrophobia, or simply displeasure. The black screen presents itself against naturalized systems of representation, defamiliarizing “the privileged viewing conditions that ‘institutional’ (from [Noël] Burch) or ‘state’ (Deleuze) viewership takes for granted.”[88]

 

Kiarostami’s cinema has been previously placed under the rubric of Deleuzian “minor cinema” in connection with new political forms of consciousness.[89] In this sense, Kiarostami, an Iranian filmmaker, undermines the dominant Hollywood “language” through his “accented cinema,”[90] much like Kafka, writing in German as a Jew living in Prague, and creates “lines of flight” by way of experimentation.[91] The black screen in ABC Africa, similar to that at the end of Five, can also be approached as an any-space-whatever. For one, there is the shared motif of lightning strikes that make the screen appear and disappear out of the throbbing darkness, thus fragmenting the space. But, poignantly, in minor cinema these spaces of virtuality, invisibility, and affect also become the locus in which “the missing people are a becoming,” they create their collectivity and “invent themselves”[92] in the absence of recognition in the black tunnels and the underground into which they were pushed by power structures. For these “missing people,” either the Kurdish milkmaid Zeynab or the Ugandan grandmother who cares for thirty-five children in a single room, the power failure might be caused either by poor infrastructure or by political struggles. The “voided” nature of the spaces where the missing people find themselves has a strong genetic element, which in minor cinema acquires the special meaning of an anticipatory function, the seeds of the people to come. These “disconnected spaces”[93] (from electricity and privilege) become emancipatory channels, a call “for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist.”[94] And if there is hope for humanity, then it will be because the privileged, sunstruck cosmopolite Behzad, a cognate of the film director, will acclimate himself to the motor-sensory deprivation of the dark cellar, thus “becoming-woman,” “becoming-molecular,” “becoming-imperceptible,” just as Kiarostami and his assistant will also see in the lightning-illuminated trees of Uganda their own “becoming-other,” “becoming-minor.” There is also hope for the spectator who will reach out to the imperceptible and co-emerge with the world through the affective power of darkness and for whom the non-signifying black screen will become a virtual space where new possibilities can be thought. But above all, there is hope for all people who will engage with the Earth differently.

 

Coda

In this essay I address the deep affinities between Deleuzian philosophy and Kiarostami’s films, placing the latter’s cinema within the recent turn to non-representation, affect theory, and the reframing of regimes of visuality in film-philosophy and media theory. I argue that Kiarostami’s cinema, especially his black screen sequences, aspire to the logic of non-representation in the audiovisual medium of cinema, which so willingly succumbs to the tenets of mimesis. The sequences of darkness in Kiarostami’s films invite an imagination of baroque interiors characterized by folds within the intersection of light and shadow, allowing entry into the realm of the imperceptible. Many of Kiarostami’s seemingly uninterrupted and non-manipulated shots mask elaborate labor, capturing movements invisible to the human threshold of perception, which in the black screen sequences is aided by darkness. As Ahmad Kiarostami noted during the post-screening conversation about 24 Frames at the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow, in many of his father’s films, what you see and take for granted has been in fact painstakingly constructed. It should not come as a surprise, then, that in Kiarostami’s last film, 24 Frames, “everything is very carefully designed” by means of digital manipulation.[95]

24 Frames, a reference to the twenty-four frames per second at which film is projected, was shown posthumously at the 2017 Cannes Film Festival. The film was inspired by Kiarostami’s desire to know what comes “before” and “after” each given image. Recalling Charles Sanders Peirce’s semiotic concept of “thirdness,” which splits the binary of the signifier/signified,[96] there has always been an indiscernible twenty-fifth frame in Kiarostami’s cinema, an element outside of the system of signification, which compels the viewer to reach beyond the dimensions of narrative content. The final black-and-white frame in 24 Frames depicts a young woman sleeping in front of the big window, with her head on her desk. On the computer screen beside the woman is a scene from the classical Hollywood film, William Wyler’s The Best Years of Our Lives (1946), which portrays a kissing couple. Famously, Kiarostami did not object to spectators sleeping during his films and even encouraged them to do so: “dreams are windows in our lives, and the significance of cinema is in its similarity to this window.” He emphasized that it was more important how the spectators felt after the film, and he wanted them to experience a “relaxing feeling” following the film’s end.[97] We then hear Andrew Lloyd Weber’s song, with lyrics by Glenn Slater, “Love Never Dies”: “Love never dies once it is in you / Life may be fleeting, Love lives on.” Finally, “The End” flashes on the computer screen, depicted against the background with streaks of light and shadow. The credits start rolling to the side of the frame, announcing Abbas Kiarostami as the director of the film. The twenty-fourth frame is a folded farewell that finds itself betwixt and between the happy ending of the classical movement-image cinema and the time-image cinema’s unresolved closure. “Nothing is ever finished in [Kiarostami], nothing ever dies,”[98] and thus there is no END in his open-image cinema. We walk away tranquil and unhurried, but now it is up to us to open that window into our individual lives and unravel what comes “after” the final frame, to track the course of Life in its reverberating process of growth and change. Kiarostami’s cinema demonstrates an affirmative ethics that helps us to survive and sustain ourselves against all odds: there is the birth of light and continuance of life on earth, even in the face of death. It’s Life, And Nothing More…

(Image 7: “The End” frame from William Wyler’s The Best Years of Our Lives [1946])

(Image 7: “The End” frame from William Wyler’s The Best Years of Our Lives [1946])

[1]Tanya Shilina-Conte <tshilina@buffalo.edu> is an Assistant Professor of Film and Media Studies in the Department of English, University at Buffalo. She teaches a wide variety of courses in Film and Media Theory, Cinema in the Post-media Age, Global Culture and Media, and Theories of Montage and Representation. She has published articles and book chapters in Studia Phaenomenologica, Word & Image: A Journal of Verbal/Visual Enquiry, Border Visions: Identity and Diaspora in Film, and Studia Linguistica. She is currently involved in a research project entitled Black Screens, White Frames: Recalculating Film History, based on Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy and theory of cinema.

 

[2]I am alluding here to Werner Herzog’s documentary, Lessons of Darkness (1992) of burning oil fields in post-Gulf War Kuwait, but not in any overtly political sense, nor in an apocalyptic manner. Lessons of Darkness, directed by Werner Herzog (France, Canal+, 1992), Film.

[3]See Babak Tabarraee, “Abbas Kiarostami: A Cinema of Silence,” Soundtrack 5, no. 1 (June 2012), 5-13, and also his MA thesis, “Silence Studies in the Cinema and the Case of Abbas Kiarostami” (Master’s thesis, University of British Columbia, 2013). Kiarostami’s cinema has also been described as “cinema of questions,” “delay and uncertainty,” “ellipsis and omission,” cinema of an “open image,” and “unfinished” or “half-created cinema.” See Godfrey Cheshire, “Abbas Kiarostami: A Cinema of Questions,” Film Comment 8, no. 6 (July/August 1996): 34-36, 41-43; Laura Mulvey, “Kiarostami’s Uncertainty Principle,” Sight and Sound 6 June 1998, 24-27; Saeed-Vafa Mehrnaz and Jonathan Rosenbaum, Abbas Kiarostami (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2003); Shohini Chaudhuri and Howard Finn, “The Open Image: Poetic Realism and the New Iranian Cinema,” Screen 44, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 38-57; Abbas Kiarostami, “An Unfinished Cinema,” Text Written for the Centenary of Cinema, distributed at Odon Theatre, Paris, 1995; and Mohammad Jafar Yousefian Kenari and Mostafa Mokhtabad, “Kiarostami’s Unfinished Cinema and its Postmodern Reflections,” International Journal of the Humanities 17, no. 2 (2010): 23-37.

[4]See Saige Walton, “Enfolding Surfaces, Spaces and Materials: Claire Denis’ Neo-Baroque Textures of Sensation,” Screening the Past 42 (2013), Web, www.screeningthepast.com/2013/10/enfolding-surfaces-spaces-and-materials-claire-denis’-neo-baroque-textures-of-sensation/, 24 November 2017;

“Affective Forces and Folds of Night: Les Salauds/Bastards (2013) as Baroque Dark Matter,” The Cine-Files 10 (Spring 2016): 1-25; and Cinema’s Baroque Flesh: Film, Phenomenology and the Art of Entanglement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).

[5]Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 276.

[6]Brian Massumi, “The Autonomy of Affect,” in Deleuze: A Critical Reader, ed. Paul Patton (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996), 221.

[7]See Nancy N. Chen, “‘Speaking Nearby’: A Conversation with Trinh T. Minh-ha,” Visual Anthropology Review 8, no.1 (Spring 1992): 83-91.

[8]Nigel Thrift, Non-Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).

[9]Phillip Vannini, “Non-Representational Research Methodologies: An Introduction,” in Non-Representational Research Methodologies: Re-envisioning Research, ed. Phillip Vannini (New York: Routledge, 2015), 5.

[10]See, for example, François Laruelle, Principles of Non-Philosophy, trans. Nicola Rubczak and Anthony Paul Smith (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013) and William Brown, “Non-Cinema: Digital, Ethics, Multitude,” Film-Philosophy 20, no. 1 (Feb. 2016): 104-30. As Brown notes, one of the characteristics of non-cinema is an imposition of darkness.

[11]Gregory J. Seigworth, “Capaciousness,” Capacious: Journal for Emerging Affect Inquiry 1, no. 1 (2017), ii, iii, Web, doi:10.22387/CAP2017.7.

[12]Simon O’Sullivan, “The Aesthetics of Affect: Thinking Art Beyond Representation,” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 6, no. 3 (December 2001), 125.

[13]1 Corinthians 13:12.

[14]See, for example, such images as “Kiarostami at Work,” Photos 12/Alamy, in David Denby, “End Games: The Films of the Iranian Director Abbas Kiarostami,” The New Yorker 87, no. 4 (14 March 2011), 65; and “The Director Abbas Kiarostami,” by Laurent Thurin Nalset, in Nicolas Rapold, “Master of Illusions Faces His Own Mirage,” New York Times 8 February 2013: AR12.

[15]Abbas Kiarostami, Fanfare 6 April 1998, Web, 24 May 2017. Other directors who have also regularly worn dark glasses in public appearances, if not for medical reasons, then possibly as an affectation or a prop, are Jean-Pierre Melville, Jean-Luc Godard, Wong Kar-wai, Tim Burton, and Claire Denis. In Agnès Varda’s recent film, Faces Places (France: Ciné Tamaris, 2017), dark glasses become one of the cross-cutting themes. Varda’s partner in this film, a young visual artist named JR, is constantly wearing dark glasses, which reminds her of Jean-Luc Godard. Varda remarks in the film that JR’s dark glasses are like “the black screen” between them.

[16]Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 31.

[17]See Chris Lippard, “Disappearing into the Distance and Getting Closer All the Time: Vision, Position, and Thought in Kiarostami’s The Wind Will Carry Us,” Journal of Film and Video 61, no. 4 (Winter 2009): 31-40; Michael Price, “Imagining Life: The Ending of Taste of Cherry,” Senses of Cinema 17 (November 2001), Web; Hamish Ford, “Driving into the Void: Kiarostami’s Taste of Cherry,” Journal of Humanistics and Social Sciences 1, no. 1 (2012): 1-27; Mathew Abbott, “The Appearance of Appearance: Absolute Truth in Abbas Kiarostami’s ABC Africa,” Senses of Cinema 67 (July 2013), Web; Justin Remes, “The Sleeping Spectator: Nonhuman Aesthetics in Abbas Kiarostami’s Five: Dedicated to Ozu,” in Slow Cinema, ed. Tiago de Luca and Nuno Barradas Jorge (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 231-42; and Alberto Elena, The Cinema of Abbas Kiarostami (London: SAQI Books/Iran Heritage Foundation, 2005), among others.

[18]A reference to Chris Marker’s film, Sans Soleil (Sunless) (France, Argos Films, 1983).

[19]Nadia Bozak, The Cinematic Footprint: Lights, Camera, Natural Resources (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2012), 42; 40.

[20]Bozak, Cinematic Footprint, 18.

[21]Bozak, Cinematic Footprint, 32.

[22]Bozak, Cinematic Footprint, 40.

[23]Henry Corbin, The Voyage and the Messenger: Iran and Philosophy, trans. Joseph Rowe (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books, 1998), 156.

[24]Deleuze, The Fold, 10.

[25]Marcus A. Doel, “Representation and Difference,” in Taking-Place: Non-Representational Theories and Geography, ed. Ben Anderson and Paul Harrison (London: Ashgate, 2010), 128.

[26]Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 201.

[27]Bozak, Cinematic Footprint, 19-20.

[28]Bozak, Cinematic Footprint, 18. Also a reference to Kiarostami’s film Life, and Nothing More… (Iran, Kanoon, 1992), sometimes also translated as And Life Goes On.

[29]Kiarostami, “An Unfinished Cinema.”

[30]Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 282.

[31]O’Sullivan, “The Aesthetics of Affect,” 127.

[32]This type of “blackout cut” was often practiced in classical cinema, when objects or characters momentarily blocked the camera. In film literature, blackout cuts have variously been described as hidden cuts, masked cuts, or invisible edits, as they are presumed to pass unnoticed.

[33]Forough Farrokhzad, “Gift” (Hediyeh), Web, www.forughfarrokhzad.org/selectedworks/selectedworks1.php#Gift, 31 May 2017.

[34]The Wind Will Carry Us, directed by Abbas Kiarostami (France, MK2 Productions, 1999), Film.

[35]Forough Farrokhzad, “The Wind Will Take Us,” Web, www.forughfarrokhzad.org/selectedworks/selectedworks1.php#The%20Wind, 31 May 2017.

[36]Hamid Dabashi, Close-Up: Iranian Cinema Past, Present, and Future (New York: Verso, 2001), 253.

[37]Dabashi, Close-Up, 253, 254.

[38]Dabashi, Close-Up, 253. She does remain silent when asked her name by Behzad, but we know that her mother has called her Zeynab.

[39]Copjec, “The Object-Gaze: Shame, Hejab, Cinema,” Gramma: Journal of Theory and Criticism 14 (2007), 176.

[40]Copjec, “The Object-Gaze,” 177.

[41]Copjec, “The Object-Gaze,” 179.

[42]Copjec, “The Object-Gaze,” 164.

[43]Hamid Naficy, “Veiled Voice and Vision in Iranian Cinema: The Evolution of Rakhshan Banietemad’s Films,” Social Research 67, no. 2, Iran: Since the Revolution (Summer 2000), 565.

[44]Naficy, “Veiled Voice and Vision in Iranian Cinema,” 572.

[45]O’Sullivan, “The Aesthetics of Affect,” 127. He references Chapter 6 of A Thousand Plateaus, on “The Body Without Organs.”

[46]O’Sullivan, “The Aesthetics of Affect,” 128.

[47]Rosi Braidotti, “The Ethics of Becoming Imperceptible,” in Deleuze and Philosophy, ed. Constantin Boundas (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 157.

[48]Khatereh Sheibani, “Kiarostami and the Aesthetics of Modern Persian Poetry,” Iranian Studies 39, no. 4 (December 2006): 524.

[49]For example, Behzad is perplexed as to why the whitewashed village is called Black Valley, not White Valley, a (for him) confusing reorganization of binaries.

[50]Sheibani, “Kiarostami,” 524.

[51]Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 299.

[52]The Passion of Joan of Arc, directed by Carl Theodor Dreyer (France, Société Générale des Films, 1928), Film.

[53]Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 286.

[54]Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 287.

[55]See Yulia Ustinova, Caves and the Ancient Greek Mind: Descending Underground in the Search for the Ultimate Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 2.

[56]Ustinova, Caves and the Ancient Greek Mind, 1.

[57]O’Sullivan, “The Aesthetics of Affect,” 127.

[58]Deleuze, Cinema 2, 201. Deleuze is quoting from Jean-Louis Schefer, L’homme ordinaire du cinema (Paris: Cahiers du cinema, Gallimard, 1980).

[59]Deleuze, Cinema 2, 201.

[60]Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 287.

[61]Forough Farrokhzad, “The Wind Will Take Us.”

[62]Taste of Cherry, directed by Abbas Kiarostami (Iran, France, Zeitgeist Film, 1997), Film.

[63]Roger Ebert, review of Taste of Cherry, Chicago Sun-Times 27 February 1998, Web, www.rogerebert.com/reviews/taste-of-cherry-1998, 21 May 2017.

[64]Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 282.

[65]Braidotti, “Ethics of Becoming Imperceptible,” 153.

[66]Un Chien Andalou, directed by Luis Buñuel (France, Les Grands Films Classiques, 1929), Film.

[67]It is of interest that Mr. Badii, just like Luis Buñuel in the razor scene of Un Chien Andalou, is smoking a cigarette.

[68]Homayoun Ershadi lights up a cigarette and hands it over to Kiarostami, an extension of the gesture from the previous scene.

[69]Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (London and New York: Verso, 1998), 26.

[70]Nagisa Oshima, “Banishing Green,” in Color: The Film Reader, ed. Angela Dalle Vacche and Brian Price (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), 119.

[71]Deleuze, The Fold, 10.

[72]Keith Uhlich, “Kiarostami at MoMA, Day 1: Birth of Light and Taste of Cherry.” Slant 6 May 2007, Web, www.slantmagazine.com/house/article/kiarostami-at-moma-day-1a-birth-of-light-taste-of-cherry, 24 November 2017. Lumière and Company includes a different short by Kiarostami, Dinner for One (Iran, France: Cinétévé, 1996).

[73]The most typical use of time-lapse is usually sunset to sunrise.

[74]Noël Burch coined this term in comparison to a “pillow-word” (makurakotoba) in Japanese poetry, “a conventional epithet or attribute for a word,” that serves a brief auxiliary function in a poem. Based on this analogy, “pillow-shots” are scenes of everyday life seemingly disconnected from the main plot, and without humans present in them. In To the Distant Observer: Form and Meaning in the Japanese Cinema (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), 160.

[75]Vannini, “Non-Representational Research Methodologies, 9.

[76]Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 280.

[77]Jonathan Rosenbaum, “Spoiler Alert,” Chicago Reader 8 June 2006, Web, www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/spoiler-alert/Content?oid=922348, 22 May 2017.

[78]See Tom Paulus, “Truth in Cinema: The Riddle of Kiarostami—Part Two,” Cinea 3 January 2017, Web, https://cinea.be/truth-cinema-the-riddle-kiarostami-part-two/, 22 May 2017.

[79]Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 281.

[80]See Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 12.

[81]Deleuze, Cinema 1, 122.

[82]Deleuze, Cinema 1, 120.

[83]Deleuze, Cinema 1, 110-11. Regen (Rain), directed by Joris Ivens (Netherlands: Capi-Holland, 1929), Film.

[84]Deleuze, The Fold, 5. Deleuze is quoting from Letter to Des Billettes, December 1696 (GPh, VII, 452).

[85]“It’s a good thing we took our pills,” they say right before the power is cut off, wondering if any of the mosquitoes carry malaria.

[86]ABC Africa, directed by Abbas Kiarostami (Iran: IFAD, 2001), Film.

[87]Bozak, Cinematic Footprint, 42.Think also of blackouts during the Special Period in Cuba or extended periods of time without electrical supply on some Caribbean islands after the recent hurricanes Jose and Maria. 

[88]Bozak, Cinematic Footprint, 43.

[89]See, for example, Vered Maimon, “Beyond Representation: Abbas Kiarostami’s and Pedro Costa’s Minor Cinema,” Third Text 26, no. 3 (May 2012), 331-44.

[90]See Hamid Naficy, An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

[91]See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “What Is a Minor Literature?”, Mississippi Review 11, no. 3 (Winter/Spring 1983), 13-33.

[92]Deleuze, Cinema 2, 217.

[93]Deleuze, Cinema 2, 273.

[94]Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson (London and New York: Verso, 1994), 108.

[95]Conversation with Ahmad Kiarostami at the Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow, about 24 Frames, 13 September, 2017. For instance, Ahmad Kiarostami talks about the zigzagging path in Where is the Friend’s Home? (1987), trampled down by a class of children who were directed to walk back and forth across the hill. Another example includes a piece of wood “spontaneously” split apart by the waves in Five, which occurred because Kiarostami hid an explosive in it (see Mahmoud Reza Sani, Men at Work: Cinematic Lessons from Abbas Kiarostami [Los Angeles, CA: Mhughes Press, 2013], 16).

[96]Peirce’s three trichotomies of the sign (Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. Justus Buchler [New York: Dover, 1955]) influence Deleuze’s analyses of the image in the Cinema books.

[97]Xueili Wang, “Sleeping Through Kiarostami,” Los Angeles Review of Books 7 October 2016, Web, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/sleeping-through-kiarostami/, 24 November 2017. A few reviews of the screening of 24 Frames at the Cannes Film Festival described sleeping spectators in the audience: “During the screening at the Lumière, where I sat in the balcony, probably half the audience in my area got up and left in the first hour. Over half of those who remained spent portions of the film asleep,” Nolan Kelly, “24 Frames: The Last Word of Filmmaker Abbas Kiarostami,” The Pavlovich Today 12 August 2017, Web, http://thepavlovictoday.com/mixed-media/24-frames-last-word-filmmaker-abbas-kiarostami/, 24 November 2017. For a scholarly treatment of “the sleeping spectator,” see Remes, “The Sleeping Spectator: Nonhuman Aesthetics in Abbas Kiarostami’s Five.”

[98]Deleuze, in “The Greatest Irish Film (Beckett’s “Film”), gave this assessment of Beckett, in Essays Critical and Clinical, 26.

Namag: A Concise Etymology and Semantic

نامگ /nāmag/ (هزوارشِ آن:[1] MGLTA) واژه‌ای است که در زبان‌های فارسی میانۀ زرتشتی و مانوی باقی مانده است.[2] صورت باستانی آن را می‌توان nāmanka*، متشکل از دو جزء nāman به معنای نام و پسوند ka- دانست که پسوند اسم‌ساز است. منتها، از آنجا‌ که اولاً این کلمه در هیچ‌یک از زبان‌های دورۀ باستانی باقی‌ نمانده، ثانیاً چون که نه n نهایی nāman در نامگ آمده است و نه جبران آن، باید تاریخ پیدایش این کلمه را دورۀ میانۀ زبان‌‌‌‌‌های ایرانی دانست.[3] به عبارت دیگر، نامگ صورت باستانی ندارد و در دورۀ میانه، از دو جزء nām و پسوند ag-، ساخته شده است.[4] ظاهراً کهن‌ترین ضبط کلمه در ۴ کتیبۀ کردیر، متعلق به نیمۀ دوم قرن سوم میلادی، آمده باشد؛ یعنی سندی قدیمی‌تر که حاوی کلمه‌ی نامگ باشد به دست ما نرسیده است. نامگ در این ۴ کتیبه‌ مجموعاً ۱۱ بار به کار رفته است.[5] این تعدد موارد استفاده نشان می‌دهد که نامگ در آن تاریخ واژه‌ای پذیرفته‌شده در زبان فارسی میانه بوده و لاجرم از پیدایشش در آن زمان مدتی نه ‌چندان کوتاه گذشته بوده.

نامگ سه معنای اصلی دارد: ۱. مطلق مکتوب همچون کتاب و هر چیزی که نوشته‌ شده باشد، ۲. سند، ۳. مراسله.

۱. نامگ در معنای مکتوب

در باب پانزدهم فرهنگِ پهلوی که مجموعه‌ای است از هزوارش‌ها و املاهای دشوار فارسی میانۀ زرتشتی،[6] نامگ را معادل کلمۀ آرامی כתיב /ketiv/ (در عربی کتیب، در سریانی ܟܬܝܒܗ) دانسته‌اند. کلمۀ آرامی به معنای نوشته، کتاب و هر چیز مکتوب دیگری است.[7] در سطر 22 کتیبۀ کردیر در نقش رجب چنین می‌خوانیم:

  1. … um ēn nāmag ēd-iz rāy nibišt kū…

۲۲. . . . و این نامه را نیز نوشتم که . . .[8]

نامگ در اینجا در معنای نوشته آمده است.

در معنای کتاب هم نامگ در نام چند کتاب فارسی میانۀ زرتشتی آمده است: ارداویرازنامگ و جاماسپ‌نامگ که باقی مانده‌اند.[9] نامگ در نام کتاب‌های دیگری که اصلشان از دست رفته نیز آمده است: خودای‌نامگ (xwadāy-nāmag)، طوطی‌نامگ، اسکندرنامگ، سندبادنامگ و اونگ‌نامگ (ēwēnag-nāmag لفظاً: آیین‌نامه).[10] نامگ همچنین در همین معنا در ترکیب کارنامگ در عنوان کتاب مهم کارنامگ اردشیر پاپکان نیز آمده است.[11] ترجمۀ تحت‌اللفظی آن نام چنین است: کتاب اعمال اردشیر پسر بابک. همچنین، در مادیان هزاردادستان[12] به نام کتاب‌های حقوقی ازدست‌رفته‌ای برمی‌خوریم که طرف استناد مؤلف آن کتاب بوده‌اند: دادستان‌نامگ،[13] مُستبارنامگ[14] (mustbār-nāmag لفظاً: تظلم‌نامه)، خویشکاری‌نامگ موبدان[15] (xwēškārīh-nāmag ī mowbadān)، خویشکاری‌نامگ کارفرمایان[16] (xwēškārīh-nāmag ī‌kārframān[ān]‌).

نامگ غیر از جزیی از عنوان کتاب‌های خاص، در معنای عام برای نامیدن نوع مشخصی از مکتوبات نیز به کار رفته است. مثلاً در مادیان هزاردادستان ترکیباتی را نظیر پرسش‌نامگ[17] (pursišn-nāmag) در معنای صورت‌جلسۀ بازجویی و سخن‌نامگ[18] (saxwan-nāmag) در معنای صورت‌جلسۀ دادگاه، هِشت‌نامگ[19] (hišt-nāmag) در معنای طلاق‌نامه و یزش‌نامگ[20] (yazišn-nāmag) در معنای صورت‌جلسۀ انجام مراسم ور می‌توان یافت. همچنین، در آن کتاب به نامگ‌دان[21] (nāmag-nīdān) به معنای بایگانی برمی‌خوریم.

۲. نامگ در معنای سند

 در مادیان هزاردادستان نزدیک به 20 بار نامگ در معنای مکتوبی دارای ارزش حقوقی آمده است. مثلاً در بندی از آن کتاب می‌خوانیم:

Ud ān-ī guft kū ka gōwēd kū-m ēn wizīr ō tō dād ēg-iš gil ud nāmag dād bawēd.

و آن گفته شده که اگر گوید که ”این قباله را به تو می‌دهم.“ پس گِل (مُهر) و نامه را داده باشد.[22]

۳. نامگ در معنای مراسله

 کتابی موسوم به آیین نامه‌نویسی (پهلوی: Abar ēwēnag ī nāmag nibēsišnīh) احتمالاً از اواخر دورۀ ساسانی باقی‌ مانده است.[23] کتاب مطابق عنوانش حاوی الگوهای گوناگون مراسله است. این کتاب چنین آغاز می‌شود:

Nūn nibēsīhēd pad sazīd nibišt nāmag-ē ō kas kas xwadāyān…

اکنون نوشته می‌شود، نوشته‌ای سزاوار، نامه‌ای به یکایک خداوندان . . .

همچنین، در بند ۱۸ آمده است:

Nāmag pad bēš pursišnīh hunsandīh dādan…

نامه برای غمگساری، تسلیت . . .[24]

همچنین، در کارنامۀ اردشیر بابکان آمده است:

  1. uš nāmag ō pāpak kard kū amā ēdōn ašnūd kū ašmā rāy pus-ē ast ī abāyišnīg pad frahang ud aswārīh abēr frahixtag.[25]

۲۷. و نامه به پاپک کرد که ما ایدون شنیدیم که شما را پسی هست که بایسته، به فرهنگ و اسواری بسیار فرهیخته.[26]

نامگ در فارسی دری

پسوند ag- ایرانی میانه که خود بازماندۀ aka- ایرانی باستان است، در گذر به فارسی دری g نهایی خود را از دست داده و در گویش‌های متفاوت به اشکال فتحه یا کسره تبدیل شده است.[27] از این رو، نامه صورت فارسی دری نامگ فارسی میانه است. از لحاظ معنی‌شناسی، نامه هر سه معنای نیای خود را حفظ کرده است.

۱. نامه در معنای مکتوب

در عناوین کتاب‌های مشخصی همچون شاهنامه، مرزبان‌نامه، مصیبت‌نامه، اسرار‌نامه، گشتاسب‌نامه، سیاست‌نامه، نوروزنامه و مانندشان آمده است. همچنین، برای اشاره به نوع مشخصی از مکتوبات هم از نامه استفاده می‌شود: فرس‌نامه، بازنامه، فتوت‌نامه، ساقی‌نامه، خواب‌نامه، سفرنامه و مانند اینها. نامه در این معنا از پرکاربردترین واژه‌ها برای برساختن کلمات جدید در فارسی معاصر است: فیلم‌نامه، نمایش‌نامه، نظام‌نامه، پایان‌نامه، اساس‌نامه، لغت‌نامه، دانش‌نامه‌، اجازه‌نامه، دعوت‌نامه، بخش‌نامه، آیین‌نامه، جشن‌نامه، یادنامه، شناخت‌نامه، شب‌نامه، شیوه‌نامه و مانندشان. همچنین، نامه اخیراً در عنوان بخشی از فصول کتاب هم به کار می‌رود: نام‌نامه و کتاب‌نامه. در عناوین بعضی متون روایی و نمایشی فارسی معاصر، ملهم از عناوین کتب قدما، نامه در معنای حکایت یا داستان آمده است: عارف‌نامه یعنی داستان عارف و نه کتاب مستقلی دربارۀ عارف قزوینی.[28] همچنین‌اند فتح‌نامۀ مغان (داستان فتح مغان)،[29] گنج‌نامه (داستان گنج).[30]

نامه همچنین برای اشاره به جراید دوره‌ای به کار می‌رود. در این معنا به طول دورۀ انتشار جریده می‌پیوندد: روزنامه، هفته‌نامه، دو‌هفته‌نامه، ماهنامه، فصلنامه، دوفصلنامه، سالنامه و گاهنامه.

نامه، خارج از ترکیباتی اینچنین، در معنای کتاب در فارسی کلاسیک آمده است:

یکی نامه بود از گه باستان

فراوان بدو اندرون داستان[31]

این معنا در فارسی امروز متروک شده است.

۲. نامه در معنای سند

نامه در فارسی دری برای اشاره به نوشته‌ای به کار می‌رود که ارزش حقوقی دارد. در این معنا، به عنوان عقد یا عمل یا وضع حقوقی‌ای منضم می‌شود که در آن نوشته درج شده است: اجاره‌نامه، وصیت‌نامه، وکالت‌نامه، عقد‌نامه، طلاق‌نامه، بیمه‌نامه، گذر‌نامه، گواهی‌نامه، شهادت‌نامه، رضایت‌نامه، عهد‌نامه، پیمان‌نامه، مقاوله‌نامه، بیع‌نامه، صلح‌نامه، دادنامه، بارنامه، وقف‌نامه، شناسنامه و مانند اینها.

۳. نامه در معنای مراسله

استعمال نامه به صورت مجزا در معنای کتاب در فارسی امروز متروک شده است. مراسله در فارسی امروز یگانه معنای نامه است، وقتی که مجزا و بیرون ترکیب به کار می‌رود. این معنا در فارسی کلاسیک نیز وجود داشته است:

به سمرقند اگر بگذری ای باد سحر

نامۀ اهل خراسان به بر خاقان بر

نامه‌ای مطلع آن رنج تن و آفت جان

نامه‌ای مقطع آن درد دل و سوز جگر

نامه‌ای بر رقمش آه عزیزان پیدا

نامه‌ای در شکنش خون شهیدان مضمر[32]

[1] هزوارش کلمه‌ای بوده است که صورت آرامی‌اش نوشته، اما صورت ایرانی‌ میانه‌اش خوانده می‌شده است. بنگرید به ژاله آموزگار یگانه و احمد تفضلی، زبان پهلوی: ادبیات و دستور آن (تهران: انتشارات معین، ۱۳۸۲)، 60-61.

[2] دیوید نیل مکنزی، فرهنگ کوچک زبان پهلوی، ترجمۀ مهشید میرفخرایی (تهران: پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی، ۱۳۸۳)، ۱۰۹؛

Desmond Durkin-Meisterernst, Dictionary of Manichean Middle Persian and Parthian (Turnhout: Breplos, 2oo4), 238.

[3] زبان‌های ایرانی را از لحاظ زمانی در سه دوره قرار می‌دهند: از آغاز تا سال ۳۳۱ق‌م و یورش اسکندر دوران باستان است. از ۳۳۱ق‌م تا ۸۶۷م، سال به سلطنت رسیدن یعقوب لیث صفاری و رسمی شدن زبان فارسی دری، دورۀ میانه است و پس از آن دورۀ جدید. بدین ترتیب، حیات زبان فارسی نیز به سه دورۀ باستان، میانه و جدید تقسیم می‌شود. فارسی باستان، زبان کتیبه‌های پادشاهان هخامنشی، نیای فارسی میانۀ زرتشتی یا پهلوی است که خود نیای زبان فارسی دری است. در اینجا فارسی دری را، که زبانی است که این مقاله به آن نوشته شده است، به دو دورۀ کلاسیک، از ۶۳۰م تا ۱۹۰۶م (سال انقلاب مشروطه)، و فارسی معاصر، از آن تاریخ به این سو، تقسیم کرده‌ام تا تحول معنایی واژه را در طول تاریخ زبان فارسی دری دقیق‌تر نشان دهم. برای آگاهی از تاریخ زبان فارسی بنگرید به محسن ابوالقاسمی، تاریخ زبان فارسی (تهران: سمت، ۱۳۹۴).

[4]Henrik Samuel Nyberg, A Manuel of Pahlavi (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1974), vol. 2, 135.

[5]Philippe Gingnoux, Glossaire des Inscriptions Pehlevies et Parthes (London: Lund Humphries, 1972), 30.

[6] احمد تفضلی، تاریخ ادبیات ایران پیش از اسلام، به کوشش ژاله آموزگار (تهران: سخن، ۱۳۷۶)، ۳۲۱.

[7]Henrik Samuel Nyberg, Farhan ī Pahlavik (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1988), 12.

[8]Philippe Gingnoux, Les Quatre Inscriptions du Mage Kirdīr (Paris: Association pour l’Avancement des Études Iraniennes, 1991), 36.

[9] تفضلی، تاریخ ادبیات، ۱۶۷ و ۱۷۳.

[10] تفضلی، تاریخ ادبیات، ۲۶۹، ۳۰۴، ۲۹۹ و ۲۴۵

[11] تفضلی، تاریخ ادبیات، ۲۶۰.

[12] تفضلی، تاریخ ادبیات، ۲۸۶

[13]برای آگاهی از محتوای مادیان هزاردادستان -مختصراً برای بخش اول MHD و برای بخش دوم MHDA- بنگرید به

Maria Macuch, Das Sasanidische Rechtsbuch “Mātakdān I Hazār Dātistān” (Wiesbaden: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, 1981), Teil 2; Maria Macuch, Rechtskasuistik Und Gerichtspraxis Zu Beginn Des Siebenten Jahrhunderts in Iran: Die Rechtssamlung Des Farroḫmard I Wahrāmān (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993); Anahit Perikhani︠a︡n, The Book of a Thousand Judgements: A Sasanian Law-book, trans. Nina G. Garsoïan (Costa Mesa: Mazda, 1997); MHD, 11-2, 36, 2.

[14]Mātakdān I Hazār Dātistān, A5, 11.

[15]Mātakdān I Hazār Dātistān, A26, 15.

[16]Mātakdān I Hazār Dātistān, A38, 16-17.

[17]Mātakdān I Hazār Dātistān, 78, 4-5, 7, 14, 15; 98, 4; 100, 7,11 etc.

[18]Mātakdān I Hazār Dātistān, 4, 8; 9, 7; 73, 12-14 etc.

[19]Mātakdān I Hazār Dātistān, 87, 10.

[20]Mātakdān I Hazār Dātistān, A13, 7; A27, 8.

[21]Mātakdān I Hazār Dātistān, 78, 12-13.

[22]Mātakdān I Hazār Dātistān, A34, 2-3.

[23] تفضلی، تاریخ ادبیات، ۲۹۴.

[24]Jamaspji Dastur Minocherji Jamasp-Asana, Corpus of Pahlavi Texts (Bombay, 1913), 132  and 135.

[25] آوانویسی برگرفته از محسن ابوالقاسمی، راهنمای زبان‌های باستانی ایران (تهران: سمت، ۱۳۸۶)، جلد ۱، ۲۲۵.

[26] ترجمه برگرفته از ابوالقاسمی، راهنمای زبان‌های باستانی ایران، ۲۳۱.

[27] محسن ابوالقاسمی، دستور تاریخی زبان فارسی (تهران: سمت، ۱۳۹۴)، ۳۲۵.

[28] محمدجعفر محجوب، دیوان کامل ایرج‌میرزا (تهران: نشر اندیشه، 2536شاهنشاهی/1356ش)، 75-96.

[29] هوشنگ گلشیری، نیمۀ تاریک ماه (تهران: نشر نیلوفر، ۱۳۸۰)، 311-336.

[30] گلشیری، نیمۀ تاریک ماه، 517-532.

[31] ابوالقاسم فردوسی، شاهنامه، تصحیح جلال خالقی مطلق (تهران: دائره‌المعارف بزرگ اسلامی، ۱۳۸۶) جلد ۱، ۱۲.

[32] محمدتقی مدرس رضوی، دیوان انوری (تهران: علمی فرهنگی، ۱۳۷۶)، جلد ۱، ۲۰۱.

Cyrus in Judeo-Persian Literature

بررسی اشعار فارسیهود نمودار همبستگی ایرانیان یهودی با ادب و فرهنگ ایران است. این همبستگی‌ها در دوره‌های ایران باستان و ایران اسلامی به دو گونۀ متفاوت بود. در ایران باستان، آنچه قوم یهود را به ایران پیوند می‌داد حمایت از قوم یهود و بازسازی معبد مقدس به دست پادشاهان دوران هخامنشی و تکوین تلمود بابلی در نیمۀ اول دورۀ ساسانیان بود، اما در دورۀ ایران اسلامی، یعنی پس از ورود اعراب به ایران، زبان فارسی به این رابطه استحکام بخشید. نقش یهودیان در پیگیری رابطۀ فارسی میانه و فارسی نو را نباید از یاد برد، زیرا اولین نوشته‌های فارسی نو همانا نوشته‌های فارسیهود است که زبان فارسی را به حروف عبری می‌نوشتند.

بازتاب احترام‌آمیز یهودیان از ایران و ایرانی را در کتب مقدس یهود، به‌ویژه کتاب اشعیای نبی و در سه کتاب عزرا و دانیال و استر می‌توان مشاهده کرد. در کتاب‌های اشعیا و عزرا و استر، نقش فعال و نجات‌دهندۀ پادشاهان ایران، به‌ویژه کورش و داریوش و خشایارشاه، در زندگی و ادامۀ حیات یهودیت بازگو شده است.

توصیف کورش در ادبیات فارسیهود اصولاً از گزارشات و توصیفات شعرای فارسیهود یا از منابعی یهودی مانند تورات و حکایات و روایات تلمود یا از مراجع غیریهودی اسلامی برگرفته شده که غالباً ریشه در منابع یهودی دارند. در مراجع یهودی، عهد قدیم اولین مرجع است که در آن نام کورش مستقیماً 23 بار و مطالبی دربارۀ او به دفعات بیشتر آمده است. از آن جمله می‌توان به تواریخ دوم 33-‌36:22؛ عِزرا 8 – 1:1؛ عِزرا 3:7؛ عزرا 5‌ و 4:3؛ عِزرا 17-3‌:5؛ عِزرا 14 و 3: 6‌؛ اشعیا 44:28؛ اشعیا 13و 1: 45؛ دانیال 1:21؛ دانیال 6:28 و دانیال 10:1 رجوع کرد.[1] در منابع یهودی خارج از کتاب مقدس، وصف کورش را در حکایات و روایات یهودیان و به‌خصوص در تلمود می‌توان جُست.

در منابع غیرایرانی غیریهودی آنچه را مربوط به دوران ایران باستان است می‌توان در نوشته‌های هردوت، گزنفون و بعدتر در آثار فلاویوس ژوزیفوس یافت، زیرا هر یک از آنان به‌گونه‌ای درست یا افسانه‌وار از کورش نام برده‌اند.

در منابع ایرانی اسلامی باید از تاریخ طبری یا تاریخ الرسل و الملوک تألیف ابوجعفر محمدبن جریر طبری وت رجمه و تفسیر فارسی آن یعنی تاریخ بلعمی نام برد که ابوعلی محمدبن محمدبن بلعمی آن را تألیف کرد. آگاهی شعرای فارسیهود از نوشته‌های منابع غیریهودی غیرایرانی مانند آثار هردوت، گزنفون و ژوزیفوس بعید به نظر می‌رسد، اما منابع اسلامی به خوبی در دسترس آنان بود. محققاً هر یک از این منابع در شرح وقایع آن دوران تفاوت‌هایی با آگاهی‌های امروزی ما از تاریخ مستند آن دوران دارند، اما آنچه همگی در آن مشترک‌القول‌اند مدح کورش و سپاس از او به برای رهایی یهودیان از اسارت است.

با نگاهی کلی به نام کورش در ادبیات فارسیهود می‌توان شخصیت کورش را در چهار اثر ادبی پیگیری کرد:[2]

  1. قصۀ دانیال: اثری به نثر که در قرن دوازدهم هجری نوشته شده و احتمالاً برداشتی از کتاب دانیال در عهد عتیق یا ترجمه‌ای از نسخۀ گم‌شدۀ ترجمۀ کتاب دانیال از عبری به آرامی بوده است.
  2. دانیال‌نامه: اثری به نظم از شاعر فارسیهود، خواجه بخارایی(قرن هفدهم میلادی)، که نسخ معدودی از آن در دست است.
  3. اردشیرنامه: اثر شاعر فارسیهود شاهین (اواخر قرن سیزدهم و اوایل قرن چهاردهم میلادی) است. در این کتاب داستان ملکه استر با شاه اردشیر و داستان افسانه‌آمیز ایرانی دیگری در هم آمیخته شده است که حکایت فرزند دیگر شاه اردشیر از ملکه وشتی است. در کنار داستان استر و فرزندش کورش، شاعر از فرزند دیگر شاه اردشیر از وشتی، به نام شیرو، و عشق او با یک پریزاد سخن می‌گوید.
  4. عزرا‌نامه: اثر دیگر شاهین است که در اکثر نسخه‌ها در دنبالۀ اردشیرنامه آمده است.

 

نگاهی کلی به نام و جایگاه کورش در ادبیات فارسیهود و منابع یهودی و اسلامی آن

اصولاً شاعران حماسه‌سرای مذهبی فارسیهود که بعد از حملۀ مغول و حکومت ایلخانان می‌زیستند، از شاهنامه فردوسی الهام می‌گرفتند. آنان قدیسین یا وقایع رزم‌های مذهبی را به تقلید از شاهنامه توصیف کرده در این راه از قهرمانان ایران باستان، از جمله زال و رستم و اسفندیار، برای معرفی شخصیت‌های مذهبی استفاده کرده و حتی برای توصیف برخی از این شخصیت‌ها از مفهوم ایرانی ”فرّه ایزدی“ به مفهوم گسترده‌تری به معنی ”التفات الهی“ (Divine Providence) بهره برده‌اند. مثلاً عمرانی، شاعر فارسیهود قرن شانزدهم میلادی، برای توصیف شائول، اولین پادشاه یهودی، و حضرت داوود از همین موهبت یاد کرده است. او دربارۀ شائول گفته است :[3]

در آن عهد در میان نسل عِبَر

نبود چون او یکی با هیبت و فرّ

رُخش آیینۀ نور الهی

سزای تاج و تخت پادشاهی

پدر او را نهاده نام شائول

جوان قابل و دانا و معقول

و دربارۀ داود نیز چنین می گوید:[4]

خوش آمد شاه را دیدار داوود

کمال و دانش و گفتار داود

جوانی دید با فرّ و هدایت

دلیر و کاردان و با درایت

منابع هر دو شاعر در خصوص کورش دانش آنان از کتاب عهد قدیم بوده، ولی سعی کرده‌اند روایات خود را بیشتر با

منابع ایران اسلامی مطابقت دهند، مگر در بعضی موارد که تناقض بسیار موجب عدم رعایت این امر بوده است. شرح این تناقضات را به ترتیت ذیل می‌توان بیان کرد:

  1. در بسیاری ازمراجع یهودی، داریوش و کورش معاصر هم معرفی شده‌اند. کورش فاتح ماد و بابل و داریوش فاتح آسور و پارس خوانده شده‌اند. در همین روایات، گاهی هم به اشتباه کورش داماد و جانشین داریوش معرفی شده است.[5]

باید به خاطر سپرد که در روایت یهودی دیگری داریوش‌شاه فرزند اَحَشوِرُش (خشایارشاه) و شخصی معرفی شده است که معبد مقدس را باز سازی کرد.[6]

  1. در تاریخ طبری و تفسیر بلعمی نیز ترتیب کورش وداریوش و خشایارشاه (اَحَشوِرُش) در هم آمیخته است. بنا به گفتۀ تاریخ بلعمی، بهمن فرزند اسفندیار و نواده گشتاسب بود. و او اَحَشوِرُش [خشایارشاه] را به جای داریوش بر تخت عراق و بابل نشاند:

بهمن نامه فرستاد سوی اَحَشویرش که به عراق حادثه چنین افتاد، باید که تو [اَحشویرش] به هندوستان خلیفتی شایسته بنشانی و به تن خویش بیایی و مُلک عراق و شام و حدود مغرب به تو ارزانی داشتم. آنجا شوی و به جای داریوش بنشینی.[7]

  1. به کار بردن نام‌های اردشیر و بهمن به جای اَحَشوِرُش [خشایارشاه] در اشعار فارسیهود ریشه در منابع اسلامی دارد که خود متأثر از روایات تلمودی‌اند. تاریخ بلعمی به نقل از اخبار ملوک عجم، نام مرکب بهمن اردشیر را برای خشایارشاه چنین توصیف می‌کند که گروهی بهمن را فرزند اسفندیار و نوۀ گشتاسب خوانده به او ”لقب اردشیر [درازدست] خواندندی و گفتند اردشیر بهمن.“[8]
  1. معرفی کورش به نام فرزند اردشیر و اِستر در اشعار فارسیهود هم برگرفته از همین منابع اسلامی است:

و او آنجا به ملک بنشست . . . و مر او احَشویرش را یکی زن بود بزرگوار، به نام ”وشنا“ [وشتی]. برای زن خطایی برفت، او را بکشت و یکی زن از بنی‌اسراییل به زنی کرد، نیکوروی. نام او ”استیر“ واو را از آن زن پسری آمد و او را کیورش نام کرد.[9]

نکته‌ای که مبین ریشۀ منابع یهودی در متون اسلامی است به کار بردن نام ”اخشویرش“ در منابع اسلامی تاریخ طبری و ”احشویرش“ در تفسیر بلعمی است، زیرا این نام همان اَحَشوِرُش (خشایارشاه) ذکرشده در کتاب استر است که در سایر منابع اسلامی او را اردشیر یا بهمن هم خوانده‌اند.[10]

  1. از سایر موارد اختلاف منابع یهودی و اسلامی نَسَب و نسبت خانوادگی استر با کورش است. در یهودی بودن او همه متفق‌القول بوده‌اند و کم‌و‌بیش او را هم به نام‌های مشابه اِشتر، استوریا یا استار خوانده‌اند. طبری نَسَب یهودی او را به ”طالوت که مَلِک بنی‌اسراییل“ است می‌رساند.[11] آنچه متناقض است، نسبت او با کورش است. تاریخ طبری و تفسیر بلعمی در دو جا استر را مادر اردشیر بهمن و راحب را همسر او خوانده‌اند: الف: ”و این اردشیر را مادری بود نام او استوریا از فرزندان طالوت که مَلِکِ بنی‌اسراییل بود؛“[12] و ب: ”و مادر فرزندان بهمن، راحب دختر فِنحَس [پینحاس/ Pinhas] از اولاد رِحبُعَم [Rehovoam] پسر سلیمان، پسر داود است.“[13]

اما تاریخ بلعمی در فصل پیشینش استر را همسر اَحَشویرش [بهمن یا ادشیر] معرفی کرده است. همسری که فرزند مشترکشان کورش نامیده می‌شود:          ج: ”احَشویرش . . . یکی زن از بنی‌اسراییل به زنی کرد، نیکوروی. نام او استیر و او را آن زن پسری آمد و او را کیورش نام کرد.“[14]

  1. کورش را فرزند مادر یهودی خواندن در تاریخ بلعمی و اشعار شاهین نمودار انگیزۀ یهودی ساختن او به علت ”محدودیت مذهبی“ است. شبیه همین انگیزه را فردوسی به سبب ”غرور ملی“ دربارۀ اسکندر داشته است.[15] در منابع یهودی نیز به سبب همین محدودیت مذهبی است که اشعیا انتخاب کورش را میل خداوند می‌داند که به او این توان را داد. اشعیا با این توجیه سعی کاربرد عنوان ”مسیح“ یا نجات‌دهندۀ قوم یهود به کورش را مشروعیت بخشد که اصولاً باید به کسی از ”خانواده داوود“ داده می‌شد. در این خصوص تمایل اشعیا به حدی است که می‌گوید: ”خداوند کورش را برگزید و به او توانایی بخشید تا پادشاه شود.“[16] او در ادامۀ ارادۀ خداوند می‌گوید:

اکنون نیز کورش را برانگیخته‌ام تا به هدف عادلانۀ من جامۀ عمل بپوشاند. من تمام راه‌هایش را راست خواهم کرد. بی‌آنکه انتظار پاداش داشته باشد، شهر اورشلیم را بازسازی خواهد کرد و قوم اسیر مرا آزاد خواهد ساخت. این است کلام خداوند متعال.[17]

فلاویوس ژُزیفوس (37-100م)، فیلسوف و تاریخ نویس یهودی‌الاصل روم باستان، معتقد بود که اشعیا کتاب خود را قبل از برپایی کورش و در حدود 140 سال قبل از خرابی معبد نوشته است و بر این عقیده بود که کورش از آنچه حدود یک قرن و نیم پیش از او در باره‌اش نوشته بودند آگاهی داشته، به خدای یهود ایمان آورده و از تمایل او برای بازسازی معبد خبر داشته است.[18]

  1. پس از عهد قدیم، منابع یهودی دیگر دربارۀ کورش سخنی به میان نمی‌آورند، زیرا نه فقط معلومات تاریخی آنها اطلاع بیشتری دربارۀ کورش به آنها نمی‌داد و در منابع تلمودی هم دیگر جنبۀ تقدسی که در منابع قبلی به او داده می‌شد مشاهده نمی‌شود.

در سال 399م که تدوین تلمود بابلی عملاً پایان پذیرفت، حدود 900 سال از گفته‌های کتاب‌های عزرا و استر گذشته بود و یهودیان بار دیگر در پراکندگی زندگی می‌کردند و لذا دیگر در شرایطی نبودند که کورش را هم‌شأن ابراهیم، موسی و داوود بدانند. به این سبب برداشت آنها از کورش دیگر جنبۀ تقدس خود را از دست داد و او را بیشتر به چشم یک پادشاه دادپرور می‌دیدند تا مسیح و ناجی. [19]

  1. در منابع اسلامی، کیورش یا کورش را در مقام فرزندی و جانشینی اَحَشوِرُش (بهمن/خشایارشاه) می‌شناختند و بر تخت نشستن او ا در سن چهارده سالگی چنین توصیف می‌کنند:[20]

و احشویرش از پس آنک او را این پسر آمد. چهارده سال بزیست اندر مُلک . . . و چون پسرش چهارده ساله شد، احشویرش بمرد و کیورش به ملک بنشست . . . و منشور نو فرستاد، او بنی‌اسرائیل را نیکو همی داشت و بزرگ داشتی و گفتی این خویشان مادر من‌اند.‌[21]

این امر را فقط در اردشیرنامه شاهین می‌بینیم، در حالی که در دانیال‌نامه خواجه بخارایی، کورش هم‌زمان حاکم پارس است و بعدتر جانشین داریوش در بابل (بغداد) می‌شود.

  1. از جمله مواردی که کاملاً با مراجع یهودی متناقض است و هیچ یک از دو شاعر به آن تأسی نکرده اند، ”اسلام آوردن شاه بهمن و کورش است.“ به نظر می‌رسد که منظور بلعمی مترادف شناختن اسلام با یکتاپرستی است، چون اوخدا پرستی را از یک سو ”اسلام“ می‌خواند و از سوی دیگر آن را به ”دین موسی“ نسبت می‌دهد. محمدتقی بهار، مصحح تاریخ بلعمی، در توضیح این موضوع به این بخش ارجاع داده است:[22]

و دانیال . . . مر کورش را به خدای خواند و بدین مسلمانی . . . اما دین مسلمانی پنهان همی داشت تا بهمن آگاه نشود. چون از ملک او سیزده سال بگذشت، بهمن بمرد. چون خبر به کیورش آمد که بهمن به بلخ نماند، او دین مسلمانی آشکار کرد و همه خلق را به شریعت توریت خواند و بر دین موسی، و دانیال را بر همۀ پادشاهی خویش حاکم کرد تا همۀ خلق را به حکم توریت آورد.

 

نماد کورش از دیدگاه مولانا شاهین

اگر زندگینامۀ کورش را از قول شاهین بررسی کنیم، متوجه می‌شویم که بسط و تفسیرات شعری شاهین بیشتر به برخی از منابع تاریخ طبری و منابع تلمودی، به ترتیب، شباهت دارد تا نقل داستان از تورات عهد قدیم، هرچند در خود این منابع نیز عدم هماهنگی وجود دارد. شاهین دانش خود را در خصوص متن تورات و زبان عبری در موسی‌نامه و آفرینش‌نامه نشان داده بود و در اردشیرنامه، منابع افسانه‌ای ایرانی و اسلامی مبتنی بر دوران تلمودی را تا زمان بر تخت نشستن کورش به جای پدر (شاه بهمن) در هم آمیخته و داستانی درهم‌تافته از ریشه‌های مذهبی تاریخی و افسانه‌ای می‌سراید. اما پس از این دوران، دیگر بسیاری از گفته‌های او با منابع یهودی و اسلامی مطابقت ندارد و شاید برگرفته از افسانه‌های دیگر ایرانی و غیرایرانی باشد. برخی از جمله داستان‌های درآمیخته با متن اصلی گزارش عبارت‌اند از رابطۀ رستم و بهمن وتربیت او به دست رستم، بازگشت بهمن به سوی پدرش گشتاسپ، وفات گشتاسپ و بر تخت نشستن بهمن پس از پدر، پادشاهی کردن بهمن، آگاهی بهمن از وفات رستم و بالاخره ازدواج و جدایی بهمن از وشتی، عشق افسانه‌ای شیرو، فرزند نخست شاه بهمن از ملکه وشتی، پس از مرگ شاه بهمن در جنگ با اژدها و در نهایت وفات او در کام اژدها.[23]

از جمله تناقضات طبری و بلعمی با شاهین، معاصر بودن دانیال با کورش، دعوت کورش به دین اسلام ، تشویق او به دست برداشتن از ”آتش‌پرستی“ و قبول ”اسلام“ و کتمان آن تا زمان فوت پدر به مدت 13 سال است. بعضی از این گفته‌ها تا حدی غیرمستندند که محمدتقی بهار، مصحح متن، نیز به آنها اشاره می‌کند.[24]

شاهین ابتدا در قالب فرهنگ ایرانی به توصیف بر تخت نشستن شاه بهمن (اردشیر/ اَحَشوِرُش)، ازدواج او با ملکه وشتی و تولد فرزندشان، شیرو، می‌پردازد. پس از حکایت خشم پادشاه بر ملکه وَشتی و طرد او، به چگونگی انتخاب استر برای ازدواج پرداخته، در پی آن پیوند عروسی پادشاه را با ملکه استر چنین آغاز می‌کند:[25]

 

صفت پیوند شاه بهمن با استر

پیروز و پشوتن و دلیران

میلاد و یلان ملک ایران

از حضرت شهریار رفتند

با هدیه و با نثار رفتند

چون بر در قصر او رسیدند

میران ز دو رویه سرکشیدند

استر ز پرده همچو ناهید

بنمود رخی چو ماه و خورشید

پوشیده نقاب حُسن در رو

در پای کشان، کمند گیسو

آهسته به ناز شد خرامان

چون کبک دری، بتی بسامان

. . .

با مطرب و با نشاط همراه

رفتند پیاده تا در شاه

از حضرت شاه بانویی چند

با موبد و هَگای خرمند

رفتند به پیشواز آن ماه

آن زینت تاج و و زیور گاه

پس از آن دربارۀ تولد کورش، که فرزند این زوج است، سخن می‌گوید.[26]

زاییدن استر کورش را

استِر چو همدم شهنشاه

گردید و بیافت رفعت و جاه

دلشاد شد اردشیر از آن حور

در چهرۀ او ندید جز نور

با او به صفا و ذوق می‌بود

با عشرت و عیش و شوق می‌بود

استر به امر فرد اکبر

شد حامله از شه هنرور

هنگام، چو در رسید زایید

زیباپسری به رخ چو خورشید

حق باب صفا بدو ببخشید

اندر خور تاج و تخت جمشید

شه شاد شد از جمال آن پور

در چهره بُدَش ز خسروی نور

کورش بنهاد نام فرزند

بنیاد ستم ز دهر بر کند

برداشت ز راه کاروان باج

زر داد و درم بسی به محتاج

در شوش نماند بینوایی

از جود و عطای او به جایی

تربیت و تحصیل کورش

آنچه در بسط شاهین در تربیت کورش قابل توجه است جنبۀ تربیت او برای پادشاهی و پهلوانی است تا

جنبه‌های آسمانی و تقدس او:[27]

                 

کورش چو چهار ساله گردید

رویش چو بهار و لاله گردید

شه بی رخ او نداشت آرام

روز و شب و صبح صادق و شام

یک روز پشوتن هنرور

فرمود به اردشیر صفدر

آمد گه آنکه شاهزاده

چشمشن به هنر شود گشاده

نیک و بد و بیش و کم بداند

ضایع‌شده روز او نماند

چون پند وزیر شاه بشنید

از وی همه آن به راه گردید

شه خواست هنروران بسیار

اندر خور کار خود به هر کار

زر داد به هر یکی و فرزند

با زر به هنرور خردمند

تا هر هنری که نامداران

گُردان و یلان و شهریاران

دانش همه یک‌به‌یک بیاموخت

رو از هنر و یلی برافروخت

عمرش برسید چون به ده سال

دولت بگشاد بر درش بال

بر جملۀ شهرهای ایران

درگاه شجاعت، آن دلیران

کس پایۀ او نداشت در جنگ

پولاد بُدش چو موم در چنگ

. . .

مشهور شد او به نامداری

چون رستم زال در سواری

در توضیح کشته شدن شاه بهمن (خشایارشاه) به دست یکی از سرداران محافظ سلطنتی خود،[28] شاهین از افسانۀ کشته شدن او در کام اژدها سخن می‌گوید؛ اژدهایی که محصول کشاوزان را به باد می‌داد و شاه برای نجات ملتش به جنگ او رفت و کشته شد:[29]

 

رفتن شاه اردشیر به شکار ، کشتن اژدها و مردن در شکم اژدها

این گفت و به کار آن پرداخت

چو باد به نزد اژدها تاخت

از دور ورا چو اژدها دید

چو رعد بهار و شیر غُرید

از دَم بفشاندی آتش و دود

در دم بکشید شاه را زود

چو در دَمِ اژدها بشد شاه

با خنجرِ مُشک سر به آن راه

خود را به مقام بوالعجب دید

در صبح امید، شام شب دید

پس از مرگ شاه بهمن، کورش بر تخت پادشاهی نشسته، خطابۀ تاجگذاری خود را ایراد می‌کند. در اینجاست که شاعر با بسط و تفسیر سرنوشت کورش را به تاریخ باستانی ایران پیوند زده، از بی‌عدالتی پدر شاه بهمن، پسر اسفندیار، با رستم سخن می‌گوید و از افرادی همچون نوذر، کی‌قباد، رستم، طوس، ایرج، سلم و تور، لهراسب، بهمن، زال، گیو و گشتاسب نام می‌برد و اشاره می‌کند که همه از این جهان رفتند و آنچه می‌ماند عدالت است. کورش دادگستری را به ملت خویش چنین وعده می‌دهد:[30]

بر تخت نشستن کورش به جای کی اردشیر و عدالت پروری او

چون صبح برآمد از سیاهی

بر شب به فراز تخت شاهی

بر جای کی‌اردشیر بنشست

با داد و صفا و عدل پیوست

. . .

کورش بگشاد لفظ دُر بار

گفت ای سر سرکشان هوشیار

اندیشۀ بد ز دل برانید

با هم همه یک‌به‌یک بدانید

حق داد به من چو پادشاهی

ناید به جهان زمن تباهی

کارم همه عدل و داد باشد

از داد زمانه شاد باشد

پیوسته به عدل وداد کوشم

در داد، چو کی‌قباد کوشم

ظالم نبود ز تیغ من شاد

خاکش بدهم به تیغ بر باد

دانم که کی‌اردشیر سرکش

در دانش و داد در زد آتش

. . .

من جامۀ ظلم در نپوشم

دایم پی عدل و داد کوشم

دود از دل ظالمان برآرم

در خاک چو دانۀ امان بکارم

دانم به کسی نماند این جاه

خرم دل آن که باشد آگاه

کو نوذر و کی‌قباد و کاووس؟

کو سام سوار و رستم طوس؟

کو رنج و ظلم و زور لهراسب؟

کو بهمن زار و جور گشتاسب؟

. . .

گُردان چو ز کورش آن شنیدند

سر بر فلک برین کشیدند

از او همه شاد شاد گشتند

در دل همه تخم داد کِشتند

کورش همه روز داد می‌داد

دایم دل خلق ازو بُدی شاد

ظالم به جهان نماند یک تن

از شاه و گدا و مرد و از زن

در اینجا شاعر می‌بایست قبل از وصف آزادی یهودیان به دست کورش، ابتدا از خرابی معبد مقدس و به اسارت رفتن یهودیان به شهر بابل سخن بگوید. او خرابی معبد اول را به دست بخت‌النصر نتیجۀ گناهکاری یهودیان و عدم پیروی از قوانین موسی می‌داند:[31]

 

صفت خراب شدن معبد مقدس

چون قوم کلیم حق خطاکار

گشتند همه چو اهل کفار

با هر بد و نیک یار گشتند

بر بد همه استوار گشتند

نامد ز نبی و شرطشان یاد

برخاست غبار و گرد و فریاد

. . .

در بابل و بصره بود یک شاه

بَدگوهر و بُت‌پرست و گمراه

با لشکر بی قیاس و بی مَر

لشکر همه چو شاه کافر

او بود به نام بختُ‌النصر

عاصر چو وی نبود در عصر[32]

سرلشکر جمله عاصیان بود

گمراه لعین و بدگمان بود

جبّار جهان ورا به قدرت

انگیخت ز جا، بداد نصرت

لشکر بکشید گَبرمعیوب

بر جانب خاندان یعقوب

. . .

نگذاشت به دهر هر کلام او

تورات شریف بانظام او

و آن‌گاه بشد او به سوی بابل

با فتح و مراد گشته حاصل

با نعمت و چارپای بسیار

با بَرده و گنج‌های بسیار

به گفتۀ شاهین در عزرانامه، عزرا چنین درخواستی از کورش می‌کند و سختی‌های اسارت، پس از فتح بابل به دست کورش، عِزرا را به فکر می‌اندازد تا برای نجات قوم خود و جلوگیری از نابودی آنان چاره‌ای بیندیشد. او رهبران جامعۀ یهودی بابل را ترغیب می‌کند که به نزد کورش رفته، هویت قومی خود را به او ظاهر کرده، از او درخواست آزادی و بازگشت به سرزمین کنعان کنند. برای این منظور، عِزرا از سه نمایندۀ دیگر جامعه به نام‌های حَگای، زخریا و مَتَتیا درخواست می‌کند تا همراه او به حضور کورش بروند. آنان مَتَتیا را، که پیرِ قوم و پیشوای یهودیان بود، به سخنگویی برمی‌گزینند:[33]

او را همه عجز وانماییم

بر وی همه راز برگشاییم

تا صورت حال ما بداند

ما را ز عذاب وارهاند

کنعان بکُند دِگر ره آباد

با معبد خاص و جای میعاد

گفتار نبی سران شنیدند

فرمان ورا به جان خریدند

آن روز گذشت و روز دیگر

عِزرای نبی، رسول اکبر

با حَگای پیر و با زخریا

با مهترِ خسروان، مَتَتیا

شد جانب کورشِ سر افراز

خود همچو همای با سه شهباز

به هنگام حضور آنان نزد پادشاه، رفتار کورش نسبت به مَتَتیا، پیشوای روحانی قوم و اسیر خود، همراه با احترام و حرمت بود و فرمان پیروی از همین رفتار را به اطرافیانش نیز صادر کرد: [34]

دریاب که این سران عزیزند

قوم خوش خوب باتمیزند

پیغمبر و شاه و نام دارند

بر قوم کلیم شهریارند

نام همه را که گفت با شاه

یک‌یک همه سرفراز آگاه

کورش همه را به تخت بنشاند

نامحرم را ز پیش خود راند‌[35]

گفتا پس از آن با متتیا

ز آن مه ز خاندان یهودا

برگو که ز من چه کام خواهی

از گوهر و گنج و پادشاهی

تا کام دلت برآرم از پیش

کامت به صفا بر آرم از پیش

گفتا به شه ای به دانش آباد

گیتی ز تو گشته خرم و شاد

. . .

دریاب شَها که ملک کنعان

از دورِ کلیم ابنِ عمران

مأوا و مقام و جایگه بود

از جود عطا و فضل معبود

. . .

زآنجا شدیم سرنگونسار

گشتیم به هر بدی گرفتار

. . .

اکنون بگذشت سال هفتاد

کان ملک خراب شد ز بیداد

خواهم به کرم تو آن زمین باز

معمور کنی اَیا سرافراز

پس از این درخواست متتیا، کورش به شرط نوشیدن یک جام شراب به او قول کمک می‌دهد، ولی متتیا

نمی‌تواند فوراً این درخواست را قبول کند.[36]

خواهی که مراد تو بر آرم

من با تو یکی مراد دارم

خواهم که ز دست من یکی جام

مِی نوش کنی به کام و ناکام

. . .

آن چو بشنید ازو مَتتیا

گفتا به سخا چو ابر دریا

امروز ناید این ز دستم

مَپسند و مَکوش در شکستم

اکنون بروم به سوی یاران

در پیش سران و نامداران

بینم که شریعت جهاندار

فتوا چه دهد ز بهر این کار

شاعر در اینجا سعی می‌کند موضوع شراب نوشیدن از دست یک ”غیریهودی“ را که یکتاپرست نیست مطرح کند. در اینجا این سوال پیش می‌آید که چرا شاعر ناگهان موضوع غیریهودی بودن کورش را مطرح می‌سازد، در صورتی که خود در ابتدای داستان او را پسر استر یهودی معرفی کرده است. امری که در منابع اسلامی، از جمله تاریخ طبری، نیز تأیید شده است که همسر بهمن، رحاب، دختر پینحاس یهودی بود.[37] شاهین این مسئله را می‌دانست و به راحتی می‌توانست مطابق فقه یهود در این داستان کورش را به علت یهودی بودن مادرش یهودی به شمار آورد، ولی چنین نمی‌کند. شاهین مخصوصاً در این داستان ساختگی تردید متتیا را مطرح و قبول آن را منوط به مشورت با یاران می‌کند. متتیا هم پس از مشورت، تنها به صرف بازگشت قوم یهود و فرمان بازسازی معبد تن به قبول پیشنهاد کورش می‌دهد و توجیه عزرا را در این زمینه می‌پسندد:‌[38]

هر چیز که آن ز دست کفار

نوشی بود آن حرام، پرُبار

بستان و بنوش یک قدح بیش

گر خواهی نخوری ز دست بدکیش

تا خانۀ خاص بار دیگر

معمور بگردد ز امر داور

لذا متتیا پس از خوابی که در این خصوص می‌بیند، روز بعد با زخریا و سایر همراهان به نزد کورش بازمی‌گردد تا جام شراب را از دست او بنوشد:[39]

برخاست ز خواب خوش متتیا

رفت بر شاه، با زخریا

با هم رُخِ دو سه یاران

آزاده سران و نامداران

کورش چو ورا بدید و بنواخت

جایش بر تخت خویشتن ساخت

بنشاند ورا به رسم و آیین

چون خسرو روم و هند و ماچین

پس از آن کورش به قول خود وفا کرده، فرمان آزادی آنان و بازسازی سرزمین کنعان و معبد مقدس را صادر می‌کند.[40]

                          

کورش پس از آن بداد فرمان

کآباد کنند مُلک کنعان

تا خانۀ خاص را بسازند

چندی زر و سیم درو ببازند

زان قوم کلیم شاد گشتند

از کار تباه درگذشتند

بسط شاهین دربارۀ تردید متتیا در خصوص نوشیدن شراب با کورش را در منابع اسلامی، که الگوی اولیۀ او هستند، نمی‌بینیم. چنین بسطی ممکن است به این علت باشد که شاعر قرن چهاردهم میلادی تحت تأثیر ربانان گذشتۀ تلمودی و شاید هم به علت افسردگی از ادامۀ پراگندگی قوم یهود و این اصل که کورش بالمآل نتوانست ماشیه معهود باشد و آنان را از پراگندگی همیشگی نجات دهد، می‌خواهد کورش را از درجۀ تقدس به مقام پادشاهی عادل پایین آورد.[41]

 

وفات یافتن کورش‌بن اردشیر[42]

مرگ کورش آخرین فصل عزرانامه است و شاعر پس از وصف صفات انسانی و عدالت‌پروری او و سخن از مرگ طبیعی بشر، شرح غسل دادن او با گلاب و خاکسپاری او را بیان کرده، به نظر می‌رسد از کشته شدن کورش در میدان جنگ خبر ندارد:[43]

هر گل که برآید از سر خار

هم عاقبت او، بریزد از بار

روزی دو سه بیش و کم نماند

هم کار ورا اجل براند

حال بشر زمانه این است

بر شأن بشر جهان به کین است

کورش چو فراز تخت اقبال

شادان بنشست خرم آن سال

می‌بود فراز تخت عالی

از داد نبود شاه خالی

مأوای پدر نگاه می‌داشت

اندر بر حق به راه می‌داشت

چون گاه شدن فرازش آمد

بر رحمت حق نیازش آمد

. . .

روح از برخویشتن روان کرد

ترک بد و نیک و این و آن کرد

بر تخته فتاد کارش از تخت

پیچید ز کار خسروی رخت

غسّال ورا بشست زیبا

پوشید برش ز حرز و دیبا

دراینجا شاعر در شرح مرتبت کورش او را علاوه بر شخصیت‌های مذهب با آدم‌های زمینی در قالب قهرمانان شاهنامه مقایسه می‌کند:[44]

کو آدم و نوح و شیث و ایوب

موسی و خلیل و اسحق و یعقوب

کو عوج و کی‌قباد و نوذر

جمشید و گیو و قباد و قیصر

. . .

کو رستم زال و نیرم و سام

کو بیژن و طوس و گیو بهرام

و به تأسی از متقدمان ایرانی خود به توصیف فلسفۀ زندگی و گذرا بودن جهان می‌پردازد:[45]

او مُرد و هر آنکه زاد میرد

کس را به جهان بقا نگیرد

خاکیم و به خاک بازگردیم

گر خود همه گنجِ راز گردیم

. . .

ا ز مرگ نه شَه رهد نه دَربان

نه دیو و پری، نه مُرغ و حیوان

بر سوی عدم رهی‌ست دشوار

باید همه را شدن به ناچار

در این زمینه به نظر می‌رسد که شاعر قرن چهاردهم میلادی با فلسفه و اشعار حکیم عمر خیام، شاعر قرون یازدهم و دوازدهم میلادی آشنایی داشته است، زیرا که تأثیر زمان و مکان در افکارو اندیشۀ او نمایان است.[46] خیام سروده است:

این کوزه چو من عاشق زاری بوده است

در بند خم زلف نگاری بوده است

این دسته که بر گردن او می‌بینی

دستی است که بر گردن یاری بوده است

در هر دشتی که لاله‌زاری بوده است

از سرخی خون شهریاری بوده است

هر شاخ بنفشه کز زمین می‌روید

خالی است که بر رخ نگاری بوده است

و شاهین می‌گوید:

در هر وطنی که لاله زاری‌ست

آن لاله ز خون شهریاری‌ست

در کوزه‌گران یکی گذر کن

در حالت و کارشان نظر کن

تا کاسۀ سر ز کوزه بینی

بر دست و زبان و چشم بینی

گستاخ مبین، کوزه در دست

کو از من و تو کمی نبوده‌ست

این کهنه سبوی ما دگر هم

اشکسته شود دریغ آدم

 

کورش از دیدگاه خواجه بخارایی

خواجه بخارایی نیز، همچون شاهین، کورش را از برخی منابع اسلامی برگرفته از حکایات و امثال یهودی متفاوت معرفی می‌کند. از جمله تفاوت‌های اصلی دانیال‌نامه خواجه بخارایی و اردشیرنامه شاهین موضوع معاصر بودن داریوش و کورش و جانشینی کورش بعد از داریوش است. این امر را هم در حکایات یهودی و هم در گوشه‌هایی از تاریخ طبری و تفسیر بلعمی مشاهده می‌کنیم؛ در حالی که شاهین یا از آن بی‌خبر بوده یا به علت تناقض با گفتۀ خودش ذکری از آن به میان نمی‌آورد:[47]

قضارا داریاوش شاه مادی

به کورش گفت در کیفیت می

که آورده است پیکی تیزگام

ز بغداد از برای من پیامی

که پورِ بُخت‌ النصر آن شاه بدنام

به تخت سلطنت بگرفته آرام

. . .

روان باید شد اکنون بر سر او

که اکنون است غافل لشکر او

. . .

شهنشه را چو کورش بود داماد

به ناچاری به تدبیرش رضا داد

به بلشاصر خیال رزم کردند

به رفتن بر سر او عزم کردند

به هنگام حملۀ سپاه فرنگ به بغداد و نیاز داریوش به کمک، کورش همچون یک فرمانده قوی و دلیر، بدون هیج توصیف تقدس‌آمیزی، به نجات بغداد و پادشاهی داریوش می‌شتابد و دشمن را از خاک بابل (بغداد) بیرون می‌راند. در این توصیف است که شا عر از صحنه‌های رزمی شاهنامه وآلات و ابزار جنگی آن مدد می‌گیرد:

چو کورش دید این احوال هایل

تو گویی گشت از او ادراک زایل

به میدان تاخت همچون شیر سرمست

به آن نام‌آوران در جنگ پیوست

به مردی، گرز در جولان درآورد

سمندش گرد از میدان بر آورد

. . .

ز کورش آن سپه این ضرب چون دید

به غایت تند و خشم‌آلود گردید

. . .

درافتادند با هم از سر قهر

همی خوردند از هم تیغ پُرزهر

ز ضرب گرز و تیغ تیز و خنجر

تن بسیار کس گردید بی‌سر

. . .

چو سردار عدو از پا درآمد

سپاه خصم را دولت سر آمد

به سوی کشور خود رو نهادند

اساس بارگه از دست دادند.

دربارۀ جانشینی کورش به جای داریوش، خواجه بخارایی چنین می‌سراید که که پس از کشته شدن داریوش در جنگ، کورش به جای داریوش بر تخت پادشاهی بغداد هم می‌نشیند و در هر دو مُلک پارس و عراق (بغداد) در جایگاه پادشاهی عادل حکومت می‌کند.[48]

چو کورش گشت ازین هنگامه دلشاد

گرفت آرام اندر شهر بغداد

امیران را نوازش کرد بسیار

به قانونی که گفتند نیست در کار

بشد بخت و سعادت همدم او

مبدل گشت با شادی غم او

به ملک فارس دایم بود دلشاد

هم از وی شد عراق و ملک بغداد

چو در کشور فروغ مهر او تافت

ازین، آن مملکت زیب دگر یافت

نبودش پیشه‌ای در شهر جز داد

بُدی از عدل او بحر و بر آباد

به تخت خسروی منزل گرفتی

ز بخت و ملک کام دل گرفتی

چنان در وادی عشرت فتادی

که جامش یاد از جمشید دادی

ز بزمش مردمان بودند دلشاد

از او این مملکت شد عشرت‌آباد

برخلاف شاهین که در بسط و تفسیر خود سعی دارد کورش را پادشاهی عدالت‌پرور و زاده از مادری یهودی معرفی کند، خواجه بخارایی به هر دو پادشاه، یعنی داریوش و کورش، رنگ تقدس بیشتر و خداشناس بودن می‌دهد. خواجه بخارایی با الهام از اشعیا، فصل 45، آیات 1-5، داریوش و کورش را مخاطب خدا قرار داده و ندای خداوند به آنان این است که به جنگ بلشاصر پادشاه بابل بروند:[49]

به وقت صبحدم آمد ندایی

که شام تیره را آمد ضیایی

شما را بخت و دولت یار گردید

سعادت مونس و غمخوار گردید

. . .

همان دم بازگردید و بیایید

به شهرستان بغداد اندر آیید

که بلشاصر بسی پژمرده آمد

به چنگال شما بسپرده آمد

چو بشنیدند شاهان آن ندا را

ثنا گفتند بی‌حد کبریا را

که ای اهل جهان را روزی از تو

صلاح و زهد و دین‌اندوزی از تو

خواجه بخارایی دربارۀ بازسازی اورشلیم و بازگشت یهودیان به آنجا، برخلاف شاهین که پیشنهاد را از قول عزرا مطرح می‌سازد، این امر را از سوی دانیال مطرح می‌کند. مر جع او در این تفاوت ممکن است تاریخ طبری باشد که در توصیف دوران پادشاهی کورش چنین می‌گوید:[50]

و آن‌گاه دانیال علیه‌السلام ازو [کورش] دستوری خواست که [به] بیت‌المقدس شود با بنی‌اسرائیل و آن مزگت را و شهر را به حال آبادانی باز آرد، و [کورش] او را دستوری نداد و گفت همه اعتماد من به تُست.

                 

 

نتیجه

به دنبال کشف منشور کورش در 1879م در نزدیک بغداد به دست هرمزد رَسام و پژوهش‌های ارنست هرتسفلد، باستان‌شناس معروف آلمانی، نام و توصیف کورش را در ادبیات ایرانی قرن گذشته مشاهده می‌کنیم. این در حالی است که طی تاریخ دو هزار سال گذشته، به‌خصوص در ادبیات ایران اسلامی و حتی شاهنامه فردوسی، کمتر به نام کورش برخورد می‌کنیم. شاید علت آن عدم آگاهی از تاریخ آن دوره باشد. اما شعرای فارسیهود که از دو فرهنگ ایرانی و یهودی بهره می‌بردند، همواره در توصیف کورش، چه در نقش ناجی و چه در نقش پادشاهی دادپرور و قهرمانی شجاع، شعر سروده‌اند. پر کردن چنین کمبودی در تاریخ ادبیات ایران به دست شعرای فارسیهود جایگاه آنان را در ادبیات ایران معین می‌سازد. آنچه راجع به کورش از شاهین و خواجه بخارایی آمد، نشانه‌ای از کورش در ذهن دو شاعر یهودی ایرانی است. شاهین کورش را در حاشیۀ داستان زندگی خشایارشاه و ملکه استر و عزرا و به سبب بازسازی معبد اول تحت راهنمایی عزرا می‌شناساند، در حالی که خواجه بخارایی او را در داستان دانیال همراه و سپس در مقام جانشین داریوش معرفی می‌کند.

تناقض حوادث و اتفاقات مطرح در این اشعار با آنچه امروز دربارۀ کورش می‌دانیم غیرمنتظره نیست، زیرا همین حکایات و احادیث در برخی از منابع یهودی و اسلامی دیده می‌شود؛ منابعی که شاعران فارسیهود نیز از آنها استفاده کرده‌اند.

آنچه در سروده‌های هر دو شاعر قابل توجه است توصیف متفاوتی است که از کورش عرضه می‌کنند. در قسمت‌های آغازین، آنان همراه با متن تورات او را به مرتبۀ تقدس رسانیده و ناجی توصیف می‌کنند. گاهی هم او را یکتاپرست، خداشناس و از سوی مادر یهودی‌زاده توصیف کرده‌اند. اما در مسیر گفتار خود همراه با احادیث و منابع تلمودی، توصیف آنان نیز تغییر می‌کند. مقام کورش کم‌کم از ناجی و کسی که از خداوند به او ندا می‌رسد، صرفاً به مقام پادشاهی دلاور و دادپرور تبدیل می‌شود، کسی که با یهودیان به نیکی رفتار و آنان را از اسارت آزاد کرد. در خصوص علل این تغییر که از سویی ریشه در دوران تلمودی دارد، می‌توان دوران زندگی شاعران و آگاهی آنان از منابع اسلامی را دخیل دانست. این تفاوت مقام را شاهین به‌خصوص در شرط شراب نوشیدن رهبران یهودی با کورش به هنگام درخواست آنان برای بازسازی بیت‌المقدس مطرح می‌سازد. در شراب نوشیدن با کورشی که خارج از متن تورات به نام فرزند استر و یهودی‌زاده معرفی شده است، در پایان به علت عدم یکتاپرستی تردید می‌شود. این تغییر دید را در خواجه بخارایی نیز مشاهده می‌کنیم. در روایت او، در ابتدا کورش و داریوش از عالم بالا ندا می‌شنوند و برای آزادی بابل به ستیز با بلشاصر می‌روند، ولی همین دو قهرمان در پایان به صورت دو پادشاه با محدودیت‌های انسانی از جمله کشته شدن به دست سپاه فرنگ یا با رشادت‌های قهرمانی در میدان نبرد و شکار و بزم و نوشیدن شراب توصیف می‌شوند.

با ذکر این تفاوت‌ها سوالی پیش می‌آید که اصولاً شاهین و خواجه بخارایی حماسه‌های دینی خود، اردشیرنامه و دانیال‌نامه، را برای چه کسانی سروده‌اند و مخاطب آنان کیست؟ آیا خوانندگان مطلوب آنان یهودانی هستند که با زبان عبری آشنایی دارند، تورات و کتاب‌های اهل عتیق را که شامل داستان‌های عزرا و اِستر و دانیال است می‌شناسند یا اینکه این دو روایت را برای کسانی سروده‌اند که اگر هم خط فارسیهود را می‌دانستند، بیشتر با فرهنگ ایران اسلامی آشنایی داشتند تا با مراجع یهودی. آیا شاهین پس از حدود 19 قرن و خواجه بخارایی پس از 22 قرن زندگی یهودیان در ایران، رابطۀ قومی و دینی خود را با سرزمین یهودا از دست داده بودند یا می‌خواستند حماسه‌ای از یهودیت را به سبک ایرانی به زبان فارسی برای هم‌عصران خود باقی گذارند، ولی چون زمان زیادی از وقوع حوادث گذشته بود، حین استفاده از منابع در دسترسشان، گاهی بنا به سلیقه یا به عللی دیگر به آن اضافاتی غیرحقیقی و اغراق‌آمیز افزوده‌اند.[51]

مسلم این است که جامعۀ یهودی ایرانی نیز مانند سایر اقوام از نظر دانش فرهنگی و دینی به طبقات گوناگونی تقسیم می‌شدند و دانشمندان و فقهای یهودی کم نبودند و اگر هم صرفاً به فارسیهود می‌نوشتند، علت عدم آشنایی و سواد مخاطبان به خط فارسی- عربی بود. سطح دانش این دو شاعر در زمینۀ یهودیت را می‌توان با رجوع به سایر کارهای آنان سنجید. دربارۀ خواجه بخارایی متأسفانه معیار دیگری در دست نداریم، اما در خصوص شاهین، آفرینش‌نامه و موسی‌نامه او مبین اطلاع او از روال تاریخ یهود است و به نظر نمی‌رسد تغییرات و تفسیرات او به سبب بی‌اطلاعی بوده باشد. از سوی دیگر، استعمال آرایه‌های شعری و ادبی و قهرمانان ملی ایرانی مؤید این نکته است که آنان دقیقاً با شاهنامه و آثار سایر متقدمین ادبی خود آشنایی داشته‌اند . مقایسۀ شاهین و خیام نمونه‌ای از این امر است. آنچه درخور اهمیت است تصویر مثبتی است که در سروده‌های هر دو شاعر از کورش ارائه می‌شود، چه در نقش ناجی فرستادۀ خدا و چه در نقش قهرمانی حماسی با محدودیت‌های انسانی

آن گوهر شهریار والا

چو سرو سهی کشید بالا

شه بی رخ او نداشت آرام

روز و شب ]و[صبح صادق و شام

جمع آوردن شاه بهمن هنرمندان را جهت تعلیم دادن کورشيک روز پشوتن هنرور

فرمود باردشير صفدر

 

بر تخت نشستن کورش به جای کی‌اردشیر

دانای سخن ز تار تا پود

از حال شه جهان بفرمود

سرش چو ز سوک باب پرداخت

از نو علم صفا برافراخت

 

 

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyrus_the_Great_in_the_Bible/.

[2] Amnon Netzer, “ Some Notes on the Characterization of Cyrus The Great in Jewish and Judeo-Persian Writings,” Acta Iranica, 2 (1974), 43, at http://azargoshnasp.net/famous/Cyrus/cyruscharacterizationjp.pdf /.

[3] عمرانی، فتح‌نامه (نسخۀ لندن، OR: 1370, 292: 3-4, 8).

[4] عمرانی، فتخ‌نامه نسخۀ بن‌صوی، إBZ: 964, 280a: 5-6).

[5] Louis Ginxberg, Legends of the Jews (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication society, 2003), vol. 2, 111 and 119.

[6] Ginzberg Legends of the Jews, vol. 2, 1129.

[7] ابوعلی محمدبن محمد بلعمی، تاریخ بلعمی، تصحیح محمدتقی بهار (تهران: انتشارات دانشگاه تهران، 1353) جلد 2، 674 .

[8] بلعمی، تاریخ بلعمی، جلد 2، 683-684.

[9] بلعمی، تاریخ بلعمی، جلد 2، 675 .

[10] محمد جریر طبری، تاریخ طبری یا تاریخ الرسل و الملوک، ترجمۀ ابوالقاسم پاینده (تهران: انتشارات فرهنگ ایران، 1352)، جلد 2، 486؛ بلعمی، تاریخ بلعمی، جلد 2، 677 .

[11] ‌”وهی استار بنت یائیر بن شمعی بن قیس بن میشا بن طالوت الملک.“ بنگرید به بلعمی، تاریخ بلعمی، جلد 2، 685.

[12] بلعمی، تاریخ بلعمی، جلد 2، 685._

[13] طبری، تاریخ طبری 484.

[14] بلعمی، تاریخ بلعمی، جلد 2، 675.

[15] Jalal Khaleghi Motlagh, Women in the Shahnameh, trans. Brigitte Neuenschwander, edited by Nahid Pirnazar (   :     ,   ), 67: n. 152.

به روایت شاهنامه، اسکندر حاصل ازدواج داراب با همسر یونانی‌اش، ناهید، است.

[16] اشعیا، فصل 45، آیۀ 1.

[17] اشعیا، فصل 45، آیۀ 13.

[18] Netzer, “Some Notes,” 41-41; Antiquities XI, 1 and 2.

اکنون ثابت شده است که این کتاب طی 200 سال، به‌تدریج و در قسمت‌های مختلف نوشته شده است.

[19] Amnon Netzer, “ Some Notes,” 40-41.

[20] بلعمی، تاریخ بلعمی، جلد 2، 675-676.

[21] بلعمی، تاریخ بلعمی، جلد 2، 675-676.

[22] بلعمی، تاریخ بلعمی، جلد 2، 676-67، پانوشت 3. عدم مستند بودن این قسمت از تاریخ بلعمی را محمدتقی بهار ذکر کرده و می‌گوید که منظور از این پادشاهان همان کورش و داریوش و خشایارشاه است که قوم یهود را از اسارت بابل نجات داده، با آنان به نیکی رفتار کردند، ولی خود به یهودیت نگرویدند.

[23] مولانا شاهین، اردشیرنامه (نسخۀ لندن)، برگ ب 174.

[24] بلعمی، تاریخ بلعمی، جلد 2، 676-677، پانوشت 3.

[25] آمنون نتصر، منتخب اشعار فارسی از آثار یهودیان ایران (تهران: فرهنگ ایران زمین، 1352)، 165.

[26] نتصر، منتخب، 170-171.

[27] نتصر، منتخب، 171-172.

[28] http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/imperialism/notes/xerxes.html/.

[29] مولانا شاهین، اردشیرنامه (نسخۀ لندن)، برگ ب 78ا: 15-11.

[30] مولانا شاهین، اردشیرنامه (نسخۀ برلین)، برگ الف 184؛ برگ ب 185.

[31] مولانا شاهین، اردشیرنامه (نسخۀ برلین)، برگ الف 187؛ برگ ب 188.

[32] عاصر به معنای مرد اندک‌خیر و ممسک است. بنگرید به لغتنامۀ دهخدا.

[33] مولانا شاهین، اردشیرنامه (نسخۀ برلین)، برگ الف 189، برگ ب 190.

Amnon Netzer, “ Some Notes,” 4.

هویت متتیا در تورات در این مقطع شناخته نیست. ویلهلم باخر احتمال می‌دهد که منظور همان زروبابل باشد که در تورات از او رسماً به نام پادشاه یهودیه نام برده شده است (حگای، فصل 2، آیۀ 23).

[34] مولانا شاهین، اردشیرنامه (نسخۀ برلین)، برگ ب 190.

[35] مولانا شاهین، اردشیرنامه (نسخه برلین)، برگ الف 190.

[36] مولانا شاهین، اردشیرنامه (نسخۀ برلین)، برگ ب 191 .

[37] طبری، تاریخ طبری، 484. .

[38] مولانا شاهین، اردشیرنامه (نسخۀ برلین)، برگ الف 191._

[39] مولانا شاهین، اردشیرنامه (نسخۀ برلین)، برگ ب 192- الف 191.

[40] مولانا شاهین، اردشیرنامه (نسخۀ برلین)، برگ ب 192.

[41] Netzer, “ Some Notes,” 51.

[42] مولانا شاهین، اردشیرنامه (نسخۀ برلین)، برگ الف- ب 194؛ نتصر، منتخب، 174-175.

[43]​              حرز به معنای طلسم و منظور از آن زینت‌آلات یا طلسم‌های است که رسم بود با جنازه دفن کنند. بنگرید به لغتنامۀ دهخدا.

[44] نیرم همان نریمان، جد رستم، است. بنگرید به لغتنامۀ دهخدا.

[45] مولانا شاهین، اردشیرنامه (نسخۀ برلین)،     ؛ نتصر، منتخب، 175.

[46] جلال متینی، ”اهمیت آثار ادبی فارسی یهودیان،“ ایران‌نامه، سال 1، شمارۀ 3 (بهار 1366)، 432.

[47] بلعمی، تاریخ بلعمی 674 ؛

  1. 119 , Ginzberg, Legends of the Jews, 111 and 119;

آمنون نتصر، منتخب، 262.

[48] نتصر، منتخب، 296.

[49] نتصر، منتخب، 272. اشاره به اشعیا، فصل 45، آیات 1-5: ”ای کورش، من پیشاپیش تو حرکت می‌کنم، . . . آن‌گاه خواهی فهمید که من خداوند، خدای اسرائیل هستم و تو را به نام خوانده‌ام. من تو را برگزیده‌ام تا به اسرائیل که خدمتگزار من و قوم برگزیده من است یاری نمایی. هنگامی که تو مرا نمی‌شناختی من تو را به نام خواندم . . . زمانی که مرا نمی‌شناختی من به تو توانایی بخشیدم.“

[50] بلعمی، تاریخ بلعمی، جلد 2، 676-677.

[51] برای آکاهی از چگونگی پیدایش حماسه و توصیف حماسۀ مذهبی بنگرید به ذبیح الله صقا، حماسه‌سرایی در ایران (چاپ 6؛ تهران: انتشارات دیبا، 1374)، 341-385؛

William L. Hanaway Jr., “The Iranian Epics,” in Heroic Epic and Saga, An Introduction to the Worlds Great Folk Epic, ed.Felix J. Oinas (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1978), 93-96; Ehsan Yarshater, Persian Literature (New York: Bibliotheca Persica, 1988), 96-103; Michael Roberts, Biblical Epic and Rhetorical Paraphrase in Late Antiquity (London: Francis Cairns, 1985), 116.

Mistaken Modernity and Its Critics: Hussein Alatas and Jalal Al-e Ahmad

Mistaken Modernity and Its Critics:  Hussein Alatas and Jalal Al-e Ahmad

 

Ali Mirsepassi, New York University

Tadd Fernée, Université de Tours

There already exists an idea of an American or European social science tradition. Though both draw upon a common universal fountain of social science knowledge, yet we do speak of an American or European social science tradition.

Syed Hussein Alatas, 2002

THE PERILS OF MISREMEMBERING

The late Tony Judt’s book Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century alerts us to a systemic tendency to mis-remember the intellectual history of the twentieth century as one of political extremes, filled with tragic mistakes and mistaken choices, a period of delusion from which the world has now thankfully awakened.  In the spirit of Judt’s wider project, this essay offers a more nuanced understanding of twentieth-century political thought, focused on experiences outside of  the West.  Our aim is to revisit a critical intellectual debate which broached the predicaments of postcolonial societies.  Specifically, we investigate an innovative intellectual tradition which took to task the uncritical Western imitation pervasive among governing elites in postcolonial countries.  This new intellectual intervention sought to radically redefine how we understand agency in non-Western societies emerging from colonial domination.   The new tradition gave special consideration to local cultural questions while engaging in a passionate dialogue with European intellectuals.  The influence was a complex and bilateral relation, rather than a case of the West either preceding these Asian thinkers or giving birth to their recycled ideas.  The intellectual process was simultaneous, dialectical, and interdependent, for Western and Asian thinkers alike were mesmerized by the perplexing significance of multiple independence wars and social struggles taking place in Algeria, Vietnam, Cuba, and Palestine.  The worldwide national liberation struggles imaginatively impacted progressive public intellectuals everywhere and provide a background for the new intellectual tradition examined in this article.

However, to all appearance, the new twenty-first century political environment—and especially the virulent rise of political Islam—has prompted many to misremember the broader global contexts defining the postcolonial intellectual tradition we discuss in this article. The vibrant and broadly cosmopolitan communities from which Asian, Middle Eastern and African public intellectuals participated have been either forgotten or dismissed as marginal to postcolonial history.  Instead, a history is routinely recycled depicting a squandered Third World reckoning with the unscalable heights of the modern world.  It is now common to regard postcolonial intellectuals as confused ‘Third World’ individuals, helplessly obsessed with their own self-made dreams, a serpentine oscillation which—in practical reality—has catalysed the nightmarish explosion and ruins of the Iranian Revolutionary trajectory, of Latin American radicalism, and the liberation movements across Asia and Africa.  In this new discourse of imperial self-affirmation, the unleashed fantasies of non-Western intellectuals are deemed responsible for all that went tragically wrong in every colonial aftermath.

The Idea of Autonomous Social Sciences:

We shift the investigative frame to the Malaysian sociologist and public intellectual, Syed Hussein Alatas (1928-2007), who identified and critiqued the conventionalized ‘unthinking’ systemically permeating postindependence Asian scholars and political elites.  Alatas articulated theories rooted within local historical contexts, sociocultural realities, and the hopes of populations in contemporary postcolonial societies.  Alatas aimed to construct “an autonomous social science,” the fruit of intellectual engagement and political activism, and therefore his work belonged to the humanist tradition of transforming social orders through direct action:

[…] an autonomous tradition cannot develop without the commitment of an intellectual, creative and independent group striving for that tradition.[3]

In Alatas’ “The Captive Mind in Development Studies,” there are two essential categories: “the factorgenic and the actorgenic.”[4]  Factorgenic includes “all those matters which are the results of human action, external to man and able to survive longer than an individual or a group.”  Actorgenic includes “all those matters which are found within the individual or the group.”  Alatas explains:

[…] we should seriously devote increasing attention to the roles of entrepreneurs and political groups in developing societies. All analyses of human behaviour and achievements can be grouped into two broad categories, the factorgenic and the actorgenic. By factorgenic I mean all those matters which are the results of human action, external to man and able to survive longer than an individual or a group. By actorgenic I mean all those matters which are found within the individual or the group. Though in real life there is a strong interaction and interdependence between factorgenic and actorgenic phenomena, at an initial level of comprehension it is fruitful to make a conceptual distinction.

Within the purview of this double concept, Alatas makes the following observation with regard to the concept of a developing country:

economists of underdevelopment and development planners have been, on the whole, factorgenic in orientation.  When they discuss problems the picture which emerges is that of anonymous forces bringing about or obstructing certain changes.  They discuss the absence or presence of natural resources, the size of the market, the terms of trade, institutional impediments, labour productivity per capita income, and a host of other data…[5]

While conceding the importance of these “anonymous” factors, Alatas charges such development analysis with drifting into the “ahistorical.”  He contrasts them unfavourably with the Weberian tradition which includes “concrete empirical discussions of socio-economic groups centred around actorgenic data.”  Alatas writes: “our major problems are to my mind best understood in terms of actorgenic analysis.  If we desire to break the chain of circular explanation involving the continuous repetition of known data and problems, we have to enter a wider area of discourse.”  Alatas cites as important the available “moral and mental energies,” the “feelings of groups and individuals,” the “dominant conceptions and ideas,”  the “personality traits” of the “entrepreneurs and the power holders” whose decisions “decisively condition a country’s reaction to all its major problems.”[6]  Therefore, Alatas argues that it “is not enough to explain how and why development plans fail but who makes them fail and how actorgenic factors operate in the group which causes the plan to fail.”[7]  Although Alatas is perfectly cognizant of the crucial role of institutional context, his view resembles that of Amartya Sen, for whom the exclusive preoccupation with institutions in isolation is “institutional fundamentalism,” and who prioritizes positive transformations in public values and meanings as the existential foregrounding of any good institution-building.[8]

Alatas writes: “Citing factorgenic data repeatedly will not help us solve basic problems.  It is not enough to explain how and why development plans fail but who makes them fail and how actorgenic factors operate in the group which causes the plan to fail […] Discussions on the goals and prospect of development planning would then become more fruitful [and] make planning more meaningful and desirable [when] freed from the relatively ethnocentric offshoots which have grown around them.”[9]  Any emancipatory development process requires an agentive, creative and meaningful theoretical framework which closely considers the myriad details of local, social, and historical context.

This view suggests, as in the tradition of Mahatma Gandhi, “an idiom very different from that of the European Liberal-Labour radicals or the Marxists,” but which “his followers [millions of both sexes and all classes, castes, religions and regions] had little difficulty in understanding” in its message of “political and social rights” and “democratic socialist development.”[10]  It follows that a profound political importance attaches to Alatas’ theories for the objective process of economic and political unification of nations overcoming legacies of the colonial yoke.  Also like the Gandhian strategy, Alatas’ cosmopolitanism embraced an anti-imperialism that avoided “degenerating into ‘reverse’ racism of any kind.”[11]

Alatas embraced the social science tradition, while rejecting “the unreality of the basic assumptions, misplaced abstractions, ignorance or misinterpretation of data, and an erroneous conception of problems and their significance” resulting from an “uncritical demonstration effect” in the spreading of “social science knowledge in Asian countries.”[12]  He rejects a kind of inflationary ontology identifiable with Eurocentrism.  Alatas promotes a social science tradition based not on “laws of society” deduced from perfected individual psychology (John Stuart Mill) but applying scientifically disciplined intelligence to problems of social reform in concrete contexts driven by moral motivation (John Dewey).  He nevertheless identifies universal foundations for the “social science tradition,” comprising “factors peculiar to [that tradition] that distinguish it from other traditions.”  These include: “(1) The raising and treatment of definite problems, (2) the application of definite methodologies, (3) the recognition of definite phenomena, (4) the creation of definite concepts, and (5) the relation with other branches of knowledge.”[13]

Alatas therefore links the epistemic character of his Social Science project to the Marxian tradition of transforming the world rather than merely passively understanding it as a fixed reality.  Alatas’ ‘autonomous social science’ is intended to liberate: “what were the factors conducive to the birth of such a tradition and what were the serious impediments? In order to liberate, one must first understand the condition of bondage. This led me to the problem of the captive mind.”[14]  Meanwhile, the existing imitative practice has done untold harm: “Asian scholars are still under intellectual domination.  The pattern and effects of this domination can be easily traced […] Whole nations have been subjected to ill-conceived planning with serious consequences.”[15]

Alatas defines the “Captive Mind” as the consequence of the “intense bombardment on the developing societies of an ever-growing volume of literature from the West resulting in uncritical assimilation by the scholars of developing societies.”[16]  The failure to produce an original and emancipatory social science in postcolonial contexts is the legacy of a colonial system “which did not have a functioning group of independent scholars.”[17]  The colonial afterlife persists in postindependence scholars who have “picked up the habit of discourse, employing a stock of general concepts and method of analysis [while] clearly not focusing on the distinctive features of this society [i.e. Malaysia]. This is nothing but imitation of instant scholarship that abounds in the fields of economics, political science, sociology and development studies.”[18] The word “instant” indicates a prefabricated template, requiring no further reflection, only a passively “imitative” reproduction of fixed guideline answers.  These answers were strictly laid down by unquestioned authorities in the wealthy and powerful universities and research institutes of those rich countries which were the erstwhile colonial masters of Asian countries from Malaysia to India.

It follows, Alatas argues, that discursive productions are so tightly defined by genre types that texts on different Asian countries are interchangeable.  This renders them irrelevant abstractions bound only by superficial discursive conventions.  Alatas noted that “more and more Asian scholars of the demonstration effect type are being produced and diffused.”[19]  Haunted by this impression of superficiality in established academia, Alatas did an experiment while teaching in Singapore:

Several years ago, at the National University of Singapore I read out in class an article on education written by a sociologist. The entire class thought that this was the situation of education in Singapore. But this was not so. This article was about another Asian country. I merely substituted the name ‘Singapore’ in place of the country’s original name. The strange thing was that it clicked. There was nothing wrong with the content. It dealt with a general concept and processes, and attempted causal analyses of the kind that are valid everywhere. When I told the students that the article was not about Singapore, they were truly shocked.[20]

Alatas’ Cosmopolitan World:

Alatas’ project of launching new and creative analytical strategies focused on dynamic Asian social realities invokes a specific ‘tradition’ of humanist universalism. This ‘tradition’ is grounded in ongoing dialogic exchange with multiple social science streams from around the globe.  Alatas writes: “Ignoring a valuable contribution from the West is as negative as uncritically accepting whatever is served on the academic platter.”[21]  Alatas’ social scientific investigation therefore transcends the new game of ‘nativism’ that gained considerable influence over public imaginations in many Asian countries at around the same time.  His writings never entertained the revivalist fantasy of a total cultural rebirth realized through violent rupture away from the West.  This is why he writes: “The domination of the greater part of mankind by Western civilisation has led to certain positive as well as negative effects. Our concern in the field of the social sciences is to identify these two effects and to avoid the negative ones.”[22] In the principle of concretion, or fact confronted with alternatives, Alatas adopts a pragmatic and consequentialist schema rather than utopian totality.  He calls for more opening—not closing—of new horizons in the global intellectual space, envisioning an inclusive cosmopolitanism embracing postcolonial experiences, histories, and realities.

Until now, then, we have established that Alatas coined the concept of ‘the Captive Mind’ to debunk the conventional ‘un-thinking’ defined by professional practices of simple reproduction of Western thought by non-Western intellectuals in the social sciences. Alatas calls for a new ‘tradition’ of social science theory rooted in the collective imaginaries of Asian societies: the singular modes of living, seeing and making social existence through imaginary significations lacing together a society and defining its moral claims to change.  Democracy is not the institutional reflection of an idealized image of property law contracts projected as the transcendent motive for social cohesion (i.e., the “social contract” tradition), but the framework for applying intelligence to the ethical and practical problems of the given society.  To illustrate how this issue concerns concealed epistemic power inequalities, Alatas proposes a thought experiment:

Can you imagine a Japanese writer writing a book on the American national character, published in Japan, reviewed by a Japanese scholar, popularized by the Japanese propaganda machinery and eventually sold in the United States, resulting in thousands of [American] students seeing their own country through Japanese eyes?[23]

            The reverse situation, where Western scholars set the standard for societies they have scarcely encountered, has persisted despite the end of Empire.  It has inflicted, Alatas argued, a crisis of creative reflection upon social problems in non-Western societies:

Intellectual imperialism conditions the mental attitude of those who have been caught in its web. Apart from encouraging docility, it stifles creativity. As a result of being dominated by intellectual imperialism scholars cannot become creative. They spend their time imitating. They spend their time trying to be acceptable and trying to gain approval from the group whom they look up to [i.e., in a power relation].[24]

            Alatas hence indicates the emulatory behaviour to which capital gives rise within a stratified order of power and prestige, because its power to allow or refuse access to institutional resources shapes the destinies of millions.  Domination of one country over another persists within spaces of exile, or the wider liminal zone, defining the parameters of independent countries and the metropole as power constructs.  This was also the subject of Sudanese author Tayeb Salih’s 1966 Season of Migration to the North.[25]  The novel depicts how the speech act, as conditioned by the colonial aftermath, is stuck in forced repetitions through the underlying force of hidden layers of historical violence.  The two principal characters, the unnamed narrator and Mustafa Sa’eed, represent a typology of alternative “us” and “others” constructions.  They are two Western-educated Sudanese intellectuals still struggling to achieve national liberation in the colonial aftermath, upon a topography crisscrossed with the power legacies of Empire.  We might very well compare Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923-69) to the revolutionary Mustafa Sa’eed, whose murderous acts of violence echo the Orientalist fantasies of his women victims, a closed loop immortalized in Richard Wright’s 1940 Native Son, which examines the psychological linkage between systemic deprivation of autonomy, blind anger, repressive condescension, and retaliatory violence as a political dead end:

In all of [Bigger’s] life these two murders were the most meaningful things that had ever happened to him […] Never had he had the chance to live out the consequences of his actions […] Blind anger had come often and he had either gone behind his curtain or wall, or had quarrelled and fought. And yet, whether in running away or in fighting, he had felt the need of the clean satisfaction of facing this thing in all its fullness, of fighting it out in the wind and sunlight, in front of those whose hate for him was so unfathomably deep that, after they had shunted him off into a corner of the city to rot and die, they could turn to him, as Mary had that night in the car, and say: ‘I’d like to know how your people live.’[26]

 

            Mustafa Sa’eed, like Al-e Ahmad, desires a total and radical break from the West in the colonial aftermath.  Alatas, by contrast, more resembles the unnamed narrator who endeavours to build his nation based on the reform of power abuse and improvement of public institutions. Contemporary Iran, one may argue, is to all appearances the outcome of Wright’s “closed loop” approach while other parts of  Asia—for example, postindependence Nehruvian India—reflected for several decades the creative reform model promoted by Alatas.  The comparison brings to mind Marcus Aurelius’ citation: “the best revenge is not to be like your enemy.”

A larger backdrop to Alatas’ epistemic reflections is to be found in the central twentieth-century debate about “independent thought.”  In the Soviet Marxist camp, this was dismissed as “bourgeois.”  Important Eastern European dissidents and philosophers of science like Michael Polanyi, however, argued that “autonomy of thought” is not only the basis for scientific practice but also a free society.[27] The Autonomy of Science debate originated when Polanyi was invited to the Ministry of Heavy industries in 1930s Moscow. His 1935 conversation with Bukharin, editor of the Party newspaper Pravda and leading Kremlin theoretician, exemplifies alternative twentieth-century Left “development” paths.  Both embraced modern science as a social ideal, discussing the “scientific” rationale for Soviet government conduct. Bukharin declared “pure science,” truth-seeking regardless of extraneous influences, the illusion of contradictions in capitalist society.  Independent initiative, Bukharin held, is unnecessary. Individual and communal concerns harmonize as a “whole” through the Five-Year Plan. Bukharin’s denial of an intrinsic link between economic development and political freedom constituted a denial of the central value in everyday communication, for party dogma replaced its function in resolving the perennial contradictions of rapidly changing modern societies.  This debate indirectly paved the way for Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm theory.

Alatas partakes of this twentieth-century social science tradition that shifted centrality to the communicative act in pursuing democratic social transformation, emphasizing “the role of human sciences in the dialogue among civilizations.”  This included the “participation in and monitoring of public discourse with the objective of breaking stereotypes and unsettling commonly held notions that typically translate into prejudiced views.”  This extended to “formal education of the public at all levels, that is, primary, secondary and tertiary education, such that intercivilizational encounters, the multicultural origins of modernity, and the variety of points of view, inform the development of curricula.”  Alatas champions public non-conformity, willingness to pursue radical reform, and the popular masses having a share through direct action in the changes that need be brought about in post-colonial power configurations.

The desire or courage to think for yourself and be critical of conventional thinking defines Alatas’ “humanist” vision of the Captive Mind. It is not uncommon among “radical” scholars to dismiss this tendency as “liberal,” but it underpins the essential quality of any truly radical way of thinking which aims to challenge any dominant discourse.  These debates mainly took place in the 1960s and 1970s, during the Cold War, and Alatas makes a unique contribution to them from the perspective of non-Western societies whose rich and profound cultural histories had been marginalized and degraded by Empire.

 Alatas proposes a process of theory making to counter the resulting creative paralysis constricting Asian intellectual culture, which he calls the “autonomy of the social sciences.” His two interconnected ideas, the “Captive Mind” (condition of un-thinking) and the “new social science tradition” (postcolonial theory making), are joint elements in his vision of a new cosmopolitanism:

The emancipation of the mind from the shackles of intellectual imperialism is the major condition for the development of a creative and autonomous social science tradition in developing societies.[28]

 

            To justify its rule and protect its interests, Empire had to articulate a historical narrative ideologically purveying an image of its benevolence and of native inadequacy.  These myths, Alatas argues, had a concealing function.  Undermining the legacy of such official belief systems, Alatas points out, requires the rigours of objective scholarship:

Certain neglected phenomena crucial to the history of Malaysia and Indonesia, such as the destruction of the trading classes by colonial rule, had to be seriously studied and the sociological mechanism bringing about the destruction had to be described in order to understand the motives of the aliens to describe the natives as ‘lazy.’[29]

Alatas therefore urges a prolonged process of intellectual struggle to remake the established order of ideological power across diverse civil society plateaus, to overcome their historically unbalanced military, political, and economic power orders.

 

The Last Muslim Intellectual:

Hamid Dabashi, in his elegantly written new volume, is fascinated with the world and time of Iranian intellectual Jalal Al-e Ahmad, a literary figure, essayist, and author of the influential Gharbzadegi (Occidentosis).  Dabashi calls Al-e Ahmad “the last Muslim intellectual.”   We find it valuable to place Dabashi’s presentation of the “last Muslim intellectual” in conversation with Alatas’s idea of the “Captive Mind.” Alatas and Al-e Ahmad hailed from the same generation of non-Western intellectuals who sought to re-envision their respective societies on their own terms while also self-consciously participating in the larger spaces of the modern world.  Al-e Ahmad’s thoughts drew inspiration from literary and cinematic premonitions of the modern world as bound to an inevitably apocalyptic path.  He regularly criticised the “unthinking” of the Iranian modernizing elite,  yet his was an alternative conception of “unthinking,” one based on the contagious disease of modernity that he labelled “Gharbzadegi:”

[…] Albert Camus, Eugene Ionesco, Ingmar Bergman and many other artists, all of them from the West […] all regard the end of human affairs with despair.  Sartre’s Erostratus fires a revolver at the people in the street blindfolded; Nabokov’s protagonist drives his car into the crowd […] These fictional endings represent where humanity is really ending up […] crushed under the machine …

It follows that the West had already been fully contaminated by the Gharbzadegi disease, while in Asia there still remained some hope for a cure.  The comparison between Alatas and Al-e Ahmad throws new light upon twentieth-century anti-colonial thought by highlighting the crucial practical differences entailed by alternative modes of thoughts.  Too often these differing modes of thoughts are blurred together in a nebulous anti-modernism.  By underlining the differences, we also starkly display the enduring legacy of these alternative modes of thoughts in today’s brand new but retro world.

Dabashi’s recent critique of our remembrance of events like the Iranian Revolution and Al-e Ahmad provides one illuminating departure point for understanding the contemporary world. We comparatively analyse Al-e Ahmad and Alatas, two outstanding individuals of the same generation who shared kindred intellectual and political concerns.  Dabashi urges us to remember important twentieth-century figures in new ways, freed from Eurocentric theoretical distortion, or misassessment born of the violent passions of the time.  Al-e Ahmad, by Dabashi’s account, was the “last Muslim cosmopolitan.”   An entire world became extinct with his passing.  The unique qualities of an irretrievable era also passed from the Earth shortly after Al-e Ahmad’s death.  Dabashi writes:

After the Iranian revolution of 1977–9 came the devastating Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s, then the two successive US invasions of Iraq in the 1990s and 2000s, the Afghanistan invasion in 2001, the Green Movement of 2008–10 in Iran, and then the Arab Spring of 2010–12, then the rise of the criminal

gang of ISIS, followed by the mayhem in Syria and the Saudi genocide in Yemen.

This citation from Dabashi powerfully poses the following problematic: the twenty-first century witnesses a decline in both Liberal Humanism and Marxism, but do we live in a better century? Analytically remembering Al-e Ahmad and Alatas as distinctive but related visionaries is one way to avoid falling into forgetfulness about the past, but to recall its genuine complexity and even its promise.

Al-e Ahmad and Alatas shared a definition of twentieth-century intellectual vocation by their both being public intellectuals.  Both would have embraced such description. Alatas’ key idea, the “Captive Mind,” and Al-e Ahmad’s, “Gharbzadeghi,” were both articulated to radically critique postcolonial modernity while imagining an alternative future.  For Al-e Ahmad, the intellectual horizon was tainted by polarized ideologies, all covertly enslaved by industrial modernity: “all of these ‘isms’ and ideologies are roads leading to the sublime realm of mechanization.”[33] He sought a secure ontological ground beyond the conflicted intellectual confusion of the times, a space of being and belonging to provide a shelter.

Unlike Al-e Ahmad, Alatas presents the “Captive Mind” as a sociological category.  For Al-e Ahmad, as a literary essayist, “Gharbzadeghi” has a deeply metaphysical connotation.  Al-e Ahmad strikingly depicts “Gharbzadeghi” analagously with the spread of a contagious virus: “I speak of [‘Gharbzadegi’] as of tuberculosis.”  The infectious disease “Gharbzadegi” preserves the outer aspect of its victims while corrupting them from inside, like a latent infection: “[‘Gharbzadegi’] more closely resembles an infestation of weevils.  Have you seen how they attack wheat? From the inside.  The bran remains intact, but it is just a shell.”  Although tuberculosis and weevils are only metaphors, Al-e Ahmad concludes: “At any rate, I am speaking of a disease: an accident from without, spreading in an environment rendered susceptible to it.”

We ask: What differences in intellectual traditions explain the differing critiques of these two pioneering thinkers on the postcolonial experience of modernity? What is the significance of those differences for political practice within the spheres of public activism, social revolution, and ultimately nation-building?  For both their time, as well as for ours.  Alatas is especially concerned with an imperial politics of extraction that simultaneously silences its victims on the basis of their exclusion from educational and other power circuits:

I met a leading traditional healer who used to supply some British writers with information. He was not able to make the finished product, as he had not been taught to write, he did not know how to use footnotes, and was not able to write essays. The colonial scholars took the data and just published them without any acknowledgement or further analysis. This was then distributed. There is a parallel here between economic exploitation and the exploitation of knowledge.[35]

Alatas’ theory combines Marxian analysis of exploitation with assessment of how knowledge acquition is systemically abused within the same process.  But Alatas does not reduce all knowledge acquisition to an intrinsically coercive process, in contrast to Heidegger’s harmonizing powers of “restored” being.  Alatas’ major difference from Al-e Ahmad is in this aspect.  Al-e Ahmad certainly had a passionate early interest in imagining a so-called postcolonial intellectual paradigm through a rich cosmopolitan dialogue with Western traditions from Existentialism to Marxism. As Dabashi himself acknowledges, this dialogue on alternative paradigms is mostly limited to Al-e Ahmad’s earlier period. This was subsequently followed by Al-e Ahmad’s later period, when he became influenced by Ahmed Fardid and German romantic thought. In this latter context, Al-e Ahmad advanced his key idea of “Gharbzadeghi.”  Comparing Alatas and Al-e Ahmad provides the opportunity for a new discussion on Alatas’s “Captive Mind,” which urges postcolonial intellectuals and the educated middle class to re-learn independent, open, and creative thought in the social sciences, in the aftermath of the colonial mould.

Unlike the “Captive Mind,” Al-e Ahmad’s idea of “Gharbzadeghi”—coined by Fardid and appropriated by Al-e Ahmad—lacks many positive qualities due to its provenance in pessimistic traditions of understanding the human condition: 1) it originated from Heidegger’s notion of the “darkening of the world;” by definition, this is an anti-humanist vision. It envisions salvation in a return to the roots and is defiantly hostile to cosmopolitanism.  It concerns cultural authenticity: “we [Iranians] are like strangers to ourselves, in our food and dress, our homes, our manners, our publications, and most dangerous, our culture […] If in the beginning of the Constitutional era the danger brushed up against us, it has now touched our souls.”[36] Lastly, it is a deeply deconstructive idea, without corresponding positive vision, except for the militant anti-modernism that vaguely alludes to utopia beyond everything in the “modern” present.  Alatas articulates a different conception of the colonial aftermath for intellectual culture in countries recovering from domination:

with the political edifice of the colonial state gone, the thought structure continues to operate but in a different form outside the area of obvious political control […] There is a kind of intellectual bondage that is not directly brought about by intellectual imperialism. This is the phenomenon of the captive mind in the non-Western world […] In brief, a captive mind is one that is imitative and uncreative and whose thinking is based on Western categories and modes of thought.

We compare Alatas and Al-e Ahmad in terms of their distinctive intellectual vocations. Alatas lived his life as a public intellectual, like Al-e Ahmad, while also being a serious sociologist engaged in debates and discussion within social and scientific communities worldwide.  Alatas had a sharply analytical mind.  He carefully explained and documented his arguments, despite clear political motivation.  His concept of the “Captive Mind” is built upon the criterion of verifiability, not a fictitious category like “being” or “authenticity.”  It must be “studied through empirical observation.”  He wrote, citing K. William Kapp: “the current disenchantment with the rate of economic development in many countries is the result of the inadequacy of theoretical frameworks to diagnose the nature of the problem and to prescribe appropriate course of action.”[38]

Alatas’ hypothesis is based on the observation of the functioning of institutions.  He starts by defining the “Captive Mind” as “a product of higher institutions of learning, at home or abroad, whose way of thinking imitates, and is dominated by, Western thought in an uncritical manner.”  From this, the following characteristics follow: “It is uncreative and incapable of raising original problems […] Its method of thinking depends on current stereotypes […] It is incapable of separating the particular from the universal, and consequently fails to adapt the universally valid corpus of knowledge to the particular local situations.”

Alatas is exceptional among late twentieth-century intellectuals in deeply thinking through the crisis of modern universalism.  The “Captive Mind,” he argues, is “fragmented in outlook,” that is, it lacks universality.   His committed universalism was exercised as careful self-criticism of his own beliefs, not empty self-congratulation.  For example, Alatas pursued the following inquiry:

There already exists an idea of an American or European social science tradition. Though both draw upon a common universal fountain of social science knowledge, yet we do speak of an American or European social science tradition.

            This passage, and many others, show that Alatas explicitly never doubted the universality of a “fountain of social science knowledge.”  We never find any entertainment of the Heideggerian idea of modern science as a disguised Will to Power eradicating every variety of local cultural being.  However, Alatas does argue that the “Captive Mind” is “alienated from the major issues of society” and “unconscious of its own captivity and its conditioning factors,” which are the

“result of Western dominance upon the rest of the world.” Alatas is concerned with how modern science, although universal, can be appropriated by wealthy and powerful nations to the exclusion of poorer ones, not merely in terms of access to its benefits (i.e. medicine, health care, goods), but in terms of an epistemic problem he called the tertium comparationis.

As a comparative device serving scientific research, Alatas took no issue with the tertium comparationis as such.  He presents one example:

Christianity and Islam are subsumed under religion. The problem with this is that the characteristics of religion are derived from Christianity to begin with. Therefore, the supposedly general scientific concept ‘religion’ is culturally defined by Christianity. Islam is looked at in terms of Christianity, rather than compared to Christianity in terms of a tertium comparationis, a general concept of ‘religion.’

What this amounts to is saying certain categories taken for scientific generalizations are, upon examination, determined by concealed cultural prejudices.  The tertium comparationis, to function seriously and accurately within the field of sociological research, must be subjected to the rational scrutiny of a world community of social scientific inquirers.  Alatas invokes something not far from Thomas Kuhn’s “paradigm theory” in the Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  This has nothing to do with an uncritical acceptance of dogma as we might imagine in theocratic social orders or religious institutions. It is about the polyvocal upshot of ongoing research among multiple institutions and individuals, and how a consensus forms and then transforms, in modern secular domains of knowledge production.  Its history is defined by established norms that preside at a wide pan-institutional level. These norms are partly the upshot of broader social changes (for example, military interests, international business, changes in higher education, etc.) but at another (and this is where Kuhn’s theory happens) there is a community of working scholars whose combined research and teaching practices produce a body of theoretical consensus. With this evolving consensus comes the eruption of paradigm changes in the history of scientific thought, what Kuhn calls revolutions.  This, however, is where Alatas proposes a more controversial idea in the “Captive Mind.”

Alatas is a what we might call a new cosmopolitan intellectual.  That is, he is a person who cares deeply about Asia, particularly the predicaments of postcolonial Malaysia/Indonesia, while also holding a broader “humanist” vision.  For example, Alatas cites how “Malinowsky spent a couple of years in the Trobriand Islands in the Pacific,” from where “he succeeded in evolving a  theory of human behaviour [that was] a landmark in the history of cultural anthropology.”  Alatas took no issue with the veracity of the theory.  However, he urgently queried “why he succeeded and not our own scholars.”  Alatas finds the reply in a frozen posture of subservience towards the erstwhile colonial master that obstructs the flow of “self-confidence” and “creativity.”  Alatas writes: “[Malinowsky] had no complexes. He did not feel compelled to imitate. He was not interested whether his writing would be accepted by this or that journal. He spent his time thinking and evolving his theory.”[44]  It is a hidden problem of power inequality.

Alatas adopts a scholarly distance to articulate the idea of the “Captive Mind,” comprising on the one hand a claim that the “native” elite is demonstrably unable to think beyond the colonial worldview (and, therefore, unable to conceive an appropriate tertium comparationis through rational criticism of Eurocentric scientific hegemony, thereby triggering a new paradigmatic revolution at the transnational level).  None of this is a Heideggerian argument against modernity, but a scientific variant of paradigm theory.  It takes full account of the devastating mental impact of colonial conquest in non-Western countries around the world.  Alatas, meanwhile, proposes the break with the “Captive Mind,” or the postcolonial impasse, through a  positive vision of building a humanist cosmopolitanism based on creative thinking and a pragmatic approach to solving specific problems.  Alatas emphatically encouraged a cosmopolitan approach to knowledge production:

One crucial question has to be answered if we wish to see the growth

of an autonomous social science tradition in Asia. Should Asian social science isolate itself from that of the West and the rest of the world? Definitely not. On the contrary, there should be greater and continuous attention paid to knowledge developed elsewhere, particularly in the West. But the problem is to select the significant from the trivial.[45]

For Alatas, the collective selection process of fact confronted by alternative lines of public action constitutes the core of the social scientific vocation.  Al-e Ahmad, by contrast, was an undisciplined, larger than life figure, with a unique and original Persian writing style expressing dynamism while being blunt, enunciated rhythmically in a way both pleasing and arresting. Al-e Ahmad’s ideas were deeply seductive, but not necessarily intellectually productive.  In his own words, Al-e Ahmad was a man of the “pen.”  He wrote: “I am professionally a teacher.  Yet I am not devoid of preaching either.  I don’t know what I am.”[46]  Beyond his considerable literary talents, Al-e Ahmad was a genuine wonderer, driven by the certainty that something was deeply wrong with how the world is set up. He spent his entire short life in search of an answer—from Boston to Washington DC, from Israel to Iran’s rural areas,  while also reading widely about histories and events in revolutionary countries like the Soviet Union, and dynamic Western capitals like Paris or Berlin.  The experience of Israel provoked Al-e Ahmad to speculate: “I as an Easterner [prefer] an Israeli model over all other models of how to deal with the West.  How to extract from its industries by the spiritual power of mass martyrdom […]”[47] In effect, Al-e Ahmad imaginatively opened new secular spaces for politicization which borrowed the structure of traditional religious ritual—thereby defining nation-building as a religiously rooted process of constructing and endowing national meaning to secure collective identity.

We needn’t doubt Al-e Ahmad’s sincerity in seeking a new postcolonial vision of the world.  His very life was almost a performance and a novel, “written” in his daily actions inspired by a vision he ceaselessly projected to all other Iranians.  He became almost an icon, a semiotic entity like the Bastille might mark the French Revolution in people’s minds all over the world.  Al-e Ahmad was a master of capturing the imagination through his writings and actions.  For example, his Meccan Pilgrimage resulted in Khasi dar Mīqāt (Lost in the Crowd), a monumental if highly entertaining rethinking of religion and modern politics written entirely from the perspective of one among millions of massed faithful in their human ordinariness.  Al-e Ahmad was by his own account, and of those who knew him, a deeply intelligent and sensitive man who was also confused by the appalling reality of the world around him.  The Iran of his lifetime suffered from disease, autocratic modernization, and a police state, all in the aftermath of foreign occupation and decades of revolutionary struggle.  We are not to be surprised that his searching imagination wandered to widespread possible explanations, and he entertained the notion that perhaps the cause of Iranian freedom had been genuinely held in the hands of anti-constitutionalist figures like Sheikh Nouri:

To me, the corpse of that great man hanging on the gallows is like a flag they raised over this country after two-hundred years to symbolize the ascendancy of Gharbzadegi.

That a reactionary cleric who vehemently opposed the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1906-11) should become a symbol of the struggle against “Gharbzadegi” proves that the term is not synonymous with Alatas’ the “Captive Mind.”  Al-e Ahmad reveals the nature of this difference by citing the ideological source of “Gharbzadegi” in German romanticism: “(Ernst) Jünger and I were both exploring more or less the same subject, but from two viewpoints.  We were addressing the same question, but in two languages.”

            That is, Al-e Ahmed embraced the “question” of forgotten “authentic being” late in his literary and activist career.  Alatas was concerned with a less utopian type of recollection.  He was concerned with how the victims of prolonged oppression require a catalyst to reignite their self-confidence and to break free from internalized abuse patterns:

The emancipation of the mind from the shackles of intellectual imperialism is the major condition for the development of a creative and autonomous social science tradition in developing societies.[50]

Humanism and Revivalism:

Upon a superficial reading, Alatas’ thought could be viewed as similar to a Heideggerian roots revivalism.  This, however, would be a rudimentary error of intellectual judgement.  In contrast to the prevailing Heideggerianism of many post-colonial theories, Alatas does not declare modern science a Western episteme—he instead claims that legacies of Western imperialism have historically monopolized a modern science tradition that should rightfully belong to humanity as whole.  He writes:

A reflection on the meaning of indigenization and autonomous development should not be taken as a mere wrangling on terminology. It reveals the nature, function and genesis of the scientific spirit, the forward movement of humanity, the necessity to break with the past to forge something new but at the same time to preserve what is considered as valuable from the past. The spirit of indigenization cannot facilitate the development of the social sciences.[51]

Alatas is not a positivist, but an adherent of science as creative and ever-evolving collective inquiry.  That is, science is not a monovocal product but a polyvocal process: “In public discourse and formal education, human sciences need to facilitate the dialogue among civilizations to inculcate an attitude founded on appreciation, understanding, interest, and compassion for the cultures and worldviews of the other.” The paradigm shift in conceiving science as a social process made possible by the everyday dialogic practices of countless participants through myriad institutions is traceable to the late nineteenth-century writings of Charles Peirce, and impacted Pragmatism (John Dewey), Phenomenology (Edmund Husserl), Structuralism (Alexandre Koyré) and important religiously inspired paradigm revaluations (Michael Polanyi).  All of these outlooks retained an Enlightenment universalist foundation, while criticizing specific traditions within that foundation (i.e. the “social contract” as we saw earlier).  Alatas belonged very much to this spirit of fundamentally democratizing our understanding of the meaning and practice of modern science.

Alatas, too, is a universalist, championing “genuine knowledge,” but liberated from the historical fetters of entrenched imperial power abuse that manifests itself in a culturally conditioned but usually unconscious ontological inflation.

Human sciences must go beyond merely correcting the fallacies and distortions of public discourse. They must attack the root of the problem, which is the problem of Eurocentrism in social science education that ultimately informs public discourse. The problem has to be dealt with at the level of knowledge production in teaching and research. This in turn would mean a greater need for interaction among scholarly communities in the various civilizations.

The above citation underlines Alatas’ commitment to modern universalism which remains open to dialogue with the past as well as a wide variety of different narratives.  Moreover, the fundamental feature of Alatas’ argument is to denounce the hardened and inflexible hegemony of a Eurocentric universalism that both shut out Alatas’ own ideas and helped to create a situation of sustained subordination of the Global South in the twenty-first century.  As the following citation shows, the two problems are interconnected:

I am not suggesting that we should close our minds to genuine knowledge from any part of the world. We should assimilate as much as possible from all sources, from all parts of the world, all useful knowledge. But we need to do this with an independent critical spirit, without turning our backs on our own intellectual heritage. The phenomena of servility and intellectual bondage are not the same as genuine creative assimilation from abroad.

The different genealogies underlying the two ideas, “Gharbzadegi” and the “Captive Mind,” can be represented as follows: “Gharbzadegi” is a philosophical/literary concept originating from the German intellectual tradition of the counter-Enlightenment.  Al-e Ahmad, and also Fardid, were in conversation with Western literary and philosophical interlocutors who imagined the modern world as the “darkening” of the human condition.  As we read in the original Heideggerian articulation, this “disease” began in the West but spread to global proportions through technology and science, having been seeded in ancient Greece through the labours of rationalism and at the expense of meaning-bestowing mythic understandings of being. Alatas’ “Captive Mind,” by contrast, proposes a sociological concept which—while it may hold certain elective affinities with “Gharbzadegi”—is a deeply productive idea which sees the requisites for social progress in both conversation with Western traditions and selectively preserving the cultural past as an inhabitant of any meaningful and autonomous present.

[1] Syed Hussein Alatas, “The Development of an Autonomous Social Science Tradition in Asia: Problems and Prospects, Asian Journal of Social Science 30, no. 1 (2002): 151.

[2] Tony Judt, Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twenty Century  (New York: Penguin Books, 2009).

[3] Alatas, “The Development of an Autonomous Social Science,” 150.

[4] Syed Hussein Alatas, “The Captive Mind in Development Studies: Some Neglected Problems And the Need for an Autonomous Social Science Tradition in Asia,” International Social Science Journal 24, no. 1 (1972): 22.

[5] Alatas, “The Captive Mind,” 23

[6] Alatas, “The Captive Mind,” 23.

[7] Alatas, “The Captive Mind,” 24.

[8] Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (London: Penguin, 2009), 57.

[9] Alatas, “The Captive Mind,” 24-25

[10] Bipan Chandra, The Writings of Bipan Chandra: The Making of Modern India from Marx to Gandhi (Hyderabad: Orient Black Swan, 2012), 18.

[11] Chandra, Writings, 15.

[12] Alatas, “The Captive Mind,” 11.

[13] Alatas, “The Development,” 151.

[14] Alatas, “The Development,” 150.

[15] Alatas, “The Captive Mind,” 10

[16] Alatas, “The Development,” 150.

[17] Alatas, “The Development,” 150.

[18] Alatas, “The Development,” 151.

[19] Alatas, “The Captive Mind,” 11.

[20] Alatas, “The Development,” 156.

[21] Alatas, “The Development,” 150.

[22] Alatas, “The Development,” 151.

[23] Syed Hussein Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism: Definition, Traits, and Problems,” Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 28, no. 1 (2000): 30.

[24] Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism,” 30.

[25] Tayeb Salih, Season of Migration to the North (New Hampshire: Heinemann,

1970).

[26] Richard Wright, Native Son (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1970), 231.

[27] Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 8.

[28] Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism,” 44.

[29] Alatas,“Intellectual Imperialism,” 27.

[30] Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Occidentosis: A Plague from the West, trans. R. Campbell, ed. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1984), 227.

[31] Hamid Dabashi, The Last Muslim Intellectual :The Life and Legacy of Jalal Al-e Ahmad (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021).

[32] Dabashi, The Last Muslim Intellectual.

[33] Al-e Ahmad, Occidentosis, 29.

[34] Al-e Ahmad, Occidentosis, 27.

[35] Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism,” 25.

[36] Al-e Ahmad, Occidentosis, 57-8.

[37] Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism,” 37.

[38] Alatas, The Captive Mind,” 11.

[39] Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism,” 37.

[40] Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism,” 37.

[41] Alatas, The Development,” 151.

[42] Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism,” 37.

[43] Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism,” 37.

[44] Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism,” 31.

[45] Alatas, “The Development,” 153.

[46] Al-e Ahmad, “Kārnāmah-i Sih Sālhā,” (Tehran: Revagh Publisher, 1984), 159.

[47] Al-e Ahmad, Safar bih Vilāyat-i ‘Izrā’īl (Tehran: Revagh Publisher, 1984), 52.

[48] Al-e Ahmad, Occidentosis, 59.

[49] Al-e Ahmad, Occidentosis, 25.

[50] Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism,” 44.

[51] Alatas, “The Development,” 155.

[52] Syed Hussein Alatas, “The Role of Human Sciences in the Dialogue Among Civilizations,” Development and Society 31 (2002): 265.

[53] Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism,” 27.

 

The Matrix of the Mystic: The Enclosure of Being in the Ikhwan as-Safa’ and Saadya Gaon’s Commentary on the Sefer Yezirah

Racial Profiling of Iranian Armenians in the United States: Omid Fallahazad’s “Citizen Vartgez”

 Claudia Yaghoobi is Roshan Institute Associate Professor in Persian Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She received her PhD in comparative literature from the University of California, Santa Barbara in 2013. She is the author of Temporary Marriage in Iran: Gender and Body Politics in Modern Iranian Literature and Film (Cambridge University Press, 2020) and Subjectivity in ‘Attar, Persian Sufism, and European Mysticism (Purdue University Press, 2017). She is also the coeditor (with Janet Afary) of a book series titled Sex, Marriage, and Family in the Middle East for Bloomsbury Press.

 

Throughout history, Armenians have endured several resettlements and migrations, one of which dates back to the seventeenth century when the Safavid monarch Shah Abbas (r. 1588–1629) forcibly moved Armenians to Isfahan, Iran. However, Armenians’ most major migration came after the 1915 genocide. Some settled in the Middle East, yet others resided in Europe and North America. A number of those who resettled in Iran post-1915 moved to the United States, especially after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88). In this paper, focusing on Omid Fallahazad’s “Citizen Vartgez,” I will examine the (hi)story of Vartgez, Fallahazad’s protagonist, as an Iranian Armenian in the diaspora in the United States. First, I will briefly chart the various waves of Armenian migration to the United States regardless of the migrants’ origin state. In this section, I will also point out the ways that Armenians have been exposed to discrimination in the United States. Next, I will delineate the ways that Iranian Armenians, along with other Middle Easterners, have been subjected to racism and Islamophobia in the United States post-9/11. In the following section, examining Fallahazad’s “Vartgez,” I will map out the ways that Iranian Armenians attempt to hold onto their heritage in the United States while simultaneously maintaining their ties with both Armenian and Iranian cultures. I will also discuss the fact that regardless of whether they live in Iran or in the United States, Armenians have had to negotiate their minoritized status within a codified legal hierarchy—in Iran, with an ethno-religious hierarchy and in the United States, with a racial one. Because Armenians are Christians in a Muslim-majority Iran, their identity is defined via its ethno-religious minoritized status in official Iranian narratives. However, after their migration to the United States, Iranian Armenians enter a national context defined by race, ironically enough; now, they are considered a white ethnic minoritized group, but are lumped together with Muslim Middle Easterners and subjected to America’s racism and Islamophobia. In the next section, I will address questions of racial profiling against Iranian Armenians along with other Middle Easterners in the United States. I will conclude this paper with a discussion of Iranian Armenians’ transnationalism as a result of their precarious minoritized position within the United States.

Armenian Migration to the United States

Since much of Vartgez’s story is set in the United States, it is beneficial to look at a few of the major Armenian migration waves to America. Armenians arrived in the United States as early as the seventeenth century, when a few were brought to America to help grow silkworms. The earliest record of an Armenian pioneer to America belongs to “Malcolm the Armenian,” who arrived in Jamestown in 1618–19. The most considerable Armenian migration to the United States began when American missionaries visited Turkey in the early nineteenth century, prompting some Armenians to enter the United States in pursuit of a theological education, while others arrived to develop the Oriental rug industry. It has been estimated that approximately 60 businessmen educated by New England Protestant missionaries came to the United States from Asia Minor before 1870, yet that number rose to 1,500 by the late 1880s. Most of these immigrants were artisans and laborers seeking economic opportunities.[1] Between 1869 and 1890, 1,400 Armenians arrived in the United States, with another 5,000 emigrating in the following years. While the first major wave of migrants entered the United States after the 1894–96 Ottoman massacres, the trend of Armenian immigration to the United States continued well into the twentieth century. After the 1909 massacres of Cilicia, this number increased to 5,500 in 1910, for instance. Interestingly, as the number of immigrants rose, the boat fare from Constantinople to New York decreased from $34 to $24 in 1913.[2] In the last decades of the nineteenth century, Ottoman policies and violence motivated Armenians to take refuge in the United States in the first fourteen years of the twentieth century; immigration rates rose dramatically; and by World War I, there were approximately 60,000 Armenians in the United States. Before World War I, the majority of the Armenian immigrants arriving in New York hailed from Asia Minor. A small number of Russian Armenians (about 2,500) also arrived between 1898 and 1914, first moving to Canada and later to Southern California in 1908. This migratory trend continued after World War I, when many of the 1915 genocide survivors continued to migrate to America until the 1924 quota system took hold in the United States.[3]

The post-1915 immigrants settled in the eastern states of the United States within industrial centers before moving to California and engaging in farming there. Today, multitudes of Armenian churches and schools are found in and around Los Angeles.[4] As Levon Boyajian expresses, for the children of Armenian immigrants, “survivors of the 1915 genocide, growing up in Washington Heights, that particular corner of the New York which was our home, was an experience of very special quality [. . .] Our little corner, in a sense, was what was left of the Armenian homeland for those who ended up in Upper Manhattan clustered around the Holy Cross Church on 187th street.”[5] The same was true for Armenians in New England (where Vartgez lives), who had created “little Armenian homelands” in their neighborhoods. While each neighborhood was different in its composition and architecture, they were each distinct and different from the mainstream neighborhoods. Isabel Kaprielian-Churchill writes: “Yet each Armenian neighborhood had many similar physical characteristics [. . .] More importantly, each neighborhood was dominated by the same overarching sense of Armenianness [. . .] Armenian neighborhoods have played a critical role in molding and strengthening Armenian identity in the American diaspora.”[6]

Between 1920 and 1924, a total of 20,559 Armenians arrived in the United States. As opposed to prewar immigrants, over half of the postwar immigrants were women, many of whom were widows, and one-fifth were orphaned children scarred by the atrocities of the war and the genocide. A few of these refugees had been rescued from Turkish homes, but the majority arrived from refugee camps run by Armenian charitable associations or European and American missionaries in Syria, Greece, and Egypt. Between 1924 and 1965, when the quota system was in effect, Armenians were able to circumvent restrictive barriers to immigration. The American National Committee for Homeless Armenians (ANCHA) was established in 1947, and relocated 4,500 Armenians who had been in settlement camps in Germany and Italy after World War II, using the Displaced Persons Act, which effectively exempted them from the quota. Later, ANCHA also helped Armenians from Palestine, those fleeing communist regimes in Romania and Bulgaria, and those escaping the socialist Arab governments of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. ANCHA helped about 25,000 Armenians immigrate to America as refugees between 1947 and 1965. After the 1965 liberalization of the quota law, Armenian immigration to the United States again increased. This coincided with political turbulence in the Middle East, including the start of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 and the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. The 1980 US census showed only 8 percent immigration from Iran before 1959, about 25 percent between 1960 and 1974, and 65 percent between 1975 and 1980. Three-quarters of Armenian immigrants from Iran settled in Glendale, Los Angeles.[7]

Hence, Armenian immigration to the United States can be divided into three waves: the earliest wave, beginning as early as 1618 to World War I; the post-World War I wave, which included the survivors of the 1915 genocide; and the third one in the post-quota era beginning in 1965, which included the Armenians who had escaped the political turmoil in the Middle East. While Vartgez’s story centers on Iranian Armenians, it is important to briefly explore the various waves of Armenian immigration from different countries to the United States.

It is also important to highlight the way Armenians were treated upon their arrival in the United States. Vered Talai describes Armenian presences in American cities as “relative anonymity,” meaning that they decided to remain ethnically vague.[8] While their dispersion across the United States contributed to less exposure to discrimination, it did not rescue them from stereotyping. Along with Jewish, Greek, Syrian, and Japanese Americans, they were stereotyped as “too ambitious and with a crafty kind of self-interested intelligence.”[9] The congregation of Armenians in different states and cities in the United States depended on various factors. From the beginning, however, their choices of settlement were limited; and while they were not exposed to explicit discrimination in many places, their settlement relied on the permission of the natives of those cities or states.[10] In Fresno, California, things were different, however, as Armenians were subjected to overt discrimination there.[11] In 1909, Armenians were placed in the category of “Asiatic” aliens, thus prohibiting them from purchasing land in California. This continued until the case of re Halladjian was brought to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in December of 1909, and the court ruled that Armenians are “Caucasian,” based on Franz Boas’s testimony.[12] However, even this rule did not support property ownership for Fresno’s Armenians, as the areas accessible to them did not include better neighborhoods. In addition to redlining, Armenians were forbidden from other aspects of US life, including being excluded from Protestant churches (a reminder that harkens back to Iran’s exclusion of Armenians from mosques); they also could not create social and professional associations, and were ill-treated by clerks, salespersons, and other townspeople; and Armenian schoolchildren were openly abused by teachers and classmates. According to Richard LaPierre’s 1920s research, descriptions of Armenians were similar to the negative portrayals of other communities of color, labeling Armenians as dishonest, deceitful, parasitic, heavily reliant upon community welfare, morally inferior, and inherently criminal.[13] In Fresno, anti-Armenian discrimination’s roots can be found in economic and social factors. The influx of Armenians who purchased land and attained professional positions incited fear and anxiety among Fresno’s non-Armenian population. In addition to their independent attitude, and despite their legal classification as Caucasian, Armenians exhibit a diverse set of traits including darker complexions, a unique language, and ancestral costumes. While they were exposed to discrimination, Armenians avoided any direct confrontation. This is the predicament of a minoritized population living among a dominant group that exhibits anti-ethnic discrimination. Since Armenians were not as widely known in other parts of California, Fresno natives did not succeed in mobilizing opposition to pass discriminatory laws, as they had done against the Chinese.[14] This invisibility soon ended with the advent of the Americanization process in the 1910s to 1930s, and later post-9/11.

Iranian Armenians in the United States Post-9/11

Due to their affiliation with Iran, Iranian Armenians have faced an additional layer of discrimination in the United States, particularly after the Iranian hostage crisis in the 1980s and post-9/11. Iranian Armenians have been subjected to further racial profiling along with other Middle Easterners and Arab Americans after 9/11. Much of the scholarship on American racism is centered on the white–Black binary. Focusing on Puerto Ricans and referring to them as “sandwiched minorities,” Elizabeth M. Aranda and Guillermo Rebollo-Gil problematize this dichotomous rhetoric and argue that while the rhetoric is true, “the nature of the binary racial discourse reifies the subordinate position of other Americans in the same studies that attempt to unravel how race operates in the daily lives of those most affected by it. In this manner, the duality of race and the implications for White racial subjects undermines their structurally subordinate position, shaped by centuries of institutional racism.”[15] Whereas skin color and phenotype are the typical tools for racial profiling, “the inclusion of ancestry and nativism provides an axis of racialization that differentiates citizens from noncitizens and/or Americans from non-Americans.”[16]

In the West, Iranian Armenians are frequently placed in the category of Middle Eastern “brown” bodies. In this context, Kumarini Silva writes: “In the eight years since 9/11, both the local and global arena has changed as governments and citizens respond to the growing crisis of ‘terror’, or what this issue identifies as ‘deviance’ – bodies that are identified and subsequently disciplined as out of control because they challenge the status quo.”[17] This type of “browning” is based on color, ethnicity, language, nationality, and those religions associated with a racial “Other” often viewed as a foreigner, an illegal immigrant, or un-American. Like many minoritized bodies, this brown body poses threats to the US racial and ethnic hegemony; hence, it is deemed deviant or dangerous. Therefore, the racialization of brown bodies does not require one to be a member of a specific ethno-racial group. According to Silva, “While the processes of racializing and categorizing people based on somatic identities and perceived differences are deeply historical in the United States, it is perhaps not until 9/11 that identification—of specifically targeted communities and peoples as threats to national security—has so effortlessly become incorporated into everyday life.”[18]

After 9/11 and with the rise of Islamophobia, Iranian Armenians have been lumped together with other Muslim Middle Easterners and subjected to American prejudice against non-white Muslim bodies. Despite being legally classified as white, Middle Easterners—including Armenians—are neither seen nor treated as white by the US legal system or society. When it comes to Islamophobia, however, Muslim Middle Easterners are considered anti-American because of their allegiance to Islam. Interestingly enough, religion as a motivating factor within Islamophobia is misplaced when it comes to the racialization of Armenians who identify as Christian. In the post-9/11 United States, Armenian religious affiliation is irrelevant as religious, ethnic, national, and other boundaries are blurred. Hence, post-9/11, Iranian Armenians grapple with what Neda Maghbouleh calls “racial loopholes”—the paradoxes between their legal status in American society and their everyday lived experience.[19] As Trinh T. Minh-ha points out, “At a time when the rhetoric of blurred boundaries and of boundless access is at its most impressive flourish, the most regressive walls of separation and racial discrimination [. . .] continue to be erected around the world to divide and conquer, exacerbating existing conflicts as one world, one nation, one community, [. . .] continue to be dramatically raised against another.”[20] In such a world, every immigrant or potential traveler is viewed as a terrorist. In this sense, airports and official governmental institutions become fraught with moments of racial profiling where individuals are randomly selected for background checks only because their name might sound Muslim or they were born in the Middle East.

Maintaining Heritage vs. Assimilating

Fallahazad’s story “Citizen Vartgez” begins with Vartgez, the protagonist, having a nightmare the night before his citizenship oath ceremony. Part of his nightmare includes the neighborhood grocer, Masis, who appears as a bearded and chubby king.[21] Vartgez wakes up from his nightmare and notices a police car’s light entering his apartment from a window. The confluence of anxieties about citizenship, a bearded king, and a police car right in the first paragraph of the story sets the scene for the reader to expect issues of nationality, citizenship, and power dynamics. The anxiety induced from seeing the police car makes Vartgez fetch his citizenship pamphlet, which has the red stripes, blue stars, and image of the Statue of Liberty on it—markers of superiority or integration forces. Yet Vartgez feels that he cannot tolerate the pamphlet or its symbols anymore.

With this initial scene, Fallahazad presents the reader with a character who is struggling with his immigrant status and anxieties regarding the American integrative strategies. The integrative ideology of the United States and the Americanization League in the 1910s to 1930s challenged all diasporic communities, including Armenians. This ideology provided the Armenian diaspora with greater opportunity of abandoning their heritage. Armenians were caught in between their desire to assimilate and their efforts to pass on their heritage to the next generation. Regardless of all the hardships, the Armenian political parties and the elite managed to create a core of committed Armenians with a nationalist vision. This is not to say that Armenians did not assimilate, however. For nation building in diaspora regardless of location, schooling and education became a cornerstone. Even today, Armenian diaspora schools try to instill and create a new image of what a “true” Armenian looks like. This new Armenian is conscious of their culture, heritage, history, and language, and is nationalistic. This type of nationalistic education and identity formation played an important role for the diasporic Armenians notwithstanding all the difficulties and troubles they faced.[22]

Conscious of his cultural heritage and trying to maintain his Armenian language but at the same time endeavoring to assimilate into mainstream American culture, Vartgez undertakes his journey through this citizenship process. Vartgez remembers that he had bought the citizenship pamphlet two months ago with an album of Vigen’s songs, but read only a few pages of it.[23] Building and maintaining collective identity based on shared consciousness, memory, and knowledge is a major source of identity for a minoritized diasporic community. The fact that Vartgez purchases the US nationalization books and pamphlets alongside a music album by an Iranian Armenian singer, Vigen, hints at his hybridity and the ways that he maintains his Armenian heritage but also has a tendency to assimilate. Vigen Derderian, an Iranian Armenian pop singer, was labeled “the sultan of Iranian pop music.” Before the 1950s, the Iranian music landscape was dominated by traditional singers with limited knowledge of Western pop music. In that sense, Vigen ushered in a revolution in the music industry. Even thematically, his songs were different from those of his predecessors. Traditional songs revolved around the candle and the moth, the rose and the nightingale, and an imaginary beloved and the pain of separation from this beloved. However, Vigen departed from these gloomy descriptions with mirthful content which he derived from common people and their colloquial language while also drawing from Persian rhythms. Vigen’s works became the prologue for a new type of music taking root in Iran. After the Islamic Revolution, Vigen left Iran and resided in California, where he continued to perform. When he died in 2003, his last wish was to go home (to Iran) and perform for that vast audience there, and one of his last songs, “Awazeh-Khan-e Mardom” (“People’s Entertainer/Singer”), expressed that desire. Interjecting Vigen’s name within his story, Fallahazad accomplishes two things: an intertextual dialogue between Vigen and Vartgez and a reference to Iranian Armenian collective consciousness.

Fallahazad is using intertextuality to place Vartgez’s status in the diaspora in conversation with Vigen’s diasporic story through a mosaic of allusions and intertextual references. Intertextuality, as propounded by Julia Kristeva in her essay “Word, Dialogue, and Novel,” refers to the ways in which a single work engages in dialogue with other texts, or intertexts, creating complex, layered meanings. Intertextuality manifests itself through symbolism, metaphors, allusions, and other rhetorical figures. According to Kristeva, “Any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another.”[24] Using this intertextual reference, Fallahazad transcends the limitations of history and culture and creates compounded, nuanced meanings. Intertextuality helps evoke the liminality diasporic communities experience living between cultures, languages, and literary traditions. Techniques of intertextuality help convey the layered, nuanced complexity of diasporic multivocal aspects.

By choosing Vigen’s music, Vartgez reveals the way he views himself as a part of the Iranian Armenian consciousness—a consciousness shared by an entire community. Per Emile Durkheim’s ideas, societies are constantly influenced by people who are no longer alive but have left their mark on the consciousness of the community.[25] In this sense, not only does Fallahazad’s inclusion of Vigen in the story hint at the group identity and consciousness of Armenians, but also as the sultan of Iranian pop music, Vigen is integral to the collective national consciousness of all Iranians regardless of their ethno-religious orientation.

Cultural identity encompasses shared culture, a sort of collective self, hiding inside the many other, more superficial and artificially imposed identities which people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common. This means that Armenian cultural identity reflects the common Armenian historical experiences and shared cultural codes, which provide Armenians as one people with stable, unchanging, and continuous frames of reference and meaning, beneath the shifting divisions and vicissitudes of the actual history.[26]

Finally, on the night before his citizenship interview, when Vartgez is confused as to which questions to read and what parts of the citizenship pamphlet to learn, his brother, Mato, gives him a ten-page photocopied pamphlet. There are no stars or stripes on this pamphlet, which contains twenty-five questions in three languages: English, Spanish, and Armenian. The Armenian part is handwritten.[27] Using the significance of language, Fallahazad draws on the idea that language is a tool for demarcating an ethnic group from other groups in the diaspora. The relationship between ethnicity and language also influences the links between language and national identity. Language and religion are typically considered markers of ethno-national identity. According to Steven Gryosby, language and religion are considered integral parts of primordialism, into which individuals are born.[28] Depending on time and place, the relationship between the two varies; however, they are associated with and feed upon one another.[29] With modernity and secularization, ethno-identities have increasingly been created based on socioeconomic status and political-territorial context; however, for ethno-national communities outside the homeland, a common language and/or religion are the major markers of collective identity, as in the case of diasporic Armenians, Chinese, Greeks, Indians, Jews, Sikhs, and Tibetans.[30]

By choosing to include a multilingual citizenship pamphlet in the story, Fallahazad offers the reader a moment of character hybridity, where instead of reading the naturalization questions in English, Vartgez is provided with a shorter, multilingual version specifically prepared for immigrants. Most importantly, the questions have been translated into Armenian; however, they are handwritten, indicating that another Armenian member has translated them for the community and that Armenians have to find ways to negotiate the exclusionary policies of the host nation by asserting themselves.

It is also important to note that after the 1915 genocide, Armenian language mastery became a cultural marker for Armenian identity. Since the genocide had the most impact on Armenians of Istanbul, their language (Western Armenian) became the hegemonic Armenian language of the diaspora, with the exception of Iran. Other dialects of Armenian language were confined to private spheres, and the use of Turkish was condemned. Western Armenian unified the polyglot diaspora Armenians into a community. Languages of the host nations were considered second languages. Of course, in the United States this was more challenging. The fluidity of borders, pressures for acculturation from the host nation, and the lack of Armenian schools contributed to the rapid integration of Armenians into mainstream American society and culture. For this community, language could not serve as a cultural identity marker which divided the diaspora Armenians in the United States. Out of necessity, this community replaced language with religion and the Apostolic Church controlled by Armenian political parties.[31]

After the citizenship interview, Vartgez promises himself that he will learn the questions from the English version before his oath ceremony: “The day when his nationality will officially become American.” He feels that reading the questions from the Armenian pamphlet is a form of cheating right before this “so-called new life, or [. . .] this rebirth.”[32] Rightfully so, Vartgez feels that this American naturalization and citizenship means the death of his roots and heritage and a rebirth into a new life. Hence, as he tries to integrate into the host nation in the United States, he first needs to disintegrate from the memories and languages of the homeland: Iran and Armenia. This is a common process of disintegration and reintegration that diasporic communities undergo. Vartgez must first empty his soul so that the new culture can penetrate and settle in. However, this strategy proves unsuccessful as the past continues to haunt him. Therefore, he has to reinvent himself, bringing the past, present, and future together rather than disintegrating from one and integrating into the other. The cultures are not mutually exclusive; he has to combine all three into a form of transnationalism and multiple consciousnesses.

Anxiety-Induced Racial Profiling

However, Vartgez’s collective consciousness is not limited to the shared memories of Armenians but also includes those of Iranians: twice a stranger, he has two homelands in his consciousness. After twenty years of living in the United States, Vartgez has given in and accepted, or more accurately, been forced, to become an American citizen. Mato and Mato’s friend Avizhan fill out the forms for him and pay for his interview without his knowledge. After they tell him the truth, when he finally tries to explain to them that “[he] may one day want to go back [to Iran], because you cannot bury twenty years of memories,” Mato interrupts him: “What memories? You grew up in Abadan, but with the first signs of the war [Iran–Iraq War], you left and moved here. Don’t talk about memories in front of me. I have memories, not you, of fighting during the war in Basra, Iraq. Four years, yes it was imposed, but still, my body is torn, haven’t you seen?”[33] The conversation leads to a discussion about how, during wars, everything becomes binary. You are either a supporter of one group or the other; there is no middle way.

Avizhan tells Vartgez that it is important to become a US citizen because his nationality is currently stamped “Iranian.” Mato continues: “It doesn’t matter if you are Armenian or non-Armenian, your passport says Iranian; it will become a headache here in these conditions. It’s happened to us once when we were kids. You and dad were in Abadan. Mom and I in Basra. I’m still suffering from that.”[34] Mato’s comment about the irrelevance of Vartgez’s Armenian nationality or religion hints at the ways that people of Middle Eastern descent are racialized in the United States. It also indicates the increasing visibility of non-white and non-Black ethno-racial minoritized groups in the United States. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva calls this visibility the “intermediate racial categories” and conceives of “racial groups in the Americas as inhabiting ‘spaces’ – that is, as sharing a location without necessarily crystalizing into a social collectivity.”[35] This intermediary group occupies a “different location[s] in the racial order, and [is] racialized through ethnicity, national origin, and/or religion, rather than strictly phenotype.”[36] Legally in the category of Caucasian but racialized as non-white, Iranian Armenians (like other Middle Easterners) are located in an ambiguous space as neither white nor non-white—a group that Gualtieri calls the most “invisible of invisibles” but at the same time hyper-visible, as seen in Vartgez’s case.[37]

The racialization of Iranian Armenians has less to do with race, ethnicity, and religion, and more to do with the US foreign policy that has fluctuated throughout history.[38] As citizens of Iran, Iranian Armenians have been increasingly viewed as threats to US national security with the increasing Islamophobia that has targeted Muslims, specifically after 9/11. When Vartgez gets to his oath ceremony, breaking news appears on TV: the image of a fugitive terrorist whose facial components are ironically similar to those of Vartgez, from his tuft of tongue-shaped hair on his balding head, to his sunken eyes on his wide face, and worst of all his full mustache. Seeing the image of this “terrorist,” Vartgez begins sweating, and taken over by his anxiety, he feels that everyone is staring at him. When the woman in charge of his file calls him, all he thinks about is “to immediately make her understand that while his nationality is Iranian, he is actually a Christian Armenian.”[39] That day, things end up well, but he avoids the news for the next two days. Since Mato is a fan of the news, he notices a change in Vartgez, and finally realizes that ever since his oath ceremony, Vartgez has been wearing a beard so he will not look like the “terrorist.”[40] This scene in the story clearly dramatizes the fact that while race has been understood as a biological entity, it is in fact a social construction. What is significant in this episode, however, is that this socially constructed understanding of race has global implications where nationality, language, religion, and history come into play.[41] Race sociologists have called this process “brown racialization,” which encompasses a confluence of skin color with ethnic, religious, linguistic, or national factors.[42]

Interestingly enough, racialization of brown bodies requires only being viewed as a foreigner or a terrorist, not any racial or ethnic specificity. This homogenization leads to racialization of all brown bodies in the same way. During the oath ceremony, the young man next to him asks Vartgez, “so we should congratulate you for two things? [. . .] one for your citizenship, and one for getting rid of your dictator leader?” A woman sitting next to them corrects the young man, saying “like everyone else, he confuses Iran with Iraq. It’s on your paper. But he means Saddam.” The young man asks Vartgez if he is Iranian or Iraqi. Vartgez responds: “I am Iranian. Honestly, I was born in Iraq. My parents were Armenian. Then my father took me to Iran and was forced to get an Iranian birth certificate for me, but in reality, I’m Armenian.”[43] As they are singing the American anthem, Vartgez thinks, “what would happen to him? Would he be taken to court? For what? Betrayer? Rioter? Terrorist? American? Iraqi? Iranian? Or Armenian?”[44]

What happens to Vartgez in this scene crystalizes that for brown bodies, American citizenship is legally obtainable; however, American cultural identity remains elusively unattainable. In the context of blackness, Devon Carbado labels this as testimony to the policies of “inclusive exclusion: inclusion in American citizenship and exclusion from American identity.”[45] This is also true about brown bodies that are positioned both inside and outside of America’s national imagination. According to Louise Cainkar, “As a result of exclusion and denigration in American society, the normative pattern among Arab immigrants arriving in the last 40 years and their American-born children was to develop a range of transnational identities [. . .] Shun[ing] a hyphenated identity [. . .] wait[ing] for a society more willing to incorporate them as full members.”[46]

Iranian Armenian Transnationalism 

As Vartgez’s story shows, diasporic subjects inherently navigate a dual challenge—namely, the everyday implications of a kaleidoscopic identity in a new environment, and the task of puzzling together an identity rooted in a fragmented home and host nation. In their attempts to resolve both challenges, the subjects’ cultural identity simultaneously takes root. Stuart Hall defines cultural identity as a focus on a shared culture and the mixture of vectors that cultural identities occupy, taking up multiple cultures.[47] Because diasporic subjects experience multiple consciousnesses, establishing a cultural identity is often full of challenges, including the suffering arising from fragmented memories, the weight of solitude, and constant roaming between borders of two or more worlds. The new and old environments exist together, placing life in diaspora “outside of habitual order. It is nomadic, decentered, contrapuntal.”[48] This decentered lifestyle necessitates physical representation as a single point of consistency in a life of constant movement. Focusing on the idea of dignity inherent in the concept of “multiplicities” rather than in the attempts to belong, as Franz Fanon puts it, diasporic multiplicities often contradict one another as a “way of being.” To become their true self is a never-ending journey for diasporic subjects[49]; they cannot seek approval in either the majority or the minoritized group and must create an amalgam of all identity factors, firmly establishing diasporic multiplicity in all aspects of life.[50]

For Iranian Armenians in the United States, this is achieved by diasporic transnationalism as they are culturally anchored in the host nation yet simultaneously maintain symbolic and spiritual ties with their homeland(s). The hybrid, diasporic transnational identity of Iranian Armenians indicates that they recognize one another’s differences, fractured identities, and fragmented memories, yet they also connect with others cross-culturally. Diasporic transnationalism softens the boundaries of “us” versus “them” via exchanges and mutual connections. While not always harmonious, these exchanges allow Iranian Armenians to negotiate their social differences and positions. This, of course, is the result of centuries of similar exchanges and negotiations that the preceding generations have undergone to make the boundaries porous today. The transnational, in-between, hybrid position of Iranian Armenians today is the reason for their cultural permeability, which is essential in a world where individuals live together in their differences. This diasporic transnationalism also challenges former understandings of diaspora, immigration, and assimilation; Iranian Armenians subvert hegemonic identity formations by insinuating the marginalized Other into the fabric of the dominant. This re-articulation decolonizes hegemonic notions of one unified national identity and destabilizes the power relations between “the ethnic” and the native. The transnational boundary-blurring casts doubt on the hierarchical dualism of the center and the periphery. In Michael Smith’s words, diasporic subjects become not only transnational but also translocal—that is, “situated yet mobile subjectivities,” both here and there.[51]

[1]Anny Bakalian, Armenian Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian (London: Routledge, 1993), 10.

[2]Donald E. Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller, Survivors: An Oral History of the Armenian Genocide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 141–42.

[3]Bakalian, Armenian Americans, 10–11.

[4]Aghop Der-Karabetian, Armenian Ethnic Identity in Context: Empirical and Psychosocial Perspective (Beirut: Haigazian University Press, 2018), 46.

[5]Levon Z. Boyajian, Hayots Badeevuh: Reminiscences of Armenian Life in New York City (London: Taderon Press, 2004), v.

[6]Isabel Kaprielian-Churchill, “Changing Patterns of Armenian Neighborhoods in New England,” in The Armenians of New England, ed. Marc C. Mamigonian (Belmont, MA: Armenian Heritage Press, 2004), 16–23. Quotation on p. 17.

[7]Bakalian, Armenian Americans, 11.

[8]Vered Talai, “Mobilization and Diffuse Ethnic Organization: The London Armenian Community,” Urban Anthropology 13 (1984): 197–218. Quotation on p. 203.

[9]George Eaton Simpson and J. Milton Yinger, Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination, 5th ed. (New York: Plenum Press, 1985), 101.

[10]Kaprelian-Churchill, “Changing Patterns,” 18.

[11]Robert Mirak, Torn between Two Lands: Armenians in America, 1890 to World War I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 144–47.

[12]Anahid Victoria Ordjanian, “Children of Ararat: Political Economy and Ideology at an Armenian Ethnic School in the United States” (PhD diss., Temple University, 1991), 60–61. See also In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834 (1909), cite.case.law/f/174/834/.

[13]Richard LaPierre, “The Armenian Colony in Fresno County, California: A Study in Social Psychology” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1930), 390–415.

[14]Mirak, Torn between Two Lands, 146.

[15]Elizabeth M. Aranda and Guillermo Rebollo-Gil, “Ethnoracism and the ‘Sandwiched’ Minorities,” American Behavioral Scientist 47 (2004): 910–27. Quotation on pp. 912–13.

[16]Bradley J. Zopf, “A Different Kind of Brown: Arabs and Middle Easterners as Anti-American Muslims,” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 4 (2018): 178–91. Quotation on p. 179.

[17]Kumarini Silva, “Brown: From Identity to Identification,” Cultural Studies 24 (2010): 167–82. Quotation on p. 168. See also Neda Maghbouleh, The Limits of Whiteness: Iranian Americans and the Everyday

Politics of Race (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2017).

[18]Kumarini Silva, “What Is Brown? Theorizing Race in Everyday Life,” in Brown Threat: Identification in the Security State (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 25–51. Quotation on pp. 26–27.

[19]Maghbouleh, Limits of Whiteness, 5.

[20]Trinh T. Minh-ha, “Foreignness and the New Color of Fear,” in Elsewhere, within Here: Immigration, Refugeeism and the Boundary Event (New York: Routledge, 2010), 1–10. Quotation on p. 5.

[21]Omid Fallahazad, “Citizen Vartgez,” in Vartgez: The Trilogy of Watertown (London: Mehri Publication, 2019), 5–28. Reference on p. 5.

[22]Razmik Panossian, The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 296–99.

[23]Fallahazad, “Vartgez,” 6.

[24]Julia Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue, and Novel,” in Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, ed. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 64–91. Quotation on p. 66.

[25]Emile Durkheim, Rules for the Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and Its Method, ed. Steven Lukes, trans. W. D. Halls (New York: Free Press, 1982).

[26]Stuart Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora,” in Identity: Community, Culture, Difference, ed. Jonathan Ruthengord (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990), 222–37. Reference on p. 223.

[27]Fallahazad, “Vartgez,” 6.

[28]Steven Gryosby, “The Verdict of History: The Inexpungeable Tie of Primordiality – A Response to Eller and Coughlan,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 17 (1994): 164–71. Reference on p. 168.

[29]William Safran, “Language, Ethnicity and Religion: A Complex and Persistent Linkage,” Nations and Nationalism 14 (2008): 171–90. Reference on pp. 171–74.

[30]Safran, “Language, Ethnicity and Religion,” 184.

[31]Panossian, The Armenians, 299–300.

[32]Fallahazad, “Vartgez,” 7. All translations are mine.

[33]Fallahazad, “Vartgez,” 12.

[34]Fallahazad, “Vartgez,” 13.

[35]Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, “More Than Prejudice: Restatement, Reflections, and New Directions in Critical Race Theory,” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 1 (2015): 73–87. Quotation on pp. 79–80.

[36]Zopf, “Different Kind of Brown,” 178.

[37]Sarah A. Gualtieri, “Strange Fruit? Syrian Immigrants, Extralegal Violence, and Racial Formation in the United States,” in Race and Arab Americans before and after 9/11: From Visible Citizens to Visible Subjects, ed. A. Jamal and N. Naber (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008), 147–69. Quotation on p. 149.

[38]Louise Cainkar, “Thinking outside the Box: Arab Americans and U.S. Racial Formations,” in Race and Arab Americans before and after 9/11: From Visible Citizens to Visible Subjects, ed. A. Jamal and N. Naber (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008), 46–80.

[39]Fallahazad, “Vartgez,” 9.

[40]Fallahazad, “Vartgez,” 10.

[41]Aranda and Rebollo-Gil, “Ethnoracism,” 913.

[42]Silva, “Brown.”

[43]Fallahazad, “Vartgez,” 21.

[44]Fallahazad, “Vartgez,” 25.

[45]Devon W. Carbado, “Racial Naturalization,” American Quarterly 57 (2005): 633–58. Quotation on p. 638.

[46]Louise Cainkar, “No Longer Invisible: Arab and Muslim Exclusion after September 11,” Middle East Report 224 (2002): 22–29. Quotation on p. 25.

[47]Stuart Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora,” in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader, ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), 222–37. Reference on p. 226.

[48]Edward Said, “Reflections on Exile,” in Reflections on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 137–49. Quotation on p. 149.

[49]Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952), 14.

[50]Homi Bhabha, foreword to Black Skin, White Masks by Frantz Fanon (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952), vii.

[51]Michael Peter Smith, “Translocality: A Critical Reflection,” in Translocal Geographies. Spaces, Places, Connections, ed. Katherine Brickell and Ayona Datta (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011), 181–98. Quotation on p. 181.

Iran’s Literary Becoming: Zokaʾ ol-Molk Forughi and the Literary History That Wasn’t

 

Aria Fani is an assistant professor of Persian and Iranian studies at the University of Washington. He earned a BA in comparative literature from San Diego State University and a PhD in Near Eastern Studies from UC Berkeley. In addition to research and teaching, he engages in social advocacy for asylum seekers in the United States.

     The most salient marker of character, the instrument of national distinction, the basis upon which a nation becomes distinct and distinguishable from other nations is language, and the soul of language is literature[2]

Depending on context, there could be two radically different readings of the above passage. If one were to find it in Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, it would read as a critique of a national imaginary rooted in linguistic and cultural difference. If one were to encounter it in a late-twentieth-century literary textbook, it would read as a bold declaration of romantic nationalism and its obsession with cultural singularity. The first reading relies on a critical knowledge of the role that language has played within the discourse of romantic nationalism in order to strip it down to its most basic impulse: the production of distinction. The second reading frames the passage as an effort to raise language and literature as identitarian      fixtures tied to a national imaginary, one that operates through the production of distinction. I will revisit this intriguing ambivalence in my conclusion.

Although this passage may be relevant to both contexts, it did not appear in either one. It was extracted from Mohamad Hosayn Forughi’s Literary History, written with astonishing clarity between the 1890s and 1910s, lithographed posthumously in 1916–17, but never distributed widely or published using later print technologies. This source may be familiar to scholars of late Qajar Iran, but its significance remains largely unexplored outside of that subfield. Precisely because it has not been extensively analyzed or even critically introduced, it can generate a host of unaddressed questions about the social processes by which literary nationalism took shape in the late nineteenth century, particularly for scholars who research different iterations of nationalism in the Middle East.[3]

My purpose here is to introduce this important literary and historical source and meditate on what its “rediscovery” in the twenty-first century means for the field of Persian and Iranian studies. This article is the result of my ongoing dialogue with Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak about the emergence of literature as a social institution in the Persian-speaking world. The path to becoming a scholar is more than just a matter of earning academic credentials. Along the way, what shapes a young scholar’s intellectual and human development is the presence of a community who fulfills different but complementary roles: teacher, friend, peer, champion, and mentor. In the past five years, Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak has mentored me, championed my work, and treated me as a peer. It is only appropriate in writing an article in his honor that the focus should be on an astounding literary figure who shaped debates and trends in the field of Persian literature and literary history.

This article comprises three methodical vignettes centered on Mohamad Hosayn Forughi’s life, his little-known Literary History, and the broader cultural context to which it belonged. The brief biographical section places the author in the emerging ecosystem of literary institutions and journals in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, illustrating his liminal position in the Qajar court and his role in creating a national pedagogy based on which generations of Iranian students were educated. The second section focuses on introducing his Literary History by outlining its different sections, explaining what they mean and why they were important to the formation of literary history as a modern genre. The last vignette addresses the common historiographical impulse of overestimating works of prominent intellectuals by demonstrating how Forughi’s Literary History belonged to a much broader social context in which similar ideas were in circulation. Ultimately, this article hopes to raise relevant and unaddressed questions that speak to the gestation of Persian literature as an academic discipline in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[4]

 

The Figure: Zokaʾ ol-Molk Forughi 

This section introduces Forughi’s biography and demonstrates his centrality to the political, cultural, and literary life of nineteenth-century Qajar Iran. The details of his life highlight a period of social change that witnessed an itinerant merchant enter the Qajar court and shape how modern-day Iranians understand and celebrate a certain past as their own. Mohamad Hosayn Forughi (d. 1907) was born in 1839 in Isfahan, the son of Mohamad Mahdi Arbab Isfahani.[5] Forughi was a prominent Qajar-era litterateur, translator, educator, and advocate for  constitutionalism.[6] In 1894, he was given the royal epithet Zokaʾ ol-Molk, in praise of his intelligence (Zokaʾ), which he put in the service of the Qajar political domain (molk).[7] He received a madrassa education in Persian and Arabic in Isfahan. Encouraged by his father, the young Forughi paused his education and became a merchant in the Persian Gulf and India.

After fourteen years, he returned to his life of learning by working as a poet in the court of Kerman’s ruler Esmaʿil Khan Vakil ol-Dowle Nuri. In 1872, Mohamad Hasan Khan Eʿtemad ol-Saltane (d. 1896), who directed the Publication and Translation Bureaus (Dar ol-tebaʿa, Dar ol-tarjome-ye homayuni), hired Forughi as a translator in the court of Naser ol-Din Shah (r. 1848–96).[8] Forughi entered the court as a merchant and man of learning, not on the basis of aristocratic pedigree or background in bureaucratic or administrative work. As an outsider, he maintained a liminal position vis-à-vis the Qajar dynasty. Farzin Vejdani writes, “This liminal position may explain why, despite being a Qajar bureaucrat, Muhammad Husayn Furughi supported constitutional change and moved in circles critical of the ruling dynasty.”[9] Thanks to his knowledge of Arabic, French, and English, combined with his mastery of Persian prose and rhetoric, Forughi produced important literary textbooks and translations and edited canonical works of Persian literature. In doing so, he played a major role in the proliferation of print culture and the promotion of a nationalist historiography that valorized the study of the past.[10]

In the mid-1890s, Mohamad ʿAli Tarbiyat founded Iran’s first independent newspaper, called Tarbiyat or Education (1896–1907), thanks in no small part to newfound political freedoms that followed the assassination of Naser ol-Din Shah in 1896. Tarbiyat was published by an eponymous library in Tehran, which was among the new sites for the reading and the distribution of literary production that had proliferated in late-nineteenth-century Tehran. Forughi served as Tarbiyat’s editor.[11] In its first issue, released on December 16, 1896, Forughi boldly declared that the difference among people and societies boiled down to only their education.[12] As Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet has noted, “Most newspapers published in the late Qajar period heralded the virtues of education in shaping a civilized and progressive society—ideals to which a beleaguered Iran aspired.”[13] Tarbiyat represents only one example of Persian-language newspapers, many of which remain unexamined, that aimed to cultivate a normative national subject in the early twentieth century.

For Forughi, the idea of literature—which he understood as a nationally enshrined corpus of prose and poetry—was a major pillar of education. Since print capitalism was understood as an instrument for the production and dissemination of literature, he wrote a series in Tarbiyat about the history of printing in Europe. Another important series in that newspaper was called adabiyat, a novel concept that needed extensive contextualization for uninitiated readers in the late 1890s, since in its premodern iteration, adabiyat referred to adab-derived sciences such as balagha (rhetoric).[14] Mid- and late-nineteenth-century thinkers like Forughi invested a great deal of intellectual labor toward bringing adabiyat into close alignment with the nineteenth-century French notion of littérature, a national culture in possession of a singular and distinct literary tradition.[15]

In Tarbiyat, Forughi featured biographies of poets like Hafez and ʿOmar Khayyam to highlight the literary achievements of New Persian.[16] The inclusion of Persian poets’ biographies in Tarbiyat was novel not only in its radical rewriting of the tazkere genre or biographical dictionary (more commonly transliterated as tadhkira or tazkira, and also translated as commemorative biographical compendia by Mana Kia), but also for mass producing it for a nationally imagined readership in the format of periodicals.[17] Kevin Schwartz has conceptualized the tazkeres of Persian poets as a “transregional library” in that the genre forged imagined literary communities with competing poetics and geographical centers of gravity.[18] Forughi’s literary history and his columns in Tarbiyat can then be understood as an “autobiography” for Qajar Iran at a time when romantic nationalism—the idea of one nation, one language—had become the cultural and cognitive center of gravity for most late-nineteenth-century intellectuals.[19]

Forughi  taught at premier schools of higher education in Qajar Iran, notably Tehran’s School of Political Science (est. 1899), which he directed until his death in 1907.[20] I insist on the political qualifier “Qajar” to describe Forughi’s Iran to reduce the risk of collapsing the multitude of political, cultural, and social experiences that existed in different regions of mid-nineteenth-century Iran. Forughi also directed the Education Committee or Anjoman-e maʿaref, wherein he helped to develop a literary curriculum based on different components of Perso-Arabic rhetoric (balagha), including textbooks on maʿna, bayan, and badiʿ, as well as manuals on rhyme and prosody.[21] His lithograph on Persian literary history includes materials that he used for teaching at the School of Political Science. ʿAbbas Eqbal Ashtiyani (d. 1956), a literary historian at the University of Tehran, claimed that “Zokaʾ ol-Molk was the first in Iran to systemize the history of Persian poets in the style of European writers and [also] add literary criticism to [this European-inspired system].”[22]

This important assertion lends itself to the observation that balagha was an integral component of a rising literary culture centered on literature and its ties to a national imaginary. Eqbal Ashtiyani’s note about arranging the biography of poets in the style of Europeans is what is identified today as a new mode of historiographical production, in other words a new discourse of literature. His mention of tanqid-e adabi or literary criticism denotes new approaches to writing about Persian literary works, therefore a new discourse on literature. Maintaining such distinction opens new avenues of inquiry for a deeper understanding of these two literary discourses: one creates literature (adabiyat) as a conceptual category, while the other provides a system of approaching its object of critique (naqd).

Like many in his generation, Forughi also composed poetry, and his takhallos or pen name was adib. His divan or collected poems was lithographed in 1900, when Forughi was in his early sixties; it has received passing mentions and very little scholarly attention. His divan opens with a note about the importance of adabiyat for the nation and the education of its body politic, once again demonstrating how the topic remained at the forefront of Forughi’s mind:

I have said this a number of times, but I will repeat it once more: literature (adabiyat) is a page or a text that must bear the imprint of all sciences (tamam-e ʿolum). We must understand that a container will die away without its content. Let me be more clear: the education of a nation lies in literature (tarbiyat-e mellat dar adabiyat ast). That is the reason why I have undertaken this task for fifty years. I will not yield to the enemies’ disapproving taunts, I will not deviate from the straight path (sirat al-mustaqim), and I will not abandon my way.[23]   

This passage indicates that the notion of literature, even as early as the nineteenth century, was not limited to works of literary history. Followed by Forughi’s preface to his divan, there appears a biographical note written by Shams ol-ʿOlama in the flowery style of Qajar-era courtly writings, which reads like a manaqeb-style hagiography, short on factual information and full of laudatory epithets and rhyming phrases.[24] A part of Forughi’s translation of E. Abkarius’s Rayhanat ol-Afkar is appended to his divan. This is a curious addition given that the work is framed as the “divan of Zokaʾ ol-Molk” and not an anthology of his writings. Forughi’s poetry mainly consists of qasides that eulogize the prophet of Islam, his daughter, the imams (which he composed during his time in Najaf and Karbala), and his patron Naser ol-Din Shah. Also included are robaʿis with spiritual themes and a versified narrative on love interspersed with prose. His divan is a little over six hundred pages and contains more than five thousand lines of poetry.    

In the course of his extraordinarily productive career, Forughi helped to set in motion a new discourse of (and on) literature and nationalist historiography. His legacy has shaped the careers of many intellectuals who came after him. The memoirs of scholars who were taught and mentored by Forughi are a testament to this claim.[25] Mojtaba Minovi (d. 1977), the distinguished scholar of Persian literature, recalls that when he was receiving his secondary education in Tehran, he studied textbooks that had been produced primarily by Mohamad Hosayn Forughi and his son Mohamad ʿAli.[26] During his lifetime, Forughi’s work was known in elite circles familiar with or invested in Persian literature.[27] For instance, in 1926, Ömer Halis Bıyıktay (d. 1939) translated into Turkish a primary-school textbook on Iran’s history that Forughi had coauthored with his Mohamad ʿAli.[28] Forughi’s success is not only a recognition of his intellectual force but also a clear indication that the discursive tools with which he was engaged in late Qajar Iran were in global circulation.

 

The Text: Forughi’s Literary History  

Forughi’s intellectual capital helped to create literature as a social enterprise in late Qajar Iran. He did not operate within ready-made conceptual categories that had been imported wholesale from Europe; instead, he cultivated a set of discursive toolkits with which to rewrite and realign literary concepts in Persian literature. Forughi was part of a network of global intellectuals who were politically, socially, and cognitively preoccupied by the idea of the nation and its cultural properties. In order to fully substantiate some of these assertions, this section examines Forughi’s Literary History in a detailed and focused fashion. 

I first learned about this work in a footnote in the journal Daneshkade (1918–19).[29] I could not locate Forughi’s Literary History in any university library in the United States or Europe. This is because the work was catalogued under the title ʿElm-e badiʿ, denoting a branch of Perso-Arabic rhetoric that deals with innovations and beautification of literary style. This is because the Forughi sons gathered their father’s disparate writings (or his mosavvades or rough drafts, as they called it), slapped them together under the title ʿElm-e badiʿ, and printed it.[30] Its posthumous production gives the text an uncertain status and provenance. Was it intended to be a literary history? More importantly, what did it mean for a work to be read as such in the 1910s when literary history was not yet a bounded and institutionally recognized category?

Similar to Forughi’s position in the Qajar court, his Literary History—or one that wasn’t—also occupies a liminal position in the field of Persian studies. It is the work of a scholar who gave the idea of literature arguably its clearest expression in the nineteenth century, yet it is a largely forgotten text. Despite its unique and original ideas—ones that would preempt a generation of scholars—by a twist of fate, it never came into being as a clearly expressed literary product in the author’s lifetime. It has subsequently slipped through the cracks of publishing houses and later generations of scholars and editors. Now, my task is to make sense of the work, its rhetorical novelty, and its discursive logic at a time when Persian literary history has been automatized as a mythologized narrative mapped onto an ethno-geographical entity called Iran. For those reasons, the most sensible approach to understanding it will be through intentional ambivalence.

Because I was searching for Forughi’s work under the title Tarikh-e adabiyat, I did not realize that a copy was held by the library of my own home institution at the University of California, Berkeley until I had graduated and left California.[31] Curiously, the lithograph copy held at Berkeley is different from the copies my colleagues Alvand Bahari and Shahla Farghadani sent me from the National Library and Archives of Iran and the Library of the Academy of Persian Language and Literature respectively. The Berkeley version has 124 pages of notes on ʿElm-e badiʿ along with samples of Persian and Arabic poetry that elucidate different aspects of Perso-Arabic rhetoric; the copies held in Tehran do not include those pages. The Berkeley version has two systems of pagination: the notes on badiʿ run from pages 1 to 124 followed by the section analyzed in this article, which runs from pages 1 to 353. This is yet another indication that the work was put together with haste and lacks clear organization.  

The task of introducing Forughi’s work begins with clarifying its unusual publication status. It was lithographed, but its number of print runs is unknown. Besides the three copies currently held in Tehran and Berkeley, I do not know of another copy.[32] Also unknown is whether it was intended to be sold or handed out informally amongst scholars of Persian literature. The only mention of a publisher is on the last page of the copy, bearing the stamp of Mirza ʿAli Asghar’s Press (matbaʿe-ye Mirza ʿAli Asghar), who was a grand vizier to three Qajar monarchs.[33] The last page also bears information about the scribe, simply identified as Malek ol-Khattatin or “the Chief Scribe,” and one of the book’s patrons, ʿAbdol Vahab Nezam ol-Molk (d. 1917), a Qajar administrator who occupied different positions inside and outside the court. Finding clear answers to these questions would provide a better understanding of the context in which Forughi’s work was disseminated.

The second challenge is how to precisely name this work. His sons, Mohamad ʿAli (d. 1942) and Abol Hasan (d. 1959), classified it as ʿElm-e badiʿ, writing in their introductory note that they had compiled class notes that their father had designed for his literature classes at Tehran’s School of Political  Science.[34] Those notes primarily consisted of biographies of Persian poets and samples of their verse. Forughi never had the chance to produce a final version for dissemination or publication beyond the classroom, as he may have intended.[35] Two of his biographies were featured in the newspaper Tarbiyat, demonstrating an overlap in audience. The Forughi sons stated that it was their father’s unfulfilled goal to compose a “Persian literary history in the style of European literary texts” which would “mitigate our shame among educated nations who have studied the history of our literature and knowledge.”[36]

Could we then call it a literary history? This article refers to Forughi’s work as a literary history with the following caveats: In the 1890s, the first literary histories of Persian had not yet been published, no less translated into Persian. For instance, the first volume of Edward G. Browne’s A Literary History of Persia appeared in 1902, and Shibli’s multivolume Shiʿr ul-ʿAjam was published in Urdu between 1908 and 1918. The University of Tehran’s Faculty of Letters, which became a major site of scholarly production, was not founded until 1935. Therefore, literary history did not yet exist in the late nineteenth century as an institutional fixture. But Forughi exhibited the language, if not the entire structure, that marked the beginning of literary history’s gestation, as this section will show.

Alexander Jabbari has illustrated how the genre of Persian literary history was the result of a long and uneven process of repurposing and refashioning the tazkere genre.[37] Jabbari has analyzed the rhetorical devices and discursive innovations used by Persian- and Urdu-language scholars like Shibli Nuʿmani (d. 1914) and Mohamad Taqi Bahar (d. 1951) that set in motion a new mode of historiographical production across national and linguistic boundaries. His analysis of how Persian translations of Urdu-language texts helped to define the domain of literary history in Iran and Afghanistan helps disrupt anxieties of originality and influence that surround the study of Persian-Urdu literary dynamics in the twenty-first century. As the earliest instance of literary history (yet) in the Persian language, Forughi’s work bears a formative connection to the tazkere genre in that it is chiefly organized by biographies of Persian poets. Unlike tazkeres, it lucidly articulates adabiyat as the cultural possession of a national historical subject called Iran.[38] 

Forughi’s literary history, lithographed in the nastaʿliq script,[39] contains 353 pages and is made up of the following five sections:

  1. Note by the Forughi sons, 4 pages
  2. Preface, 12 pages
  3. Introduction: On the Essence of Literature, Its Influence and Quality, 9 pages
  4. The Definition, Subject and Benefit of Literature, 51 pages
  5. Biographies of Persian Poets, 282 pages

The dibache or preface is on the nature and importance of literature for the nation. The preface mainly delves into the nature of linguistic interplay, particularly regarding Persian and Arabic. Forughi reminds readers that “no language is pure,” an astonishingly progressive declaration for a nineteenth-century nationalist intellectual.[40] For Forughi, Arabic elements in Persian do not constitute a linguistic or cultural “flaw or shortcoming” (asbab naqs va ʿeyb).[41] Forughi’s view shows that not all forms of Iranian linguistic nationalism were accompanied by ideological hostility toward the Arabic language and literature.[42] Not showing racial or ideological hostility toward Arabic does not prevent Forughi from asserting that in all the works of Arabic poetry, he does not find a single poet who equaled Ferdowsi’s  Shahname.[43] Writing more than a century before Forughi, Sir William Jones (d. 1794) praised Ferdowsi’s Shahname, but decided that it was ultimately no match for the works of Homer.[44] Although they belong to different time periods, both assertions are rooted in an evaluative notion of literature with the nation  as its uncontested unit of analysis.[45]

For Forughi, Arabic elements in Persian stand as historical remnants of a time when Arabic was the dominant language of scientific and literary production in Persian-speaking lands.[46] Yet Forughi implies that while it may have made sense for “our forefathers” (niyakan-e ma) to borrow their lexicon and aesthetic norms from Arabic, it is no longer appropriate for modern-day Iranians to do so.[47] He may not flag Arabic elements in Persian as inherently problematic, but Forughi does consider them fundamentally foreign. In fact, his preface reads as a clear declaration of Iranian cultural singularity, with Persian as its most enduring symbol, an idea largely upheld by many in the field of Iranian studies today.[48]

Language does not only serve as an identitarian symbol for Forughi. He is equally preoccupied with the idea of transforming Persian into a linguistic vehicle capable of producing different types of knowledge, both humanistic and scientific. This transformation primarily requires a simplified, exact, and clear prose style that Forughi thematizes in his own diction. His preface lauds the work of the Académie française (est. 1634) (or Anjoman-e adabiyat-e Faranse, as he called it), for systematically coining new words based on industrial and scientific needs (hajat-e ʿelm va sanʿat) while not giving in to the idea of purging “foreign words” (loghat-e ajnabi) from its lexicon.[49] According to Forughi, the French language was historically in need of borrowing words from Latin and Greek because the latter were languages of knowledge production, similar to the interplay of Persian and Arabic during the advent of Islam. However, the nineteenth century is the time for Persian to step into the age of knowledge production by strengthening its literature, the “true distinction of being Iranian” (emtiyaz-e haqiqi-ye Irani budan yaʿni adabiyat).[50] He bemoans the absence of literary associations and individuals who would light up such assemblies (na anjomani na anjoman-araʾi).[51] Here, Forughi anticipates and calls for the establishment of the Academy of Persian Language and Literature (est. 1935), which now houses a copy of his literary history.[52]  

The following section of Forughi’s text is titled “On the Essence of Literature, Its Influence and Quality” (Dar haqiqat-e adabiyat va asar va khasiyyat-e an). He writes that speech was assigned to human nature (nahad-e bani Adam) by the “Creator” (afarinande) and its      quality transcends ethnic difference, whether “Iranian, Roman, Indian, or Chinese.”[53] For Forughi, balagha is the “soul of literature” (ruh-e adabiyat); the key term is often translated as rhetoric, here with the caveat that it defies self-evident and easy translation.[54] Throughout his literary history, Forughi employs a constellation of terms centered on Perso-Arabic rhetoric whose semantic domain in this period remains underexplored: balagha or belaghat, fesahat, sokhan-vari, sokhan-saraʾi, and terms that pertain to its evaluative or critical domain like sokhan-sanji and sokhan-dani (some of these terms are defined by Forughi below). In fact, Forughi was insistent on classifying literature—and by extension rhetoric—as a science (ʿelm) whose study is indispensable for national education. He writes, “Some have assumed that poetry and prose composition (enshaʾ) are a matter of national amusement (omur-e tafannoni-ye mellal) and pastime while that is decidedly not the case; eloquent poetry and prose (nazm-e fasih va nasr-e baligh) constitute an essential part of rational sciences (ʿolum-e maʿqul), beneficial wisdom (hekmatʾha-ye nafeʿ), honorable ethics (akhlaq-e hamide), and desirable attributes      (owsaf-e pasandide).”[55]

In the same section, Forughi expresses his idea with precision, writing “Let me be more clear: literature (adabiyat) transmits the true nature of knowledge (ʿelm) through the language of people (be zabaan-e ʿavam).”[56] This passage should be read in the context of an era whose central ethos was the cultivation of a national readership, designated by Forughi as an undifferentiated entity called ʿavam or the commoners.[57] The task of literature was to transform the language of commoners and edify their conduct. He writes: “It is important to discern which linguistic register will prevail and prove durable as an instrument of safeguarding language; there are no doubts that the vulgar and reprehensible register of commoners (zaban-e zesht va rakik-e ʿavam) and the grossly weak language of the merchant class (ʿebarat-e sost va sakhif-e mardom-e bazari) lack the stature to prevail and [in turn] deliver durability to the masses.”[58] If literature embodied the highest character of the nation, then the formation of an Iranian national subject for Forughi necessarily meant being versed in canonical works of Persian literature like Saʿdi’s Golestan, the only work he mentions under its own subheading.[59]   

Forughi goes one step further and asserts that a nation’s own durability lies chiefly in the rhetorical force of its literature: “What lands have been conquered by a pithy expression (yek ʿebarat-e abdar) and what armies have been broken by an eloquent word (yek kalame-ye baligh).”[60] He then lauds the works of Nezami and Ferdowsi for capturing the imagination of people living in “climes of knowledge” (aqalim-e maʿrefat).[61] A survey of the most salient ideas of this section raises two questions. Generally, in order to better understand the processes of adabiyat’s formation as a new discourse of literature, its discursive ties to forms of knowledge related to adab and the role played by balagha therein must be critically examined. More specifically, it is equally important to analyze the way Forughi fashions a crisp and clear prose style to set in motion a new model of literariness.[62] Consider the following example:

طول نمیدهم و پاک و پوست کنده میگویم انسان بعد از خوب فهمیدن محتاج بخوب گفتن و خوب نوشتن میباشد تا بتواند مدرکات صحیح و سالم خود را مدلّل و ثابت کند و الاّ خوب فهمیدن او غالباً لاطایل و بیحاصل میشود پس سخندانی بیش از هر چیز طرف احتیاج است و این دولت احدیرا چنانکه باید و شاید دست ندهد مگر بمدد ادبیات یعنی احاطه در نظم و نثر استادان سخن و بزرگان اهل فن و بصیرت و وقوف کامل در طرق کلام و خبرت و اطلاع از آغاز تا انجام.

I will cut to the chase: in addition to good comprehension, people need good speaking and writing [skills] so that they can realize and demonstrate their sound and robust intellectual faculties, otherwise their good comprehension will prove futile. Therefore, more than anything, one needs [the ability] to discern eloquence (sokhan-dani). This government can extend a hand to [its] people only through literature—[literature] meaning a command of the prose and poetry of literary masters and [the work of] notables of science and wisdom, and a comprehensive knowledge of and dexterity with the paths of speech [or syntactic constructions], from its inception to conclusion.[63]

Forughi’s prose style varies throughout the work. In certain passages, it reads as flowery and creative, as exemplified in his entry on Saʿdi’s Golestan.[64] In other instances, it adopts a more informative rather than creative register, as exemplified in the above passage. The pioneers of literature as a social enterprise in the early twentieth century possessed distinctly different prose styles. Understanding their stylistic and rhetorical variation will help us better distinguish their approaches to meditating on and writing about works of literature. This refers to the generation of scholars who overlapped with and succeeded Forughi, scholars like ʿAbdol ʿAzim Qarib Garakani (d. 1965), Mohamad Qazvini (d. 1949), Mohamad Taqi Bahar, Eqbal, and many others. Broadly put, the question of style has not been fully examined in the formation of various modes of literary production in early-twentieth-century Persian literature.

Other points in this passage demand critical attention. Perhaps the most salient one is the way Forughi defines the notion of literature. He does not see it as a corpus of writing consisting of prose and poetry regarded to possess a certain aesthetic and imaginative quality, as rendered by most dictionaries in the latter part of the twentieth century. Instead, Forughi refers to literature as a type of literacy tied to a particular literary canon. He understands adabiyat as an evaluative, skill-based outcome, not merely an expression of national and literary achievement. Writing in the early twentieth century, ʿAli Akbar Dehkhoda similarly defined adabiyat as “knowledge pertaining to adab” and “literary works,” containing both valences present in Forughi’s literary history.[65] Adabiyat’s discursive ties to adab, as understood in the nineteenth century, are the main reason we cannot accept the term literature as its clear-cut and self-evident English translation and the anxiety of influence with which it comes. Analyzing these ties will clarify the processes of adabiyat’s conceptual realignment from a plural designation for knowledge linked to adab into a singular term primarily denoting the concept of literature in modern European literary cultures.[66]

The next section of Forughi’s work is titled “The Definition, Subject and Benefit of Literature” (Taʿrif va mozuʿ va fayede-ye adabiyat). In the first paragraph, he lays out his critical vocabulary. It demands critical attention because it illustrates the ways in which Forughi aims to realign these terms linguistically and conceptually:

Adab has been translated in Persian as culture (farhang); the composite term farhang consists of farr meaning honor and glory, and hang meaning understanding and intelligence. Adab and farhang are both essentially related to knowing the limits and extent of any subject. Therefore, one can refer to adab or farhang as knowledge (danesh) which is not that different from science (ʿelm). According to the terminology of the learned of the age of science (odabaʾ-ye ʿasr-e ʿelm) adab denotes the knowledge of poetry (nazm) and prose (nasr) which in Persian is called sokhan-sanji. Whomever is in possession of this knowledge may be called a discerner of literary discourse (sokhan-sanj); its Arabic equivalent is adib. Literature (adabiyāt) refers to expressions that will render students and any human prosperous through a profitable acquaintance with knowing (shenasaʾi) and a shining light of awareness (agahi). Everyone knows that literary discourse (sokhan) is of two types: metered and unmetered (mowzun va ghayr-e mowzun). metered speech is called poetry and unmetered is called prose; poetry has [different] types which are known in Arabic as qasida, ghazal, taghazul, musammat, qitʿa, rubaʿi, and mathnawi; these types [of poetry] in Persian are called chame, chakame, setayesh-name. Arabs call poets shaʿir or nazim while Persians (ʿajam) call them chame-sara and chakame-sara, a prose writer is called munshi in Arabic and dabir in Persian . . . [67]   

To many twenty-first-century readers, this passage may read like a vocabulary lesson given the extent to which the notion of literature has become automatized in Persian literary culture, treated as a given. In the late nineteenth century, however, this passage played a vital role, rhetorically and discursively, in bolstering Forughi’s twofold agenda: turning Persian literature into an object of scholastic inquiry and mythologizing it as a fixture of Iran’s national patrimony. For instance, outlining the discourses of farhang and danesh in parallel to the Arabic adab and ʿelm indicates the interplay of Persian with Arabic, but it also shows Forughi’s insistence on the idea of Iranian cultural singularity expressed through a facile bifurcation of Arabic and Persian concepts and terminologies.

According to Forughi, the subject of literature is prose and poetry, and the science of literature (ʿelm-e adabiyat) is tasked with forming a knowledge of and doing an evaluative assessment of literary discourse (az hays-e dorosti va na-dorosti va khubi va badi).[68] Adab has two types: adab-e nafs and adab-e dars.[69] The former includes forms of knowledge like philosophy that bring about moral conduct and self-refinement, while the latter includes academic subjects like geometry, medicine, and geography “whose knowledge has little bearing on perfecting the self (kamalat-e nafsani).”[70] Both forms of knowledge, rational and authoritative (ʿaqli va naqli), fall under those two types of adab.[71] Changing his tone, Forughi then laments the poor state of education in Qajar Iran, writing that “in our age, visions are so impaired that the sun’s appearance would not be sufficient proof of its existence.”[72] In other words, the importance of literature is far from self-evident and needs enforcement in the form of national education.

The remainder of this section draws extensively on the works of Persian poets to establish various points. Lesser-known figures include Maktabi Shirazi, ʿAmʿaq Bokhari, Mokhtari Qazvini, Azraqi Heravi, Seyyed Hasan Ghaznavi, Adib Saber Termezi, Saba-ye Kashani, and Fadaʾi Ardestani. Forughi’s poetic selection speaks to different themes, but he frames them to articulate a single message: One cannot cultivate a national subject through geometry and medicine alone; literature is what instills in people a sense of cultural singularity and moral conduct, while language secures their political autonomy from other nations. The poems do not merely illustrate the points that Forughi made in prose. They embody the rhetorical force with which he wishes to reconfigure the Persian language for its newly imagined role: mass education. Following that point, Forughi writes, “The heart of the speech lies in rhetoric (sokhan-dani) and if what I am saying is not right, then burn it after reading, or wash it off, and say whatever you wish.”[73] There remains a substantial amount of analysis left to be done on the discursive entanglements of literature, rhetoric, and philosophy in nineteenth-century Iran, which also holds the key to a deeper understanding of Forughi’s conceptual vocabulary and the ways in which he maps them onto newly emerged semantic domains.

The bulk of Forughi’s literary history delves into the biography of Persian poets, opening with a brief note on the rise of New Persian literature—or zaban-e Farsi-ye haliye, as Forughi called it—in the western edges of the ʿAbbasid political realm.[74] He writes: “Persian literature, particularly poetry, began in the ninth century during Iran’s Islamic era, which is also the period that we are in.”[75] He notes that Umayyad rulers in Iran did not pay attention to Persian, leading to the lack of literary production in that language. Here, Forughi invokes Persian as an undifferentiated language, not specifying to which variation of Middle or New Persian he is referring. Perhaps this context does not necessitate any linguistic or historical differentiation as Forughi mainly aims to locate the origins of a literary tradition that best captured the essence of Iranians—another undifferentiated entity—as a people. As New Persian emerged as a medium for literary production, Forughi writes, “our lands (mamalek-e ma) became a fertile field for the sprouting of knowledge and excellence.”[76]

The main section of the book is the biographies of Persian poets, which includes a brief overview of lesser-known Samanid poets such as Abu Salik Bokhari, Abu Shaʿib Heravi, and Esteghnaʾi Nayshaburi and samples of their poetry. Following this section, he provides an extensive biography for several Persian poets, starting with Rudaki of Samarqand (d. 941) and ending with Hafez of Shiraz (d. 1390).[77] Forughi’s work is uniquely different from most literary histories of Persian writing that were developed later in the twentieth century in that it does not place the biography of Persian poets within a political and dynastic history.[78] Instead, the biographies are organized chronologically. Forughi alludes to his sources mostly in the body of the text and does not cite, with the exception of Jules Mohl’s introduction to the Shahname, his European sources. This is in stark contrast to some of his counterparts writing in other languages—for instance, Mehmet Fuat Köprülü (d. 1966), whose essay “Methods in Turkish Literary History,” published in 1913, is replete with references to European scholars and literary historians.[79]

Persian literary history is a highly composite genre, and Forughi’s Tarikh-e adabiyat is no exception. By composite, I am referring to the ways in which literary history draws on and radically rewrites different types of historical and literary production composed across linguistic and geographical boundaries.[80] In Forughi’s case, these modes include tarikh (history), tazkere (biographical dictionary), hagiography, various kinds of anthologies, periodicals, rhetorical treatises, dictionaries, literary studies, and the received literary taste and judgment of his period.[81] Forughi synthesizes these elements into a work that poses as singular, functioning as greater than the sum of its parts.

Let us return to the notion of adabiyat, which lies at the center of Forughi’s cultural undertaking. I argued that adabiyat prior to the nineteenth-century served as a designation for a body of knowledge related to adab. In the mid-nineteenth century, Persian-language intellectuals such as Fathʿali Akhundzade (d. 1878), Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani (d. 1897), and Forughi set in motion an epistemological break from an adab-oriented definition of literature by bringing adabiyat into close alignment with a nineteenth-century colonial concept of literature as a canon of literary works that encapsulates the essence of a racialized people.[82] In light of this conceptual realignment, there was a shift in emphasis from balaghat to history as the social status and meaning of literature changed from a subject to be learned through cultivating adab—using tools like balaghat—to a historical artifact to be studied and enshrined. Adabiyat, a plural concept, was made singular during a time when romantic nationalism set out to collapse concepts such as origin, ethnicity, homeland, and language with multitudes of meaning and relationships into a singular entity that poses as homogeneous.

Forughi’s Literary History is an important source that needs to be extensively analyzed alongside other late-nineteenth-century works. If literature, then a new and unfamiliar concept, had found such a cogent expression in the 1890s, then it means that decades prior to the compilation of Forughi’s Literary History, these ideas must have been discussed and debated in elite circles in Qajar Iran. But the field of Persian studies is largely left to imagine how such ideas entered literary circles and poetry salons in early-nineteenth-century Iran, a period before the proliferation of print culture and the establishment of literary journals. In that light, there is a need for more analysis or even brief critical introductions of Qajar-era literary sources, both well-known works such as Name-ye daneshvaran and Majmaʿ ol-fosaha and lesser-known anthologies and treatises that have yet to receive careful study. Forughi’s lithograph helps place the gestation of a new discourse of literature earlier than previously thought,[83] but its rise cannot be attributed to a single work of literary history. Therefore, it is important to place Literary History within a macroscopic framework.

Framing Forughi’s Literary History as the only earliest instance of an emerging mode of new literary knowledge can be problematic if not also teleological.[84] It is important to understand and appreciate Literary History through its own discursive logic. I am referring to its biographical structure (as opposed to periodization based on national political history); its varied conceptualizations of literature, which include adabiyat as a science encompassing all forms of knowledge expressed through human speech; and its definition of adabiyat as a form of literacy. These features constituted alternative scenarios of literary modernism that did not become a normative part of the genre of literary history. In fact, today these features of Forughi’s work would be labeled by many in Iran as “traditional,” an assessment informed by a presentist vision of literary history. More inquiries into the distinct ways in which Forughi and nineteenth-century European scholars like Browne viewed the concept of literature will deepen our understanding of local forms of knowledge that existed prior to the proliferation and co-options of orientalist interventions that were linked to the “colonial matrix of power.”[85] In short, there are more questions than answers, and there is more ambiguity than certainty in our understanding of Persian literary historiography.

 

The Context: Literature as a Social Enterprise

In his lifetime, Forughi put a great deal of intellectual labor into creating an Iranian national imaginary closely tied to the rise of New Persian literature. He spent his career writing, translating, teaching, and building institutional sites of national education and literary production. The ideas he produced and promoted were both aligned with and subversive to Qajar state politics. He did not achieve his goal of producing what could have been—and may still be dubbed as—the first literary history of Persian. His lithographed Literary History, compiled by his sons, may remain largely unknown, but the ideas he expressed in it reached a transregional readership through the newspaper Tarbiyat from the 1890s to the 1910s. For instance, his definition of adabiyat and his biographies of Hafez and Khayyam were first printed in the pages of Tarbiyat. In fact, the main vehicle for the creation of a new discourse of literature in Persian was periodicals that sprang up in the early twentieth century.[86] In other words, the format through which the novel idea of adabiyat—and by extension literary history—took form was decidedly the small magazine.[87]  

Early-twentieth-century newspapers and journals created a new literary ecosystem. The ecosystem metaphor refers to a specific literary context wherein certain ideas and behaviors germinate. It operated, in this case, through an interconnected network of ideas with symbolic and binding values: nation, ethnicity, land, origin, race, culture, history, language, literature, and many other notions with which the nation-state rendered itself distinct and complete.[88] The literary ecosystem nourished a constellation of agents who were in one way or another connected to it: publishers, readers (students, educators, semi-literate readers, listeners), distributors, writers, translators, patrons (the state, merchants, etc.), and many other actors. It gave an institutional form and authority to the multiple sites of power and literary production operative within it: administrative bureaus, national schools, literary associations, language academies, reading rooms or qeraʾat khane, universities, national libraries, and many others. This literary ecosystem was in no way bounded by language or political territory; in fact, it survived through cross-pollination with other literary cultures, regardless of the fact that each national context had its own center of gravity. The most lasting outcome of this literary ecosystem was the constitution of literature as a culturally authoritative and socially prevalent enterprise—in other words, literature as an institution.

Unless Forughi’s Literary History is placed squarely within this expansive literary ecosystem, we run the risk of rendering it a standalone work, thus necessarily overvaluing it. The same conclusion can be applied to other towering figures such as Edward Browne and Mohamad Taqi Bahar, the authors of A Literary History of Persia and Sabk-shenasi respectively. Both scholars have rightly been credited for setting in motion a new model of literary historiography. In Browne’s case, this model was a literary history of a people called Iranians based on a system of political periodization. Bahar’s model forged four different historiographical categories—Khorasani, ʿEraqi, Hendi, and Bazgasht—based on a study of stylistic differences.[89] Both figures have undoubtedly left their mark on the formation of Persian literature as an academic discipline. However, the literary ecosystem within which their works were produced and read is rarely included in critical assessments of their work.[90] This omission has led to an overestimation of their work.       

One study that critically contextualizes the rise of national historiography is Farzin Vejdani’s Making History in Iran. Among other topics, Vejdani analyzes the ways in which two generations of Iranian intellectuals became involved in researching and writing Iran’s national history from the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. In other words, it tells the story of how history writing became a social enterprise, a profession culturally enshrined and socially institutionalized. Vejdani convincingly demonstrates that there is no single pole from which a new historical and literary knowledge is transmitted, disrupting the tired narrative of an undifferentiated entity called the East passively receiving knowledge from a transhistorical entity called the West. Vejdani does that partially by highlighting the idiosyncratic nature of the writings of Iran’s prominent historians. Whether considering history or literature as a discourse, the social processes that led to the formation of new ecosystems—or as Vejdani puts it, a “Republic of Letters”—must be analyzed.[91] The alternative is to treat literature as a derivative discourse.[92]

It is worth clarifying my critique of influence as a category of analysis. I do not deny that nineteenth-century Europe was a major source of inspiration for the transmission of a new mode of literary knowledge. In fact, most late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century Middle Eastern intellectuals who nationalized their literary curriculum also professionally translated works of European literature and history into Turkish, Arabic, and Persian.[93] But the rise of literary nationalism was not the inevitable outcome of translation. Instead, it was the result of a non-linear process of network and institution building that allowed certain ideas to take anchor in different Middle Eastern cultural contexts, setting in motion new conceptualizations of language and literature in the age of romantic nationalism. Influence as a rubric is rarely ever defined, woefully overused, and closely linked to colonial forms of knowledge; thus, it is incapable of elucidating the nuances involved in the emergence of literary nationalism in the Middle East.[94]

By way of conclusion, I will address the ambivalence formulated in this article. Writing in the late nineteenth century, Forughi aimed not only to create a new mode of literary knowledge, but also to cultivate a normative literacy required to understand and respond to it. This literacy was defined by the positivist impulse of modern historiography and was inseparable from the ethos of romantic nationalism, the idea that each nation is in possession of a singular literary tradition that renders it unique and complete.[95] The intellectual force and clarity of his ideas notwithstanding, Forughi’s work is also marked by its inbetweenness: not a tazkere, but not quite a literary history; printed, but not distributed widely; linked to the courtly discourse of power, but also independent from and vulnerable to it. Therefore, it is important not to erase the text’s ambivalent status in the historical journey that marked the gestation of literary nationalism in Iran. Effortful ambivalence can produce the type of analysis that dispels the false assumption that Iran’s literary becoming was the predestined and inevitable outcome of a pure contact with Europe.

By writing that the most salient marker of a people is their language and literature, Forughi set out to bring Qajar Iran into closer alignment with elite global networks that were constructing and adopting a new set of symbols and myths that resulted into a new imagined community. For Forughi, the production of distinction was an outcome that he was seeking to achieve. For twenty-first-century readers, particularly in the institutional setting of the university, the production of distinction is only a means to better understand how elite Iranians created a national imaginary in the early twentieth century. The growing body of scholarship on different aspects of nationalism has enabled us to read Forughi’s passage with intentional ambivalence, opening a vital space in which the myths that bind us are subject to the process of humanistic inquiry, as opposed to unquestioned devotion. What may emerge as a result of valorizing ambivalence as a conscious part of humanistic inquiry is a new literary map of our worlds, one no longer beholden to the idea of cultural singularity.

 

[1]I am grateful to Kevin Schwartz, Alexander Jabbari, and Amir Vafa for their critical comments. My thanks also go to Farzin Vejdani for answering my inquiries about Forughi.

[2]In Persian: Avval ʿalamat-e tashakhkhos yaʿni asbab-e shakhsiyat-e mellat ke mayeh-ye emtiyaz va joda kardan-e an melal az sayer melal mishavad zaban ast va ruh-e zaban adabiyat mibashad. Mohamad Hosayn Forughi, ʿElm-e badiʿ, compiled and prefaced by Abol Hasan Forughi and Mohamad ʿAli Forughi (n.p: Matbaʿ-e Mirza ʿAli Asghar, 1916–17). Copy available at the National Library and Archives of Iran (Cat. No. 13157). I will later explain why I refer to this work as “literary history.” My analysis here is based on the lithograph available at the National Library and Archives of Iran. All translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

[3]For a cogent analysis of Mohamad Hosayn Forughi’s role in the creation of history as a social enterprise, see Farzin Vejdani, Making History in Iran: Education, Nationalism, and Print Culture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 35–54. Vejdani shows that Forughi had an ambivalent relationship with the Qajar court and was a more independent actor than many other courtiers. Vejdani’s dissertation offers a lengthier biography of Forughi and his father, Mohamad Mahdi Arbab Isfahani. See “Purveyors of the Past: Iranian Historians and Nationalist Historiography, 1900-1941,” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2009). For an examination of the rise of Persian literary history as a genre, including a brief analysis of Forughi’s work, see Manzar Soltani, “Tahlil-e sayr-e tazkere’ha va tarikh-e adabiyat’ha-ye Farsi dar Iran az 1258/1880 (mashrute) ta 1332/1953,” (PhD diss., Tarbiyat Modares University, 1999). Forughi’s Literary History has received passing references in Persian-language periodicals, but it has not been analyzed in a standalone article in English or Persian. I am not able to verify this claim when it comes to scholarship on Persian literature in other European languages.

[4]See Mahmud Futuhi Rudmaʿnji, Daramadi bar adabiyat-shenasi: Rahnema-ye osul-e amuzesh va parvaresh dar adabiyat-e Farsi (Tehran: Pazhuheshgah-e ʿolum-e ensani va motaleʿat-e farhangi, 2017).

[5]For a biographical essay on Mohamad Mahdi Arbab Isfahani, see Jalal ol-Din Homaʾi, “Khandan-e Forughi,” Yaghma 66 (AH 1332/AD 1953): 361–65. Most notably, Arbab was the first Iranian to produce a lithographed edition of the Shahname.  

[6]For biographical information on Forughi, please see Manouchehr Kasheff, “FORUGI, MOHAMMAD-HOSAYN Khan Dokaʾ-al-Molk,” Encyclopedia Iranica, 2012, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/forugi-mohammad-hosayn; Baqer ʿAqeli, Zokaʾ ol-Molk Forughi va Shahrivar-e 1320 (Tehran: AH 1367/AD 1988); Edward Granville Browne, The Persian Revolution (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1910), 404–5.

[7]That is in addition to “Forughi,” an epithet that was bestowed on him by Naser ol-Din Shah after he composed a qaside on the occasion of tree plantation. Kasheff, “Forugi” Encyclopedia Iranica. He shared this epithet with the distinguished Qajar-era poet ʿAbbas Forughi Bastami (d. 1857). The two Forughis are unrelated.

[8]For a description of his exact duties at the court, see Kasheff, “Forugi,” Encyclopedia Iranica.

[9]Vejdani, Making History in Iran, 41; Kasheff, “Forugi,” Encyclopedia Iranica.

[10]ʿAbbas Eqbal Ashtiyani, “Zokaʾ ol-Molk Forughi,” Adabiyat va zaban’ha 163 (AH 1340/AD 1962): 517–22.

[11]H. Maʿsumi Hamadani, “Zokaʾ ol-Molk Forughi va ruzname-ye Tarbiyat,” Nashr-e Danesh 4 (AH 1363/AD 1984): 5–19.

[12]Zokaʾ al-Molk Forughi, “Aqaz-i sukhan,” Tarbiyat, no. 1 (11 Rajab 1314/17 December 1896), 1–3; quote on p. 2; digitized archive of Universität Bonn, Abteilung für Islamwissenschaft und Nahostsprachen (accessed September 29, 2017).

[13]Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804–1946 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 291.

[14]Adab is a discourse of humanistic inquiry centered on civility and self-conduct. For more on the term and idea of adabiyat and Tarbiyat’s role in reframing it, see Aria Fani, “Becoming Literature: The Formation of Adabiyat as an Academic Discipline in Iran and Afghanistan (1895–1945)” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2019), chap. 1.

[15]Another example is Fathʿali Akhundzadeh, who wrote that “literātur consists of any composition whether in prose or poetry,” leaving the French term untranslated in Persian. Maktubat (n.p.: Mard-e Emruz Publications, 1985), 10.

[16]For instance, the newspaper featured a biographical series of Johannes Gutenberg (d. 1468), the inventor of the movable-type printing press; on Hafez, see Tarbiyat, no. 255 (1902): 14.

[17]Mana Kia, Persianate Selves: Memories of Place and Origin before Nationalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020).

[18]Kevin L. Schwartz, “A Transregional Persianate Library: The Production and Circulation of Tadhkiras of Persian Poets in the 18th and 19th Centuries,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, no. 1 (2020): 1–27.

[19]I have borrowed this phrase from Charles Kingsley, one of the pioneers of English literature, who in 1848 declared that “literature of every nation is its autobiography.” Charles Kingsley, “On English Literature: Introductory Lecture Given at Queen’s College,” in The Works of Charles Kingsley, vol. XX, Literary and General Lectures and Essays (London: Macmillan and Co., 1880), 257.

[20]Majid Tafrishi, “Madares-e ʿali-ye hoquq va ʿolum-e siyasi dar Iran az ebteda ta taʾsis-e daneshgah-e Tehran,” Ganjineh-ye asnad, no. 1 (1991): 53–81.

[21]Depending on the discipline in which it is encountered, maʿna can mean different things. To highlight the absence of an English equivalent or close approximation, Alexander Key has proposed the deliberately unfamiliar phrase “mental content.” See Key, Language between God and the Poets: Ma‘na in the Eleventh Century (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018). ʿElm-e bayan broadly refers to a branch of Perso-Arabic rhetoric concerned with eloquence. The term bayan denotes manifestation, lucidity, and clearness. ʿElm-e badiʿ as a branch of rhetoric is concerned with figures of speech and innovation in language.

[22]Ashtiyani, “Zokaʾ ol-Molk Forughi,” 520. It is important to note that premier schools of higher education in Iran, such as Dar ol-Fonun and the School of Political Science, were not only sites of teaching and learning forʿolum-e jadid, or the new sciences, but also sites for groundbreaking innovation in humanistic inquiry that paved the way for the formation of the humanities decades later.

[23]Mohamad Hosayn Forughi, Divan (n.p., 1900).  

[24]According to the divan, the biography had been originally intended for inclusion in Name-ye daneshvaran. Manaqeb is a genre focused on the praiseworthy deeds and memorable sayings of saints.    

[25]ʿAbbas Eqbal-Ashtiyani, “Mohamad Hosayn Zokaʾ ol-Molk,” Yaghma 14/11 (AH 1340/AD 1962): 517–22; Qasem Ghani, Yaddashtha -ye doktor Qasem Ghani, ed. S. Ghani, 12 vols. (London: n.p., 1980–84); Habib Yaghmaʾi, “Asar va taʾlifat-e marhum Mohamad Hosayn Forughi,” Yaghma 19/3 (AH 1345/AD 1966): appendix.

[26]Mojtaba Minovi, “Rejal: Jaryan-shenasi-ye rejal dar tarikh-e moʿaser-e Iran (Zokaʾ ol-Molk Forughi),” Ravesh-shenasi-ye tarikh-e shafahi 41/42 (AH 1375/AD 1996): 81–100.

[27]Forughi’s Divan includes laudatory prose and poetry—poems mostly in Arabic, prose in Persian—about different Arab leaders of the late Ottoman Empire, including Muhamad ʿAli of Egypt (d. 1848) and Muhamad III as-Sadiq (d. 1882). Forughi noted having met Muhamad III as-Sadiq and given him his biographical dictionary of poets, Tabaqat ol-Shoʿara. See Divan, 121–39. There is a need for a critical biography of Forughi, one that would take into consideration his cultural exchanges and travels.

[28]Mohamad Hosayn Forughi and Mohammad ʿAli Forughi, Büyük İran Tarihi: Safavi, Afşar, Zend, Kaçar şahları ve kayi-i tarihiyyesi, trans. Ömer Halis Bıyıktay (Istanbul: Matbaʿ-i Askeri, 1926). The Persian original was titled Tarikh-e mokhtasar-e Iran (Tehran: Sherkat-e Matbuʿat, AH 1309/AD 1930–31) or The Abridged History of Iran, originally published in 1905. I am grateful to Farzin Vejdani for bringing this translation to my attention.

[29]It was in ʿAbbas Eqbal Ashtiyani’s column “Tarikh-e adabi” (“Literary history”), Daneshkade 1 (April 1918): 8. His footnote stated: Tarikh-e adabiyat-e marhum Zokaʾ ol-Molk Forughi. Eqbal Ashtiyani (d. 1956) was among the first in early-twentieth-century Iran to introduce “literature” and “literary history” as conceptual categories to Persian-language readers.

[30]In a parenthetical note, the Forughi sons wrote, “In full disclosure these biographies, as stated in the preface by the publishers, consisted of disorganized and incomplete rough drafts for teaching at the School of Political Science” (Mohamad Hosayn Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, compiled and prefaced by Abol Hasan Forughi and Mohamad ʿAli Forughi [n.p: Matbaʿ-e Mirza ʿAli Asghar, 1916–17], 242, 310). The contemporary Persian term to describe class notes, used as study guide for exams by students, would be jozve.

[31]Mohamad Hosayn Forughi, ʿElm-e badiʿ (Tehran: Matba‘ah-i Mirza ‘Ali Asghar, AH 1335/AD 1916).

[32]The Berkeley copy has been digitized by HathiTrust Digital Library, accessible here: https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b5069901. Encyclopedia Iranica lists the two works separately as ʿElm-e badiʿ (AH 1333/AD 1915) and Tarikh-e adabiyat (AH 1335/AD 1917). Kasheff, “Forugi,” Encyclopedia Iranica.

[33]This must be a reference to Mirza ʿAli Asghar Amin ol-Soltan, in whose stable Forughi took refuge to escape from the wrath of the shah, who had been led to believe that Forughi had written for the dissident newspaper Qanun (Vejdani, “Purveyors of the Past: Iranian Historians and Nationalist Historiography, 1900–1941,” 149). On Mirza ʿAli Asghar’s biography, see J. Calmard, “Atabak-e Aʿzam, Amin-al-Soltan,” Encyclopedia Iranica, 2011, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/atabak-e-azam.

[34]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 1, 3.

[35]In his entry on Hafez, Forughi mentioned that he was writing a Persian literary history. Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 349.

[36]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 1.

[37]Alexander Jabbari, “The Making of Modernity in Persianate Literary History,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, no. 3 (2016): 418–34; Alexander Jabbari, “Late Persianate Literary Culture: Modernizing Conventions between Persian and Urdu” (PhD diss., University of California, Irvine, 2017); Alexander Jabbari, papers presented at “The World of the Tazkirah: Sources for Study of the Premodern Persianate Lands” conference, University of California, Irvine, 5 February 2016, https://sites.uci.edu/tazkirah.

[38]Fani, “Becoming Literature,” chap. 1.  

[39]Alexander Jabbari has analyzed the importance of formal conventions such as script in making Persian literature appear modern in the early twentieth century. He writes: “Lithography, which allowed for the inexpensive reproduction of handwritten nastaʿliq script, helped popularize printed books among Iranians, who preferred nastaʿliq over naskh.” See “Late Persianate Literary Culture,” 72.

[40]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 3.

[41]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 5.

[42]The Qajar Prince Jalal ol-Din Mirza (d. 1872) was an example of an Iranian nationalist who was ideologically hostile toward Arabic. See Afshin Marashi, Nationalizing Iran Culture, Power, and the State, 1870–1940 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011).

[43]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 9.

[44]Sir William Jones, “An Essay on the Poetry of the Eastern Nations,” in The Collected Works of Sir William Jones, vol. 4 (London: Printed for John Stockdale, Piccadilly, and John Walker, Paternoster-Row, 1807), 544.

[45]Jones’ claim can be understood within a civilizational—as opposed to national—discourse in which Greek literature was being framed as “Western,” though the term Western civilization did not yet exist in the time of Sir William Jones.

[46]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 8.

[47]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 8–13. He writes, “zur-e tāzi bar Pārsi becharbid va kalamāt-e loghat-e ʿArab na yek yek balke dah dad va sad sad dākhel mohāverāt va resāʾel mā gasht zirā ke tamām-e estelāhāt-e ʿelmi rā bāyad az ʿArabi farā-girim.”

[48]Aria Fani, “The Allure of Untranslatability: Shafiʿi-Kadkani and (Not) Translating Persian Poetry,” Iranian Studies (forthcoming).

[49]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 3.

[50]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 12.

[51]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 11.

[52]Forughi’s entry on Hafez includes a note on Hafeziye, the poet’s resting place, and all the changes that different dynasties made to it throughout history. This note is in the context of enshrining Hafez as part of a pantheon of Iran’s seven most distinguished luminaries. In doing so, Forughi also anticipates the foundation of Anjoman-e asar-e melli or the National Heritage Society, which set out to build mausoleums for Persian poets, transforming their resting place into a site of national memory and pilgrimage. Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 349–50.

[53]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 14.

[54]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 15. The field of literary studies has begun to pay more critical attention to the importance of balagha in the conceptualization of literariness in non-European and American cultural contexts. The project “Global Literary Theory: Caucasus Literatures Compared” at the University of Birmingham is focused on the role of balagha in Arabic, Turkish, Persian, and Georgian literature. The project, which includes extensive bibliographies in those languages, may be accessed here: www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/lcahm/departments/languages/research/projects/globallit/index.aspx.

[55]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 15.

[56]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 15.

[57]Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak, “Language Reform Movement and Its Language: The Case of Persian,” in The Politics of Language Purism, ed. Björn H. Jernudd and Michael J. Shapiro (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1989), 81–104.

[58]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 16.

[59]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 334–35. For the ways in which Golestan was read in the Mughal milieu, see Mana Kia, “Adab as Ethics of Literary Form and Social Conduct: Reading the Gulistan in Late Mughal India,” in No Tapping around Philology: A Festschrift in Celebration and Honor of Wheeler McIntosh Thackston Jr.’s 70th Birthday, ed. Alireza Korangy and Daniel J. Sheffield (Wiesbaden, DE: Harrassowitz, 2014), 281–308.

[60]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 19.

[61]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 19.

[62]For the use of colloquialisms in nineteenth-century Persian prose, see Afshin Marashi, “Print Culture and Its Publics: A Social History of Bookstores in Tehran, 1900–1950,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 47 (2015): 89–108. See pages 94–95.

[63]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 22.

[64]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 334–35.

[65]ʿAli Akbar Dehkhoda, Mohamad Moʿin, and Jaʿfar Shahidi, Loghatnameh (Tehran: Daneshgah-e Tehran, 1949), 6:1545.

[66]One instance of adabiyat denoting sciences related to adab is Mohamad Amoli’s fourteenth-century Nafaʾes ol-fonun fi ʿAraʾes al-ʿoyun, ed. Abol Hasan Shaʿrani (Tehran: Islamiya, 1957), 16.

[67]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 23.

[68]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 24.

[69]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 24.

[70]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 25.

[71]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 26.

[72]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 26.

[73]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 69.

[74]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 301.

[75]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 70.

[76]Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 71.

[77]The full list is Rudaki, Ferdowsi, ʿOnsori, Farrokhi, ʿAsjadi, Manuchehri, Abu Hanife, Eskafi, Masʿud Saʿd Salman, ʿOmar Khayyam, ʿAttar, Saʿdi, and Hafez. The last four poets were not included in Forughi’s class notes, but are included in the lithograph copy compiled by his sons (Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 310). Also, the entry on Rudaki is primarily about Ferdowsi and his Shahname and does not include much information about him (Forughi, Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 83–127).

[78]For instance, Badiʿozzaman Foruzanfar wrote Sokhan va Sokhanvaran (Tehran: Sherkat-e sahami-ye entesharat-e kharazmi, 1971), which reads more like a tazkere in the way it has a brief preface followed by biographical sketches of poets and selections of their work. The same scholar also wrote Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Iran: Baʿd az Eslam ta payan-e Taymuriyan (Tehran: Sazman-e chap va entesharat, Vezarat-e farhang va ershad-e eslami, 2004), which is organized not by poets’ biographies but by a dynastic and political history of Iran. Yet both are often classified as works of literary history because they were produced in the same time period.

[79]Mehmet Fuat Köprülü, “Method in Turkish Literary History,” trans. Gary Leiser, Middle Eastern Literature, no. 1 (2008): 53–84. I am thankful to Selim Kuru for introducing me to Köprülü’s work.

[80]Sunil Sharma was among the first to place Persian literary history within a multilingual and transnational framework of historiographical production. See “Redrawing the Boundaries of ʿAjam in Early Modern Persian Literary History,” in Iran Facing Others: Identity Boundaries in a Historical Perspective, ed. Abbas Amanant and Farvin Vejdani (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 51–64.

[81]The following offer one example of each mode of writing used in Forughi’s Literary History: Tarikh-e bayhaqi (tarikh), Tazkera tol-shoʿara (tazkere), Chahar maqale (hagiography), Majmaʿ al-fosaha (tazkere/anthology), al-Hilal (periodical), Tarjoma tol-balaghe (rhetorical treatise), Borhan-e qateʿ (dictionary), Jules Mohl’s introduction to his edition of the Shahname (literary studies), and Azad Bilgrami’s Subhat al-marjan (literary judgment).  

[82]Fani, “Becoming Literature,” chap. 1.

[83]William L. Hanaway, “Is There a Canon of Persian Poetry?” Edebiyat, no. 1 (1993): 3–12.

[84]One example is Naser Qoli Sarli’s recent book Dowre-bandi-ye adabi (Tehran: Nashr-e khamush, AH 1397/AD 2018). On page 19, Sarli writes: “the tradition of literary historiography in Iran has still not released itself from the model of tazkere writing which is based on the biography of poets and writers in sections that are self-contained and unrelated to one another. [This model] does not pay much attention to the history of literary change and the trajectory of literature on its terms. In this vein, accounts of literary history by Orientalists are closer to the concept of literary history [than the tradition of literary historiography in Iran].” Sarli’s purity test ignores the fact that the ideas of literary history and literature are both modern inventions. The discursive ties of Persian literary history with the tazkere genre need to be further analyzed, but certainly not in light of anachronistic criteria uncritically set by modern-day understandings of literary history.

[85]Rita Felski and Susan Stanford Friedman, ed. Comparison: Theories, Approaches, Uses (Baltimore, ML: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).

[86]Fani, “Becoming Literature.” For a list of these periodicals, see Edward G. Browne and Mohamad ʿAli Tarbiyat, The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia: Partly Based on the Manuscript Work of Mírzá Muḥammad ʻAlí Khán “Tarbiyat” of Tabríz (Los Angeles: Kalimát Press, 1983); Mohamad Mohit Tabatabaʾi, Tarikh-e tahlili-ye matbuʿat-e Iran (n.p.: Moʾassese-ye entesharat-e besʿat, 1987); Mohamad Sadr-Hashemi, Tarikh-e jaraʾed va majallat-e Iran (Isfahan: Entesharat-e kamal, 1948). Sadr-Hashemi’s four-volume dictionary of Persian-language periodicals, printed in Iran and its diaspora, is a work of encyclopedic scope. It even includes periodicals printed in Afghanistan although the title suggests otherwise.

[87]I speculate that one of the main reasons Forughi’s Literary History remains unpublished is the fact that the ideas he tried to promote in the nineteenth century have become normative and prevalent in the twenty-first century.

[88]Mana Kia has convincingly attempted to restore our pre-nation-state imagination by analyzing such concepts as origin, place, and land in eighteenth-century Persian-language sources from West and South Asia. See Persianate Selves.

[89]Forughi mentioned the idea of Sabk-e Hendi or the Indian Style of Persian poetry, curiously in the context of Hafez’s poetry, a poet whose oeuvre is thought to have predated the rise of the Indian Style. Forughi’s mention of Sabk-e Hendi is also one of the earliest instances, to the best of my knowledge, of this idea. This questions the tendency to single-handedly attribute the idea of sabk to Bahar. Tarikh-e adabiyat-e Farsi, 348. For a critical examination of Bazgasht as a historiographical category, see Kevin L. Schwartz, Remapping Persian Literary History, 1700–1900 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020).

[90]The following studies exemplify this paradigm: Shamsur Rahman Faruqi, “Stranger in the City: The Poetics of Sabk-i Hindi,” Annual of Urdu Studies 19 (2004): 1–94; Rajeev Kinra, “Writing Self, Writing Empire: Chandar Bhan Brahman and the Cultural World of the Indo-Persian State Secretary,” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2008); Mostafa Vaziri, Iran as Imagined Nation: The Construction of National Identity (New York: Paragon House, 1993). His polemical and dismissive assessment of Bahar notwithstanding, Faruqi inaccurately claims that the term “Sabk-e hendi” was coined by Bahar (although he was right in adding the qualifier “perhaps” to his claim). As Forughi’s Literary History proves, the term “Sabk-e hendi” was in use well before Bahar’s career started. Kinra largely attributes the nationalist ideas produced in early twentieth-century Iran to Bahar and a select group of orientalists. More importantly, both Faruqi and Kinra treat Sabk-e hendi as a bounded and stable category of description when in reality that was not the case in early twentieth-century discussions of stylistic variations in Persian literature. Mostafa Vaziri attributes the rise of literary nationalism in Iran entirely to Edward Browne. The ways in which we have understood the role of literary institutions in ushering in a new conceptualization of Persian language and literature also exhibits the same impulse to overestimate. These institutions were the outcome of decades-long social processes— that included debating and networking—that gave rise to their establishment. One article that critically examines the role of the Academy of Persian Language and Literature is Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak’s “Language Reform Movement and Its Language: The Case of Persian.” For Karimi-Hakkak, the establishment of the Academy was only the culmination—and not the originator—of language reform in its cultural and conceptual sense.

[91]Vejdani, Making History in Iran, 147.

[92]The edited volume History of Iranian Literature represents this trend. In it, Kubíčková (a collaborator on Rypka’s book) writes, “The knowledge of European languages and literatures, western education, with its opening of new possibilities in technology, natural sciences, and the social sciences, and the reflection of all this in everyday life, is for Iranian literature a discovery in the light of which truths accepted as immutable for thousands of years collapse and the existing social order appears as what it is – a mediaeval survival.” Jan Rypka, History of Iranian Literature, ed. Karl Jahn (Dordrecht, NL: D. Reidel, 1968), 362.

[93]Vejdani, “Purveyors of the Past: Iranian Historians and Nationalist Historiography, 1900-1941,” 148.

[94]See the “Introduction” to Hamid Rezaei Yazdi and Arshavez Mozafari, ed., Persian Literature and Modernity: Production and Reception. Iranian Studies (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2019).

[95]Forughi’s critical attitude toward tazkere writers, seen in many parts of his Literary History, is a function of this positivist impulse.

Worlding with Images: Nexus between Art and Anthropology

Mazyar Lotfalian <mazyar.lotfalian@gmail.com>is a scholar of the anthropology of science, technology, and media. He is engaged in public space policy debates and the role that arts play in urban revitalization.

After the events of 9/11, the Iranian filmmaker Mohsen Makhmalbaf released his film, Kandahar. Just in time after the US invasion of Afghanistan, New Yorkers lined up to see this film with great curiosity. Was Kandahar the movie an accurate representation of Afghanistan? Made by an Iranian filmmaker who once was an Islamist revolutionary in Iran and now a political exile, was it a critique of war and the rise of political Islam? Makhmalbaf contended that Afghanistan is a country with no “image.” ­­­Afghanistan’s lack of image (in the media, prior to 2001) has been due to a variety of reasons in the country’s recent history: the stricture and censorship by colonial forces such as Soviet troops, or the Taliban’s ban on image production, photography or painting. In addition, at the international level, there had been very little image production of Afghanistan until the defeat of the Taliban by US forces. Kandahar is a type of story that builds on three main elements, an Afghan diaspora in search of her identity, an assassin fleeing from the US, and a war amputee in Afghanistan.  The film asks: how can we create an image for a country of no-image in the West?

In Kandahar, Makhmalbaf addresses the question of representing or identifying a place at the outset of 20 years of war and destruction. If Alain Renais’ style in his iconic film, Hiroshima Mon Amour,[1] is “false documentary,” I suggest that Makhmalbaf’s is that of “participant simulation,” where real people enter the world of imaginaries to play out alternative meanings that are arrested on the transnational circuits. Makhmalbaf uses a set of techniques or poetics modes of subversions to re-open dialogue and understanding.

If Renais addresses the effect on the level of mnemonic reconstruction, by problematizing facile ways of representing a traumatic experience, Makhamalbaf addresses the reconstruction of places and people by prostheses (modes of externalities or technologies), retracing places through people and experiences, that are no longer whole, identified, and centered. Furthermore, he uses stereotypical images to generate and open dialogues with a contested past.

Kandahar marks the beginning of a new era of image-production for the Islamicate cultures in the transnational landscape. Along with new modes of production and circulation, there is the question of what the images are trying to address. What technological practices, for example, are deployed? In the context of a new Cold War, one must address the question of the political ends of images.

In the post 9/11 world, the Iranian diaspora has created an ecology of images that call for something like anthropology to understand. The Cold War between the US and Iran, which has pushed the two countries into mediatic politics and inhibited real dialogue, also presents the possibility of communication by other means. “Worlding” with images fills this communicative gap. In this article, I go beyond Orientalized and Self-Orientalized images of Iran and show a much more active agency from artists to create a different world.

Transnational Space of Image-making

The space of image-making is heterogeneous. Various practices intersect with politics and aesthetic forms to give rise to images. Here different media types and technologies interconnect to create the condition of possibility of communicating through images. Here people manipulate images in order to present an alternative reality. In worlding with images, artists often contest a reality that is imposed on them by creating an alternative reality or dimension. Anthropological studies of space, since the late 1980s and into 1990s, have explored space as forms of disjunctive cultural flows, “transnational space” or “transnational circuitries” and “diasporic space,” where globalization of culture and production create its particular logic.  Anthropology considers art objects not as bearers of meaning but as mediating social action. To look at Iranian production of visual art in transnational space is to study social action and politicized aesthetics, and by the same token, to study social action is to study visual production.

Specifically, In the 1990s, Iranian cinema became transnational. First, Iranian films circulated at film festivals elsewhere and festivals in Iran brought other work into the country. Then, bit by bit, modes of production ventured beyond the national boundary, moving from the Toronto International Film Festival to Cannes and beyond. For three decades, Iranian cinema went through the thick and thin of reinventing itself and has not stopped. It became a voice for Iran to those in the West who had no firsthand knowledge. It also became space for cultural critique to experiment with cultural codes such as the veil, family relations, and war trauma. At times, what could not be discussed in public spaces could be fictionalized on the screen. Iranian films became a surrogate for a real dialogue between Iran and the rest of the world.

After 2001, Iranian cultural production started to boom, expanding to underground music, painting, photography, and graphic art. These modes of expression built on the success of cinema and in turn have fueled intercultural dialogue. My attempt is to track this transnational expansion: the movement of people across borders, changes in the practices of museums and other institutions, the rise of digital technologies, and to show how all of these merge into a politicized aesthetics. Yet when I began preliminary work on this topic in 2001, the curatorial practice was sparse in the area of the visual culture of the Middle East; I was on the ground as it eventually grew to a large enterprise in New York City, Los Angeles, London, San Francisco, Paris, and Beirut. I have had an ethnographic relationship with many exemplary cases, focusing my discussion on them, yet knowing that I must omit many more.

This study addresses Iranian visual culture in the transnational setting beyond the representational content – whether it is a national cinema, or Islamicate culture, etc. – instead it focuses on what people do with images. In short, image-making tends to create representational values, but it also has a playful value and aesthetic value. The two latter are different in that they are acted upon to generate forms of sociality.

Aesthetics and Politics

Politicized aesthetic and aestheticized politics are symptoms of political shifts. Jacques Rancière connects the uses of political aesthetic to a shift in representational politics that challenges established forms of visibility and invisibility.[2] The contemporary Iranian image production in transnational space is an instance of this political shift, where the aesthetic enters into the political discourse. Iranian image-makers find themselves in the midst of a new Cold War, coping with what I call “meta-political space.” They try to generate expressive modes (poetic) that speak to their experiences of war, displacement, and a desire for new political identity. These expressive modes can become scaffolding for new forms of identity.

Whether structural shifts are in politics or urban structure, Brian Larkin suggests that we should see them not only as architectural and physical, such as roads and bridges, but also in language, accent and emergent cultural patterns. This can also be seen in African films that evoke Diawara’s suggestion about “diasporic aesthetics.”[3] There is also a parallel in “Accented Cinema” that Hamid Naficy suggested a couple of decades ago about a network of diasporic artists who use alternative modes of production to create their work of art.[4]

After Larkin, I interpret “cultural systems” of Iranians and “technologies” together in generating their “cultural ambition.”[5] An obvious example of this cultural ambition, today, can be seen in the Iranian public relation stunt to install artistic rendition of “Cyrus Cylinder” as a giant sculpture in downtown LA in 4th of July, 2017. This is a fusion of aesthetics, materiality, and political publicity that get translated into forms of political dissensus. The reference to an ancient object (the cylinder) is to disrupt and neutralize the portrayal of Iranians as a variation in Muslim signifiers. This neutralization is not necessarily oppositional; Rancière calls it dissensus.[6] “Cultural ambition” is a performative act that functions on this political dissensus.

Objects such as Cyrus Cylinder can have social agency. Alfred Gell points to the social agency of work of art as they mediate social relations, and shows the connection between art and anthropology. Images as much as they are objects mediate social agencies: “I have just provisionally defined the “anthropology of art” as the theoretical study of “social relations in the vicinity of objects mediating social agency” – art object equivalent to persons.[7] I concur with Gell that an art object’s production, circulation, and forms of practices that created it can be taken as a person who embodies experiences and agency to change a course of action. This allows us to understand the social relations that created art, and bestows on it an agency to mediate social relations.  I would add that technology also enhances social agency. Technology frames new sets of social relations rather than just facilitating them.

Iranian “cultural ambition” incarnates in various technological realms as well as politics of identity and fiduciary plans. Digital technologies have dominated the transnational landscape, in terms of circulation of art, production, and formation of new practices. Traditional public spaces such as museums and galleries have been active as well. Furthermore, “underground production” should not be understood literally. For the rest of this article, I discuss how new and old practices come together through aesthetics and politics.

Diasporic Imaginaries and Heterology of Resistance

My first ethnographic exposure to this emergent cultural ambition was formed in New York City around 2001. A group of artists, led by Shirin Neshat, used alternative spaces of production to challenge the mainstream visual culture of Muslims. They played with aesthetics of veils, religious piety, and gender segregation among other things to show how stereotypes can be turned around and be used to invite the audience for critical reflection. This coincided with 9/11 and the beginning of the war in Afghanistan. In 2001, I performed in a “Logic of the Birds” performance (based on Manṭiq-uṭ-Ṭayr, an eleventh-century Persian Sufi poem by Farid-u-din Attar) by Neshat and her collaborators. This was a multi-sensory performance of film, sound, and movement. It was also the beginning of her multi-screen installations. During one of the nights when we were rehearsing, an intense conversation broke out among the performers: should we continue? We had little understanding of, but feared, the Islamophobia that was beginning to surface in a completely new way. The twin towers had just been attacked in New York, a tragic and confusing event. The artist’s local community was very much affected, then later emerged stronger. The event took place in The Kitchen. All shows were sold out, an astonishing debut for a new era for the production of aesthetics and politics.

“Logic of the Birds” was the Ur event of this new era, at least among Iranians. The aesthetics and politics of Iran, Islam, and the West formed a new connection after this event. The US had begun playing a more active role towards Iran, which oscillated between rapprochement and war. This approach was tested differently in Afghanistan. On the one hand, its invasion of Afghanistan unleashed a new era of politics in which the US and its allies took an aggressive stance towards Muslim majority nations. On the other hand, the politics of Islamism began to enter the realm of aesthetics. In the US, while Islamophobic sentiment grew, aesthetic forms from Muslim world became an important cultural consideration in institutions of cultural making, such as museums and festivals.

How can we understand the use of religious themes in these emerging artworks? These earlier cases of politicized aesthetics such as “Logic of the Birds” were ignoring the meaning of scripture, as it is evident in the work of Shirin Neshat. This is to build a new sensible world, not to conceal the real meaning of the original texts but to give the audience a chance to imagine new meaning. As Rancière suggests, the aesthetic of ignorance is to overcome the hierarchy of knowledge and to break away from established rules.[8] The aesthetic of ignoring the established meaning of scripture, hijab, and gender roles is about neutralizing the established rules to open alternative discussion.

To what extent are images, made by Iranian diaspora, forms of protests? I found the notion of dissensus in Rancière important to situate the mediation of images. Dissensus is a political process that resists political litigation. Rancière does not conceive it as a challenge to replace that litigation but to neutralize it. I found the images of Iranians in Iran and the diaspora, including underground production, are best understood as mediating a form of dissensus. For example, Shirin Neshat’s earlier works used the veil and Islamic subjectivities to work within the space of dissensus. Earlier commentators classified her work as Orientalist[9] . Her earlier work is best understood as heterology in political art [which]:

…refers to the way in which the meaningful fabric of the sensible is distributed: a spectacle does not fit within the sensible framework defined by a network of meanings, an expression does not find its place in the system of visible coordinates where it appears. The dream of a suitable political work of art is, in fact, the dream of disrupting the relationship between the visible, the sayable, and the thinkable without having to use the terms of a message as a vehicle….[10]

Instead of focusing on meaning of the images, dissensus and heterology point to the act and performance of the art that in the process destabilize those meanings. In the revolutionary moment, modes of artistic expressions register a kind of traumatized or ruptured society; artists often use their bodies to express forms of affect. In post-revolutionary times, this gets translated into meta-political space, a kind of second-order politics in Rancière’s sense.

Practice, Technology, and Space

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there have been two major changes that have implications on cultural practices. These are the rise of Islam as a political and cultural force and the emergence of the Internet technology that form the context for artist practice. The technological context for the Iranian Revolution of 1979 consisted of mass-media, on the one hand, and cassette player technology on the other hand . A technological shift in circulation and communication had occurred, from one-to-many to many-to-many.

This is a paradigm shift in how content flows, from media-specific devices (like radios or televisions or cassette players) to devices that can run multiple technologies (smartphones, computers). In this shift, the simple boundary between top-down (or state) and participatory media breaks down. In the convergence mode, mobile technologies have enabled individuals and groups to interact in a particular configuration of space, time, and place.

These shifts have led to emergent discursive practices in cultural production. In the realm of the visual, as it happened in the Iranian presidential election of 2009, images flowed from mobile technologies to the Internet and onto different Web-enabled technologies such as YouTube, Twitter, Web blogs, and various social networking sites. Raymond Williams argued for emphasizing social practice when discussing media.[11] The notion of practice fills the gap between individual agency and the state; it situates the opposition in a network of active discourses, expertise, and social movements. I argue that the notion of circulation in new media and theories of representation both are insufficient to address the impact of digital culture on protest art and its effect on the public sphere. I propose a theory of practice that accounts for new forms of social practice that is based on a convergence mode of production. My approach here is to expand the notion of practice (media is always already a social activity) to materiality and technology. In convergence culture, attending to both practice and various mobile technologies helps us avoid easy conclusions such as these are democratic technologies and there are technologies of resistance. Technology as a form of “cultural ambition” is present among Iranian diaspora.

Technology as a frame for advancing Iranian “cultural ambition” emphatically emerged during the 2009 election. The online digital environment provides a transnational space not only for the circulation of images but also, and more importantly, for their production. Political cartoonists and graphic artists (most of whom have gone into exile) especially moved to the online environment to both produce their protest art and circulate it through social networking sites such as Facebook. In addition, after Mousavi’s camp promoted the slogan, “media is you,” amateur graphic artists flourished online, producing political posters. For instance, the Facebook group Iranian Graphic Artists became the repository of 2009 protest posters that self-proclaimed graphic artists, not necessarily professional graphic artists, individually or collectively created and circulated online. Mousavi’s Facebook page itself was created by an Iranian who lived in Germany; because the campaign created no Facebook page, this poster became the Facebook voice of the presidential candidate. Many digital posters appeared after the election, signed with authors’ first names or pseudonyms. Internet sites such as United4Iran.org or rahesabaz.net (the Green Path) were set up by individuals, but are now mostly gone from the Internet and untraceable. In all of these examples, circulation and production merge online.

In what follows, I analyze the image-making in the digital environment through one prominent example. Two important icons were the images of Neda Agha Sultan and Sohrab Arabi, protestors who were killed by government forces immediately after the election of 2009. The original pictures showed the two protestors on the street, in action, but later artists used these abstracted images and further worked on them and subjected them to various social and technical practices.

Neda was shot within days after the election. As she was walking with her music teacher and observing a street demonstration, Neda was suddenly shot from the rooftop of a building. She fell to the ground and a medical doctor who happened to be nearby offered assistance, putting his hands on her chest to stop the bleeding. Within seconds Neda died. The first images were in a mobile video of her actual death. Other images quickly followed, and Neda’s image moved from the grainy mobile video to artistic experiments in a variety of media: painting, sculpture, cartoons, a slide show, and collage.[12] Two years later, a Google search of her name yields more than 675,000 results; some of the YouTube images have been viewed more than a million times. Neda’s image appeared in perhaps more online forms than any other political image of the post-2009 protests.

One of the earliest renditions of Neda was made by the caricaturist Bozorgmehr Hosseinpour, who based his image on the raw mobile video. This was arguably the first abstraction of the actual image, the first aestheticized (though representational) image of Neda circulated online. Using the Internet to circulate street art is an emerging way of linking the street to the virtual world; for example, Banksy, the British graffiti artist, has used online photos of his site-based art to expand his audience globally. In Iran, cartoon and caricature artists—such as Mana Neyestani, who mostly worked for newspapers—started using the online digital environment to spread their art prior to 2009.

The place that Neda’s image occupies in the collective imaginary in the West could be compared to that of the Tank Man from Tiananmen Square in June 1989, the young Chinese man who stood in front of a tank to protest the massacre of hundreds of people a couple of days earlier. A few professional news photographers took his picture and smuggled the film out of China. The difference in technological materiality between the two events, Neda’s shooting, and the Tank Man’s protest has been explored by Patterson and Whitehouse.[13] The photographers of the Tank Man had to physically transport their image out of China, and, more importantly, the state could control the access of Chinese viewers to this image. So, while the Tank Man became a symbol of freedom in the West, his image remained out of the mass media and carried no political meaning in China. In contrast, Neda’s case happened in the age of the Internet and YouTube, collaborative work platforms where nonprofessional photographers could transfer, share, manipulate, and appropriate images easily. Thus, Neda Agha Sultan became the iconic image of the post-2009 election both in and outside Iran.

One of the main organizing affective devices for these visual works has been the Karbala paradigm, the martyrdom of Imam Hossein (the third Shiite imam) as a meta event of injustice. At the time of the revolution, activists used the allegory of Karbala to liken the shah to Yazid, who committed horrendous injustices. Allegorical references to the martyrdom of Imam Hossein were central to political aesthetics both historically and especially after the revolution of 1979.[14] After the revolution, though, its uses could no longer be distinctly associated only with religious groups. In the aftermath of the election of 2009, these allegorical references became more contested. There is more diversity in their usage. A few artists created YouTube collages in which they have tried to challenge the secular versus religious division, targeting the state’s exclusive right to use the Karbala paradigm. As Mousavi tried to revive revolutionary mottos from 1979, artists and activists found the online digital environment to be a space of incarnation of aestheticized politics where they could assert that state-sponsored political slogans deviated from their original meanings. Mousavi’s revival of the paradigm, they could say here, was an act of proliferation and subversion of religious symbols.

One of these materials is a video collage by Reza Deghati.[15] Consider the image from the video shown in Figure 5, in which Neda’s face is superimposed on every woman’s face in the frame. This frame is taken from a popular rendition (widely circulated, online and offline) of a late-19th-century depiction of the Imam Hossein’s household in Karbala. The original popular rendition shows only the tents and the women who are facing Zuljinah (the imam’s horse). Zuljinah is bringing the news of the imam’s death to the household; it is the marker of tragedy and injustice. In the original drawing, to the right of Zuljinah, there is no one, just the landscape. In various collage techniques that Deghati applied to the original, he added the face of Neda to the scene. In addition, farther to the right in this image, modern anti-riot forces (a collage of actual images of riot police in Tehran during the 2009 election) are attacking protesters. The video continues, including various images of individuals who were killed during the post-election demonstrations of 2009. Although the images are not animated—they are laid as wallpaper or tableaux in a coffee-house painting style (this genre of painting, usually displayed in public spaces, sets a mood of nostalgia and remembrance of the past)—the YouTube format creates an animation effect with familiar warm colors of red and yellow. The elegiac music that complements the images is a mix of songs that are associated with mourning during the commemoration of the Karbala event.

Media Practices and the Transformation of the Public Sphere

In the aftermath of the election of 2009, particular social practices merged with technology to simulate another revolution in Iran. Images became live: sometimes they became objects with which Iranians in Iran and its diaspora expressed their opposition and imagined a democratic future, and sometimes they became detached from what was happening in the streets of Iran. To outside viewers, such a digital revolution can eclipse what actually happens on the streets. The transnational audience is likely to forget street life in favor of what they see, read, and hear online—to read the online material as mirroring actual experiences. After the Arab Spring, the street social movement in the United States reemphasized the importance of location, as in Occupy Wall Street.

It is important, however, to understand an emerging form of image-making, through digital and internet platforms which frame media practices. Some emergent elements of image-making are worth summarizing here. First, the digital environment encourages collaborative work while relying on a dispersed mode of production (people connecting from many geographical areas). Secondly, the digital processing makes simulation – that is, imitating a particular form or model in a computer environment – possible, which in turn, adds a new dimension to representational art. Thirdly, simulation creates the possibility of what W. J. T. Mitchell calls an image-thing, a concept that speaks to how contemporary media is addressed by its audience.[16] In this concept, viewers (including other artists) have opportunities to interact with the image. I would argue that because these images are produced in a convergent mode of production, their signification is always emergent—that is, they can be religious, secular, and subversive, depending on the context and audience. In this way, a representational analysis is insufficient.

Underground

One of the arenas of artistic activities in Iran, has been referred to as “underground” after the similar space that existed in the Soviet Bloc, before its fall. Underground is often characterized as an illegal product: those that do not pass government censors have to relocate to space outside the purview of the authorities. If the previous Cold War created underground music to create a counter-culture, the new Cold War has produced an “underground” that cannot simply be located physically, nor in terms of its value as a political opposition to the state. Much of the Iranian underground is transnational. A digital archive of Iranian cultural product virtually exists and defies a physical space.

I argue that the cognitive and affective categories of Iranian culture that lead to forms of art are essential to understanding this new Cold War condition. I situate artists’ work not in resistance and oppression but in the everyday experience of ideology. I use the important distinction that Peter Sloterdijk has made between cynical reason and kynical creative process of self-making.[17] Below, I explore the creativity of the underground in Iranian cultural categories such as khalvat and rendi.

The transformation of the publics after the Iranian Revolution of 1979 is essential to understanding the relationship between the public and private realms. One of the earlier linguistic works on affect and space in Iranian culture is conducted by William Beeman; for example, as a socio-linguist, he argues for an emotional frame of Iranian interactional situations.[18] In this frame, the outward (zaher) and inward (baten) world of persons together define the quality of interaction. Baten is recognized as more pure and sincere, and zaher as more superficial.

Architecture provides another spatial metaphor that is rooted in mysticism. In Islamic mysticism, the concept of khalvat (roughly translated as solitude) is central to something closer to the underground in the Iranian cultural context. Khalvat is a spatial concept that signifies a form of withdrawal from the business of public spaces to privacy of the centered self, a meditative act towards truth (haq) by way of secrecy. There are two kinds of khalvat, khalvat of zaher and that of baten.[19] The khalvat of zaher is simply when one removes oneself from the gathering of people. The khalvat of baten is mediation of secrets of life and witnessing truth. In the second form, there is a sense of zen-like existence, where one witnesses the appearances but one’s heart is with a higher meaning of existence than only the appearance of things. This cognitive discourse of knowledge is manifest in architecture as well. Maymaneh Farhat[20] argues that in Islamic architecture, khalvat (that structurally plays between zaher and baten) is the focal point and sanctum towards the multiplicity of existence, which is often achieved in dome design. In this sense, the underground, affectively, is a space of creativity that removes the artists from guise of government regulation to the emancipated space where the artist freely experiments with possible forms and norm.

There is also another relevant term, rendi which chiefly appears in poetry of the 13th century poet Hafez.[21] I argue that rendi is an important term to understand the Iranian underground. Hafez uses rendi as an embodied cognitive practice to break out of the bonds of established rationality. Rendi means “slyness” and a rend person is sly. The characteristic of rendi is associated with detachment from conventional forms of social existence that are associated with zaher. Rendi is linguistically structured in the Persian language from a range of “street smarts” to a form of creative act that ultimately leads to higher moral value.

This existential move is to bring back the Dionysian laughter to a concept of modernity that is caught between secularism and Islamism. As Sloterdijk argues, cynicism is the false consciousness of the Enlightenment. He wants to counter the cynicism of everyday life with a kynicism of laughter.[22] This is an argument for a place for the body and senses in the enlightenment discourses– not self-denial.

Although it is not accurate to situate the underground movement as a function of neoliberal ideology, in forms of “human rights” or “democracy,” and “resistance” to totalitarianism, this movement is threatened to be appropriated by a neo-liberal agenda. The point is that one has to be attentive to both sides: on the one hand, it is an aesthetic move for existential insertion of laughter into everyday life; on the other hand, it can be appropriated by the culture industry as a “freedom movement.”

One of the foremost ethnographic examples of underground production is the phenomenon of Mohsen Namjoo. He is musician and lyricist who has begun his career in literal underground spaces of Iran, later moved to the US to establish himself as a transnational artist. His work embodies what I am theorizing here. Namjoo himself historicizes his work and situates it within the evolution of poetry in Iran. He claims that people first doubted they could do anything with Persian new poetry – i.e., Nima Yushij’s poetry. He suggests that with the publication of Barahani, Chalangi, and Royai who have paved the way for new ways of looking at poetry this mindset started shifting.  All-the-sudden there were words that convey feelings (tabayoni) rather than describing the feeling (tozihi).[23]

In a series of haiku-like evocative words, he conveys an affect – or what he calls tabayoni words. The effect is the condition of modernity for Iranians – constantly in translation and transition. The dilemma for him is not to be in denial of this condition but to work through it. In this example, the underground is where this denial which is the condition of post-revolution Iran, is restored.

It is interesting and relevant to Namjoo’s work that a genre of writing emerged in the sixties Iran that was a combination of caricature and text – karikalamature.  This genre was associated with Parviz Shahpoor who used to write in a comic magazine, Tofigh. Karikalamature was a kind of satire of social criticism pointing at this bricolage of norms and forms. Namjoo’s songs are very similar to this bricolage. He combines not only traditional poetry and new poetry, but also music, such as jazz, blues, rock, and Persian classical. He suggests that he has broken the connection between the rhythm and lyrics.[24]

Works such as the ones produced by Namjoo vacillates between the cynicism of everyday life and the creative force that karikalamature exemplified. I have pointed to the creative aspect of his work that has universal aspiration, and how it is grounded in Iranian culture as well. It remains to be seen how they will evolve in dialogue with diaspora politics. In addition, the underground as a self-descriptive and existential referential category remains important whereas I would argue against it having an ontological place in opposition to Islam.

Central to practices of art-making are modes of representation and exhibition. Curating, the practice of bringing together artwork (and now most cultural events) can teach us how to trace the source of the money as well as the discursive practices of representing art. To understand curation is to understand the practices for the distribution of sensible, which, according to Rancière, means that what is rendered visible and invisible follow a particular regime of representation.

Curating Iran

Curating cultural productions, that include a range of music, poetry and many visual events, became the hallmark of public spectacle connecting Iran and the West. Cultural diplomacy during the Cold War between Iran and the West began taking shape after September 11, 2001, when George W. Bush promoted the idea that the Iranian diaspora had become a defining force in this dialogue. This was the beginning of a range of institutional shifts that indicated that a thaw between the two countries had begun. Museums became interested in contemporary Iranian art. Galleries in New York, London, and Los Angeles began exhibiting Iranian visual art. Universities turned over a new leaf in favor of renewed Iranian studies. Such programs, wiped out in the 1980s, began to re-emerge with the financial support of the Iranian diaspora.

Part of my argument here is that worlding with images happens in the context of institutional and curatorial practices. Specifically, curating visual culture has become central to a dialogue between Iran and the West. I use curation to refer to a process of cultural production in the late capitalist condition where people bring together individual forms of expression, critical discourse, and politics of aesthetics in a public space. To “cure” and “care” are etymologically similar. The idea is to bring seemingly unrelated objects, texts, and people together to curate/care/create work of art. In the context of Islamic(ate)/Islamic political challenges to western secularism, visual culture is a site where diasporic Iranians articulate emergent identities. Literal sites of this work include venues of Western cities: galleries, museums, university halls, screening rooms, and foundations. Earlier, central themes of the visual material included the veil. Artists post-revolutionary experiences blurred Western interests in Islam and Iran.

This was a crucial moment in curating Iran and Islam and an ambiguous one. I think the early phase in the shift in distribution of the sensible (i.e., politics of aesthetics inclusion and exclusion) in the US was important not because Islamic(ate) signifiers appeared in the contemporary art form, which has happened before, but because a new confluence of experts (art historians, gallery owners, composers, videographers) have come together to collaborate in this new shift in representation from Iran and other Muslim-majority countries.  No longer the insistence by museums, galleries, and performance spaces on historical aesthetics of the past, no longer familiar Oriental program music, veils, domes, minarets, turbans, and scimitars; instead we now have contemporary cutting-edge avant-garde experimentalism.

Two major exhibitions in the US, first in 2004 at MOMA NYC, called “Without Boundary,”[25] and a second in 2015 at LACMA (Los Angeles), called “Islamic Art Now,” reinforced Islamic art as a category still operative in the contemporary curatorial imagination, if newly open to an anthropological understanding of revelation as an access to alternative norms for living in the contemporary world.  Of course, Islamic art can be modern in the sense that forms of Islamic aesthetic traditions have extended into the modern moment. But can Islamic art be also contemporary in the sense of addressing new problems of a changing world?  I have already been using Marshall Hodgson’s term “Islamicate”[26] to distinguish the religious category Islam as a temporal and cultural category, an aesthetics in Rancière’s terms that changes over time, a metapolitical set of discourses.[27]  Here I want to also invoke, with modification, those of Shahab Ahmed for upholding Islamicate as an important category that includes revelation.[28]  I would modify this to revelability: revealing other norms and forms as sources for the contemporary imagination. Anthropological literature has begun to address this emergent space of art that includes experiences of religious faith[29] or uses Islamic(ate) cultural settings where cultural forms and the politics of the everyday come together to suggest alternative visions.

For example, in the first exhibition of 2004 at MOMA, among the artists included in this exhibition were Shirin Neshat, the Atlas Group/Walid Raad, Shazhia Sikandar, Marjane Satrapi, and Shirana Shahbazi. Their works represented a wide range of style and degrees of more or not-particularly-political signifiers. The funding came from a range of sources, including ethnic foundations and individual donors such as the Persian Cultural Foundation and the Namazee family.  Viewers can immediately recognize the kinship among these disparate works, connecting it to contemporary political situations in the Muslim world or the US. And yet the styles of representations are so diverse that one must ask what brought them together under the same roof. The work of, for example, Shirin Neshat or Marjane Satrape are so nuanced and textured that one cannot only attribute them to politics. I argue that they share an emergent aesthetics that combines Islamicate and other forms to create a potent form of critique.

I suggest that curation has become part of a wider assemblage of artistic production, archiving and the underground. By around 2010 on, Iranians both in the diaspora and Iran, have shown interest in archival projects and databases as forms of collective cultural memories. In both the diaspora and Iran, the interest partly stems from the fact that the revolutionary regime has put the pre-1979 history under a meta-narrative of state and thus facilitated the erasure of possible stories. The hauntology of this past, not so distant, is a productive space: oral histories; biographies; memoirs; and now with the advent of the internet, we have raw audio/visual material of the pre-revolution in terms of film, Youtube uploads, pictures, and music. 

Conclusion

The research for this project was spread over a long period (10 years) while moving from one city to another for teaching jobs beginning in New York in 2001 and ending in California in 2007. Methodologically, this project relied on participating in the works of art, playing the role of curator, observing others, and conducting many interviews, in the US, Iran, and other parts of the Middle East. The conclusions will result in a book but this article addresses some critical points that will be presented.

This research builds on some of earlier works on visual cultures of Iran. The study of visual culture in relation to Iranian politics came to maturity after the revolution. By adopting semiotic approaches authors such as Fischer and Naficy focus on the socio-cultural meaning of images rather than the literal interpretation of images.[30]

First, the work of Michael M. J. Fischer on the Iranian revolution and semiotics of posters, stamps, and words in the revolution is significant. In addition to this, Fischer’s later work on Iranian cinema uniquely established continuity between cinema and culture. Secondly, the work of Hamid Naficy that began as semiotics of Iranian cinema and media, later focused on the history of Iranian cinema. One major emphasis on his work was the transnational nature of cinema and media, particularly modes of production and circulation. By 1990s he argued that there were new forms of practices arising in transnational settings. This work, here, expands on what Naficy has done, focusing emergent practices (from accented mode to cultural ambition and digital technologies).

Asking questions concerning emergent forms and styles, this research focuses on the role of technology. How does technology frame culture and give rise to new forms? To this end, in the book, I will explore how religious ritual transforms with technology and how autoethnography becomes stylistic preference in the context of digital technology. I argue that technology gets appropriated for advancing cultural ambition.

Since the early 2000s, the work of Iranian visual culture has been significant culture-making practices in transnational settings. These practices have merged with digital technologies to advance a cultural ambition unprecedented in the contemporary history of Iranians. This cultural ambition has also been merged with political spaces. Technologies and different political articulations have framed and challenged artistic productions. Artists, like anthropologists, have to understand their politics of representation.

I have been arguing that aesthetic practices in knowledge production are key in understanding the Middle East. As an anthropologist, I would like to highlight the parallel between the anthropological practice of ethnography and the artistic practices of social, political, and conceptual art. This work situates the artistic production of Iranians in its transnational context where emergent forms of aesthetics and curatorial practices merge with artists’ experience of the diaspora. The result vacillates between the meta-political appropriation of politicized art and creative practices of critical art.

[1]Marguerite Duras, Hiroshima, Mon Amour, directed by Alain Renais (1959; France: Argos-Films), Film.

This article is based on my forthcoming book, What People Do with Images: Aesthetics, Politics, and Production of Iranian Visual Culture in Transnational Circuits. In Press, Sean Kingston Publishing, UK.

[2]Jacques Rancière, “The Aesthetic Dimension: Aesthetics, Politics, Knowledge,” Critical Inquiry 36, no. Autumn (2009): 1-19.

[3]See Manthia Diawara, African Cinema: Politics and Culture (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.

[4]See Hamid Naficy, Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking, ed. Hamid Naficy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 2001.

[5]See Brian Larkin, Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria (Durham: Duke University Press), 2008.

[6]Jacques Rancière, “The Aesthetic Dimension.”

[7]Alfred Gell, Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 7.

[8]See Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible, trans. Gabriel Rokhill (New York: Bloomsbury, 2004).

[9]Jaleh Mansoor, “Shirin Neshat,” ArtForum April (2008), 365.

[10]Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, 63., 63.Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, 63.

[11]Raymond Williams, “From Medium to Social Practices,” in Marxism and Literature (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 153-64.

[12]Reza Deghati, “Neda of Ashura.” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mv9ehsW6PN8&feature=player_embedded#.

[13]Margaret Jones Patterson and Virginia Whitehouse, “The Power of Tank Man Versus Neda: How New Media Ironic Images Penetrate Censorship and Indifference,” (Unpublished work, 2009).

[14]Mazyar Lotfalian, “Aestheticized Politics, Visual Culture, and Emergent Forms of Digital Practice,”International Journal of Communication 7, (2013): 1371-90.

[15]Reza Deghati, “Neda of Ashura.”

[16]See W. J. T. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005).

[17]See Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).

[18]William O. Beeman, “Emotion and Sincerity in Persian Discourse: Accomplishing the Representation of Inner States,” International Journal of Socio-Linguistics 148 (2001): 31-57.

[19]Khosrow Zafarnavaie, “Khalvat in Islamic Mysticism (Khalvat Dar Erfan E Islami),” Professional Journal of Religion and Mysticism (faslname takhasosi e adian va erfan) 7, no. 25 (2010/1389).

[20]Maymanah Farhat, “Khalvat: Towards Meaning,” The Third Line (2014), <www.thethirdline.com>.

[21]See Daryoosh Ashouri, ed., Mysticism and Rindi in Poetry of Hafiz (Tehran: Markaz, 2002).

[22]Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, xii.

[23]These observations are taken from Mohsen Namjoo’s personal notes from his workshop at Stanford University, Persian Studies, 2009.

[24]Ibid.

[25]See Fereshteh Daftari, Without Boundary: Seventeen Ways of Looking (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2006).

[26]Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

[27] Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics 12.

[28]Shahab Ahmed, What Is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015

[29]Keneth M. George, Picturing Islam: Art and Ethics in a Muslim Lifeworld (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).

[30]See Michael M. J. Fischer and Mehdi Abedi,  Debating Muslims: Cultural Dialogues in Postmodernity and Tradition (University of Wisconsin Press, 1990); see also Naficy, Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking.

Foucault and Epicureanism of the Iranian Revolution

Yadullah Shahibzadeh <yad79@hotmail.com> took his Bachelor, Master and PhD from the University of Oslo. He taught and researched at the same university for many years. Shahibzadeh is author of The Iranian Political Language: From the Late Nineteenth Century to the Present (2015), and Islamism and Post-Islamism in Iran: An Intellectual History (2016). He expects to publish his new book, Marxism and Left-Wing Politics in Europe and Iran in 2018.

 

Introduction

Following Hegel and Marx, many students of the history of modern philosophy have called Immanuel Kant the philosopher of the French Revolution.[1] They  claim “it was the French Revolution that activated the latent political dimension of Kant’s philosophy…”[2] Similarly, there are students of modern Iran who argue that the Iranian Revolution activated the latent political dimension of Michel Foucault’s thought, although they may disagree on the content, meaning, and scope of that dimension.[3] Rather than resolving the problem of whether or not the Iranian Revolution activated the latent political dimension of Foucault’s thought, this article examines Foucault’s complex relation to Marx and Marxism as the backdrop of his response to the Iranian Revolution.

Foucault ascribed a grandiose significance to the Iranian Revolution, but he can barely help us understand the nature of this revolution, its politico-intellectual underpinnings or its local and international significance. Rather than the process of subjectivity and moments of subjectivation, Foucault’s concern was subjectification, a process through which individuals are constituted as subjects whose subjectivities are expressed through objectification, exclusion, and marginalization of the other. Rather than revolutionary consciousness or the science of revolution revealing the dominant ideology, Foucault deals with how these seemingly opposite theoretical stances are part of epistemic knowledge and discursive practices of every period. After his first book in 1954,[4] Foucault had never been interested in any systematic investigations of what erroneously or correctly is considered as emancipatory politics. Rather than politics and individual and collective emancipation, he is concerned with power and government of the individual and people. However, he saw the Iranian Revolution as a possible opening toward a full-fledged emancipatory politics against the existing government of the individual and people locally and globally. Foucault was perhaps the last great European intellectual who was convinced of the existence of an us constituted by a common history toward a common destiny. He described the Iranian Revolution as an uprising  against “the weight of the entire world,” and as “perhaps the first great resurrection against a planetary system, the most modern form of revolt.”[5] This description implies the universality of an us in need of revolutionary leadership to transform it into a global we.[6]  Whereas Foucault was “discovering” this Revolution as an opening toward a “great transformation,” European Marxists, as masters of universal solidarity, failed to employ the simplest method of theoretical universalization to locate the Revolution within our common humanity and destiny as the concrete transformation of the us into the we in this event.

In the early 1950s, without knowing Marx very well, Foucault became a Marxist.[7] A decade later, while Louis Althusser, his former teacher, was promoting Marx’s science of history as an epistemological break with ideology,[8] Foucault was arguing that Marxism was a product of the nineteenth century epistemological arrangement.[9] Again, more than a decade later, Foucault saw the Iranian Revolution as verification of his intellectual convergence with Marx’s thought. My contention in this article is that while this universal us had always been present in Foucault’s work, it was in the 1970s that he realized that his us was the same as Marx’s us. But what Marx did and Foucault had never done, the inference of a revolutionary we from us. Unlike Althusser’s return to Marx through a  rigorous reading of his work, Foucault’s return to Marx is very peculiar. He returns to the sources that shaped the universal us in Marx, i.e., Epicurus and the Epicurean tradition of thought. Foucault claims, in his later studies, that the rule know yourself (gnothi seau­ton) is subordinated to the principle of care of the self (epimeleia heautou).[10] This claim is an endorsement of Marx’s reading of Epicurus, who in turn dealt with the dilemma that Democritus had experienced, “The knowledge that he considers true is without content, the knowledge that gives him content is without truth.”[11]

In the process of reconciliation with the Epicurean Marx, Foucault understood the Iranian revolution within the planetary system in the same way that Epicurus understood atoms within the straight line, as both elements and principles, with the capacity for deviation and attraction expressing their individuality and universality.[12] First, I discuss Foucault’s fascination with Marxism. Second, I examine his apparent departure from Marxism. Finally, with emphasis on 1978-1982 lectures, I examine his return to Marxism.

  1. Alienation and de-Alienation

Until the late early 1940s, rather than an intellectual factor Marxism remained a political force in France. Describing the late 1940s’ French philosophical mode, Althusser claims, “Our philosophers had Descartes and self-evidence on their side, the simple act of the lucid mind, and ‘the great tradition of French Philosophy.’”[13] While not taking Hegelian philosophy seriously, this “great philosophical tradition” saw Marxism as a perverted version of Hegelianism. In the early 1950s, thanks to a new generation of French thinkers interested in Hegel, phenomenology and Marx, the French intellectual scene was entirely changed. For the young students and teachers of philosophy such as Foucault, Francoise Lyotard, and Louise Althusser, the question of truth had become “a question of history.”[14] Lyotard would argue “truth is defined in its becoming, as the revision, correction, and surpassing of itself- a dialectical operation which always takes place within the living present (lebendige Gegenwart).”[15] To liberate the subject from the transcendental presuppositions that excluded historical time and concrete social reality, these young French intellectuals challenged the Cartesian thinking subject through the Hegelian-phenomenological conception of truth. In their academic and public life, these young students and teachers had the backing of a new generation of French interpretative authorities including Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean Hyppolite,[16] Maurice Merleau Ponty, George Canguilhem[17] and Georges Bataille. These interpretative authorities had received their philosophical training from Alexander Kojeve’s Lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind (1936-1939). The interest in Hegel’s phenomenology was followed by a passion for Marx’s conception of history, the dialectics of master and slave, the concept of labor, alienation, self and class-consciousness and class-struggle.  For Sartre, Descartes-Locke and Kant-Hegel represented two significant moments of modern philosophy. But Marx was the culmination of this philosophy. Sartre wrote: “These three philosophies become, each in its turn, the humus of every particular thought and the horizon of all culture; there is no going beyond them so long as man has not gone beyond the historical moment which they express.”[18] Through Hegel, the new generation of French thinkers began to see the great philosophical value of Marx’s conceptualization of history, labor, and alienation. They learned from Hegel and Marx that the subject was more than “an abstract epistemological placeholder” that attained true knowledge, but a “human being rooted in the social, political and historical world.”[19]  With Hegel came Heidegger who argued that the possibility of knowledge depends on the subject that produces its object.[20] Heidegger conceptualization of existence as “an activity of endless transcendence” implies the reliance of man’s essence on his existence,[21] which calls into question the essential self or :and constitutes the subject within his socio-historical world. Whereas the subject’s self-understanding depends on his understanding of his socio-historical world, his actions are not predetermined by this world. The subject’s capacity to interpret his inherited situation enables him to project a new future, liberated from the limits of his present situation. Thus, man’s interpretation becomes the guardian angel of his freedom enabling him to decide the courses of his actions toward his own and his society’s freedom. Reflecting on his youth, Foucault claims that the intellectual horizon of his generation as students was limited by “Marxism, phenomenology, and existentialism.”[22] This limited intellectual horizon, shaped by the existentialist Marxism, inspires the young Foucault to develop an existential-psychology as a theoretical base for the advancement of psychiatry. He hopes that his existential-psychology plays the same role in psychiatry, that physiology has played in medicine: “Or, la psychologie n’a jamais pu offrir à la psychiatrie ce que la physiologie a donné à la medicine.”[23]

Toward an Existential-Psychology

In his Maladie mentale et personalité (1954), Foucault studies the conditions under which an illness is defined as mental illness and examines types of relationship which can be established between mental and organic pathology.[24] He argues that there is no similarity between illness of the body and mental illness, because whereas the body can be decomposed into its elements before its spirit constitutes a whole.[25] Hubert Dreyfus writes in his comments on Foucault’s Mental Illness and Psychology: “In Foucault’s accounts, social contradiction causes alienation, alienations causes mental defenses, defenses cause brain malfunction, and brain malfunction causes abnormal behaviour.”[26] The book Dreyfus is commenting on is a complete revision of Maladie mentale et personalité, published in 1962. However, according to the main thesis of the original book which is maintained in the revised version, awareness of social contradictions will lead to eradication of social alienation, and thus the disappearance of psychological alienation and mental illness. But since society refuses to relate mental illness to its own contradictions, it turns on the mentally ill individuals, alienates them from their fellow human beings, deprives them of their social, legal, and human rights, and then subjects them to the power of the doctors.[27] For Foucault, the behavior of the mentally ill is both the expression of his social existence and a protest against the condition of his existence, which reduces him to a mere thing, an object of observation and analysis. In this way, mental illness is a defense mechanism against social contradictions producing social and psychological alienation.[28] This means, the social alienation of the mentally ill is not a result of his or her illness, but the source of his mental illness. Thus, the healing of the mentally ill depends on whether his or her social environment is free from contradictions or not.[29] The task of psychology is uncovering of the existing interconnections between the state of man’s alienation and his socio-historical reality as the context within which he develops his pathological behavior toward mental illness. Foucault aspires to make this existential psychology a true science and a theory of emancipation from mental alienation.[30] He challenges psychoanalysis’ construction of mental illness as the expression of the mentally ill’s failure to deal with his reality. He argues that psychoanalysis’ conceptualization of mental illness prevents the mentally ill to make any efforts to understand his illness as a phenomenon within the existing social practices and historical conditions. Psychoanalysis deprives the mentally ill to discover that his illness is an expression of the contradictions within the real condition of or his or her existence while presenting this reality as normal and instructs the mentally ill to come to terms with the existing environment.[31] What psychoanalysis forgets, according to Foucault is that it is the alienated reality which hides itself in the consciousness of the mentally ill.[32] Foucault explains schizophrenia, for instance, as a result of man’s experience of a self that has inaccurate consciousness of the social life and its contradictions, of the economic exploitation and class-struggles. Schizophrenia is a consequence of a world which forces man to produce new technologies but does not allow him to see these products as the result of his own activities. Otherwise man could exert his control over the way these technologies function.[33] “Le monde contemporain rend possible la schizophrénie  non [pas] parce que ses techniques le rendent inhumain et abstrait; mais parce que l’homme fait de ses techniques, un tel usage que l’homme lui-même ne peut plus s’y reconnâitre.”[34] Since Foucault considers his psychology of alienation to be a continuation of Marx’s theory of alienation, he situates mental illness between the experience of the contradictions of the existing reality and the consciousness of these contradictions.

  1. Alienation as a Construct

In 1961, seven years after the publication of Maladie mentale et personnalité, Foucault publishes his groundbreaking book Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l âge classique. In 1962, he publishes Maladie mentale et psychologie, a revision of Maladie mentale et personnalité, which includes a summary of Folie et déraison. Whereas in the original version, hospitalization of the mentally ill is regarded as the expression of his or her legal alienation, deprivation of all freedom and rights that a normal person enjoys, in the revised version, the institutionalization of madness becomes the “scientific field” or the condition of possibility of psychiatric practice. Foucault seeks, in the original version, a better understanding of the relationship between the state of social alienation and mental illness to defend the rights of those confined in the hospitals. But in the revised version, he investigates how psychiatric practices used confinement and hospitalization as a mean of silencing the voice of the mad to establish psychiatry as a scientific discourse on mental illness. Whereas in the first version, Foucault tries to constitute psychology as the theoretical base of psychiatry to recognize mental illness as the expression of a society alienated from itself, in the second version he tries to remind psychology and psychiatry of their historicity. In 1963, Foucault does a similar historiography on somatic medicine.[35]

The second version of Maladie Mentale indicates Foucault’s change of focus from the social and psychological condition of the emancipation of the mentally ill to mapping the institutional process preventing his integration into the society and reducing him to the object of knowledge of the doctor. Foucault’s departure from Marxism rests on this move from looking at mental illness as a reality whose precise and objective characteristics guarantee the truth of its conceptualization, to looking at it as a construct whose “scientific conceptualization” is constituted and validated by particular social and discursive practices. By focusing on the historicity of the concept of mental illness and challenging the claim of its universal validity, Foucault distances himself from Marxism. He argues that, because of their failure to participate in the process of “production, circulation, or accumulation of wealth,” since the middle of 17th century, the mad, the poor, the unemployed, the sick and the libertine were considered a threat to society. As a result, they were subject to exclusion and confinement.[36] After the French Revolution, the mad individual was separated from this dangerous group and subjected to moral rehabilitation to develop his dependency, his sense of guilt, his gratitude and humbleness supposed to be the characteristics of the normal feeling.[37] For Foucault, whereas psychology claims to have shown the truth of madness, the history of madness reveals the truth of psychology.[38] Despite Foucault’s attempt to go beyond the phenomenological and Marxist interpretation of madness and their conceptualization of mental illness, he remains faithful to what Paul Ricoeur called the hermeneutics of suspicion as uncovering of a state of reality that covers up the truth of that reality.[39] But Foucault’s remarks, in 1966, on Marxism, made him an enemy of Marxism.

At the deepest level of Western knowledge, Marxism introduced no real discontinuity it found its place without difficulty as a full, quite comfortable and, goodness knows, satisfying form for a time (its own), within an epistemological arrangement that welcomed it gladly ( since it was this arrangement that was in fact making room for it) and that it, in return, had no intention of disturbing and, above all no power to modify, even one jot, since it rested entirely upon it.[40]

Sartre wrote in response to Foucault: “Marxism is the target, it is a matter of establishing a new ideology, the final dam that the bourgeoisie can erect against Marx.”[41] Foucault’s response to Sartre, came as a comment on his La Critique de la raison dialectique, as “the magnificent effort of a nineteenth-century man to conceive of the twentieth century. In this sense, Sartre is the last Hegelian, and even, I would say the last Marxist.”[42] He claims in an interview after the publication of The Order of Things, that unlike Sartre’s generation that “had a passion for life, politics and existence” his generation has a passion for concepts or systems.[43] Through his historical investigations Foucault becomes aware of the fact that “Before any human existence, there would already be  a discursive knowledge, a system that we will rediscover.”[44] However, Althusser who shared Foucault’s passion for concepts and systems remains Marxist and assumes that Foucault mistakes “humanist Marxism” or Hegelian Marxism for real or scientific Marxism.[45] An Archeology of the Human Sciences as the subtitle The Order of Things is meant to remind us that beneath the old city, that may be the object of our history, there might be an archaic city ready to be discovered, the disappearance of which was the condition of the appearance of that old city.[46] Thus, the knowledge of the archeological is the condition of possibility of the knowledge of the historical. Foucault’s archeological approach to human sciences is an investigation of the epistemological field or the epistemic criteria which determine what counts as knowledge and what does not in every period. A new episteme is never a continuation and development of the previous episteme toward the truth, but a discontinuation of and a rupture with the previous episteme or epistemological field. Foucault defines episteme as “the total set of relations that unites, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures…”[47] The archeological level of knowledge or episteme is the condition of possibility of conceptual knowledge. For instance, the episteme of the renaissance determines that the world is occupied by signs in need of interpretation. To know in this episteme means to interpret.[48] Hence, the episteme of the classical age the seventeenth and eighteenth century) affirms dependence of knowledge on the table as a means of representation and comparison through decomposition of a body into simple elements and its reconstruction into more complex combinations.[49] According to this episteme, God created the world and expected man to discover its order through representation, which he obeys and uses language to represent things according to their allocated places in the world. The episteme of the classical age was about the discovery of the laws of nature as the foundation of knowledge; it was about the intersection of “nature and human nature.” Classical episteme did not generate a “science of man,” because human beings were absent from the table of representation.[50]

Man had to wait for the modern episteme to design language as a theory of signification to constitute him as both the subject and object of his knowledge, namely the condition of possibility of the Hegelian and Marx’s discourses. Whereas in the pre-modern epistemes man saw himself as an object among others objects, his new position as the subject and object of his knowledge in the modern episteme enables man to discover his capacity to change his place vis-à-vis others worldly objects. In the modern episteme, language indicates man’s finitude and limitation to grasp the truth of the world. This limitation leads man to both accept the world as it is and discover its hidden possibilities, through a search for the origin and analysis of his mode of being. “It is in the analysis of that mode of being,” which man becomes the philosophical foundation of modern knowledge.[51] As a representative of the modern episteme, Kant clarifies not only man’s finitude with regard to space and time, but also his “empirico-transcendental” character whose search for origin creates the condition of possibility of history.[52] It is within the discourse on the “empirico-transcendental” character of man that Hegelian phenomenology examines the transformation of in itself into for itself, and Marx examines man’s transformation from his current alienation to his future de-alienation.[53] Foucault argues that Marx’s concept of history based on his conceptualization of labor as “the real production of real life,”[54] does not question the concept of man upon which the idealist philosophy rests.[55] By man, Foucault means the subject and object of knowledge, the supposed maker of his own history. This “man” is, for Foucault, a result of the modern arrangement of knowledge, “an invention of recent dates” which may disappear when a new arrangement of knowledge appears.[56]

Contrary to Althusser’s distinction between science and ideology, Foucault argues that science has no privilege over ideology because it is the modern episteme, which determines what counts as ideology or science. Surprisingly, Althusser describes  The Order of Things as a contribution to a general theory of ideology.[57]  This remark receives a response from Foucault in the early 1970s when he distinguishes between the Marxism of “Althusser and his brave comrades” from the Marxism of the French Communist Party.[58] Foucault’s academic work in the 1970s which includes The Order of Discourse (1970), Discipline and Punishment (1975) and The History of Sexuality Part One (1976), could be understood as reconciliatory moves toward the anti-bureaucratic Marxism of Althusser and Sartre despite the long distance between their theoretical presuppositions.

III. The Iranian Revolution and the Universal Transformation

As the Iranian Revolution was reaching its peak, at the end of 1978, Foucault gave a long interview to Duccio Trombadori, a journalist from L’ Unità, the Italian Communist Party’s newspaper. When he is reminded that he had been absent from the political debates in the 1960s, Foucault claims his absence from those debates does not make him less experienced politically. He refers to the student movement in Tunisia in the late 1960s as a valuable political lesson and the main source of his political experience, which taught him, that every political movement should be situated within a global perspective and dealt with in relation to what is happening in other parts of the world.[59] The Tunisian students, and young men and women who exposed themselves to serious dangers of being murdered, tortured or imprisoned for the simplest political acts such as writing or distributing a leaflet, or advocating student strikes in the late 1960s, were the most valuable political experience of Foucault’s life.[60] These young Tunisian students who were mostly Marxist taught him that a different Marxism is possible, a Marxism that was totally different from the French academic Marxism of the early 1960s and the Marxism of the socialist countries which he had witnessed while staying in Poland. He argues that the Marxism of these young Tunisians was astonishingly radical, violent, intense, spectacular and real because Marxism was for them not only a means of analyzing reality but “a kind of moral force, an existential act that left one stupefied.”[61] Foucault argues that the dissimilarity between the domesticated Western and East-European Marxism and the Tunisian way of being Marxist convinced him to take an interest in the political debate again. “It wasn’t May of ’68 in France that changed me; it was March of ’68, in a third-world country.”[62]

The interview with Trombadori is taking place after Foucault’s first visit to Iran and after the publication of his most debated article regarding the Iranian revolution, What are the Iranians dreaming about?[63] A few months earlier, in September 1978, he describes the revolutionary movement in Iran the embodiment of the “political will” and the expression of the “political spirituality” of the Iranian people. However, Foucault does not mention Iran in the interview. Trombadori’s reason for the interview is that after “a decade of an almost uninterrupted enthusiasm for Marxist “language,” many people are circulating Foucault’s vocabulary on “micro-physics of power,”[64] which challenges the emancipatory claim of the Marxist discourse.[65] Foucault claims in the interview that he “had only produced a history of power.”[66] As mentioned above, Foucault’s new interests in politics is a result of his Tunisian experience. By experience he means a changing and transformative determinant. He also refers to the processes of writing his books as transformative experiences because he does not write his books to communicate what he already knows but to enter into the experience of learning something new which can change him radically.[67] In addition to his Tunisian experience which taught him the existential and political way of being Marxist, Foucault claims in another interview with Farès Sassine, conducted in 1979, that his reading of Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope coincided with the Iranian Revolution. Bloch discusses the religious origin of the idea of revolution, at the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of Renaissance, because in his view the religious dissidents of the time had faith in the possibility of this-worldly revolution. So, when he hears about the uprising in the name of religion in Iran, he tries to establish a connection between what was happening in Iran and Bloch’s conceptualization of the revolutionary hope. Foucault learns from the connection between the Iranian Revolution and its religious eschatology that without a revolutionary hope there will never be a political revolution.[68] In The Principle of Hope,  Bloch argues that Marxism does not distinguish between the cold stream of analysis of the historical and socio-economic condition and its ideology, from the warm stream of the revolutionary expectations.[69] For Bloch, the cold stream of Marxism as the science of struggle forms a unity with its liberating warm stream which connects “the debased, enslaved, abandoned, belittled human being” to the proletariat toward their common emancipation. Bloch sees the Marxist construction of communism an expression of the warm stream of Marxism because the struggle for emancipation needed a home for the de-alienated humans of the future. Bloch equates hope with work, whereas work was the means of man’s transformation from animal into human, hope is the means of his second transformation from his alienated condition into his de-alienated condition in the future.[70]

 

Foucault’s fascination with Bloch’s conceptualization of hope, his Tunisian experience, his historiography of discursive practices and power, and finally, his approach toward the Iranian revolution were not contradictory but consistent with what he had perused throughout the 1970s, that is, the reconciliation of the realm of theory with the realm of practice. In the same vein, Foucault changed his focus from the discourse on micro-physics of power to a discourse on governmentality and governing and who is qualified to govern. Foucault claims that the Tunisian experience made a decisive political impact on him. Now, we can raise the question: can we expect any transformative impact from his experience of the Iranian revolution on him? In my view, Foucault approached the Iranian Revolution as a spectator rather than actor and with only one thing in mind: verification of the revolutionary hope of the Iranian people toward emancipation. Foucault’s final work, both published books and lectures are about the redefinition of the concept of political power renamed as the art and forms of governmentality, which I consider as significant supplements to the Marxist theory of state and ideology and analysis of a new form of imperialist structure. Since the early 1990s or earlier, this imperialist governmentality has enchanted former “leftists,” “radical,” and “revolutionaries” to the extent they gladly serve the states within the domain of this imperialist governmentality against all other states and people resisting this governmentality. Foucault’s investigation of how the subject of governing has been constituted is a supplement to Lenin’s conceptualization of political power in The State and Revolution and Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatuses.

 

Foucault and the Concept of Governmentality

In the middle of his lectures on Territory, Security, Population (1977-1978), Foucault claims that he preferred “a history of governmentality” as the course’s title.[71] In these lectures, Foucault challenges misconception of the state whether as a “cold monster confronting us,” or as a

means reproducing the relations of production. Foucault argues that these misconceptions have made the state to look like more important than it truly is because the danger is not the state intrusion into society (étatisation) but the art of governmentalization. This art of governmentalization of the state, discovered in the eighteenth century, saved the state from various crisis and revolutions and as a result, is “the only real space of political struggle and contestation.”[72] The idea of the government of the state as the political form of the state by the prince began at the same time as man’s government of himself, his soul, his conducts and his children.[73] The concern of government is men’s relations to wealth, resources, territory, fertility, customs, habits, and “ways of acting and thinking.”[74] In the 1978-1979 lectures which coincide with the Iranian Revolution, Foucault describes the art of government as what the state should be, its raison d’État. The art of government is an arrangement of the things which recognize the state as “a discontinuous reality” whose chance for survival depends on its strength, wealth and capability of protecting itself against external and internal threats that may put its existence in danger.[75] These are the main character of the state before the emergence of the neo-liberal art of government.

For Foucault, the neo-liberal art of government is not a disciplinary society, mass consumption society dominated by commodities, spectacle, and simulacra, but a home to “dynamic of competition” and “enterprise society.”[76] It replaces human labor by human capital and devalues Marx’s analysis of value without contesting it. Marx argued that the logic of capitalism transforms the concrete human labor into abstract labor power “measured by time, put on the market and paid by wages.” As the concrete human labor is cut off from its human reality to fit into the logic of capital, labor is reduced into “the effects of value produced.”[77] Thus, instead of challenging Marx’s critique of the logic of capitalism neo-liberal art of government argues that labor is only “a factor of production” which can be activated by investment.[78] It argues that Marx mistook “[t]he abstraction of labor, which actually only appears through the variable of time” as the product of real capitalism, whereas this abstraction of labor was only a construct put forward by Marx’s contemporary economic theory.[79] With the epistemological transformation from the classical economy into the neo-liberal economy, the “domain of objects, the general field of reference of economic analysis” such as mechanisms of production and exchange are transformed into “the study and analysis of the way in which scarce means are allocated to competing ends,…”[80] This transformation changes the worker possessing labor power into “an active economic subject” whose wage is not the price of his or her labor power, but an income resulted from the investment of his human capital.[81] As the neo-liberal practice transforms human labor into human capital and every worker into a capitalist, the art of neo-liberal governmentality is focused on the question: who can or should govern?

To discuss this question,  Foucault revisits the notion of the care of the self (epimelia heautou), a subject elaborated extensively by Epicurus and Epicureans who believed that  “Every man should take care of his soul day and night and through­out his life.”[82] Foucault argues that modem philosophy “neglected the notion of care of the self in its reconstruction of its own history.” Despite the fact that there has been a similar amount of texts and documents on “the care of the self” as there is on “know yourself,” modern philosophy gave a privileged position to know yourself (gnothi seautou).[83] As a result of this neglect, philosophy has become a “form of thought that asks what it is that enables the subject to have access to the truth” and determines “the conditions and limits of the subject’s access to the truth.” The neglect of the care of the self has led modern philosophy to ignore spirituality as “the search, practice, and experience through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth.” According to Foucault, spirituality is the price the subject pays for “access to the truth” because spirituality says that the subject can have “access to the truth” provided that he experiences transformation from himself into “other than himself.” This means, without spirituality, the subject does not have the right to the truth. Whereas the presence of truth indicates that the subject has transformed himself into something new, modern philosophy and science speak of truth only in terms of the “activity of knowing.”[84] For Foucault, the privileged position of Marxism and psychoanalysis lies in their effort to remind the subject that the truth which can liberate him is related to his being. Because of their preoccupation with “the subject’s preparation for access to the truth” and his “spirituality as a condition of access to the truth,”  Marxism and psychoanalysis are more concerned with the care of the self than other branches of knowledge.[85] The relationship between the truth and transformation of the subject is reflected in the relationship between the cathartic use of  “know yourself “and the political use of “know yourself” on the one hand, and “the political use and the cathartic use of care of the self,” on the other hand.[86] The interaction and interconnection of know yourself and care of the self, constitute “tekhne tou biou (the art of living).” As in the Christian asceticism and monasticism of the third and fourth centuries, the art of living is about how one transforms his own self to have access to the truth.[87]

Foucault argues that Descartes and Kant saw the relation of the subject’s spiritual transformation to the truth as a paradox indicating “what we cannot know is pre­cisely the structure itself of the knowing subject” and “the condition of spirituality for access to the truth.”[88] Foucault relates this same function of spirituality to Demetrius of Phalerum’s conceptualization of effective-relevant and ineffective-irrelevant modes of knowledge. Whereas the former mode of knowledge can be transformed into prescriptions, the latter mode of knowledge lacks the quality of being transformed into prescriptions. Whereas, the relevant-effective knowledge can change “the subject’s mode of being,” the irrelevant-ineffective knowledge cannot make any impacts on “the subject’s mode of being.”[89] We find the same function of spirituality in Epicurus’s concept of phusiologia which stands in opposition to paideia as a mode of knowledge which produces only eloquence and suits people who look for their personal interests. Paideia does not reflect on logos or reason but performs with phones or sounds.  Epicurus calls the performer of this mode of knowledge phones ergastikous who instead of making reason the object of his reflection, reflects on phones to impress the masses, and engages in “conceited chatter with others.” Against phones ergastikous, Epicurus says, “You must practice philosophy for yourself and not for Greece,” because philosophy is “the genuine practice of the self. “[90] Contrary to paideia, phusiolo­gia prepares (paraskeuei) the subject for “whatever circumstance” he encounters in life. As Epicurus defines it, phusiolo­gia prepares the subject to resist “every impulse and temptation” which comes from the external world because it enables him “to remain stable” and overcome all disturbances which prevent him to attain his aim.[91] The impact of phusiologia on the subject is his “boldness and courage” to resist “beliefs that others wish to impose on him, but also against life’s dangers and the authority of those who want to lay down the law.”[92]

The final impact of phusiologia is autarkeia making the individual subject autarkeis, a subject that depends only on himself, needs nothing other than himself, and is content with himself since he is the source of all possibilities, experiences, pleasures, and delights. The aim of Epicureanism is absolute mastery over the self. This mastery cannot be achieved through savoir but through connaissance of nature, insofar as this knowledge leads the subject to overcome fears from nature and gods, and transforms himself into “a free subject” capable of finding within himself permanent and impeccable serenity and joy.[93] A physiologist is not the one who merely knows nature, but the one who uses his knowledge of nature to transform himself into a free subject and uses parrhesia as the technic of mediating true and relevant knowledge to his disciple. Epicurus says that “I would rather speak in oracles about the things useful to all men” than give “my approval to popular opinion.”[94] Thus, the subject who tries to use his true knowledge is different from the one whose search for being under­stood, recognized and approved by everyone, leads him to succumb to the dominant opinion. A truth-seeker who is looking for acceptance by everyone cannot change his mode of being.[95] Epicureans consider “the most speculative knowledge of physics” as effective and relevant knowledge because it is “part of the subject’s practice on himself” and because it transforms the subject.[96] Here, Foucault refers to the interrelationship between the principle of care of the self, and know yourself.[97] In response to the Greek tradition of education, “Socrates advised Alcibiades to take advantage of his youth to take care of himself: “At fifty it will be too late.”[98] Epicurus’ response to this is “It is never too early or too late to take care of one’s soul. We should therefore practice philoso­phy when we are young and when we are old.”[99]  Philosophy is for Epicurus, the practice of the care of the soul throughout one’s life.[100] Now, the question is: who can or does have the time to practice philosophy or care of the soul or the self? In order to have time to care of themselves, the Spartans “entrusted the cultivation of their lands to slaves instead of keeping this activity for themselves” because “[t]aking care of oneself is a privilege; it is the symbol of social superiority, setting one apart from those who have to concern themselves with…a trade in order to live. The advantage conferred by wealth, status, and birth is expressed in the fact that one can take care of one­ self.”[101]

That is why, “taking care of the self (epimeleisthai heauto),” should not be understood as an advice that teachers gave to their disciples to refrain from making mistakes in their private life. They were educating them about a range of “complex and regular activities” which govern the people in their domain.[102]

In December 1978, in the climax of the Iranian revolution, Foucault writes to  L’ Unità, the Italian Communist Party newspaper, to inform them about his willingness to discuss with Italian Communist intellectuals the situation of “the capitalist and socialist states,” “the success of the revolutionary movements in the world,” the “strategy of the parties of Western Europe” toward the “development everywhere of the apparatuses of repression and institutions of national security” and finally “the difficulty in connecting local struggles with the general stakes being waged” internationally.[103] The subjects proposed by Foucault for discussion give a clear picture of how he sees the world while the Iranian Revolution is unfolding. For Foucault, the world is in a deep economic crisis, and the crisis is nearing its decisive moment because the conflict between “rich” and “poor” nations, industrialized and underdeveloped countries have coincided with the emergence of “a crisis of government” in the developed nations. The letter to L’ Unità indicates that Foucault is convinced that the world needs a decisive response from the revolutionary forces. Of all the crises, Foucault emphasizes the crisis of government because government as “the set of institutions and practices by which people are ‘led’, from administration to education” is in a deep crisis. Foucault sees crisis everywhere, in the capitalist as well as in the socialist world because the “techniques, and methods” that have guaranteed the “government” of people, thus far, do not function anymore and people cannot tolerate “the way they are led.”[104] For Foucault, this crisis of government resembles “the period following the Middle Ages,” which resulted in the “entire reorganization of the government of people,” the emergence of  “the great nation-states,” “authoritarian monarchies” and “the administration of territories.” Foucault argues that this reorganization generated the new “way of managing and governing people, both in their individual relations and in their social and political one” and  considers the situation in 1978-1979  to be “not very far from a similar period,” because all old relationships are called into question, and the people who are in the position of governing are unable to see or manage and govern the ongoing changes. He observes, “We are, I believe, at the beginning of a huge crisis of a wide-ranging reevaluation of the problem of government.”[105] Because of his understanding of the crisis of government in the late 1970s, Foucault sees the Iranian Revolution as a historic opportunity for the revolutionary left to put forward its own strategy, but the left missed the opportunity. Foucault’s argument is similar to Lenin’s remark that “it is not enough for revolution that the lower classes should not want to live in the old way. It is also necessary that the upper classes should be unable to rule and govern in the old way.”[106] Foucault’s understanding of the revolutionary situation in Iran can be compared to Rosa Luxemburg’s understanding of the 1905 Russian Revolution and her efforts to convince the German workers to consider this Revolution “as their own affair, …. as a chapter of their own social and political history.”[107]  Luxemburg tried to convey the same message to the German workers in 1918. But as the German workers were preoccupied with their own “distorted expression of the socialist class struggle,” she failed in both cases. For Luxemburg, the failure of the 1917 Russian Revolution to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat as the advancement of the bourgeois democracy, was caused partly by the German and international proletariat’s infidelity to the “proletarian revolution in an isolated land, exhausted by world war, strangled by imperialism…”[108] The German and international proletariat failed to see their common destiny through the Russian Revolution.

The common destiny is what Moses Mendelssohn and Immanuel Kant are preoccupied with when they are asked to reflect on the question What is Enlightenment? Because they recognize, according to Foucault, “that they belong to the same history.”[109] To Foucault, Kant’s reflection on the question of Enlightenment indicates that the critical ontology of modernity is not a theory, a doctrine, a body of knowl­edge through which we can understand our current condition, but “an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life” which includes in its critique of our social being both a “historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us” and “experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.”[110] This philosophical ethos is a critical attitude which not only analyzes and discovers the limits of our being but also makes it possible to go beyond those limits.[111] According to Foucault, this critical attitude is not transcendental, but “ge­nealogical in its design and archaeological in its method.” The aim of the ar­chaeological method is not the identification of “the universal structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action” but revealing the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do. The genealogical aspect of this critical attitude will help us to reveal the contingencies that have generated our present condition and mode of being, and the possibilities of going beyond our present “being, doing, or thinking.”[112] This is the meaning of transformation, whether general or specific. Foucault expected the Iranian Revolution to be the beginning of a general transformation.

 

Conclusion

As the Iranian Revolution “failed” to fulfill his expectation regarding the general transformation of the global system and the crisis of government, Foucault returns to “the specific transformations” of “our ways of being and thinking,” of our “relations to authority, relations between the sexes” and of our conception of “insanity and illness.” He describes these transformations as a result of the interaction between the “historical analysis and the practical attitude,” which in his view are much preferable than the totalitarian politics which in the name of  “a new man” have justified “the worst political systems” of the 20th century.[113] A few years earlier, Foucault was advising his audience to relinquish the issue of the intrusion of the state into civil society, because the real danger lies in the art of governmentalization of the state. But Foucault’s list of the transformations signifies the “advantages” of this art of governmentalizations over other political systems which he deems totalitarian. Since the early 1990s, the lists of such transformations have rationalized the preoccupation of almost all scholars of modern history and politics of the Middle East with two seemingly interconnected questions: who is “for or against the Enlight­enment” in the Middle East and, who should govern in this region, seculars (left versus liberal or neo-liberal) or Islamists (radical versus moderate)?  Foucault referred to the former question as an “intellectual blackmail,” a result of “the historical and moral confusionism that mixes the theme of humanism with the question of the Enlightenment.”[114] Whereas the first question has brought about historical and moral confusionism, the second question has generated various types of political opportunism. The combination of the historical and moral confusionism and political opportunism have constituted the main principle of an ideology which in the name of democracy and human rights has rationalized the most perverted form of governmentalization of the states and societies of the Middle East. This ideology does not allow commentators and analysts of modern Iran to examine or interpret the Iranian Revolution as a story or event whose importance does not lie in its closing act or its immediate results but “in its opening up new horizons for the future.” According to Arendt, for Kant, the most significant aspect of the French Revolution was “the hope it contained for future generations.”[115] The scholarly works on the Iranian Revolution have rarely been interested in touching this particular aspect of the event. Foucault had never tried to write a systematic history or analysis of any political events of historical significance. For him, politics was not an object of systematic analysis but transformative acts of human collectivities against forms of domination shaping our mode of being, seeing, thinking and doing, which he had been analyzing throughout his academic life. Without knowing anything about the details of the universal structure and Epicurean aspects of the Iranian Revolution expressed in its ideology, inspired and cultivated by Marxism, Foucault tried to universalize the Revolution in order to become its spectator-actor. Retrospectively, he realizes that he had never been involved in the act of the Revolution and seems content with his spectator-actor involvement with a community of spectator-actors in France which in his view has brought about specific democratic changes.[116] Since its outbreak, the Iranian Revolution has been a local and global a transformative event, a universal point of reference which cannot be reduced to the actions and views of a selected number of its actors or spectators. Similar to the French and Russian Revolutions, the Iranian Revolution indicated a rupture with the existing discursive and political order, but it did not fit in Foucault’s research program. 

 

[1]Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 36.

[2]Fehér Ferenc, ed., The French Revolution and the Birth of Modernity (Los Angeles: University of California Press 1990), 204.

[3]Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, Foucault in Iran: Islamic Revolution after the Enlightenment (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016).

[4]Michel Foucault, Maladie Mentale et Personalité, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954).

[5]Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault (London: Faber&Faber, 1992), 287.

[6]Eribon, Michel Foucault, 261-262.

[7]Michel Foucault, Remarks on Marx: Conversation with Duccio Trombadori (New York: Semiotext(e) 1991), 51.

[8]Louis Althusser, Pour Marx (Paris: La Découverte, 2005), 82-83.

[9]Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Vintage, 1994).

[10]Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de France 1981-82

(New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2005), 11-12.

[11]Karl Marx, The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature (PhD. diss.), Part I, section on Difficulties Concerning the Identity of the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, https://archive.org/stream/Marx_Karl.

[12]Marx, The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, Part II, Ch. I, section on The Declination of the Atom from the Straight Line.

[13]Louise Althusser, The Spectre of Hegel (London: Verso, 1997), 173.

[14]Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 63.

[15]Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, 64.

[16]Hyppolite’s Studies on Hegel and Marx exerted immense influence on Foucault and he inherited Hyppolite’s Chair of The History of Philosophical Thought at the Collège de France.

[17]Canguilhem, who had mentored the most celebrated French thinkers of 20th century such as Althusser and Derrida, remained Foucault’s soul defender when he was under attack in the late 1960s.

[18]T.Rockmore, Heidegger and The French Philosophy ( New York: Routledge, 1995), 23.

[19]Rockmore, Heidegger and The French Philosophy, 48.

[20]Rockmore, Heidegger and The French Philosophy, 50.

[21]R.Kerney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 31.

[22]Michel Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel (London: Continuum, 2000), 176.

[23]Foucault, Maladie mentale et personalité, 13.

[24]Foucault, Maladie mentale et personalité, 1.

[25]Foucault, Maladie mentale et personalité, 12.

[26]Michel Foucault, Mental Illness and Psychology (California: University of California Press 1987), XVI.

[27]Foucault, Maladie mentale et personalité, 15-16.

[28]Foucault, Maladie mentale et personalité, 101-104.

[29]Foucault, Maladie mentale et personalité, 108.

[30]Foucault, Maladie mentale et personalité, 110.

[31]Foucault, Maladie mentale et personalité, 106-109.

[32]Foucault, Maladie mentale et personalité, 110.

[33]Foucault, Maladie mentale et personalité, 86.

[34]Foucault, Maladie mentale et personalité, 89.

[35]Michel Foucault, Naissance de la Clinique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963).  

[36]Foucault, Mental Illness and Psychology, 67-68.

[37]Foucault, Mental Illness and Psychology, 73.

[38]Foucault, Mental Illness and Psychology, 74.

[39]Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 27.

[40]Foucault, The Order of Things, 261-262.

[41]Eribon, Foucault, 164.

[42]Eribon, Foucault, 161.

[43]Eribon, Foucault, 161.

[44]Eribon, Foucault, 161.

[45]Louis Althusser, For Marx, 28.

[46]Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, 111.

[47]Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge (London Routledge 1995), 191.

[48]Foucault, The Order of Things, 26-31.

[49]Foucault, The Order of Things, 74-75.

[50]Foucault, The Order of Things, 311.

[51]Foucault, The Order of Things, 335.

[52]Foucault, The Order of Things, 330-331.

[53]Foucault, The Order of Things, 327.

[54]Karl Marx, Early Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994), 138.

[55]Foucault, The Order of Things, 322.

[56]Foucault, The Order of Things, 387.

[57]Macey, The Lives of Foucault, 197.

[58]Macey, The Lives of Foucault, 171.

[59]Foucault, Remarks on Marx, 133.

[60]Foucault, Remarks on Marx, 134.

[61]Foucault, Remarks on Marx, 135.

[62]Foucault, Remarks on Marx, 136.

[63]Michel Foucault, À quoi rêvent les Iraniens?” Le Nouvel Observateur, no. 727, 16- 22 octobre 1978, 48- 49.

[64]Foucault, Remarks on Marx, 15.

[65]Foucault, Remarks on Marx, 16.

[66]Foucault, Remarks on Marx, 17.

[67]Foucault, Remarks on Marx, 27.

[68]Michel Foucault, Entretien Inédit avec Michel Foucault 1979, Assassines, Le Blog de Farès Sassine,

http://fares-sassine.blogspot.no/2014/08/entretien-inedit-avec-michel-foucault.html.

[69]Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, vol.1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996), 209.

[70]Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 210.

[71]Michel Foucault, Territory, Security, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-78 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009),144.

[72]Foucault, Territory, Security, Population, 144.

[73]Foucault, Territory, Security, Population, 127.

[74]Foucault, Territory, Security, Population, 127.

[75]Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 4-5.

[76]Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 146-147.

[77]Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 221.

[78]Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 220.

[79]Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 221.

[80]Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 221.

[81]Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 223.

[82]Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-82

(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 9.

[83]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 12.

[84]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 15.

[85]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 29.

[86]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 174.

[87]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 178.

[88]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 190.

[89]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 237.

[90]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 239.

[91]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 240.

[92]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 240.

[93]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 241.

[94]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 242.

[95]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 242.

[96]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 243.

[97]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 491.

[98]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 494.

[99]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 492.

[100]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 493.

[101]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 493.

[102]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 493.

[103]Foucault, Remarks on Marx, 175.

[104]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 176.

[105]Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 177.

[106]V. I. Lenin, Collected Work, vol. 19 (Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1977), 222.

[107]Rosa Luxemburg, Reform or Revolution & The Mass Strike (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2008), 165.

[108]Rosa Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution, Ch. 8, “Democracy and Dictatorship.”

[109]Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 33.

[110]Foucault, The Foucault Reader, 50.

[111]Foucault, The Foucault Reader, 50.

[112]Foucault, The Foucault Reader, 46.

[113]Foucault, The Foucault Reader, 46-47.

[114]Foucault, The Foucault Reader, 45.

[115]Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 56.

[116]Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy.  See 58-63 for Kant’s conception of actor and spectator.

Queering the Iranian Nation: Be Like Others and Resistance to Heteronormative Nationalism

 

Dedicated to the life-affirming work of Maryam Khatoon Molkara (1950-2012)

 

Introduction

Tanaz Eshaghian’s 2008 documentary Be Like Others simultaneously messages entrenched stereotypes about the Islamic Republic of Iran, but also moves beyond a cursory exploration about the life of trans Iranians living in the present-day country. The film offers the viewer opportunities for reflection about the role of gender, sexuality, whiteness,[1] and belonging in nation-building broadly, and in the post-1979 landscape of Iran, in particular. Eshaghian’s work as a filmmaker follows a longer legacy of Iranian artists pushing back against hegemonic-governmental control of the narrative of Iranianness, extending to the late-Qajar era through contemporary times. The film closely follows the stories of several trans Iranians, particularly Male-to-Female trans persons who are undergoing the Iranian regime’s four- to six-month process of medical and psychological therapies ending with partially subsidized sex reassignment surgery (SRS). Throughout the film, the viewer catches glimpses of contemporary Tehran with flashes of urban life with the usual hustle and bustle of cars, skyscrapers, and more specifically, chador-clad women. Huge murals of Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei amidst revolutionary heroes and the Iran-Iraq war martyrs puncture the narratives of the trans persons, signaling cues about expected gender roles for men.[2] Amidst these images of the pious, brave, and pure, Be Like Others focuses on the personal spaces and intimate relations of the trans protagonists, which works in counterpoint to the stereotypical images of masculinity throughout the film as these trans individuals were born male.

 

Despite the focus on the experiences of the trans persons, Iran’s gender binary system reverberates in nearly every conversation, landscape, and visual representation in the film, especially as regulated by the Islamic Republic. In multiple scenes, which I explore in depth below, the discussions center on making the trans person fit into the mold of heteronormativity as dictated by the Islamic state.[3] Thus, Be Like Others complicates post-1979’s project of nation-building through a narrative of heternormativity by countering this representation of citizen-subjects as gender and sexuality conforming thereby “disrupt[ing] the political order by binding audiences to stories that are open not only to interpretation, but also to political and cultural negotiations.”[4] Eshaghian’s Be Like Others showcases the Islamic Republic’s homophobia and transphobia by allowing the viewer to know the trans subjects through their own descriptions of their gender and sexuality identities, and how the state and cultural customs disrupt their connections to their hometowns, families, and desires to pursue education, jobs, and living spaces. Thus, gender and sexuality stand out as part of a network of self-identity and livelihood and not a singular issue contrary to the government’s approach towards these complexities. Benedict Anderson’s concepts of nostalgia, romance, and a sense of belonging to a particular region and cultural heritage of the world in Imagined Communities (1991), is a particularly useful point of entry to discuss the project of nation-building in Iran starting in the late 18th-century with a peak in the mid to late 19th-century. The nation as an “imagined community” is “an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”[5] The Iranian regime’s acceptance of post-SRS trans Iranians as citizen-subjects presupposes the “imagined community” of heteronormative Iran.

 

With the “imagined community” in the backdrop, that is, a collective of heteronormative, patriarchal and religious nationalists looming over the citizens, the film focuses on the stories of Iranians seeking SRS. The film emphasizes that they are in this process because they want to remain in Iran and must undergo the procedure of transformation in order to live with equal rights and access to the resources of the nation, dignity, and safety. However, as these narratives unfold throughout the film, the viewer realizes that the trans Iranians participate in “passing” as female because in order to its members to remain Iranian citizens, the nation requires that they ascribe to the gender binary system. In this regard, I will elaborate on the intertwining legacies of the role of gender and sexuality starting in the late-Qajar and Pahlavi regimes, which then established networks of medical-legal-religious governmental interventions in the lives of its subjects, so that Iran could stake a nationalist claim on the world stage in line with European modern nation-state building.[6] Afsaneh Najmabadi reminds us that, “Iranian state-formation is an on-going, fractious, and volatile process, which—more than three decades after the 1979 revolution—continues to shape and reshape, fracture and refracture, order and reorder what we name ‘the state.’”[7]

 

This effort to modernize Iran through gender and sexuality transformations mimicked a Victorian European nationalist turn in the early 1800s as Iranian and European interactions gained strength. While not solely a consequence of colonialism and European influences in Iran, gender and sexuality became increasingly entangled in the narrative of nation-building complicated by the white gaze. This “white mimicry” as M. Shadee Malaklou points out, reveals that “Iranians who narrate their same-sex or trans sexualities in [documentaries] seek recognition from the gatekeepers of empire not for their non-normative genders and sexualities but for their modern human types.”[8] While I agree with Malaklou’s assessment, Be Like Others, simultaneously seeks this recognition and challenges the controlling mechanisms of the Iranian government because audiences in some parts of the world can readily access this counter-narrative with relative ease,[9] which in turn thwarts the Islamic regime’s efforts to control and disseminate a heteronormative and modernist national identity. To complicate the Iranian government’s turn to heteronormativity as requisite to citizen-belonging and nation-building since the era of the Qajars, the concept of time and the evolution of gender and sexuality under the guise of Enlightenment Humanism are at stake. Malaklou states,

Social and political constructions of time induced by Enlightenment Humanism are chronological and continuous; they privilege persons with access to the social, political, and economic capital to move forward (literally and metaphorically) towards an identity or type that is whole, polished, and perfected. If, as Foucault describes it, ‘to be modern’ is ‘not to accept oneself as one is in the flux of the passing moments,’ but rather ‘to take onself as object of a complex and difficult elaboration’—to ‘[occupy] an imagined place at the new end of a sequence’—then to be atavistic or uncivilized, as Iranians are caricatured in literatures of empire, is to be chronopolitically queer.[10]

The European gaze upon Iranians as primitive and archaic, which renders them as out of time and sync with progress, modernity, and therefore, the ability to be fully human terrified the Iranians of the nineteenth century and set the stage for the urgency to find acceptance from and approval into whiteness. This anxiety of being subservient to Europe’s dominance becomes paramount to the government’s notions of nation-building. Ultimately, the gaze from Europe and America overpowers and heavily influences the discourse of nation-building in Iran.

 

Encountering Gender and Sexuality in Qajar Iran

In Women with Mustaches, Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity, historian Afsaneh Najmabadi outlines the transformation of gender and sexuality in the nineteenth-century as notions of masculinity and femininity merged with notions of “an imagined political community,”[11] which led to the rise of nationalism and statehood in the early twentieth century.[12] Najmabadi details how in the last half of the nineteenth-century as Iranians and the British in particular became more interactive, Iranians repressed male and female homosociality in recognition of ascribing to European notions of nationhood.[13] Soon, there developed a narrative about “vatan”[14] (homeland) as female in need of masculine protection and adoration, which harmed the once accepted bonds of homoeroticism and deemed homosociality as a dangerous passageway to homosexuality. One overt attempt to modernize Qajar Iran was to discourage men from effeminate behaviors and desires and pulling women away from their homosocial bonds and into the public sphere. In practice, this meant men chose female companions in the public and private spheres. Najmabadi says, “Centered on a female beloved, [the concept of love of vatan] indicates the depth of transformations already taking place in Iranian erotic sensibilities. The overpowering love of a female vatan mediated between homeland and heterosexuality, between nation and gender.”[15] This project of modernization through clear practices of gender and sexuality combined with efforts of nation-building required the removal of so-called backward practices and behaviors likened to homosexuality and developed the current gender binary system of male-female in Iran. Nineteenth-century Iranians’ attention to implementing a gender binary, and therefore establishing heteronormativity as the status quo, developed as a result of their knowing that another gaze was present from Europe. Najmabadi reflects, “Iranian men interacting with Europeans in Iran or abroad became highly sensitized to the idea that their desire was now under European scrutiny.”[16] Therefore, the project of modernization from the time of the Qajars until today, as revealed in Be Like Others, remains to a large extent, a replication of homophobia and transphobia in imitation of the structures in Europe and now, America, with the hope of recognition as “coeval…with Western, presumably white nations and persons.”[17] Malaklou signals the work of anthropologist Johannes Fabian who states, “Coevalness aims at recognizing contemporality as the condition for truly dialectical confrontation between persons as well as societies […] [We] are not the same societies at different stages of development, but different societies facing each other at the same time.”[18] In other words, Iranians wrestle with the cultures, history, religions, and politics of their own development as part of an emerging nation-state as well as Europe’s notions of racial superiority. As Najmabadi notes, even “the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is […] oblivious to the irony of its shared ground with secular modernists and with Orientalizing Europeans [whose] concept of homosexuality—sexual deviancy, inhiraf-i jinsi—[is] more akin to late nineteenth-century western European concepts than to anything from Islam’s own classical heritage.”[19]

 

Despite the Qajars’ efforts to display visual political representations of the Western gender binary system such as that of the male lion wielding a sword in front of a female sun rising in the backdrop of the homeland, Qajar artists continued to represent androgynous couples. Najmabadi observes, “notions of beauty were largely undifferentiated by gender in early Qajar Iran (1785-1925); that is, beautiful men and women were depicted with very similar facial and bodily features.”[20] A popular emblem of gender and sexuality, the male-female amorous couple, particularly in paintings, Najmabadi suggests, allowed for homoerotic passing because we see visual depictions of men and women in androgynous modes: with facial hair as a marker of masculinity, painters depicted women with facial hair and men without facial hair. Najmabadi calls this passing “masquerading”[21] as both Qajar men and women look the same in these paintings except for certain clothing adornments that indicate male and female distinctions. This latent homoerotic desire often depicted in Qajar paintings and other visual modes such as on tapestries, pottery, and playing cards moves beyond a simple “dyad” between painter and subject and becomes more of a triangular mode of desire between painter, subject, and viewer.[22] Thus, several agents participate in complex desire: the painter; the subject depicted in a romantic embrace with someone of the opposite sex; and the viewer who can desire the male or female subject in the artwork.

 

In this sense, the case of the Qajars reveals that Iranian artists and their visual representations of gender and sexuality posed a contentious challenge to the project of nation-building among the emerging citizen-subjects and the government; people’s desires and self-expressions or representations of gender, sexuality, and desire broadly did not readily align with the emerging heteronormative impulse of the government. This Qajar-dilemma remained palpable during the Pahlavi era and continues to haunt current efforts of the Islamic regime’s nation-building as evident in Be Like Others, which again reveals the complications and nuances of gender and sexuality, not only in family and social life, but especially as trans Iranians navigate the governmental dictums for streamlining desire and citizenship. While the current vein of Islamophobia and Iranophobia in the United States and Europe paints the current Iranian regime as particularly brutish, corrupt, and homophobic, a closer turn to the Pahlavi regime and the mid-twentieth century intellectual ideologues of the Islamic Revolution reveals a troubling truth: the Islamic Republic adopted earlier iterations of homophobia.

 

Pahlavi Iran

A closer examination of the cultural and political transformations regarding sexuality and gender reveal that in the past two centuries, Iranian (including Islamic Iran) modernity required a significant repression of public displays of homoeroticism in order to support a sense of belonging to 18th– and 19th-century social science notions of human becoming.[23] While the Qajars configured representations of the nation to depict heteronormative gender and sexuality such as in emblems for public, namely European, consumption (i.e., national flag), the social and cultural transformations occurred sporadically and with resistance from the citizens. This tension continued to exist in the Pahlavi era with the indoctrination of the Iranian polity with Western notions of manhood and womanhood as well as governmental enforcement of gender roles and expectations.[24] Reza Shah’s particular allegiance to whiteness in the guise of Iranians as Aryans[25] transferred to his son, Mohammad Reza Shah. During the Pahlavi era, the conflation of race with gender undergirded the project of modernity.[26] Even those who politically opposed the Pahlavi regime, such as Jalal Al-e Ahmad, condoned gender conformity. Al-e Ahmad ridicules Iranian men in particular who ascribe to “Weststruckness” by describing them as “effete [qerti]. He is effeminate [zan-sefat; efféminé]. He attends to his grooming a great deal. He spends much of his time sprucing himself up. Sometimes he even plucks his eyelashes.”[27] The important connection here between the governmental push to modernize through streamlining gender and sexuality with the critiques against empire by Iranian intellectuals is a shared practice of homophobia. While Al-e Ahmad, Shariati, and other Islamic intellectuals turned their backs to Iranian subservience to European and American imperial projects, they nonetheless echoed the need for a gender-binary system and heteronormativity.

 

Islamic Republic of Iran

Although SRS became a legal-medical health topic under the Pahlavi regime, intersex people were the main recipients of the procedure.[28] While LGBTQ citizens were a part of Pahlavi society, there were no particular edicts and codes of conduct for LGBTQ individuals other than typical homophobic sentiments, which forced most LGBTQ peoples into oppression or exile. There were no governmental procedures, programs, or discourses concerning the well-being of LGBTQ persons and specifically, no protocols for people identifying as trans who sought SRS, even though according to Najmabadi, the first documented case of SRS occurred in 1930 for an inter-sex individual.[29] However, as early as 1964, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini discusses the acceptable practice of SRS within Islamic paradigms as part of his two-volume series of fatwas known as Tahrir al-Wasilah. In a section called “The Changing of Sex,” Khomeini states, “The prima facie [al-zahir] view is contrary to prohibiting the changing, by operation, of a man’s sex to that of a woman or vice versa […] [sex change] is not obligatory if the person is truly of one sex, and changing his/her sex to the opposite sex is possible.”[30] Even before the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the Supreme Leader envisioned a plan to address the trans community in Iranian society. In the Pahlavi era, Khomeini’s fatwa carried little more than light conversations among clerics and for several years after the Islamic revolution, the fatwa remained untenanted. The policy changes under the Islamic regime were the result of the staunch activism of Maryam Khatun (formerly Fereydoun) Molkara, a Male to Female (MtF) transgendered activist in Iran, who risked her life and relentlessly wrote to urge Khomeini to enact the fatwa. Molkara even met with the Grand Ayatollah, enduring violent attacks, to encourage him to uphold his earlier musings.[31] Because of her tireless efforts, SRS became governmental policy in 1985 backed by various modes of support for the post-SRS trans community.

 

This seemingly pro-trans position stands in stark contrast to a regime known for its various human rights violations. Presently, Iran is the only Muslim-majority nation in the world whose government partially subsidizes SRS for its citizens. However, a closer look at the four- to six-month process of undergoing religious-medical-legal interventions towards SRS makes clear that the fatwa for sex reassignment aims to abolish homosexuality by ensuring a particular form of trans identity. The film shows that the trans persons only go through with the process because it is required by law; not because their identities and desires necessarily fall in line with government expectations. Near the end of the film, two trans women share that they would have refused SRS if “we were not in Iran”[32] and if they had known that the process would sever their family ties.[33] To further complicate matters, the government sponsors trans-activists and organizations, partially subsidizes SRS, and issues new birth certificates and identification materials to post-operative trans citizens, which supports an overt rejection of homosexuality. In a sense, the nation gives many incentives to LGBTQ Iranians as far as citizen-subject recognition and access to state-mandated resources if they follow through with SRS procedures, and for the nation, despite the gender and sexuality identifications of the Iranian individuals, SRS eradicates homosexuality in a bureaucratic sense. In a cruel sense, the trans community in Iran finds one of its most stable, albeit treacherously dubious, allies in the government and not in the social, cultural, and familial experiences of living in Iran. The simultaneous rejection by society-family and acceptance by orthodox nation-state strengthens the Islamic Republic’s reputation as a guardian of its citizens.

 

As Minoo Moallem posits, “the emergence of a gendered Islamic subject in the context of the Iranian revolution of 1979 and its aftermath provided a surface on which cultural and religious nationalists were able to write their own meanings of the Islamic nation.”[34] Following Foucault’s notion of “the art of governmentality,”[35] the Iranian government uses various modes including technology such as visual media to display its self-narrative,[36] but Be Like Others functions as counterpoint to the project of heteronormativity by depicting the tensions between state-sanctioned gender and sexuality identities and human desires.

 

In “Capitalism and Gay Identity,” John D’Emilio traces how with the rise of industrialization and capitalism, the heteronormative family became less necessary, thus allowing a new category for homosexual men and women to emerge, who could also contribute to the economic system without relying on interdependent family units. As D’Emilio observes, “only when individuals began to make their living through wage labor, instead of as parts of an interdependent family unit, was it possible for homosexual desire to coalesce into a personal identity [and therefore a political entity].”[37] Thus inadvertently, capitalism was imperative in the earliest stages of LGBTQ liberation, but also simultaneously a terrorizing force to repress and punish sexual variation and desire. While D’Emilio examines these shifts in European and American contexts, his observations apply to the Iranian case as well. Just as European values, beliefs, and practices shifted with the new economic system of capitalism, Iranian society underwent transformations that upheld industrialization, capitalism, and the project of modernity. However, in the Iranian landscape, European colonialism impacted the rise of heteronormativity.

 

 

Be Like Others

In Professing Selves: Transsexuality and Same-Sex Desire in Contemporary Iran, Najmabadi highlights that Iranian LGBTQ concerns took the forefront during the early years of this new century. Namely, between 2003-2008, a substantial focus from the national and international communities as well as a plethora of visual productions emerged during these years highlighting the experiences of Iranian trans communities. Perhaps this interest in LGBTQ Iranians stemmed from the more liberal and reformist political climate of President Mohammad Khatami, but the concerns facing the oppression of LGBTQ experiences certainly became critical when on September 24, 2007 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared at a talk in New York that, “In Iran we don’t have homosexuals like in your country.”[38] Ahmadinejad’s avowal, while atrociously reductive and simplistic, alludes to a conundrum among Iranian Islamic authorities and theorists who were left with no particular strategies in dealing with Ayatollah Khomeini’s declaration that “[sex change] is not obligatory” and that trans individuals’ experiences are acceptable within Islamic faith. Saying that “In Iran we don’t have homosexuals like in your country” reveals that the Iranian government officially denies the existence of LGBTQ Iranians and instead funnels the broad spectrum of LGBTQ identities into only one form of queer existence, which encourages people with same-sex desire to follow a program of transitioning away from homosexual practices. Essentially then, homosexual people whether cisgender male or female, that is whether gay or lesbian, do not exist in the Iranian national narrative.

 

Najmabadi surmises, “keeping all gender/sex variant desires and practices in close proximity”[39] demonstrates the continuous and contentious discourses among biomedical, psycho-sexual, and Islamic jurisprudential experts while the lives of trans Iranians remain in the balance. For many of these specialists and scholars, the legal, religious, and medical consequences outweigh the preferences and lived experiences of trans Iranians; especially for the religious officials, the most critical issue remains abolishing homosexuality at all costs. I would argue though that this insistence on the “sinful prohibited practices”[40] of LGBTQ people in Iran moves beyond Islamic dictums and demonstrates the Iranian government’s homophobia and fear of appearing weak on the world stage. In the Ahmadinejad statement, his emphasis is on the concerns of the “country” while he is speaking in the United States, a historic enemy, which indicates that the Islamic Republic’s main focus remains on the image of the nation rather than a progressive program for improving the lives of its citizens.

 

Moallem suggests that “Islamic notions of masculinity are influenced by the perceptions of the modern nation-state and the relationship between nationalism, masculinity, and respectability.”[41] Further, “after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the hegemonic masculinity of the citizen/subject became a site of tension and contradiction between the pious masculinity of the clergyman and the secular masculinity of the citizen.”[42]  Be Like Others allows us to interrogate the contentious negotiations between the nation and its trans citizens. The documentary opens with two lines on a black screen: “In the Islamic Republic of Iran, sex change operations are legal” and “Homosexuality is punishable by death.”[43] The film immediately addresses the viewer’s curiosity about the apparent irony of trans Iranians living in an Islamic country.

 

The scene cuts away and focuses in on Mirdamad Surgical Center, Iran’s premiere privately-owned institution for SRS where Paris-trained surgeon, Dr. Bahram Mirjalali examines, advises, and schedules procedures for trans Iranians on “Tuesdays and Wednesdays” as the voiceover informs the viewer.[44] The film captures the crowded waiting room of trans men and women and their companions all of whom rise to greet and shake hands with the stoutly and silver-haired Dr. Mirjalali who speaks warmly as he receives each extended hand or touches his heart with a slight bow and moves rapidly into a private room to meet a patient. The voiceover informs the audience about Dr. Mirjalali’s extensive record of performing SRS in Iran “with the approval of the Iranian government.”[45]  This particular caveat, which indicates the Islamic regime acknowledges the existence of queer Iranians despite Ahmadinejad’s declaration, also reveals the interlocking systems in Iran, which respond to trans issues in the country. The medical, psychobiological, Islamic jurisprudential and political networks must all work in tandem.

 

Soon after this introductory glimpse at the clinic, the viewer eavesdrops on the consultation between Dr. Mirjalali and the only patient seeking a Female to Male (FtM) sex reassignment surgery highlighted in the film. Dr. Mirjalali says to his patient, “Shoma yek mowjudat-e estesna-yi hastid” [“You are unusual creatures”—film’s translation], “vali sad-dar-sad tabi-ee hastid”[46] [“But perfectly normal”—film’s translation]. The voiceover alerts the viewer to a sobering fact after Dr. Mirjalali’s encouraging thoughts: “Those who seek treatment from the doctor realize that the authorities see their condition as an illness that has a cure.”[47] For this reason, Iranians seeking SRS are required to undergo a six-month process that includes physical examinations, hormonal therapies, and psychological evaluations to confirm that they are identifiable as trans men and trans women before the surgery and thus are obliged to endure SRS to be recognized as citizen-subjects. The patient seeking FtM transition interrupts the doctor’s explanation of the required process and asks that he introduce the patient to a psychiatrist who is “enlightened” like the doctor and will not end up “put[ting] a bad label” on the patient[48] and in essence, rejecting the patient’s request for the surgery. This patient’s fear of the psychological process indicates what many queer Iranians fear about the six-month process of evaluations. Often, the process ends up with the patients’ experiencing forced exiles, unwanted interventions, and suicide or murder because the multi-layered vetting system for SRS reveals the complexities of trans identity which do not always align with the regime’s dictates of singular sexuality. Needless to say, SRS is not the desired option for many trans Iranians, but for those who wish to remain in Iran and live with less police harassment, social stigma, and gain equal rights, SRS paves a viable path.

 

Be Like Others highlights that staying in Iran is a critical issue for trans Iranians. For various reasons, many trans individuals wish to remain in Iran and therefore seek SRS as a means for safely pursuing their lives in the nation. As citizen-subjects, trans Iranians want the same rights and dignities as their fellow non-trans compatriots. The film focuses on the question of gender through representation with nuanced care. At one point, someone asks a MtF seeking SRS, why a man would want to live as a woman in Iran in particular. The trans Iranian replies that living in the guise of a stereotypical man is not any easier for a trans person because of the harassment trans persons receive from law enforcement, their families, and broader Iranian society. The political, economic, social, religious, and familial rejection of being trans forces Iranians to succumb to the government’s dictates of streamlining gender and sexuality through SRS.

 

The film never explicitly identifies the class positions of the trans Iranians it follows, but one can assume from the individuals’ lifestyles, jobs, and hometowns (not all of them are from the capital but end up in Tehran for SRS) that we are watching what middle- and lower-class trans Iranians have to do in order to remain in Iran with equal rights and access. As one of the exchanges in the film between a transwoman and a conservative Muslim journalist reveals, the surgery itself is not desired by all the trans Iranians undergoing the mandated evaluation. The journalist retorts, “Iran has the best social services in the world for transsexuals. First of all, no other country on Earth changes the gender on your birth certificate […] The first supreme leader, the first religious authority in the whole world to give a ruling on sex change is Imam Khomeini.”[49] While her commentary aligns with the official national position on transsexuality, she never acknowledges the decades of trans-activism which influenced Khomeini’s edict becoming policy and trans-activists such as Vida in the film, who continuously engage directly and at great risks with governmental agencies to ensure a dignified life for trans Iranians.

 

Further, as the trans Iranian woman replies, “In European countries, religion is not the law [because religion is separate from politics—(the film does not translate this part)],”[50] which pulls on the anxieties of the Iranian regime in its struggles to appear powerful especially when placed in a comparative context with Global North nations. This instance in the film highlights the tensions between trans experiences and the nation’s self-narrative which hopes to appear as “enlightened Shi’ism” and not “homicidal homophobia.”[51] We see how murky the distinctions are between acceptable citizenship and disciplinary mechanisms for deviant behavior, while recognizing the Islamic Republic’s mimicry of Victorian European values of nation-building.

 

One of the trans women in the film says, “In this society, you have to be either a man or woman;” otherwise, the nation will punish alternative gender representations. Be Like Others allows the viewer to understand the connections between nationalism, gender, and sexuality and the restrictions upon these categories by the Iranian government. In another scene, one trans Iranian SRS-patient’s mother brings her employer to a conference about transsexuality out of fear that she may get fired from her job if her son receives SRS. She asks Dr. Mirjalali to speak to her boss and explain that legally, medically and religiously, trans people are accepted and respected. The doctor speaks to the conservative man, but the employer chillingly tells the woman and Anoush, her trans child, that they should be “patient” and not go through with the surgery. He tells them he will email the doctor to understand more, but the look on Shahin’s face indicates to the viewer that she did not get the answer and reprieve from unemployment anxiety that she was hoping for with his attendance at this conference.  This scene depicts the nexus of class, nation, and gender expectations in explicit terms which other media fails to showcase.

 

Moallem’s observation that “filmic space [is] an alternative site for cultural struggle,”[52] allows us to examine gender and sexuality dynamics in the Iranian landscape as part and parcel to the Islamic regime’s program of self-representation and nation-building. The pressure to eradicate so-called weakness-cum-homosexuality from the nation-state appears in the daily dealings of the Iranian polity such that one’s livelihood is threatened if the parameters of ideal citizenship are not met. In this case, Shahin is already a single-mother and in addition to this less than desirable status in Iranian society, as her eldest child is trans and seeking SRS. Despite governmental acceptance of her child’s situation and the process involved in aligning their family with state dictates about acceptable citizenship, Shahin still struggles with social and economic prejudices of other Iranians, which can completely undermine her family’s well-being. This dilemma is double-edged: for her child, SRS may allow a more equitable and liberatory life in Islamic Iran, while for her, it could mean shame, ridicule, unemployment, and virtually, disenfranchisement from all of Iranian society. As the documentary traces, whether the trans Iranians remain connected with their families or not, the emerging relationships are strained, confusing, difficult and often result in more complications for both the trans person and the extended family.

 

Be Like Others ends with some complicated issues remaining unresolved for the trans Iranians in the film. Several times towards the end of the film, the trans Iranians are asked whether they would go through with the surgery if it was not required by the government. In every reply, the answer was a clear “no.” When one trans person says in the film, “Who is forcing you to have the operation?” she is met with silence from her peers and then she answers for the collective with, “Society.”[53] She continues that “I am an Iranian. I want to live here”[54] and thus, in order to live safely and humanely, she and other trans Iranians, have to comply with the government dictates and cultural expectations. The film shows the viewer that the lives of post-SRS trans Iranians involve a series of more medical tests, evaluations and procedures while they have to deal with the adjustment for themselves and their loved ones to their new identities. One couple, Anoush/Anahita and Ali, who plans to get married, moves forward with the engagement but the male-identifying partner becomes more hesitant about marriage after his fiancée’s operation. While Anoush/Anahita is satisfied with the post-operation situation, with the hope that they can marry sooner than later, Ali seems despondent and reluctant as he relays to the interviewer that “I don’t want to get married.”[55] Ali’s hesitance indicates that the heteronormative lifestyle, required by custom and law in Iran, remains undesirable for some Iranian subjects. He says he can “handle” the sex-change status of his partner, but to fully engage in heteronormativity is not what he wants for himself.

 

In another instance, a trans woman named Farhad who comes to Tehran to support her friend through her transition, tells the interviewer that she has decided to wait on the operation. She says that in part, she hesitates to go through with the surgery because although her relationship with her family is strained, they agree to talk with her so long as she avoids the operation. She continues that her friends who went through with the procedure seem unhappy and often tell her about attempted suicides because they no longer experience sexual satisfaction; they have health complications; and she indicates that some of the trans Iranians end up “forced to do things you don’t want to.”[56] In essence, this Iranian subject defies the system as she lives a non-gender binary life within the nation despite the risks and rejections this situation brings to her.

 

Ali-Asghar, now Negar after the operation, struggles to live in Tehran. The voiceover tells the viewer that “like many who have had sex-change surgery in Iran, she’s struggling to make ends meet.”[57] The viewer sees Negar enter a small apartment, take off her black chador, and reveal a hot pink, tightly fitting dress. Negar tells the interviewer about her life after her operation and says that after a period of depression, she now feels she “has been born again.”[58] She no longer has a relationship with her family who “shunned”[59] her, but she lives with other trans Iranians who have had the operation and she is happy with their living arrangement. When asked how they afford their apartment and lifestyle, Negar says “I do business”[60] and then lists the various boulevards and streets where one can find her at work. She boldly says, “I do a temporary marriage” and “we sell ourselves.”[61] Negar emphasizes that they have “principles” such as making sure to “first do a temporary Islamic marriage contract” before having sexual relations with someone because “halal mishim” (translation, “In other words, it’s allowed by Islam”).[62] Negar continues, “Since we don’t have female reproductive parts and can’t get pregnant, we can get ‘married’ once an hour or so.”[63] Earlier in the film, Veda, a trans activist, discusses that prostitution becomes one of the only work opportunities for trans Iranians, which also indicates her plea for more support of the trans community. Prostitution is illegal in Iran for trans and non-trans citizen-subjects alike, but the government cannot curtail its existence especially for disenfranchised citizens whose identities are shunned and rejected by larger society. Ironically, the Islamic custom of the temporary marriage supports the legal application of prostitution for trans Iranians who cannot financially support themselves otherwise.

 

The film ends with these unresolved stories: Ali, whose sexual identity remains unknown and who rejects heteronormative patriarchy; Farhad, who identifies as trans but opts out of SRS; and Negar, who declares she has killed a sense of love in herself after following through with the complete process dictated by the government. Foucault reminds us to think about these individuals’ situations as reflective of the “sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual co-determin[ing] each other’s emergence.”[64] Despite the Islamic regime’s intervention in defining gender identities for the Iranian trans community, the film leaves the viewer with a sense that sexuality and gender cannot be boxed into a binary system. Further, the film shows that a sense of national belonging and desire to remain in Iran as a full Iranian citizen complicates the living conditions of the trans community in Iran. The intersection between politics, gender, class, and sexuality in Be Like Others disrupts the “art of governmentality” and thus, the project of modernization in Iran. Moallem suggests, “it is crucial to challenge dichotomous notions of gender, religion, culture, and modernity in order to interrogate and deconstruct the conditions under which political and cultural citizenship constitute and are constituted by citizen-subjects”[65] and Be Like Others allows us to continuously engage with these issues. Highlighting Malaklou’s interventions in Enlightenment Humanism, the viewer also finds the intersections of race with gender and sexuality in a critical rupture in this film: Iranians stumble towards whiteness vis-à-vis the European social and political order as the Islamic Republic dubiously stakes a claim in patriarchal heteronormativity.

 

In a nation whose visual self-representation includes images of martyrs in military uniforms, pious clerics with austere gazes, chador-clad mothers, sometimes holding a child in one arm and a weapon in the other, the Iranian family is a heteronormative, patriarchal, devoutly religious unit and therefore, the pillar of the Islamic nation. As Gerami observes,

 

Three versions of masculinities in postrevolutionary Iran stand out well beyond the revolutionary stage: the martyr as brave and innocent, the mullah as otherworldly and pious, and ordinary men as sexual and dominant. Women were not discouraged from emulating the manly traits of the first two prototypes.[66]

 

However, Be Like Others challenges the Islamic Republic’s notions of gender and sexual identity by disrupting the monolithic depictions of Iranian masculinity and femininity. While the film participates as a tool in “the art of governmentality,” its purpose of highlighting the complex stories of trans Iranians makes the film a work of resistance against the state’s mission to use technology to promote its self-image. If we understand visual technologies such as print media, television broadcasts, and films as part of what Foucault calls “the art of government,” then Be Like Others pushes back against the government’s “technologies of domination.”[67]

 

Further, by showing the complexities of trans lives, the film pushes back against the homophobia and transphobia of the Iranian state that falsely proclaims that the Iranian government, contrary to more democratic nations, supports its trans population and allows these individuals more freedom to live in their authenticity than other nations. In Be Like Others, this visual representation of trans experiences inside and outside of Iran is particularly powerful as the Islamic regime relies heavily on visual culture to promote its ideals, values, and political philosophy to its own citizenry and by extension, the world. The film provides a critical tension against the state’s domination and disciplinary program, making it difficult for the Islamic regime to control the effects of the film on its own population or the broader world’s viewers.[68] The film continuously challenges Iran’s best efforts to eradicate homosexuality and gender-queer identities by merely remaining in the public’s access.

 

Conclusion

While Iranians never experienced settler-colonial practices, their on-going relationship with the British in particular shaped many of the emerging nation’s homophobic views. As early as 1838, Iranian travelers to Europe were writing about same-sex practices in various countries in Europe and condemning the hypocrisy of Europeans towards homosexuality in Iran. Najmabadi suggests that this “anxiety over Europeans’ judgment of Iranian sexual mores and practices remained a preoccupation”[69] for nineteenth-century Iranians, but it also plagued the Pahlavi era and continues to haunt the Islamic regime.  Today, Iran’s government vehemently invests in erasing visual representations of queer identities. By directly coercing queer Iranians into SRS, the Islamic Republic maintains the most rigorous program of heteronormativity of the last two centuries of Iranian regimes.

 

Najmabadi reminds us, for instance, that “Nineteenth-century Iranian culture…had other ways of naming [gender beyond the man/woman binary], such as amrad (young adolescent male) and mukhannas (an adult man desiring to be an object of desire for adult men), that were not equated with effeminacy”[70] but indicated same-sex relations. That said, Iranian masculinity weakened as female agency to dictate the parameters of marriage, sexual relations, and divorce, gained strength. With the establishment of a military and state bureaucracy under Reza Shah Pahlavi, gender roles and expectations increasingly dictated the political, social, and economic behaviors of Iranian men and women, but until the establishment of the Islamic Republic, manhood, masculinity, and sexual behaviors were not under the jurisdiction of the government, although as Sivan Balslev notes, “during the late nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth century, western-educated elite men created and promoted a new model of Iranian masculinity by means of mass communication, cultural production, modern education and governmental reforms.”[71]  While masculinity re-presented itself after 1979, “the Islamic revolution and the Republic constituted a hypermasculine social order. This misogynistic order was hard on women, but it also harmed men. The state’s imposition of Sharia, its harsh implementation of sex segregation and condoning of vigilantism, hurt men as it did women”[72]  and effectively obliterated any gender and sexual nonconformity. Needless to say, this deliberate erasure, by any means necessary, makes the project of Iranian nation-building problematic and inhumane.

 

 

 

[1]I will turn to the critical intervention by M. Shadee Malaklou in thinking about Iranians and how they “narrate their non-normative genders and sexualities as identity and type to negate (for themselves as Other, not pace Hegel but Fanon) the racial schemas that atavistically hail them in modern historiography.” Maryam Shadee Malaklou, Chronopolitical Assemblages: Race/ism, Desire, and Identification in Iranian Contexts (ProQuest, UMI Dissertations Publishing, 2016), 13.

[2]Shahin Gerami, “Mullahs, Martyrs, and Men: Conceptualizing Masculinity in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Men and Masculinities 5, no. 3 (January 2003): 257-274. In this essay, Gerami traces the development of “an Islamic hypermasculinity” which focuses on developing heteronormative men and women who abide by new “ideals of manhood” with three main identities for men: “mullahs,” or clerics, as wise interpreters of the Quran; “martyrs,” as young men who sacrifice their lives for the Republic; and “ordinary men” who benefit from Shari’at at the family and civil society level, but suffer depending on class status.

[3]Be Like Others/Transexual in Iran, directed by Tanaz Eshaghian (2008), Film.

[4]Minoo Moallem, “Passing, Politics, and Religion,” The Scholar and Feminist Online, Issue 9.3: Summer 2011, http://sfonline.barnard.edu/religion/moallem_01.htm.

[5]Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (Verso, 1991), 6.

[6]Afsaneh Najmabadi, Professing Selves: Transsexuality and Same-Sex Desire in Contemporary Iran (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 3.

[7]Najmabadi, Professing Selves, 6.

[8]Malaklou, Chronopolitical Assemblages, 2.

[9]Eshaghian, Be Like Others. The film is readily accessible online in the US under the title, Transsexual in Iran.

[10]Malaklou, Chronopolitical Assemblages, 12.

[11]Anderson, “Introduction,” Imagined Communities, 6.

[12]While still recognized as a functioning monarchy, Iran, then known as Persia, formed a majlis or parliament in 1906, thus heralding the early steps to statehood.

[13]Afsaneh Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches, Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press). Najmabadi relates how “Iranian modernity was shaped in the rearticulation of concepts like nation (millat), politics (siasat), homeland (vatan), and knowledge (‘ilm),” 1.

[14]Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches, 98.

[15]Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches, 1.

[16]Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches, 4.

[17]Malaklou, Chronopolitical Assemblages, 2.

[18]Malaklou, Chronopolitical Assemblages, fn. 3, 2.

[19]Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches, 57.

[20]Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches, 11.

[21]Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches, 58.

[22]Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches, 27.

[23]Malaklou dissects this idea through a turn to antiblackness in notions of modernity. She says, “Liberal pluralism, the grandchild of evolutionary humanism, assigns Iranian and black persons non-commensurate ranks in the saga of Man. Theirs is a difference not of degree but of kind; while Iranians can slowly stand upright to arrive at human capacity abstracted in shades of white, black persons as ‘the missing link between ape and man’ are altogether proscribed from human dialectical spirit and agency,” Chronopolitical Assemblages, 8.

[24]The era of Reza Shah Pahlavi’s terror on the masses is well known. As Najmabadi says, “Riza Shah’s state was a re-formed military and bureaucratized state, even though it was centered around the individual figure of the king […] Riza Shah’s manhood and kinghood did not tolerate frivolous and playful associations with what had now becomes signs of a despised manhood and womanliness,” Women with Mustaches, 93.

[25]Reza Zia-Ebrahimi, “‘Arab Invasion’ and Decline, or the Import of European Racial Thought by Iranian Nationalists,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 37, no. 6 (November 2012): 1046. Zia-Ebrahimi traces the adoption by Reza Shah and the Pahlavi regime in general of the developing nationalist ideologies of Qajar era intellectuals such as Mirza Fath’ali Akhunzadeh (1812-78) and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani (1853-96). This ideology, he says, grew out of “a racialized historiography of Iran developed primarily in nineteenth-century European scholarship,” 1045. In, “Self-Orientalization and Dislocation: The Uses and Abuses of the ‘Aryan’ Discourse,” Iranian Studies 44, no.4 (2011): 445-472, Zia-Ebrahimi elaborates on the development of the identification of nineteenth-century Iranians with the concept of Aryan and how they used literature, politics, and culture to align themselves with European notions of whiteness and superiority.

[26]Hamideh Sedghi, Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling, (Cambridge University Press, 2007). Modernity for the Pahlavi regime meant embodying whiteness through imitation of European fashions and values. Although her analysis fails to think through antiblackness and the Pahlavi project of Aryanness, Sedghi posits, “My focus is on the centrality of unveiling to Reza Shah’s policy and politics. I view unveiling [and the adoption of European dress] in the context of state-building,” 85.

[27]Jalal Al-i Ahmad, Occidentosis: Plague from the West, trans. R. Campbell (Mizan Press, 1984), 96.

[28]As Najmabadi notes, “In its earliest reported appearance in Iran, in the 1930s and 1940s, ‘changing sex’ referred to intersex transformations—some reported as spontaneous—but increasingly the phrase indicated those transformations effected through surgical interventions,” Professing Selves, 38.

[29]Najmabadi, Professing Selves, 40.

[30]Although Khomeini briefly discusses the case of trans people as accepted in Islam in his works, he never clearly outlined the state’s role in the well-being and inclusion of trans individuals who do not ascribe to the gender binary system. Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini, Tahrir al-wasilah, 2 vols. (Najaf: Matba‘at al-Adab, 1387 AH/1967/8).

[31]“Transgender in Iran: The Story of Maryam Khatoon Molkara,” Transgender Universe, 25 February 2016, http://archive.transgenderuniverse.com/2016/02/25/transgender-in-iran-the-story-of-maryam-khatoon-molkara/.

[32]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 55:46.

[33]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 57:26.

[34]Moallem, “Passing, Politics, and Religion.”

[35]In his lectures, Michel Foucault describes the various modes by which governments produce citizens to fit into their notions of policies, practices, and self-narratives. Foucault includes political, legal, religious, educational, familial, and socio-cultural inventions including the use of technology and media by the government to control the narrative of its ideologies.

[36]As Ziba Mir-Hosseini notes, “Through its various organizations, the regime promoted the creation of a distinctively Islamic cinema in the early 1980s. In those years no quality film was produced […] and women and love were almost totally absent from the screen,” and today, the Islamic government contends with filmmakers who want to expand beyond the fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence ideology, because it is still palpable in Iran. See Iranian Cinema: Art, Society and the State,” Middle Eastern Research and Information Project, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer219/iranian-cinema.

[37]John D’Emilio, “Capitalism and Gay Identity,” Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality, ed. Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell, and Sharan Thompson, New Feminist Library Series (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), 470.

[38]Satyam Khanna, “Iran Denies Existence of Gays in Iran,” Think Progress, 24 September 2007, https://thinkprogress.org/ahmadinejad-denies-existence-of-gays-in-iran-e1418f709193/.

[39]Najmabadi, Professing Selves, 185.

[40]Najmabadi, Professing Selves, 182.

[41]Moallem, “Passing, Politics, and Religion.”

[42]Moallem, “Passing, Politics, and Religion.”

[43]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 0:03 and 0:07.

[44]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 0:52.

[45]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 1:07.

[46]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 1:24-1:32

[47]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 2:18-2:22.

[48]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute 2:48-3:00.

[49]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 36:03.

[50]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 36:12.

[51]Afsandeh Najmabadi, “Verdicts of Science, Rulings of Faith: Transgender/Sexuality in Contemporary Iran.” Social Research 78, no. 2 (2011): 2.

[52]Moallem, “Politics, Passing, and Religion.”

[53]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 37:17.

[54]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 37:19.

[55]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 55:25-55:33.

[56]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 49:26-49:29.

[57]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 51:51.

[58]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 51:57-52:00.

[59]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 52:26.

[60]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 52:47.

[61]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 52:56-53:01.

[62]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 53:03-53:12.

[63]Eshaghian, Be Like Others, minute mark 53:16-53:26.

[64]Thomas Lemke, “Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique.” Paper presented at Rethinking Marxism Conference, University of Amherst, 21-24, 2000, www.thomaslemkeweb.de/publikationen/Foucault,%20Governmentality,%20and%20Critique%20IV-2.pdf.

[65]Moallem, “Politics, Passing, and Religion.”

[66]Gerami, “Mullahs, Martyrs, and Men,” 264.

[67]Lemke, “Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique,” 2.

[68]Indeed, the Islamic Republic continues to make counter-documentaries and interviews to reinforce and render as ethical and acceptable its own viewpoints. For some videos that depict the Islamic Republic’s efforts to erase homosexuality and position itself as supportive of trans Iranians, please see www.aparat.com/result/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%B3_%D8%B3%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84.

[69]Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches, 37.

[70]Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches, 3.

[71]Sivan Balslev, “Dressed for Success: Hegemonic Masculinity, Elite Men and Westernization in Iran, c. 1900-40,” Gender & History, vol. 26. no. 3 (November 2014): 546.

[72]Gerami, “Mullahs, Martyrs, and Men,” 260.

An Approach to Humour in Persian Literature

 

Homa Katouzian is the Iran Heritage Foundation Research Fellow, St Antony’s College, and Member, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Oxford. He is editor, International Journal of Persian Literature and co-editor, the AIS-Routledge book series in Iranian studies.

In the eleven hundred years of literature in Persian, humour has been quite visible and has played important roles in various contexts. It has also been widely varied in style, form and scope. There has been both verbal and fictional satire, lampoon and buffoonery , some of them soft and subtle, others coarse and even obscene, but all of them more or less amusing, though behind many of them are such motives as anger, revenge, blackmail, sarcasm, mockery, social criticism and so on, while some others resemble maxims and aphorisms dressed up as satire. The title of this talk is too ambitious for the time available, so I shall offer an overview of classical humour and modern satire in the early twentieth century.

Generally, there is not much difference between Persian and Western satire beyond the inevitable differences of from, but we find more indelicate jibes and abuses in Persian satire, especially when matters of sex and honour are brought into them. Still, even these are quite distinct from simple invective because it is precisely their literary form that shapes them into humour. For example, Mahsati or (Mahasti) Ganjavi, a twelfth century female poet, wrote in a quatrain:

When the judge’s wife came with child, he cried

Struck by pain he found it extremely odd

Saying I am old and cannot have an erection

This whore is not Mary, so whence the benediction.[2]

This quite compares with the style of reporting in Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales and Boccaccio’s Decameron. But theirs are relatively rare in the body of Western satire, whereas they are more common in Persian literature.  Some of Rumi’s tales in his Masnavi almost border on pornography, even though, oddly enough, they too are lessons in mysticism. However, there are also many subtle and delicate satires, verbal as well as fictional, not only in the works of such great classicists as Sa’di and Hafiz but also in modern satirists such as Dehkhoda.

Abolfazl Beyhaqi (995-1077) wrote in his great history a thousand years ago about a man who procured concubines for a prince and received ample rewards for them. A judge told him to remember that pimping is better than judging.[3] Naser Khosrow (1004-1088), who also flourished in the eleventh century, was a very serious and highly religious man who, in his polemics against his religious enemies called them, ass, cow and so on. He wrote in a humorous aphorism:

نشنیده ای که زیر چناری کدو بنی

بر رست و بردوید بر او بر به روز بیست

پرسید از چنار که تو چند ساله ای

گفتا چنار سال مرا بیشتر ز سی ست

خندید پس بر او که من از تو به بیست روز

بر تر شدم بگوی که این کاهلی ز چیست

او را چنار گفت که امروزه ای کدو

با تو مرا هنوز نه هنگام داوری ست

فردا که بر من و تو وزد بعد مهرگان

آنگه  شود پدید که نامرد و مرد کیست

Have you heard that once a marrow grew

Under a maple tree and bore fruit in a day or two?

It asked the tree’s age which it said

Was more than thirty years

The marrow laughed and said how come

That by me in a few days you have been overcome

The tree said today o marrow

It is too early to compare me and you

For when the October wind begins to blow

It’ll be seen which one of us is to bellow[4]

Not long afterwards, the nobleman Keykavus ibn Eskandar (1021-1087) wrote in his Qabusnameh, the book intended for the education of his son, that a dress-maker whose shop was near the cemetery used to throw a pebble into a vase each time they buried a dead person, and counted the pebbles every month. After his death a man showed up looking for him and was told that the tailor too had fallen into the vase.[5]

In another anecdote, he says that a sheep owner used to dilute milk with water and sell it. One night his shepherd was sleeping on high ground when a flood came and swept the sheep away. Next day the shepherd told the sheep owner: last night the waters that you used to put in the milk gathered together and took the sheep away.[6] He also tells the tale of a hundred-year-old man who was bent and leaning on a walking-stick. A young man asked him in mockery how much he would sell his little bow. He told him, if you wait long enough, life would give it to you free of charge, although you are not worthy of it[7]. Keykavus emphatically advises his son not to resort to obscene words when he jokes, but, as mentioned, that advice is not observed by a number of Persian poets and satirists.

Anvari Abivardi (d. 1189), that twelfth century great but not very ethical poet, wrote in a long qasideh that emptying cesspits is better than writing poetry because that is a useful occupation whereas there is no use in writing poetry.[8] He wrote once, addressing himself, that he would not be immune from danger as long as he is in danger of writing poems.  Although he did write panegyrics, he was not successful in earning a good living, so he resorted to lampoon and blackmail to milk the rich. Once he addressed a short stanza to one such:

انوری نام هجو می نبرد

چون ترا چشم بر عطا ست هنوز

کیر خر نام می برد لیکن

می نگوید که در کجاست هنوز

Anvari will not talk of lampoon

Since he still hopes for a donation

He does mention donkey’s prick

But does not yet mention its location[9]

 

In another piece he complained of the meanness of the prince:

 

گر اندک صلتی بخشد امیرت

از او بستان کز او بسیار باشد

عطای او بود چون ختنه کردن

که اندر عمر خود یک بار باشد

If the prince gives you a little reward

Take it from him for it is too much.

His gift is like circumcision

In a lifetime it happens only once.[10] Reflecting on his own lack of fortune, he wrote once:

 

هر بلایی کز آسمان آید

گر چه بر دیگری روا باشد

نرسیده به خاک می پرسد

خانه انوری کجا باشد

Whatever ill descends from the heavens

Even if intended for someone else,

Before reaching the earth it asks

Where’s Anvari’s residence?[11]

It is perhaps not surprising because, apart from lampooning for money, he scandalised anyone he disliked. Addressing a man, for example, he wondered why every woman he married slept around with others, ending by the question: Do you want whorish wives to praise / Or it just happens to be the case?[12] He overreached himself in ribaldry when he wrote in a stanza:

 

اگر سهلان رستم نذ ر کرده ست

که هر کس را که من گایم بگاید

بگادن چون تواند خواهرش را

و یا مادر , که قتلش واجب آید

وگر گآید مر ایشان را و گوید

که در سوگند تا ویلی  نباید

بگادن چون تواند خویشتن را

مگر بر علم ما چیزی فزاید

If Sahlan son of Rostam has vowed

To fuck anyone that I fuck

How can he fuck his mother and sister?

Since he would surely be executed.

But if he does it nevertheless

Saying that an oath should not be broken.

How can he possibly fuck himself?

Perhaps he’ll teach us a lesson. [13]

He was very unhappy with his wife and wrote such obscene verses about her which are almost unprintable. He wrote about marriage that: To get married in this era / Is naught but pure pimping (کاندر این روزگار زن کردن / بجز از محض قلتبانی نیست ).[14] However, sometimes he also wrote humorous poems without targeting himself or others, but still using foul language. For example, he tells the tale of a group of ladies who had gone out to the countryside.  A he- donkey happened to be mating with a she-donkey ‘with a two-feet long ebony’ (یک گز و نیم آبنوس), ‘while farting and braying with much excitement’ (گوز می افکند و میزد عر عر ان). The leader of the ladies said to the others: ‘If copulation is what this donkey is doing / Our husbands surely shit on our pussies’(گر جماع این است که این خر می کند

بر کس ما می ریند این شوهران  ).[15]

It is not just Anvari, but many a twelfth-century poet has tried his hands at ribaldry.  Sana’i Ghazanavi (b. 1150) – to become a mystic later in life – tells the tale of a woman in labour that sends someone to ask for a remedy from a holy man which would relieve her pain. The messenger comes across a eunuch on the way who tells her to tell the woman that pain cannot be avoided: ‘You have enjoyed the sweetness of fucking / So put up with the pain of squatting (چون چشیدی حلاوت گادن / بکش اکنون مشقت زادن).[16]

Yet, in a more subtle anecdote, he says that an old woman had a pretty daughter called Mahsati as well as three cows.  One day the girl became seriously ill, making the mother extremely unhappy. Meanwhile, one of her cows put her head into a pan but could not take it out. She emerged from the kitchen with her head in the pan. The mother thought it was the Angle of Death and shouted: I aren’t Mahsati, Angle of Death / I am only a poor old woman; If it’s Mahsati you have come to claim / There she is for you to take’; It is she who is ill, not me / Don’t with her confuse me.

ملک الموت من نه مهستی ام

من یکی پیرزال محنتی ام

گر تو را مهستی همی باید

اینک او را ببر که می شاید   [17]

Khaqani (1126-1198), the great twelfth century poet was so proud that he did not regard any other living poet worthy of the name. This got him into highly scathing exchanges, among others, with his teacher and father-in-law Abol’ala Ganjavi and his own pupil Mojir al-Din Bilaqani, both of them poets of different standing, though much less talented than him.  He wrote other lampoons and abuse about all and sundry, even including the lesbians of Baghdad: This is drumming, not fucking / resulting in a world-full of noise.[18] He wrote about a Lord As’ad:

خواجه اسعد چو می خورد پیوست

طرفه شکلی شود چو گردد مست

پارسا روی هست , اما نیست

قلتبان شکل نیست , اما هست

When Lord As’ad goes on drinking

His appearance looks ironical – drunk

He is pious looking but he is not one

He is not looking like a pimp, but he is one.[19]

Khaqani’s contemporary, Suzani Samarqandi (1072-1166) is perhaps the most notorious classic in harsh lampooning and ribaldry. His Divan is packed with harsh lampoons many of which are low in artistic touch. He too was at odds with his contemporary poets and used to attack them in poems which he wrote in the same metres and rhymes as theirs.  One of his targets was the great poet Nezami Ganjavi for whom he wrote an elegy before his death:

نظامی ار چه نمرده ست , مرده انگارم

به نظم مرثیتش حق طبع   بگزارم

چه گر بمیرد و آنگاه مرثیت  گویم

چو نشنود که چه گویم چه سود گفتارم

لطیف مرثیتی پیش او فرو گویم

چنانکه در دل او آرزوی مرگ آرم…

بمیرد آن سگ زن روسپی به مرگ سگان

اگر چه گوید با شیر نر به پیکارم…

Nezami is not dead but I assume he is

And write his elegy in verse

For if I do so after he dies

What’s the use when he hears it not?

I’ll write him such a delicate elegy

That would induce him to have death-wish…

Let that dog of a wife-whore die like dogs,

Even though he says he will fight me like a lion…[20]

Both Rumi and Sa’di, two of the all-time great classics flourished in the thirteenth century. They were both humorous in different ways, though, as mentioned, Rumi has a number of virtually pornographic tales. One of the better known is the story of the lady without a male partner who discovered that her slave girl lets the donkey in the stable have sex with her, not suspecting that she uses a pumpkin as a buffer. She tried to imitate the girl without the use of the pumpkin and died as a result: ‘It was a most disreputable death, my friend / Have you ever seen someone martyred by a donkey’s prick? (مرد مرگی با فضیحت ای پدر / تو شهیدی دیده ای از کیر خر ؟’)[21] Rumi also tells the story of two men, one of them good looking with a small beard, the other, ugly, whose beard had not yet grown. They once stay the night in a khaneqah, and in the middle of the night the beardless youth erects a barrier around himself with bricks. A resident man comes along with ill intentions. The pretty male had a small beard and so was out of bounds.  He asks the beard-less youth why he had done that. He said, to protect myself from geezers like you, since: A few hairs on the chin are more protective / than thirty bricks around one’s ass (بر زنخ سه چار مو بهر نمون /  بهتر از سی خشت گرداگرد کون).[22]

However, much that Rumi wrote in his Masnavi, let alone Divan-e Shams, was far from harsh and indelicate. He tells the tale of a man whom a group of dervishes invite to eat with them. At the dinner spread he joyfully repeats with them the zekr (evocation) ‘the donkey’s gone, the donkey’s gone, the donkey’s gone’ (خر برفت و خر برفت و خر برف), unaware that they had secretly sold his donkey to throw the feast. The camel’s knees are rough and dirty since she sits on them. Rumi says in a piece:

آن یکی پرسید اشتر را که هی

از کجا می ایی ای اقبال پی

گفت از حمام گرم کی تو

گفت خود پیداست از زانوی تو

Someone asked the camel, hey

Whence come you, you lucky one?

From your neighbourhood’s bath, he answered

Ah, it’s obvious from your knees, he said.[23]

Almost everything that Rumi wrote contained a mystical message, though this did not stop them from being humorous as well. The tale is famous of the merchant who had a parrot and, going to India, he asked it what it wanted as a souvenir. The parrot asked him to ask wild parrots how it could return to them. On return, the merchant said that when he put the question to the Indian parrots one of them dropped dead. Whereupon his own parrot dropped dead and he threw it out of its cage. The parrot flew up and was free.

Sa’di (c1210-1292) was the greatest Persian satirist of the thirteenth century. His satire is usually subtle and amusing, and contains a maxim or is instructive in other ways. In some of his works he resembles Rabelais who flourished more than two centuries after him, and sometimes Voltaire, who came centuries later, although no work of Sa’di’s is blasphemous. No wonder that Voltaire said if Sa’di is from Persia then Persians must be a highly civilised people. He wrote in a short stanza:

مردکی بود غرقه در جیحون

به سمرقند بود پندارم

بانگ می کرد و زار می نالید

که دریغا کلاه و دستارم

A little man was drowning in the River Oxus

– It was in Samarqand, I think –

Clamouring and complaining desperately

Woe for my hat and headdress![24]

 

Sa’di’s Golestan, a gem of a prose book that also includes the occasional verse, is packed with verbal and fictional satires of various kinds. A minister told a great Sufi that he served the sultan day and night, hoping for his reward while fearing his wrath. The Sufi told him that if he worshipped God as much as he worshipped the sultan, he would be one of the most pious.[25]

He tells the story of an imposter who dressed up his hair in the style of the descendants of the Prophet Mohammad and arrived in a town saying he was returning from Hajj and presented a qasideh to the king who gave him ample reward and treated him with great respect. However, one of the courtiers said that at the time of Hajj he had seen the man in Basra, so he was not a Hajji. Another one said that his father was Christian, how could he be a descendent of the Prophet. And they found his qasideh in Anvari’s Divan. The king ordered him to be flogged and driven out of town. He told the king ‘I’ll tell you one more thing and if it is not right I would deserve any punishment that you would mete out on me’. The king agreed, and he said in verse:

غریبی گرت ماست پیش آورد

دو پیمانه آب است و یک چمچه دوغ

اگر راست می خواهی از من شنو

جهاندیده بسیار گوید دروغ

If a stranger brings you yoghurt / It’ll be diluted and full of water; Ask me if you want to

know the truth / An experienced traveller tells all sorts of untruths.

The king laughed and let him go[26].

A religiously devout man was guest of a king and at dinner he ate less than usual. And when they stood to prayers he prayed longer than he was used to. Returning home, he asked for food. His son asked him why and he said he had not eaten much at the court to impress the king. The son told him to repeat his prayers as well because his prayers at the court would not be answered.[27]

A king asked an ascetic ‘Do you ever remember me?’ He said yes, when I forget God[28].

They said an ascetic ate a lot of food every night and then prayed until dawn. A wise man   said it would be much better if he ate lightly and slept through[29].

A king faced a difficulty. He vowed that if it was resolved he would give so much alms to the ascetics. When his prayers were answered he asked a trusted servant to distribute the alms among the ascetics. Next day the servant returned and said he could not find one. Surprised, the king said to his knowledge there were four-hundred ascetics in his land. The servant said Sire those who are ascetic refuse the alm, and those who accept it are not ascetic.[30] Someone told his guru that he was tired of having so many visitors. He said give a loan to those of them who are poor and ask for a loan from those who are rich. You would then not be bothered by any of them.[31]

Someone got an eye-ache and went to a vet. The vet put in his eye what he would for beasts and he got blind. The case went before the judge. The judge said there is no compensation, since if he was not an ass he wouldn’t seek treatment from a vet.[32]

Someone’s young good-looking wife died and his mother-in-law stayed at home on account of the dowry. The man found her presence unpleasant, but he could see no way out of it. One day a group of friends came to see him. One of them asked how he was in the absence of his beloved. He said seeing my mother-in-law is worse than missing my wife.[33]

The relatively long tale of the Hamedan judge and the pretty farrier boy could have made a scandal in the twenty-first century. The judge fell madly in love with the youth and tried every trick to seduce him and eventually succeeded. One night they got together and on the same night the police chief was informed. The judge was at the height of ecstasy when one of his retainers brought him the news that the prince was on the way. The judge did not heed the warning. The prince showed up and this was the scene he saw:

شمع را دید ایستاده , شاهد نشسته,  می ریخته , قدح شکسته , قاضی در خواب مستی بی خبر از ملک هستی.

The candle standing, the youth sitting, the wine spilled on the floor and the judge

drunken and sleep, unaware of all that there was.

The prince gently told him to wake up since the sun was rising. The judge got the message and said: Where did it rise from? He said from the east. The judge said thank God it is still possible to repent [since according to a hadith, as long as the sun rises from the east it is possible to repent]. His canny response was ineffective since the prince thought a man of his standing must be punished for others to take a lesson from it, and so ordered that he be thrown down the castle. The judge said I have been a servant of your dynasty, why don’t you throw someone else so I would take a lesson. The prince laughed and forgave him.[34]

Sa’di also tells the tale of a fox who was running away. They asked it why, it said they were catching camels. They said but you are not a camel. It said if an enemy said I was, it would be all over before he was proven wrong.  In several anecdotes, Sa’di is critical of the marriage of old men with young women. In the shortest one of them he says that they asked an old man why he did not marry. He said “I don’t enjoy the company of old women.” They said but you are wealthy and can marry a young one. He said, “Being old, I don’t have any joy with old women. How can a young woman have affection for me?”[35] In a lengthier anecdote he says that an old man married a young woman, trying to amuse her every night to make her happy. One night he told her that luck was with her in marrying him, not an arrogant and ill-tempered young man.  The woman sighed and said what you have told me so far is not as good as what I heard from my midwife who said it would be better for an arrow to sit at the side of a young woman than an old man. So there was no hope of agreement and they separated. The woman then got married to a poor and aggressive young man and constantly thanked God that she had escaped from that hideous torture and reached this state of bliss.[36]

The great fourteenth-century poet, Hafiz (1325-1389), lived for five years under the religious tyranny of a ruler who had defeated in battle his favourite prince and imposed the strictest possible Islamic rule. In his ghazals, we find jibes and subtle humour reflecting his acute unhappiness in those circumstances. He used to call the ruler, Amir Mobarez, “the chief religious police” or mohtaseb, each time he wanted to say something critical about him.  For example, he says in a ghazal: Do not ever drink with the city’s mohtaseb / because he will drink your wine and throw stones at its cup.[37] And in another: “We drink, we are licentious, we love pretty youths / who is there in town unlike us; Do not mention to mohtaseb my vices / Because he is drinking constantly like us.”[38]

میخواره و سرگشته و رندیم و نظر باز

وان کس که در این شهر چو ما نیست کدام است

با محتسبم عیب نگو یید  که او نیز

پیوسته چو ما در طلب عیش مدام است

 

In yet another ghazal, he writes: Try to learn libertinism from mohteseb / Since he is drunk and no-one suspects it (ای دل  طریق رندی از محتسب بیاموز / مست است و در حق او, کس این گمان ندارد ) .[39]

Neither does Hafiz leave the divine and the preachers unscathed. For example: The preachers who appear thus at the altar and pulpit / Do the other thing when no-one is looking. ( واعظان کاین جلوه در محراب و منبر می کنند / چون به خلوت می روند آن کار دیگر می کنند  )[40] Or: The Lord Imam whose prayers was so long / washed up his gown in the blood of wine (امام خواجه که بودش سر نماز دراز  / به خون دختر رز خرقه را قصارت کرد.[41] Somewhere else he wrote: Although I am drunk, libertine and sinful / Thank God my fellow citizens are all sinless (من ار چه عاشقم و رند و مست و نامه سیاه / هزار شکر که یاران شهر بی گنهند).[42]

Again: Forty years we suffered and in the end / Our remedy was in the hands of two-year-old wine (چل سال رنج و غصه کشیدیم و عاقبت / تدبیر ما به دست شراب دو ساله بود).[43] In general, the humour of Hafiz is so subtle that it is difficult to appreciate fully out of the context.

The greatest classical satirist, however, is Obeyd Zakani (c.1300-1370). He compares with Voltaire and Jonathan Swift, to the extent that his satire involves sharp criticism of social injustice, prejudice and irrational beliefs. Contemporary but senior to Hafiz, he was an accomplished poet in his own right, but most of his satire is found in a series of small books such as Cat and Mouse, Ethics of the Gentry, Joyous Treatment, The Hundred Maxims, etc. His long poem, Cat and Mouse, is a political allegory about the war between the noted religious tyrant of Shiraz who had previously been the prince of Kerman and had defeated and killed the ruler of Shiraz, who was both a favourite of Hafiz and Obeyd. It tells how a cat in Kerman repented in a mosque of catching mice, unaware that a little mouse was hearing him. The mouse rushes to its friends and gives them the good news, and being elated, they bring the cat presents for its life-saving decision. But no sooner do they get close to him that he jumps at them and begins to catch as many as possible: “Five mice he captured-two in each front paw / And one was snapped up in his lion-like jaw’ (دو بدین چنگ و دو بدان چنگال

یک به دندان چو شیر  غرانا .[44] The mice declare war and capture the cat, but it manages to break free of its fetters and attacks and wins the war. This is a mockery of Amir Mobarez al-Din – Hafiz’s mohtaseb – portrayed by the cat whose piety is implied to be pure hypocrisy.

It would take a volume to describe and discuss Obey’d satirical booklets. Here let me quote a couple from his Resaleh-ye Delgosha or Joyous Treatment, some of which are written in Arabic:

For example:

They asked a man why does your son not look like you. He said, ‘If our neighbours leave us alone, my children would look like me’.[45]

A man saw a baby cry and would not stop despite her mother’s gentle touches. The man told her if you don’t stop I’ll give your mother a treatment. The mother said this baby will not believe what you say unless she actually sees it. [46]

And in Persian:

A man asked a preacher what is the name of Satan’s wife. He said ‘Come here and I’ll tell you’. The man went to him and the preacher said into his ear ‘You bloody pimp, how would I know?’ When he returned to his place, others asked him what the answer was. He said: Whoever wants to know should go and ask his reverent himself.[47]

In another anecdote, Talhak (Cf. dalqak) the court jester was asked the meaning of cuckoldry. He said this question should be asked of judges.[48]

In another anecdote we read:

A man went to a doctor of religious law and told him that when he stood to prayers he got an erection; what is the remedy? He told him to think of his dead parents. He said it would not work. He said think of when you die. He said that would not work either. No matter how many advices of this kind the doctor gave, it was useless. He lost his cool and said ‘little man come and push it up my ass’. He said ‘I have come to you to do whatever you advise’.[49]

In yet another coarse anecdote:

They were mating two donkeys in a village, a pretty woman being the owner of the he-donkey. The she-donkey’s owner told the woman how come you want 5 drachmas for the services of your donkey whereas if I want to copulate with a woman she would demand ten drachmas from me? The woman said ‘bring me a prick like this and I would give you fifty drachmas.’[50]

Mowlana Qotb al-Din, a renowned physician, went to visit an important man who was ill.  He asked the patient how he was. He replied that he had had fever but it had now broken, although his neck was still hurting. The physician said let’s hope that that too would break soon.[51]

A judge fell ill and the physician ordered him to be fed wine through his ass. This they did and he got drunk and began to shout and bellow. They asked his son what he was doing. He said he is shouting through his ass.[52]

As it can be imagined there are a number of anecdotes in Obeyd’s Treatise on marriage and the relationship between husbands and wives, not to mention men and youths. He says in one of them:

A young wife went to the judge and complained, ‘I am a young woman and my husband does not serve me right’. The husband said, ‘I serve her as much as I can’. She said ‘I am not content with less than five times a night’. He said, ‘More than three times is not in my power’. The judge said ‘What a strange plight I am in. They don’t bring a case to me unless I have to contribute something myself. But let it be. I will undertake the other two times myself.’[53]

Some of the anecdotes regarding men and youths cannot be repeated in polite society. Let us, nevertheless, quote one which more or less can be.

A Christian boy converted to Islam. The police chief ordered him to be circumcised.  At night fall he sodomised the boy. Next day his father asked him how he had found the Muslims. The boy said they are a strange lot, when someone converts to their religion, in the morning they cut off his prick and at night they tear up his ass.[54]

As mentioned, there is much more to Obeyd than has been presented here. But his was the peak of both coarse and subtle classical humour.

Passing over the neo-classical period in which much of the satire in poetry, such as in Yaghma Jandaqi and Qa’ani Shirazi, was coarse though still humorous, we arrive in the twentieth century which among so many other literary and cultural developments saw the popularity of humour both at the literary and journalistic level. The century opened with the movement against arbitrary rule (estebdad) and for the establishment of a constitution, subsequently known as the Constitutional Revolution. Within a short period, young poets and satirists took to the field and published their works in the extensive revolutionary press which had mushroomed up both in the capital and the provinces. The focus was on the aims of the revolution and especially the central objective of ending the shah’s arbitrary powers.  The old shah (Mozaffareddin) gave up resistance relatively easily, but he died soon, and when his son and successor (Mohammad Ali) mounted the throne it took two years of struggle between 1908 and 1909 before he would be overthrown.

Ali Akbar Dehkhoda (1879-1955) is everybody’s darling for his famous ‘charand parand’ or charivari column in the newspaper Sur-e Esrafil. He displayed unrivalled talent both for his clear, simple and somewhat colloquial prose and for his highly effective political satire. But what he wrote was often scathing and sometimes libelous. He addressed one piece to Adam Smith whom he described as “the father of political economy.” He said that Smith had been wrong in identifying nature, labour and capital as the three factors of production, because in that case the shah would have no way of increasing his wealth. The shah does not work, he went on to explain, his nature does not function well ever since he has been taking an opium tablet every night, and he has no capital. Would he then not be able to increase his wealth? He would, Dehkhoda went on to say, by holding a circumcision ceremony for the boy heir-designate, Ahmad Mirza, and collect the pishkeshes that courtiers and notables would be obliged to present to him on such an auspicious occasion.[55]

 

In another piece he wrote a letter, as if addressed by the shah to the Swiss parliament. In it the shah is made to address the Swiss parliament as “his exalted excellency the parliament of Switzerland”, ask the parliament to arrest all the Iranian dissidents in “his” realm and have them bastinadoed, and end by saying that the letter is accompanied by a ceremonial robe (khal’at) to show the shah’s appreciation of his, i.e., the parliament’s, services.[56]

Dehakhodâ wrote a few satirical poems as well, but, though sometimes sounding colloquial, they tended to contain archaic words, and in any case were no match for his prose in charand parand.

Seyyed Ashraf (1871-c1934) published the newspaper Nasim-e Shomal (Northern Breeze), all the columns of which he virtually filled single-handedly. He was to a considerable extent Dehkhoda’s counterpart in writing simple and colloquial poetry in support of constitutionalism as well as constitutionalists.  He too was vehement in dealing with the shah, the anti-constitutionalists and critics of constitutionalism, but stopped short of Dehkhoda in his personal attacks. Still, he was scathing enough. He accused Sheikh Fazlollh Nuri, a conservative cleric, of putting his faith on sale and destroying the dignity of Muslim people:

دشمن فرقه ابرار منم

قاتل زمره احرار منم

شیخ فضل الله سمسار منم

دین فروشنده به بازار منم

مال مردار حراج است حراج

كو خریدار حراج است حراج…

I am the enemy of the freedom party [the sheikh is made to say]

I am the murderer of all freedom-lovers

I am Sheikh Fazlollah the pawn-broker

I am selling religion in the bazaar…

-Dead stuff I must put on sale

Come buyers, sale, sale![57]

Iraj Mirza (1873-1925) who was not a typically political poet was nevertheless moved by the action of Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri in taking sanctuary against the parliament (Majlis) to write:

حجت الاسلام کتک می زند

بر سر و مغزت دگنک می زند …

چک زن سختی بود این پهلوان

ملتفتش باش که چک می زند

دستش اگر بر فکلی ها رسد

گوز یکایک به الک می زند …

حالا در حضرت عبدالعظیم

شیخ در دوز و کلک می زند

ان شاءالله دو روز دگر

خیمه از آنجا به درک می زند

 

His reverend smacks you

He clubs your head and brain

A big slapper is this champion

Look out or he’ll slap you.

If he gets his hands on men with a bowtie

He would beat the fart of each of them by a stick…

Now in the shrine of Abdol’azim

The sheikh is busy scheming

God willing in a couple of days

He would leave there and camp in Hell…[58]

Of the poets who continued – indeed advanced – the writing of harsh political poetry in the period of post-revolutionary conflict and chaos, the highest prize should go to Aref-e Qazvini (c.1281-1933) and Mirzade-ye Eshqi (1893-1924). Much of the humorous effects of their political lampoons are due to the coarseness of the language, although Eshqi’s poetry is considerably more mature, and he might even have made a notable poet had he not fallen victim to political assassination at an early age.

The end of World War I and the conclusion of the 1919 Agreement led to an explosion of nationalist passions both in response to the influenza epidemic, famine and chaos, and to what was firmly (but erroneously) believed to be the design to turn Iran into a British protectorate.[59] It was of course not just poetry. The newspapers opposed to the 1919 agreement – that is, most of the papers published in Tehran were full of innuendos and sometimes downright libels against the government and its leading figures. Eshqi addressed an obscene poem to Vosuq, the prime minister, saying that Iran was not his daddy’s property, was not the rent of his boyhood adventures, and was not the wages of his loose-laced daughter.

ای وثوق الدوله ایران ملک بابا یت نبود

اجرت المثل زمان بچگی هایت نبود

مزد کار دختر هر روز یکجایت نبود…[60]

Aref went overboard and described the entire Iranian people as asses:

…People of this lawless land are asses

By God both common and grand are asses…

He who heads the ministers,

– I swear by the God of both worlds –

Is a bigger ass than them all

In fact he is a stable-full of asses …[61]

And he ended this long poem with verses which could well be the subject of a separate study:

بلشویک است خضر راه نجات

– بر محمد و آله صلوات –

ای لنین ای فرشته رحمت کن

کن قدم رنجه زود و بی زحمت

هین بفرما که خانه خانه توست

تخم چشم من آشیانه توست…

 

The Bolshevik is the divine guide to salvation

– Blessed be Mohammad and his people –

O’ Lenin, O’ angel of bliss

Take the trouble if you please

You may nest in the apple of my eye

Please step in, the home is yours…[62]

The period between the 1921 coup and the fall of the Qajars in 1925 was one of intense power struggle between popular democrats and constitutionalists, on the one hand, and nationalists and modernists, on the other. Towards the end of the period, the body politic was divided between those for and those against a dictatorship led by Reza Khan, but in the first couple of years the situation was a good deal less clear-cut. For example, when Vahid Dastgerdi wrote a poem in praise of Reza Khan and incidentally attacked Eshqi and Aref, Eshqi wrote a long and devastating reply in a qasideh, leaving little to imagination:

ای وحید دستگردی شیخ گندیده دهن

ای که نامیدی همی گند دهانت را سخن

ای شپش خور شیخ یاوه گوی شندر پندری

ای نداده امتیاز شعر با گند دهن

پوستین بر پیکرت چون جلد خرسی کول سگ

هیکلت اندر عبا چون دوش نسناسی کفن

بر سرت عمامه چون آلوده با گچ سنده ای

رو در آیینه نگر باور نداری گر ز من

ای سخن هایت همه مانند گوز اندر هوا

ای زبانت در دهان مانند گه  اندر لگن…

O Vahid-e Dastgerdi, filthy-mouthed sheikh

Who call the filth of your mouth poetry!

O louse-eating sheikh in torn-off rags

Who mistake poetry for the filth in your mouth!

Your skin coat is like a bear’s skin on a dog’s shoulder

Your garment looks like a shroud around a baboon

Your turban is like a turd wrapped in plaster

Look in the mirror if you doubt my word

Every word of yours is like a fart in the air

Your tongue in your mouth is like shit in a basin…and so on.[63]

At about the same time, Eshqi wrote a general condemnation of politics and politicians:

بعد از این بر وتن و بوم و برش باید رید

به چنین مجلس و بر کر و فرش باید رید

به حقیقت در عدل ار در این بام و در است

به چنین عدل و به دیوار و درش باید رید

آنکه بگرفته از او تا کمر  ایران گه

به مکافات الا تا کمرش باید رید…

From now on the motherland and its environs must be shat on

Such a parliament and both its high and low members must be shat on.

Truly if the gate of justice is this roof and gate [i.e. the parliament]

Then such justice and its wall and gate must be shat on.

He who has been shitting on Iran up to her waist,

In retribution, up to his waist he must be shat on…[64]

At the close of the fourth parliament in 1923, both Aref and Eshqi were still pro-Reza Khan. Aref was to continue his support but Eshqi was to renounce it. When the fourth parliament ended, Eshqi wrote his infamous poem in which he haled insult and invective on virtually every politician:

این مجلس چارم به خدا ننگ بشر بود

دیدی چه خبر بود

هر کار که کردند ضرر روی ضرر بود

دیدی چه خبر بود

این مجلس چارم خودمانیم  ثمر داشت

ولله ضرر داشت

صد شکر که عمرش چو زمانه به گذر بود

دیدی چه خبر بود…

دیگر نکند هو نزند جفت مدرس

در سالن مجلس

 بگذشت دگر مدتی ار محشر خر بود

دیدی چه خبر بود…

This fourth parliament was a blot on humanity,

Didn’t you see it all?

Whatever they did was loss upon loss,

Didn’t you see it all?

Honestly was this fourth parliament of any use?

By God it was all loss

Thank heaven that its life was not to last,

Didn’t you see it all?…

No more will Modarres jump and somersault

In the parliament’s hall

The jamboree of donkeys is now up,

Didn’t you see it all?. . .[65]

Parvin E’tesami was a prominent woman poet with a pessimistic view of life and society, and was extremely sympathetic towards the meek, weak and downtrodden. And she often employed irony, not satire, in defending the weak and castigating the strong. She does however have a piece in the form of a dialogue or debate, in which she satirizes the symbols and agents of religious authority in a very effective way. The morality police (mohtaseb) stops a drunk and grabs his neck. The drunk tells him that what he has grabbed “is a shirt, not a [donkey’s] rein(این پیراهن است افسار نیست  ).”

In the course of the conversation the policeman tells the drunkard he can be held at the mosque before they call the civil police, but he rebuffs that by saying that the mosque is no place for evil-doers. The policeman then says that the house of the judge is nearby so they can go there, but the drunk retorts that the judge himself may be in the tavern. In the end the policeman says that the sober should punish the drunk by whipping them, and the drunk says but no-one here is sober.[66]

Iraj was an outstanding poet and satirist and in no way can justice be done to his work in this brief. He is, among other things, famous for his opposition to face veil.  And we may here quote two specimens of his long poems on this subject.[67]

Very briefly, the narrator says that as a young man he had once invited a woman into his home on a bogus pretext. He had then asked the woman to show him her face and the woman had severely rebuked him. As a result, he had changed tactics and, instead, made physical passes at the woman. The woman had responded positively, and they had ended up copulating while she was holding fast onto her hejab, refusing to show her face, because, the narrator jibes, chastity was in her face. The poet then concludes that, compared with liberated women, ignorant women wearing the face veil are far less capable of defending their honour.[68]

And once more criticizing hejab, he says in another poem that they once drew the picture of a woman above the gate of a caravanserai. The clerics, whom he calls ‘the turban masters,’ hear of it and arrive at the scene without delay. They mix dust with water, make a neqab for the picture, and thus save the faith—he comments—with a fistful of mud.[69]

Another outstanding poet was Poet-Laureate Bahar who did not often write humorous poems but he has a long piece satirising the efforts to turn Iran into a republican dictatorship, in 1923-24, with a couple of stanzas of which we may end this talk[70]:

چو جمهوری شود آقای دشتی

علمدارش بود شیطان رشتی

تدین آن سفیه کهنه مشدی

نشیند عصرها در توی هشتی

کند کور و کچل ها را خبر دار

ز حلاج و ز رواس و ز سمسار

-دریغ  از راه دور و رنج بسیار…

ز عدل الملک بشنو یک حکایت

که آن بالا  بلند بی کفایت

میانجی گشته بین بول و غایط

کند گاهی تدین را حمایت

شود گاهی سلیمان را مدد کار

که سازد این دو را با یکدگر یار

– دریغ  از راه دور و رنج بسیار…

When there appears a republican in Mr. [Ali] Dashti

His standard bearer being that devil of a Rashti [Mirza Karim Khan]

[Seyyed Mohammad]Tadayyon, that insane old Mashti

Sits every night in the entrance hall of his home

Summons the riffraff up to the hashti

From cotton-whippers to pawn-brokers

– Alas the long way and great suffering

Listen to a tale about Adl-al-Molk

That that tall and useless bloke

Between shit and piss he tries to mediate

He sometimes to Tadayyon lends support

And at other times becomes Soleyman’s assistant

To bring these two together

– Alas the long way and great suffering. . .[71]

To conclude this necessarily incomplete talk, ever since the rise of classical literature circa eleven centuries ago, satire was a genre that was used especially in poetry though sometimes in prose as well. In classical era it peaked in the fourteenth century, though it did continue less frequently and less prominently until the twentieth century when it flourished in the constitutional era. In the regime of one-man-rule that followed – and putting aside the occasional “harmless” satirical journals – it necessarily was either unpublished or muted, until the 1940s and early 50s when a number of good satirical magazines emerged in a free atmosphere. But that did not last long, until the revolution of February 1979 changed the nature of many things, including satire.

 

[1]The revised and extended version of Keynote address delivered at the conference of the International Society for Humour Studies, Montreal, 10-14 July 2017.

[2]Divan-e Mahhasti Ganjavi, ed. Taheri Shahab (Tehran: Tahuri, 1957), 28.

[3]Abolfazl Beyhaqi, ed. Ali Akbar Fayyaz (Tehran: N.P, 1995), 458.

[4]Divan-e Naser Khosrow, ed. Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh, re.ed., Mehdi Soheili (Isfahan: Enteshar-e Ketabforushi-ye Ta’id, 1956), 616.

[5]Keykavus ibn Eskandar, Qabusnameh, ed. Amin Abdolmajid Badavi (Tehran: Ibn Sina, 1956), 134.

[6]Keykavus ibn Eskandar, Qabusnameh, 136.

[7]Keykavus ibn Eskandar, Qabusnameh, 134.

[8]Divan-e Anvari, ed. Modarres Razavi (Tehran: Bongah-e Tarjomeh va Nashr-e Ketab, 1968), 471-473.

[9]Homa Katouzian, “Satire in Persian Literature, 1900-1940” in Literature of the Early Twentieth Century, From the Constitutional Period to Reza Shah, ed. Ali-Asghar Seyed-Gohrab (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2015), 163.

[10]Mehdi Hamidi, Behesht-e Sokhan (Tehran: Pazhang, 1987), 439.

[11]Divan-e Anvari, Ba Moqaddameh va Tashih va Moqabeleh-ye Hasht Noskheh, ed. Sa’id Nafisi (Tehran: Mo’asseseh-ye Matbu’ati-ye Piruz, 1959), 379.

[12]Hamidi, Behesht-e Sokhan, 438.

[13]Hamidi, Behesht-e Sokhan, 439.

[14]Hamidi, Behesht-e Sokhan, 437.

[15]Ali Asghar Halabi, Tanz o Shukh Tab’i dar Iran va Jahan-e Eslami, Tehran: Entesharat-e Behbahani, 1998, 491.

[16]Sana’i Ghaznavi, Hadiqa al-Haqiqa, ed. Modarres Razavi (Tehran: N.P., 1951), 387.

[17]Hamidi, Behesht-e Sokhan, 329.

[18]Divan-e Khaqani Shirvani, ed. Zia Al-Din Sajjadi (Tehran: Zavvar: 1959), 808-809.

[19]Sajjadi, Divan-e Khaqani Shirvani, 847.

[20]Divan-e Hakim Suzani  Samarqandi, ed. Naser al-Din Shah-Hosseini (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1959), 62.akim Suzani SamarqandiHh

[21]Ketab-e Masnavi-ye Ma’navi, ed. Reynold A. Nicholson, Book Five (Tehran: N.P., N.D.),  86-87.

[22]Nicholson, Ketab-e Masnavi-ye Ma’navi, Book 6, 493-495.

[23]Homa Katouzian, Tanz o Tanzineh-ye Hedayat (Tehran: Pardis-e Danesh, 2016), 90.

[24]Katouzian, Satire, 162.

[25]Homa Katouzian, Golchin-e Sa’di (Tehran, Nashr-e Markaz, 2009), 25.

[26]Katouzian, Golchin-e Sa’di, 25-26.

[27]Katouzian, Golchin-e Sa’di, 30.

[28]Katouzian, Golchin-e Sa’di, 32.

[29]Katouzian, Golchin-e Sa’di, 33.

[30]Katouzian, Golchin-e Sa’di, 35.

[31]Katouzian, Golchin-e Sa’di, 36.

[32]Katouzian, Golchin-e Sa’di, 62.

[33]Katouzian, Golchin-e Sa’di, 50.

[34]Katouzian, Golchin-e Sa’di, 55-56.

[35]Katouzian, Golchin-e Sa’di, 58.

[36]Katouzian, Golchin-e Sa’di, 57.

[37]Ghazaliyat-e Hafiz, ed. Adib Borumand, aided by Purandokht Borumand (Tehran: Pazhang, 1988), 329.

[38]Borumand, Ghazaliyat-e Hafiz, 47.

[39]Borumand, Ghazaliyat-e Hafiz, 279.

[40]Borumand, Ghazaliyat-e Hafiz, 422.

[41]Borumand, Ghazaliyat-e Hafiz, 290.

[42]Borumand, Ghazaliyat-e Hafiz, 426.

[43]Borumand, Ghazaliyat-e Hafiz, 452.

[44]“Cat and Mouse,” trans. Dick Davis, in Hasan Javadi, Obeyd-e Zakani (Washington: Mage Publishers, 2008), 129.

[45]Kolliyat-e Obeyd-e Zakani, ed. Abbas Eqbal, re-ed., Parviz Atabaki (Tehran: Zavvar, N.D.; date of preface, 1963), 251.

[46]Eqbal, Kolliyat-e Obeyd-e Zakani,118.

[47]Javadi, Obeyd-e Zakani, 112.

[48]Javadi, Obeyd-e Zakani; Kolliyat-e Obeyd-e Zakani, ed. Abbas Eqbal, re-ed., Parviz Atabaki, 289.

[49]Eqbal, Kolliyat-e Obeyd-e Zakani, 278.

[50]Eqbal, Kolliyat-e Obeyd-e Zakani, 286.

[51]Eqbal, Kolliyat-e Obeyd-e Zakani, 281.

[52]Eqbal, Kolliyat-e Obeyd-e Zakani, 287.

[53]Javadi, Obeyd-e Zakani, 93.

[54]Eqbal, Kolliyat-e Obeyd-e Zakani, 279.

[55]See Maqâlât-e Dehkhodâ, ed., Mohammad Dabir-Siyâqi, vol. 1 (Tehran, 1983), 194-195.

[56]Dabir-Siyâqi, Maqâlât-e Dehkhodâ, 199-200. For a study of Dehkhoda’s life and works see the entry in Encyclopedia Iranica, www.iranica.com/articles/dehkoda.

[57]See Edward G. Browne, Press and Poetry (Hyderabad, India: Osmania University, 1914), 213-214.  For Browne’s English translation of this poem’s first five stanzas see 215-216.

[58]See Divan-e Kâmel-e Iraj Mirzâ, ed. Mohammad Ja’far Mahjub, fifth impression (America: 1986), 12-13.

[59]Almost everyone was convinced that this was the case until 1981 when, for the first time, this author argued against it. See Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran (London and New York: Macmillan), 77-78.  For a detailed and documented study of the Anglo-Iranian 1919 Agreement, see idem, State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), chapters 4-7.

[60]See Kolliyat-e Mosavvar-e Eshqi, ed. Ali Akbar Mir-Salimi (Tehran: Mir-Salimi, 1943), 292. For a study of Ehsqi’s life and works see the entry in Encyclopaedia Iranica, www.iranica.com/articles/esqi-mohammad-reza-mirzada.  For further and more recent studies of Eshqi and his works see Mohammad Qa’ed, Eshqi, Sima-ye Najib-e yek Anarshist, Virast-e Dovvom (Tehran: Tarh-e Naw, 2001); Solmaz Naraqi, Mirzadeh-ye Eshqi (Tehran: Nashr-e Thaleth, 2009).

[61]Divan-e Aref-e Qazvini, ed. Abdorrahman Seyf-e Azad (Tehran: Seyf-e Azad, 1948), 298.

[62]Seyf-e Azad, Divan-e Aref-e Qazvini, 300.

[63]See Mir-Salimi, Kolliyat-e Mosavvar, 407-409.

[64]Mir-Salimi, Kolliyat-e Mosavvar, 403.

[65]Mir-Salimi, Kolliyat-e Mosavvar, 396-402.

[66]Divan-e Parvin E’tesami, ed. Heshmat Moayyad (Costa Mesa, Calif: Mazda Publishers, 1987).

[67]For a longish study of Iraj’s work, see Homa Katouzian, “Iraj, the Poet of Love and Humour” in HK, IRAN, Politics, History and Literature (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).

[68]Divan-e Kamele- Iraj Mirza, ed. Mohammad Ja’far Mahjub (Washington: Shrkat-e Ketab, 1989), 79-84.

[69]Mahjub, Divan-e Kamele- Iraj Mirza, 177-178.

[70]For a longish treatment of Bahar’s humour, see, Katouzian, “Satire in Persian Literature, 1900-1940″; and “Literature and Politics in Iran: 1919-1925.”

[71]Divan-e Ash’ar-e Mohammad Taqi Bahar, Malek al-Sho’ara, ed. Mehrdad Bahar (Tehran: Tus, 1989), I.

Culture and Democracy

دموکراسی یا حقیقت محصول بحث‌هایی بود که طی اقامتم در ایران و حین تدریس در دانشکدة علوم اجتماعی دانشگاه تهران در سال 1378 با روشنفکران، استادان و دانشجویان داشتم. هر چند این کتاب اولین اثری بود که از من در ایران به چاپ می‌رسید، خوشبختانه مباحث کتاب با نقد و بررسی‌های مفیدی روبه‌رو شد و خوانندگان از آن استقبال کردند و شاید بتوان آن را یکی از علت‌های گفت‌وگو و زمینۀ نقدهایی جدی‌‌‌تر میان روشنفکران و اهل ‌نظر دربارة دموکراسی در ایران دانست. به‌رغم انتشار سه کتاب دیگرم در ایران، عمدتاً از طریق مباحث مطرح در این کتاب به خوانندگان فارسی‌زبان معرفی شده‌ام. با این ‌همه،  باید اذعان کنم که ضمن دفاع از بنیان و اساس نظریاتی که در این کتاب به آنها پرداخته‌ام، مطالب مطرح شده در این اثر دربرگیرندة همة موضوعات و مشغولیات ذهنی امروز من نیست و به اقتضای زمان با سویه‌های دیگری از این مباحث و مسایل درگیر شده‌‌ام. بحث‌های ده سال اخیرم دربارة ”سنت‌های روشنفکری در ایران،“ ”اخلاق در حوزة عمومی“ و ”نقد گرایش‌های آزادی‌ستیز در ایران“ به من کمک کرد تا به محدودیت‌های آن کتاب پی ‌ببرم و به زوایای دیگری از تدوین نظریة دموکراسی در ایران بپردازم. می‌کوشم در این مقاله چند نکتة مهم نظری را عرضه کنم که برای پیشبرد مباحث مطرح شده ضروری‌اند.

 

حقیقت و سیاست

به هر میزان که حقیقت و سیاست از یکدیگر مستقل‌تر باشند، جامعه بازتر، شهروندان شادمان‌تر و بی‌اخلاقی، تزویر و ظلم کم‌رنگ‌‌‌‌‌‌تر خواهد بود. اگر دلسوزانه خواهان زندگی در جامعه‌ای باز و آزادیم، بهتر است فریب اشتیاق برای ساختن جامعه‌ای کامل و متعالی را نخوریم و پاسداران جدایی حقیقت از قدرت (سیاست) باشیم، زیرا اگر آنان که در کار اخلاق، دین و فلسفه‌اند در حوزة سیاست مستقر شوند، هم حقیقت و هم سیاست قربانی خواهند شد. در عوض، اگر گفتمان حقیقت‌خواه به نقد سیاست و قدرت دست‌زند، هم سیاست تلطیف می‌شود و هم جامعه به فضایل مدنی بیشتر راغب خواهد شد. محور اصلی بحث دموکراسی یا حقیقت بر این پایه قرار گرفته است که حقیقت‌‌‌خواهی در حوزة سیاست، عملاً به معنی ادغام حقیقت با قدرت سیاسی است. این در حالی است که قائل شدن به ارجحیت هرگونه نظام فکری (خواه فلسفی یا دینی)  سبب فساد فرهنگ و رواج ظلم در جامعه خواهد شد. به گمان من، دموکراسی‌خواهی و حقیقت‌خواهی دو حوزة گوناگون با کیفیات متفاوت و ملاحظات متمایزند و به ‌هیچ‌وجه نباید یکی را جای دیگری پنداشت.

در روشنفکران ایران: روایت‌های یأس و امید کوشیده‌ام به پیامدهای دهشتناک این وسوسة روشنفکرانه بپردازم که جامعه را بر اساس نوع خاصی از حقیقت تعریف می‌کند. در نوشته‌های دیگرم هم کوشیده‌ام به خطرات این شور روشنفکرانه به منظور تسلط مطلق حقیقتی واحد بر جامعه توجه دهم. از آنجا که به‌ هیچ‌وجه و تحت هیچ شرایطی نمی‌توان تعریفی واحد از حقیقت را به کلیت جامعه تعمیم داد، هرگونه تلاش برای برتر دانستن حقیقت در جامعه در عمل منجر به خشونت می‌شود. بنابراین، حوزة فلسفه و دین، که حقیقت در مرکز توجه‌شان است، اگر در مرکز سیاست نباشند، به  طراوت و بهروزی جامعه کمک‌های اساسی می‌کنند. اما اگر به قصد تحول اجتماعی به مرکزیت سیاسی وارد شوند، ‌جز اعمال قهر و خشونت چاره‌ای نخواهند داشت. نمونة بارز این امر در فلسفة مارتین هایدگر دیده می‌شود. هایدگر در دنیای مدرن به دنبال تعریفی اصیل از هستی انسان -در مقابل هستی‌های متفاوت واقعاً موجود- در نهایت به خشونت و نازیسم رسید. همچنین، می‌شود تبعات ناگوار این نوع نگرش را در تلاش کسانی دید که در روسیه، چین، کوبا و کشورهایی از این دست مارکسیسم را بر واقعیات انسانی و اجتماعی مرجح دانستند. صورت دیگری از این مسئله را در حمله به افغانستان و پاکستان و عراق می‌بینیم.

برای اجتناب از سوء تفاهم باید بگویم که بحث من این نیست که فلسفه، و حتی فلسفه هایدگر که به آن اشاره کردم، در ذات خود خشونت‌زا و قهرآمیزند و از این‌ رو باید از آن گریخت. کاملاً به عکس، فلسفه و حتی فلسفة هایدگر و دیگر حوزه‌های تعریف حقیقت، اگر قصد غلبه بر عرصة سیاسی جامعه را نداشته باشند، نقشی مثبت در اصلاح و بهبود جامعه خواهند داشت و نتیجة پرداختن به آنها توسعۀ آزادی فکری و فرهنگی در جامعه است. توسل به راه ‌‌‌حل‌‌‌های فلسفی به منزلۀ حقیقتی مطلق و یکّه در جوامع بحران‌زده می‌‌‌تواند یکی از راه‌ حل‌‌‌های سیاسی و اجتماعی باشد که پیامدهایی تراژیک در بر خواهد داشت. برای نمونه، ایده‌های  مارکس هرچند به دیدن و شناختن محدودیت‌ها و دشواری‌های نظام سرمایه‌داری کمک شایانی کرد، اما زمانی به فاجعه بدل شد که در کشورهایی کوشیدند این نحوة نگرش را چونان حقیقتی مطلق به نگرش غالب در جامعه بدل سازند. تجربة جنبش‌ها و کشورهایی را که با توسل به فلسفة مارکسیسم انواع آزادی را از مردم سلب کردند و در نهایت سبب تحقیر و سرکوب مردم شدند باید از این منظر کاوید. شاید اگر به اندیشة مارکس در این جوامع به ‌منزلة نگرشی انتقادی توجه می‌شد، از بسیاری از تجارب ناگوار تاریخ اجتناب شده بود.

دین هم در حوزة سیاسی سرنوشت مشابهی دارد. به گفتۀ جان لاک، به محض اینکه دینداران در پی تعریف و تعیّن همة زوایای جامعه با قرائت خاصی از دین باشند، زبان و بیان دین به ناگزیر با قهر و خشونت می‌آمیزد.

تقدم دموکراسی

بنابراین، برای بررسی وجود یا عدم وجود دموکراسی در جامعه و برای بحث بر سر توسعه  یا گفت‌وگو بر سر موانع دموکراسی در جامعه باید بیش از هر چیز به تحلیل و ارزیابی نهادها، چه حقوقی و به اصطلاح ”گفتمانی“ و چه مادی و حقیقی، پرداخت. بحث از تاریخ، فرهنگ، عادات و آداب و رسوم بسیار لازم است و گاه آنها با ارزش‌های دموکراتیک یا استبدادی یکی می‌دانیم. باید توجه داشت که این ارزش‌های فرهنگی و تاریخی با نهادهای دموکراتیک یکی نیستند.

این منظری خطاست که دموکراسی نوعی  ”اندیشه“ یا ”فرهنگ“ است و وجود آن بدون قبول آن فرهنگ و بدون درک تفکر و اندیشة دموکراتیک تصورناپذیر است، زیرا نه با تجربة تاریخی تحقق دموکراسی هم‌خوان است و نه با تجربة دموکراسی در دورة معاصر. با این ‌همه، پذیرش تقدم فرهنگ بر واقعیات مادی و اجتماعی در ایران سبب بروز دشواری‌های جدی و جانکاه نظری و عملی در تدوین و پیشبرد دموکراسی شده است.

در دورة روشنگری، زمانی‌که عمدتاً شرایط مادی و اجتماعی برای شکل‌گیری نهادهای دموکراتیک فراهم شده بود، این بحث مطرح شد که فرهنگ خردمدار سبب انقلابی نو در اروپا شده و امکان تحقق لیبرالیسم سیاسی و سکولاریسم فرهنگی را فراهم کرده است. اما این تفسیر فلسفی از توسعة مدرنیته و دموکراسی در اروپا بیش از آنکه نشان از واقعیاتی تاریخی داشته باشد، نشان‌دهندة نوعی خودشیفتگی اروپاییان به فرهنگشان بود و روایتی تک‌بُعدی از تجربۀ دموکراتیک اروپایی به ‌دست می‌دهد. پیامد این نگرش تاریخی، یعنی اتکای یکجانبه بر پیدایش و توسعة دموکراسی به مثابه نوعی فرهنگ و ایدئولوژی، باعث ناسازگاری این فرهنگ با فرهنگ‌های دیگر، خاصه فرهنگ‌هایی با ریشۀ غیرمسیحی، شده است.

این تلقی رایج که دموکراسی فرهنگی خاص است و فقط با رسیدن به آن فرهنگ می‌توان به دموکراسی دست ‌یافت، از یک سو باعث رونق بحث‌هایی پیرامون اخذ تمدن اروپایی و تجددخواهی و از سوی دیگر غرب‌زدگی شده است. در این بحث‌های چالش‌برانگیز، دموکراسی کم‌وبیش پروژه‌ای کم‌اهمیت و سطحی جلوه داده می‌شود و عملاً با رویکردی ایدئولوژیک اولویت به سکولاریسم یا ظواهر و روابط فرهنگ غربی داده می‌شود. این طرز تلقی غالباً برای حکومت‌های استبدادی سکولار توجیهات موجهی فراهم می‌کند.

در ایران، متأسفانه نقد دموکراسی با این پیش‌فرض ملازم بوده است که مدرنیته و دموکراسی پروژه‌هایی ”فرهنگی“‌اند و بنابراین، جریان انتقادی از یک‌سو با فرهنگ ”غربی“ به ‌مثابه فرهنگ حامل دموکراسی و ارزش‌های آن خصومت می‌ورزد و از سوی دیگر، به‌ دنبال پالایش فرهنگ ”ایرانی/اسلامی“ از عناصر فرهنگ غربی برمی‌آید و می‌کوشد فرهنگ بومی یا ایرانی/اسلامی اصیل را در ایران رواج دهد. پیامد چنین نگرش چیزی نخواهد بود جز استقرار نوعی استبداد و فرهنگ به ظاهر ”خودی“ تحت عنوان سیاست فرهنگ دینی و بومی. بدیهی است که در تقابل با این نوع ”فرهنگ دینی، بومی“ شاهد پیدایش و گسترش گروهی هستیم که پرچم ”فرهنگ سکولار و لاییک“ را بالا می‌برند.

آیا دموکراسی فرهنگ دارد؟

حال اگر دموکراسی را پدیده‌ای مادی و دربرگیرندة روابط و نهادهای اجتماعی، سیاسی و حقوقی در نظر بگیریم و تحقق آن را با تحولات و توسعة جوامع مرتبط بدانیم، پرسش اساسی پیش ‌رو این است که آیا روابط اجتماعی و امکانات مادی است که جامعه را تبدیل به جامعه‌ای باز، آزاد و برخوردار از اعتماد و حقوق مدنی می‌کند. اگر چنین است، نقش نهادهای حقوقی و ارزش‌هایی که سازمان‌ها و روابط دموکراتیک را در جامعه تقویت و تشویق می‌کنند و سبب توسعه و طراوت آنها می‌شوند چگونه توضیح‌پذیر است؟ آیا رابطۀ میان ارزش‌ها و نهادهای دموکراتیک دلیل ارجحیت امور فرهنگی نیست؟

به گمانم این پرسش به حدی مهم و بنیادین است که در شرایط کنونی ایران ‌باید هرچه وسیع‌‌‌تر طرح شود و در خصوص آن بحث و گفت‌وگو و تبادل‌ نظرهای مداوم صورت گیرد.

فضیلت‌های دموکراتیک

هرچند گمان می‌کنم تحقق و توسعة دموکراسی و اساساً هر جامعۀ مدنی آزاد به معنی متداول امروزی امری مادی است که در زمینه‌های اجتماعی و همراه با رشد و توسعة نهادهای مدنی و اجتماعی دموکراتیک معنا می‌یابد، مسایل بسیار مهم دیگری نیز وجود دارند که در تبیین نظری توسعه و پیدایش جامعه‌ای دموکراتیک بسیار اساسی‌اند و به ما ثابت می‌‌‌کنند که تحقق دموکراسی تقلیل‌پذیر به پدیده‌های مادی نیست. جامعة‌ آزاد و نیک و باطراوت جامعه‌ای است که در آن هم میان فرد فرد شهروندان جامعه روابط اخلاقی مدنی وجود دارد و هم در آن وسایلی فراهم می‌شود که بهره‌گیری از منابع تاریخی، اخلاقی و فرهنگی آن سرزمین و نیز تجربة دیگر جوامع -چه تجربة معاصر جوامع و چه تلاش تاریخی تمدن بشری برای ساختن جامعه‌ای نیک- به منظور تحقق جامعه‌ای بهتر، آزادتر و عادلانه‌تر را ممکن می‌سازد. به سخن دیگر، حفظ، توسعه، شادابی و تعالی دموکراسی در سطح کلی و نهادهای مدنی و دموکراتیک در سطح عینی و مشخص تا حد زیادی در پیوند با توانایی، خلاقیت، اخلاقی بودن و فرهنگ شهروندان جامعه است که از طریق برجسته کردن، عزیز شمردن و بحث و گفت‌وگو دربارة ارزش‌های دموکراتیک فرهنگی به ظهور می‌رسد؛ امری که من آن را ”فضیلت اخلاقی و دموکراتیک“ نامیده‌ام.

در همین زمینه است که با ریچارد رورتی (Richard Rorty, 1931-2007) و آرای او نیز هم‌عقیده‌ام که انسان از طریق منطق یا روندی پیش‌بینی‌شده به دموکراسی نمی‌رسد و چه ‌بسا بسیاری با استدلال و منطق استبداد را مرجح بدانند. بنابراین، دموکراسی نوعی گزینش اخلاقی است که در تجربة زندگی معاصرمان آن را پذیرفته‌ایم: شیوه‌ای که ما را خودمختارتر می‌سازد، رنج و دردمان را کمتر می‌کند و امکانات زندگی شرافتمندانه و به دور از خشونت را برای اقشار بیشتری از جامعه ممکن می‌سازد. از این ‌رو، دموکراسی در حیطة اخلاقی مذاکره‌پذیر است و قابل بحث و گفت‌وگو.

جان دیویی (John Dewey, 1859-1952)، متفکر دیگر امریکایی، در این زمینه بحث‌های هوشمندانه‌ای مطرح کرده است. او دموکراسی را پروژه‌ای اجتماعی قلمداد می‌کند و تحقق و توسعة آن را مشروط به همبستگی، تعاون و نیک‌خواهی برای همة شهروندان جامعه و سراسر جهان می‌داند. در عین ‌حال، دیویی به عنصری ”غیرمادی“ و ”غیرساختاری“ در خصوص امکان تحقق، به‌ویژه توسعه و تعمیق دموکراسی، هم اشاره می‌کند که همان خلاقیت، ایمان و کلاً ارزش‌های اخلاقی است که سبب تعالی جامعه می‌شوند، انسان را با تاریخ و دستاوردهای آن مرتبط می‌کنند و تصور آزادی و عدالت را چونان اعتقاد بشر ممکن می‌سازند.

دیویی در کتاب ایمانی مشترک (A Common Faith) به طرح این نکته می‌پردازد که قدرت خلاقیت و خیال در انسان کیفیت و پیامدهایی بسیار مهم و اساسی برای  توسعه و حفظ دموکراسی دارد: اولاً، قدرت خلاقه و خیال انسان باعث نوعی تعهد یا ایمان اخلاقی به نیک‌خواهی برای خود و دیگران شده و سبب می‌شود که شهروندان جامعه از منافع و محدودیت‌های شخصی و محلی‌شان فراتر رفته، با نیک‌خواهی و حس تعاون خواهان بهبود اوضاع و آزادی دیگران در جامعه شوند، زیرا قدرت خیال انسانی کیفیتی دموکراتیک و اخلاقی دارد و سبب پیوندی مستحکم میان ارزش‌های اخلاقی و آزادی‌خواهانه در همة تمدن‌های بشری می‌شود و سنت عدالت‌خواهی و آزادی‌خواهی را زنده و پویا نگه می‌دارد.

ثانیاً، جان دیویی قدرت خلاقه و خیال تاریخی بشر را نوعی ”ایمان به سرنوشت مشترک“ انسان‌هایی می‌داند که بخش مهم و بنیادین هستی‌شان را نیک‌خواهی یا عدالت‌خواهی قلمداد می‌کند. به همین سبب، از منظر دیویی انسان‌هایی به ظاهر تنها، محدود و کم‌قدرت در خیالشان به جزیی از کلیتی وسیع، تاریخی و متعلق به همة تمدن‌های بشری تبدیل می‌شوند که تعهداتی مشخص، انسانی و اخلاقی دارند و با کمک قدرت خلاقۀ انسانی‌شان قادر به خلق پدیده‌ها و دستاوردهای عظیم در حوزه‌های علمی، هنری و فرهنگی می‌شوند. دیویی بر این باور است که فارغ از چنین تعهدی و بدون قبول سرنوشت مشترک انسانی، دانشمندان و شاعران و نویسندگان و رهبرانِ مبارزات آزادی‌خواهانه قادر به خدمت نبودند.

این فیلسوف پراگماتیست در بسط نظریة خود رابطة دموکراسی را در مقام پروژه‌ای اجتماعی با پدیدة دین توضیح می‌دهد، زیرا در نظر دیویی اغلب انسان‌هایی که در طول تاریخ در راه نیک‌خواهی، کم‌ کردن درد و رنج انسان‌‌‌ها و بهبود و عدالت مبارزه کرده‌اند و امروزه به آنها افتخار می‌کنیم، عمدتاً در مقام انسان‌هایی دینی و مؤمن چنین تعهدی را احساس کرده‌اند. بنابراین، دیویی اصرار دارد که فرهنگ و ارزش‌های دموکراتیک زمانه را باید در رابطه‌ای خلاقانه با این شکل از تجربۀ دینی در نظر آورد. به عقیدة او، طرح این مسئله که جامعة دموکراتیک جامعه‌ای سکولار است، انگاره‌ای جامد و ساده‌انگارانه است که به نوعی سبب تعصب و شکنندگی روابط و ساختارهای دموکراتیک می‌شود. البته باید این نکته را در بحث دیویی در نظر گرفت که اصرار او بر تجربۀ انسان‌های دینی است که در کار نیک‌خواهی بوده‌اند، تجربه‌ای که باید به آن ارج نهاد و از آن تأثیر پذیرفت. دیویی این تجربه را از نهادها و دکترین دینی متمایز می‌کند.

از منظر او، تجربۀ انسانی از دین تجربه‌ای خلاق، خیالی و نیک‌خواهانه و عدالت‌جویانه است، در حالی‌ که تجربة نهاد دین معمولاً بسته و متعصب و یکسونگر است که آگاهانه یا ناخودآگاه مانع خلاقیت و تحقق خیال‌پردازی و نیک‌خواهی می‌شود.

طرح این مفهوم تاریخی‌ـ فرهنگی از دین در نظریة دیویی واجد دو نکتة اساسی است: اول آنکه او دین را نه از طریق الهیات یا باورهای متافیزیک، بلکه با متعالی‌ترین تجربیات عینی و اجتماعی تعریف می‌کند که متعهد به تعالی و نیکی و رشد جامعه است. برخلاف پندار کسانی ‌که دین را آیینی فراتر از انسان‌ها و به مراتب بالاتر و ارجح‌تر از آنها می‌دانند، جان دیویی تجربة دینی را بدون پرده‌‌‌پوشی بیان اصلی و اساسی حقیقت دینی می‌داند که تاریخ بشری را بدل به عامل تعالی انسانی، تعهد به نیک‌اندیشی، آزادی و عدالت‌خواهی می‌کند. در این فرایند، تجربة دینی یا امر دینی از محدودیت نهاد دین آزاد می‌شود.

همچنین، در نظریة دیویی و نگاه او نسبت به دین، امر دینی نوعی تعهد اخلاقی به منظور اصلاح، بهبود و تعالی جامعه و امری کلی و عمومی به حساب می‌آید. او  حتی ریشة عشق، علاقه و مسئولیت دانشمندان و هنرمندان و کارشناسان، کار معلم یا هر انسان نیک‌خواه دیگر را در امر دینی می‌بیند. به باور او،  تجربة دینی (امر دینی) پدیده‌ای منحصر به فرد و از لحاظ فرهنگی محدود به آموزه‌ها و ارزش‌های یک دین خاص نیست. تجربة دینی تجربه‌ای تاریخی و اجتماعی است که برای درک آن باید زمان، مکان و روابط اجتماعی، سیاسی و فرهنگی جوامع را در نظر گرفت. مثلاً تجربة دینی در تاریخ اولیة مسیحیت با تجربة دینی مسیحیان در زمان حال یکی نیست. مسیحیت در دوره‌های معینی در ساختار و آداب و رسوم مرتبط با کلیسا و نیز در مدارس و نظام آموزشی و همچنین در عرصة سیاست و حقوق حاضر و فعال بود. در قرون وسطا، هر فرد مسیحی در خانواده، روستا یا شهری عمدتاً مسیحی متولد می‌شد و در همان منطقه رشد می‌کرد و سپس می‌مرد. اما امروزه مسیحیان  بعد از تولد انتخاب‌های گوناگونی در پیش دارند.

ایران و اسلام

با توجه به بحث‌هایی که مطرح شد، یعنی تقدم نهادهای دموکراتیک بر فرهنگ، و نیز فهم دین به منزلة نوعی تجربة خلاق بشری و تعریف تجربه دینی متناسب با زمان و مکان مشخص، حال باید بررسی کرد که دین از منظر روشنفکران و سیاستمداران ایرانی چه ارتباطی با ایجاد توسعه و تعمیق دموکراسی در ایران داشته است.

نگرش غالب در میان برخی از روشنفکران ایرانی، و البته نگرش غالب در میان متفکران اروپایی و شرق‌شناسان، این است که دموکراسی و مدرنیته ‌ــ که پروژه‌هایی یگانه تصور می‌شوند ‌ــ  پروژه‌هایی سکولارند و نوعی فرهنگ عمومی و ایدئولوژیک با ‌نام ”سکولاریسم“ پیش‌‌‌زمینه و بنیاد فرهنگی و ارزشی تحقق توسعۀ جوامع مدرن دموکراتیک است. بر اساس این باور ایدئولوژیک، امکان تحقق دموکراسی و مدرنیته بدون قبول نظام فکری سکولار به منزلۀ حقیقت مطلق تصورناپذیر است.

اغلب شرق‌شناسان بر اساس چنین پیش‌فرض نظری به طرح این پرسش ایدئولوژیک می‌پردازند که آیا اسلام با سکولاریسم و ارزش‌های دنیای جدید هم‌خوانی و آشتی دارد یا خیر و پاسخ به این پرسش بدون استثنا منفی است. در این نوع نگاه، با استناد به این امر که اسلام قائل به جدایی میان حوزۀ دین و سیاست نیست و با تأکید بر برخی از شاخص‌های تاریخی اسلام، مانند نظامی‌گری خشونت‌آمیزش که می‌‌‌دانیم در فرهنگ قبایل عرب پیش از ظهور اسلام ریشه دارد، و با برجسته کردن این امر که توسعة اسلام از طریق جنگ بوده است و دست‌‌‌آخر با تأکید بر نگرش افراطی اسلام بر ”تسلیم“ به خدای یکتا نتیجه می‌‌‌گیرند که هرگونه امکان آشتی میان این دین با دموکراسی ناممکن است. این گروه از روشنفکران در ادامة قضاوتشان پدیدة ”اسلام سیاسی“ و بنیادگرایی کنونی را نیز ادامۀ همان روند تاریخی خشونت در این دین ارزیابی می‌کنند.

در میان روشنفکران ایرانی هم بحث‌های این حوزه کمابیش مشابه مباحث شرق‌شناسان است و مهم‌ترین انتقادات به اسلام و اشاره به عدم هم‌خوانی آن با مدرنیته تقریباً تکرار بی‌چون‌وچرای مباحث شرق‌شناسان است. در این مباحث، فرهنگ جامعه در آرای معدودی از متفکران یا متألهان سرشناس خلاصه می‌شود و از طریق قرائت چند کتاب مرجع و متون دوران قدیم به این نتیجۀ از پیش مشخص می‌رسند که فرهنگ و ارزش‌های اسلامی و ایرانی از بنیاد با فردگرایی، اندیشۀ انتقادی و آزاداندیشی بیگانه است و حتی با آن خصومت دارد.

برخی از روشنفکران مدافع این نگرش از طریق تحلیل رابطة فرهنگ با مدرنیته و دموکراسی به این نتیجه می‌‌‌رسند که جامعة بشری پدیده‌ای یگانه و یکرنگ و یکدست است. آنان حتی اعلام می‌‌‌کنند که فرهنگ نیز پدیده‌ای بدون گوناگونی و فارغ از خصلت‌های متفاوت است. پاره‌‌‌ای دیگر از این گروه نیز، متأثر از وجود طرز رفتار حکومت دینی، سکولاریسم را کم‌وبیش به منزلة نوعی ایدئولوژی فرهنگی/سیاسی و یگانه طریق مخالفت به منظور رهایی از وضع موجود قلمداد می‌کنند و از منظر دفاع از ”سکولاریسم“ به نقد ”فرهنگی“ می‌پردازند.

عمدۀ مباحث در این تئوری کلان‌‌‌نگر عملاً غیرتاریخی‌ و تکرار گفته‌های شرق‌شناسان دربارۀ اسلام تاریخی است. چنین نقدی به سیاست و حکومت امروز ایران در عمل منجر به تمرکز عمده بر پدیده‌ای کلی با نام ”فرهنگ“ و طرح تفسیرهای سیاسی از آن می‌شود. پیامد چنین نگرشی نادیده انگاشتن تمایز میان حوزة قدرت (ظلم) و پندارها و رفتارهای توده مردم است: رادیکالیسمی به ظاهر فرهنگی که در اغلب اوقات دچار نوعی محافظه‌کاری غیراخلاقی هم می‌‌‌شود.

بحث من البته این نیست که تحلیل شرق‌شناسان اروپایی به این علت بی‌اعتبار است که محصول دورة استعمار اروپایی است، بلکه بحث من عمدتاً معطوف به زمینه‌های تاریخی و اجتماعی نظریات شرق‌شناسان است که نباید و نمی‌شود نسبت به آنها بی‌توجه بود. در این نوشته فرصت کالبدشکافی این بحث نیست، اما پاره‌‌‌ای از متفکران معاصر انتقادات بسیار مهمی به محدودیت بحث‌های شرق‌شناسان و پیش‌زمینه‌های تئوریک آ‌‌نها وارد کرده‌اند که متأسفانه روشنفکران ایرانی چندان توجهی به این انتقادات ندارند.

بنابراین، فرهنگ جامعه را نمی‌توان در ایده‌های چند متفکر صاحب‌‌‌نام یا چند کتاب، هرچند مهم، خلاصه کرد. مردم در اقشار و گروه‌های گوناگون و در زمان‌های متفاوت در زندگی روزمره‌شان برخی از ارزش‌های فرهنگی را می‌پذیرند یا آن ارزش‌ها را متحول می‌کنند. حتی ممکن است برخی از ارزش‌های دینی یا فرهنگی را بخشی از جامعه، مثلاً گروه‌‌‌هایی از نخبگان، بپذیرند. اما این امر لزوماً باعث سازگاری بخش‌های دیگر جامعه با آن ارزش‌های فرهنگی نیست. در اغلب جوامع، حتی از مقدس‌ترین ارزش‌ها و مثلاً اسلام، تفسیرهای بسیار گوناگون و متفاوتی وجود دارد. تأسف‌بار است که اکثر روشنفکران ایرانی مجموعه‌ای از بحث‌های مهم و انتقادی در خصوص مفهوم فرهنگ را که در چند دهۀ اخیر مطرح شده و امروزه تقریباً مورد قبول عموم نظریه‌پردازان علوم اجتماعی و انسانی است نادیده گرفته‌اند. اکنون سال‌هاست که متفکران علوم اجتماعی به نظریاتی که فرهنگ را به پدیده‌ای واحد، منسجم، جامع و غیرقابل تحول تقلیل می‌دهند یا به نظریاتی که این پدیده‌‌ را به کل جامعه و تاریخ تعمیم می‌دهند توجهی جدی نشان نمی‌دهند. سنتی که در قرن نوزدهم در علوم انسانی رونق بسیار یافت و تا سال‌های 1950 هم ادامه داشت و در واقع  عملاً نظریه‌پردازی در علوم اجتماعی و انسانی را به حوزۀ ”متافیزیک“ برد و تمام هم و غم‌‌‌اش توسل به نوعی کلی‌گویی ظاهرفریب و پیامبرگونه بود که غرب و تاریخ و فرهنگ آن را محصول خِرد و آزادی و شرق را محکوم به بردگی و خشونت می‌دانست. این نگرش خودپسندانه هر آنچه را در عمل و به شکل عینی و تاریخی برخلاف باروش بود بی‌اهمیت جلوه می‌داد.

فرهنگ را نمی‌شود پدیده‌ای با معنی و مفهوم قالبی و از پیش‌‌‌ دانسته تلقی کرد. حتی در غرب  هم ”فرهنگ“ مفهومی به نسبت تازه و جدید است. مثلاً در انگلستان تا اواسط قرن نوزدهم میلادی استفاده از مقولۀ ”فرهنگ“ رواج چندانی نداشت. به ‌جای آن مقولة ”فضیلت“ در نوشته‌ها و بحث‌های نظری به‌ کار گرفته می‌شد و از جمله هنگام بحث دربارة ارزش‌های دموکراتیک به فراوانی از فضیلت‌های مدنی صحبت به میان می‌آمد و نه از فرهنگ مدنی. در ایالات متحد امریکا نیز در بحث‌هایی که حول محور دموکراسی‌خواهی مطرح می‌شد، توجه ویژه‌ای به رابطۀ میان نهادهای دموکراتیک و ارزش‌هایی معطوف می‌شد که فضیلت‌های جمهوری‌خواهی (دموکراسی‌خواهی) را بازتاب می‌‌‌دادند و البته این مباحث خود بسیار متأثر از بحث‌های دورۀ روشنگری در انگستان بودند.

مفهوم فضیلت از یک‌سو، به زبان امروزی، به برخی از ارزش‌های فرهنگی نظیر نیک‌خواهی عمومی، اعتماد به دیگران، پذیرفتن آزادی دینی و مانند اینها اشاره داشت و از سویی دیگر، این ارزش‌ها در رفتار و زمینه‌هایی مادی و اجتماعی معنا پیدا می‌کردند که شامل تحقق و توسعۀ دموکراسی بود. از این لحاظ، مفهوم ”فضیلت“ بسیار نزدیک به مفهوم ارسطویی ”فضیلت اخلاقی“ بود که در آن، ارزش‌های فرهنگی در بستری معنا می‌یافت که انسان‌ها در زندگی روزمرۀ خود انتخاب یا نفی می‌کنند و در نتیجه، تعامل و تعاون و همکاری با یکدیگر را می‌آموزند. بعدها با شکل‌گیری جامعۀ امریکایی و شکل‌گیری بافت‌های طبقاتی گوناگون، مفهوم فرهنگ رفته‌‌رفته به ‌جای مفهوم فضیلت نشست. در چنین زمینه‌‌‌ای بود که فرهنگ، عمدتاً شهرنشینی، بیان برخی ارزش‌ها و رفتار طبقۀ فاخر و متمول جامعه شد. به ‌‌‌تدریج در تلقی مدافعان این نگرش، مفهوم فرهنگ با توجه به افزایش سطح سواد و تحصیلات رسمی، آگاهی از هنر و ادبیات و حتی با طرز لباس پوشیدن، آداب صحبت کردن و ظواهر زندگی بورژوایی یکی پنداشته شد و کار به‌ جایی رسید که دیگر رابطة میان ارزش‌های دموکراتیک و فرهنگ به فراموشی سپرده شد و فرهنگ نیز خصوصیتی طبقاتی به ‌خود گرفت.

بررسی مفهوم فرهنگ در ایران هم تاریخی جالب توجه دارد. در جامعه‌ای عمدتاً کشاورز و با وجود نگرش محافظه‌کار و نخبه‌پرور ایرانی، غیر از ارزش‌های دینی، ادبیات هم عمدتاً بیان ارزش‌های متعالی جامعه بوده است. دو واژة ”ادب“ و ”علم“ را شاید بتوان نزدیک به آنچه امروزه فرهنگ می‌نامیم دانست و سپس آنها را در شکلی تاریخی بررسی کرد. ادب عمدتاً با شعر و سوادآموزی مرتبط دانسته و ”عالم“ به کسانی اطلاق می‌‌‌شد که در حوزة تدریس و تحصیل و مکتبخانه اشتغال داشتند. البته همة این‌ مقولات در حوزة ادبی اتفاق نمی‌‌‌افتاد و گاه عالمان به نشر فلسفی مبانی مذهبی هم می‌پرداختند و امور روحانی را نیز عهده‌دار بودند.  اما نکتة جالب ‌توجه در تلقی تاریخی و به اصطلاح سنتی مفهوم ”ادیب“ و ”عالم“ است که به‌رغم ویژگی غلبه‌گرایانۀ این مفاهیم، به گونه‌ای منصب نزدیک‌ترند تا فرهنگ. ادب در عین‌ حال که به شعر و شاعری و زیستن در حوزۀ ادبیات اشاره داشت، بیان نوعی رفتار و زیست هم بود. از سوی دیگر، عالم کسی بود که از یک طرف سر در حوزۀ علم و تحقیق داشت و از سوی دیگر، قرار گرفتن در این جایگاه به مدلی از زیستن اشاره می‌کرد. در عین حال، در ایران کسانی مانند حافظ در شعرهایشان با کنایه و اشاره به نقد قشر به اصطلاح بافرهنگ جامعه می‌پرداختند، یعنی قشری که لزوماً ارتباطی میان دانسته‌ها با رفتار و کردارشان نیست. این امر نشان‌دهندۀ این است که جامعة ایرانی با تیزهوشی فرهنگ ایستای اقشار بالای جامعه را فاسد می‌دانست و به نقد آن کمر می‌بست. با حضور انکارناپذیر این تفاسیر، مشخص است که قشر بافرهنگ جامعه بهره‌ای انحصاری از برخی منصب‌های اخلاقی  داشت.

امروزه در جامعۀ دانشگاهی و حوزۀ علوم اجتماعی غرب و در ایران دو نوع نگرش عمده دربارة فرهنگ وجود دارد: یکی فرهنگ را مجموعه‌ای بسته، مستقل و مصون از تغییرات تاریخی می‌داند و آن را بیان متعالی‌ترین ارزش‌های جامعه می‌پندارد که به دست اقشار نخبه در نهادهای مرتبط با این اقشار مانند نهاد دین، نهاد هنر، ادبیات رسمی، میراث تاریخی و معماری تجلی پیدا می‌کند. در این نگرش، فرهنگ و ارزش‌های تجربی مردم مستقل نیستند و صرفاً بازتولید فرهنگ فاخر در زندگی روزمرۀ مردم‌اند. اگر چنین بازتولیدی وجود نداشته باشد، نشان بی‌فرهنگی تودۀ مردم است. این نوع نگرش نسبت به فرهنگ گاه در دین، فرهنگ اسلامی یا فرهنگ سنتی و گاه با توجه به ملیت در فرهنگ ایرانی یا ترکی و گاه در مقایسه با غرب در روایت‌های عقب ماندگی فرهنگی ایرانیان بازنمایی می‌شود.

در قرن نوزدهم و اوایل قرن بیستم، زمانی‌که متفکران علوم انسانی در پی تدوین نظریات کلان فرهنگ بودند، برخی از متفکران اروپایی، به ویژه متأثر از فرهنگ جدید اروپایی، نظریاتی مشابه بحث ماکس وبر (Max Weber, 1864-1921) دربارة پدیده‌ای با نام روح سرمایه‌داری یا اخلاق سرمایه‌داری را به منزلة فرهنگ و سرنوشت زمانه مطرح کردند. بحث‌های دیگری نیز حول محور فرهنگ مدرن در تضاد با فرهنگ سنتی یا فرهنگ و جهان‌بینی غربی در مقابل فرهنگ شرقی مطرح شد.

امیل دورکم (Emil Durkheim, 1858-1917)، که تقریباً هم‌زمان با ماکس ‌‌‌وبر می‌زیست، هرچند بسیاری از پیش‌فرض‌های وبر نظیر دوگانگی روشن میان سنت‌/مدرن را پذیرفته بود، اما بحث‌ و استدلال‌‌‌هایش دربارة مقوله فرهنگ بسیار هوشمندانه‌تر از وبر بود. نکتة قابل ‌توجه در نظریات دورکم این است که او، چه در تعریف  دین و چه در تحلیل فرهنگ و چه در تبیین و توضیح رابطة میان حوزه‌های تولید معنا (فرهنگ) و پدیده‌های دینی و مقدس و عرفی این جهانی، همواره به زمینه‌های اجتماعی این پدیده‌ها در نهادهای اجتماعی توجه شایانی نشان می‌دهد.

شاید مهم‌ترین نکته‌ای که دورکم به آن اشاره می‌کند و بر آن تأکید می‌‌‌ورزد این باشد که میان وجود مادی و اجتماعی ما (یعنی انسان به مثابه واقعیت و تجربۀ اجتماعی) و آنچه به آن فرهنگ اطلاق می‌‌‌شود (یعنی دین و سایر ارزش‌ها، باورها و آداب و رسوم) رابطه‌‌‌ای متقابل وجود دارد. این رابطه نه فقط در سطح تودۀ مردم و زندگی روزانه، بلکه در سطح فرهنگ متعالی و در سطح باورهای مقدس نیز وجود دارد و فعال است. در نگاه دورکم، فرهنگ در حقیقت منبعی معنابخش به زندگی اجتماعی ماست. به بیانی دیگر، حوزه‌های فرهنگی است که زندگی و نهادهای اجتماعی ما را در کلیت خود برمی‌سازد و از این طریق باعث توسعه و گسترش آنها می‌شود.

در تعریف دورکم از فرهنگ نکاتی مهم قابل بررسی است: شناخت فرهنگ بدون شناخت روابط و نهادهای اجتماعی و بدون شناخت تجربۀ زندگی روزمرة مردم در جامعه ناممکن  است. در نظر دورکم، فرهنگ پدیده‌ای مستقل یا صرفاً تولید ذهن افراد جامعه نیست. فرهنگ و پدیده‌های فرهنگی رابطه‌ای جدی و انداموار با سبک زندگی ما دارند و از آن متأثرند و در عین‌ حال که به شیوۀ زندگی ما معنا می‌دهند سبب تداوم یا تغییر آن نیز می‌شوند. بنابراین، فرهنگ در این نگرش پدیده‌ای بسیار مهم و تاثیرگذار بر جامعه محسوب می‌‌‌شود و به‌رغم اینکه پدیده‌ای مستقل نیست، اما می‌تواند در همبستگی جامعه نقش بسیار مؤثری داشته باشد و بنابراین، باعث پدید آمدن تعاون و شادمانی شود. در حالی ‌که این ظرفیت را نیز دارد که به ایجاد بحران، آشفتگی و بی‌ثباتی دامن بزند.

با این ‌همه، نظرات دورکم دربارة فرهنگ بعد از او به دامچالة تفسیرهای یک‌بُعدی جامعه‌شناسان مکتب کارکردگرایی سقوط کرد و به تأکید دورکم بر این نکته که حوزة فرهنگ نقشی اساسی در تحول جامعه دارد چندان توجهی نشد. از سوی دیگر،  نفوذ مارکسیسم در محیط‌های دانشگاهی نیز به مهجور ماندن نظریات دورکم کمک شایانی کرد. مارکسیست‌‌‌ها غالباً به دورکم همچون متفکری محافظه‌کار می‌نگریستند که منش فرهنگ را مهم می‌دید.

بسیاری از هواداران مارکسیسم هم نظرات مارکس دربارة ارتباط هستی اجتماعی با ذهن انسان را به بوتة فراموشی سپردند. مارکس، به‌خصوص در نوشته‌های بعد از انتشار ایدئولوژی آلمانی، از سیطرة بلامنازع آرای هگل و تفکر او منزجر شده بود تا جایی‌که در واکنش به او هیچ امکانی را برای موجودیت مستقل پدیده‌های فرهنگی نظیر ایدئولوژی، فلسفه، دین و مانند اینها قائل نبود. با وجود این، مارکس نقد‌های بسیار جالب و خلاقی را در آثار و مکتوباتش از جمله در دست‌نوشته‌های فلسفی و اقتصادی یا نقد فلسفة حق هگل صورت‌بندی کرد و شناخت پیچیده‌ای از رابطۀ میان هستی اجتماعی با دنیای ذهنی انسان در جهان سرمایه‌داری به مخاطبانش عرضه کرد. متأسفانه هیچ‌‌‌یک از این تزها مورد عنایت قرار نگرفتند.

مارکسِ اولیه نظریات بسیار جالبی دربارۀ ارتباط متقابل میان خودآگاهی انسان با روابط مادی طرح کرد که با نظریات ساده‌انگارانۀ بعدی او که در آنها فرهنگ را فقط انعکاسی از زیربنای اقتصادی می‌دید تفاوت‌های عمده داشت.

از سال 1940م به بعد، گروهی از متفکران مارکسیست، که به مکتب فرانکفورت شهرت یافتند، تلاش کردند بحث‌های فرهنگی را با نگرش تازه‌تری از اندیشۀ مارکس به جامعۀ روشنفکری عرضه کنند و امروزه عمدتاً میراث فکری این گروه نمایندۀ بحث‌های فرهنگی به شمار می‌آیند. برخی از متفکران مکتب فرانکفورت در طرح نظریات مارکس در خصوص جامعة مدرن سرمایه‌داری به طرح و توضیح فرهنگ جوامع سرمایه‌داری و چگونگی دموکراتیزه‌شدن باورهای فرهنگی و مدرنیته‌ در خصوص تحولات مادی و تکنولوژیک ‌پرداخته‌اند. بحث والتر بنیامین (Walter Benjamin, 1892-1940) دربارة رابطه فرهنگ و مدرنیته از جملۀ این بحث‌هاست. اما در بین برخی از متفکران این مکتب، از جمله آدورنو (Theodoe W. Adorno, 1903-1969) و مارکوزه (Herbert Marcuse, 1898-1979)، نگرش رادیکال ضدروشنگری قوت گرفت. متفکران مکتب فرانکفورت با دنباله‌روی از نیچه، نقدهای مارکس به سرمایه‌داری را که نقدی بسیار پیچیده و دوگانه بود و جوانب انتقادی فراوان داشت به منظری بسیار نخبه‌گرایانه و اشراف‌‌‌منشانه بدل کردند که متأسفانه در انتها منجر به نفی بسیاری از سنت‌های نظریۀ انتقادی  شد.

باید به این نکته اشاره کرد که متفکران و نظریه‌پردازان مکتب فرانکفورت، خاصه آدورنو، اندیشمندانی با بصیرت و هوشمند بودند و به‌رغم بازگشت به سنت نیچه‌ای، کمک شایانی به شناخت انحصاری جامعۀ مدرن کردند. یورگن هابرماس (Jürgen Habermas, b. 1929) نیز ازجمله متفکران معاصری است که مکتب فرانکفورت را در سنت انتقادی و دموکراتیکش ادامه می‌دهد. برخلاف دیگر متفکران مکتب فرانکفورت، هابرماس در طرح و نظریه‌پردازی دربارة جامعه مدرن نگرش دو وجهی مارکس را مد نظر دارد و با برخی از تناقضات نظریة مارکس هم آشناست. اما او به‌ جای حل این تناقضات یا بازگشت به سنت ضددموکراسی‌خواهی (اندیشۀ هایدگری)، نوعی آشتی میان سنت انحصاری مارکس و سنت دموکراسی‌خواهی لیبرال پدید آورده است. نکتة جالب ‌توجه اینجاست که هابرماس در طرح نظراتش به دورکم هم توجه دارد و از او تأثیر پذیرفته است.

هم‌زمان با پیدایش مکتب فرنکفورت و نظریه‌پردازان فرهنگ آن و هم‌زمان با غلبۀ اندیشۀ مارکسیستی در جوامع روشنفکری، سنت مهم دیگری هم به طرح نظریات انتقادی از جامعة سرمایه‌داری و به ‌ویژه نقد اخلاقی و فرهنگی آن همت گماشت. مهم‌ترین متفکر این مکتب جان دیویی، فیلسوف نظریة دموکراسی، در امریکاست. دیویی منتقد جدی نظریات آن دسته از روشنفکرانی بود که اساس، پیدایش و توسعۀ جامعۀ مدرن و دموکراسی را در قبول برخی ارزش‌های نظری و فرهنگی جهان‌شمول (خردگرایی) خلاصه می‌کردند. این گروه از روشنفکران که مورد خطاب دیویی قرار داشتند عملاً قائل به وجود نیازهایی شناخت‌شناسانه و برتری و تقدم آنها بر روابط و نهادهای اجتماعی و زمینه‌های مادی زندگی در جامعه بودند.

جان‌‌‌دیویی، و اصولاَ سنت فکری پراگماتیسم، قائل به دوگانگی و جدایی ذهن و عین نیست؛ یعنی موضوعی که از زمان افلاطون مطرح بوده است. در نظر دیویی، ”زندگی مادی انسان“ و حوزۀ ”آگاهی و شناخت“ دو حوزۀ جدای از هم تعریف نمی‌‌‌شوند و لزوماً یکی (عینیت) بر دیگری (ذهنیت) تقدم ندارد. براساس این نظریه، روابط اقتصادی و اجتماعی در هر جامعه و در نهادهای فرهنگی آن، از دین گرفته تا هنر و علم و غیره، همگون با جامعه است.

دیویی با تکیه و توجه دقیق بر این روند مستند و عینی (تجربه) نظریۀ‌‌‌ بسیار جالب و شجاعانه‌‌‌ای مطرح کرد و توانست  عین و ذهن را آشتی دهد. در نظر او، آنچه مهم و واقعی است عینیت یا برداشت‌هایی فرهنگی ناشی از ”تجربۀ“ انسان در زندگی روزمره است.

شاید روشنفکر ایرانی نیز با توجه به دستاوردهای عظیم و گاه بسیار پرهزینۀ تاریخ معاصر بشر این ‌‌‌بار ناگزیر باشد به مقولة ”تجربه“ به منزلۀ پدیده‌ای واقعی و ملموس که رابطه‌ای درونی و مستقیم با هستی انسان دارد و از قضا به تصویر انسان انتزاعی هگلی نیز شباهتی ندارد، عنایت بیشتری مبذول دارد و برای استقرار دموکراسی از آن بهره‌‌‌ها گیرد، زیرا این مقوله (تجربه) در عین‌حال در زمینه‌ای مادی و در همگامی با انسان‌های دیگر و تجربۀ مشترک آ‌نها معنا پیدا می‌کند.

اسلام، ايران و دموكراسى

 باتوجه به بحث‌هايى كه پيش از اين مطرح شد، اکنون به نقد نظریه‌ای می‌پردازم که ميان گروهی از روشنفكران ايران همچنان مقبولیت دارد. این دسته از روشنفکران چنین می‌پندارند که برای آزادى و آبادانی اين جامعه باید به نوعى انقلاب يا خانه‌تكانى فرهنگى دست ‌زد. به باور من، قائل بودن به پديده‌اى با ‌نام فرهنگ و اشتياق برای تحول بنیادین فرهنگ  به منزلة پيش‌شرط و بنياد تحول اجتماعی عمدتاً برآمده از سنت فكرى ضدروشنگرى و راديكاليسم اشرافى (محافظه‌كارانه) است. این نظریه دمکراسی و مدرنيته را به پديده‌هایی فرهنگى يا اخلاقى تقليل مى‌دهد و به سبب خصومت با آن، برای بازسازی نوعى اصالت فرهنگى می‌کوشد. در نهایت، این نظریه با توجه به ”شرايط محلى“ ممكن است به انواع گفتمان‌هاى محافظه‌كارانۀ ناسيوناليستى و دينى یا گفتمان‌هایی نظیر آنها بدل شود.

ويژگى مشترك ‌-و غالباً پنهان- اين نگرش عملاً خصومت با دموكراسى و خوار پنداشتن آن است که تحت پوشش نظريه‌پردازى دربارة بنياد‌هاى فكرى و روش‌شناسی و شناخت‌شناسى، دموكراسى را امرى ثانوی و مهجور مى‌پندارد. اما اگر با رهیافت نظري متفكران دنياى جديد، از کارل ماركس گرفته تا امیل دورکم و به‌خصوص جان دیويى، فرهنگ را امرى اجتماعى بدانیم كه در بافت روابط موجود جامعه ریشه دارد و با شرايط و نهادهاى مادى جامعه در ارتباط نزديك و متقابل است، آن‌‌‌گاه شايد بهتر و روشن‌تر بتوانیم به بحث‌هايى بپردازیم كه امروزه در کشور ما پیرامون ايران‌خواهى و اسلام‌خواهى ‌به منزلة پديده‌هایی فرهنگى و تاريخى جریان دارد و قرار است ارزش‌هاى عام جامعه به‌واسطة آنها معنا پیدا کند.

پيش از وارد شدن به اين بحث بايد گفت كه توسل به دين یا مليت در كارزارهاى سياسى تقريباً در همة جوامع معمول و مرسوم است. از اين ‌منظر، اين داعیة سياسى كه فرد يا گروهى از مردم هویت و اهداف سياسى‌ خود را با ايران‌خواهى و اسلام‌مدارى تعريف می‌كنند و در اغلب موارد آنها را يكى می‌دانند نیز ادامه و بازتاب تأثیر دیرپای همین نگرش است.

 

زمينه‌هاى همبستگى ذهنى

جان دیویی نقدی مهم و تاریخی بر ”سكولارهاى افراطی“ (militant secularism) وارد کرده است. اساس نظریة دیویی اين است كه هر جامعۀ دموكراتيك با داشتن  نظام حقوقى دموكراتيك و نهادهاى سياسى مردم‌‌‌سالار لزوماً نمی‌تواند آزادی و دموکراسی را حفظ کند و آن را توسعه دهد، زیرا بدون وجود نوعى تعهد (commitment) عمیق و همگانی به اين باور كه دموكراسى و زيستن آزادانه و در صلح بودن انسان‌ها بخشی مهم و انضمامی از هويت و ارزش‌های بشری است، دمکراسی صرفاً به پدیده‌ای بروکراتیک و بیگانه با ارزش‌های مدنی تقلیل می‌‌‌یابد. او سپس نتیجه می‌‌‌گیرد که چنین تعهد اخلاقی‌ای با قبول برخى از مهم‌‌‌ترین فضيلت‌هاى مدنی و اجتماعى ممکن می‌شود. ارزش‌هایی كه زندگى یک شهروند جامعة دموكراتيك را از تنهایی و ”جزء“ (insular) بودن به زندگى اجتماعى ديگر شهروندان پيوند مى‌زند و در یک روند آرام و طبیعی -و در نتیجه کم‌‌‌هزینه- زندگى امروز ما را به تاريخ گذشتۀ ما و تمدنى كه به آن تعلق تاريخى داريم پیوند می‌دهد. این پیوند در عین‌حال به ما امکان می‌دهد که با  فرهنگ‌ها و تمدن‌هايى مرتبط شویم كه نشان از تعالی و فضیلت‌های تاریخی تمامی بشريت دارند. در چنین بستری است که ذهنيت تاريخى ما تلاش طولانى، فداکاری‌‌ها و رنج بردن خیل عظیمی از مردم براى تحقق آزادى و عدالت در جامعه را درک می‌کند و هستى‌مان را با گونه‌ای هستى تاريخى/فرهنگى وسيع‌تر و متعالى‌تر مرتبط می‌‌‌سازد؛ ارتباطی كه از زندگى‌ مادى و روزمره فراتر رفته و به زندگی جمعی ما هویت و معنا می‌بخشد. بدين‌سان، بستر رشد و شکوفایی  فضيلت‌هایی مدنی از قبیل احساس اعتماد، همبستگی و اميد به آینده فراهم می‌‌آید و این فضیلت‌ها به‌ تدریج و در فرایندی بلندمدت به ارزش‌های اصلی آن جامعه تبدیل و در آن نهادینه می‌شوند. از این منظر، دموكراسى پديده‌اى‌ است كه هم در عمل مفيد و هم از لحاظ اخلاقى نيك و مآلاً خواستنی است.

بنابراين، دو مبحث نظرى در این زمینه اهميت پيدا مى‌كند: 1. توجه به دموكراسى به‌منزلة نوعی پديدار اجتماعى معاصر و ارتباط آن با زندگى و تجربة تاريخی وسیع‌تر و میراث متعالی بشر و 2. تمرکز بر آن دسته از ارزش‌هاى فرهنگى و تاريخى كه امكان چنين ارتباطى را با سرنوشت تاريخى بشريت به منظور حصول آزادى و عدالت فراهم كرده‌اند و امروزه نیز سبب همبستگى اجتماعى و ملى در جوامع دموكراتيك‌اند.

با توجه به این دو نكتة اساسی است كه تجربة تاريخى مهمى كه همة‌ جوامع دنيا از سر گذرانده‌اند و هويتشان در روابط و نهادهاى اجتماعى نیز از آن متأثر بوده‌ است (پديده‌هايى كه امروز به آن ”فرهنگ“ مى‌گویيم) اهميت پيدا مى‌كند. تعریف فرهنگ از این منظر ازجمله با تعريف مردم‌‌‌شناسانۀ آن که به ارزش‌ها و آداب و رسوم زندگى روزمره توجه دارد و نیز با تعريف نخبه‌گرایانه‌ای كه فرهنگ را در ارزش‌هاى كلى قشر نخبۀ جامعه خلاصه می‌‌‌کند قطعاً متفاوت است. البته فرهنگ به آن معنى كه در اين‌ بحث در نظر داريم شامل هر دو تعریف مى‌شود. اما در تعریف جامع‌‌‌تر چندان حد و مرز روشنى ميان ارزش‌ها، باورها و رفتارهاى فرهنگىِ به اصطلاح متعالى جامعه با ارزش‌ها و آداب و رسوم مردم عادى وجود ندارد. مهم‌تر اينكه بنا به این تعریف، فرهنگ گذشته و حال، سنت‌هاى فرهنگى و کلاً پديده‌هاى جديد فرهنگى از یکدیگر جدا نیستند. پديدة فرهنگ در تعريف ما از ويژگی‌هاى دوركمى برخوردار است. معنی این سخن آن است که این پدیده در زندگى روزمره نقش مهمى دارد و به آن معنا و شكل مى‌بخشد و در عین‌حال، خود این پدیدار در متن زندگى تحول پيدا می‌‌‌کند و معناى جديدترى به دست می‌‌‌آورد. با این ‌همه، تلاش براى تمایز قائل شدن میان ارزش‌های فرهنگی برآمده از سنت گذشته و آن دسته از پدیده‌های فرهنگی که محصول تحولات دنیای جديدند چندان ممكن نيست. اغلب ارزش‌ها و رفتارهاى فرهنگى آمیزه‌‌‌ای از هر دو است. با اين ‌حال، بحث من اين نيست كه فرهنگ تعریف‌ناشدنی، فهم‌ناپذیر و ناشناختنی است، بلکه كاملاً برعكس، همة پديده‌هاى فرهنگى به‌رغم آنكه ممكن است آ‌نها را برآمده از سنت و تاريخ قدیم یا صورت بیانی از دنیای جديد و مدرن، دينى و مقدس، عرفى یا اين دنيايى بدانيم، به احتمال قريب به‌‌يقين نشانه‌اى از همة این خصوصیت‌ها را در خود دارند. اگر به این ویژگی پیچیده توجه نکنیم و قادر به درک روابطی نزديك و متقابل نباشیم -منظورم روابط پُرتنشی است که بین مفاهيمى چون قديم و جديد، مقدس و اين‌جهانى، ما و ديگرى، وجود دارد- احتمالاً دچار آشفتگی اندیشه خواهیم شد.

برای شناخت قديم باید به عناصر و تجربه‌هاى معاصری رجوع کرد كه شناخت ما را از سنت‌هاى گذشته شكل می‌دهد و برای فهم عمیق‌‌‌تر دين ناگزیریم به امور اين دنيايى نظر بکنیم كه صد البته بخش بسيار مهمى از الهيات و تجربه‌هاى دينى را شامل می‌‌‌شود. به این صورت است که شناخت غنى‌تر و بهترى از  پديده‌هاى فرهنگى حاصل خواهد شد.

حال با توجه به نكات پیش‌گفته ناگزیریم بر این نکته پای بفشاریم كه پديده‌اى با نام اسلام يا  ايران كه ذاتی يگانه و از لحاظ تاريخى ماندگار و بدون تغيير و تحول داشته باشد و از ارزش‌ها و خصوصياتی جهان‌شمول برخوردار باشد در عالم واقع وجود ندارد. اصرار بر اين امر كه ”يك اسلام“ يا ”يك ايران“ وجود دارد، در بهترين حالت، اين دو پديدۀ اجتماعى، فرهنگى و تاريخى را تقريباً از اكثر كيفيات درونی و غنایی‌‌‌شان كه ناشی از تجربة تاريخى و فرهنگى در طى هزاره‌هاست تهی می‌‌‌کند و تحولی تدریجی را که این پدیده‌ها به خود دیده‌اند خواهی‌‌‌نخواهی نادیده می‌گیرد.

درک اسلام و ايران جدا از قرن‌‌‌ها تلاش و تجربة خلاقانه میلیون‌‌‌ها مردم و ندیدن رنج‌‌‌ها و آرزوها و بيم و اميدهاى مسلمانان و ايرانيان در اقصی نقاط جهان، در واقع تهى کردن این دو پدیده از هستی واقعی و تاریخی‌‌‌شان است و در نهایت، معنایی انتزاعی بخشیدن به این پدیده‌‌‌های انضمامی است.

بايد توجه داشت كه زمينۀ بحث من در اين نوشته شناخت الهيات اسلامی و مسایل اعتقادی‌‌‌اش نيست. اسلام مانند هر دين و آیين ديگر در حیطة اعتقادى خود به ‌نوعی با جامعه و بیرون از خود ارتباط دارد كه معمولاً در چارچوب قبول الهيات مقدس و مناسكى معنا پيدا مى‌كند. در چنین بستری است كه تفسيرهاى گوناگون از دين و اسلام عرضه می‌‌شوند. اتفاقاً در همین زمینه است که خصوصيت ”مقدس“ دين مطرح می‌‌‌شود و اساس بحث قرار می‌گیرد. مثلاً در کشور ما، بخش بزرگی از مؤمنان و دين‌داران ایرانی به الهيات شيعى عقيده دارند و از مناسك مربوط به آن پيروى مى‌كنند. ولى در دنیای کنونی، بخشى هم از این دین‌داران سنى هستند و بخش‌هاى ديگر هم، مانند دراویش و نیز انواع دیگر فرقه‌‌‌های اهل حق، پيرو الهيات ديگری‌اند. هرچند از لحاظ تاريخى حوزۀ تقدس و دامنۀ قبول باورهاى متافيزيكی عملاً تغییرناپذیر است، با اين‌همه، نظام‌های متفاوتی با نام اسلام در کنار هم كم‌وبيش در صلحی به سر می‌برند که مستلزم احترام و قبول تقدس مناسک يكديگر است.

بحث ما در اينجا نقش فرهنگى و عمومى اسلام است كه نه مى‌شود و نه بايد آن را در قالب تعريفی از يك نظام فقهى و الهی خلاصه و محدود کرد. همان‌گونه كه مسلمانان و آنها كه به دين‌ باور دارند و خود را مؤمن و مسلمان مى‌دانند بخش مهمى از زندگى روزمره، آرزوها و رنج و دشواري‌‌‌شان به واسطة مسایلى است كه لزوماً ارتباط مستقيم و نزديكى با دين و الهياتشان ندارد و عمدتاً مربوط به اين دنيا و مسایل عرفى و مادى و سياسى جامعه است، به همان شكل هم اسلام مانند هر دين زندۀ ديگر، هرچند بر مبنای الهياتى مقدس استوار است، اما به‌ مثابه پديده‌ای اين‌جهانى با اقتصاد، سياست و مسایل ديگر عرفى روبه‌روست و از آنها هم تأثير مى‌گيرد و هم بر آنها تأثير مى‌گذارد. از اين منظر، اسلام در بُعد اجتماعى و عرفى تاريخ‌هاى گوناگونى دارد و در دنياى معاصرهم هستى و معناى متفاوتی یافته است. مثلاً از لحاظ تاريخى، اسلام در دنياى عرب با زبان عربى رابطه‌اى دارد كه مسلمانان فارسى‌زبان يا ترك يا مسلمانان هند و پاكستان با آن زبان ندارند. در اغلب جوامع عربى، مثلا در مصر، يادگيرى زبان (خواندن و نوشتن) عربى و آموزش رسمى دينى عملاً يكى است و كودك در شش یا هفت سالگى فراگرفتن زبان مادرى‌اش (عربى) را با فراگرفتن قرآن شروع مى‌كند. جالب است كه چنين رسومى هم در بین كودكان مسلمان رواج دارد و هم در بین مسيحيان و علت آن است كه حداقل تا نسل گذشته، هر دانش‌آموز مسيحى مصرى تقريباً به اندازۀ دانش‌آموز مسلمان تعليمات دينى را فرا مى‌گرفت، زیرا جدايى ميان زبان و دين در جوامع عربى ناممکن بود. به همين سبب، از قرن نوزدهم به بعد كه انديشۀ مدرنيته و گرايش به سكولاريسم در دنياى عرب مطرح شد، متفكرانى مانند طاها حسین زبان عربى و مسئلۀ جدايى زبان و دين را به بحث و نقد کشیدند. در دنياى عرب، عمدتاً تاريخ هم به‌گونه‌اى پیچیده با دين پيوند دارد، به قسمی كه آغاز تاريخ و پيدايش اسلام و اعراب يك زمان و يك روایت مشترک دارند. اما مثلاً در تركيه، كه اهالی آن چند قرن بعد از پيدايش اسلام به آن گرویدند و مهاجران آسيايى به اسلام‌ محسوب می‌شوند، روابط چندانى ميان زبان، تاريخ و دين وجود ندارد. با این‌ همه، کار مصطفی کمال آتاتورك و سكولارهاى این کشور كه تصور می‌کردند با تغيير الفبا به الفبای غربى و تبدیل تاريخ اسلامى به مسيحى جامعة تركيه سكولار خواهد شد، عملاً بى‌معنى بود. دليلى وجود ندارد كه قبول کنیم باور ترك‌ها به اسلام کمتر از ساير جوامع است. جدايى ميان برخى از عناصر فرهنگى زندگى‌ ترک‌ها (زبان، تاريخ، نژاد) با دين اسلام هم قبل از پيدايش جمهورى تركيه و کمال‌‌‌آتاتورك وجود داشت و هم بعد از آن وجود دارد. از سوى ديگر، در ايران بسيارى از روشنفكران و متفكران ايرانى زبان فارسى را بيان‌کنندۀ ويژگى‌هاى فرهنگ غيرعربى و غيراسلامى ايرانیان مى‌دانند. حتى برخی از تجددخواهان ايرانى اواخر قرن نوزدهم (آخوندزاده، کرمانى، تقى‌زاده)، با تأکید بر نقش فرهنگی زبان فارسى و تلاش برای پالايش آن از عربى، در انديشة رواج سکولاریسم و تضعیف نقش اجتماعى، فرهنگى و سياسى اسلام در ايران بودند. از منظر تاريخى، زبان فارسى در ايران زبان شعر و حوزۀ تخيل و خلاقيت ايرانيان بوده است و در حوزة فلسفه، الهيات و حوزه‌های سنتى ”علم“ زبان عربى رواج داشته است. بنابراین، همواره نوعى تنش ميان زبان و دين در ايران وجود داشته است.

تصور ايرانيان از تاريخ هم با اعراب مسلمان متفاوت است. بی‌‌‌شک ايرانيانی كه بر تاريخ پیش از اسلام در فرهنگ ایران تأکید می‌کنند، به‌نوعى در انديشة كم‌رنگ كردن نقش اسلام در هويت ايرانى‌اند. همچنین، می‌توان گفت آن عده از نخبگان ایرانی كه نقش اسلام را در ايران برجسته کرده‌اند، قصدشان مهجور ساختن مقام تاریخی ایران پیش از اسلام است.

تبیین و شناخت ماهيت پديده‌هايى مانند دين و مليت در جوامع معاصر، ازجمله شناخت رابطة اسلام و ايران یا  ملیت با دین، کاری به‌‌‌ غایت دشوار و پيچيده است، چرا که در ايران معاصر تصورها، تفسيرها و نگرش‌هاى متفاوت و متناقضی از نقش دین و ملیت به‌ دست داده شده است. اغلب این نظریه‌ها تقلیل‌گرایانه و تک‌بعدی‌اند. برای نمونه، تصورى كه از اسلام در جوامع عربى يا تركيه يا در ايران وجود دارد نبايد سبب شود كه گمان بریم مثلاً در همۀ كشورهاى عربى تاريخ پيش از اسلام را با جاهليت یکی می‌پندارند. همچنین، باید پذیرفت که در تركيه بسيارى از مسلمانان ترك ‌خواهان تعريف هويتشان براساس تاريخ اسلام‌اند و در ايران بسيارند كسانى كه هر نوع بحث از ايران را به منزلة خصومت با اسلام می‌دانند. بنابراين، ناگزیریم توجهی جدى به اين امر داشته باشیم كه هيچ فرهنگ، تاريخ يا جامعه‌اى به صورتی یکدست و غيرقابل تغيير و تحول داراى يك فرهنگ، هویت یا تصوری از دين و مليت خود نیست.

با توجه به این همه، در نظر آوردن اسلام بدون در نظر گرفتن موقعیت جغرافيايى بحث و بدون توجه به رابطة اسلام با عناصر فرهنگي و زمينه‌هاى اجتماعی ديگر بى‌معنى خواهد بود. اين امر هم در خصوص شناخت تاريخى اسلام از بدو پيدايش و تحول آن و همچنین، در خصوص شناخت از آن در دورۀ معاصر بايد مد نظر باشد. اعتقاد و باور به اینكه پديده‌‌اى فرهنگى، مانند ملیت ايراني، به‌گونه‌ای روشن، خالص و دست‌نخورده وجود دارد كه مى‌توان به آن دسترستى پيدا كرد، افسانه است. پديده‌هايى كه ما آنها را اصالت‌گرایی يا ايراني‌گرايى مى‌دانيم در واقع محصولات ذهنی انسان‌های این زمانه‌اند و بيش از اینكه بیانی عینی و ”صادق“ از ایران یا اسلام باشند، نمایندۀ آرزوها و بیم و امیدهای دنياى موجود و شرايط فرهنگى و اخلاقى آن‌اند.

پديدة اسلام ناب و اصیل يا دورة طلايى اسلام کمتر با تجربۀ تاریخی آن مربوط است و اساساً این مفهوم پروردة معاصران ‌‌‌ماست. اسلام، مسيحيت يا هر دين و آيين ديگرى كه تاریخشان به 2 هزار سال يا 1500 سال پيش می‌رسد، حتى در دورة آغازينشان نیز پديده‌هايى خالص و یکدست نبوده‌اند و از تأثيرات جوامعى كه در آن به وجود آمدند و فرهنگ و روابط اجتماعى آن جوامع بر کنار نبوده‌‌‌اند. شايد مثال برده‌دارى و توضيح آن اين نكته را روشن كند. شكى نيست كه هم مسیحیت و هم اسلام در مقام دو آیين اخلاقى ظاهر شدند كه هدفشان تغيير روابط فاسد و ناعادلانه در جوامع بود. در كتاب‌های مقدس اين دو دين، چه در تعاليم كلى و چه در آموزه‌‌‌ها و سنت‌های اخلاقی‌‌‌شان، عدالت و عزيز شمردن انسان‌ها بسيار مهم و اساسى تلقى شده است. به این ترتیب، در نگاه اول چنين به‌نظر می‌رسد كه این ادیان باید با يكى از مهم‌ترين، رايج‌ترين و غيراخلاقى‌ترين و حقارت‌بارترين اموری كه هم در روم و هم در شبه‌جزيرۀ عربستان رواج داشت، يعنى برده‌دارى، مخالفت کنند. به عبارت دیگر، باید مخالف آن باشند كه انسانى را كه خداوند او را آزاد خلق كرده و ويژگی‌هایی متعالی به او بخشیده مملوک انسانی دیگر شود و با او مانند حيوانات و اشيا رفتار کنند. اما مى‌دانيم كه مسيحيت و بعدها كليسا هيچ‌گاه جرئت نکردند اعلام کنند که برده‌دارى كارى ضدمسيحى و ناميمون و گناه است. در مسيحيت، كه در دوره‌اى در آن هزاران گناه خلق کردند و مردم را به بهانه‌های بسیار کوچک مجازات می‌کردند و كليسا بر همة امور نظارت داشت، برده‌دارى آزاد بود. در امريكا، در اوایل دورة مبارزه با برده‌دارى، كليساى سفيدها شايد مهم‌ترين نهاد رسمى بود كه برده‌دارى را امرى برمی‌شمرد كه مسيح آن را نيك مى‌دانست. در اسلام هم برده‌دارى پذيرفته شد، هرچند شریعت اسلام تشويق می‌کرد كه برده‌ها آزاد شوند و برده‌دارى را ارزشى نيكو در اسلام به حساب نمى‌آورد. اما خريد و فروش برده، گرفتن انسان‌ها برای بردگی و برقراری رابطة جنسى با زنان برده (کنیز) هم در کلیسا و هم در اسلام پذيرفته شده است، تا جایی‌که در اسلام مقررات و دستورات بسیاری در این زمینه موجود است. حال پرسش اساسى اين است كه چرا اين دو دين بزرگ تاريخ بشر و دو سنت ملهم از دستورات اخلاقى و الهى نيك زیستن و عزت انسانى برده‌دارى را تحمل کردند. مسلمانان و حتی بسیاری از معتقدان و رهبران آ‌نها چگونه به خريد و فروش برده می‌‌‌پرداختند، درحالی‌که برده انسانى مانند ساير انسان‌هاست كه در انجيل و قرآن به صراحت تکریم شده است؟

پاسخ من به نكتة بالا همان است كه هم اميل دوركم و هم انسان‌شناس معاصر، کلیفورد گیرتز (Clifford Geertz, 1926-2006)، به آن اشاره كرده‌اند. بنا به تعاریف، دين محصول نوعی نظام فرهنگى و اخلاقى عام است كه به زندگى، رفتار و كردار جامعه و مردمش خط و جهت مى‌دهد و آنها را راهنمايى مى‌كند و براى اينكه چنين كند، خود بيان‌کننده و بازتابندۀ برخى از مهم‌ترين ارزش‌هاى فرهنگى و اجتماعى آن جوامع است و دقيقاً به همين علت است كه اديان هم‌تراز با جوامع پدید مى‌آيند و همراه با جوامع تحول می‌‌‌پذیرند. امروز مسيحيان و مسلمانان برده‌دارى را كارى زشت و ناپسند مى‌دانند و حتى مسلمانانى كه قصدشان ظاهراً بازگشت به ارزش‌‌‌های صدر اسلام است نیز خواهان بازگشت به برده‌دارى نيستند.

 

اسلام ايرانى چيست؟

در تحليلی تاريخى و اجتماعى از پیدایش و توسعة اسلام، خصوصيات اساسى آن را بايد مرتبط با نيازهاى مبرم اجتماعى اعراب قرن هفتم میلادی در شبه‌جزيرة عربستان ديد و در این زمینه آن را توضيح داد. اعراب در دورة پيش از اسلام نوعى روابط اجتماعى نسبتاً مستقل قبیله‌ای داشتند. این قبایل تا حد زیادی از يكديگر مستقل بودند و در نوعى جنگ و جدال دایم به‌ سر می‌بردند. از نظر فرهنگى، اعراب چندان درك جدى و عمیقی از دين يا هر نوع مجموعۀ اخلاقى نداشتند و عمدتاً در بین آنان پرستش بُت‌هاى محلى و حتی خانوادگی و شخصى مرسوم بود. وضع در این زمینه هم بدین‌گونه بود که اعراب خود را در بسيارى از موارد قدرتى بالاتر از موضوع مورد پرستش‌شان می‌دانستند. به‌رغم اين‌‌كه یکی دو شهر در شبه‌جزيرة عربستان وجود داشت، اما اين سرزمین دور از ”مراكز تمدنى“ آن زمان، یعنی ايران و روم و مصر، قرار داشت.

دو دين عمدة ديگر آن زمان، يهوديت و مسيحيت، نیز حضور كم‌رنگى در این منطقه داشتند. با این اوصاف، روى ‌هم ‌رفته، جامعة قبيله‌اى بسيار پراكندة اعراب تقريباً از هر نوع ارزش و پديدۀ‌ فرهنگى كه امكان وحدت، اتحاد يا اشتراك فكرى و اخلاقى را سبب شود به دور بودند. زندگى پراكندۀ قبيله‌اى پُر از تنش و خشونت و وجود روابط طبقاتى ناعادلانه کل جامعۀ اعراب را با بحرانی عمیق روبه‌رو کرده بود که محتاج تحولی جدی بود.

از سوى ديگر، زيستن در چارچوب قبیله در آن زمان نوعى ارزش و مجموعه‌ای از روابط ”دموكراتيك“ را در ميان اعراب مرسوم کرده بود. رئیس قبیله هرچند كه احتمالاً سخت‌گیر و خشن بود، اما با ديگر افراد قبيلهو حتى فقيرترين آنها نشست و برخاست مى‌كرد و اصولاً زندگی قبیله‌‌اى نهادى بود كه به ‌هيچ‌وجه با رفتار و ارزش‌های بسيار اشراف‌منشانۀ امپراتورى ايرانى قابل مقایسه نبود.

دين اسلام در چنين شرايط و زمينه‌اى با اعراب شبه‌جزيرة عربستان متولد شد که در پاسخ‌ به نيازهاى اساسى آنان مهم‌ترين ويژگی‌اش معرفى مفهوم ”توحيد“ بود. توحید، به‌منزلة مقوله‌ای مقدس، اساس وحدت اعراب در قالب جامعه‌ای واحد (امت) شد و بدین‌ترتیب بود که اسلام توانست با آیین اخلاقی‌اش به جامعۀ پراكندة اعراب نوعی نظام ارزشی ‌مشترک فرهنگى و اخلاقى هدیه کند. درست در همین زمینۀ تاریخی است که می‌بینیم مفاهيم مقدسی مانند مقولۀ توحيد و امت جنبۀ عرفى و اجتماعى مهمی دارند. از جمله فهم جامعۀ مشترك و يگانۀ مسلمانان، يعنى امت، هم از این منظر  توضيح‌پذیر است.

شايد دومين مفهوم مهم كه در پاسخ ‌به نيازهاى اساسى آن دورة در اسلام اهميت پيدا كرد، مفهوم عدالت و برابرى ميان مسلمانان بود. در آن زمان، طرح اين مفهوم اخلاقى/اجتماعى باعث شد كه پذیرش اسلام به ‌منزلة آيينی اخلاقى و پيروى از آن و داشتن هويت مسلمانى در نهايت از ديگر هويت‌های قبیله‌ای، سرزمینی، طبقه‌ای و نژادی مهم‌تر و کارآمدتر باشد. از اين ‌نظر، اسلام  نوعى ويژگى جهان‌شهری دارد و گاه با ملی‌گرایی در تضاد قرار می‌گیرد.

اين خصوصيت فرامحلی اسلام و اصرار بر فرارفتن از تعلقات  جغرافيايى و نژادى در ابتدا نقطۀ قوت سیاسی اسلام بود، در ميان قبایل بسيار پراكندۀ اعراب سبب وحدت شد و پدید آمدن حكومت مركزى را در میان اعراب امکان‌پذیر ساخت. از سوى ديگر، اسلام اوليه در بيرون از شبه‌جزيرة عربستان با تأكيد بر عدالت و برابرى همه مسلمانان، به‌رغم جايگاه طبقاتى، مقبول بخش‌هايى از طبقات فرودست امپراتورى ساساني و ديگرانى شد كه در جوامع به‌ شدت طبقاتى و كاستى زندگى مى‌كردند.

با این همه، سرنوشت سياسى اسلام، مانند هر پديدة اجتماعى ديگر، در رويارويى با سنت‌هاى فرهنگی و سياسى و واقعیت‌های اين‌جهانى دچار تحولات اساسی شد. مدل‌های سیاسی شناخته‌شده نزد مسلمانان اوليه يكى ساختار خليفه‌‌گری بود و ديگر، ساختار امپراتورى‌هاى ايرانى و روم. آیين اسلام نه نظريه‌اى روشن در زمینۀ ساختار سياسى دارد و نه در دورۀ زندگى پيامبر اسلام در عمل تلاشى جدى براى به دست دادن الگوی نظام سیاسی اسلامی صورت گرفت. این شد که بعد از وفات پیامبر اسلام، مهم‌‌‌ترين‌ چالش ميان مسلمانان بر سر چگونگى ساختار قدرت سياسى درگرفت كه عملاً نوعى جنگ داخلى در ميان مسلمانان بود. جدالی كه هزینه‌‌‌های سنگین و پيامدهایی خونين در پی داشت و طى آن، اسلام عملاً دچار انشعاب شد و میان رهبران و شخصیت‌های مهمی مانند امام على(ع)، عثمان و همسر پیامبر (عايشه) خصومت و جنگ درگرفت و جامعة مسلمانان به دو جناح اكثريت (سنى) و اقليت (شيعه) تقسيم شد.

در واقع، اتفاقاتی كه پس از وفات پيامبر رخ داد و به‌خصوص جنگ قدرت در ميان مسلمانان عرب بسیاری از خصوصیات اوليۀ اسلام را عملاً متحول کرد و برتری هويت قبيله‌ای و نژادی بار دیگر حیات خود را باز یافت. اما در دوران اموی، دیگر بخش مهمی از جامعة اسلامی عرب نبود و بنا به برتری نژادی، حكومت بنى‌اميه حكومت قوم عرب بر غيراعراب پنداشته می‌شد. بدین‌سان، اولین مدل حكومتى نسبتاً مركزى و ماندگار، حكومت اموى (661-750م)، تجربة تلخى براى مسلمانان غيرعرب بود، زیرا بسيارى از آنان هرچند در پی شكست نظامى از اعراب به اسلام گرویده بودند، پيام عدالت‌خواهانه و برابری نژادى و قومى اسلام اوليه را باور كرده بودند و حال می‌دیدند كه رهبرى سياسى جهان اسلام  تعلقات خانوادگى و قومی را اساس تبعیض سیاسی قرار می‌دهد. شايد كمك نسبتاً فراوان مسلمانان غيرعرب و به‌خصوص ايرانيان مسلمان به خانوادة بنى‌عباس که سبب شكست بنى‌اميه و پيدايش مهم‌ترين امپراتورى اسلامى، يعنى امپراتورى بنى‌عباس، شد به علت عرب‌گرايى شديد بنى‌اميه بود.

حکومت عباسيان نوعی امپراتورى پهناور اسلامى را بنا نهاد كه مرزهاى مسلمانان عرب‌نشين را درنوردید و اقوام و نژادها و فرهنگ‌هاى گوناگونى را در بر گرفت. حتى در بغداد، كه مركز خلفای عباسیان بود، نوعى فرهنگ اسلامى جهان‌شهرى پدید آمد. مسلمانان غيرعرب، به‌خصوص ايرانيان، نقش مهمی در شکل دادن به اين امپراتورى بزرگ اسلامی داشتند و بعید نیست که بسیاری از ساختارهای سیاسی امپراتورى ساسانيان در حکومت عباسیان تجدید شده باشد.

تعريف سياسى اسلام به‌مثابه پديده‌اى با شكلى عام (امت اسلامى) و برآمده از آخرين امپراتورى اسلامى، يعنى حكومت عثمانيان، شدت بيشترى گرفت. عباسيان هرچند مانند امويان دچار نژادگرايى افراطى عربى نبودند و در دنياى اسلام ديگر نژادها و فرهنگ‌ها را مشروع مى‌ديدند، کماکان اعراب را در مركز و برتر از ديگران می‌دانستند، زیرا زبان عربى مركز توجه‌شان بود و از تلاش برای عربى‌كردن فرهنگ‌هاى مناطق جغرافيايى جديد ابايى نداشتند. اما عثمانى‌ها از قوم عرب نبودند و از نژاد ترك آسیای مرکزی برخاسته بودند. آنها دوران پيامبر و خلفاى راشدین را هم تجربه نکرده بودند و گروهی مهاجر از آسيا به داخل مرزهاى  مسلمان‌نشین به‌ حساب می‌آمدند. ترک‌ها مهم‌ترين امپراتورى عرب اسلامى را در جنگ شكست دادند و در نتیجه، ديگر نمى‌توانستند مشروعيت خود را با فريب از نژاد عرب (پیامبر) يا زبان عربى (قرآن) کسب كنند. آنان از لحاظ سياسى و فرهنگى نیز صلاح نديدند كه نژاد یا زبانشان را مبنای هویت فرهنگی امپراتوری جدید اسلامی قرار دهند. مى‌دانيم كه امپراتورى عثمانى در تصرفات خود در اروپاى شرقى و مناطق مسيحى‌نشين چندان علاقه‌ای به غلبه بر زبان يا حتى مسلمان ‌كردن ایشان نشان ندادند. مهم‌تر اينکه فرهنگ نخبگان عثمانى به ‌جاى بزرگ داشتن تعلق نژادى و زبانى‌ (ترك‌ بودن) نوعى فرهنگ متعالى جديد پدیدآوردند و خود را عثمانى معرفی کردند و به همین واسطه، ترك بودن را كمى خوار دانستند و آن را از ويژگى‌های قشرهاى كم‌فرهنگ قلمداد کردند. از این ‌رو، در دربار عثمانی در استانبول زبان فارسى رواج داشت و نه تركی يا عربى.

تاريخ امپراتورى‌هاى اسلامى در عین‌ حال شامل تجربة ديگری هم در هند است -و البته تجربه‌هاى ديگری كه کم‌اهمیت‌ترند- که متأسفانه به آن توجه چندانى نمى‌شود. تجربه‌اي كه از قضا بسيار مى‌توان از آن آموخت، زیرا امپراتورى اسلامى در هند اولين و يگانه تجربة حكومت سياسى مسلمانان در مقام اقلیت در سرزمينی وسيع و پُرجمعیت بود كه بخش اصلی جمعیت آن نیز مسلمان نبودند.

امپراتورى اسلامی در هند (1526-1707م) از لحاظ فرهنگى چند ويژگى منحصربه‌فرد داشت: حكومت نخبگان مسلمان بر كشورهايى با اكثريت غيرمسلمان و حتى حکومت بر هندى‌های غيرمسلمانی که ”اهل كتاب“ هم نبودند. شواهدی جدى در دست است كه شاهان دربار هند آگاهانه چندگانگى فرهنگى/دينى اين كشور را پذیرفته بودند و نوعى مدارای دينى را رواج داده، تشویق می‌کردند. شواهد بسیاری هم از مدارای دیگر اديان در دورة امپراتورى اسلامى مغول در هند موجود است. اكبر، پادشاه هند، حكومتش را پایه‌گذاری تمدنی مى‌دانست كه در آن، تضادهاى فرهنگى و دينى از بين مى‌رفت. سياست این حکومت براساس ”صلح كل“ (مفهومى عرفانی به معنای آشتى و زيستن همه) بود كه چه در عرصة زندگى مادى و چه از لحاظ فرهنگی و اخلاقی، نيكى و سعادت همگان را امكان‌پذير می‌كرد و اين خود مقدمه‌اى براى رسيدن به ”محبت كل“ به‌حساب می‌آمد كه در آن، عشق و خيرخواهى براى همه ممکن خواهد بود[1].

 

اسلام سياسى امروز

 در سه دهة اخیر، اسلام سیاسی به يكى از حادترين موضوعات سياسى و روشنفكرى تبديل شده است. اسلام سیاسی چگونه پديده‌اي است و رابطة آن با فرهنگ و تاريخ اسلام به ‌منزله آیينی مقدس و نیز با تجربة تاريخى اسلام به ‌مثابه نهادی سياسى كه عموماً در امپراتورى‌هاى اموى، عباسي، عثمانى، هند و صفوى ظهور یافت واقعاً چیست؟ آيا گفتمانى كه امروزه با نام ”اسلام سياسى“ يا ”بازگشت به اصول‌گرايى و هويت دينى“ شناخته می‌شود، پديده‌‌اى دينى است يا فرهنگى و ملى يا سياسى؟ یا اینکه امری ا‌ست كه باید به آن در حوزة قدرت توجه کرد؟ آيا عناصر و عوامل جديدى در اين گفتمان وجود دارد و نوعى تلقى جديد از اسلام و رابطه‌‌اش با سياست در حال شکل‌گیری است؟

اسلام سياسى ‌-كه متفاوت با اسلام تاريخى و اسلام به ‌مثابه‌ تجربة فرهنگى/ايرانى است- بيان‌کنندة رويارويى قشر نخبة مسلمانانی است که موقعیتشان در شرایط گسترش مدرنيته تضعیف شده است. اين بخش از نخبگان مسلمان غالباً در علوم جديد و حوزه‌های فنی و مهندسى یا در حوزة فكر و انديشه کار مى‌كنند. آنان بر این باورند که هم به علوم جدید آگاه‌اند و هم به اندیشة غرب. این گروه بیشتر با اندیشة غربى از طریق متفکران آلمانى آشنا شده‌اند که ريشه در دين‌دارى مسيحى داشته و سنت مهم محافظه‌كاری راديكال را در اروپا بنا کرده است؛ جنبشی ضدروشنگرى كه از نيمة اول قرن نوزدهم شروع شد و با يونگر و هايدگر به حوزة سياسى گسترش یافت. به‌رغم آنكه این رویکرد از لحاظ فلسفى و حتى عرفانى با علم و مدرنيتة غربى ناهم‌خوان است، اما اين متفكران و رهبران سياسى، که خود دانشجويان و تكنوكرات‌هاى جديدند، در حوزة سياسى بر اين باورند كه با كسب تكنولوژى غرب می‌توان نوعى اصالت‌گرايى فرهنگى و دينى ایجاد کرد و جامعه‌ را از ارزش‌ها، رفتارها و فرهنگ ليبرال پاك‌ ساخت.

پروژة اروپايى ضدروشنگرى و پروژة بسیاری از متفکران اسلام  سياسى به‌رغم شيفتگى‌ نسبت به ارزش‌های عرفانى و سنت‌های روحانی در حوزة سياسى از کاربرد تكنولوژى‌های جديد کوچک‌ترین ابایی ندارد. در ايران هم بسیاری از رهبران اسلام سیاسی و كسانى كه خود را نخبگان این نحله معرفى كرده‌اند دانشجويان رشته‌های مهندسى، مهندسان تكنوكرات‌، پزشکان و کسانی‌اند که علم و تکنولوژی جدید را بخشی از فرایند تحقق جامعة ایدئال خود می‌دانند. بدین‌سان، اسلام سیاسى هم از اين لحاظ كه به علم و تکنولوژی جديد اهميتی اساسی مى‌دهد و هم از این ‌رو‌ كه به لباس اسلامى و به اصطلاح سنتى‌ درآمده ‌در روايت خود به‌شدت از تفكر ضدروشنگرى مدرن اروپايى بهره مى‌برد و نوعی از فكر و ايدئولوژي فراهم می‌آورد كه در آن تکنولوژی و مدرنيته از هم جدا نیستند.

بايد توجه داشت كه وضعيت اسلام سیاسی به ‌سبب وجود عوامل و عناصر دينی، سنتى، علمى و تکنولوژیک به‌گونه‌ای است که قادر به نزديكي با بخش‌هايی از جوامع اسلامى‌ است كه لزوماً گرايشی به ايدئولوژى اسلام سياسى ندارند. تکنوکرات‌ها و بخش‌‌‌هایی از قشر تحصیل‌‌‌کردة شهری در عین‌حال با گفتما‌نى که دنياى سنت‌هاى تاريخى و اخلاقى به آن توجه دارد احساس نزديكى مى‌كنند. همچنین، اقشار تحصيل‌كرده و طبقة متوسط هم خود را با گفتمانى دينى كه با زبانى امروزى ‌(غربى و تا حدى ‌علمی) نزديك می‌دانند.

بنابراین، اسلامى كه امروزه همچون پديده‌ای سياسى در مقابل ما قرار دارد از مدرنيته تمايزناپذیر است. به سخن ديگر، سرنوشت اسلام سیاسی با اين امر گره خورده كه جامعه‌ای دینی، اما مرفه و مدرن، پدید آورد. از اين منظر، لازم است بین اسلام سياسى و پديده‌هاى ديگری كه تا حدى به آن نزديك‌اند (طالبان و جنبش‌هاى گروه‌هاى وابسته به آن) تفاوت قائل شد. درست است كه هم در اسلام سياسى ممكن است گرايش‌هاى طالبانى دیده شود و هم گفتمان طالبانى توجهی به اسلام سياسى داشته باشد، اما اسلام سياسى عمدتاً محصول آرزو و آمال مسلمانان تحصيل‌كرده در نهادهاى آموزشی جديد یا در دانشگاه‌هاى غربى و اقشاری از شهرنشينان جوامع نسبتاً پيشرفتة اسلامی (ايران، مصر، تركيه، الجزاير، تونس، مراكش) است.

بسيارى از رهبران فكرى جنبش اسلام سياسى در ايران، تركيه، مصر، الجزاير، مراكش و کشورهایی نظیر اینها روشنفكران و تحصيل‌كردگان دانشگاه‌هاى اروپايى و امريكايى‌اند. در ايران، برای نمونه، سابقة تحصیل اشخاصی چون احمد فرديد، على شریعتی و رضا داورى در غرب بيشتر از رابطة آنها با حوزه‌های علمیه و مردم است. رهبران اصلى جنبش الجزاير نیز در اروپا تحصيل‌كرده‌اند. گذشته از سابقة تحصيلى رهبران فكرى جنبش اسلام سياسى، اصولاً رهبران سنتى دينى در اكثر كشورهاى اسلامى رغبتی به ايدئولوژى اسلام سياسى ندارند. در برخى از كشورها، از جمله مصر، رهبران سنتی دینی آشکارا با اسلام سیاسی مخالف‌اند. در ميان اقشار متمایل به اسلام سياسى هم اصولاً قشر تحصيل‌كردة شهرى و آن بخش از طبقة متوسط كه عمدتاً در دانشگاه‌هاى جديد و در رشته‌هاى فنى، پزشکی و دیگر علوم عملى فارغ‌التحصيل شده‌‌‌ا‌ند، به مراتب بیشتر از اقشاری که عموماً بخش سنتی جامعه به‌حساب می‌آیند ‌و از جمله روستاییان مسلمان ‌تودة متمایل به اسلام سياسى را تشکیل می‌دهند. روحانیان سنتی فقط در شرايطى از اسلام سياسى حمایت می‌کنند که مقبوليت عام داشته و بر جامعه غلبه پیدا ‌كند و البته این حمایت غالباً سیاسی و مصلحت‌آمیز است، نه ایدئولوژیک.

بنابراین باید این افسانه را کنار گذاشت كه اسلام سياسى بيان‌کنندۀ بازگشت یا احیای دين و سنت است و پذیرفت كه آنچه امروزه با نام اسلام سياسى مطرح است، پدیده‌ای جدید و تمایزناپذیر از پروژة مدرنيته است. از این‌ رو، پرسش اساسی اين نيست كه از ميان اسلام و مدرنيته يا سنت‌هاى خودى و غربى كدام را باید انتخاب كرد، بلكه مسئله را باید چنین طرح کرد که اسلام سياسى چه نوع ”شناختى“ از وضعيت دنياى امروز دارد و چه نقش و برنامة سياسى و فرهنگى‌ای براى تحول جامعه عرضه مى‌كند.

اسلام سياسى منادی سنت‌گرايى يا بازگشت به اسلام اوليه نيست. ایدئولوژی‌های مادی‌گرایانه‌ای هم که هدفشان احیای عظمت دوران باستان است روایت دیگری از مدرنیتة ملی‌اند. اسلام سياسى انرژى فكری و ايدئولوژيك خود را صرف ”پاك‌سازی“ جوامع اسلامى از فرهنگ سكولار، ليبرال و دموكراتيك مى‌كند. این برداشت ایدئولوژیک و سیاسی از دین براى دست‌یابی به اهدافش از انديشه‌هاى غربى ضددموكراتيك کمال استفاده را می‌‌‌برد و در این راه، از نزدیکی با دولت‌‌هاى كمونيستى و سکولار ضدغرب هیچ‌گونه ابایی ندارد. در این خصوص، البته از آن عناصر فرهنگى جوامع اسلامى كه با ارزش‌هاى دموکراتیک در تضادند نیز استفاده مى‌كند. در چارچوب این‌ تفکر ایدئولوژیک، تأكيد بر اسلام عمدتاً شامل تأکید بر خصوصيات تسليم مردم به رهبران و دفاع از نوعى عدالت‌گرايى برای سرکوب آزادى‌هاى فردى و اجتماعی است.

بنابراین، بحث از فرهنگ و پديده‌هايى كه ما آنها را نمودهاى فرهنگى جامعه مى‌دانيم، فقط در زمينة‌ خاص تاريخى و اجتماعى‌آنها معنا پیدا می‌کند. فرهنگ در این تعریف بسيار تحول‌پذیر است. نگرانى كسانى كه در قدرت‌اند و خود را پاسداران و حافظان انحصاری ”فرهنگ“ جامعه مى‌دانند، معمولاً تقويت و توسعة فرهنگى جامعه نیست، بلکه حفظ موقعيتشان در مسند قدرت است، چرا که فرهنگ در همزیستی باورها و رفتارهاى متنوع جان مى‌گيرد و زنده مى‌ماند و اين دقيقاً امرى ا‌ست که در جامعة دموكراتيك محقق می‌شود.

دموكراسى زيستن فرهنگ‌ها را در صلح و صفا امکان‌پذیر می‌کند، اما به ‌خودی‌ خود صاحب هیچ فرهنگی نيست. دموكراسى روابط قدرت را در جامعه به‌گونه‌اى تنظيم می‌کند یا روابط قدرت متفاوتى پدید مى‌آورد كه به واسطة آن، فرهنگ جامعه هرچه بیشتر شكوفا و بارور می‌شود و در نتیجه، امكان صلح اجتماعى فراهم می‌‌‌‌آید.

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Table of Contents, Volume 2, Number 1

Iran Namag: A Bilingual Quarterly of Iranian Studies
Volume 2, Number 1 (Spring 2017)

English Verso

The Rhetoric and Performance of the Trickster Nasreddin
Janet Afary &Kamran Afary

The Perfect Human in Modern Iranian Shī‘ism: Murtaḍá Muṭahharī’s ‘Irfān-Oriented Conception of the Ideal Human Being
Fitzroy Morrissey

Of the Sins of Khalil Maleki
Homa Katouzian

Towards a History of Iran’s Baha’i Community during the Reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, 1941-1979
Mina Yazdani

Persian Recto

From Appearance to Character: A Exploration of Sexual and Gender Conceptions in Safavid Physiognomy
Behzad Karimi

A Glance at the Creativity of Firdawsi: “Ant” in the Shahnameh
Mahmoud Fazeli-Birjandi

Iranian Ideas in Farabi’s Philosophy
Hooshang Shokri

Richard Frye’s Narrative of Iranian Cultural Continuity
Halimeh Jafarpoor & Mohsen Massumi

Towards a Sociology of Technology Transfer and Reception: The Case of Abbas Mirza Qajar’s Military Reform
Yasser Khoshnevis

Critical Child: An Examination of the “Reader” in Ali Ashraf Darvishian’s Our School’s Wall Newspaper
Jafar Mirzaee & Neda Akbari

Zarir Memorial (Yadegar-e Zariran) and the Maiden’s Battle 130 Chronicle (Razmnameh-’i Kanizak)
Arash Akbari Mafakher